

A TYPICAL KENTUCKY COOK



Dunsmuir

Abraham Lincoln
and the
The Battles of the
Civil War

Vol 3

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C. S. LEWIS, 1913

[See "The Old Dominion."]

CHRISTMAS MORNING.—"TO THE HEALTH OF MISSUS."


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HORA CHRISTI

BY
ALICE
BROWN

SWEET IS THE TIME FOR JOYOUS FOLK
OF GIFTS AND MINSTRELSY,
YET I, O LOWLY-HEARTED ONE,
CRAVE BYT THY COMPANY,
ON LONESOME ROAD, BESET WITH DREAD,
MY QVESTING LIES AFAR.
I HAVE NO LIGHT, SAVE IN THE EAST
THE GLEAMING OF THY STAR.

IN CLOISTERED AISLES THEY KEEP TO-DAY
THY FEAST, O LIVING LORD!
WITH POMP OF BANNER, PRIDE OF SONG,
AND STATELY SOVNDING WORD.
MYTE STAND THE KINGS OF POWER AND PLACE,
WHILE PRIESTS OF HOLY MIND
DISPENSE THY BLESSED HERITAGE
OF PEACE TO ALL MANKIND.

I KNOW A SPOT WHERE BVDLESS TWIGS
ARE BARE ABOVE THE SNOW,
AND WHERE SWEET WINTER-LOVING BIRDS
FLIT SOFTLY TO AND FRO:
THERE WITH THE SYN FOR ALTAR-FIRE,
THE EARTH FOR KNEELING-PLACE,
THE GENTLE AIR FOR CHORISTER,
WILL I ADORE THY FACE.

LOVD, VNDERNEATH THE GREAT BLVE SKY
MY HEART SHALL PEAN SING,
THE GOLD AND MYRRH OF MEEKEST LOVE
MINE ONLY OFFERING,
BLISS OF THY BIRTH SHALL QVICKEN ME;
AND FOR THY PAIN AND DOLE
TEARS ARE BYT VAIN, SO I WILL KEEP
THE SILENCE OF THE SOVL.

THE OLD DOMINION.

BY THOMAS NELSON PAGE.

“The Virginian? What is he good for? I always thought he was good for nothing but to cultivate tobacco and my grandmother,” says my lord, laughing.

“She struck her hand upon the table with an energy that made the glasses dance. ‘I say he was the best of you all.’”—*Thackeray*.

THE traveller to-day who takes a run through Virginia on one of the roads which cut across her from Washington to the south or southwest gets a very inadequate idea of that which is in fact the Old Dominion, for in localities throughout this section, poor as it appears, lie some of the best farming-lands in the State—the lands, in fact, which once made her wealthy; and much besides her lands enters into that which is the Old Dominion.

Virginia is divided geographically into sections.

Of these sections the richest, and by far the most beautiful, are the Valley and the Southwest, whilst the oldest and the best known are the Tidewater (including the South Side) and the Piedmont.

Of later years the tendency of immigration has been towards those more fertile sections, the rich lands of the Valley and of the Southwest making them as desirable as farm lands as they are beautiful. The mountains, once inaccessible to the outer world, are rich enough in iron and coal to attract the attention of Northern investors and to draw capital almost unlimited, and railway lines like the Norfolk and Western, the Chesapeake and Ohio, and the Baltimore and Ohio, recognizing their future, have penetrated them, placing alike their ore-filled ranges and their fertile valleys in direct communication with the outer world, and opening the way for enterprise and capital to make this long-closed portion of the Old Dominion one of the great manufacturing centres of the country. A trip down the Valley of Virginia or across the rolling Piedmont will, especially in the summer, well repay the trouble, though one should never leave his car; for there are few more beautiful sections of this country than that from the Potomac to the Cumberland Mountains.

The idea, however, which one gets from his car window in passing through eastern Virginia will be very incorrect.

From Washington to Petersburg the

railway passes along the former army track, from Petersburg to the southern border it is in what was known years ago as the “Black Belt,” and neither section has yet fully recovered.

This region, now so largely grown up in forest or left as “old fields,” was, before the war, filled with comfortable homesteads and well-cultivated farms. It was here that much of the early history of “Old Virginia” was enacted. A single county produced George Washington and all the Lees. Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and John Marshall were from the Piedmont, a little nearer the Blue Ridge; Patrick Henry and Henry Clay came from the same country, lower down. Even now the region through which the road passes conveys, with its leagues of apparently virgin forest, but an inadequate idea of the life within it. To know this one must leave the train and strike out into the country. There he shall find Virginia. It is true he will frequently find the lands poorly cultivated if not poor; he will find old homesteads dishevelled and worn, and he will find the old houses, the home of charming hospitality and refinement, sadly dilapidated and unfurnished. He will be struck by the apparent want of things to which he is accustomed elsewhere, and for the possession of which ready money is needed; but in a little time he will forget this; he will be in an atmosphere which will soothe his senses and lull him into a state of content, and he will become aware that there is something even amid this simplicity which he had not before discovered, a certain restful feeling with which the external is in harmony, and in which it is well with the spirit.

Assuming that he was not in a Pullman, he has discovered that he is in a new region, or, more accurately, a new environment, from the time he crossed the Potomac. The low, soft, slow speech, with its languid long vowels and neglected final endings, has caught his ear, and he listens to it as music without trying to follow the words. There is a difference



IN THE BLACK BELT.

not only in the manner, but in the matter. There is a difference, too, not very marked at first, but still perceptible, in the dress. The people all seem to know each other, and they talk with easy familiarity of personal concerns as members of one family. The conversation is more personal for that reason, the tones less repressed. The women will appear less expensively dressed. A man will probably not notice this; for they will be generally prettier than those he left the other side of the bridge, and they will have something about them—an air, a manner, a something—which will be more attractive. Among the older persons, men and women, he will note a gentler air than he has seen the other side. They will in a way be more individual, too; there will be individualities of dress. He will see more men offer seats to ladies, and more as a matter

of course. He will be surprised to see how many get off at Alexandria; for the little station at which the train stops and the poor streets through which the train passes will give him an idea of meanness in the place. Should he, however, stop there, and be so fortunate as to know some of his fellow-travellers who have got off, he will discover that the view of the town which he has had from the car window gives but an indifferent idea of the place itself. He will find it old, it is true, and bearing unmistakable marks of narrowness of means; but the want of money is not poverty, and the old age is not decrepitude. The streets are paved in the old-fashioned way with cobble-stones, which look strange to one who has been rolling through the asphalt avenues of Washington; the houses are often antiquated, and sometimes out of

repair, but there is something impressive in it all. There are no marble palaces on the street corners, but the old square houses with their classic porticos, on the streets or set back in the yards amid the old trees, are homes, not mere monuments of wealth and pride; the stain on them is that of time and of the elements, not a chemist's concoction; and they have sheltered through generations a pure, kindly, and home-loving people. The splendid marble shaft that towers to the memory of Washington is on the other side of the river in the city which bears his name, and which is even a more splendid monument to the great Virginian; but the old church where he met his neighbors and worshipped God is in Alexandria. It was on this side of the river that he learned the sublime lessons which have made him the foremost American and the greatest citizen that the world has known. Down the broad river only a short distance is the home where he lived as a Virginia gentleman, and the simplicity of which he adorned with the elegance of a noble life.

As soon as we reach the old town we are on historical ground. The house where Braddock rested when the young Virginian who was to be known as the Father of his Country was his volunteer aide is still shown, and the road that leads away towards the west is still called "Braddock's Road," after the brave but ill-fated British general. Here, too, British troops landed to ravage when the city across the river was but a village; and here in the late war came the first army which invaded Virginia to march on Richmond and end the war during a summer holiday. Away to the westward, only a little distance, is Bull Run, where the summer-encampment idea was so terribly destroyed, and here the shattered army returned to prepare for war in earnest. From here to Petersburg lies the way that the armies took, in campaign after campaign, and this explains in part the appearance of the country. This region was "swept by the besom of war," to use the old phrase, and the besom of war sweeps clean. Time not only repairs the ravages of war and heals its physical wounds, but it heals the wounds of the spirit as well. It takes time to do so, however, and the length of time required is proportioned to the severity of the injuries. Thus the country here has not yet recovered. In the lapse of

years men forget the conditions that once existed. When the war had been going on three years there was not a fence and scarcely a tree left standing from Alexandria to Fredericksburg. When the war closed, from Alexandria to Danville, almost on the North Carolina border, was little more than a waste. In portions of the counties of Culpeper, Fauquier, and Prince William there was hardly a house left standing within five miles of the railway on either side, and a bill was introduced in the Legislature empowering the railway company to buy the lands within five miles on either side.

As the road turns south it shortly reaches again the noble Potomac, and for many miles follows its winding marge, with the bluffs of Maryland rising bold and blue on the other side of the broad stream. When it touches the river, however, it has left in the angle it has made Mount Vernon, the home of George Washington, and Gunston Hall, the home of George Mason, who drew the Virginia Constitution and the Virginia Bill of Rights. Then, after a run across the same poor-looking country, the train suddenly crosses a high bridge over a small river, with a hamlet on the near side and a town on the other, in a plain between the river-bank and a line of semi-circular hills. The little village is Falmouth, where George Washington went to school. The town on the other side is Fredericksburg, and the heights which bend around it are the far-famed Marye's Heights (pronounced Maree, from the old Virginia family whose residence crowned them). It was up these heights that Meagher's brigade charged time after time, to be swept back by Lee's line with a loss of seventeen hundred in fifteen minutes, and on the plain below men were mowed down like grass. The country all around here has been a battle-ground, for this is Spottsylvania, where much of the war was fought. To the westward a few miles lies Chancellorsville, where Stonewall Jackson, after one of the most brilliant military movements ever conceived, and which only genius could have planned and only genius could have executed, fell at the age of thirty-nine with his fame established. Not a hundred yards from the railway a dozen miles below Fredericksburg, in a garden, stands the little quaint house in which he died one Sunday morning, alternately giving orders to for-

ward his infantry to the front, and whispering of passing over the river to rest under the shade of the trees.

A singular circumstance has recently come to light. On a part of the battlefield of Chancellorsville have lately been discovered the site and remains of Governor Spotswood's furnace, the first iron furnace ever established in America. The old race has been traced, the foundation of the old stack uncovered, and the be-

the country on their plantations, but in Fredericksburg there were many of that class who kept town-houses there. Washington's mother spent her declining years here, and the little old house where she lived still stands, with its quaint roof and its garden stretching around it as when she received, flower-pot in hand, the nation's benefactor, Lafayette, "without the parade of changing her dress." Fredericksburg gave to the country three of the



OLD PARISH CHURCH, WILLIAMSBURG.

ginning of that industry which is now said to control general commerce has been laid open to the sight.

Only a short distance to the south lies the country not inaptly called the Wilderness, but back a little along the rivers are many nice farms and pleasant sections.

The valley of the Rappahannock was in the old times a famous grain region, and some of the finest plantations in Virginia still lie there around the old colonial mansions.

Fredericksburg itself was formerly somewhat unique among the towns of Virginia. The gentry generally lived in

most noted men that have honored our navy; for here lived, from the age of thirteen, Paul Jones, that "foreigner of the South" who, with the *Bonhomme Richard* on fire and sinking, replied to a demand to surrender that he was just beginning to fight, lashed the *Serapis* to her, and forced her to strike her colors; and here were born Lewis Herndon and Matthew F. Maury. Some of the old mansions still stand embowered in trees, impressive as in the old days when they were the homes of wealth and ease as well as of elegance and refinement.

A picture of the town recalled by mem-



WESTOVER.

ory rises before the writer when it was very different from its present placid condition. It is as it looked forty-eight hours after the battle when for days and nights it had been in the focus of the fire of two armies. It was whilst the dead were being buried under a flag of truce, and once seen, its appearance could never be forgotten—the battered and riddled houses; the dug-up and littered streets with earthworks thrown across them, on which groups of children had planted little Confederate flags, whilst they played at levelling them with fire-shovels; the torn gardens; the shattered fences, behind which men had poured out their blood; the long trench on the common where the Path of Glory ended; the roadways filled with broken vehicles and fleeing refugees. All combined to leave on the memory the ineffaceable picture of a bombarded town.

Some fifty miles further on is Richmond, the capital of the Old Dominion, and during the war the capital of the Confederate States, about which the war surged for four years.

As the train runs out on the high bridge which crosses the James, and one sees the historical river boiling beneath it over its granite ledges, with the beautiful city spread out for miles along its curving bank, and with Belle Isle in the middle, and Manchester on its further side, he must agree that it was a wise man who selected the spot for a city, and that he had an eye for the picturesque as well as for the material advantages of a location. He was Colonel William Byrd, one of the old Virginia grandees—a wit, a humorist, a colonial Councillor, a man of affairs, and the Virginia author of greatest note during her colonial history. He wrote the *Trip to the Mines*, which contains in side lights the best picture of life in the Old Dominion that illumines her colonial period. His descendants in Virginia are numerous, and many of the Virginia families trace back to the founder of her capital.

He laid it off at the falls of the James, on which river his own beautiful home, Westover, one of the handsomest types of

colonial architecture remaining, was situated, some scores of miles lower down; and, sorrowful to relate in this advanced age of the world, he established a lottery to dispose of his lots. The place had already been long known. John Smith planted a cross on the island here as long ago as 1607, when he explored the James to its falls. Here Nat Bacon, the Rebel, had a place, and Bacon's Quarter Branch perpetuates the memory of the spot where the young planter had his plantation, little knowing of the fame that should come to him when he struck the first armed blow on American soil for constitutional rights.

The falls of the James stretch in a reverse curve for about seven miles, boiling over granite ledges and slipping between islands covered with birch, sycamore, and willow, which, although two railway lines occupy the banks, are as wild and beautiful to-day as they were when Indians hunted upon the wooded bluffs which hem them in. All old travellers unite in their praise. They might have extended their eulogies to the whole river, for from its source among the blue Alleghanies to where it widens into Hampton Roads it is

not only the most historical river in this country, but is one of the most beautiful.

It may be that nativity in Virginia and many years of residence in Richmond have inclined the mind of the writer to idealize the city's loveliness, yet he knows no city in the United States more beautiful. It is not that the houses generally are handsome, but there are sections of the city where the yards, filled with trees, look like bowers, and the public squares are among the most beautiful in the country. "The Capitol Square," with its leafy slopes, its fine old Capitol lifting itself on its eminence with the simple grandeur of an old temple, and with its broad walk, with the splendid Washington Monument at one end, and the impressive old "Governor's Mansion" at the other, is perhaps the prettiest park of its size in the country. It is certainly so to a Virginian, for many proud or tender associations cling about the place. For a hundred years and more the city has been associated with all that Virginians are proud of. In old St. John's Church assembled the great Virginia convention which prepared for the public defence and led the way to the independence of



STATE CAPITOL AND CITY HALL, RICHMOND.

the colonies. Here in Richmond sat the great convention for the ratification of the Constitution, when Kentucky was a district of Virginia; here have assembled her law-makers, her jurists, and all that have contributed to make the Old Dominion renowned and great. Here met, year after year, the Old Virginians, with their wives and daughters, to enjoy the gay life of the capital of the Old Dominion, which they adorned by their presence. Here sat and deliberated the Secession Convention during the period when Virginia stood as the peace-maker between the two sections. Here she finally declared her decision, to secede from the Union. Here Lee received the command of the Virginia forces, and here he was appointed later to the command in chief of the armies of the Confederacy. Here the Confederate government passed its life, and from here the Southern side of the war was fought. To Richmond the armies and energies of the North were directed, and for it they strove. Whilst it stood the Confederacy stood, and it fell only when the South was exhausted.

The country to the south of Richmond is like that to the northward; for it went through the same experience—if anything, worse. For not only has war been here, but after the war it underwent an evil from which the other was exempt. This was the Black Belt, and on it rested the heaviest burden any portion of Virginia has had to bear. Before the war this section of Virginia, the South Side, was perhaps the most "comfortably off" of any in the State; there were more negroes here than elsewhere, and though the lands were not as fertile as those in the Valley, or generally even as those in the Piedmont, they were readily susceptible of improvement, and were in a state of good cultivation. Negro emancipation meant necessarily a change in this; but negro domination meant its destruction.

It was of this section in old times that George W. Bagby used to write his charming sketches, such as "My Uncle Flatback's Plantation," with touches of delicious local color, and with a delicate sentiment that made the reader homesick to get out under the trees and roll on the grass. Yet, some years back, I have oftener than once gone from Richmond almost entirely across this section, and outside of the towns never seen a single

farm animal, this in a section once filled with well-stocked and well-cultivated farms. Even then there were good sections back from the railways, and some of the most beautiful farms in the State lay along the rivers, but these were at that time the exception. My Uncle Flatback's sons were dead, one of camp-fever, one at Gettysburg, and one in an unnam'd skirmish; he himself slept in the old garden, where the roses and hollyhocks used to bloom, and his daughters used to walk with their lovers in the old times; his plantation was let or deserted, and the home with its cheer and charm was empty. War and its followers had eaten up the land.

As stated before, the lands along the railways in this part of Virginia give but an indifferently true idea even of the soil and its culture; and what is viewed from a car window gives none of the life which is the real Virginia. Poor as the soil appears on the ridges, it is kindly. It is easily susceptible of improvement, and produces grain and tobacco of a peculiar quality. It was in this eastern part of Virginia that the most famous race-horses of the country were raised in old times, such as Boston, Nina, Planet, Fanny Washington, and many others of the great plate-winners. Of late years Fanny Washington's great son Eolus and his wonderful progeny have justified the boast of the old Virginians that this is the home of the thoroughbred. Last year a Virginia colt, Morello, won the great Futurity, and four out of twelve Virginia entries stood the training and ran in the race, a fine test of bone, muscle, and bottom. Perhaps nowhere in the country has the external and material been less indicative of the internal or spiritual than in the Old Dominion. The life has been so sequestered, so self-contained, and the people have been so indifferent to public opinion—at least, of all public opinion outside of Virginia itself—and have cared so little for show, that from the outward appearance a wrong conception has often been drawn of that which was within. Back from these ridges along which the railways run, on the rivers and little streams which empty into the rivers, are peaceful valleys filled with sweet homesteads, where the life flows on as calmly and undisturbed as the limpid streams which slip so silently between their mirrored willows. This,



THE STAIRCASE OF THE TUCKAHOE.

after all, is Virginia—the Virginia which is not seen any more than the air or the perfume of the fields is visible to the eye, but which is felt and known through its silent influence. In those secluded homes, under their great oaks, far from the bustle and din and strife of the world, grew the Virginian who made the Old Dominion what she was.

To understand Virginia and the Virginians it is necessary to know something of her history. That furnishes the key to much of their character. It entered into the Virginian's life, influenced his tendencies, and tempered his spirit. He was proud of being a Virginian, and he never forgot the fact. To him the Old Dominion was what she had appeared to the earliest chroniclers: "Most plentiful, sweet, wholesome, and fruitful of all other." It was, indeed, a picturesque history that lay back of him; beginning to come into being like a glimmering dawn, with the mighty figures of great Elizabeth accepting the name bestowed as an honor to her Majesty, and Sir Walter Raleigh, courtier, soldier, statesman, discoverer, historian, poet, Admiral and Shepherd of the Ocean, proud to style himself "Lord and Chief Governor of Virginia."

She had not been won easily. Many had "come to leave their bodies in testimony of their minds"; but in the Virginian's mind the prize had been worth the striving for. He loved Virginia with a passionate love. Abana and Pharpar were better than all the waters of Israel. The James was greater to him than Jordan, Tiber, Nile, or Thames. It was on the James, in Virginia, that Anglo-Saxon civilization on this continent first found a lodgement. The Virginian knew, as no one else did, all the attendant history of sorrows and joys, hardships and triumphs. He treasured the picturesque history of the bold chevalier Captain Smith, a story which, notwithstanding all his detractors, survives to-day with the romance of the old paladins. He knew him and he believed in him. To him he was what he was to his contemporaries: "deare noble captain and loyal hearte." He always thought of him as a Virginian, and was proud to claim him. He believed that Pocahontas saved his life, and he held her in high esteem. Any reflection upon her offended him as if she had been a member of his family, however remote. In any event, she was a benefactress of

Virginia, and that called forth his gratitude.

The life in the Old Dominion was not unlike that in England, and the Virginian treasured the idea of a resemblance. Hawkins and Drake and Gilbert and Grenville had taken part in Virginia's history. Shakespeare had been inspired by an event in her romantic story to write the *Tempest*, and, before her limits were curtailed, Ariel inhabited the airs that blew upon her shores. During all the colonial period this resemblance to the mother country had been warmly cherished. The conditions were such that the rich planters with their indentured servants and slaves had advantages which brought them great wealth, and they knew how to enjoy it. They patterned their life on that in England; built large country houses on English models, and established "their fine seats upon the rivers"; kept their coaches and four; entertained with a lavishness and cordiality which established the custom of hospitality with the authority of a law; bred horses which rivalled the cracks of the turf in the old country; monopolized the offices of honor; passed laws recognizing "quality"; and endeavored, as far as they might, to perpetuate old England in the Old Dominion.

But so far from their love of England impeding their development along their own lines, it fostered it. They cherished their resemblance to England so warmly that they never admitted a difference, and always insisted on equal rights. Sir Walter Raleigh's charter had guaranteed them "all the privileges of free denizens and natives of England," and they never ceased to be jealous of them. Within twelve years from their first coming they had a General Assembly, with every freeman having a vote for the representatives. "The Virginia courts are but a summary way to a seditious parliament," the Spanish ambassador had told James, and it proved to be measurably true. One of the things this first elective Assembly of Burgesses did was to claim of the company at home a right "to allow or disallow their orders of court as his Majesty had given them power to allow or disallow our laws." This was but the beginning of a long and continuous line of claims of right, insistence on which has become a fixed characteristic of the Virginian, and on

which he has been ready always to stand to the end. If the royal governors held their prerogatives in high esteem, the people held their privileges in no less esteem. They or their rulers named their rivers after kings and queens, and their boroughs and counties after royal princes and princesses, so that the chronology of

missioner to inspect their records they refused to exhibit them, and when their clerk furnished him a copy they put him in the pillory and cut off one of his ears.

"Whole for monarchy," one wrote of Virginia when the struggle came between the Crown and the people (whatever she is "for" she is always "whole for"); but



"THE BARE-ARMED WHEAT-CUTTERS."

the settlement of Virginia may be told by the geographical names; they declared their loyalty with piled-up asseveration, but they never forgot their chartered rights. The General Assembly addressed James in terms of worship extraordinary to a republican ear of the year of grace 1893, but when the King sent over a com-

she was even more whole for her rights; and though, as old Beverley says, she was the last to give up for the King and the first to assert his restoration, and though in his defeat she offered an asylum to his discomfited followers, she stood up boldly against Charles I., and refused her sanction to his claims to the tobacco

monopoly. When Charles II., to whom she had offered a crown when he was a fugitive, attempted to invade her privileges and violate her grants, she grew ready for resistance. When his Governor refused her rights she actually burst into revolution, and, under command of "Nat Bacon the Rebel," stormed and took the colonial capital, the young commander capturing, it is said, the wives of the chief supporters of the Crown, and standing them in white aprons before his men whilst he threw up his breastworks preparatory to his attack on Jamestown. Later on new elements came into the Dominion. Stout Scotch-Irish settlers filled up the Valley, and made it a different type social and religious, whilst similar politically. They were Presbyterians, and they made a new force in the colony. They made the valley a garden, guarded and extended the frontier, worshipped God agreeably to the dictates of their own consciences, and became, with another infusion of religious refugees who came later—the Huguenots—a new element of force in the Old Dominion.

From all these different elements came the Virginian character, a character with some singular contradictions in detail, and yet with certain general basic principles which govern it and give it its form and force. From it came in one generation that extraordinary body of men who did so much in the Revolution and afterwards to create and establish this nation.

The master of characterization, the profound student of life, the ablest analyst of our time, knowing the Old Virginia life, deemed the Old Dominion a worthy refuge and home, in his later years, for Henry Esmond. If there is one character described in the literature of our race by which one would have the race judged, it perhaps is the scholar, the soldier, the courtier, the man, the gentleman, Henry Esmond. Recognizing the virtue of the old Virginia life, the great novelist deemed Virginia the fitting place in which to have Colonel Esmond end his days and leave his blood, and the sequel to the greatest romance of our time he entitled *The Virginians*.

The elements of character which the Virginian of the Revolutionary time inherited from his father he transmitted to his children.

At the close of the Revolution new conditions had supervened, new energies

were demanded, and those men were most successful who could adapt themselves best to the new conditions. Out of this came men like John Marshall, James Madison, James Monroe, and John Randolph of Roanoke, who were still the leaders in the country, as the older generation had been before them.

Virginia entered upon her new career with a full recognition of her commanding position. The people had become more homogeneous. The participation by all in the war and in the subsequent creation of the new government had done away with privilege, and opened the way to all. Still, the great leaders were in the prime of their intellectual vigor, and they necessarily still led. The social order was too firmly established to be radically changed at once even by the sterling republicanism which had supervened, and the most republican leaders alongside of their strong republicanism maintained a social order with many aristocratic features. They disestablished the Church and did away with primogeniture, but still built their seats on the loftiest hills, and maintained their establishments as nearly like those of the English gentry as they might, Jefferson himself levelling the top of a mountain for his mansion. It was one of this class that in Congress prevented the stamping of the President's head on the national coin, and had substituted therefor the figure of Liberty with her cap on her pike.

The negro question about this time began to assume new importance, and thenceforward it was to be an even more potent factor in all that related to the life of Virginia. Virginia was the first State to declare the slave trade piracy, and in 1832 she came within one vote of abolishing slavery. The opening up of the West had brought in new elements, political and social. Many of the hardiest of Virginia's sons had gone with their wives and children across the mountains to settle in Kentucky and Tennessee, and had taken with them the political tenets of their mother State. Perhaps in no other States did politics ever stand so closely related to the social life as in Virginia and Kentucky. It assumed a personal character, and families were divided by their political faiths. In Virginia it even entered into the considerations governing matrimonial alliances. Fathers interposed objections to their sons paying addresses

to girls in families of a different political faith.

Virginia was not even before the war one of the rich States like the cotton and sugar States of the South, but she was at least fairly well off. In those States there were many splendid fortunes; in Virginia there were but few of these; but there were many who were "comfortably off." They were still almost entirely an agricultural people, and naturally the large fortunes lay in the rich grain-producing belts along the low grounds of the James, the Rappahannock, the Roanoke, etc., or in the fertile valleys. Here the bare-armed wheat-cutters *en échelon* cradled the wheat that fed the country when the great Western grain sections and the reaper which mows them, and which was invented by a Virginian, were alike unknown.

The history of the commonwealth had left its strong impress on the Virginians, and they, perhaps, still were more like the English than were the people of any other State. They continued to pattern their life on that of the old country, even after they had lost the conscious knowledge of the source from which it came. Their social customs were continued. They could no longer send their sons to English universities, but as substitutes they maintained William and Mary College in the Tidewater, and founded the University of Virginia in the beautiful Piedmont, Jefferson devoting the end of his life to the establishment of the latter, and drawing with his own hand the plans for some of its charming and classical structures. They preserved the language they brought over, and English travellers remarked on the purity of their English. It is said that Thackeray stated that he heard the purest Saxon English in Virginia that he had ever heard. Freeman and Matthew Arnold are quoted to the same effect at a later time. Be that as it may, they preserved through all their republicanism a strong feeling, almost like kinship, towards the English. Some of the old families kept up a sort of association with the old country; filled their shelves with English books; took English reviews, and kept abreast of English politics. When the war broke out, it was to England that they looked for recognition and support, and the failure to realize that expectation was scarcely enough to shake their confidence or change their sentiment.

The resemblance in the life was not merely fancied—in the tone at least. It has been called feudal and aristocratic. This is, perhaps, not the most accurate nomenclature. The old feudal features had in the main passed away with the stanch republicanism that succeeded the Revolution. The aristocratic features were so modified by the introduction of the same factor that what remained was rather a feeling than a condition. There were classes, it is true, and there was, perhaps, a stronger class feeling than existed anywhere else on this side of the water, unless it was in South Carolina; but the class distinction was not based upon those elements which marked it elsewhere. Birth counted for something, it is true—that is, that a man's forefathers had been gentlemen before him—but it was not sufficient to keep him in the pale if his personal character and address were not up to the standard, and it was not necessary to admit him if they were. What was demanded was a certain personal standard of education, address, and character. The pedigrees, at best, in the great majority of cases, ran back only to some one who had been distinguished in Virginia's history, and if more were asked it was comfortable to believe that it might easily be extended back further without making the attempt to verify it. Wealth was absolutely nothing.

The standard was personal. Ties of blood were recognized to an extent which has excited the astonishment of the outer world, and cousinship was claimed as long as the common strain could be traced. It was felt that the relationship gave a claim, and the claim was honored.

The Virginian still kept open house, as his fathers had done before him, and hospitality was the invariable law of every class. It had been noted since long before the Revolution. English travellers recorded how gentlemen sent their servants to invite strangers to make their houses their homes, and the poorer people gave up their beds to make them comfortable. This custom continued. Relatives and friends came by with their carriages and servants, summer after summer, on their annual hegira to the White Sulphur Springs, or to stay as long as they liked, assured that with their hosts it was always "the longer the better." It was, indeed, a purely pastoral life that they led. The large planter on his great

plantation with scores of slaves, and the poorer one on his smaller farm with but a few servants, differed only in degree. The life was substantially the same on both. Their characters were the same, proud, self-contained, brave, generous, tender when undisturbed, fierce when aroused, loving Virginia idolatrously, and knowing little of and caring less for what was outside of her; his chief glory was that he was a Virginian. Money made no difference to them or in them.

There were handsome estates along the rivers—old colonial mansions with their wings and "offices," terraced gardens and imposing gates, along the lower James, the Rappahannock, the York, etc.; fine houses of a Greek, Gothic, or Italian style on the upper James, the Staunton, the Dan, or in certain portions of the Valley, etc.; but in the main the houses were plain, unpretentious wooden structures, with additions put on from time to time as the family increased or the demands of hospitality required. Often they had been built for overseers' houses, with the intention of building better as means increased, but the families increased more rapidly than the means. In these unpretentious houses the old Virginian made his home. Here he governed his plantation, raised the wheat, corn, and tobacco which made the Old Dominion wealthy; entertained like a gentleman whoever came within his gates; shot partridges (styled simply "birds") in the fall, fox-hunted in the winter, and at Christmas gathered his children, his relatives, and his friends about his hearth, and with bowls of apple toddy and eggnog, amid holly and mistletoe, with peace on earth and good-will towards men, dispensed an abounding hospitality, worshipping God and loving his fellow-men to the best of his ability, having wealth without riches and content without display.

This was the life in Virginia when the John Brown raid shocked her from the Potomac to the North Carolina line. It was "a fire-bell in the night," and every man sprang to attention, and "every mother clutched her babe closer to her bosom."

When the law was vindicated, Virginia settled down again, but there was no longer any possibility of the old repose. When the convention called to consider the question of secession assembled, the

majority were Whigs, undoubted Union men. They resisted secession, with the hope that they might effect a reconciliation appointed peace commissioners, and used every effort to preserve peace.

Then came the President's call for troops, and finding that she must fight on one side or the other, Virginia retired from the Union.

The outer world has never appreciated the spirit in which the South went to war. It was like a conflagration. After it started, the people outstripped the leaders. Gray-headed men who had been the staunchest maintainers of the Union enlisted and marched to the Peninsula under Magruder or to Manassas under Beauregard. Boys ran away from home to join the army; women cut up their gowns to make flags, and their under-clothes for lint and bandages.

The slavery question, which had been prominent in the previous agitation, now, fused in the furnace, passed completely out of sight, and the battle-cry was the invasion of the South. With this the entire population of old Virginia rallied to the standard as one man.

It was in this period, and that more terrible one which followed it, that the people of Virginia showed their character. They accepted victory and defeat with equal constancy. No success elated them unduly. No disaster cast them down. Their zeal never flagged, their enthusiasm never wavered. The exactions of war sapped their strength and engulfed their property. There were not men enough left at home to bury the dead, and women not infrequently had to perform the last sad sacred offices. Rich women sent their sons to fight, gave up their jewels to help the cause, or sold their lands to reinvest in Confederate bonds or gunboat stock. Poor women wrote to their husbands that they were starving, but to stand to their duty. This was the spirit all the way through. They never doubted, never flagged. He would have been rash who would have dared to hint of making peace on any terms less honorable than complete separation. The failure of the Hampton Roads conference was based on the universal sentiment of the people.

The condition of the city of Richmond at that time will give an idea of the condition of the country as well. At first only the excitement of war was felt, only



“LOVE-MAKING WENT ON.”

its pomp was seen; but in a little time its graver side was understood, and when McClellan's army was within sight of the city's steeples the terrors of war began to be recognized. “The Seven Days' Battles around Richmond” were fought with-

in sound of the church bells of the capital, and the roar of the artillery floated in at her windows, and drew throngs out into the streets and gardens. Soldiers already wounded crawled from their beds and made their way to the battle-fields to die.

It was a terrible time indeed. None knew what the next day might bring forth. A general and his staff breakfasted at a country house just outside of the city. Within three days an ambulance passed through the place on its way from a battle-field with three of the gay breakfast party in it in their coffins. When McClellan fell back the city reacted from the tension, and social life once more began. A memoir of General Pendleton, Lee's chief of artillery, just written by a lady who was present, gives a picture of the time. "Hearts grew light," it says, "at the knowledge that Richmond was safe and free, and could pet and praise her defenders to her fill; eyes smiled through their tears upon dear ones still left to them; and strangers and friends coming daily to look for others reported 'wounded' or 'missing' were received with cordial and limitless hospitality. The city kept 'open house' for every one who had fought or prayed for her safety."

After this thousands flocked to the city, "refugeeing" before the invading armies, until its population trebled and quadrupled. Under such circumstances amusement is necessary, and life in the capital grew gay. The entertainments were termed "starvation parties," because there was nothing to eat. Provisions were too high to be wasted at a mere social entertainment, and even if money had not been wanting, the necessaries of life were too precious to be squandered in revelling. A breakfast came to cost more than a year's pay of a private and a month's pay of a captain; a pair of boots cost a thousand dollars; coffee, tea, sugar, and such articles came to be things unknown. Yet the life was not without its compensations, even its joys. There was a pleasure in self-sacrifice where all were vying with each other. Love-making went on all the more prosperously that young Mars who courted in a captain's bars might lay a colonel's stars or even a brigadier's wreath at his lady's feet before the campaign was over. When Petersburg was in a state of siege the favorite ride was across a bridge which was under Federal fire, and horseback rides in the autumn afternoons were all the more exciting that a dash across the open space might be followed by a shell crashing across behind the horses.

It was not only provisions, but every-

thing, that was wanting. The dearth of materials exercised the ingenuity of people, and called forth all their cleverness. Old garrets were explored, old trunks ransacked, and everything available was utilized. Hats were plaited of wheat or oat straw by the girls; old silk stockings were made over into gloves; ball dresses were fashioned from old lace curtains, and slippers were made from bits of old satin which might have been remnants of ball dresses worn by the fair wearers' great-grandmothers at Lady Washington's levees.

When Lee surrendered at Appomattox the war ended.

The home-coming of the disbanded remnant of the Southern armies was the saddest hour her people had ever known. Up to that time Virginia and the South at large had not dreamed of final failure.

At first the news of Lee's surrender came borne, so to speak, by the winds, so vague was the whispered rumor, then taking palpable shape, as it were, as weary stragglers passed along the country roads, stopping in at the naked farms to get a meal, if there were enough left to feed a hungry man. Then little parties passed by with details of the surrender that no longer left any room for even the faintest doubt. And after weary days—it might be fewer or more—days in which it was not known whether loved ones might not have been captured or killed in the last engagement, they came home foot-sore and broken, dragging themselves along the cannon-worn roads they had marched down so bravely four years before, and flinging themselves into the arms of weeping mothers or wives or sisters gathered to receive them, surrendered for the first time to despair.

Even then they had no thought of what the immediate future had in store for them. The conditions which existed and the period which ensued were utterly without precedent. The negroes took prompt advantage of their new freedom, and almost without exception went off, some openly, some by night—those that went openly declaring that "the word had come from Richmond for them." Generally speaking, they returned home after a brief experience of travel and sojourn among strangers.

For a time there appeared danger of some friction under the evil influence of that species of visiting adventurer wittily



"BALL DRESSES WERE FASHIONED FROM OLD LACE CURTAINS."

termed, from the smallness of his personal belongings, "the carpet-bagger," but good sense and the good feeling engendered by long association between the races prevailed, and the peril passed away.

The soldiers returning from the army found Virginia almost as war-worn as they were themselves. In many sections the country was swept clean, and the disorganization of labor and the depletion of teams had prevented the proper preparation of a crop. The horses which the soldiers had brought home from Appomattox were not infrequently the chief dependence for a new crop, and before the huzzas over the returning armies of the Union had died away in the North, the soldiers of the other army which had held them at bay so long were working in the fields, trying to build up again the waste places of their States. There is scarcely a professional man over the age of forty to-day who did not work at the plough during those first years after the war.

The complete prostration of Virginia—indeed, of the whole South—at the close of the war has never been fully apprehended by the outside world. It was not only that property values had been swept away, but that everything from which property values can be created had been extirpated. The entire personal property of the State had been destroyed; the laboring class of a country dependent upon its agriculture had been suddenly changed from laborers into vagrants, with no property to make them conservative and no authority to hold them in check. Their dependence was suddenly shifted from their former masters to strangers, whose indirect if not their direct teaching was hostility to the former owners. The country was left overwhelmed with debt, with nothing remaining from which the debts could be paid. It is difficult to conceive of this even as applied to a small section, but when it embraces a great territory covering a dozen great States, with their entire population of many millions, the mind refuses to take it in. Yet such was the case at the South.

It was amid such conditions as these that Virginia and the other Southern States addressed themselves to the new life.

For a time there was a condition which was peculiar. The old life survived for

a period in a sort of after-glow; the people thought they could reconstruct the shattered fragments and live it over. They undertook to reorganize their governments and their life. The one was as vain as the other; but at least the dignity and courage with which they set about it call forth unqualified admiration. Certain laws were passed looking to the control of labor. The whites believed them necessary, as well as wise. The military rulers viewed all such action with suspicion, and assumed fuller control than ever. Whatever disputes arose between whites and blacks were reviewed by the military authorities. An old justice of the peace tried and convicted a negro of some offence and sentenced him to a term in jail. The Military Governor of the State was applied to, and he sent an order to the justice to release him. His reply was that he had tried the negro fairly, convicted him justly, and imprisoned him legally; that the Governor might come with his troops and release him, but that if he did so it would not be until after he had exhausted the whole power of the country in his effort to carry out the law.

The fact that the land had survived gave it a peculiar if not a fictitious value. It was estimated and appraised highly. Money was borrowed on it to restock and plant it, and the old life went on for a while almost as before, like a wheel that continues to turn with its own propulsion even after the motive power is removed.

For a time, under the reaction resulting from the wear and tear of war, the spirit rebounded. After the fatigue of war even the meanest home was comfort, and the life was almost gay, even amid the ruins. They had been overwhelmed, not whipped, and the indomitable spirit survived. So the young soldiers patched up the broken farm implements, hitched up their thin army horses, and worked at their crops. They worked like laborers, but they were not laborers. They kept ever in view the fact that they were more than ploughmen. Classical schools sprang up again almost as soon as the war closed, and colleges opened with fees fixed at the lowest possible sum, and board provided at the lowest possible figure. Young men poured in when they were too poor to pay even that, and had to mess as they had done in the army. They went to town and took



"WEARY STRAGGLERS STOPPING TO GET A MEAL."

positions as watchmen, brakemen, street-car drivers, foremen in factories, anything that would enable them to support themselves and those dependent on them, and would aid them in educating themselves. There was no feeling of indignity, no repining. A man who had hitched the horses to a gun under fire and brought

it off under a storm of shot and shell could drive a street car without chagrin. He had expected to be a brigadier-general then; now he expected to be some day president of the line.

It was a strange spectacle, the people commonly supposed to be the proudest in the land engaging in the work of laborers

and losing no caste by it. When night came they dressed up in their best, whatever that was, and went to see the girls, or, with their eyes fixed on some profession, they devoted themselves to study, and in the evenings one might find visiting in the parlors, with that old-time courtesy of manner which had made notable the Virginia gentleman, the same men to be seen in the day at the plough or on their engines.

The girls were not less brave than the men. They accepted and married them without a dollar, and, with a sublime faith in their lovers which was a happy augury of the future, went with them to live in the old broken farm-houses or in upper stories in town, planted flowers, hung baskets in their windows, and made their homes fragrant with sweetness and content.

Then came the reconstruction period. The negroes were enrolled by the carpet-bag leaders in what was known as the Union League, and were drilled in political antagonism to the whites.

The six years of carpet-bag rule were the worst that the South has ever known. It is the writer's belief that the Southern States were poorer when they ended than when the war closed. However theorists may regard it, it was an object-lesson which the Southern States can never forget. The conditions then existing paralyzed every energy, and withdrew the South from the common movement of progress. The States which went through it could think only of existence; they had to struggle for mere life. Even after these States obtained control of their governments, the conditions were for a while such that there could be no advance. It was at this time that South-Side Virginia suffered most. She was in the "Black Belt," and the incubus upon her was a burden which kept her down.

The negro question was a theory or a sentiment with the outside world; with the South it was and still is a vital fact. Only time can solve it. It has already solved some of its problems. Before it did so, however, much injury had been done Virginia and the other Southern States, from which they are but now recovering.

Virginia has always been a great colouizer, and her sons have gone forth from her to build up with their energy the great States which lie to the south

and west, and to strengthen them with their brain and character. They are to be found in every Western and North-western State, where they began as cow-boys on ranches, as mechanics in factories, as brakemen on railways, clerks in law-offices, anything that was honorable, and have worked themselves up to the highest positions of trust and responsibility. They have filled every position, from that of Chief Executive of their States down, and always with honor. But this has been at a terrible loss to the old mother State, and the pride in her sons' success has had something of pain that they no longer live within her borders.

The disorganization of the laboring class in Virginia and the condition of her transportation facilities, coupled with universal lack of means at that time, almost destroyed her agriculture. The negro as a slave was an excellent laborer; as a free-man, at least under conditions which have existed in the country, he is not. Under compulsion he works laboriously, but otherwise not steadily, and generally only when he is obliged to work. Cincinnati is the only recorded instance of a statesman who was also a good ploughman. At the ordinary cost of corn and bacon in Virginia, a man can for \$15 obtain meat and bread enough to give him three meals a day for the whole year.

The old planter system proved generally wholly unsuited to the new conditions, and under the continued depression of agriculture, and such agricultural products as it had been the custom to raise in Virginia, it almost entirely disappeared. When labor only gave a half-year's work for a full year's hire, only that man could afford to farm who was independent of labor. Thus the old planter class gradually passed away, the young representatives of it going to cities and seeking other fields of enterprise for the application of their faculties, and their place has been taken by the small farmer, who works at the plough himself, or who hires a few "hands" to work under his own eye. Few outside of the South dream of the privations which the old planter class have gone through in these years. That they have endured in silence is their best testimonial. A few years ago it was not unusual to find in old neighborhoods in certain sections the best houses shut up and the farms abandoned or let to

tenants at a rental which was merely nominal—homes which had once been the centres of a life as elegant and charming as ever graced any people. Some places were held on to, but went steadily down year by year, there being absolutely no money to keep them up.

still keeps the simplicity of the past. Hospitality and the domestic virtues yet survive, and notwithstanding some changes, the old standards of gentility and righteousness of life still stand. One may drive through the country, from one end of Virginia to the other, and never pay a



“THE HORSES FROM APPOMATTOX.”

Yet through all the poverty there remained just that something which preserved in them without money that which distinguished the Virginia homes when they were the seats of ease and elegance, and about which the light of romance yet lingers.

There life still is based on the old foundations of purity and peace; preserved from the materialism of the present, it

cent; and if he were to stall or break down in the road, there is not a Virginia farmer who would not cheerfully turn out of his bed to help pull him out. On one of the old plantations that I know a lady told her son but the other day that he must get her some more knives, as she had only twenty, and when she had more than twenty people in the house she had to borrow some.

The conditions have of late been changing. Virginia, instead of being, as the cant phrase went, "a good country to come from," has become a good country to come to. Her advantages of location and climate have ever been recognized, and of late other advantages also have been discovered. Her transportation facilities have been steadily improving, her mineral resources have attracted the attention of capital, and, being examined, have been found to be wonderful both in quantity and quality. Her coal produces the highest speed in the ocean racers, and her iron brings the best prices at the Northern forges.

The improvement in her transportation facilities was the beginning of her new era; her timber regions have been penetrated, and have proved a great field for new enterprise. The judge of one of her Southwestern counties, being shown in Chicago a few years ago suites of walnut furniture as something remarkable, said, "Young man, in my country we make fence rails of walnut." The development of her mineral resources has given an impetus to manufactures, and factories have been and are being established everywhere; villages are springing up on all sides and are becoming towns, whilst the towns are becoming cities.

Richmond has long been a manufacturing city. Over one-fourth of her entire population is engaged in manufactures, and some of the largest manufactories in the country are there.


The diversity of life in the Old Dominion may be illustrated by the fact that one of the greatest ship-yards in this country, and one of the greatest winter health resorts—those at Newport News and at Old Point Comfort respectively—have been of late years established only six miles apart, at the mouth of the great river on which our race first found a lodgement in this country, and the names of both places are memorials of the hardships which the first settlers endured.

If at one time the interest in Virginia's mineral resources grew to excitement and the progress ran into a "boom," it was but the natural and common result of the conditions which were suddenly disclosed, and though inexperience and folly ran away with the movement, and wound up as every one in his sober senses knew it must end, yet the general result was growth; the advance never receded.

What were believed to be incipient cities are, at least, growing villages, the conditions which first caused the excitement still exist, and the progress is going on steadily, on an ever firmer and firmer basis. The beauty of that section of Virginia cannot be overstated, and it seems to the writer destined to become one of the most prosperous and wealthy regions in the entire country.

It is not only the Southwest that is now improving; other sections as well are in the movement, and after the long night the day seems at last to have broke. Even the poorest section is beginning to advance. One large portion of it, lying within the influence of the Chesapeake, has been found admirably adapted to trucking, and now furnishes fruits and vegetables for the markets of Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston weeks before they can ripen a hundred miles further inland; other portions produce bright tobacco which brings many times the price of the common leaf; in yet others, other resources are being developed. The farmer has learned in the school of experience where to let out and where to take in. He no longer confines himself to cereals and tobacco. Stock is being raised more generally than before.

A gauge of Virginia's advance may be found in the fact that whilst other classical schools and colleges continue to maintain their number of students, the University of Virginia has doubled her number within the last few years. The country is once more filling up. The cheapness of the lands and the charm of the life have arrested attention, and the beautiful old country houses are being bought up by Northerners of capital, or as Virginians have made money in cities the old instinct has awakened, and they are returning to the country, buying and fitting up country places in which to bring up their children and spend their declining years amid scenes associated with their happy youth. The climate is attracting those who can no longer stand the rigors of a Northern winter, and many new settlers are seeking homes in the Old Dominion, where wealth is not needed, and contentment yet has its home. The old country places are thus being opened again, and the old life which made her distinguished is beginning under new conditions to be lived once more in the Old Dominion.



RIGHT AND LEFT PROFILES OF GENERAL GRANT. (SEE NOTE PAGE 120.) FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY WALKER IN 1875 AND LENT BY MAJOR C. C. SNIFFIN.

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AT SPRINGFIELD.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDERACY.



OLLOWING the successive ordinances of secession passed by the cotton-States, their delegations withdrew one by one from Congress. In this final step their senators and members adopted no concerted method, but went according to individual convenience or caprice; some making the briefest announcement of their withdrawal, others delivering addresses of considerable length. These parting declarations contain nothing of historical interest. They are a mere repetition of what they had said many times over in debate: complaints of Northern aggression and allegations of Northern hostility; they failed to make any statement or acknowledgment of the aggressions and hostility on the part of the South against the North.


The ceremony of withdrawal, therefore, was formal and perfunctory; pre-announced and recognized as a foregone conclusion, it attracted little attention from Congress or the public. Only two cases were exceptional,—that of Mr. Boulogny, a representative from Louisiana, who, as already mentioned, remained loyal to the Union and retained his seat in the House; and that of Senator Wigfall of Texas, who, radically and outspokenly disloyal, yet kept his seat in the Senate, not only through the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's term, but even during the special session assembled, according to custom, to confirm the nominations made by President Lincoln immediately after his inauguration.

One of the remarkable coincidences of the secession conspiracy is, that on the same day which witnessed the meeting of a peace convention in Washington city to deceive and confuse further the public opinion of the North with discussion of an impossible compromise, the delegates of the seceded States convened at Montgomery, Alabama, to consolidate rebellion and prepare for armed resistance. It is not impossible that this was a piece of strategy, purposely designed by the secession leaders; for the Washington peace conference,

despite its constant avowals of a desire to promote union, was originated and managed by the little clique of Virginia conspirators whose every act, if not preconceived, at least resulted in treasonable duplicity.

The secession conventions of the cotton-States had appointed delegates equal in number to their former senators and representatives in Congress. These met in Montgomery, Alabama, on the 4th day of February, 1861, to form a Southern Confederacy. The Washington caucus, it will be remembered, suggested the 15th of the month. But such had been the success, or, rather, the want of opposition to the movement, that it was probably considered advisable to hasten the programme, and instead of only having preliminary secession complete by the 4th of March, to finish the whole structure of an independent government before the inauguration of President Lincoln. Thus far Mr. Buchanan had not offered the slightest impediment to the insurrection; it might reasonably be inferred that this inaction on his part would continue to the end of his term. Mr. Lincoln would be powerless until officially invested with the executive duties, and thus the formal organization of a Southern Confederacy could proceed at convenient leisure and in perfect immunity from disturbance.

The meeting at Montgomery had its immediate origin in the resolutions of a committee of the Mississippi Legislature, adopted January 29th; and it is another evidence of the secret and swift concert of secession leaders, that in six days thereafter the delegates of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida were assembled for conference. The delegates from Texas joined them later on. An organization was effected by choosing Howell Cobb chairman, and the body called itself a Provisional Congress, though it was merely a revolutionary council, invested with no direct representation of the people, but appointed by the secession conventions. Its reactionary spirit was shown in returning to the antiquated and centralizing mode of voting by States. This same rule under the old Congress of the Confederation had produced nothing but delay and impotence, and earned deserved contempt; and these



HOWELL COBB, PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST CONFEDERATE CONGRESS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH LENT BY GENERAL MARCUS J. WRIGHT.)

identical delegates, after incorporating the rule in their provisional scheme of government, immediately rejected it when framing their permanent one. We may infer that they employed it at the moment, because it was admirably suited to the use of cliques and the purposes of intrigue. Very little more than half the delegates of four States could carry a measure, and the minority of total membership could exercise full power of legislation. A project of government was perfected on February 8th, and the name of the "Confederate States of America" was adopted.

This first project was provisional only, to serve for one year; and the Provisional Congress retained the legislative power for the same period. The temporary continuance of certain United States laws and officials was provided for. On the following day (February 9th) it elected Jefferson Davis of Mississippi President and Alexander H. Stephens of

Georgia Vice-President of the new Confederacy. The body then set itself more seriously at work to prepare a permanent constitution which should go into effect a year later. This labor it completed and adopted on the 11th of March. In this permanent constitution, as in the provisional one, they adhered closely to the letter and spirit of the Constitution of the United States, making few changes other than those which the pretensions and designs of the rebellion made essential.

"The new constitution professed to be established by 'each State acting in its sovereign and independent character,' instead of simply by 'we the people.' It provided that in newly acquired territory 'the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected by Congress and by the Territorial Government'; also for the right of transit and sojourn for 'slaves and other property,' and the right to

reclaim 'slaves and other persons' to service or labor. It did not, as consistency required, provide for the right of secession, or deny the right of coercion; on the contrary, all its implications were against the former and in favor of the latter; for it declared itself to be the supreme law of the land, binding on the judges in every State. It provided for the punishment of treason; and declared that no State should enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin money, lay duties, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, make any compact with another State or with a foreign power;—a sweeping practical negation of the whole heretical dogma of State supremacy upon which they had built their revolt.*

Stephens, being a member of the Congress, was sworn into office as Vice-President, February 10th. Davis, with becoming modesty, remained absent during the election; being sent for, he arrived and was formally inaugurated on February 18th. His inaugural address presents few salient points. In later times he has disavowed the fiery and belligerent harangues the newspapers reported him to have made on his way to assume his new duties. Perhaps the most important announcement of his inaugural was the opinion that the new Confederacy might welcome the border slave-States; "but beyond this," he continued, "if I mistake not the judgment and will of the people, a reunion with the States from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable."

Superficially, it appeared that the new government had been agreed upon among the leaders, with unusual harmony and unanimity; and such is the impression conveyed in the books written long years after by the two principal chiefs. But plausible reports have come down by tradition, that no previous legislative body had ever developed an equal amount of jealousy and bitterness to that which manifested itself in the Provisional Congress; that there were more candidates for President than States in the Confederacy, Georgia alone having furnished four aspirants, and that the rivalry between Toombs and Cobb in fact brought about the selection of Davis, who had openly expressed his preference for the post of General-in-Chief of the future rebel armies. Cobb might indeed dispute the prize of leadership with Davis, and especially with Toombs, who was, of all the candidates, least suited for such a task. It was Cobb who was the master spirit of secession intrigue in Buchanan's Cabinet; it was Cobb who carried the wavering Georgia convention into secession; it was Cobb who reappeared as the dominating power in the Montgomery

Congress. Practically, it was Cobb who by recent secret manipulations had made the Confederacy possible, and erected the Confederate constitution. He might without vanity aspire to become its chief officer; yet with a truer recognition of the fitness of things, the choice of the delegates fell upon Davis, who, for a longer period and with deeper representative characteristics, had been the real embodiment and head of the conspiracy.

Jefferson Davis was born in Christian (afterwards Todd) county, Kentucky, June 3d, 1808. Soon afterwards his father removed to Mississippi; but the boy was sent to complete the education begun by home and academic studies, to Transylvania University, where he remained till the age of sixteen. Appointed in that year a cadet at the Military Academy at West Point, he received the thorough training of that institution, graduating in June, 1828; he was then attached to the army, and served as a lieutenant of infantry in the Black Hawk war and other campaigns against the Indians. He resigned his military commission in 1835, having attained the grade of first lieutenant of dragoons. Returning to Mississippi, he secluded himself in plantation life, devoting his time largely to political studies calculated to qualify him for a public career. In 1843 he launched himself on the tide of Mississippi politics, by a speech in the Democratic State convention, which attracted considerable notice. From the very first he became a central party figure in his State, was made a presidential elector in 1844, and chosen a representative in Congress in 1845. When the Mexican war broke out, Davis's military training and experience naturally carried him into the campaign as colonel of a volunteer regiment called the Mississippi Rifles; and he rendered valuable service and won deserved distinction in the storming of Monterey and the battle of Buena Vista. Returned from the war, the governor of Mississippi appointed him to the United States Senate to fill a vacancy. When the next legislature met, it confirmed the governor's choice by electing him for the remainder of the term; and a subsequent legislature reelected him for the full term succeeding.

From the beginning to the end of his public career Davis posed as a disciple of Calhoun and an advocate of the extreme doctrine of State-rights. His maiden speech in the Mississippi convention of 1843 was to recommend Calhoun as an alternative presidential candidate; his parting address on leaving the Senate in 1861 drew a contrast between Calhoun as the advocate of nullification, and himself as the advanced defender of secession. So also, when President Polk offered him the commis-

* Nicolay, "The Outbreak of Rebellion."

sion of brigadier-general of volunteers, to reward his military service in Mexico, the Quixotism which was a marked feature of Davis's character moved him to employ the incident for the ostentatious championship of State-rights. He declined the offer, his biographer says, "on the ground that no such commission could be conferred by Federal authority, either by appointment of the President or by act of Congress."

His next State-rights exploit occurred in 1851. A strong party in Mississippi, violently opposing the compromise measures of 1850, organized a resistance movement in that State, and undertook upon that issue to elect General Quitman governor in 1851. A preliminary election, however, in the month of September, showed them to be some seven thousand votes in the minority; whereupon Quitman withdrew from the contest. Jefferson Davis immediately resigned his full term in the United States Senate and took up the canvass for governor of Mississippi, which Quitman had ingloriously abandoned. Davis's short campaign was brilliant but unsuccessful; he was beaten about one thousand votes by Hon. Henry S. Foote, the Union candidate, who had also resigned the remainder of his senatorship to make the contest.


The defeat appeared to have a salutary influence upon Davis's politics, but it proved transient. In the presidential campaign of 1852 a forlorn-hope of the State-rights fanatics nominated Quitman for President. Davis, with a wiser calculation, forsook his reckless friends and supported Pierce; and for this adhesion Pierce gave him a seat in his Cabinet as Secretary of War. The history of the Kansas trouble shows how faithful he was in this position to pro-slavery interests; and when Buchanan succeeded, he again became a senator for Mississippi, and assumed the leadership of the ultra-Democrats. Years afterwards he explained that in abandoning for a while his extreme course, he was conforming his actions to the decision which Mississippi pronounced in 1851 in favor of the Union. "His opinions," he said, "the result of deliberate convictions, he had no power to change." When, therefore, he entered the Cabinet of President Pierce in 1853 as Secretary of War, and when again on the accession of President Buchanan the Legislature of Mississippi returned him to the Senate, he was by his own declaration, and by the evidence of his subsequent words and deeds, only an acting Unionist, who at heart cherished the belief of Federal usurpation, and hoped and labored for the hour of confederated State resistance.

It may not be without interest to call attention at this point to a few coincidences in the

careers of Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln. They were both born in Kentucky — Davis in the south-western, Lincoln near the central part of the State. They were both near the same age, Davis being less than nine months the elder. Both were taken in their early years from their birthplaces — Davis's parents emigrating south to Mississippi, Lincoln's north to Indiana and Illinois. Both were soldiers in the Black Hawk war — Davis as lieutenant of Regulars, Lincoln as captain of Volunteers. Both were candidates for presidential elector in 1844. Both were soon elected to Congress — Davis in 1845, Lincoln in 1846. Both were successful politicians and popular orators. Both were instinctively studious, introspective, self-contained. Both rose to distinction through the advocacy of an abstract political idea. Both became the chiefs of rival sections in a great civil war.

These are the only points of resemblance, and the contrasts running through their lives are bold and radical. It is unnecessary to present them in detail; they are comprehended and expressed in their opposing leaderships. If chance or fate had guided their parents to exchange their routes of emigration from Kentucky; if Lincoln had grown up on a Southern cotton plantation, and Davis had split rails to fence a Northern farm; if the tall Illinois pioneer had studied trigonometry at West Point, and the pale Mississippi student had steered a flat-boat to New Orleans, education might have modified but would not have essentially changed either. Lincoln would never have become a political dogmatist, an apostle of slavery, a leader of rebellion; Davis could never have become the champion of a universal humanity, the author of a decree of emancipation, the martyr to liberty. Their natures were antipodal, and it is perhaps by contemplating the contrast that the character of Davis may be best understood.

His dominant mental traits were subtlety and will. His nature was one of reserve and pride. His biographers give us no glimpse of his private life. They show us little sympathy of companionship, or sunshine of genial humor. Houston is reported to have said of him that he was "as ambitious as Lucifer and as cold as a lizard." His fancy lived in a world of masters and slaves. His education taught him nothing but the law of subordination and the authority of command. A Democrat by party name, he was an aristocrat in feeling and practice. He was a type of the highest Southern culture and most exclusive Southern caste. His social ideas were of the past. In political theory he was a sophist, and not a logician. With him, "consent of the governed" in a State was truth; "consent of the gov-



JEFFERSON DAVIS, PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

erned" in a Territory was error. "Rebellion" in a State must be obeyed; "rebellion" in a Territory "must be crushed." Constitutional forms in Kansas in the interest of slavery were sacred law; constitutional forms in the Union in the interest of freedom were flagrant usurpation. The majority in a State was enthroned freedom; a majority in the nation was insufferable despotism. But even his central dogma became pliant before considerations of self-

interest. In his own State, a majority of seven thousand against Quitman in September he treated as a dangerous political heresy to be overthrown by his personal championship. A majority of one thousand against himself in November he affected to regard as a command to stultify his own opinions. His beliefs were at war with the most essential principles of American government. He denied the truth of the Declaration of Independence, denied

the right of the majority to rule, denied the supremacy of the national Constitution. His narrowness was of that type which craved the exclusion of Northern teachers and the official censorship of school-books to keep out "Abolition poison." It was in perfect keeping with his character, and in perfect illustration of the paradoxical theories of his followers, that, holding the lash over fifty or a hundred slaves, or exercising an inflexible military dictatorship over nine millions of "his people," he could declaim in fervid oratory against the despotism of a majority.

One of his most salient traits was the endeavor to maintain a double position on the question of disunion. His leadership of the "resistance" party in Mississippi in 1850-51 gave him a conspicuous starting-point as an instigator of sedition, and while laboring then and afterwards to unite the South in extreme political demands, and in armed preparation for war against the Union if those demands were not complied with, he as constantly declared that he was no disunionist. Of course he could do this only by setting at defiance the plainest meaning of words and the clearest significance of acts. As the slavery contest drew to its culmination, his recklessness of assertion and antagonism of declaration on these points reached an extreme entitling them to be classed among the curiosities of abnormal mental phenomena. As a blind man may not be held responsible for his description of a painting, or a deaf-mute be expected to repeat accurately the airs of an opera, so we can only explain Jefferson Davis's vehement denial of the charge of hypocrisy and conspiracy through a whole decade, by the supposition that he was incapable of understanding the accepted meaning of such words as "patriotism," "loyalty" "allegiance," "faith," "honor," and "duty." On no other hypothesis can we credit the honesty of convictions and sincerity of expression of sentiments so diametrically opposed as the following which occur in the same speech :

"Neither in that year [1852], nor in any other, have I ever advocated a dissolution of the Union, or a separation of the State of Mississippi from the Union, except as the last alternative, and have not considered the remedies which lie within that extreme as exhausted, or ever been entirely hopeless of their success. I hold now, as announced on former occasions, that whilst occupying a seat in the Senate, I am bound to maintain the Government of the Constitution, and in no manner to work for its destruction ; that the obligation of the oath of office, Mississippi's honor and my own, require that, as a Senator of the United States, there should be no want of loyalty to the Constitutional Union. . . .

"Whether by the House [of Representatives] or by the people, if an Abolitionist be chosen President of the United States, you will have presented to you the question of whether you will permit the Government to pass into the hands of your avowed and implacable enemies. Without pausing for your answer, I will state

my own position to be that such a result would be a species of revolution by which the purposes of the Government would be destroyed, and the observance of its mere forms entitled to no respect. In that event, in such manner as should be most expedient, I should deem it your duty to provide for your safety outside of a Union with those who have already shown the will, and would have acquired the power, to deprive you of your birthright and reduce you to worse than the colonial dependence of your fathers. . . . As when I had the privilege of addressing the Legislature a year ago, so now do I urge you to the needful preparation to meet whatever contingency may befall us. The maintenance of our rights against a hostile power is a physical problem and cannot be solved by mere resolutions. Not doubtful of what the heart will prompt, it is not the less proper that due provision should be made for physical necessities. Why should not the State have an armory for the repair of arms, for the alteration of old models so as to make them conform to the improved weapons of the present day, and for the manufacture on a limited scale of new arms, including cannon and carriages ; the casting of shot and shells, and the preparation of fixed ammunition? "*

That man is not to be envied whose reason can be quieted by a casuistry capable of discovering consistency between these and analogous propositions. From declarations of this quality he could prove his record black or white, as occasion demanded, and, in face of direct threats of secession in Mississippi, deny in the United States Senate, without wincing, that he had avowed disunion sentiments.

It will not be amiss to invite the reader to a pen-picture of the man as he appeared in the Senate (May 8th, 1860) shortly before he led the South, with open eyes, into that drama of disaster, suffering, and blood of which he was the fatal inspiration :

"The crowd in the galleries give a buzz of relief, and everybody tells his right-hand man, 'Here he comes; that's Jeff Davis.' And can it be possible that he proposes to make a speech? You are surprised to see him walking. Why, that is the face of a corpse, the form of a skeleton. Look at the haggard, sunken, weary eye, the thin, white wrinkled lips clasped close upon the teeth in anguish. That is the mouth of a brave but impatient sufferer. See the ghastly white, hollow, bitterly puckered cheek, the high, sharp cheek-bone, the pale brow full of fine wrinkles, the grizzly hair, prematurely gray ; and see the thin, bloodless, bony, nervous hands ! He deposits his documents upon his desk, and sinks into his chair as if incapable of rising. In a few minutes the Vice-President gives his desk a blow with his ivory hammer, calls for profound order, and states 'that the senator from Mississippi' has the floor. Davis rises with a smile. His speech was closely reasoned, and his words were well chosen. Once in a while he pleases his hearers by a happy period ; but it was painfully evident that he was ill."

Montgomery having witnessed the glories of such an inauguration pageant as could be extemporized, Davis proceeded to the appointment of his Cabinet. Toombs of Georgia was made Secretary of State ; Memminger of South Carolina Secretary of the Treasury ; Walker

* Jefferson Davis, speech at Jackson, Mississippi, Nov. 11th, 1858. In "Daily Mississippian," Nov. 15th, 1858.

of Alabama Secretary of War; Mallory of Florida Secretary of the Navy; Reagan of Texas Postmaster-General; and Benjamin of Louisiana Attorney-General. Various acts of the Provisional Congress authorized the new Executive to continue the organization of the provisional government of the Confederate States. A regular army of about 10,000 men was ordered to be established; a navy of 10 steam gun-boats authorized to be constructed or purchased; 100,000 volunteers for 12 months authorized to be enlisted, and existing State troops to be received into the provisional army. A loan of \$15,000,000 was authorized, and an export duty on cotton of $\frac{1}{8}$ cent per pound levied, to pay principal and interest. Among the first executive acts, Davis assumed control of military operations in the several seceded States; and his Secretary of War (March 9th) made a requisition for 11,000 volunteers, for contingent service at Charleston, Pensacola, and other points. Agents were dispatched to Europe to purchase material of war; and to obtain if possible a recognition of the Confederate States by foreign powers. As a matter of the greatest immediate necessity, a commission of three persons was appointed to proceed to Washington, to bring about the peaceful acquiescence of the United States in the dismemberment of the Union.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

THE disunion conspirators had good reason to show symptoms of dismay at the Cabinet régime to which Mr. Buchanan yielded direction and authority in the last days of the year 1860. Hitherto, not alone in shaping a policy of non-coercion and preventing reinforcements, but in numerous minor matters as well, had the complicity of Cobb, Floyd, and Thompson enabled them to turn the varied agencies of the Government against its own life. Under the new dispensation these practices instantly came to an end. For the moment Mr. Buchanan was in a patriotic mood, and at the urgent solicitation of Black, Holt, and Stanton yielded his consent to a number of measures he had for two months persistently neglected. For the first time since his arrival in Washington, General Scott was permitted to notify commanders of forts and garrisons to be on the alert against surprise; and though this admonition came too late to inspire and reassure many a wavering officer, it had the direct effect of saving one of the most important military posts on the gulf. Reënforcements were resolved upon. The policy of defending the national capital was discussed and adopted. At least one member of the Cabinet placed himself in confidential communi-

cation with leading Republicans and unionists in Congress, and counsel and warning in behalf of the Government were freely interchanged and faithfully observed. Préëminent in his opportunities and services at this critical juncture was the new Secretary of War, Joseph Holt, of Kentucky. He had been a life-long Democrat and a stubborn partisan; but above everything else he was a patriot. Under his administration the War Department was no longer a bureau of insurrection.

The Cabinet régime consisted mainly of the combined will and energy of four leading members,—Black, Secretary of State; Dix, Secretary of the Treasury; Holt, Secretary of War; and Stanton, Attorney-General. Neither their relation to the President nor to each other can be very clearly made out. Their loyal activity was still occasionally hampered by Buchanan's stubbornness and timidity. On some points they appear to have had very different views, but the daily stress and danger in which they moved compelled mutual tolerance and tacit co-operation. They had indeed one common bond of union. Now that the conspiracy was so fully revealed they battled against it manfully, not with any proximate hope of crushing it, but to tide over the peril to the end of the presidential term, to be able to lay down their responsibilities with honor. Their services in detail cannot be here recorded, but the principal duty which they successfully performed, the protection of the national capital, needs special mention.

In the early days of January, 1861, Washington city was the natural focus of the secession excitement pervading the South; and the capital seemed to lean towards the prevailing mania. Seditious harangues in Congress were applauded from well-filled galleries, and society feasted and flattered the most daring fire-eaters. So strong was this Southern drift of local sentiment that the Federal city began to be confidently looked upon by the conspirators as the prospective capital of a Southern Confederacy. Nothing seemed wanting to the early consummation of such a scheme but the secession of Virginia and Maryland, of which the signs were becoming only too abundant. Reasoning from this to plausible consequences, the coolest heads began to fear a popular outbreak to seize upon the buildings and archives of the Government; and as a final result forcibly to prevent the inauguration of the President-elect.

Buchanan affected not to share these apprehensions. Nevertheless he acknowledged his duty and purpose to preserve the peace, and authorized the necessary precautions. On the 9th of January, therefore, Colonel Charles P. Stone, chosen for that duty by General Scott, submitted a memorandum in which he sketched a plan for the defense of

Washington, which was adopted, and under which Colonel Stone was appointed inspector-general and ordered to organize and drill the militia of the District of Columbia. This duty he faithfully discharged, and on the 5th of February reported the existence of some thirteen volunteer companies, constituting a total of 925 men, "which can be at once called into service"; adding also, "the number of volunteers for service can be doubled within seven days with proper facilities." Not underrating either the moral or military aid of raw levies of militia, General Scott was nevertheless too old a soldier to rely exclusively upon them in an emergency. He therefore obtained consent to concentrate at the capital available regular forces to the number of eight companies, a total of about 480 men.

Stanton, appointed Attorney-General on the 20th of December, was, with his ardent and positive nature, one of the most energetic and uncompromising unionists in the Cabinet. For him, the expulsion of Floyd, the reënforcement of Sumter, and the other military precautions hastily ordered, were not yet sufficient. Chafing under the President's painful tardiness, he turned to Congress as a means for exposing and thwarting the intrigues of the conspirators. Sacrificing his party attachments to the paramount demands of national safety, he placed himself in confidential correspondence with Republican leaders in that body, giving and receiving advice as to the best means of preserving the Government.

On the 8th of January Mr. Buchanan transmitted to Congress a special message on the state of the Union, discussing also the rumors of hostile designs against the capital. The Republicans in the House of Representatives seized the occasion to secure the appointment of a Committee of Investigation, of which Mr. Howard, of Michigan, was made chairman. He has left us an interesting account of its origin and purpose :

"That committee was raised at the request of loyal members of the Cabinet. The resolutions came from them, and were placed in my hands with a request that I should offer them and thus become, if they should pass, chairman of the committee. At first I refused to assume so fearful a responsibility. But being urged to do so by members and senators, I at last consented, on condition that the Speaker would allow me to nominate two members of the committee. I selected Mr. Daves, of Massachusetts, and Mr. Reynolds, of New York. Mr. Reynolds was elected as a Democrat, but he was true as steel, and a good lawyer. I do not know that Mr. Stanton wrote the resolutions creating the committee. I did not see him write them. I never heard him say he wrote them. It would be easier, however, to persuade me that Mr. Jefferson did not write the Declaration of Independence than that Mr. Stanton did not write those resolutions."

With this committee Mr. Stanton and perhaps other members of the Cabinet continued

to correspond confidentially and coöperate. This has been characterized as disrespect and treachery to their chief; but in the face of Mr. Buchanan's repeated neglect and avowed impotence to resist open insurrection, discriminating history will applaud the act. The committee found no substantial proof of an organized plot to seize the capital; nevertheless its investigation and report quieted the apprehensions of the timid, at the same time that they afforded a warning to mischief-makers that the authorities were on the alert and would make such an enterprise extremely hazardous.

While the Howard Committee was yet pursuing its inquiry, and as the day for counting the presidential vote approached, General Scott requested permission from the Secretary of War to bring several additional companies of regulars from Fortress Monroe, to be replaced by recruits. This would augment his regulars to some seven hundred men, which, with the police and militia, he deemed sufficient for all contingencies. Before the day arrived a confidential arrangement of signals was communicated to the officers, the regular troops being placed under command of Colonel Harvey Brown. General instructions were issued in strict confidence, and to officers alone. The militia was charged with the care of the various bridges of the Potomac; the regulars were stationed at convenient points in the city.

Happily no alarm occurred. On the 13th of February an unusually large and brilliant throng filled the galleries of the House of Representatives to witness the proceedings of the presidential count. Vice-President Breckinridge, one of the defeated candidates, presided over the joint convention of the two Houses. Senator Douglas, another, was on the floor, and moved to dispense with certain tedious routine. The sealed returns of the electoral votes, cast by the chosen colleges of the several States on the 5th of December, were opened and registered. The tellers officially declared the result already known, viz.: that Lincoln had received 180 votes; Breckinridge, 72; Bell, 39; Douglas, 12. Vice-President Breckinridge thereupon announced that "Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, having received a majority of the whole number of electoral votes, is elected President of the United States for four years commencing the 4th of March, 1861."

To comprehend more clearly the transactions growing out of the event, it is necessary to repeat that immediately after the beginning of the Cabinet régime it was resolved to send reënforcements to Fort Sumter. The first arrangement was to dispatch them in the sloop-of-war *Brooklyn*; but owing to certain difficulties and objections which presented

themselves, General Scott decided to send two hundred recruits with supplies from New York in the merchant steamer *Star of the West*, hoping she might enter the harbor and effect their landing at the fort without suspicion of her real errand. But, among others, Secretary Thompson, who was still a member of Buchanan's Cabinet, sent the Charleston conspirators notice of her coming. When on the morning of January 9th about daylight the *Star of the West* attempted her entrance, she was fired upon from a battery which had been erected since New Year's Day under the order of Governor Pickens; and, though the vessel suffered no serious injury, the apparent danger caused the officers to desist from their attempt and turn and run the vessel out of the harbor.

The whole occurrence came upon Major Anderson unexpectedly; and before he could well comprehend the design or decide to encourage or assist the ship with the guns of Fort Sumter, she had retreated, and the opportunity was gone. But the insult to the national flag roused his anger, and he demanded an apology from Governor Pickens for the hostile act. So far from retracting or apologizing, however, the governor boldly avowed and sustained his conduct; and Major Anderson, instead of making good the threat which accompanied his demand, proposed as an alternative to "refer the whole matter to my Government." With great tact Governor Pickens at the same time made use of the occasion to send Attorney-General Hayne, of South Carolina, to President Buchanan, bearing a new written demand (the third one made by the State), for the possession of the forts in Charleston Harbor; and the two messengers arrived in Washington on the 13th of January. But the central cabal at Washington, which in its caucus resolutions of January 5th had issued orders for immediate secession, seeing the danger and complication likely to arise from this headlong separate action of South Carolina's governor, now took possession of Hayne and his mission. By a skillful device of dilatory diplomacy they kept open the question of the demand Hayne had been instructed to make, and thereby prolonged the military truce at Charleston which it involved, until the 6th of February following, when Secretary of War Holt officially wrote the President's refusal of the governor's demand. The advantage of this course to the conspirators became quickly apparent. Between the 12th of January and the 6th of February the insurrection at Charleston worked day and night in building batteries and preparing men and material to attack Sumter. In other States the processes of secession, seizure, drill, equipment, and organization had also been going on with

similar activity. Receiving no effective discouragement or check, the various elements of rebellion had finally united in a provisional congress at Montgomery, which two days later (February 8th) perfected a provisional government for the rebellion.

As part of the same intrigue another incident, which for convenience may be called the Fort Pickens truce, must also be mentioned. One of the most important naval and military stations of the United States was that at Pensacola, Florida. Near it on the mainland were Fort Barrancas and Fort McRae, and on Santa Rosa Island, immediately opposite, Fort Pickens, a powerful work, built for a war garrison of 1260 men, but now entirely empty. Lieutenant Slemmer held military command with a garrison of only forty-six men, in Fort Barrancas. When on January 3d General Scott under the Cabinet régime admonished him to prevent the seizure of these forts by surprise, Slemmer repeated the strategy of Anderson, spiking the guns and destroying the powder in Barrancas and McRae, and transferring his command, increased by thirty ordinary seamen from the Navy Yard, with all available supplies, to Fort Pickens, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th of January. Lieutenant Slemmer was not a moment too quick. The Florida convention passed an ordinance of secession on the 10th, and two days afterwards a regiment of Florida and Alabama rebels appeared and took possession of the Navy Yard and the two abandoned forts. A considerable rebel force was within a short time concentrated to attempt the capture of Fort Pickens, but in the mean time sundry ships of war had been ordered there by the Government. On January 21st the *Brooklyn*, with a company of regular artillery under Captain Vodge, was dispatched thither as a further reënforcement to the fort. The rebels now perceiving that this preponderance of military strength might enable the Government to recapture the Navy Yard, the central cabal at Washington resorted to an intrigue to paralyze it. They proposed that "no attack would be made on the fort if its present status should be suffered to remain," thus beguiling President Buchanan into a new truce. A joint order was thereupon issued by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, January 29th, that Captain Vodge's artillery company should not be landed from the *Brooklyn* "unless said fort shall be attacked or preparations made for its attack." The advantages of this stipulation were all on the side of the insurrection, and its existence proved a most mischievous complication, and caused perilous delay when the new Lincoln Administration began its dealings with the rebellion.

Want of space forbids us to review the

debates and proceedings of Congress during the winter of 1860-61 further than to note the complete failure of the projects of compromise which were originated in and out of it, and brought to its attention. The Senate Committee of Thirteen ended by reporting an irreconcilable disagreement. The various propositions which were apparently adopted by the House Committee of Thirty-three proved to be nothing but the resolves of the several minority factions of that committee, and commanded no united support when reported to the House. The Peace Conference terminated its labors by certain recommendations receiving only a minority vote of that body, and Congress, to which these recommendations were sent, would have nothing to do with them. So also certain other propositions of adjustment offered in Congress, known as the "Crittenden Compromise," failed equally of acceptance.

Nevertheless these many efforts were not entirely barren of result. At a point where it was least expected, they contributed to the adoption by Congress of a measure of adjustment which might have restored harmony to the country if the rebellion of the cotton-States had not been originated and controlled by a conspiracy bent upon revolution as its prime and ultimate object. It is a noteworthy fact that just at the dawn of the civil war through which slavery rushed to a swift self-destruction, that institution received the largest recognition and concession ever given it in American legislation.

The report of the Committee of Thirty-three was made about the middle of January, but at that time none of its six propositions or recommendations commanded the attention of the House. The secession stage of the revolution was just culminating. All was excitement and surprise over the ordinances of the cotton-States and the seizure, without actual collision or bloodshed, of the several Southern forts and arsenals. The retirement of the Southern members of Congress, and the meeting of the revolutionary leaders, to unite and construct their provisional government at Montgomery, prolonged what was to the public a succession of dramatic and spectacular incidents resembling the movements of a political campaign, rather than the serious progress of a piece of orderly business-like statesmanship. The North could not yet believe that the designs of the cotton-State hotspurs were so desperate.

The more conservative Congressmen from the North and from the border States still hoped that good might come if an effort of conciliation and compromise were once more renewed. Accordingly, near the close of the session (February 27th, 1861), Mr. Corwin, chairman of the House Committee of Thirty-three, brought forward one of the propositions

which had been reported more than a month before from his committee. The original report proposed in substance an amendment of the Constitution providing that any constitutional interference with slavery must originate with the slave-States, and have the unanimous assent of all the States to become valid. Mr. Corwin by an amendment changed the phraseology and purport to the following:

"Article 13. No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere within any State with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State."

This amendment was adopted by the House on February 28th, yeas 133, nays 65. The Senate also passed it during the night preceding the 4th of March, though in the journals of Congress it appears dated as of March 2d. The variation is explained by the fact that the legislative day of the journals frequently runs through two or more calendar days. In that body the vote was, yeas 24, nays 12, and it was approved by President Buchanan probably only an hour or two before the inauguration of his successor.

Mr. Lincoln alluded to this amendment in his inaugural address, reciting its substance and giving it his unreserved approval. "I understand," he said, "a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which amendment, however, I have not seen — has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable." The new Lincoln Administration soon after transmitted this Joint Resolution to the several States to receive their official action. But nothing came of it. The South gave no response to the overture for peace, and in the North it was lost sight of amid the overshadowing events that immediately preceded the outbreak of hostilities.

It was at this point that the South committed its great political blunder. There is little doubt that in the prevailing anxiety for compromise this constitutional amendment might have been ratified by the necessary three-fourths of the States. Had the Southern leaders been sincere in their professed apprehensions for the security of their slave property and polity in their own States, here was an effectual and practically a perpetual guaranty, offered in good faith as such. Their neglect and rejection of it shows that it was not dread

of ultimate abolition, but chagrin and a species of gambler's desperation at the present and prospective loss of political domination for which they rushed headlong into revolution.

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT.

AMONG the first congratulations which poured in upon Mr. Lincoln was a terse greeting from Governor Chase, dated November 7th, that admirably expressed the prevalent feeling.

"You are President-elect. I congratulate you and thank God. The great object of my wishes and labors for nineteen years is accomplished in the overthrow of the slave power. The space is now clear for the establishment of the policy of Freedom on safe and firm grounds. The lead is yours. The responsibility is vast. May God strengthen you for your great duties."*

Day after day confirmed the completeness of the Republican victory, and two weeks after election the city of Springfield was in all the blaze and glory of a great celebration to signalize the result. Projected merely as a local jubilee, it called to the city crowds of rejoicing strangers. Though he had not said a public word during the campaign, Mr. Lincoln could not on this occasion refuse the sound of his voice to the huge torch-light procession, and the crowds of his neighbors and friends whose shouts called him to the door of his modest home. It was not the voice of partisan exultation, however, but of patriotic liberality.

"Friends and fellow-citizens," said he, "please excuse me on this occasion from making a speech. I thank you in common with all those who have thought fit by their votes to indorse the Republican cause. I rejoice with you in the success which has thus far attended that cause. Yet in all our rejoicings, let us neither express nor cherish any hard feelings toward any citizen who by his vote has differed with us. Let us at all times remember that all American citizens are brothers of a common country, and should dwell together in the bonds of fraternal feeling."

We will perceive hereafter how in this simple utterance of his opening presidential career he struck the keynote of blended firmness and charity, which was to become the characteristic of his Administration.

For some months Springfield now became the Mecca of American politics. Transient travelers and casual visitors tarried for a few hours to shake hands with the newly chosen chief; correspondents of leading newspapers established temporary headquarters from which to send their readers pen-pictures of his personal appearance, his daily habits, his home and public surroundings, and to catch the flying and often contradictory rumors of his probable intentions. Artists came to paint

* Chase to Lincoln, Nov. 17th, 1860. Warden, "Life of Chase," p. 364.

his portrait, ambitious politicians to note new party currents, and veteran statesmen to urge the adoption of favorite theories or the advancement of faithful adherents.

To all outside appearance Lincoln remained unchanged. In the unpretending two-story frame house which constituted his home, his daily routine continued as before, except that his door was oftener opened to welcome the curious visitor or to shelter the confidential discussion of ominous occurrences in national affairs. His daily public occupation was still to proceed to the governor's office in the State-house, to receive the cordial and entirely unceremonious greetings of high or low,—whosoever chose to enter at the open door,—and in the interim to keep himself informed, by means of the daily-increasing budget of letters and newspapers, of the events of the country at large, and to give directions to his private secretary as to what replies should be made to important communications. Beyond the arrival of distinguished visitors, there was in all this no sign of elevation or rulership; he was still the same kind neighbor and genial companion, who, whether on the street, in his office, or at his fireside, had for every one he met the same familiar nod or smile or cheering word,—the same bearing which for a quarter of a century had made his name a household synonym of manly affection, virtue, and honor.

Under this quiet exterior and commonplace routine he was, however, already undergoing most anxious and harassing labors. Day by day the horizon of politics gathered gloom,—there were signs of disunion in the South, of discord in Congress, of weakness in Mr. Buchanan's administration. The theory of secession became the theme of every newspaper and the staple question of his daily visitors. Even upon theories Lincoln maintained a prudent reserve. Nevertheless his qualified comments to friends were prompt and clear. "My own impression is," said he (November 15th), "leaving myself room to modify the opinion if upon a further investigation I should see fit to do so, that this Government possesses both the authority and the power to maintain its own integrity. That, however, is not the ugly point of this matter. The ugly point is the necessity of keeping the Government together by force, as ours should be a government of fraternity." Later (December 13th) he formulated his opinion a little more in detail. "The very existence," said he, "of a general and national government implies the legal power, right, and duty of maintaining its own integrity. This, if not expressed, is at least implied in the Constitution. The right of a State to secede is not an open or debatable question. It was fully discussed in Jackson's

time, and denied not only by him, but by the vote of Congress. It is the duty of a President to execute the laws and maintain the existing Government. He cannot entertain any proposition for dissolution or dismemberment. He was not elected for any such purpose. As a matter of theoretical speculation it is probably true, that if the people, with whom the whole question rests, should become tired of the present government, they may change it in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.*

The secrets of the incipient rebellion, and the treachery and conspiracy of a portion of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, which have been already so fully laid bare from data only since become accessible, neither Mr. Lincoln nor any one save the actors themselves had then any means of knowing. But in addition to other current sources of information the confidential letters of Captain Abner Doubleday, second in command at Fort Moultrie, written to the captain's brother in New York, were, so long as mail communication remained, forwarded to the President-elect, giving him an inside view of matters at that critical post.

Most important, however, in its influence, and most valuable in its possible as well as actual consequences, were the correspondence and unity of patriotic confidence which established themselves at an early day between Mr. Lincoln and General Scott. The general was evidently somewhat proud of his famous "Views," written to President Buchanan under date of October 29th, 1860, as a political suggestion. He transmitted a copy of the same to the President-elect, as he had done to many other gentlemen of prominence. A brief acknowledgment was written in reply (November 9th):

"Mr. Lincoln tenders his sincere thanks to General Scott for the copy of his 'views, etc.,' which is received; and especially for this renewed manifestation of his patriotic purposes as a citizen, connected as it is with his high official position and most distinguished character as a military captain."†

The delicate compliment and dignified reserve made their impression on the old hero. Called to Washington about the middle of December, and smarting under the neglect of Secretary Floyd and the discouraging indifference of President Buchanan, his hopes turned toward the elect of the people at Springfield.

It was at this juncture (December 17th) that a personal and political friend of long standing called upon the general, and in a confidential but frank interview learned from his own lips the alarming dangers of the Government,—the neglect of the Administration to

send reinforcements, the defenseless situation of Fort Moultrie, and that Sumter, the key of Charleston Harbor, lay at the mercy of the mob.

"None of his suggestions or recommendations have been acted upon, and of course he is powerless to do anything further, but his heart is sound and true. 'I wish to God,' said he, 'that Mr. Lincoln was in office.' He continued, 'I do not know him, but I believe him a true, honest, and conservative man.' Then he asked earnestly, 'Mr. Washburne, is he a *firm* man?' I answered that I had known you long and well and that you would discharge your duty, and your whole duty, in the sight of the furnace seven times heated. He then said resolutely and hopefully, 'All is not lost.'‡

In response to this patriotic expression of the general, the return mail carried back the following letter from Lincoln to Washburne:

"SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Dec. 21st, 1860.
"HON. E. B. WASHBURNE.

"MY DEAR SIR: Last night I received your letter giving an account of your interview with General Scott, and for which I thank you. Please present my respects to the general, and tell him, confidentially, I shall be obliged to him to be as well prepared as he can to either *hold* or *retake* the forts, as the case may require, at and after the inauguration.

"Yours as ever, A. LINCOLN."§

A little later Mr. Lincoln again sent messages of esteem and confidence to the general by Senators Cameron and Baker, who made visits to Springfield.

"I have seen General Scott," writes Cameron in reply (January 3d), "who bids me say he will be glad to act under your orders in all ways to preserve the Union. He says Mr. Buchanan at last has called on him to see that order shall be preserved at the inauguration, in this District; that for this purpose he has ordered here two companies of flying artillery, and that he will organize the militia and have himself sworn in as a constable. The old warrior is roused, and he will be equal to the occasion."¶

This statement was repeated in an autograph note from the general himself on the following day:

"Lieutenant-General Scott is highly gratified with the favorable opinion entertained of him by the President-elect as he learns through Senators Baker and Cameron, also personal friends of General S., who is happy to reciprocate his highest respect and esteem. The President-elect may rely with confidence on General S.'s utmost exertions in the service of his country (the Union) both before and after the approaching inauguration."

The general then mentions in detail the measures just taken, under the reorganized Cabinet and the accession of Mr. Holt, to countermand the shipment of the Pittsburg guns, to send reinforcements to Fort Jefferson, and to secure the safety of Washington for the presidential count and the approaching inauguration.¶¶

"Permit me," wrote Mr. Lincoln in reply, January 11th, "to renew to you the assurance of my high

§ Lincoln to Washburne, Dec. 21st, 1860. Unpublished MS.

¶ Cameron to Lincoln, Jan. 3d, 1861. Unpublished MS.
¶¶ Scott to Lincoln, Jan. 4th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

* Nicolay, Manuscript Memoranda.

† Lincoln to Scott, Nov. 9th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

‡ Washburne to Lincoln, Dec. 17th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

appreciation of the many past services you have rendered the Union, and my deep gratification at this evidence of your present active exertions to maintain the integrity and honor of the nation.”*

The President-elect was further gratified to receive about the same time from the veteran General Wool a letter of noble and uncompromising loyalty.

“Many thanks,” he wrote in reply, January 14th, “for your patriotic and generous letter of the 11th instant. As to how far the military force of the Government may become necessary to the preservation of the Union, and more particularly how that force can best be directed to the object, I must chiefly rely upon General Scott and yourself. It affords me the profoundest satisfaction to know, that with both of you judgment and feeling go heartily with your sense of professional and official duty to the work.” †

Meanwhile trusty friends in Washington, both in and out of Congress, had kept Lincoln informed by letter of public events occurring there, so far as they were permitted to come to the knowledge of Republicans: how the Cabinet divided, how the message was scouted, the bold utterances of treason, the growing apprehensions of the public. But general opinion was still in a hopeful mood.

“Mr. Mann,” wrote one, “who stated that he knew you personally, requested me to say that he had seen the Union dissolved twice — once when Southern members of Congress refused for three days to occupy their seats — and that it all ended in smoke. He did not appear the least alarmed about the secession movement, but others, particularly Thurlow Weed and Horace Greeley, expressed great anxiety.” ‡

These were influential names, and it may be well to cite their own words. “I am anticipating troubles,” wrote Mr. Weed, December 2d, “not generally apprehended by our friends. I want the North to be sure she is right and then to go ahead.” || Some days later he wrote further:

“In consultation yesterday with several friends, it was thought best to invite the governors of several States to meet in this city on Thursday of next week, so that, if possible, there should be harmony of views and action between them. It occurred to me that you should be apprised of this movement. Of course it is to be quiet and confidential. I have been acting without knowledge of your views, upon vital questions. But I find it safe to trust the head and heart when both are under the guidance of right motives. I do not want you to be saddled with the responsibilities of the Government before you take the helm. On the question of preserving the Union, I am unwilling to see a *united* South and a *divided* North. Nor is such an alternative necessary. With wisdom and prudence we can unite the North in upholding the supremacy of the Constitution and Laws, and thus united, your Administration will have its foundation upon a rock. . . .” §

* Lincoln to Scott, Jan. 11th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Lincoln to Wool, Jan. 14th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Trumbull to Lincoln, Dec. 2d, 1860. Unpublished MS.

|| Weed to Swett, Dec. 2d, 1860. Unpublished MS.

§ Weed to Lincoln, Dec. 16th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

To this Mr. Lincoln replied as follows:

“SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 17th, 1860.
“MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 11th was received two days ago. Should the convocation of governors of which you speak seem desirous to know my views on the present aspect of things, tell them you judge from my speeches that I will be inflexible on the territorial question; that I probably think either the Missouri line extended, or Douglas’s and Eli Thayer’s popular sovereignty, would lose us everything we gain by the election; that filibustering for all south of us, and making slave-States of it would follow, in spite of us, in either case; also that I probably think all opposition, real and apparent, to the fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution ought to be withdrawn.

“I believe you can pretend to find but little, if anything, in my speeches, about secession. But my opinion is, that no State can in any way lawfully get out of the Union without the consent of the others; and that it is the duty of the President and other government functionaries to run the machine as it is.

“Truly yours, A. LINCOLN.” ¶

Mr. Greeley not only had similar fears, but, what was much worse, by his editorials in the “Tribune” encouraged the South to hope for peaceable disunion. He wrote (November 30th):

“Webster and Marshall and Story have reasoned well; the Federal flag represents a government, not a mere league; we are in many respects one nation from the St. John to the Rio Grande; but the genius of our institutions is essentially Republican and averse to the employment of military force to fasten one section of our Confederacy to the other. If eight States, having five millions of people, choose to separate from us, they cannot be permanently withheld from so doing by Federal cannon.” **

“There is a pretty general belief here that the cotton-States will go out of the Union,” wrote a correspondent from Washington. “One South Carolina member is sorry for the condition of things in his State — is at heart opposed to disunion; but I will not mention his name lest it should by some means get into the newspapers. Orr was forced into the secession movement against his will. This I have from good authority, and yet the statement may be a mistake. It is hard to get at the exact truth.” ††


From another Mr. Lincoln received information as to the course of his party friends: “A good feeling prevails among Republican senators. The impression with all, unless there be one exception, is, that Republicans have no concessions to make or compromises to offer, and that it is impolitic even to discuss making them. . . . I was a little surprised that the House voted to raise a committee on the state of the Union. . . . Inactivity and a kind spirit is, it seems to me, all that is left for us to do, till the 4th of March.” †††

¶ Weed, *Memoirs*, Vol. II., p. 310.

** N. Y. “Tribune,” Nov. 30th, 1860.

†† Gurley to Lincoln, Dec. 3d, 1860. MS.

††† Trumbull to Lincoln, Dec. 4th, 1860. Unpublished MS.



HON. E. B. WASHBURNE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

"I have never in my life," wrote Mr. Corwin, chairman of the Committee of Thirty-three (December 10th), "seen my country in such a dangerous position. I look upon it with great alarm, but I am resolved not to be paralyzed by dismay. Our safety can only be insured by looking the danger full in the face and acting with calm dignity in such way as [that] if possible we may ride out the storm."*

These few extracts out of a multitude must suffice to indicate the current and character of the reports which reached Mr. Lincoln from various quarters. The hopes of the more sanguine were, unfortunately, not realized. The timid grew more despondent, the traitors bolder, and the crisis almost became a panic. Business men and capitalists of the Eastern States were beginning to exert a pressure for concessions to avert civil war, under which stanch Republicans were on the point of giving way. The border States, through their presses and their public men, implored a compromise, but the entreaty was uniformly directed to the Republicans to make concessions, and more often to justify than to denounce disunion. Some of the conspirators themselves adroitly encouraged this effort to demoralize the North by a pretense of contrition. "South Carolina, I suppose," wrote a friend to Mr. Lincoln, "will try on her secession project. Perhaps some of the cotton-States will follow. Their number will not be large. Indeed I know that some of the

heretofore most rabid secessionists now tremble before the brink on which they stand. They would retreat without trying the experiment if they had not kindled a fire at home which is beyond their control. This, in substance, Jefferson Davis stated to Fitch no longer ago than yesterday."† The profession did not well accord with the signing of the conspirator's secession address by that senator only three days before. "I listened yesterday to Mr. Crittenden's speech," wrote another friend, "in support of his proposed compromise. In my opinion he is one of the most patriotic and at the same time mischievous of the Southern senators. . . . After Mr. Crittenden, Mr. Johnson of Tennessee took the floor. . . . His simple declaration that the supposed wrongs must be settled inside of the Union is worth a hundred-fold more than all the patriotic wailing of the antediluvian Crittendens."‡

There were plenty of correspondents to announce and describe the present and impending dangers, but none to furnish a solution of the national difficulty. There was no end of wild suggestion, and that too from prominent men ordinarily capable of giving counsel. One, as we have seen, was for accepting disunion. Another thought a letter or proclamation from the President-elect would still the storm. A third wanted him to drop down into Washington "with a carpet-sack." A fourth advised him to march to the capital with a hundred thousand "wide-awakes." Still a fifth proposed he should create a diversion by the purchase of Cuba.

It was a providential blessing that in such a crisis the President-elect was a man of unflinching common sense and complete self-control. He watched the rising clouds of insurrection; he noted the anxious warnings of his friends. He was neither buoyed up by reckless hopes, nor cast down by exaggerated fears. He bided his time, grasped at no rash counsels or experiments, uttered neither premature cry of alarm nor boast of overweening confidence. He resisted pressing solicitations to change his position, to explain his intention, to offer, either for himself or the great national majority which chose him, any apology for his or their high prerogative exercised in his election.

It must not, however, be inferred from the foregoing that Mr. Lincoln shut himself up in total silence. To discreet friends, as well as to honorable opponents, under the seal of con-

*Corwin to Lincoln, Dec. 10th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

†Fogg to Lincoln, Dec. 17th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

‡Williams to Lincoln, Dec. 19th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

confidence, he was always free to repeat his well-formed convictions, and even in some degree to foreshadow his probable course. It is gratifying to note in this connection, especially since it evinces his acute judgment of human nature, that in few instances was such confidence violated during the whole period of his candidacy and official life. By unnoticed beginnings he easily and naturally assumed the leadership of his party in the personal interviews and private correspondence following the election, called out by the manifestations of Southern discontent. He was never obtrusive nor dictatorial; but in a suggestion to one, a hint to another, a friendly explanation or admonition to a third, he soon gave direction, unity, and confidence to his adherents.

Mr. Bryant, for instance, was strongly opposed to Mr. Seward's going into the Cabinet. Lincoln wrote him a few lines in explanation, which brought back the following qualified acquiescence:

"I have this moment received your note. Nothing could be more fair or more satisfactory than the principle you lay down in regard to the formation of your council of official advisers. I shall always be convinced that whatever selection you make it will be made conscientiously."*

Mr. Greeley was, as we have seen, indulging in damaging vagaries about peaceable secession, and to him Lincoln sent a word of friendly caution. Greeley wrote a statement of his views in reply, but substantially yielded the point. He said a State could no more secede at pleasure from the Union than a stave could secede from a cask. That if eight or ten contiguous States sought to leave, he should say, "There's the door — go!" But,

"if the seceding State or States go to fighting and defying the laws, the Union being yet undissolved save by their own say-so, I guess they will have to be made to behave themselves. . . . I fear nothing, care for nothing, but another disgraceful back-down of the free States. That is the only real danger. Let the Union slide — it may be reconstructed; let Presidents be assassinated, we can elect more; let the Republicans be defeated and crushed, we shall rise again. But another nasty compromise, whereby everything is conceded and nothing secured, will so thoroughly disgrace and humiliate us that we can never again raise our heads, and this country becomes a second edition of the Barbary States, as they were sixty years ago. 'Take any form but that.'"†

* W. C. Bryant to Lincoln, Jan. 3d, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Greeley to Lincoln, Dec. 22d, 1860. Unpublished MS.

‡ Lincoln to Kellogg, Dec. 11th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

It would have been well had his advice been followed. Under the pressure of the disunionists and of



THURLOW WEED. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

On this point Lincoln's note had reassured his shrinking faith. The "Tribune" announced that Mr. Lincoln had no thought of concessions, and thenceforward that powerful journal took a more healthy and hopeful tone.

Hon. William Kellogg, the Illinois representative on the Committee of Thirty-three, wrote to him for instructions as to the course he should pursue. Under date of December 11th Mr. Lincoln replied to him as follows:

"Entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to the extension of slavery. The instant you do they have us under again: all our labor is lost, and sooner or later must be done over. Douglas is sure to be again trying to bring in his 'Popular Sovereignty.' Have none of it. The tug has to come, and better now than later. You know I think the fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution ought to be enforced — to put it in its mildest form, ought not to be resisted."‡

Some weeks later Kellogg visited Lincoln to urge his views of compromise on the President-elect. As a result of that visit Lincoln wrote the following letter to Seward on February 1st:

"On the 21st ult. Hon. W. Kellogg, a Republican member of Congress of this State, whom you probably know, was here in a good deal of anxiety for our friends to go in the way of compromise on the now vexed question. While he was with me I received a dispatch from Senator Trumbull, at Washington, al-

the border-State men, Kellogg's firmness gave way, and he announced his willingness to recede from the Republican declarations. The change effected nothing but the sacrifice of his own consistency. He lost his friends and gained no followers. His concession was spurned by the disunionists; and being a large and corpulent man, the wits of the day made themselves merry by dubbing his apostasy the "Mammoth Cave."

luding to the same question and telling me to await letters. I therefore told Mr. Kellogg that when I should receive these letters, posting me as to the state of affairs at Washington, I would write you, requesting you to let him see my letter. To my surprise, when the letters mentioned by Judge Trumbull came they made no allusion to the 'vexed question.' This baffled me so much that I was near not writing you at all, in compliance with what I had said to Judge Kellogg. I say now, however, as I have all the while said, that on the territorial question — that is, the question of extending slavery under the national auspices — I am inflexible. I am for no compromise which assists or permits the extension of the institution on soil owned by the nation. And any trick by which the nation is to acquire territory, and then allow some local authority to spread slavery, is as obnoxious as any other. I take it that to effect some such result as this, and to put us again on the high road to a slave empire, is the object of all these proposed compromises. I am against it. As to fugitive slaves, District of Columbia, slave-trade among the slave-States, and whatever springs of necessity from the fact that the institution is amongst us, I care but little, so that what is done be comely and not altogether outrageous. Nor do I care about New Mexico, if further extension were hedged against.*

We shall describe somewhat in detail the formation of Lincoln's Cabinet, and will only mention here that on December 13th he began that work by tendering the post of Secretary of State to Mr. Seward, which offer was accepted December 28th. The correspondence between these eminent men affords an interesting view of the beginnings of the new administration.

"Mr. Weed finding it not inconvenient to go West," wrote Seward, December 16th, "I have had some conversation with him concerning the condition and the prospect of public affairs, and he will be able to inform you of my present unsettled view of the subject upon which you so kindly wrote me a few days ago. I shall remain at home until his return, and shall then in further conference with him have the advantage of a knowledge of the effect of public events certain to occur this week."†

Weed went to Springfield and had several interviews with the President-elect. There is no record of these conferences; but it is likely that Mr. Weed urged on those occasions, as he did on all others, the utmost forbearance, conciliation, and concession to the South. To employ his favorite formula, he wanted Republicans "to meet secession as patriots and not as partisans." The sentiment and the alliteration were both pleasing; but Lincoln, trained in almost life-long debate with Douglas, the most subtle juggler in words ever known to American politics, was not a man to deal in vague phrases. He told Mr. Weed just what he would concede and just how far he would conciliate — drew him a sharp and definite line to show where partisanship ends and where patriotism begins. When Mr. Weed returned he bore with him the written statement of Lincoln; what he believed,

* Lincoln to Seward, Feb. 1st, 1860. Unpublished MS.

† Seward to Lincoln, Dec. 16th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

and was determined to assert and maintain on pending and probable issues.

Mr. Seward's letter of December 26th, to Lincoln, gives us the sequel of this visit.

"I had only the opportunity for conferring with Mr. Weed which was afforded by our journeying together on the railroad from Syracuse to Albany.

"He gave me verbally the substance of the suggestion you prepared for the consideration of the Republican members, but not the written proposition. This morning I received the latter from him, and also information for the first time of your expectation that I would write to you concerning the temper of parties and the public here.

"I met on Monday my Republican associates on the Committee of Thirteen, and afterwards the whole committee. With the unanimous consent of our section I offered three propositions which seemed to me to cover the ground of the suggestion made by you through Mr. Weed as I understood it.

"*First.* That the Constitution should never be altered so as to authorize Congress to abolish or interfere with slavery in the States. This was accepted.

"*Second.* That the fugitive-slave law should be amended by granting a jury trial to the fugitive. This in opposition to our votes was amended so as to give the jury in the State from which the fugitive fled, and so amended was voted down by our own votes. The committee had already agreed to Mr. Crittenden's amendment concerning the fees of the commissioner, making them the same when the fugitive is returned to slavery as when he is discharged.

"Our *Third* resolution was that Congress recommend to all the States to revise their legislation concerning persons recently resident in other States and to repeal all such laws which contravene the Constitution of the United States, or any law of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. This was rejected by the pro-slavery vote of the committee.


"To-day we have had another meeting. I offered, with the concurrence of my political associates, a fourth proposition, viz.: That Congress should pass a law to punish invasions of our States and conspiracies to effect such invasions, but the latter only in the State and district where the acts of such complicity were committed. This by the votes of our opponents was amended so as practically to carry out Mr. Douglas's suggestion of last winter for the revival of the old Sedition law of John Adams's time, and then was rejected by our own votes.

"This evening the Republican members of the committee with Judge Trumbull and Mr. Fessenden met at my house to consider your written suggestion and determine whether it shall be offered. While we think the ground has been already covered, we find that in the form you give it, it would divide our friends not only in the Committee but in Congress; a portion being unwilling to give up their old opinion that the duty of executing the constitutional provisions concerning fugitives from service belongs to the States, and not at all to Congress. But we shall confer and act as wisely as we can.

"Thus far I have reported only our action on the subject of your suggestion. I proceed now to tell you what I think of the temper of the parties and of the public here.

"South Carolina has already taken her attitude of defiance. Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are pushed on towards the same attitude. I think that they could not be arrested even if we should offer all you suggest and with it the restoration of the Missouri Compromise line. But persons acting for those States intimate that they might be so arrested because they think that the Republicans are not going to concede the restoration of that line.

"The action of the border States is uncertain. Sym-



ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

pathy there is strong with the cotton-States, while prudence and patriotism dictate adhesion to the Union. Nothing could *certainly* restrain them but the adoption of Mr. Crittenden's compromise, and I do not see the slightest indication of its adoption on the Republican side of Congress. The members stand nearly or quite as firm against it as the country is. Under these circumstances, time and accident, it seems to me, must determine the course of the border States.

"Probably all the debate and conferences we have hitherto had will sink out of the public mind within a week or two, when the Republican members shall have refused to surrender at discretion to the State of South Carolina. New and exciting subjects will enter into the agitation and control results.

"Thus I have said all that I am able to say of the temper of parties and of the public. I add, very respectfully, my own opinion on the probable future.

"The United States of America, their Constitution, their capital, their organization in all its departments, and with all its military and naval forces, will stand and pass without resistance into your hands. There will be several, perhaps all, of the slave-States standing in a contumacious attitude on the 4th of March. Sedition will be growing weaker and loyalty stronger every day from the acts of secession as they occur."⁷*

But now the crisis in the affairs of the Government was approaching. It is already foreshadowed in Mr. Seward's letter of December 28th. "There is a feverish excitement here," writes he, "which awakens all kinds of apprehensions of popular disturbance and disorders

connected with your assumption of the government." And he suggests that Mr. Lincoln should prepare to come to Washington a week earlier than is usual on such occasions; prefacing the advice, however, with the statement, "I do not entertain these apprehensions myself." But by the day following he becomes convinced of the danger.

"At length I have gotten a position," writes he, December 29th, "in which I can see what is going on in the councils of the President. It pains me to learn that things there are even worse than is understood. The President is debating day and night on the question whether he shall not recall Major Anderson and surrender Fort Sumter and go on arming the South. A plot is forming to seize the capital on or before the 4th of March, and this too has its accomplices in the public councils. I could tell you more particularly than I dare write, but you must not imagine that I am giving you suspicions and rumors. Believe me that I know what I write. In point of fact, the responsibilities of your administration must begin before the time arrives."[†]

Mr. Seward then advises that the President should arrive earlier, that he appoint his Secretaries of War, Navy, and Treasury, and that they come to Washington as soon as possible.

The events of a day or two, however, dissipated the apparent magnitude of the crisis. Buchanan's council broke up, Floyd retired in disgrace, the Cabinet was reorganized; Holt was made Secretary of War, and the immediate plots of the conspirators were exposed and for a season baffled.

STEPHENS'S SPEECH AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH LINCOLN.

FOLLOWING the lead of South Carolina, the governor of Georgia began the secession movement in that State almost immediately after the presidential election, by such public declarations and acts as fell within the scope of his personal influence and official authority. Georgia had, however, given a heavy vote for Douglas, and her people were imbued with a strong feeling of conditional unionism. An opposition to hasty secession at once developed itself of so formidable a character that all the influence and cunning of the secessionists were needed to push their movement to success. The ablest men in the State hurried to Mill-edgeville and met in a sort of battle-royal of speech-making and wire-pulling. The Legislature was the target, and its action or non-action upon military appropriations and a convention bill the result to be affected. Senator Toombs and others made speeches to promote

*Seward to Lincoln, Dec. 26, 1860. Unpublished MS.

†Seward to Lincoln, Dec. 29, 1860. Unpublished MS.

secession; and in reply to these Alexander H. Stephens addressed the Legislature by special invitation on the 14th of November. It was the greatest effort of his life, and takes rank as the ablest speech made by a Southerner in opposition to disunion. The occasion appears to have been one of great excitement. Toombs sat on the platform beside the speaker, and interlarded the address with his cynical interrogatories and comments, which Stephens met in every instance with successful repartee.

The speaker declared that to secede in consequence of Lincoln's election was to break the Constitution, and show bad faith. "We went into the election with this people," said he. "The result was different from what we wished; but the election has been constitutionally held." Mr. Lincoln could do the South no harm against an adverse House and Senate. This government, with all its defects, came nearer the object of all good governments than any other on the face of the earth. One by one he refuted the charges and complaints which had been advanced by Toombs, and warned his hearers against the perils of sudden disunion. Liberty once lost might never be restored. Georgia had grown great, rich, and intelligent in the Union.

"I look upon this country, with our institutions," continued he, "as the Eden of the world, the Paradise of the Universe. It may be that out of it we may become greater and more prosperous; but I am candid and sincere in telling you that I fear if we yield to passion, and without sufficient cause shall take that step, instead of becoming greater, or more peaceful, prosperous, and happy — instead of becoming gods we will become demons, and at no distant day commence cutting one another's throats."

The speech created an immense sensation throughout the South, and but for an artful trick of the secessionists would have arrested and changed the immediate tide of secession in Georgia. Seeing that the underlying Union feeling was about to endanger their scheme of revolt, through a defection or hesitation on the part of the Empire State of the South, they devised an adroit plea to appropriate its whole force to further their own plans. They persistently urged that "we can make better terms out of the Union than in it." Mr. Stephens himself has explained the misrepresentation and its result. "Two-thirds at least of those who voted for the ordinance of secession did

so, I have but little doubt, with a view to a more certain re-formation of the Union."*

To understand this statement more thoroughly, it must be added that Mr. Stephens's great Union speech was also enthusiastically hailed by the North as a sign of firm allegiance. But that part of the country totally misapprehended its spirit and object. With all his eloquently asserted devotion to the Union, he was a pro-slavery man of the most ultra type. He defended the institution upon the "higher-law" doctrine. "If slavery," said he, "as it exists with us is not best for the African, constituted and made as he is, if it does not best promote his welfare and happiness, socially, morally, and politically, as well as that of his master, it ought to be abolished."† He believed slavery should be protected in the Territories by Federal law. He did not go quite to the extent of advocating a revival of the African slave-trade; but went so far as to suggest that without such a reopening the South could not maintain her coveted balance of power. "If the policy of this country," said he, "settled in its early history, of prohibiting further importations or immigrations of this class of population, is to be adhered to, the race of competition between us and our brethren of the North in the colonization of new States, which heretofore has been so well maintained by us, will soon have to be abandoned."‡

So again, while he asserted that the South had lost nothing, but gained much through the slavery agitation, and while he maintained that she was menaced by no danger, he had been for nearly ten years a conditional disunionist. During the agitation of 1850, a convention of Georgia passed certain resolutions, known as the "Georgia platform." The resolutions declared the acceptance of the Compromise of 1850 as a "permanent adjustment"; and then went on to threaten disunion in case that adjustment were violated.§ This "Georgia platform" was Mr. Stephens's rallying-ground and stronghold; latterly he had extended it by including personal liberty bills as a cause of disunion. He loved the Union, but he held the Union secondary to the Georgia platform; and he opposed secession because he thought it a departure from this platform. "Not only a departure from the Georgia platform," said

* Stephens, "War Between the States," Vol. II., p. 321.

† Stephens, Farewell Speech, Augusta, Ga., July 2d, 1859. Cleveland, "Life of Stephens," p. 650.

‡ Ibid., p. 647.

§ "Fourth. That the State of Georgia, in the judgment of this convention, will, and ought to resist, even (as a last resort) to a disruption of every tie which binds her to the Union, any future act of Congress abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, without the consent and petition of the slave-holders thereof, or any act abolishing slavery in places within the slave-

holding States, purchased by the United States for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, navy-yards, and other like purposes; or in any act suppressing the slave-trade between slave-holding States; or in any refusal to admit as a State any territory applying, because of the existence of slavery therein; or in any act prohibiting the introduction of slaves into the territories of Utah and New Mexico; or in any act repealing or materially modifying the laws now in force for the recovery of fugitive slaves."— [Stephens, "War Between the States," Vol. II., p. 676.]

he, "and from the long-established principles of the national Democratic party, but an entire change of position of the entire South, of all parties, not of all individuals, in relation to the power and jurisdiction of the Federal Government over the subject of African slavery." * Still further: when the disruption of the Charleston convention paralyzed the Democratic party, Mr. Stephens lost heart. He thought the times out of joint. He saw no further prospect of doing good. The popular fever must run its course. If disunion came he avowed he would yield to the misfortune. His destiny, he said, lay with Georgia and the South.† It will appear from this that if Mr. Stephens was not a flexible reasoner, he was a most unsafe political mentor. Yet, out of this lethargy of conviction and will came the splendid outburst of patriotic eloquence and Union argument of his Milledgeville speech; only to be marred, however, at its close by renewed adhesion to the Georgia platform, and a new subserviency to the "will of Georgia."

The newspapers brought the report of Mr. Stephens's speech to Springfield, the home of Mr. Lincoln, as well as to all other Northern cities, and the President-elect read its stirring periods with something of the general hope that a gleam of light was shining upon dark places. Like other men in the North, he had no means of knowing the eccentricities of Mr. Stephens's principles and policy, and therefore probably shared the general error of overvaluing his expressions of attachment to the Union. He had personally known him as fellow-congressman and a fellow-whig in 1847-9; they had become co-laborers in their advocacy of the nomination and election of General Taylor to the presidency, and through these associations contracted a warm social and political friendship.

It was, therefore, most natural that, upon reading his reported speech Mr. Lincoln addressed a note of a few lines to Mr. Stephens, asking him for a revised copy; and that this note led to a short but most interesting correspondence.

Mr. Stephens replied courteously, saying that his speech had not been revised by him; that while the newspaper report contained several verbal inaccuracies, its main points were sufficiently clear for all practical purposes. The note closed with the following sentence: "The country is certainly in great peril, and no man ever had heavier or greater responsibilities resting upon him than you have in the present momentous crisis." The phrase seemed to open the way to a confidential interchange

of thought; and a few days afterwards Mr. Lincoln wrote the following frank letter:

"For your own eye only.

"SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Dec. 22d, 1860.

"HON. A. H. STEPHENS.

"MY DEAR SIR: Your obliging answer to my short note is just received, and for which please accept my thanks. I fully appreciate the present peril the country is in, and the weight of responsibility on me. Do the people of the South really entertain fears that a Republican administration would, directly or indirectly, interfere with the slaves, or with them about the slaves? If they do, I wish to answer you, as once a friend, and still, I hope, not an enemy, that there is no cause for such fears. The South would be in no more danger in this respect than it was in the time of Washington. I suppose, however, this does not meet the case. You think slavery is right and ought to be extended, while we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted. That, I suppose, is the rub. It certainly is the only substantial difference between us.

Yours very truly,

"A. LINCOLN."‡

With equal frankness Mr. Stephens, under date of December 30th, wrote back a long reply, which is conspicuous for its candid admissions. Premising that though differing from him politically he was not Mr. Lincoln's enemy, Mr. Stephens proceeds as follows:

"I will also add that in my judgment the people of the South do not entertain any fears that a Republican administration, or at least the one about to be inaugurated, would attempt to interfere directly and immediately with slavery in the States. Their apprehension and disquietude do not spring from that source. They do not arise from the fact of the known antislavery opinions of the President-elect. Washington, Jefferson, and other Presidents are generally admitted to have been antislavery in sentiment. But in those days antislavery did not enter as an element into party organizations. . . . But now this subject, which is confessedly on all sides outside of the constitutional action of the Government so far as the States are concerned, is made the central idea in the platform of principles announced by the triumphant party. The leading object seems to be simply, and wantonly, if you please, to put the institutions of nearly half the States under the ban of public opinion and national condemnation. This, upon general principles, is quite enough of itself to arouse a spirit not only of general indignation, but of revolt on the part of the proscribed. . . . We at the South do think African slavery, as it exists with us, both morally and politically right. This opinion is formed upon the inferiority of the black race; you, however, and perhaps a majority of the North, think it wrong. Admit the difference of opinion. The same difference of opinion existed to a more general extent amongst those who formed the Constitution when it was made and adopted. The changes have been mainly to our side. As parties were not formed on this difference of opinion then, why should they be now? The same difference would, of course, exist in the supposed case of religion. When parties, or combinations of men, therefore, so form themselves, must it not be assumed to arise not from reason or any sense of justice, but from fanaticism? The motive can spring from no other source, and when men come under the influence of fanaticism, there is no telling where their impulses or passions may drive them. This is what creates our

* Stephens, Augusta Speech, Sept. 1st, 1860. Cleveland, p. 692.

† Stephens to Landrum, July 1st, 1860. Cleveland, p. 672.

‡ Stephens, "War Between the States," Vol. II., p. 266.

discontent and apprehension. . . . Conciliation and harmony, in my judgment, can never be established by force. Nor can the Union, under the Constitution, be maintained by force. The Union was formed by the consent of Independent Sovereign States. Ultimate sovereignty still resides with them separately, which can be resumed, and will be, if their safety, tranquillity, and security in their judgment require it. Under our system, as I view it, there is no rightful power in the general government to coerce a State in case any one of them should throw herself upon her reserved rights, and resume the full exercise of her sovereign powers. Force may perpetuate a Union—that depends upon the contingencies of war. But such a Union would not be the Union of the Constitution: it would be nothing short of a consolidated despotism.”*

Mr. Lincoln could not, of course, enter upon a further discussion of the topics raised, and made no reply to Mr. Stephens's letter. The correspondence is noteworthy as showing how both writers agreed perfectly upon the actual and underlying cause of the political crisis,—*viz.*, that the South believed slavery to be right and ought to be extended, while the North believed it was wrong and ought to be restricted. It was a conflict of public opinion. Such conflicts have come in all times, in all nations, and under all forms of government. They have sprung from every passion of the human soul, ambition, avarice, the generous affection of kindred nations, and the deadly hatred of religious fanaticism. But, admitting the existence of such a conflict of opinion, the true and legitimate inquiry arises, Was it a proper cause of war?

History must answer this question unhesitatingly and emphatically in the negative. In ages happily passed, the anger of a king, the caprice of a mistress, or the ambition of a minister has often deluged a nation in blood. But in our day the conscience of civilization demands that the sword shall only defend the life of governments, or the life, liberty, and property of their subjects. It has ordained that written constitutions should decide claims of rulers and rights of citizens. Casuistry the most adroit could not prove the right of the free States to expel the slave-States for believing the institution of slavery to be a substantial blessing; equally absurd was the doctrine that the slave-States had a right to destroy the Union by secession because the free States thought slavery a moral, social, and political evil. Upon this question, as upon all others, public opinion was the arbiter appointed by the Constitution and laws. Upon this question the lawful and constitutional verdict had been pronounced by the election of Lincoln; and the proper duty of the South under the circumstances had been admirably stated by Mr. Stephens himself in his Milledgeville speech: “In my judgment the election of no man constitutionally chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any

State to separate from the Union. It ought to stand by and aid still in maintaining the Constitution of the country.”†

Mr. Stephens's letter utterly ignored the existence of the pro-slavery sentiment in the South, which had for six years been united and unceasing in party affiliation and action; that this party action had wrought the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in violation of pledged political faith, and generous comity between sections. Moreover that antislavery opinions had there been not only under ban of public sentiment, but had notoriously for years been visited with mob violence, and been made the subject of prohibitory penal statutes. The experiment of a sentimental union dreamed by Stephens and others had been fully tried in the compromise of 1850, and first and flagrantly violated by the South herself, under party coalition, against every appeal and protest.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

ONE of the vexatious duties of Lincoln was to answer the importunings of a class of sincere, intelligent, but timid men, alarmed by the signs of disunion, who besought him to make some public statement or declaration to quiet the South. Requests of this character were not confined to one party, but came from all; the more considerable numbers being from Republicans and from Southern unionists or followers of Bell and Everett. The great bulk of these letters were, of course, never answered; but occasionally one was received from a man of such standing and influence that to ignore it would not only seem ungracious, but might subject the President-elect to more serious misrepresentation than it had already been his lot to endure. Both to show a prominent phase of current politics and his manner of dealing with it, several replies of this class are laid before the reader.

Thus, for instance, he wrote, confidentially, to Mr. William S. Speer, a citizen of Tennessee, under date of October 23d:

“I appreciate your motive when you suggest the propriety of my writing for the public something disclaiming all intention to interfere with slaves or slavery in the States; but in my judgment it would do no good. I have already done this many, many times; and it is in print, and open to all who will read. Those who will not read or heed what I have already publicly said would not read or heed a repetition of it. ‘If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead.’”‡

Among the political newspapers of the West, none had for many years taken a higher rank or wielded a greater influence than the “Louisville Journal.” It had in a manner been Mr. Lincoln's primer in politics in those early days

* Stephens, “War Between the States,” Vol. II., pp. 267-70.

† Cleveland, p. 696.

‡ Lincoln to Speer, Oct. 23d, 1860. Unpublished MS.

when he labored through Blackstone, or even farther back when he was yet struggling with Kirkham's grammar on the shady knolls of New Salem. Compared with these rocks and pitfalls of letters, the anecdotes, the wit, the epigrammatic arguments of the "Louisville Journal" were a very garden of delight, not only to Lincoln, but to the crude yet knowledge-hungry intellects of the whole Mississippi Valley. In time the "Journal" became a great luminary, and the name of its witty editor a household word. For long years it was a beacon and watchtower of the Whig party; then the Pandora's box of the Nebraska bill was opened; and when finally in the extraordinary campaign of 1860 Lincoln read this once-favorite sheet, it was to find himself the victim of its satire and depreciation. Victory, however, is a sovereign balm for detraction; and it must have been easy for him to forgive his old friend George D. Prentice when the latter wrote him (October 26th): "There is evidently a very strong probability of your being elected to the presidency by the popular vote." Expressing the "strongest" confidence in both his "personal and political integrity," he suggests that in the event of his election he should publish a letter setting forth his conservative views and intentions, "to assure all good citizens of the South and to take from the disunionists every excuse or pretext for treason."*

To this appeal Mr. Lincoln prepared a reply, October 29th, though it was not then sent.

"Your suggestion," wrote he, "that I in a certain event shall write a letter setting forth my conservative views and intentions, is certainly a very worthy one. But would it do any good? If I were to labor a month, I could not express my conservative views and intentions more clearly and strongly than they are expressed in our platform and in my many speeches already in print and before the public. And yet even you, who do occasionally speak of me in terms of personal kindness, give no prominence to these oft-repeated expressions of conservative views and intentions, but busy yourself with appeals to all conservative men to vote for Douglas,—to vote any way which can possibly defeat me,—thus impressing your readers that you think I am the very worst man living. If what I have already said has failed to convince you, no repetition of it would convince you. The writing of your letter, now before me, gives assurance that you would publish such a letter from me as you suggest; but, till now, what reason had I to suppose the 'Louisville Journal,' even, would publish a repetition of that which is already at its command, and which it does not press upon the public attention? And now, my friend,—for such I esteem you personally,—do not misunderstand me. I have not decided that I will not do substantially what you suggest. I will not forbear from doing so merely on punctilio and pluck. If I do finally abstain, it will be because of apprehension that it would do harm. For the good men of the South—and I regard the majority of them as such—I have no objection to repeat seventy and seven times. But I have had men also to deal with, both North and South; men who are eager for something

new upon which to base new misrepresentations; men who would like to frighten me, or at least to fix upon me the character of timidity and cowardice. They would seize upon almost any letter I could write as being an 'awful coming down.' I intend keeping my eye upon these gentlemen, and to not unnecessarily put any weapons in their hands."†

This letter was withheld till after election. On the 16th of November he wrote a letter of very similar purport to Mr. N. Paschal, editor of the "Missouri Republican."

"I could say nothing which I have not already said, and which is in print, and accessible to the public. Please pardon me for suggesting that if the papers like yours, which heretofore have persistently garbled and misrepresented what I have said, will now fully and fairly place it before their readers, there can be no further misunderstanding. I beg you to believe me sincere, when I declare I do not say this in a spirit of complaint or resentment; but that I urge it as the true cure for any real uneasiness in the country, that my course may be other than conservative. The Republican newspapers now and for some time past are and have been republishing copious extracts from my many published speeches, which would at once reach the whole public if your class of papers would also publish them. I am not at liberty to shift my ground—that is out of the question. If I thought a repetition would do any good I would make it. But in my judgment it would do positive harm. The secessionists *per se*, believing they had alarmed me, would clamor all the louder."‡

With solicitations of this nature coming in part from his political friends, Mr. Lincoln was not only as firm and decided, but more emphatic and unsparing in criticism. On November 5th, the day before the presidential election, there arrived at Springfield, and called upon the President-elect, a gentleman from New England of some prominence in political and official life, who brought and presented letters of this same tenor from a considerable number of citizens representing business, commercial, and manufacturing industries of that region. He was one of those keen, incisive talkers who went direct to the heart of his mission.

"I have called to see," he said, "if the alarms of many persons in New England engaged in commerce and manufactures cannot by some means be relieved. I am myself largely interested in manufactures. Our trade has fallen off, our workmen are idle, we get no orders from the South, and with the increasing chances of civil war, bankruptcy and ruin stare us in the face."

Something in the persistence and manner of his interlocutor, something in the tone of the letters presented, and still more in the character of the signers, quickly irritated Lincoln to a warmth of retort he seldom reached until after long provocation. He divined at once the mercenary nature of the appeal about to be tried on him, and it roused him to repel the pressure. His visitor closed by asking some

* Prentice to Lincoln, Oct. 26th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

† Lincoln to Prentice, Oct. 29th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

‡ Lincoln to Paschal, Nov. 16th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

conservative promise "to reassure the men honestly alarmed."

"There are no such men," bluntly replied Lincoln. "This is the same old trick by which the South breaks down every Northern victory. Even if I were personally willing to barter away the moral principle involved in this contest for the commercial gain of a new submission to the South, I would go to Washington without the countenance of the men who supported me and were my friends before the election; I would be as powerless as a block of buckeye wood."

The man still insisted, and Lincoln continued:

"The honest men (you are talking of honest men) will look at our platform and what I have said. There they will find everything I could now say, or which they would ask me to say. All I could add would be but repetition. Having told them all these things ten times already, would they believe the eleventh declaration? Let us be practical. There are many general terms afloat, such as 'conservatism,' 'enforcement of the irrepressible conflict at the point of the bayonet,' 'hostility to the South,' etc., all of which mean nothing without definition. What then could I say to allay their fears, if they will not define what particular act or acts they fear from me or my friends?"

At this stage of the conversation his visitor, who with true military foresight had provided a reserve, handed him an additional letter numerous signed, asking if he did not there recognize names that were a power.

"Yes," retorted Lincoln sharply, glancing at the document, "I recognize them as a set of liars and knaves who signed that statement about Seward last year."

The visitor was taken aback at this familiarity with the local politics of his State, but rallied and insisted that there were also other names on the list. Lincoln now looked through the paper more carefully, his warmth meanwhile cooling down a little.

"Well," answered he, laughing, "after reading it, it is about as I expected to find it. It annoyed me to hear that gang of men called respectable. Their conduct a year ago was a disgrace to any civilized citizen."

Here his visitor suggested that the South was making armed preparations.

"The North," answered Lincoln, "does not fear invasion from the slave-States, and we of the North certainly have no desire, and never had, to invade the South. They have talked about what they intend to do in the event of a Black Republican victory, until they have convinced themselves there is really no courage left in the North."



GEORGE D. PRENTICE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

"Have we backed this time?" interrupted the visitor.

"That is just what I am pressed to do now," replied Lincoln. "If I shall begin to yield to these threats, if I begin dallying with them, the men who have elected me (if I shall be elected) would give me up before my election, and the South, seeing it, would deliberately kick me out. If my friends should desire me to repeat anything I have before said, I should have no objection to do so. If they required me to say something I had not yet said, I would either do so or get out of the way. If I should be elected, the first duty to the country would be to stand by the men who elected me."*

Still, from time to time the point was pressed upon him from other influential quarters. Mr. Raymond, editor of the "New York Times," joined in urging it. Lincoln, on November 28th, answered him confidentially as follows:

"Yours of the 14th was received in due course. I have delayed so long to answer it, because my reasons for not coming before the public in any form just now had substantially appeared in your paper (the 'Times'), and hence I feared they were not deemed sufficient by you, else you would not have written me as you did. I now think we have a demonstration in favor of my view. On the 20th instant Senator Trumbull made a short speech, which I suppose you have both seen and approved. Has a single newspaper, heretofore against us, urged that speech upon its readers with a purpose to quiet public anxiety? Not one, so far as I know. On the contrary, the 'Boston Courier' and its class hold me responsible for that speech, and endeavor to inflame the North with the belief that it foreshadows an abandonment of Republican ground by the incoming administration; while the 'Washington Constitution' and its class hold the same speech up to the South as an open declaration of war against them. This is just as I expected, and just what would happen

* Nicolay, Manuscript memoranda.

with any declaration I could make. These political fiends are not half sick enough yet. Party malice, and not public good, possesses them entirely. 'They seek a sign, and no sign shall be given them.' At least such is my present feeling and purpose."*


And in this purpose he remained steadfast to the end, though put to yet more trying tests. It has already been mentioned, that with the opening of Congress, and the formation of the Senate Committee of Thirteen and the House Committee of Thirty-three, certain conservative men from the border slave-States endeavored to gain control of the political situation by forming a neutral or mediating party between the disunionists and the Republicans. Their policy was an utter mistake; for, while reprobating present dismemberment, their attitude on the slavery question indicated clearly enough that, if clung to, it would inevitably drive them to the extreme plans of the cotton-States. Some of these would-be "neutral" States eventually went that direful road; and those which did not were saved only by the restraint of the Union army. But for the present their leaders were sincerely patriotic. From one of the most prominent of these, Hon. John A. Gilmer of North Carolina, to whom Lincoln afterwards made a tender of a Cabinet appointment, he received an inquiry, dated December 10th, concerning his opinions on several points of the slavery controversy, saying:

"I am not without hope that a clear and definite exposition of your views on the questions mentioned may go far to quiet, if not satisfy, all reasonable minds that on most of them it will become plain that there is much more misunderstanding than difference, and that the balance are so much more abstract than practical."†

However difficult to resist this appeal, so influential, so respectful, so promising, the President-elect felt himself bound to adhere to his policy of refusing any public utterance, for reasons which he set forth at some length in a confidential answer, written December 15th.

"I am greatly disinclined," said he, "to write a letter on the subject embraced in yours; and I would not do so, even privately as I do, were it not that I fear you might misconstrue my silence. Is it desired that I shall shift the ground upon which I have been elected? I cannot do it. You need only to acquaint yourself with that ground, and press it on the attention of the South. It is all in print and easy of access. May I be pardoned if I ask whether even you have ever attempted to procure the reading of the Republican platform, or my speeches, by the Southern people? If not, what reason have I to expect that any additional production of mine would meet a better fate? It would make me appear as if I repented for the crime of having been elected and was anxious to apologize and beg forgiveness. To so represent me would be the principal use made of any letter I might now thrust upon the public. My old record cannot be so used; and that is precisely the reason that some new declaration is so much sought.

* Lincoln to Raymond, Nov. 28th, 1860. Unpublished MS.



JOHN A. GILMER. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

"Now, my dear sir, be assured I am not questioning your candor; I am only pointing out, that while a new letter would hurt the cause, which I think a just one, you can quite as well effect every patriotic object with the old record. Carefully read pages 18, 19, 74, 75, 88, 89, and 267 of the volume of Joint Debates between Senator Douglas and myself with the Republican Platform adopted at Chicago, and all your questions will be substantially answered. I have no thought of recommending the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, nor the slave-trade among the slave-States, even on the conditions indicated; and if I were to make such recommendation, it is quite clear Congress would not follow it.

"As to employing slaves in arsenals and dockyards, it is a thing I never thought of in my life, to my recollection, till I saw your letter; and I may say of it precisely as I have said of the two points above.

"As to the use of patronage in the slave-States, where there are few or no Republicans. I do not expect to inquire for the politics of the appointee, or whether he does or not own slaves. I intend in that matter to accommodate the people in the several localities, if they themselves will allow me to accommodate them. In one word, I never have been, am not now, and probably never shall be in a mood of harassing the people either North or South.

"On the territorial question I am inflexible, as you see my position in the book. On that there is a difference between you and us; and it is the only substantial difference. You think slavery is right and ought to be extended; we think it is a wrong and ought to be restricted. For this neither has any just occasion to be angry with the other.

"As to the State laws, mentioned in your sixth question, I really know very little of them. I never have read one. If any of them are in conflict with the fugitive-slave clause, or any other part of the Constitution, I certainly shall be glad of their repeal; but I

† Gilmer to Lincoln, Dec. 10th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

could hardly be justified, as a citizen of Illinois, or as President of the United States, to recommend the repeal of a statute of Vermont or South Carolina."*

We have given samples of these solicitations coming from Republicans, from Douglas Democrats, and from the adherents of Bell; the following, coming from the fourth political school, will perhaps be found of equal if not greater interest. Its origin is given in the words of the principal actor, General Duff Green, who, in a letter some three years afterwards, thus described it:

"In December, 1860, at the request of the President of the United States, I went to Springfield to see Mr. Lincoln and urge him to go to Washington and exert his influence in aid of the adjustment of the questions then pending between the North and the South. I was authorized by Mr. Buchanan to say to him that if he came he would be received and treated with the courtesy due to the President-elect. I saw Mr. Lincoln at his own house, and did urge the necessity of his going to Washington and uniting his efforts in behalf of peace, telling him that in my opinion he alone could prevent a civil war, and that if he did not go, upon his conscience must rest the blood that would be shed."†

Whether this proposition came by authority or not, Lincoln could not publicly either question the truth of the envoy or the motive of the mission. In either case the appeal was most adroitly laid. Of course it was impossible to accept or even to entertain it; on the other hand, a simple refusal might be made the basis of very serious misrepresentation. He therefore wrote the following reply:

"SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Dec. 28th, 1860.

"GEN. DUFF GREEN.

"MY DEAR SIR: I do not desire any amendment of the Constitution. Recognizing, however, that questions of such amendment rightfully belong to the American people, I should not feel justified nor inclined to withhold from them if I could a fair opportunity of expressing their will thereon through either of the modes prescribed in the instrument.

"In addition I declare that the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of powers on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend; and I denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as the gravest of crimes.

"I am greatly averse to writing anything for the public at this time; and I consent to the publication of this only upon the condition that six of the twelve United States senators for the States of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas shall sign their names to what is written on this sheet

* Lincoln to Gilmer, Dec. 15th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

† Duff Green to Jefferson Davis, May 26th, 1863. Unpublished MS.

‡ Lincoln to Duff Green, Dec. 28th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

below my name, and allow the whole to be published together.

"Yours truly,

"A. LINCOLN.

"We recommend to the people of the States we represent respectively, to suspend all action for dismemberment of the Union, at least until some act deemed to be violative of our rights shall be done by the incoming administration."‡

This letter Lincoln transmitted to Senator Trumbull at Washington, with the following direction:

"General Duff Green is out here endeavoring to draw a letter out of me. I have written one which herewith I inclose to you, and which I believe could not be used to our disadvantage. Still, if on consultation with our discreet friends you conclude that it may do us harm, do not deliver it. You need not mention that the second clause of the letter is copied from the Chicago Platform. If, on consultation, our friends, including yourself, think it can do no harm, keep a copy and deliver the letter to General Green."§

While the fact is not definitely known, it is probable that this letter was delivered. Nothing further came of Duff Green's mission except a letter from himself in the "New York Herald" mentioning his visit and its failure, in the vaguest generalities. His whole aim had been to induce Lincoln tacitly to assume responsibility for the Southern revolt; and when the latter by his skillful answer pointed out the real conspirators, they were no longer anxious to have a publication made.

The whole attitude and issue of the controversy was so tersely summed up by Lincoln in a confidential letter to a Republican friend, under date of January 11th, 1861, that we cannot forbear citing it in conclusion:

"Yours of the 6th is received. I answer it only because I fear you would misconstrue my silence. What is our present condition? We have just carried an election on principles fairly stated to the people. Now we are told in advance the Government shall be broken up unless we surrender to those we have beaten, before we take the offices. In this they are either attempting to play upon us or they are in dead earnest. Either way, if we surrender, it is the end of us, and of the Government. They will repeat the experiment upon us *ad libitum*. A year will not pass till we shall have to take Cuba as a condition upon which they will stay in the Union. They now have the Constitution under which we have lived over seventy years, and acts of Congress of their own framing, with no prospect of their being changed; and they can never have a more shallow pretext for breaking up the Government, or extorting a compromise, than now. There is in my judgment but one compromise which would really settle the slavery question, and that would be a prohibition against acquiring any more territory."||

§ Lincoln to Trumbull, Dec. 28th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

|| Lincoln to Hon. J. T. Hale, Jan. 11th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

A Song in Camp.

THE article on the "Songs of the War," by Mr. Brander Matthews, in THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for August, brought back to my memory vividly an experience at Murfreesboro', just after the battle of Stone's River. There was a good deal of gloomy feeling there. The losses in the army had been terrible; and, besides, there were among the troops a large number of Kentucky and Tennessee regiments, to whom the Emancipation Proclamation was not palatable. A number of officers had resigned, or tendered resignations, on account of it. One day a whole batch of resignations came in, all written in the same handwriting and coming from one regiment, including nearly all the officers in it, assigning as a reason their unwillingness to serve longer in consequence of the change in the purpose and conduct of the war. The instigator of these letters was found, and dismissed with every mark of ignominy — his shoulder straps were cut off, and he was drummed out of camp. This heroic remedy caused the officers whom he had misled to withdraw their resignations; but the thing rankled. A few days afterward a glee club came down from Chicago, bringing with them the new song,

"We 'll rally round the flag, boys,"

and it ran through the camp like wildfire. The effect was little short of miraculous. It put as much spirit and cheer into the army as a victory. Day and night one could hear it by every camp fire and in every tent. I never shall forget how the men rolled out the line,

"And although he may be poor, he shall never be a slave."

I do not know whether Mr. Root knows what good work his song did for us there — but I hope so.

Henry Stone.

The Confederate Strength in the Atlanta Campaign.

THE paper by General Joseph E. Johnston on the Atlanta campaign, in the August number of THE CENTURY MAGAZINE, asserts that on the 30th of April, 1864, the strength of the Confederate army was "37,652 infantry, 2812 artillery with 112 guns and 2392 cavalry," — in all 42,856. The return of the army on file in the War Department signed by General Johnston and attested by his adjutant-general, for April 30th, 1864, shows its "present for duty" almost 53,000:

Infantry	41,279
Cavalry	8,436
Artillery, 144 pieces	3,277

52,992

The difference between these figures and those given by General Johnston from the same return is, that

* For Cantey's strength, see General D. H. Maury's return April 22d, 1864.

† For Loring's strength, see General S. D. Lee's return May 10th, 1864.

in the magazine he gives the footings of the column of "effective total." This, in all Confederate returns, includes only sergeants, corporals, and private soldiers for duty. That the cavalry had an effective total of but 2392 with 8436 officers and men for duty is accounted for by the fact that a large number of horses were grazing in the rear because of the scarcity of forage at Dalton. They were brought to the front and the men became effective when Sherman's army began to advance. General Johnston's statement that his artillery comprised but 112 pieces is a manifest error, for the return plainly says 35 companies, 144 pieces.

The battle of Resaca was fought on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of May. Prior to that time, the Confederate army was reinforced by General Mercer's brigade of four Georgia regiments, which had been on garrison duty on the Atlantic coast. A footnote to the return of April 30th records that one of these regiments, the 63d Georgia, joined the army "since the report was made out," and that its effective total was 814. All of these regiments had full ranks; 2800 is a low estimate of their line-of-battle strength. Cantey's division,* 2 brigades of infantry and 2 batteries, 5300 for duty, came from Mobile about the 7th of May and was stationed at Resaca. Loring's division, 3 infantry brigades and 2 batteries, from General S. D. Lee's command, with 5145 for duty and a detachment of 550 from French's division, reached Resaca May 10th, 11th, and 12th. Meantime a regiment of the Georgia State line, estimated as six hundred strong, had been added to Hood's corps.

General Johnston had at Resaca at least 67,000 men for battle and 168 pieces of artillery. General Sherman had at most 104,000; † the odds against General Johnston when "the armies were actually in contact" were as 100 to 64, instead of "10 to 4," as stated in his article.

On the night of May 16th the Confederate army evacuated Resaca. On the following day, at Adairsvill it was reinforced by General W. H. Jackson's cavalry command, 4477 for duty, which was increased to 512 by June 10th. On the 19th of May at Cassville the division of General French joined the army with 417 effectives, exclusive of the detachment which was at Resaca. Another Georgia State line regiment, estimated as 600, was added to Hood's corps, an Quarles's brigade, 2200 strong, came on the 26th of May at New Hope Church. A comparison of the return of April 30th with that of June 10th shows an increase to the fighting strength of the army of 3399 from the return of men "absent with leave" in the corps of Hood, Hardee, Wheeler, and in the artillery. The return of May 20th is missing, but that of June 10th shows an increase since May 20th of 649 "returned from desertion" and 799 "joined by enlistment."

For French's detachment, see General French's report of "effectives when joined."

† For Sherman's army at Resaca, add 5200 for cavalry joined between May 1st and 12th to his strength May 1st of 98,797.

General Johnston has to account between April 30th and June 10th for men available for battle *at least*:

Present for duty at Dalton	April 30th	52,992
Mercer's brigade	May 2d	2,800
Cantey's division	" 7th	5,300
Loring's " "	May 10th, 11th, and 12th	5,145
French's detachment	May 12th	550
French's division	" 19th	4,174
Jackson's cavalry	" 17th	4,477
Jackson's cavalry increase before June 10th		643
Quarles's brigade	May 26th	2,200
Two regiments Georgia State line		1,200
Furloughed men returned		3,399
Recruits		799
Returned deserters		649
		84,328

All these figures are official except for Mercer's brigade and the two regiments of the Georgia State line.*

The return of General Johnston's army June 10th is the first on file in the War Department which includes all these reinforcements. It shows "present for duty":

	Officers.	Men.
Infantry	5049	47,554
Cavalry	1232	12,372
Artillery, 187 pieces	257	4,414
	6538	64,340
Or in round numbers		71,000

The difference of over 13,000 is accounted for by losses in battle, desertion, and increase in absent sick. The incomplete return of Medical Director Foard shows killed and wounded May 7th to 20th, inclusive, 3384. The return of June 10th shows 1551 killed and died since May 20th, indicating fully 6000 wounded. The same return shows 569 deserters. The 1542 prisoners captured from Hood and Hardee, shown by increase of absent without leave in their corps, account for the remainder without examining the returns of Polk's corps and the cavalry.

General Johnston's army reached its maximum strength on the New Hope Church line, where he must have had 75,000 for battle when the armies faced each other May 27th. General Sherman's army † there numbered, of all arms, for duty, 93,600 men, and several brigades of this force were employed in guarding trains and watching roads in all directions, for Sherman's army had no rear. Odds of less than 5 to 4 against him is "the great inequality of force" which General Johnston complains compelled him "to employ dismounted cavalry" in holding this line.

In a footnote to his article General Johnston says:

"I have two reports of the strength of the army besides that of July 30th, already given: 1. Of July 1st, 39,746 infantry, 3855 artillery, and 10,484 cavalry; total, 54,085. 2. Of July 10th, 36,901 infantry, 3755 artillery, and 10,270 cavalry; total, 50,926."

The return of July 1st shows "present for duty" all arms, officers and men, 64,578, instead of 54,085. (As in case of the return of April 30th, General Johnston gives only the "effective total.") The loss since June 10th is accounted for by 1114 dead, 711 deserters, 1042 increase in absent without leave (prisoners), and 3693 in increase of absent sick and wounded.

None of the returns of this army, either under Johnston or Hood, make any account of the Georgia militia, a division of which under General G. W. Smith

* For strength of Jackson's cavalry division, see General S. D. Lee's return May 10th, and the return of General Johnston's army June 10th, 1864.

† For strength of General French's division, see his return of "effectives when joined."

joined the army about June 20th near Kenesaw, making its available force on that line nearly 70,000 men.

The return of July 10th gives the present for duty 60,032, instead of 50,926, the loss since July 1st being 1377 deserters, 526 dead, two regiments sent to Savannah, and prisoners and wounded. This with the Georgia militia (increased to about nine thousand when the army reached Atlanta) represents the force turned over to General Hood July 18th, viz.:

Infantry	42,571
Cavalry	13,318
Artillery, 187 pieces	4,143
Militia (probably)	5,000

65,032

General Johnston asserts that the only affair worth mentioning, on his left at Resaca, was near the night of May 14th, when "40 or 50 skirmishers in front of our extreme left were driven from the slight elevation they occupied, but no attempt was made to retake it." In his official report, made in October, 1864, he says that at 9 o'clock at night of May 14th he "learned that Lieutenant-General Polk's troops had lost a position commanding our bridges." Comment upon the generalship that would leave a position commanding the line of retreat of an army in charge of 40 or 50 skirmishers within gun-shot of a powerful enemy is unnecessary, for it was not done. The position was held by a line of men. It was carried on the evening of May 14th by a gallant charge of two brigades of the Fifteenth Corps of the Union army. Reinforced by another brigade, they held it against the repeated and desperate efforts of Polk's men to retake it. The battle lasted far into the night. General John A. Logan, in his official report of it, says that when at 10 o'clock at night "the last body of the enemy retired broken and disheartened from the field, . . . it was evident to the meanest comprehension among the rebels that the men who double-quickened across to their hills that afternoon had come to stay." General Logan also says that by the capture of this position "the railroad bridge and the town were held entirely at our mercy."

The Fifteenth Corps lost 628 killed and wounded at Resaca. The troops in its front, Loring's and Cantey's divisions and Vaughan's brigade, according to their incomplete official reports lost 698. Much the greater part of this loss must have been on the evening of May 14th, for there was no other line-of-battle engagement on this part of the field.

General Johnston characterizes the battle of May 28th at Dallas as "a very small affair," in which the Confederates lost about 300 men and the Union troops "must have lost more than ten times as many." This was an assault made upon troops of the Fifteenth Corps by two brigades of Bate's Confederate division and Armstrong's brigade of Jackson's cavalry dismounted, supported by Smith's brigade of Bate's division and Ferguson's and Ross's brigades of Jackson's cavalry. Lewis's Kentucky brigade attacked the front of Osterhaus's division without success. Bullock's Florida brigade charged along the Marietta road and was driven back, with heavy loss, by the fire of the 53d Ohio regiment. Armstrong assailed the position held by Walcutt's brigade across the Villa Rica road and met a bloody re-

For strength of Quarles's brigade, see Johnston's narrative, p. 575.

† For Sherman's strength on the New Hope line, see his return May 31st and deduct Blair's Seventeenth Corps, which did not join the army until June 8th.

pulse. General Bate officially reported the loss in his division as 450. General Walcutt in his official report says that "244 dead and wounded rebels were found in my front," and many were doubtless removed. The Confederate loss in this "very small affair" was, therefore, over 700. The loss of the Fifteenth Corps was 379, or about one-half the Confederate loss, instead of "more than ten times as many."

General Johnston assumes that General Sherman used his entire army in the assault on Kenesaw Mountain, when, in fact, he employed less than 15,000 men. The remainder of the army was not engaged, except in the continuous battle of the skirmish lines. The assaulting column of the Army of the Cumberland, directed against Hardee's corps, was composed of 5 brigades about 9000 strong. The formation was such that each brigade presented a front of but two companies. The leading regiments lost very heavily; those in the rear suffered few casualties. General Thomas reported the entire loss as 1580. The attack of the Army of the Tennessee was made upon the Confederate intrenchments held by French's division and a part of Walker's, by three brigades of the Fifteenth Corps, numbering 5500 men. Their formation was in two lines; their total loss 603, three-fourths of this falling on the regiments in the first line.

General Johnston expresses the belief that Northern soldiers could not be repulsed with casualties so small as reported at Kenesaw. In this he, unwittingly perhaps, compliments Sherman's army at the expense of his own. On the 22d of June, five days before the battle of Kenesaw, he tells us that the divisions of Stevenson and Hindman were repulsed, in an assault on the Union line, with a loss of one thousand men. These divisions, June 10th, numbered over 11,000 for duty. Their loss, therefore, was but 9 per cent., while that of the troops of the Army of the Cumberland engaged at Kenesaw was 17 per cent.; of the Army of the Tennessee, 11 per cent. In both cases the loss sustained was sufficient to demonstrate the futility of further effort. In neither case was it a fair test of the staying qualities of the troops who on many fields had shown their willingness to shed any amount of blood necessary when there was reasonable hope of success.

E. C. Dawes,
Late Major 53d Ohio Regiment.

CINCINNATI, September 8th, 1887.

A Rejoinder to General Robertson by Colonel Mosby.

IN THE CENTURY for August, General Beverly H. Robertson defends himself against the charge of having disobeyed orders in the Gettysburg campaign, and imputes to me the absurdity of trying to prove that Stuart knew nothing about it, and also with defending him against "an imaginary attack." With equal propriety it might be said that General Robertson has defended himself against "an imaginary attack." I never intimated that Stuart was ignorant of his default. Stuart fought at Gettysburg and knew that Robertson did not. The latter affects to be unaware of the fact that two of General Lee's staff have published accounts of Gettysburg, in which they attribute the loss of the battle to the want of cavalry to make the preliminary reconnoissances; and that in the memoir of his chief by Stuart's adjutant, the blame of it is put upon himself

(General Robertson). The accusation against which I defended Stuart was, that by going into Pennsylvania around Hooker's rear with a portion of the cavalry he had taken away the eyes of the army, so that General Lee, like a blind man, had stumbled into the fight. I think I have shown that the fault was not in Stuart's plan, but in the execution of the part assigned to a subordinate. If Booth plays "Othello" with a bad support, the performance as a whole will be a failure, no matter what may be the merit of the chief actor. The complaint against Robertson is, that having been placed with a large force of cavalry in observation, with orders to follow on the *right* of the army *next to the enemy*, he gave General Lee no information of their movements, but followed on the *left*, and never reached the battle-field. He says that he was ordered "to cross the Potomac where Lee crossed," and follow on the *right* of the army. No such instructions were given him, as they would have involved a physical impossibility, as Lee crossed with Longstreet on the *left* at Williamsport. So did General Robertson. His instructions were: "After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains, and withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, and place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its *right* and rear." In his letter to Stuart of June 23d, General Lee had directed that, if the cavalry passed through the Shenandoah Valley, it must cross on our *right* at Shepherdstown (where A. P. Hill crossed) and move towards Frederick City. Stuart's instructions to Robertson indicated the same general direction for him to go, and, if they had been obeyed, would have put the cavalry in its proper position, between our infantry and the enemy. The Northern army moved into Pennsylvania east of the Blue Ridge or South Mountain, while Robertson's command moved on a parallel line, about twenty miles to the *west* of it. This is the only example in war of the cavalry of an invading army marching in rear of the infantry. He says that, as he was ordered to avoid pikes, he was compelled to go by Martinsburg. But that could not have been the reason for selecting this route, as he actually traveled along pikes nearly all the way; whereas, if he had gone by Shepherdstown, he might have avoided them altogether. The suggestion to keep off turnpikes, to save his horses' shoes, did not require him to change the direction prescribed for him on the *right* of the army. He says he hurried on from Virginia to join the army, and by forced marches reached Chambersburg on the evening of July 2d, and Cashtown on the next morning — which was the last day of the battle. If he had kept on to Gettysburg, he might have reached there in time to witness the last scene of the great tragedy. He had marched from Berryville to Chambersburg in *three* days — which is exactly the time that it took Longstreet's infantry to march the same distance. But then Longstreet did not pretend to be in a hurry. If keeping behind the *left* wing is the same thing as being on the *right* flank of the army, then there can be no doubt that General Robertson obeyed orders. At Cashtown, he says that he heard that Pleasonton was moving to capture our trains, so he turned off and went to meet him. Pleasonton was then fighting Stuart at Gettysburg. General Robertson made no report of his operations in this campaign, but General Jones, who was

under him, says that at Cashtown an order came from General Lee requiring a cavalry force to be sent to Fairfield, and that in the *absence of General Robertson* he determined to move in that direction at once, and that near there he encountered and routed the 6th United States Regulars. There was only *one* regiment of Federal cavalry there, which thus neutralized two Confederate brigades with two batteries of artillery. If all of our cavalry had been at the front, Meade could not have spared even this one regiment to send after Lee's trains; it would have been all he could do to take care of his own. In the skirmish at Fairfield on July 3d was the first time Robertson's command had seen the enemy since it disappeared from his front at Middleburg, Va., early on the morning of June 26th. Keeping eight days out of sight of the enemy was not exactly the way to carry out Stuart's order *to watch and harass him*. It was his leadership *preceding* the battle that I criticised. In modern war the most important service of cavalry is rendered before a battle begins. General Robertson says that it was at Martinsburg, and not at Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge, "*as Colonel Mosby insinuates,*" that he received orders from General Lee to join the army. In December, 1877, a letter of his was published in the Philadelphia "Times," in which he justified his delay in Virginia, on the ground that his instructions required him "*to await further orders,*" and stated that on June 29th, *at Ashby's Gap,* he received orders from General Lee to join the army, and started forthwith. He fortified this statement by certificates of two members of his staff. The instructions which I recently found among the Confederate archives direct him to hold the mountain gaps "as long as the enemy remains in your [his] front in force." He staid there *three* days after they had gone into Pennsylvania, and now makes no explanation of the delay, but raises an immaterial issue about the skirmish at Fairfield, which simply proves that on the day of battle he was in the rear with the wagon trains. General Robertson says that he gave satisfaction to General Lee. Now, that General Lee was dissatisfied with some one is shown by his report in which he complains that "the movement of the army *preceding* the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry." I have elsewhere shown that this censure can only apply to the commander of the cavalry who was left with him to observe the enemy. As soon as the army returned to Virginia, General Robertson, at his own request, was relieved of command. No argument in favor of acquittal can be drawn from the leniency that was shown in this case. There was but little of the stern Agamemnon in the character of General Lee.

Jno. S. Mosby.

SAN FRANCISCO, August 24th, 1887.

An Anecdote of the Petersburg Crater.

I WAS in Virginia in 1864, and the paragraph in General Grant's Vicksburg paper describing the mine explosion and the frightened negro who was lifted "about three mile" brings to my mind the mining of the Confederate works before Petersburg in the summer of 1864. Among the prisoners captured was one whose face was greatly begrimed, and as he marched by he was saluted by a blue-coat with the remark, "Say, John-

ny! guess you got blown up." "Well," replied Johnny with an oath, "I should just say so; but somehow I got the start of the other fellows, for when I was coming down I met the regiment going up, and they all called me a blasted straggler!"

Henry R. Howland.

BUFFALO, September 7th, 1885.

Ransom's Division at Fredericksburg.

IN the August, 1886, number of THE CENTURY General James Longstreet published what he "saw of the battle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, 1862."

The omissions in that article were so glaring and did such injustice, that I wrote to him and requested him to correct what would produce false impressions. His answer was unsatisfactory, but promised that, "I [Longstreet] expect in the near future to make accounts of all battles and put them in shape, in a form not limited by words, but with full details, when there will be opportunity to elaborate upon all points of interest."

General Lee, in his report of the battle of Fredericksburg, December 13th, 1862, writes as follows:

... "Longstreet's corps constituted our left, with Anderson's division resting upon the river, and those of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood extending to the right in the order named. Ransom's division supported the batteries on Marye's and Willis's hills, at the foot of which Cobb's brigade of McLaws's division and the 24th North Carolina of Ransom's brigade were stationed, protected by a stone wall. *The immediate care of this point was committed to General Ransom.*"

The italics in this paper are all mine. The positions are stated by General Lee exactly as the troops were posted. Lee's report continues, farther on:

... "About 11 A. M., having massed his [the enemy's] troops under cover of the houses of Fredericksburg, he moved forward in strong columns, to seize Marye's and Willis's hills. General Ransom advanced Cooke's brigade to the top of the hill, and placed his own, with the exception of the 24th North Carolina, a short distance in rear."... "In the *third* assault " [his report continues] "the brave and lamented Brigadier-General Thomas R. Cobb fell at the head of his gallant troops, and almost at the same moment Brigadier-General Cooke was borne from the field severely wounded. Fearing that Cobb's brigade might exhaust its ammunition, General Longstreet had directed General Kershaw to take two regiments to its support. Arriving after the fall of Cobb, he assumed command, his troops taking position on the crest and at the foot of the hill, *to which point General Ransom also advanced three other regiments.*"

General Kershaw took command of Cobb's brigade, which I had had supplied with ammunition from my wagons, and I repeated the supply during the day.

General Longstreet in his official report says:

... "General Ransom on Marye's Hill was charged with the *immediate care of the point attacked*, with orders to send forward additional reinforcements, if it should become necessary, and to use Featherston's brigade of Anderson's division, if he should require it." And continuing, "I directed Major-General Pickett to send me two of his brigades: *one, Kemper's, was sent to General Ransom to be placed in some secure position to be ready in case it should be wanted.*" And again, "I would also mention, as particularly distinguished in the engagement of the 13th, Brigadier-Generals Ransom, Kershaw, and Cooke (severely wounded)."

General McLaws was not upon the part of the field in the vicinity of Marye's and Willis's hills during the

battle, but his aide, Captain King, was killed on the front slope of the hill near Marye's house.

My own permanent command was a small division of two brigades of infantry,—my own, containing the 24th, 25th, 35th, and 49th; and Cooke's, the 15th, 27th, 46th, and 48th regiments,—all from North Carolina; and attached to my brigade was Branch's battery, and to Cooke's brigade the battery of Cooper.

At the time the fog began to lift from the field, I was with Generals Lee and Longstreet, on what has since been known as Lee's Hill. Starting to join my command as the Federals began to emerge from the town, General Longstreet said to me, "Remember, general, I place that salient in your keeping. Do what is needed; and call on Anderson if you want help."

I brought up Cooke before the first assault to the crest of the hills, and before that assault ended, Cooke took the 27th and 46th and part of the 15th North Carolina into the sunken road in front. The 48th North Carolina fought on top of the hill all day.

At the third assault I brought up the 25th North Carolina just in time to deliver a few deadly volleys, and then it "took position shoulder to shoulder with Cobb's and Cooke's men in the road."

During this third attack General Cobb was mortally hit, and almost at the same instant, and within two paces of him, General Cooke was severely wounded and borne from the field, Colonel E. D. Hall, 46th North Carolina, assuming command of Cooke's brigade.

At this juncture I sent my adjutant-general, Captain Thomas Rowland, to the sunken road to learn the condition of affairs. "His report was most gratifying, representing the troops in fine spirits and an abundance of ammunition. I had ordered Cobb's brigade supplied from my wagons."

After this third attack I was bringing up the 35th and 49th North Carolina of my brigade, when General Kershaw, by a new road leading from the mill below, came up on horseback with his staff at the head of *one* regiment, which he took in just at Marye's house. He was followed by a second regiment, which halted behind a brick-walled graveyard upon Willis's Hill.

About sundown Brigadier-General Kemper was brought up, and relieved the 24th North Carolina with two of his regiments and held the others in closer supporting distance. On the 20th of December, 1862, he sent me a list of his casualties, with this note:

"HEADQUARTERS KEMPER'S BRIGADE,
December 20th, 1862.

"GENERAL: I inclose herewith the statement of the losses of my brigade on the 13th and 14th insts. while acting as part of your command. While a report of my losses has been called for by my permanent division commander, and rendered to him, it has occurred to me that a similar one rendered to yourself would be proper and acceptable. Permit me to add, general, that our brief service with you was deeply gratifying to myself and to my entire command. I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

"J. L. KEMPER, BRIGADIER-GENERAL.
"BRIG.-GEN. RANSOM, COMMANDING DIVISION."

As stated in my letter to General Longstreet dated August 14th, 1886, when I brought to his attention his extraordinary omissions, it gave me unfeigned pleasure to mention properly in my official report the meritorious conduct of those who were a part of my permanent command and those others who that day fell under my direction by reason of my "*immediate care of the point attacked.*" My official report exhibits no self-seeking nor partial discriminations.

Upon a letter from me (of the 17th of December, 1862) to General R. H. Chilton, assistant adjutant-general Army of Northern Virginia, wherein I protest against the ignoring of my command in some telegraphic dispatches to the War Department at Richmond relative to the battle of the 13th, General Longstreet indorses these words: "*General Ransom's division was engaged throughout the battle and was quite as distinguished as any troops upon the field*"; and the same day, the 19th of December, I received from both him and General Chilton notes expressing the regret felt by General Lee at the injustice of which I complained. Those original letters are now among the "Official Records" in Washington.


I may be pardoned for remembering with pride that among the Confederate troops engaged on the *whole* battle-field of Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, 1862, none were more honorably distinguished than the sons of North Carolina, and those of them who with brother soldiers from other States held the lines at Marye's Hill against almost ten times their number of as brave and determined foes as ever did battle can well trust their fame to history when written from truthful official records.*

R. Ransom.

* When credit is not given for quotations, they are from my official report of the battle.—R. R.




THE BAGGAGE GUARD.



“He is the true history of the American people in his time. Step by step he walked before them; slow with their slowness, quickening his march by theirs, the true representative of this continent.”

EMERSON.



PHOTOGRAPHED BY BARR & YOUNG, ARMY PHOTOGRAPHERS. VICKSBURG, AUGUST, 1863.

LENT BY FRED B. SCHELL.

ENGRAVED BY T. JOHNSON.

GRANT AS MAJOR-GENERAL.



MUSIC ON SHERIDAN'S LINE OF BATTLE.

GRANT'S LAST CAMPAIGN.

I.

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG.*

AT 9 o'clock in the morning of the 29th of March, 1865, General Grant and the officers of his staff bid good-bye to President Lincoln and started by special train from City Point to the front.

The military railroad connecting headquarters with the camps south of Petersburg was a surface road, built up hill and down dale, and its undulations were so emphasized, that a train moving along it looked in the distance like a fly crawling over a corrugated wash-board. The general sat down near the end of the car, drew from his pocket the flint and slow match that he always carried, which unlike a match never missed fire in a gale of wind, and was soon wreathed in the smoke of the inevitable cigar. I took a seat near him with several other officers of the staff, and he at once began to talk over his plans in detail. They had been discussed in general terms before starting out from City Point.

For a month or more, General Grant's chief apprehension had been that Lee might suddenly pull out from his intrenchments, and fall back into the interior, where he might unite with General Joe Johnston against Sherman and force our army to follow him to a great distance from its present base. General Grant had been sleeping with one eye open and one

foot out of bed for many weeks, in the fear that Lee would thus give him the slip. Each army, in fact, had been making preparations for either a fight or a foot-race, or both, and the starting time had now arrived, for the weather had been fair for several days, and the roads were getting in good condition for the movement of troops, that is, as good as could be expected, through a section of country in which the dust in summer was generally so thick that the army could not see where to move, and the mud in winter was so deep that it could not move anywhere. On the train General Grant said: "The President is one of the few visitors I have had who has not attempted to extract from me a knowledge of my plans. He not only never asks them, but says it is better he should not know them, and then he can be certain to keep the secret."

When we reached the end of the railway, we rode down the Vaughn road, and went into camp for the night in a field just south of that road, close to Gravelly Run (see map, page 128). That night (March 29th), the army was disposed in the following order from right to left: Weitzel in front of Richmond, with a portion of the Army of the James, Parke and Wright holding our works in front of Petersburg, Ord extending to the intersection of Hatcher's Run and the Vaughn road, Humphreys stretching beyond Dabney's Mill, Warren on the extreme left reaching as far as the junction of the Vaughn road and the Boydton

Five Forks, have been necessarily omitted. The paper will be given entire in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," a work now being published by subscription, by the Century Co., in thirty-two parts—or four volumes—containing THE CENTURY war series in permanent and greatly extended and embellished form. — EDITOR.

* The reader is referred to the September CENTURY for articles on the siege of Petersburg, the last event described there being the Confederate sortie and repulse at Fort Stedman on March 25th. In order to bring the first half of General Horace Porter's paper within the limits of the present magazine article, many interesting details, including those of the fighting at

plank-road, and Sheridan at Dinwiddie Court House. The weather had become cloudy, and towards evening rain began to fall. It fell in torrents during the night and continued with but little interruption all the next day. The country was densely wooded, and the ground swampy, and by the evening of the 30th whole fields had become beds of quicksand in which horses sank to their bellies, and the bottoms of the roads seemed to be falling out. The men began to feel that if any one in after years should ask them whether they had been through Virginia, they could say, "Yes, in a number of places." The roads had become sheets of water; and it looked as if the saving of that army would require the services not of a Grant but of a Noah.

While standing in front of the general's tent on the morning of the 30th, discussing the situation with several others of the staff, General Sheridan turned in from the Vaughn road with his escort and came up to our headquarters camp. He dismounted, entered General Grant's tent, and had a long interview. The general informed Sheridan that he had intended to send him a corps of infantry that day, but the condition of the roads prevented, and that he hoped he could feel the enemy the next day, and if possible seize Five Forks with his cavalry. The next morning, the 31st, Sheridan reported that the enemy had been hard at work intrenching at Five Forks and to a point about a mile west of there. Lee had been as prompt as Grant to recognize Five Forks as a strategic point of great importance, and, to protect his right, had sent Pickett there with a large force of infantry and nearly all the cavalry. The rain continued during the night of the 30th, and the weather was cloudy and dismal on the morning of the 31st.

General Grant had anticipated that Warren would be attacked that morning and had warned him to be on the alert. Warren advanced his corps to develop with what force the enemy held the White Oak road and to try to drive him from it; but before he had gone far, he met with a vigorous assault. When news came of the attack, General Grant directed me to go to the spot and look to the situation of affairs there. Upon meeting him afterwards, about 1 o'clock, as he was riding out to Warren's command he directed me to go to Sheridan and explain what was taking place in Warren's and Humphreys's front, and have a full understanding with him as to further operations in his vicinity. I rode rapidly

NOTE TO THE PROFILES OF GENERAL GRANT: On being asked for the history of these portraits (which it will be noticed, were taken during General Grant's second term as President), Colonel Frederick D. Grant replied: "The taking of the photographs in profile was the occasion of my father's shaving for the second time that I ever knew of. My mother had asked him

down the Boydton plank-road, and hearing heavy firing in the direction of the Five Forks road, hurried on in that direction by way of the Brooks road.

I found Sheridan a little north of Dinwiddie Court House, and gave him an account of matters on the left of the Army of the Potomac. He said he had had one of the liveliest days in his experience, fighting infantry and cavalry with only cavalry, but that he was concentrating his command on the high ground just north of Dinwiddie, and would hold that position at all hazards. He begged me to go to General Grant at once and urge him to send him the Sixth Corps, because it had been under him in the Shenandoah Valley, and its people knew his people and were familiar with his way of fighting. I told him, as had been stated to him before, that the Sixth Corps was next to our extreme right, and that the only one which could reach him by daylight was the Fifth. I started soon after for General Grant's headquarters, then at Dabney's Mill, a distance of about eight miles, reached there at 7 o'clock P. M., and gave the general a full description of Sheridan's operations. He at once telegraphed the substance of my report to Meade, and preparations soon after began looking to the sending of the Fifth Corps to report to Sheridan. This proved to be one of the busiest nights of the whole campaign. Generals were writing dispatches and telegraphing from dark till daylight. Staff-officers were rushing from one headquarters to another, wading through swamps, penetrating forests and galloping over corduroy roads, engaged in carrying instructions, getting information, and making extraordinary efforts to hurry up the movement of the troops.

The next morning, April 1st, General Grant said to me: "I wish you would spend the day with Sheridan's command, and send me a bulletin every half-hour or so, advising me fully as to the progress being made. You know my views, and I want you to give them to Sheridan fully. I hope there may now be an opportunity of fighting the enemy's infantry outside of its fortifications."

I set out with half a dozen mounted orderlies to act as couriers in transmitting field bulletins. Captain Hudson, of our staff, went with me. After traveling again by way of the Brooks road, I met Sheridan about 10 A. M., on the Five Forks road, not far from J. Boisseau's house. General Warren, who had accompanied

to have a profile taken so that she might send it to Rome to have a cameo cut. Thinking that she wanted a profile of his features, he got shaved and had these pictures taken, very much to the disgust of my mother, who did not accept them for the cameo, but waited until his beard grew out again, and then had another profile taken for the purpose."—EDITOR.



GENERAL GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS, CITY POINT. (FROM THE PAINTING BY E. L. HENRY, OWNED BY THE UNION LEAGUE CLUB, NEW YORK.)

Crawford's division, arrived at 11 o'clock and reported in person to Sheridan.

A few minutes before noon, Colonel (afterwards General) Babcock, of General Grant's staff, came over from headquarters, and said to Sheridan: "General Grant directs me to say to you, that if in your judgment the Fifth Corps would do better under one of the division commanders, you are authorized to relieve General Warren, and order him to report to him, General Grant, at headquarters." General Sheridan replied, in effect, that he hoped such a step as that might not become necessary, and then went on to speak of his plan of battle.

The enemy's earth-works were parallel to the White Oak road and about a mile and three-quarters in length, with an angle formed by running a line back about one hundred yards from the main line and at right angles to it. The Fifth Corps was to wheel to the left and make its attack upon the "angle," and then moving westward sweep down in rear of the enemy's intrenched line. The cavalry, principally dismounted, was to deploy in front of the enemy's line and engage his attention, and, as soon as it heard the firing of our infantry, to make a vigorous assault upon his works.

The Fifth Corps had borne the brunt of the infantry fighting ever since the army had moved out on the 29th, and the gallant men who composed it were eager once more to cross bayonets with their old antagonists. But the movement was slow, the required formation seemed to drag, and Sheridan, chafing with impatience and consumed with anxiety, became as restive as a racer when he hears the line, and is struggling to make the start. He made every possible appeal for promptness; he dismounted from his horse, paced up and down, struck the clenched fist of one hand into the palm of the other, and fretted like a caged tiger.

At 4 o'clock, the formation was completed, the order for the assault was given, and the struggle for Pickett's entrenched line began.

Soon Ayres's men met with a heavy fire on their left flank and had to change directions by facing more towards the west. As the troops entered the woods and moved forward over the boggy ground and struggled through the dense undergrowth, they were staggered by a heavy fire from the angle and fell back in some confusion. Sheridan now rushed into the midst of the broken lines, and cried out: "Where is my battle-flag?" As the sergeant who carried it rode up, Sheridan seized the crimson and white standard, waved it above his head, cheered on the men, and made great efforts to close up the ranks. Bullets were humming like a swarm of bees. One pierced the battle-flag, another killed the sergeant who had carried it, another wounded Captain McGonnigle in the side, others struck two or three of the staff-officers' horses. All this time Sheri-

dan was dashing from one point of the line to another, waving his flag, shaking his fists, encouraging, threatening, praying, swearing, the very incarnation of battle. It would be a sorry soldier who could help following such a leader. Ayres and his officers were equally exposing themselves in rallying the men, and these veterans soon rushed forward with a rousing cheer and dashed over the earth-works, sweeping everything before them, and killing or capturing every man in their immediate front whose legs had not saved him.

Sheridan rode "Rienzi," the famous horse that had once carried him "twenty miles from Winchester." The general spurred him up to the angle, and with a bound he carried his rider over the earth-works, and landed in the midst of a line of prisoners who had thrown down their arms and were crouching close under their breastworks. Some of them called out, "Whar do you want us all to go?" Then Sheridan's rage turned to humor, and he had a running talk with the "Johnnies" as they



GENERAL PHILIP SHERIDAN. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1864.)

filed past. "Go right over there," he cried, pointing to the rear, "get right along, now, drop your guns, you 'll never need them any more. You 'll all be safe over there. Are there any more of you? We want every one of you fellows." Nearly 1500 were captured at the angle.


The cavalry commanded by the gallant Merritt had made a final dash, had gone over the earth-works with a hurrah, captured a battery of artillery, and scattered everything in front of them. Here Custer, Devin, Fitzhugh, and the other cavalry leaders were in their element, and vied with each other in deeds of valor.

After the capture of the angle, I went in the direction of Crawford's division, passed around the left of the enemy's works, and met Sheridan again, west of the Ford road, just a little before dark. He was laboring with all the energy of his nature to complete the destruction of the enemy's forces, and to make preparation to protect his own detached com-

mand from an attack by Lee in the morning. He said he had relieved Warren, directed him to report in person to General Grant, and placed Griffin in command of the Fifth Corps.

Sheridan had that day fought one of the

April fool." I then realized that it was the 1st of April. I had ridden so rapidly, that I reached headquarters at Dabney's Mill before the arrival of the last courier I had dispatched. General Grant was sitting with most of the



TWO OF SHERIDAN'S SCOUTS. (SKETCHED FROM LIFE BY WINSLOW HOMER.)

most interesting technical battles of the war, almost perfect in conception, brilliant in execution, strikingly dramatic in its incidents, and productive of immensely important results.

About half-past 7 o'clock I started for general headquarters. The roads in places were corduroyed with captured muskets; ammunition trains and ambulances were still struggling forward for miles; teamsters, prisoners, stragglers, and wounded were choking the roadway; the "coffee-boilers" had kindled their fires, cheers were resounding on all sides, and everybody was riotous over the victory. A horseman had to pick his way through this jubilant condition of things as best he could, as he did not have the right of way by any means. As I galloped past a group of men on the Boydton plank, my orderly called out to them the news of the victory. The only response he got was from one of them who raised his open hand to his face, put his thumb to his nose, and yelled: "No, you don't—

staff about him before a blazing camp-fire. He wore his blue cavalry overcoat, and the ever-present cigar was in his mouth. I began shouting the good news as soon I got in sight, and in a moment all but the imperturbable general-in-chief were on their feet giving vent to wild demonstrations of joy. For some minutes there was a bewildering state of excitement, grasping of hands, tossing up of hats, and slapping each other on the backs. It meant the beginning of the end, the reaching of the "last ditch." It pointed to peace and home. The general, as was expected, asked his usual question: "How many prisoners have been taken?" This was always his first inquiry when an engagement was reported. No man ever had such a fondness for taking prisoners. I think the gratification arose from the kindness of his heart, a feeling that it was much better to win in this way than by the destruction of human life. I was happy to report that the prisoners this time were esti-

mated at over five thousand, and this was the only part of my recital that seemed to call forth a responsive expression from his impassive features. After having listened attentively to the description of Sheridan's day's work, the general, with scarcely a word, walked into his tent, and by the light of a flickering candle took up his "manifold writer," a small book which retained a copy of the matter written, and after finishing several dispatches, handed them to an orderly to be sent over the field wires, came out and joined our group at the camp-fire, and said as coolly as if remarking upon the state of the weather: "I have ordered an immediate assault along the lines." This was about 9 o'clock.

In his conversation now, his sense of humor began to assert itself. I had sent him a bulletin during the day saying, "I have noticed among the prisoners many old men whose heads are quite bald." This was mentioned as an evidence that the enemy in recruiting was "robbing the grave." A staff-officer was sitting with us whose hair was so thin, that he used to part it low behind and comb the stray locks forward, trying to make the rear-guard do picket duty at the front. The general delighted in teasing him on this subject, and he now said to me: "When I got your message to-day about the bald-headed men, I showed it to General Blank and told him he had better take care and not fall into the hands of the enemy, for that is just the way they would be commenting on his head in their reports."

A little after midnight General Grant tucked himself into his camp-bed, and was soon sleeping as peacefully as if the next day was to be devoted to a picnic instead of a decisive battle.


At 4:45 there was a streak of gray in the

heavens which soon revealed another streak of gray formed by Confederate uniforms in the works opposite, and the men rushed forward to the charge. The thunder of hundreds of guns shook the ground like an earthquake, and soon the troops were engaged all along the lines. The general awaited the result of the assault at headquarters, where he could be easily communicated with, and from which he could give general directions.


At a quarter past 5 a message came from Wright that he had carried the enemy's line and was pushing in. Next came news from Parke, that he had captured the outer works in his front, with 12 pieces of artillery and 800 prisoners.

Soon Ord was heard from as having broken through the intrenchments, and Humphreys, too, had been doing gallant work.

The general and staff now rode out to the front, as it was necessary to give immediate direction to the actual movements of the troops, and prevent confusion from the overlapping and intermingling of the several corps as they pushed forward. He urged his horse over the works which Wright's corps had captured, and suddenly came upon a body of three thousand prisoners marching to the rear. His whole attention was for some time riveted upon them, and we knew he was enjoying his usual satisfaction in seeing them. General Grant, after taking in the situation, directed both Meade and Ord to face their commands towards the east, and close up towards the inner lines which covered Petersburg. Lee had been pushed so vigorously, that he seemed for a time to be making but little effort to recover any of his lost ground, but now he made a determined fight against Parke's corps, which was threaten-



MAP OF THE PETERSBURG-APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN.



PRESIDENT LINCOLN, GENERAL GRANT, AND TAD LINCOLN AT A RAILWAY STATION. (SKETCHED FROM LIFE BY WINSLOW HOMER.)

ing his inner line on his extreme left and the bridge across the Appomattox. Repeated assaults were made, but Parke resisted them all successfully, and could not be moved from his position. Lee had ordered Longstreet from the north side of the James, and with these troops reinforced his extreme right. General Grant dismounted near a farm-house which stood on a knoll within a mile of the enemy's inner line, and from which he could get a good view of the field of operations. He seated himself at the foot of a tree, and was soon busy receiving dispatches and writing orders to officers conducting the advance. The position was under fire, and as soon as the group of staff-officers was seen, the enemy's guns began paying their respects to the party. This lasted for nearly a quarter of an hour, and as the fire became hotter and hotter several of the officers, apprehensive of the general's safety, urged him to move to some less conspicuous position, but he kept on writing and talking without the least interruption from the shots falling around him, and apparently not noticing what a target the place was becoming, or paying any heed to the gentle reminders to "move on." After he had finished his dispatches, he got up, took a view of the situation, and as he started towards the other side of the farm-house said, with a quizzical look at the group around him: "Well, they do seem to have the range on us." The staff was now sent to various points of the advancing lines, and all was activity in pressing forward the good work. By noon, nearly all the outer line of works was in our possession,

except two strong redoubts which occupied a commanding position, named respectively Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth. The general decided that these should be stormed, and about 1 o'clock three of Ord's brigades swept down upon Fort Gregg. The garrison of three hundred men with two rifled cannon made a desperate defense, and a most gallant contest took place. For half an hour after our men had gained the parapet a bloody hand-to-hand struggle continued, but nothing could stand against the onslaught of Ord's troops, flushed with their morning's victory. By half-past two, 57 of the brave garrison lay dead, and about 250 had surrendered. Fort Whitworth was at once abandoned, but the guns of Fort Gregg were opened upon the garrison as they marched out, and the commander and sixty men were surrendered.

Prominent officers now urged the general to make an assault on the inner lines and capture Petersburg that afternoon, but he was firm in his resolve not to sacrifice the lives necessary to accomplish such a result. He said the city would undoubtedly be evacuated during the night, and he would dispose the troops for a parallel march westward, and try to head off the escaping army. And thus ended this eventful Sunday.

The general was up at daylight the next morning, and the first report brought in was



UNION CAVALRYMEN RIDING AROUND THE MONUMENT OF JACKSON IN THE CAPITOL SQUARE, RICHMOND.

that Parke had gone through the lines at 4 A. M., capturing a few skirmishers, and that the city had surrendered at 4:28 to Colonel Ely. A second communication surrendering the place was sent in to Wright.

The evacuation had begun about 10 the night before, and was completed before 3 on the morning of the 3d. Between 5 and 6 A. M. the general had a conference with Meade, and orders were given to push westward with all haste. About 9 A. M. the general rode into Petersburg. Many of the citizens, panic-stricken, had escaped with the army. Most of the whites who remained staid indoors, a few groups of negroes gave cheers, but the scene generally was one of complete desertion. Grant rode along quietly with his

staff until he came to a comfortable-looking brick house with a yard in front, situated on one of the principal streets, and here he and the officers accompanying him dismounted and took seats on the piazza. A number of the citizens now gathered on the sidewalk and gazed, with eager curiosity, upon the features of the commander of the Yankee armies.

The general was anxious to move westward at once with the leading infantry columns, but Mr. Lincoln had telegraphed that he was on his way to see him, and the general decided to prolong his stay until the President came up. Mr. Lincoln soon after arrived, accompanied by his little son "Tad," dismounted in the street and came in through the front gate with long and rapid strides, his face beaming with delight. He seized General Grant's hand as



CITIZENS OF RICHMOND TAKING REFUGE IN CAPITOL SQUARE DURING THE CONFLAGRATION FOLLOWING UPON THE EVACUATION, APRIL 3D, 1865.

the general stepped forward to greet him, and stood shaking it for some time and pouring out his thanks and congratulations with all the fervor of a heart which seemed overflowing with its fullness of joy. I doubt whether Mr. Lincoln ever experienced a happier moment in his life. The scene was singularly affecting and one never to be forgotten. He then said:

"Do you know, general, I have had a sort of sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this, though I thought some time ago that you would so manoeuvre as to have Sherman come up and be near enough to cooperate with you."

"Yes," replied the general, "I thought at one time that Sherman's army might advance so far as to be within supporting distance of the

Eastern armies when the spring campaign against Lee opened, but I have had a feeling that it is better to let Lee's old antagonists give his army the final blow and finish up the job single-handed."

"I see, I see," said Mr. Lincoln, "but I never thought of it in that light. In fact my anxiety has been so great that I did n't care where the help came from so the work was perfectly done."

Mr. Lincoln then began to talk about the civil complications that would follow the destruction of the Confederate armies in the field, and showed plainly the anxiety he felt regarding the great problems in state-craft which would soon be thrust upon him.


Meanwhile Tad, for whom he always showed great affection, was now becoming a little uneasy and gave certain appealing looks to which a staff-officer responded by producing some sandwiches, which he offered to him, saying: "Here, young man, I guess you must be hungry." Tad seized them as a drowning man would seize a life-preserver, and cried out: "Yes, I am, that 's what's the matter with me." This greatly amused the President and the general-in-chief, who had a hearty laugh at Tad's expense.

The general hoped that he would hear before he parted with the President that Richmond was in our possession, but after the interview had lasted about an hour and a half, the general said he must ride on to the front and join Ord's column, and took leave of the President who shook his hand cordially, and with great warmth of feeling wished him God-speed and every success.

The general and staff had ridden as far as Sutherland's Station, about nine miles, when a dispatch from Weitzel overtook him, which had come by a roundabout way, announcing the capture of Richmond at 8:15 that morning. Although the news was expected, there were wild shouts of rejoicing from the group who heard it read. The general, who never manifested the slightest sign of emotion either in victories or de-

feats, merely said: "I am sorry I did not get this news before we left the President. However, I suppose he has heard of it by this time," and then added: "Let the news be circulated among the troops as rapidly as possible."

Grant and Meade both went into camp at Sutherland's Station that evening, the 3d. The Army of the Potomac caught a few hours' sleep, and at 3 the next morning was again on the march. The pursuit had now become unflagging, relentless. Grant put a spur on the heel of every dispatch he sent. Sheridan "the inevitable," as the enemy had learned to call him, was in advance thundering along with his cavalry, followed by Griffin and the rest of the Army of the Potomac, while Ord was swinging along towards Burkeville to head off Lee from Danville, to which point it was naturally supposed he was pushing in order to unite with Joe Johnston's army. The 4th was another active day; the troops found that this campaign was to be won by legs, that the great walking match had begun, and success depended upon which army could make the best distance record. General Grant marched this day with Ord's troops. Meade was quite sick and at times had to take to an ambulance, but his loyal spirit never flagged, and his orders breathed the true spirit of the soldier. That night General Grant camped at Wilson's Station, on the South Side railroad twenty-seven miles west of Petersburg. On the 5th he marched again with Ord's column, and at noon reached Nottaway Court House, about ten miles east of Burkeville, where he halted for a couple of hours. A young staff-officer here rode up to General Ord, in a state of considerable excitement, and said to him: "Is this a way-station?" The grim old soldier, who always went armed with a joke concealed somewhere about his person, replied with great deliberation: "This is Nott-a-way Station." We continued to move along the road which runs parallel to the South Side railroad till nearly dark, and had reached a point about half-way between Nottaway and Burkeville. The road was skirted by dense woods on the northside,



THE RUINS OF RICHMOND BETWEEN THE CANAL BASIN AND CAPITOL SQUARE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

the side towards the enemy. There was a sudden commotion among the headquarters escort, and on looking around I saw some of our men dashing up to a horseman in full Confederate uniform, who had suddenly appeared in the road, and in the act of seizing him as a prisoner.

I recognized him at once as one of Sheridan's scouts, who had before brought us important dispatches, and said to him: "How do you do, Campbell?" and told our men he was all right and was one of our own people.

He informed us he had had a hard ride from Sheridan's camp, and had brought a dispatch for General Grant. By this time the general had recognized him, and had stopped in the road to see what he had brought. Campbell then took from his mouth a wad of tobacco, broke it open, and pulled out a little ball of tin-foil. Rolled up in this was a sheet of tissue paper on which was written the famous dispatch so widely published at the time, in which Sheridan described the situation at Jettersville, and added: "I wish you were here yourself."

The general said he would go at once to Sheridan, and dismounted from his black pony "Jeff Davis," which he had been riding, and called for his big bay horse "Cincinnati." He stood in the road for a few minutes and wrote a dispatch, using the pony's back for a desk, and then mounting the fresh horse, told Campbell to lead the way. It was found we would have to skirt pretty closely to the enemy's lines, and it was thought prudent to take some cavalry with us, but there was none near at hand, and the general said he would risk it with our mounted escort of fourteen men. Calling upon me and two or three other officers to accompany him, he started off. It was now after dark, but there was enough moonlight to enable us to see the way without difficulty. After riding nearly twenty miles, following cross-roads through a wooded country, we struck Sheridan's pickets about half-past 10 o'clock and soon after reached his headquarters.

Sheridan was awaiting the general-in-chief, thinking he would come after getting the dispatch; a good supper of coffee and cold chicken had been spread out, and it was soon demonstrated that the night ride had not impaired any one's appetite.

When he had learned fully the situation in Sheridan's front, General Grant first sent a message to Ord to watch the roads running south from Burkeville and Farmville, and then rode over to Meade's camp near by. Meade was still suffering from illness. His views differed somewhat from General Grant's regard-

ing the movements of the Army of the Potomac for the next day, and the latter changed the proposed dispositions so as to have the army swing round towards the south, and endeavor to head off Lee in that direction. The next day, the 6th, proved a decided field day in the pursuit. It was found in the morning that Lee had retreated during the night from Amelia Court House, and from the direction he had taken and from information received that he had ordered rations to meet him at Farmville, it was seen that he had abandoned all hope of reaching Burkeville and was probably heading for Lynchburg. Ord was to try to burn the High Bridge and push on to Farmville. Sheridan's cavalry was to work around on Lee's left flank, and the Army of the Potomac was to make another forced march and strike the enemy wherever it could reach him.

I spent a portion of the day with Humphreys's corps, which attacked the enemy near Deatonsville, and gave his rear-guard no rest. Joining General Grant later I rode with him to Burkeville, getting there some time after dark.

Ord had pushed out to Rice's Station, and Sheridan and Wright had gone in against the enemy and fought the battle of Sailor's Creek [east of Farmville, see map, page 143] capturing six general officers and about seven thousand men, and smashing things generally. General Grant started from Burkeville early the next morning, the 7th, and took the direct road to Farmville. The columns were crowding the roads, and the men, aroused to still greater efforts by the inspiring news of the day before, were sweeping along, despite the rain that fell, like trained pedestrians on a walking-track. As the general rode amongst them, he was greeted with shouts and hurrahs, on all sides, and a string of sly remarks, which showed how familiar swords and bayonets become when victory furnishes the topic of their talk.

II.

THE SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE.

A LITTLE before noon on the 7th of April, 1865, General Grant with his staff rode into the little village of Farmville on the south side of the Appomattox River, a town which will be memorable in history as the place in which he opened the correspondence with Lee which led to the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia.

He drew up in front of the village hotel, dismounted, and established headquarters on its broad piazza. News came in that Crook was fighting large odds with his cavalry on



THE RETREAT FROM PETERSBURG—CONFEDERATES AT A WELL NEAR FARMVILLE.
(DRAWN BY W. L. SHEPPARD, WHO OBSERVED THE INCIDENT.)

the north side of the river, and I was directed to go to his front and see what was necessary to be done to assist him. I found that he was being driven back, and the enemy was making a bold stand north of the river. Humphreys was also on the north side, isolated from the rest of our infantry, confronted by a large portion of Lee's army, and having some very heavy fighting. On my return to general headquarters that night, Wright's corps was ordered to cross the river and move rapidly to the support of our troops there. Notwithstanding their long march that day, the men sprang to their feet with a spirit that made every one marvel at their pluck, and came swinging through the main street of the village, with a step that seemed as elastic as on the first day of their toilsome tramp. It was now dark, but they spied the general-in-chief watching them with evident pride from the piazza of the hotel.

Then was witnessed one of the most inspiring scenes of the campaign. Bonfires were lighted on the sides of the street, the men seized straw and pine knots, and improvised torches. Cheers arose from throats already hoarse with shouts of victory, bands played, banners waved, arms were tossed high in air and caught again. The night march had

become a grand review, with Grant as the reviewing officer.

Ord and Gibbon had visited the general at the hotel, and he had spoken with them as well as with Wright about sending some communication to Lee which might pave the way to the stopping of further bloodshed. Dr. Smith, formerly of the regular army, a native of Virginia and a relative of General Ewell, now one of our prisoners, had told General Grant the night before that Ewell had said in conversation that their cause was lost when they crossed the James River, and he considered it the duty of the authorities to negotiate for peace then, while they still had a right to claim concessions, adding that now they were not in condition to claim anything. He said that for every man killed after this somebody would be responsible, and it would be little better than murder. He could not tell what General Lee would do, but he hoped he would at once surrender his army. This statement, together with the news which had been received from Sheridan saying that he had heard that General Lee's trains of provisions which had come by rail were at Appomattox and that he expected to capture them before Lee could reach them, induced the general to write the following communication :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.

"5 P. M., April 7th, 1865.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A. :

"The results of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army, known as the Army of Northern Virginia. U. S. GRANT, LIEUT.-GENERAL."

This he intrusted to General Seth Williams, adjutant-general, with directions to take it to Humphreys's front, as his corps was close up to the enemy's rear-guard, and have it sent into Lee's lines.

The general decided to remain all night at Farmville and await the reply from Lee, and he was shown to a room in the hotel in which he was told Lee had slept the night before.

Lee wrote the following reply within an hour after he received General Grant's letter, but it was brought in by rather a circuitous route and did not reach its destination till after midnight :

"April 7th, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on conditions of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, GENERAL.

"LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,

"Commanding Armies of the U. S."

The next morning before leaving Farmville the general wrote the following reply, and General Williams again started for Humphreys's front to have the letter transmitted to Lee :

"April 8th, 1865.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A. :


"Your note of last evening in reply to mine of the same date, asking the conditions on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon,—namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, LIEUT.-GENERAL."

There turned up at this time a rather hungry-looking gentleman in gray, in the uniform of a colonel, who proclaimed himself the proprietor of

the hotel. He said his regiment had crumbled to pieces, he was the only man left in it, and he thought he might as well stop off at home. His story was significant as indicating the disintegrating process which was going on in the ranks of the enemy.

General Grant had been marching most of the way with the columns which were pushing along south of Lee's line of retreat, but expecting that a reply would be sent to his last letter and wanting to keep within easy communication with Lee, he decided to march this day with the portion of the Army of the Potomac, which was pressing Lee's rear-guard. After issuing some further instructions to Ord and Sheridan, he started from Farmville, crossed to the north side of the Appomattox, conferred in person with Meade, and rode with his columns. Encouraging reports came in all day, and that night headquarters were established at Curdsville in a large white farm-house, a few hundred yards from Meade's camp. The general and several of the staff had cut loose from the headquarters trains the night he started to meet Sheridan at Jetersville, and had neither baggage nor camp equipage. The general did not even have his sword with him. This was the most advanced effort yet made at moving in "light marching order," and we billeted ourselves at night in farm-houses, or bivouacked on porches, and picked up meals at any camp that seemed to have something to spare in the way of rations. This night we



THE RETREAT FROM PETERSBURG—CONFEDERATES GRATING AND GRINDING CORN, AND COOKING FLOUR-PASTE ON RAMRODS. (BY W. L. SHEPPARD, WHO OBSERVED THE INCIDENT.)

sampled the fare of Meade's hospitable mess and once more lay down with full stomachs.

General Grant had been suffering all the afternoon from a severe headache, the result of fatigue, anxiety, scant fare, and loss of sleep, and by night it was much worse. He had been induced to bathe his feet in hot water and mustard, and apply mustard plasters to his wrists and the back of his neck, but these remedies afforded little relief. The dwelling we occupied was a double house. The general threw

Army of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 A. M. to-morrow on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. R. E. LEE, GENERAL.

"LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

General Grant had been able to get but very little sleep. He now sat up and read the letter, and after making a few comments upon it to General Rawlins, lay down again on the sofa.

About 4 o'clock in the morning of the 9th,



CAPTURE OF GUNS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF A CONFEDERATE WAGON-TRAIN AT PAINEVILLE, APRIL 5TH, BY DAVIES'S CAVALRY BRIGADE OF CROOK'S DIVISION. (BY A. R. WAUD, AFTER HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

The wagon-train was escorted by Gary's cavalry with five guns. General Humphreys, in "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65" (Charles Scribner's Sons), says it is believed that "the papers of General Robert E. Lee's headquarters, containing many valuable reports, copies of but few of which are now to be found, were destroyed by the burning of these wagons."

himself upon a sofa in the sitting-room on the left side of the hall, while the staff-officers bunked on the floor of the room opposite to catch what sleep they could. About midnight we were aroused by Colonel Whittier of Humphreys's staff, who brought another letter from General Lee. General Rawlins at once took it in to General Grant's room. It was as follows:

"April 8th, 1865.

"GENERAL: I received at a late hour your note of today. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the

I got up and crossed the hall to ascertain how the general was feeling. I found his room empty, and upon going out of the front door saw him pacing up and down in the yard holding both hands to his head. Upon inquiring how he felt, he replied that he had had very little sleep and was still suffering the most excruciating pain. I said: "Well, there is one consolation in all this, general: I never knew you to be ill that you did not receive some good news. I have become a little superstitious regarding these coincidences, and I should not be surprised if some good fortune overtook you before night." He smiled and said: "The best thing that can happen to me to-day is to get rid of the pain I am suffering." We were now joined by some others of

the staff, and the general was induced to go over to Meade's headquarters with us and get some coffee, in the hope that it would do him good. He seemed to feel a little better now, and after writing the following letter to Lee and dispatching it, he prepared to move forward. The letter was as follows :

"April 9th, 1865.

"GENERAL: Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace. The meeting proposed for 10 A. M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, that I am equally desirous for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms, they would hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc.,

"U. S. GRANT, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

It was proposed to him to ride during the day in a covered ambulance which was at hand, instead of on horseback, so as to avoid the intense heat of the sun, but this he declined to do and soon after mounted "Cincinnati" and struck off towards New Store. From that point he went by way of a cross-road to the south side of the Appomattox with the intention of moving around to Sheridan's front. While riding along the wagon road which runs from Farmville to Appomattox Court House at a point eight or nine miles east of the latter place, Lieutenant Pease of Meade's staff overtook him with a dispatch. It was found to be a reply from Lee, which had been sent in to our lines on Humphreys's front. It read as follows :

"April 9th, 1865.

"GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whether I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, GENERAL.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

Pease also brought a note from Meade, saying that at Lee's request he had read the communication addressed to General Grant and in consequence of it had granted a short truce.

The general, as soon as he had read these letters, dismounted, sat down on the grassy bank by the roadside, and wrote the following reply to Lee :

"April 9th, 1865.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. Army :

"Your note of this date is but this moment (11:50 A. M.) received, in consequence of my having passed



THE VILLAGE OF APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE. THE MCLEAN HOUSE ON THE RIGHT.
(FROM A SKETCH MADE BY R. K. SNEDEN.)

from the Richmond and Lynchburg roads to the Farmville and Lynchburg road. I am at this writing about four miles west of Walker's Church, and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me.

"U. S. GRANT, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL."

He handed this to Colonel Babcock of the staff, with directions to take it to General Lee by the most direct route. Mounting his horse again, the general rode on at a trot towards Appomattox Court House. When five or six miles from the town, Colonel Newhall, Sheridan's adjutant-general, came riding up from the direction of Appomattox and handed the general a communication. This proved to be a duplicate of the letter from Lee which Lieutenant Pease had brought in from Meade's lines. Lee was so closely pressed that he was anxious to communicate with Grant by the most direct means, and as he could not tell with which column Grant was moving, he sent in one copy of his letter on Meade's front and one on Sheridan's. Colonel Newhall joined our party, and after a few minutes' halt to read the letter, we continued our ride towards Appomattox. On the march I had asked the general several times how he felt. To the same question now he said, "The pain in my head seemed to leave me the moment I got Lee's letter." The road was filled with men, animals and wagons, and to avoid these and shorten the distance, we turned slightly to the right and began to "cut across lots"; but before going far we spied men conspicuous in gray, and it was seen that we were moving towards the enemy's left flank and that a short ride farther would take us into his lines. It looked for a moment as if a very awkward condition of things might possibly arise, and Grant become a prisoner in Lee's lines instead of Lee in his. Such a circumstance would have given rise to an important cross-entry in the system of campaign book-keeping. There was only one remedy — to retrace our steps and strike the right road, which was done without serious discussion. About 1 o'clock the little



APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE. (FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.)

village of Appomattox Court House with its half-dozen houses came in sight, and soon we were entering its single street. It is situated on some rising ground, and beyond the country slopes down into a broad valley. The enemy was seen with his columns and wagon trains covering the low ground. Our cavalry, the Fifth Corps, and part of Ord's command were occupying the high ground to the south and west of the enemy, heading him off completely.

Generals Sheridan and Ord with a group of officers around them were seen in the road, and as our party came up, General Grant said:

"How are you, Sheridan?"

"First-rate, thank you; how are you?" cried Sheridan, with a voice and look that seemed to indicate that on his part he was having things all his own way.

"Is Lee over there?" asked General Grant, pointing up the street, having heard a rumor that Lee was in that vicinity.

"Yes, he is in that brick house," answered Sheridan.

"Well, then, we'll go over," said Grant.

The general-in-chief now rode on, accompanied by Sheridan, Ord, and some others, and soon Colonel Babcock's orderly was seen sitting on his horse in the street in front of a two-story brick house, better in appearance than the rest of the houses. He said General Lee and Colonel Babcock had gone into this house a short time before, and he was ordered to post himself in the street and keep a lookout for General Grant, so as to let him know

where General Lee was. Babcock told me afterwards that in carrying General Grant's last letter he passed through the enemy's lines and found General Lee a little more than half a mile beyond Appomattox Court House. He was lying down by the roadside on a blanket which had been spread over a few fence rails on the ground under an apple-tree, which was part of an orchard. This circumstance furnished the only ground for the widespread report that the surrender occurred under an apple-tree. Babcock dismounted upon coming near, and as he approached on foot, Lee sat up, with his feet hanging over the roadside embankment. The wheels of the wagons in passing along the road had cut away the earth of this embankment and left the roots of the tree projecting. Lee's feet were partly resting on these roots. One of his staff-officers came forward, took the dispatch which Babcock handed him and gave it to General Lee. After reading it, the general rose and said he would ride forward on the road on which Babcock had come, but was apprehensive that hostilities might begin in the mean time, upon the termination of the temporary truce, and asked Babcock to write a line to Meade informing him of the situation. Babcock wrote accordingly, requesting Meade to maintain the truce until positive orders from General Grant could be received. To save time it was arranged that a Union officer, accompanied by one of Lee's officers, should carry this letter through the enemy's lines. This route made the distance to Meade nearly ten miles shorter

than by the roundabout way of the Union lines. Lee now mounted his horse and directed Colonel Charles Marshall, his military secretary, to accompany him. They started for Appomattox Court House in company with Babcock and followed by a mounted orderly. When the party reached the village they met one of its residents, named Wilbur McLean, who was told that General Lee wanted to occupy a convenient room in some house in the town. McLean ushered them into the sitting-room of one of the first houses he came to, but upon looking about and finding it quite small and meagerly furnished, Lee proposed finding something more commodious and better fitted for the occasion. McLean then conducted the party to his own house, about the best one in the town, where they awaited General Grant's arrival.


The house had a comfortable wooden porch with seven steps leading up to it. A hall ran through the middle from front to back, and on each side was a room having two windows, one in front and one in rear. Each room had two doors opening into the hall. The building stood a little distance back from the street, with a yard in front, and to the left was a gate for carriages and a roadway running to a stable in rear. We entered the grounds by this gate and dismounted. In the yard were seen a fine

large, gray horse, which proved to be General Lee's, and a good-looking mare belonging to Colonel Marshall. An orderly in gray was in charge of them, and had taken off their bridles to let them nibble the grass.

General Grant mounted the steps and entered the house. As he stepped into the hall, Colonel Babcock, who had seen his approach from the window, opened the door of the room on the left, in which he had been sitting with General Lee and Colonel Marshall, awaiting General Grant's arrival. The general passed in, while the members of the staff, Generals Sheridan and Ord, and some general officers who had gathered in the front yard remained outside, feeling that he would probably want his first interview with General Lee to be, in a measure, private. In a few minutes Colonel Babcock came to the front door, and making a motion with his hat towards the sitting-room, said: "The general says, come in." It was then about half-past 1 of Sunday, the 9th of April. We entered, and found General Grant sitting at a marble-topped table in the center of the room, and Lee sitting beside a small oval table near the front window, in the corner opposite to the door by which we entered, and facing General Grant. Colonel Marshall, his military secretary, was standing at his left side.



CONFEDERATES DESTROYING THE RAILROAD FROM APPOMATTOX TOWARD LYNCHBURG, AND ARTILLERYMEN DESTROYING GUN-CARRIAGES AT NIGHTFALL, SATURDAY, APRIL 8th. (BY W. L. SHEPPARD, WHO OBSERVED THE INCIDENTS.)



THE SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX. (DRAWN BY W. TABER; BASED UPON THE LITHOGRAPH CALLED "THE DAWN OF PEACE," BY PERMISSION OF W. H. STELLE.)

1. General Robert E. Lee.
2. Colonel Charles Marshall, of General Lee's Staff.
3. Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant.
4. Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins, Chief of Staff; other members of General Grant's Staff.
5. Major-General Edward O. C. Ord.
6. Brevet Major-General Rufus Ingalls.
7. Major-General Philip H. Sheridan.
8. Major-General Seth Williams.
9. Colonel Horace Porter.
10. Colonel Orville E. Babcock.
11. Major-General Adam Badeau.
12. Colonel Theodore S. Bowers.
13. Colonel Frederick T. Dent.
14. Colonel Ely S. Parker.
15. Major-General John G. Barnard.

We walked in softly, and ranged ourselves quietly about the sides of the room, very much as people enter a sick-chamber when they expect to find the patient dangerously ill. Some found seats on the sofa and a few chairs which constituted the furniture, but most of the party stood.

The contrast between the two commanders was very striking, and could not fail to attract marked attention, as they sat ten feet apart facing each other.

General Grant, then nearly forty-three years of age, was five feet eight inches in height, with shoulders slightly stooped. His hair and full beard were a nut-brown, without a trace of gray in them. He had on a single-breasted blouse, made of dark-blue flannel, unbuttoned in front, and showing a waistcoat underneath. He wore an ordinary pair of top-boots, with his trousers inside, and was without spurs. The boots and portions of his clothes were spattered with mud. He had had on a pair of thread gloves, of a dark-yellow color, which he had taken off on entering the room. His felt "sugar-loaf" stiff-brimmed hat was thrown on the table beside him. He had no sword, and a pair of shoulder-straps was all there was about him to designate his rank. In fact, aside from these, his uniform was that of a private soldier.

Lee, on the other hand, was fully six feet in height, and quite erect for one of his age, for he was Grant's senior by sixteen years. His hair and full beard were a silver gray, and quite thick except that the hair had become a little thin in front. He wore a new uniform of Confederate gray, buttoned up to the throat, and at his side he carried a long sword

of exceedingly fine workmanship, the hilt studded with jewels. It was said to be the sword which had been presented to him by the State of Virginia. His top-boots were comparatively new, and seemed to have on them some ornamental stitching of red silk. Like his uniform, they were singularly clean and but little travel-stained. On the boots were handsome spurs, with large rowels. A felt hat, which in color matched pretty closely that of his uniform, and a pair of long buckskin gauntlets lay beside him on the table. We asked Colonel Marshall afterwards how it was that both he and his chief wore such fine toggery, and looked so much as if they had just turned out to go to church, while with us our outward garb scarcely rose to the dignity even of the "shabby-genteel." He enlightened us regarding the contrast, by explaining that when their headquarters wagons had been pressed so closely by our cavalry a few days before, and it was found they would have to destroy all their baggage except the clothes they carried on their backs, each one, naturally, selected the newest suit he had, and sought to propitiate the gods of destruction by a sacrifice of his second-best.

General Grant began the conversation by saying:

"I met you once before, General Lee, while we were serving in Mexico, when you came over from General Scott's headquarters to visit Garland's brigade, to which I then belonged. I have always remembered your appearance, and I think I should have recognized you anywhere."

"Yes," replied General Lee, "I know I met you on that occasion, and I have often thought of it and tried to recollect how you looked, but I have never been able to recall a single feature."

After some further mention of Mexico, General Lee said:

"I suppose, General Grant, that the object of our present meeting is fully understood. I asked to see you to ascertain upon what terms you would receive the surrender of my army."

General Grant replied:

"The terms I propose are those stated substantially in my letter of yesterday,—that is, the officers and men surrendered to be paroled and disqualified from taking up arms again



MCLEAN'S HOUSE, APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

until properly exchanged, and all arms, ammunition, and supplies to be delivered up as captured property."

Lee nodded an assent, and said :

"Those are about the conditions which I expected would be proposed."

impressions of the writing were made. He wrote very rapidly, and did not pause until he had finished the sentence ending with "officers appointed by me to receive them." Then he looked towards Lee, and his eyes seemed to be resting on the handsome sword which hung

at that officer's side. He said afterwards that this set him to thinking that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to require the officers to surrender their swords, and a great hardship to deprive them of their personal baggage and horses, and after a short pause he wrote the sentence: "This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage." When he had finished the letter he called Colonel (afterwards General) Parker, one of the military secretaries on the staff, to his side and looked it over with him and directed him as they went along to interline six or seven words and to strike out the word "their," which had been repeated. When this had been done, he handed the book to General

Lee and asked him to read over the letter. It was as follows :

"APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA,
"April 9th, 1865.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.

"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States, until properly [exchanged], and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked, and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe their paroles, and the laws in force where they may reside.

"Very respectfully,
"U. S. GRANT, LIEUT.-GENERAL."



GENERAL LEE AND COLONEL MARSHALL LEAVING MCLEAN'S HOUSE AFTER THE SURRENDER.
(BY A. R. WAUD, FROM HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

General Grant then continued :

"Yes, I think our correspondence indicated pretty clearly the action that would be taken at our meeting; and I hope it may lead to a general suspension of hostilities and be the means of preventing any further loss of life."

Lee inclined his head as indicating his accord with this wish, and General Grant then went on to talk at some length in a very pleasant vein about the prospects of peace. Lee was evidently anxious to proceed to the formal work of the surrender, and he brought the subject up again by saying :

"I presume, General Grant, we have both carefully considered the proper steps to be taken, and I would suggest that you commit to writing the terms you have proposed, so that they may be formally acted upon."

"Very well," replied General Grant, "I will write them out." And calling for his manifold order-book, he opened it on the table before him and proceeded to write the terms. The leaves had been so prepared that three

Lee took it and laid it on the table beside him, while he drew from his pocket a pair of steel-rimmed spectacles and wiped the glasses carefully with his handkerchief. Then he crossed his legs, adjusted the spectacles very slowly and deliberately, took up the draft of the letter, and proceeded to read it attentively. It consisted of two pages. When he reached the top line of the second page, he looked up, and said to General Grant: "After the words 'until properly,' the word 'exchanged' seems to be omitted. You doubtless intended to use that word."

"Why, yes," said Grant; "I thought I had put in the word 'exchanged.'"

"I presumed it had been omitted inadvertently," continued Lee, "and with your permission I will mark where it should be inserted."

"Certainly," Grant replied.

Lee felt in his pocket as if searching for a pencil, but did not seem to be able to find one. Seeing this and happening to be standing close to him, I handed him my pencil. He took it, and laying the paper on the table noted the interlineation. During the rest of the interview he kept twirling this pencil in his fingers and occasionally tapping the top of the table with it. When he handed it back it was carefully treasured by me as a memento of the occasion. When Lee came to the sentence about the officers' side-arms, private horses and baggage, he showed for the first time during the reading of the letter a slight change of countenance, and was evidently touched by this act of generosity. It was

doubtless the condition mentioned to which he particularly alluded when he looked towards General Grant as he finished reading and said with some degree of warmth in his manner: "This will have a very happy effect upon my army."

General Grant then said: "Unless you have some suggestions to make in regard to the form in which I have stated the terms, I will have a copy of the letter made in ink and sign it."

"There is one thing I would like to mention," Lee replied after a short pause. "The cavalymen and artillerists own their own horses in our army. Its organization in this respect differs from that of the United States." This expression attracted the notice of our officers present, as showing how firmly the conviction was grounded in his mind that we were two distinct countries. He continued: "I would like to understand whether these men will be permitted to retain their horses?"

"You will find that the terms as written do not allow this," General Grant replied; "only the officers are permitted to take their private property."

Lee read over the second page of the letter again, and then said:

"No, I see the terms do not allow it; that is clear." His face showed plainly that he was quite anxious to have this concession made, and Grant said very promptly and without giving Lee time to make a direct request:

"Well, the subject is quite new to me. Of course I did not know that any private sol-



UNION SOLDIERS SHARING THEIR RATIONS WITH THE CONFEDERATES AT APPOMATTOX.
(BY A. R. WAUD, AFTER HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

diers owned their animals, but I think this will be the last battle of the war — I sincerely hope so — and that the surrender of this army will be followed soon by that of all the others, and I take it that most of the men in the ranks are small farmers, and as the country has been so raided by the two armies, it is doubtful whether they will be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they are now riding, and I will arrange it in this way. I will not change the terms as now written, but I will instruct the officers I shall appoint to receive the paroles to let all the men who claim to own a horse or mule take the animals home with them to work their little farms." (This expression has been quoted in various forms and has been the subject of some dispute. I give the exact words used.)

Lee now looked greatly relieved, and though anything but a demonstrative man, he gave every evidence of his appreciation of this concession, and said, "This will have the best possible effect upon the men. It will be very gratifying and will do much towards conciliating our people." He handed the draft of the terms back to General Grant, who called Colonel Bowers of the staff to him and directed him to make a copy in ink. Bowers was a little nervous, and he turned the matter over to Colonel (afterwards General) Parker, whose handwriting presented a better appearance than that of any one else on the staff. Parker sat down to write at the table which stood against the rear side of the room. Wilbur McLean's domestic resources in the way of ink now became the subject of a searching investigation, but it was found that the contents of the conical-shaped stoneware inkstand which he produced appeared to be participating in the general breaking up and had disappeared. Colonel Marshall now came to the rescue, and pulled out of his pocket a small box-wood inkstand, which was put at Parker's service, so that, after all, we had to fall back upon the resources of the enemy in furnishing the stage "properties" for the final scene in the memorable military drama.

Lee in the mean time had directed Colonel Marshall to draw up for his signature a letter of acceptance of the terms of surrender. Colonel Marshall wrote out a draft of such a letter, making it quite formal, beginning with "I have the honor to reply to your communication, etc." General Lee took it, and after reading it over very carefully, directed that these formal expressions be stricken out and that the letter be otherwise shortened. He afterwards went over it again and seemed to change some words, and then told the colonel to make a final copy in ink. When it came to providing

the paper, it was found we had the only supply of that important ingredient in the recipe for surrendering an army, so we gave a few pages to the colonel. The letter when completed read as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN
"VIRGINIA, April 9th, 1865.

"GENERAL: I received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, GENERAL.

"LIEUT.-GEN. U. S. GRANT."

While the letters were being copied, General Grant introduced the general officers who had entered, and each member of the staff, to General Lee. The general shook hands with General Seth Williams, who had been his adjutant when Lee was superintendent at West Point, some years before the war, and gave his hand to some of the other officers who had extended theirs, but to most of those who were introduced he merely bowed in a dignified and formal manner. He did not exhibit the slightest change of features during this ceremony until Colonel Parker of our staff was presented to him. Parker was a full-blooded Indian, and the reigning Chief of the Six Nations. When General Lee saw his swarthy features he looked at him with an evident stare of surprise, and his eyes rested on him for several seconds. What was passing in his mind probably no one ever knew, but the natural surmise was that he at first mistook Parker for a negro, and was struck with astonishment to find that the commander of the Union armies had one of that race on his personal staff.

Lee did not utter a word while the introductions were going on, except to Seth Williams, with whom he talked quite cordially. Williams at one time referred in rather jocose a manner to a circumstance which occurred during their former service together, as if he wanted to say something in a good-natured way to break up the frigidity of the conversation, but Lee was in no mood for pleasantries, and he did not unbend, or even relax the fixed sternness of his features. His only response to the allusion was a slight inclination of the head. General Lee now took the initiative again in leading the conversation back into business channels. He said:

"I have a thousand or more of your men as prisoners, General Grant, a number of them officers whom we have required to march along with us for several days. I shall be glad to send them into your lines as soon as it can be arranged, for I have no provisions for them. I have, indeed, nothing for my own men. They have been living for the last few days principally upon parched corn, and we are badly in



GENERAL LEE'S RETURN TO HIS LINES AFTER THE SURRENDER—THE LAST APPEARANCE AMONG HIS TROOPS.
(DRAWN BY W. L. SHEPPARD.)

In his "Memoirs of Robert E. Lee" (J. M. Stoddart & Co.), General A. L. Long says of this scene: "When, after his interview with Grant, General Lee again appeared, a shout of welcome instinctively ran through the army. But instantly recollecting the sad occasion that brought him before them, their shouts sank into silence, every hat was raised, and the bronzed faces of the thousands of grim warriors were bathed with tears. As he

rode slowly along the lines hundreds of his devoted veterans pressed around the noble chief, trying to take his hand, touch his person, or even lay a hand upon his horse, thus exhibiting for him their great affection. The general then, with head bare and tears flowing freely down his manly cheeks, bade adieu to the army. In a few words he told the brave men who had been so true in arms to return to their homes and become worthy citizens."

need of both rations and forage. I telegraphed to Lynchburg, directing several train loads of rations to be sent on by rail from there, and when they arrive I should be glad to have the present wants of my men supplied from them."

At this remark, all eyes turned towards Sheridan, for he had captured these trains with his cavalry the night before, near Appomattox Station. General Grant replied:

"I should like to have our men sent within our lines as soon as possible. I will take steps at once to have your army supplied with rations, but I am sorry we have no forage for the animals. We have had to depend upon the country for our supply of forage. Of about how many men does your present force consist?"

"Indeed, I am not able to say," Lee answered after a slight pause. "My losses in killed and wounded have been exceedingly heavy, and, besides, there have been many stragglers and some deserters. All my reports and public papers, and, indeed, my own private letters, had to be destroyed on the march, to prevent them from falling into the hands of your people. Many companies are entirely without officers, and I have not seen any returns for several days; so that I have no means of ascertaining our present strength."

General Grant had taken great pains to have a daily estimate made of the enemy's forces

from all the data that could be obtained, and judging it to be about 25,000 at this time, he said:

"Suppose I send over 25,000 rations, do you think that will be a sufficient supply?"

"I think it will be ample," remarked Lee, and added, with considerable earnestness of manner, "and it will be a great relief, I assure you."

General Grant now turned to his chief commissary, Colonel (afterwards General) Morgan, who was present, and directed him to arrange for issuing the rations. The number of men surrendered was over 28,000. As to General Grant's supplies, he had ordered the army on starting out to carry twelve days' rations. This was the twelfth and last day of the campaign.

General Grant's eye now fell upon Lee's sword again, and it seemed to remind him of the absence of his own, and, by way of explanation, he said to Lee:

"I started out from my camp several days ago without my sword, and as I have not seen my headquarters baggage since, I have been riding about without any side-arms. I have generally worn a sword, however, as little as possible, only during the actual operations of a campaign."

"I am in the habit of wearing mine most of the time," remarked Lee; "I wear it invariably when I am among my troops, moving about through the army."

General Sheridan now stepped up to General Lee and said that when he discovered some of the Confederate troops in motion during the morning, which seemed to be a violation of the truce, he had sent him (Lee) a couple of notes protesting against this act, and as he had not had time to copy them he would like to have them long enough to make copies. Lee took the notes out of the breast-pocket of his coat and handed them to Sheridan with a few words expressive of regret that the circumstance had occurred, and intimating that it must have been the result of some misunderstanding.

After a little general conversation had been indulged in by those present, the two letters were signed and delivered, and the parties prepared to separate. Lee before parting asked Grant to notify Meade of the surrender, fearing that fighting might break out on that front and lives be uselessly lost. This request was complied with, and two Union officers were sent through the enemy's lines as the shortest route to Meade, — some of Lee's officers accompanying them to prevent their being interfered with. At a little before 4 o'clock, General Lee shook hands with General Grant, bowed to the other officers, and with Colonel Marshall left the room. One after another we followed and passed out to the porch. Lee signaled to his orderly to bring up his horse, and while the animal was being bridled the general stood on the lowest step and gazed sadly in the direction of the valley beyond where his army lay — now an army of prisoners. He smote his hands together a number of times in an absent sort of a way; seemed not to see the group of Union officers in the yard who rose respectfully at his approach, and appeared unconscious of everything about him. All appreciated the sadness which overwhelmed him, and he had the personal sympathy of every one who beheld him at this supreme moment of trial. The approach of his horse seemed to recall him from his reverie and he at once mounted. General Grant now stepped down from the porch, and moving towards him, saluted him by raising his hat. He was followed in this act of courtesy by all our officers present; Lee raised his hat respectfully in acknowledgment, and rode off to break the sad news to the brave fellows whom he had so long commanded.

General Grant and his staff then mounted and started for the headquarters camp, which in the mean time had been pitched near by. The news of the surrender had reached the Union lines and the firing of salutes began at several points, but the general sent orders at once to have them stopped, and used these words in referring to the occurrence: "The

war is over, the rebels are our countrymen again, and the best sign of rejoicing after the victory will be to abstain from all demonstrations in the field."

Mr. McLean had been charging about in a manner which indicated that the excitement was shaking his system to its nervous center, but his real trials did not begin until the departure of the chief actors in the surrender. Then the relic-hunters charged down upon the manor-house and made various attempts to jump Mr. McLean's claims to his own furniture. Sheridan set a good example, however, by paying the proprietor twenty dollars in gold for the table at which Lee sat for the purpose of presenting it to Mrs. Custer, and handed it over to her dashing husband, who started off for camp bearing it upon his shoulder, and looking like Atlas carrying the world. Ord paid forty dollars for the table at which Grant sat, and afterwards presented it to Mrs. Grant, who modestly declined it and insisted that it should be given to Mrs. Ord, who then became its possessor. Bargains were at once struck for all the articles in the room, and it is even said that some mementos were carried off in the shape of flowers and other things for which no coin of the realm was ever exchanged.

Before General Grant had proceeded far towards camp, he was reminded that he had not yet announced the important event to the Government. He dismounted by the roadside, sat down on a large stone, and called for pencil and paper. Colonel (afterwards General) Badeau handed his order-book to the general, who wrote on one of the leaves the following message, a copy of which was sent to the nearest telegraph station. It was dated 4:30 P. M.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR, WASHINGTON."

"General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. The accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully.

"U. S. GRANT, LIEUT.-GENERAL."

Upon reaching camp he seated himself in front of his tent, and we all gathered around him, curious to hear what his first comments would be upon the crowning event of his life. But our expectations were doomed to disappointment, for he appeared to have already dismissed the whole subject from his mind, and turning to General Ingalls, his first words were: "Ingalls, do you remember that old white mule that so-and-so used to ride when we were in the city of Mexico?" "Why, perfectly," said Ingalls, who was just then in a mood to remember the exact number of hairs in the mule's tail if it would have helped to make matters agreeable. And then the general-in-chief

went on to recall the antics played by that animal during an excursion to Popocatapetl. It was not until after supper that he said much about the surrender, when he talked freely of his entire belief that the rest of the rebel commanders would follow Lee's example, and that we would have but little more fighting, even of a partisan nature. He then surprised us by announcing his intention of starting to Washington early the next morning. We were disappointed at this, for we wanted to see something of the opposing army, now that it had become civil enough for the first time in its existence to let us get near it, and meet some of the officers who had been acquaintances in former years. The general, however, had no fondness for looking at the conquered, and but little curiosity in his nature, and he was anxious above all things to begin the reduction of the military establishment and diminish the enormous expense attending it, which at this time amounted to about four millions of dollars a day. When he considered, however, that the railroad was being rapidly put in condition and that he would lose no time by waiting till the next noon, he made up his mind to delay his departure.

That evening I made full notes of the occurrences which took place during the surrender, and from these the above account has been written.

There were present at McLean's house besides Sheridan, Ord, Merritt, Custer, and the officers of General Grant's staff, a number of other officers and one or two citizens who entered the room at different times during the interview.

About 9 o'clock on the morning of the 10th General Grant with his staff rode out towards the enemy's lines, but it was found upon attempting to pass through that the force of habit is hard to overcome, and that the practice which had so long been inculcated in Lee's army of keeping Grant out of its lines was not to be overturned in a day, and he was politely requested at the picket-lines to wait till a message could be sent to headquarters asking for instructions. As soon as Lee heard that his distinguished opponent was approaching, he was prompt to correct the misunderstanding at the picket-line, and rode out at a gallop to receive him. They met on a knoll which overlooked the lines of the two armies, and saluted respectfully by each raising his hat. The officers present gave a similar salute, and then grouped themselves around the two chieftains in a semicircle, but withdrew out of earshot. General Grant repeated to us that evening the substance of the conversation, which was as follows:

Grant began by expressing a hope that the war would soon be over, and Lee replied by

stating that he had for some time been anxious to stop the further effusion of blood, and he trusted that everything would now be done to restore harmony and conciliate the people of the South. He said the emancipation of the negroes would be no hindrance to the restoring of relations between the two sections of the country, as it would probably not be the desire of the majority of the Southern people to restore slavery then, even if the question were left open to them. He could not tell what the other armies would do or what course Mr. Davis would now take, but he believed it would be best for their other armies to follow his example, as nothing could be gained by further resistance in the field. Finding that he entertained these sentiments, General Grant told him that no one's influence in the South was so great as his, and suggested to him that he should advise the surrender of the remaining armies and thus exert his influence in favor of immediate peace. Lee said he could not take such a course without consulting President Davis first. Grant then proposed to Lee that he should do so, and urge the hastening of a result which was admitted to be inevitable. Lee, however, was averse to stepping beyond his duties as a soldier, and said the authorities would doubtless soon arrive at the same conclusion without his interference. There was a statement put forth that Grant asked Lee to go and see Mr. Lincoln and talk with him as to the terms of reconstruction, but this was erroneous. I asked General Grant about it when he was on his death-bed, and his recollection was distinct that he had made no such suggestion. I am of opinion that the mistake arose from hearing that Lee had been requested to go and see the "President" regarding peace, and thinking that this expression referred to Mr. Lincoln, whereas it referred to Mr. Davis. After the conversation had lasted a little more than half an hour and Lee had requested that such instructions be given to the officers left in charge to carry out the details of the surrender, that there might be no misunderstanding as to the form of paroles, the manner of turning over the property, etc., the conference ended. The two commanders lifted their hats and said good-bye. Lee rode back to his camp to take a final farewell of his army, and Grant returned to McLean's house, where he seated himself on the porch until it was time to take his final departure. During the conference Ingalls, Sheridan, and Williams had asked permission to visit the enemy's lines and renew their acquaintance with some old friends, classmates and former comrades in arms who were serving in Lee's army. They now returned, bringing with them Wilcox, who



DEPOT OF SUPPLIES FOR THE UNION ARMY AT BELLE PLAINE ON THE JAMES RIVER. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

had been General Grant's groomsmen when he was married,— Longstreet, who had also been at his wedding, Heth, who had been a subaltern with him in Mexico, besides Gordon, Pickett, and a number of others. They all stepped up to pay their respects to General Grant, who received them very cordially and talked with them until it was time to leave. The hour of noon had now arrived, and General Grant, after shaking hands with all present who were not to accompany him, mounted his horse, and started with his staff for Washington without having entered the enemy's lines. Lee set out for Richmond, and it was felt by


all that peace had at last dawned upon the land.

The charges were now withdrawn from the guns, the camp-fires were left to smolder in their ashes, the flags were tenderly furled,— those historic banners, battle-stained, bullet-riddled, many of them but remnants of their former selves, with scarcely enough left of them on which to imprint the names of the battles they had seen,— and the Army of the Union and the Army of Northern Virginia turned their backs upon each other for the first time in four long, bloody years.

Horace Porter.



SOLDIERS' GRAVES AT CITY POINT. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)



From a photograph by Rice
JUDGE LAWRENCE WELDON



THE MOVEMENT AGAINST PETERSBURG

BY GENERAL E. P. ALEXANDER

Of the Confederate Army



GRANT'S movement against Petersburg, I think, more than any battle or other incident constituted what may be called the crisis of the war. Possibly the South never had any real chance of success from the first, and the actual crisis was passed when she fired the first gun. But, though the North was immensely her superior in all the resources of war, the South was able to win many hard-fought battles, and her armies to cherish the hope, as year after year elapsed, that the desperation of her resistance might exact such a price in blood and treasure as would exhaust the enthusiasm of her adversary. Certainly at no other period was there such depression among the people at home, in the army, in the field, or among the officials of the Government in Washington. The expenses of the war were nearly \$4,000,000 a day. Gold was at a high premium and advancing rapidly. It went from 168 in May to 285 in July.*

Enlisting had almost ceased, although stimulated by enormous bounties. A thousand dollars per man was the ordinary price and single regiments would sometimes take from their counties one thousand men, and draw a million dollars in bounties the day of their muster. There was growing bitterness in political circles in view of the approaching presidential election. The terrible lists of casualties in battle were daily bringing mourning and distress to every hamlet in the country.

*The following table shows the fluctuations for each month of 1864:

Month	Day	Highest	Day	Lowest
Jan.	19	159½	6	151½
Feb.	16	161	27	157½
Mar.	26	169½	1	159
April	26	186½	4	166½
May	27	190	10	168
June	30	250	8	193
July	11	285	1	222
Aug.	5	261½	30	231½
Sept.	2	254½	30	191
Oct.	31	227½	3	180
Nov.	8	260	18	210
Dec.	7	243	18	212½

Swinton writes of this period as follows (p. 494):

"War is sustained quite as much by the moral energy of a people as by its material resources, and the former must be active to bring out and make available the latter. . . . For armies are things visible and formal, circumscribed by time and space, but the soul of war is a power unseen, bound up with the interests, convictions, passions of men. Now so gloomy was the outlook after the action on the Chickahominy, and to such a degree, by consequence, had the public mind become relaxed, that there was, at this time, great danger of a collapse of the war.*

"Had not success come elsewhere to brighten the horizon, it would have been difficult to have raised new forces to recruit the Army of the Potomac, which, shaken in its structure, its valor quenched in blood, and thousands of its ablest officers killed and wounded was the Army of the Potomac no more."

It was under these circumstances that Grant made his first move after the week of indecision which followed the battle of Cold Harbor. The most natural movement, and the one which Lee expected, was that he would merely cross the Chickahominy and take position on the north bank of the James at Malvern Hill, adjoining Butler on the south bank at Bermuda Hundreds. This would unite the two armies at the nearest point to Richmond, and they would have the aid of the monitors on the river in a direct advance. But Grant determined to cross the James at Wilcox's Landing, ten miles below City Point, and entirely out of Lee's observation, and to move thence directly upon Petersburg with his whole army. He would thus pass in rear of Butler and attack the extreme right flank of the Con-

*Swinton adds a foot-note: "The archives of the State Department, when one day made public, will show how deeply the Government was affected by the want of military success and to what resolutions the Executive had in consequence come."

federate line, which, it was certain, would not be held by only a small force. It involved the performance of a feat in transportation which had never been equalled and might well be considered impossible without days of delay.

It was all accomplished, as will be seen, without mishap and in such an incredibly short time that Lee refused for three days to believe it. During these three days, June 15th, 16th and 17th, Grant's whole army was arriving at and attacking Petersburg, which was defended at first only by Beauregard with about 2,500 men. Lee, with Longstreet's and Hill's corps, for the same three days, lay idle in the woods on the north side, only replacing some of Beauregard's troops taken to Petersburg from in front of Butler.

But for this, Longstreet's corps might have manned the intrenchments of Petersburg when Grant's troops first appeared before them, and it is not too much to claim that his defeat would have been not less bloody and disastrous than was the one at Cold Harbor. For while the intrenchments at Cold Harbor were the poorest and slightest in which we ever fought, the Petersburg lines had been built a year before, and were of the best character, with some guns of position mounted and all the forest in front cleared away to give range to the artillery.

This, then, was really the nearest approach to "a crisis" which occurred during the war, as will more fully appear as we follow the details. Instead of "success elsewhere," Grant here escaped a second defeat more bloody and more overwhelming than any preceding. Thus the last, and perhaps the best chances of Confederate success were not lost in the repulse of Gettysburg, nor in any combat of arms. They were lost during three days of lying in camp, believing that Grant was hemmed in by the broad part of the James below City Point, and had nowhere to go but to come and attack us. The entire credit for the strategy belongs, I believe, to Grant, though possibly it may be shared by his chief of staff, Humphreys, whose modest narrative makes no reference to the subject.

On Saturday, June 11th, the Fifth Corps was moved down the Chickahominy, about ten miles, to the vicinity of Bottom's Bridge. The next night it crossed on two pontoon bridges and inclining to the right, it took on east of Riddle's shop, where it in-

trenched to cover the passage of the other corps. All of the other corps moved at the same time. The Second Corps crossed at the same bridge and marched to Wilcox's Landing on the James. The Sixth and Ninth Corps crossed the Chickahominy at Jones's Bridge and marched to the same place. The Eighteenth Corps, under Smith, was sent back to the White House, where it took transports for City Point, and was landed there the night of the 14th. Here it was joined by Kautz's cavalry, about 2,400 strong, and by Hink's colored division, 3,700, making in all about 16,000 men, who were ordered to march at dawn on the 15th for Petersburg, about eight miles, which they were to attack. Here we may leave them for a while.

Hancock's Second Corps reached Wilcox's Landing at 6 P. M. on Monday, the 13th, after an all-night march of about thirty miles. The Fifth Corps, under Warren, held its position, covering the passage of other corps until night of the 13th, when it followed Hancock and reached Wilcox's Landing the next noon. The cavalry and infantry had had some sharp skirmishing, and reported their casualties as three hundred killed and wounded. The Sixth and Ninth Corps, whose marches had been from five to ten miles longer than Hancock's, arrived in the afternoon of the 14th.

During the 14th the transports, which had brought the Eighteenth Corps around from the White House to City Point, were employed in ferrying Hancock across the James. By the morning of the 15th his whole corps was across, with most of its artillery, and at 10.30 A. M. it set out for Petersburg, following Smith, who had gone from City Point for the same destination about sunrise. Hancock had about twenty thousand men, and about sixteen miles to go. All the complicated movements involved in this manœuvre, and in the capture of Petersburg at which it was aimed, had been as usual well thought out, and covered in the orders and instructions to the different commanders, with a single exception.

This exception was very serious in its results, as it postponed the capture of Petersburg for over nine months. It had its rise in the division of command and responsibility between the co-operating armies. This, in its turn, had arisen from the political necessity of placing Butler in com-

mand of the Army of the James. Smith's corps was a part of that army, and Grant, feeling that secrecy was essential to success, visited Butler on the 14th, and at his quarters prepared the orders for Smith's advance and attack on Petersburg the next day. When he returned to the Army of the Potomac he failed to notify Meade of the hour of Smith's march and other details, and Meade, of course, did not inform Hancock. It resulted that Hancock was not ordered to march until 10.30 A. M., when he might just as easily have marched at sunrise, and he was directed by a route an hour or two longer than he might have used. Finally he came upon the field at Petersburg after dark, when he might have arrived in time to unite in Smith's assault.

Meanwhile the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Corps, on the banks of the James, awaited the construction of the greatest bridge which the world has seen since the days of Xerxes. At the point selected the river was 2,100 feet wide, ninety feet deep, and had a rise and fall of tide of four feet, giving very strong currents. A draw was necessary for the passage of vessels. The approaches having been prepared on each side, construction was begun at 4 P. M. on the 14th by Major Duane, simultaneously at both ends. In eight hours the bridge was finished and the artillery and trains of the Ninth, Fifth, and Sixth Corps began to cross in the order named, that being the order in which the corps would follow. For forty-eight hours without cessation the column poured across, and at midnight on the 16th Grant's entire army was south of the James.

Let us now turn to Lee. On the morning of the 13th, finding the enemy gone, he at once put his army in motion, crossed the Chickahominy and that afternoon took position between White Oak Swamp and Malvern Hill. Hoke's Division went on to Drury's Bluff. His cavalry came in contact with Wilson's cavalry, and also with Warren's infantry, which had intrenched itself on the Long Bridge road not far in front of his position. Some sharp skirmishing took place, as shown by Warren's report of 300 casualties. The presence of Warren was taken as assurance that Grant's army was about to advance on the north side of the James, and Warren's withdrawal at dark, discovered the next day, was supposed to mean only a drawing nearer to Butler's

position where the narrowness of the river would permit the easy establishment of pontoon bridges. On the 14th a staff officer of Beauregard's came over from Petersburg to lay before Lee the defenceless position of that city, and to beg for re-enforcement. Lee consented that Beauregard should take Hoke's division, which had already gone to Drury's Bluff, but would not consent to weaken Longstreet or Hill, who were near Riddle's Shop. Hoke was accordingly started for Petersburg early on the 15th within eighteen miles to go. His leading brigade Hagood's, was picked up by railroad train and reached Petersburg about sunset, the rest of the division arriving about 9 P. M. Until Hoke came the whole force at Petersburg consisted of Wise's brigade of infantry "not more than twelve hundred strong" and two small regiments "of cavalry under Deering." "Some light artillery with twenty-two pieces . . . besides a few men manning three or four heavy guns in position.

Besides these there were some old men and boys, called local reserves, who on July 9th, under Col. F. H. Archer, a veteran of Mexico, and Gen. R. E. Colston, disabled at Chancellorsville, had acted with great gallantry in repelling a raid by Kautz's cavalry. The total gross of all arms is given as 2,700.

After Beauregard's staff officer had informed him, Lee gave orders to our corps to march the next morning, the 15th, to Drury's Bluff. About sunrise we broke camp and took the road, but there was a demonstration of the enemy's cavalry about Malvern Hill and we were halted to learn what was meant. About midday the report came that the enemy had fallen back, but our march was not resumed, and we later turned to our bivouac.

On the 16th, the First Corps headquarters, with Pickett's and Field's divisions were hurried across the pontoon bridge to Drury's Bluff and down to the Bermuda Hundreds lines, which had been held by Bushrod Johnson's division, but had been abandoned the night of the 15th, when Beauregard had withdrawn it for the defence of Petersburg. Kershaw's division followed us only as far as Drury's Bluff, where it was halted there. We reached the ground in time to drive off one of Butler's brigades, which had come out to the railroad and tried to tear it up. We drove his brig-

back very nearly into their original lines, and on the next afternoon, the 17th, a charge of Pickett's division entirely regained our lines which had been abandoned by Bushrod Johnson.

During these three days, the 15th, 16th, and 17th, Beauregard, while defending Petersburg with great skill and tenacity, had repeatedly reported to Lee the arrival of Grant's army at Petersburg, and begged for re-enforcements. Lee's replies were as follows:

June 16th, 10.30 A. M. "I do not know the position of Grant's army and cannot strip the north bank of troops."

June 17th, 12 M. "Until I can get more definite information of Grant's movements do not think it prudent to draw more troops to this side of the river."

On this day, Grant's entire force being now on the field, his attacks were urged with increasing vigor, and at 6.40 P. M. Beauregard telegraphed Lee as follows:

"The increasing number of the enemy in my front, and inadequacy of my force to defend the already too much extended lines, will compel me to fall back within a shorter time, which I will attempt to-night. This I will hold as long as practicable, but, without re-enforcements, I may have to evacuate the city very shortly. In that event I shall retire in the direction of Drury's Bluff, depending the crossing of Appomattox River and Swift Creek."

After the receipt of this despatch, Kershaw's division was ordered to proceed during the night to Bermuda Hundreds, and a few days later the order was extended to continue the march to Petersburg. The fighting on Beauregard's lines lasted until nearly midnight. But when it was over, and the transfer of his troops to their new line was fully under way, he began to take more political measures to convince Lee of the situation. He sent three of his staff, one after another, within two hours, with details about the prisoners captured from different corps of the Federal army, with the stories told by each of their marches since leaving Fort Harbor on the 12th. The first messenger was Beauregard's aide, Col. Chisolm, who interviewed Lee, lying on the ground in his tent near Drury's Bluff, between 12 and 2 A. M. on the 18th. Lee seemed very tired and heard many messages, but still he thought Beauregard mistaken in

supposing that any large part of Grant's army had crossed the river. He said, also, that Kershaw's division was already under orders to Petersburg, and he promised to come over in the morning.

Chisolm was soon followed by Col. Alfred Roman, but he had to leave his messages, as Lee's staff would not disturb him again. About 3 A. M. Major Giles B. Cooke arrived and insisted upon an interview. He brought further statements by prisoners, which, laid before Lee, thoroughly satisfied him that Grant's army had now been across the James for over forty-eight hours. The following telegrams, which were immediately sent, will indicate his change of view.

June 18th, 3.30 A. M. "Superintendent R. & P. R. R. Can trains run to Petersburg? If so, send all cars available to Rice's Turnout. If they cannot run through, can any be sent from Petersburg to the point where the road is broken? It is important to get troops to Petersburg without delay."

"To General Early, Lynchburg.

"Grant is in front of Petersburg. Will be opposed there. Strike as quick as you can. If circumstances authorize, carry out the original plan or move upon Petersburg without delay."

At the same time orders were sent Anderson for Field's division and the corps headquarters and artillery to follow Kershaw's division into Petersburg. Kershaw arrived there about 7.30 A. M.; the rest of us about nine.

We must now return to Smith's column, which we saw start to Petersburg, about sixteen thousand strong, at daylight on the 15th, with about eight miles to go, 2,500 of the command being cavalry, 3,700 of them colored troops. Beauregard awaits them in the lines of Petersburg which encircle the city, about two miles out, from the river above to the river below, a development of about ten miles. The intrenchments had no abatis or obstructions in front and consisted only of a small outside ditch and a parapet, with platforms and embrasures for guns at suitable intervals. As Beauregard expected Hoke's division about dark, every moment of delay was valuable; to prolong it he used the old device of sending forward a regiment of cavalry and a battery. These delayed the approach for about three hours, at the expense of a gun captured. The march was then resumed, and about 9 A. M.

the head of the column came to the zone of felled forest in front of the intrenchments. Beauregard, fortunately, had a good supply of guns and ammunition which he used freely in preventing the enemy from establishing his batteries or moving his troops within sight, and it was 1.30 P. M. when the column was deployed. Smith had still to make his reconnoissance, and this occupied him until 5 P. M. But it had been efficiently made, for he learned that our infantry was stretched out in a very thin line, and it led him to decide that his charge should be made not with a column, but with clouds of skirmishers. Another hour was taken to form the troops, and at 6 P. M. all would have been ready, but it was now found that the chief of artillery had sent all the horses to water, and it required an hour to get them back. Tall oaks from little acorns grow! By such small and accidental happenings does fate decide battles! Petersburg was lost and won by that hour.

At 7 P. M. the guns returned and opened a severe fire, to which the Confederate guns did not reply, reserving their fire for the columns which they expected to see. These never appeared, but instead the cloud of skirmishers overran the works and captured the guns still loaded with double canister and defended by only a skirmish line of infantry. Hink's colored division, which made the charge, lost 507 killed and wounded from the fire of the skirmishers. It captured four guns and 250 prisoners. Lines of battle followed, and by 9 P. M. occupied about one and a half miles of intrenchment, from redan No. 7 to No. 11, inclusive (counting from the river below), getting possession of sixteen guns. Hancock's corps had arrived on the ground during the action, and when it was over, at Smith's request, it relieved his troops. Smith had been informed of the approach of re-enforcements to both sides, and he thought it wiser to hold what he had than to venture more and risk disaster. Kautz's cavalry had been kept beyond the intrenchments all day by Dearing's cavalry and a few guns, which fired from the redans in the vicinity of No. 28. About 6 P. M., hearing no sounds of battle from Smith, Kautz withdrew, with a loss of forty-three men, and went into bivouac.

After the fighting began, Beauregard had recognized that he would need every available man to defend the city, and he ordered

Johnson to leave only Gracie's brigade in his lines, and to come to Petersburg with the rest of his division. Johnson brought about 3,500 men, which with Hoke, gave Beauregard in the morning an effective force of about fourteen thousand infantry. During the night he built a temporary line, throwing out the captured portion, while his efficient chief engineer, Col. D. B. Harris, laid out and commenced a better located permanent line at an average distance of a half mile in the rear.

On the 16th Hancock was in command, and the Ninth Corps arrived on the field, giving him about 48,000 effectives. He devoted the day to attacks upon each flank of the broken line and succeeded in capturing one redan, No. 4, on Beauregard's left, and three, Nos. 12, 13, and 14, on his right.


On the 17th the fighting began at 3 A. M., and was continued until 11 P. M. The attack at 3 A. M. was conducted by Potter's division of the Ninth Corps, and was a complete surprise. Extraordinary precautions had been adopted to make it so. No shot was fired. Canteens had been packed in knapsacks, and all orders were transmitted in whispers. The Confederates were so exhausted by their incessant fighting by day and working by night that they were sound asleep, with arms in their hands, and double canister in their guns. Only a single gunner was waked in time to pull a single lanyard before the enemy swept over and got possession of redan No. 16, with four guns and six hundred prisoners. Nowhere else during the long day were they able to make any headway.

The Fifth Corps had now arrived, and one division of the Sixth. About dark in the afternoon, redan No. 3 on the left had been taken and held temporarily by Ledlie's division of the Ninth Corps. Gracie's brigade, which had just come in from Bermuda Hundreds, was put to charge them, and drove them out, capturing over one thousand prisoners. After the fighting ceased, Colonel Harris superintended the withdrawal of the troops from the temporary line to the new location which had been prepared in the last forty-eight hours.

At 4 A. M. on the 18th a general advance was made by the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Corps, the Sixth and Eighteenth supporting in reserve. The ground in front of the points which had been assaulted was thick-

ly strewn with the Federal dead, and the slight trenches, from which they had fought so long and desperately, were filled with the slain there had been no opportunity to bury or remove. A few deserters or prisoners were picked up, and from them Meade learned that Beauregard's whole force had been but two divisions and Wise's brigade, now reduced by heavy losses, but trying to occupy a hastily constructed line a half mile, more

our pickets and in efforts to arrange for simultaneous assaults by the different corps. Meade himself at last fixed upon twelve o'clock, and ordered each corps at that hour to assault with a strong column. By that time Kershaw's division had relieved Johnson's, taking its place in the trenches. Hoke, Wise, and none of the artillery could be relieved until after dark without unwise exposure of the troops. Field's division took



From a sketch by the author.

or less, in the rear. This information was conveyed to all the corps commanders, who were ordered to press forward vigorously and overwhelm our lines in their unfinished condition.

No army could ask a more favorable chance to destroy its antagonist than was here presented. Their whole army was at hand and the re-enforcement of Longstreet's corps even now coming to Beauregard was not over twelve thousand men and was still about three to five hours away. The little which was accomplished during the whole day is striking evidence of the condition to which the Federal army had now been reduced.

At first much time was lost in driving in

position in the trenches on Kershaw's left, but it did not become engaged.

Humphreys states that about midday the Second Corps made two assaults, "both repulsed with severe loss." Later Meade again ordered "assaults by all the corps with their whole force, and at all hazards, and as soon as possible. All the corps assaulted late in the afternoon, and at hours not widely apart. Birney with all his disposable force. Mott from the Hare house . . . supported by one of Gibbon's brigades, Barlow on Mott's left—but were repulsed with considerable loss. Burnside found the task of driving the enemy [it was but a picket force] out of the railroad cut a formidable one, and assaulting established

his corps within a hundred yards of the enemy's main line. . . . Warren's assault was well made, some of Griffin's men being killed within twenty feet of the enemy's works, but it was no more successful than the others. His losses were very severe. . . . On the right Martindale advanced and gained some rifle pits, but did not assault the main line."

On the Confederate side the day was not considered a day of battle, but only of demonstrations and reconnoissance. None of our re-enforcements were engaged, the only fighting done having been by Hoke's division and Wise's brigade, who, under Beauregard, had already borne the whole brunt of the four days and three nights. The official diary of Longstreet's corps says of the day:

"We arrive in Petersburg and Kershaw relieves Bushrod Johnson's division, Field taking position on Kershaw's right. A feeble attack is made in the afternoon on Elliott's brigade."

No official report is given of any brigade except Hagood's, which describes only skirmishing and one attempted charge on our extreme left, "which never got closer than 250 yards."

It was necessary to wait until night before Beauregard's artillery could receive its plaudit of "Well done! good and faithful servants," and be relieved by the fresh battalions of Longstreet's corps. Of all the moonlight nights I can remember, I recall that Saturday night as perhaps the most brilliant and beautiful. The weather was exceedingly dry, the air perfectly calm, with an exhilarating electrical quality in it. The dust rose with every movement and hung in the air. The whole landscape was bathed and saturated in silver, and sounds were unusually distinct and seemed to be alive and to travel everywhere. It was not a night for sleep in the trenches. There was a great deal to be done at all points to strengthen and improve them, and every man was personally interested in working at his immediate location.

In spite of all pains, the drawing out of old guns and approach of new was attended with sounds which wandered far and with luminous clouds of dust gradually rising in the air. Then the enemy would know we were moving and there would come crashes of musketry at random and volleys of artillery from their lines. Then our infantry

would imagine themselves attacked and would respond in like fashion, and the fire would run along the parapet to right and left, and gradually subside for a while, to break out presently somewhere else. I was accompanied by Lieut.-Col. Branch, chief of artillery of Beauregard's army, a very competent and gallant officer, unfortunately killed in 1869 by the falling of a bridge near Richmond.

Grant did not renew his assaults on the 19th, but expressed himself satisfied that all had been done which was possible, and he now directed that the troops should be put under cover and have some rest.

Humphreys writes: "The positions gained by the several corps close against the enemy were intrenched, and the two opposing lines in this part of the ground remained substantially the same in position to the close of the war."

In brief review, it must be said that Grant successfully deceived Lee as to his whereabouts for at least three days, and thus, at the most critical period of the war, saved himself from a second defeat, more bloody, more signal, and more undeniable than Cold Harbor. For, if Beauregard alone, with only fourteen thousand men, was able to stop Grant's whole army, even after being driven by surprise into temporary works, what would Lee and Beauregard together have done from the strong original lines of Petersburg? Grant personally was at that period not abstemious, and that his troops knew of it (perhaps sometimes exaggerating facts in speaking of it) was known even to the Confederates from the stories of prisoners captured at Cold Harbor. Such a defeat, in case of any disaster, with such rumors afloat, would have cast a baleful back-light over the campaign even to Spottsylvania and the Wilderness. He was now able to base a *quasi* claim to victory in establishing himself within the lines of Petersburg. But all the odium of repeated defeats would have been heaped upon his campaign had it terminated with a final and bloody repulse.

All this had been changed by his well-planned and successfully conducted strategy. The position which he had secured was full of great possibilities, as yet not fully comprehended. But already the character of the operations contemplated removed all risk of serious future catastrophe. However bold we might be, however desperately

we might fight, we were sure in the end to be worn out. It was only a question of a few months more or less. We were unable to see it at once. But there soon began to spring up a chain of permanent works, the first of which were built upon our original lines captured by the skirmishers the first afternoon, and these works, impregnable to assault, finally decided our fate, when on the next March 25th, we put them to the test.

Of this period following the battles of Cold Harbor and Petersburg the future historian may find some interest. By all the rules of statecraft the time had now arrived to open negotiations for peace. There would no longer be any hope of final success, but there would still be much of blood, of treasure, and of political rights which might be saved or lost. The time never came again when as favorable terms could have been made as now. For it was the hour of the lowest tide in Federal hopes. It remains a fact, however, that for many months, even until the very capture of Richmond, both the Confederate army and the people would have been very loath to recognize that our cause was hopeless. Lee's influence, had he advised it, could have secured acquiescence in surrender, but nothing else would. His confidence in his army, doubtless, for some months delayed his realization of the approaching end. Even when he foresaw it, his duty to his Government as a soldier was paramount, and controlled his course to the very last.

And there is this to be said. In every war there are two issues contended for. First, is the political principle involved, which with us was the right of secession. The second is prestige or character as a people. Conceding our cause, did we defend it worthily, history and posterity being the judges?

We lost the first issue; and the more utterly it was lost the better it has proved to be—for ourselves even more than for our adversaries. Without detracting from their merit, but displaying and even enhancing it, we have gained the second by a courage and constancy which could only be fully developed and exhibited under the extreme tests endured, and by the high types of men who became our leaders. Is not that end worthy of the extreme price paid for it, even to the last drop of blood shed at Appomattox? I am sure that to the army, any end but the last ditch would have seemed

a breach of faith with the dead we had left upon every battle-field.

The Federal casualties for Petersburg and for the campaign are given as follows:

June 13th to 18th: Killed 1,298, wounded 7,474, missing 1,814; total, 10,586.

May 5th to June 18th: Killed 8,412, wounded 44,629, missing 9,609; total, 62,750.

No returns exist for Beauregard's losses, but they have been estimated at: killed 500, wounded 2,200, missing 2,000; total, 4,700. The losses among the general officers were severe on both sides, being of Confederates: killed 8, wounded 15, captured 2, total 25; and of Federals: killed 6, wounded 8, captured 2, total 16.

THE MINE

OUR first days in the Petersburg trenches were exceedingly busy ones. From June 19th to 24th a daily entry in my note-book was "severe sharpshooting and artillery practice without intermission day or night." Our whole time was spent in improving our lines and getting our batteries protected and with good communications. Never until in this campaign had the enemy used mortar fire in the field, but now Abbott's Reserve Artillery regiment of seventeen hundred men brought into use sixty mortars ranging from twenty-four-pounder Coehorns to ten-inch Seacoast, which caused us great annoyance, as we had to keep our trenches fully manned and had no protection against the dropping shells. Fortunately I had ordered some mortars constructed in Richmond about two weeks before, and they began to arrive on June 24th, and were at once brought into use. They were only twelve-pounders, but were light and convenient and at close ranges enabled us to hold our own with less loss than might have been expected. The cannoners in the batteries and the infantry in the lines who were exposed to this mortar fire managed to build little bomb-proofs and a labyrinth of deep and narrow trenches in rear of the lines. Abbott's siege train also included six 100-pounder and forty 30-pounder rifles besides their regular field artillery. Many of the heavy calibres were mounted on the permanent forts erected in the outer line already referred to.

These constituted a sort of intrenched citadel, consisting of isolated forts connected

by infantry parapets with ditches and abatis and impregnable to any assault. Here a small fraction of the army could securely hold its line for days and continue to threaten Petersburg, leaving the rest free to extend lines on the south or to threaten Richmond on the north. Meanwhile, in front their offensive system of trenches and redans was pushed as close as possible to ours and we were constantly menaced with assault should we weaken our garrison.

One point in our front, called Elliott's Salient, was recognized as particularly weak. The edge of the deep valley of Poor Creek, approximately parallel to our general line of works, here approached within 133 yards of the salient, which was held by Pegram's battery, Elliott's brigade occupying the adjacent lines. Along the near edge of the valley the enemy built strong rifle pits, with elaborate head-logs and loopholes, from which a constant fire was kept up upon our works. In the valley behind was ample room for an unlimited force, which could be collected and massed without our knowledge and would have but 133 yards to advance under fire to reach our works. We soon managed to place obstructions in front of the parapet at this point and watched closely, confidently expecting that the enemy would here begin soon to make zigzag approaches as in a siege.

On June 22d Grant despatched Wilson's and Kautz's divisions of cavalry upon a raid against the Lynchburg and Danville railroads. On the same day the Second and Sixth Corps were stretched out to the left with the intent of reaching the Weldon Railroad, and perhaps even to the road to Lynchburg.

Lee, advised of this movement, sent A. P. Hill with Wilcox's and Mahone's divisions, supported by Johnson's, to meet it. With Wilcox's division he obstructed the advance of the Sixth Corps so effectively that it failed to reach even the Weldon road by at least a mile. With Mahone's and Johnson's divisions he passed through a gap carelessly left between the Second Corps, which was swinging around to its right, and the Sixth, which was advancing, and struck Barlow's division of the Second in the rear. Barlow's and Gibbon's divisions were both badly defeated, losing four guns (which were turned upon the fugitives), several colors, and about seventeen hundred prisoners.

Mott's division was also routed, but retreated so precipitately as to lose few prisoners. Hill returned at night to his intrenchments, and the next morning the Second Corps reoccupied the lines from which it had been driven and the Sixth Corps formed on its left obliquely toward the Weldon road.

Wilson and Kautz were followed in their raid by W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry which, however, was unable to prevent the tearing up of the Lynchburg Railroad from near Petersburg to Burkeville, and of the Danville road from Burkeville south to the Staunton River. Here the bridge was defended by local militia who were intrenched with artillery. The river was unfordable, and Lee, attacking in the rear, the Federals decided to rejoin Grant at Petersburg by a circuit to the east.

Unfortunately for them, Hampton's and Fitz Lee's divisions had just returned from the pursuit of Sheridan's cavalry to Trevilian's Station, where they had had a drawn battle on June 11th and 12th. These divisions, aided by W. H. F. Lee's, which had continued in the pursuit, and by two brigades of infantry under Mahone, fell upon Wilson and Kautz on the 29th at Ream's Station and routed them with the loss of fifteen hundred killed, wounded, and captured, and all of their artillery (twelve guns) and their wagon train. They finally made their escape across the Blackwater, burning the bridge behind them and thus cutting off pursuit by Hampton and Lee. They reached the James at Light House Point on July 2d.

They had been absent ten days, had marched over three hundred miles, and torn up sixty miles of railroad. The tracks, however, were soon repaired and traffic restored by all the lines. By the Weldon road, however, it soon became necessary to halt the trains short of Petersburg, and to wagon by a roundabout road into the town.

Between July 6th and 9th Grant had found it necessary to send the three divisions of the Sixth Corps to Washington to oppose Early and Breckenridge. These, whom we saw sent by Lee from Cold Harbor to check Hunter's advance upon Lynchburg, had reached Lynchburg before him. Hunter feared either to attack or to retreat by the way he had come. After a pause of two days he started on June 19th through West Virginia, via the Great Kanawha, the Ohio River, and the Baltimore and Ohio

Railroad, to Harper's Ferry. This left the valley open. Early at once moved down it to demonstrate against Washington. The only force available to oppose him was Wallace's command from Baltimore, with Rickett's division of the Sixth Corps, which was the first to arrive. Early had crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown and moved through the passes of South Mountain. On July 9th he attacked and defeated Wallace on the Monocacy, Ricketts being killed. The next day he moved upon Washington, Wallace being driven toward Baltimore.

Never before probably had Washington been as bare of troops as when Early arrived before it on the afternoon of July 11th. But there were regular garrisons of infantry and artillery at many of the permanent forts, District of Columbia Volunteers, regiments of Veteran Reserves, many miscellaneous detachments at the camp of instruction, and about two thousand organized employees of the quartermaster's department—in all, over twenty thousand men. These troops alone, without aid, could have defended the city indefinitely and forced Early to undertake a siege. That night there arrived the two remaining divisions of the Sixth Corps, and six thousand men of the Nineteenth Corps, under Emory, from New Orleans.

In the afternoon Early had reconnoitred, and, in consultation with his officers, had ordered an assault in the morning. It is scarcely credible that he would have made more than a demonstration, for any real attack would have been but a bloody farce. In the night he heard of the arrival of the troops and in the morning could see them. He did not attack, and that night he withdrew, marching to Leesburg, where he recrossed the Potomac. Grant had intended, on Early's repulse, not only to bring back the Sixth Corps to Petersburg, but also to bring down the Nineteenth. Had he now carried out those intentions it is likely that Lee would have brought down Early. It was Lee's policy, however, to fight for time and delay matters by division rather than to hasten them by concentration. So he left Early in the valley, where his presence would be a constant menace and would neutralize more troops than his equivalent elsewhere.

On June 30th I became convinced that the enemy were preparing to mine our position at the Elliott Salient. At that point in-

cessant fire was kept up by their sharpshooters, while a few hundred yards to the right and left the fire had been gradually allowed to diminish and men might show themselves without being fired at. That indicated that some operation was going on, and for several days I had expected to see zigzag approaches started on the surface of the ground. When several days had passed and nothing appeared, I became satisfied that their activity was underground. On my way home I was that day wounded by a sharpshooter and received a furlough of six weeks to visit my home in Georgia. On my way to the cars next day I was driven by Lee's headquarters, where I reported my belief about the mine. There happened to be present Mr. Lawley, the English correspondent of the *London Times*, who was much interested and asked how far it would be necessary to tunnel to get under our works. I answered about five hundred feet. He stated that the longest military tunnel or gallery which had ever been run was at the siege of Delhi, and that did not exceed four hundred feet. That it was found impossible to ventilate for any greater distance. I replied that in the Federal army were many Pennsylvania coal-miners, who could be relied on to ventilate mines any distance that might be necessary, and it would not do to rely upon military precedents. It proved that my suspicion was correct.

It was June 30th when I guessed it. The gallery had been commenced on June 27th. It was undertaken in opposition to the advice of all the military engineers at Federal headquarters by Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment, a coal-miner, who saw the opportunity which the situation offered. A gallery was successfully extended 511 feet, with two branch galleries at the end, to the right and left, each thirty-seven feet long. These branch galleries were charged with gunpowder in eight parcels of one thousand pounds each, connected by open troughs of powder to be fired by safety fuses coming through the tamping and along the gallery.

His method of ventilation was very simple. When the tunnel had penetrated the hill far enough to need it, a close partition was built across it near the entrance with a close-fitting door. Through the partition on the side of this door was passed the open end of a long square box, or closed


trough, which was built along on the floor of the tunnel, conveying the fresh outside air to the far end of the tunnel, where the men extending it were at work.

To create a draught through this air-box a fireplace was excavated in the side of the tunnel, within the partition, and a chimney was pierced through the hill above it. A small fire in this chimney-place, and the outside air would pass through the air-box to the far end of the tunnel, whence it would return and escape up the chimney, taking with it the foul air of the tunnel. This tunnel was finished July 17th, the galleries on the 23d, and the mine was charged and tamped on the 28th.

Lee, on receipt of my message on July

known as Colquitt's and Gracie's Salients. Countermines were also begun; at Colquitt's on the 10th and at Gracie's on the 19th. All four of our mines were constantly pushed until the 30th, when the explosion occurred, the total length of our galleries being then about 375 feet. Of the two galleries on each side of the mine, one, which was unoccupied, was destroyed by the explosion. In the other the miners were at work, but, though much shaken up, the galleries were not crushed and the miners climbed out and escaped.

Meanwhile, in spite of predictions of failure, the mine had been constructed, and though we were known to suspect it, and our countermining operations could be



From a sketch by the author.

1st, ordered our engineers to start countermines at the Elliott Salient. Two shafts were sunk about ten feet and listening galleries were run out from each. Unfortunately the shafts were located on the right and left flanks of the battery, and the enemy's gallery passed at a depth of twenty feet under the apex, and was so silently built that our miners never knew of their proximity. Had they detected it they would have hastened to explode what is called a *camouflet*, an undercharged or "smothered mine," which does not disturb the surface, but caves in adjacent galleries.

By July 10th our miners had done enough work, had it been done at the apex of the salient, to have heard the enemy, who would have been directly beneath them. Work was not only kept up, however, on the flanks, but at two other positions farther to the left,

heard, it was now determined to delay the explosion until preparations could be made to have it followed by a grand charge, supported by the concentration of a great force, both of infantry and artillery. That it might be the more effective Grant determined to combine strategy with main force, and first endeavor to draw a large part of our infantry to the north side of the James. At suitable points he had already built signal towers overlooking our lines and some of our most important roads, and now the artillery officers were directed to prepare specially to concentrate fire upon every gun in our lines which could be used for the defence of Elliott's Salient. In obedience to these instructions, Humphreys reports, "heavy guns and mortars, eighty-one in all, and about the same number of field guns," were prepared with abundant ammunition.

At Deep Bottom, Butler maintained two pontoon bridges across the James, with part of the Tenth Corps on the north side, under cover of his gunboats and ironclads. Of course we had to maintain a moderate force in observation, which, under Gen. Conner, was located near Bailey's Creek. Grant could cross both the Appomattox and the James and go from his lines around Petersburg to Deep Bottom by a march of twelve miles, all of it entirely concealed from our view. Lee could only send troops to meet him by a march of twenty miles.

On the afternoon of July 26th Hancock with about twenty thousand infantry and Sheridan with two divisions, about six thousand cavalry, were started to Deep Bottom. It was expected that this force, aided by the Tenth Corps, would surprise the Confederate brigade (Conner's) and would then make a dash toward Richmond. Sheridan was directed also to endeavor to cut the railroads north of Richmond. During the night this force crossed the river, and at dawn on the 27th moved upon our lines and captured four 20-pounder Parrotts in an advanced position.

It happened that Lee had noted the activity of the enemy in that quarter. Wilcox's division was already at Drury's Bluff, and on the 24th it and Kershaw's division were sent to re-enforce Conner. This force made such a show that Hancock, finding it there before him, did not deem it wise to assault their line. On their left Kershaw even advanced against Sheridan's cavalry and forced it to retreat. It took a position behind a ridge, where it dismounted a considerable force armed with the Spencer magazine carbines. Kershaw unwisely attempted a charge and was quickly repulsed, losing 250 prisoners and two colors.

On hearing of Hancock's crossing on the morning of the 27th, and that prisoners had been captured from the Second, Tenth, and Eighteenth Corps, Lee immediately sent over W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry and Heth's infantry of Hill's corps. Later in the day he arranged to have Field's division of infantry withdrawn from his trenches at dark, to follow during the night, and Fitz Lee's cavalry the next morning. President Davis was also advised, and on the 29th the Local Defence troops in Richmond were called out to the defence of the Richmond lines. These troops were never called out

except in the gravest emergencies, which indicates the importance Lee attached to the demonstration.

But it was only a demonstration designed to be abandoned if it failed to make a surprise of our lines at Deep Bottom on the 27th. As this became apparent on the 28th, orders were issued from Deep Bottom to prepare the mine for explosion on the morning of the 30th. Orders were also given for the Second Corps, with a division of the Eighteenth Corps and one of the Tenth, to return and take part in the assault. Sheridan's cavalry was also to return, and passing in rear of the army to take position on its left to threaten our extreme right and prevent our re-enforcing the vicinity of the mine. The explosion might have been arranged for the afternoon of the 29th, but the morning of the 30th was chosen as it permitted the placing of more heavy guns and mortars for the bombardment, which would follow the explosion, as well as preliminary arrangements, such as massing the troops, removing parapets and abatis to make passages for the assaulting columns, and the posting of pioneers to remove our abatis and open passages for artillery through our lines. Depots of intrenching tools, with sandbags, gabions, fascines, etc., were established, that lodgments might be more quickly made, though the pioneers of all regiments were already well supplied with tools. Engineer officers were designated to accompany all columns, and even pontoon trains were at hand to bridge the Appomattox in pursuit of fugitives. Finally, Meade personally impressed on every corps commander the importance of celerity of movement. Briefly, no possible precaution was omitted to be carefully ordered, and the success of the Deep Bottom expedition, in drawing Lee's forces to that locality, had exceeded all expectations.

On the morning of the 30th Lee had left to hold the ten miles of lines about Petersburg but three divisions, Hoke's, Johnson's, and Mahone's, about eighteen thousand men, most of the rest of his army being twenty miles away. Hoke and Johnson held from the Appomattox on the left to a little beyond the mine. Mahone held all beyond, one brigade being four miles to the right. The Second, Fifth, Ninth Corps, and parts of the Tenth and Eighteenth, with two divisions of Sheridan's cavalry, sixteen di-

visions in all, nearly sixty thousand men, were concentrated to follow up the surprise to be given by the explosion under Johnson's division. That it should be the more complete, for two days no heavy guns or mortars had been fired, that the Confederates might believe that the Federals were preparing to retreat.

Everything now seemed to be working exactly as Grant would have it, and it is difficult to entirely explain how the attack came to fail so utterly. Doubtless several causes co-operated, which will be presently referred to, but among them was doubtless the same cause which, on May 12th, nullified the Federal surprise at the Bloody Angle at Spottsylvania. Too many troops had been brought together and they were in each other's way. On a smaller scale, in the assault on Fort Sanders at Knoxville, three Confederate brigades got mingled in the assault, which at once lost its vigor, though it did not retreat until after receiving severe punishment. The brigadier in command on this occasion ascribed his failure to the presence of the two other brigades, who should have been upon his flanks.

The assault was to be led by Ledlie's division of the Ninth Corps, a selection made by lot, and a very unfortunate one, as Ledlie and Ferrero, who commanded the colored division, which was to follow Ledlie, both took shelter in a bomb-proof, where they remained during the entire action. The mine was ordered to be fired at 3.30 A. M., but the fuses had been spliced, and when fired failed at the splice. After an hour an officer and sergeant entered the tunnel and relighted the fuse. The explosion occurred at 4.40. As the sun rose about 4.50 the delay had been advantageous, as it gave daylight for the movements of the troops and for the artillery fire.

The explosion made a crater 150 feet long, ninety-seven feet wide, and thirty feet deep, the contents being hurled so high in the air that the foremost ranks of the assaulting columns, 150 yards away, shrank back in disorder in fear of the falling earth. The bulk of the earth, however, fell immediately around the crater, mingled with the *débris* of two guns, twenty-two cannoneers, and perhaps 250 infantry (nine companies of the Nineteenth and Twenty-second South Carolina, which had been carried up in the air). Quite a number of those who fell safely

were dug out and rescued alive by the assaulting column. Some, not yet aroused, were lost, covered up in the bomb-proofs of the adjacent trenches by the falling earth. This formed a high embankment, as it were, all around the crater, with one enormous clod, the size of a small cabin, perched about the middle of the inside rim, which remained a landmark for months. A high interior line, called a trench cavalier, had been built across the gorge of the salient enclosing a triangular space, and the left centre of this space about coincided with the centre of the explosion. The parapets were partially destroyed and largely buried by the falling earth.

Into this crater the leading division literally swarmed until it was packed about as full as it could hold, and what could not get in there crowded into the adjacent trenches, which the falling earth had caused to be vacated for a short distance on each flank. But, considering the surprise, the novelty of the occasion, and the terrific cannonade by 150 guns and mortars which was opened immediately, the coolness and self-possession of the entire brigade was remarkable, and to it is to be attributed the success of the defence. This was conducted principally by Colonel McMaster of the Seventeenth South Carolina, General Elliot having been soon severely wounded. The effect of the artillery cannonade was more moral than physical, for the smoke so obscured the view that the fire was largely at random, at least for one or two hours during which it was in fullest force. The effort was at once made to collect a small force in the trenches upon each flank, and one in an intrenchment occupying a slight depression which ran parallel to our line of battle some 250 yards in rear of it, the effort being to confine the enemy to the crater and the lines immediately adjoining. The multiplicity of the deep and narrow trenches, and the bomb-proofs in the rear of our lines, doubtless contributed to our success in doing this on the flanks, but there was also decided lack of vigor and enterprise on the part of the enemy, which permitted us to form barricades which were successfully defended to the last.

Meanwhile the re-enforcements to the storming column, instead of spreading to the flanks, massed outside of our lines in rear of the storming column, which had

made no farther advance, but had filled the crater and all the captured lines. Several efforts were made to advance from time to time, but the first were feeble, and could be checked by the remnants of the brigade under McMaster, until two regiments of Wise's brigade and two of Ransom's were brought up from the left. With their aid the situation was made safe and held until about 10 A. M., when Mahone arrived at the head of three brigades of his corps drawn from the lines on our right. A regiment of Hoke's from the left also came up later.

In the meantime a few of our guns had found themselves able to fire with great effect upon the enemy massed in front of our lines. The left gun in the next salient to the right, occupied by Davidson's battery, was in an embrasure which flanked the Pegram Salient, but was not open to any gun on the enemy's line. This gun did fearful execution, being scarcely four hundred yards distant. It was fired by Maj. Gibbes commanding the battalion, for perhaps forty rounds, until he was dangerously wounded, after which it was served by Col. Huger and members of my staff, and later by some of Wise's brigade of infantry. A tremendous fire was turned upon it, but it was well protected and could never be kept silent when the enemy showed himself.

Five hundred yards to the left was a four-gun battery under Capt. Wright of Coit's battalion in a depression behind our line and masked from the enemy by some trees. But it had a flanking fire on the left of Pegram's Salient and across all the approaches and a number of infantry of Wise's brigade could also add their fire. Wright's fire was rapid, incessant, and accurate, causing great loss. The Federal artillery made vain efforts to locate him with their mortar shells, which tore up the ground all around but could never hit him or silence him.

Besides these a half dozen or more of Coehorn mortars under Col. J. C. Haskell from two or three different ravines in the rear threw shell aimed at the crater. And finally six hundred yards directly in rear of the mine was the sunken Jerusalem Plank Road, in which I had placed Haskell's battalion of sixteen guns about the 20th of June, and he had been kept there ever since without showing a gun or throwing up any earth which would disclose his position. He had suffered some loss from random sharpshoot-

ers' bullets coming over the parapets at the salient five hundred yards in front, but it was borne rather than disclose the location.

This morning, on one occasion, a charge was attempted by the colored division, part of which was brought out of the crater and started toward the plank road. Then Haskell's guns showed themselves and opened fire. The charge was quickly driven back with severe loss among its white officers. A single private, with his musket at a support arms, made the charge alone, running all the way to the guns and jumping into the sunken road between them, where he was felled with a rammer staff. Meanwhile our guns across the Appomattox on the Federal right and from our left near the river had kept up a reply to the Federal cannonade to prevent their concentration opposite the mine. Lee and Beauregard had early come to the field, which they surveyed from the windows of the Gee house, where Johnson made headquarters, on the Jerusalem Plank Road near Haskell's guns. Hill had gone to bring up his troops.

On the arrival of Mahone he at once prepared to attack, and had formed Weiseger's brigade, when a renewed attempt to advance was made from the enemy's lines on our left of the crater. He at once met this by a counter-charge of Weiseger's with a portion of Elliott's which drove the enemy back and which caused the retreat from the rear of their lines of many who had been sheltered within them. These suffered severely by our fire from the flanks as they crossed the open space behind, under fire from the guns upon both flanks and infantry as well.

This retreat under such severe fire was seen in the Federal lines just in time to put a stop to an attack upon our right flank about to be made by Ayres's division of Warren's corps, which had been ordered to capture the "one-gun battery" on our right, as they called the one at which Gibbes had been wounded.*

There was very little infantry supporting this gun, or able to reach it, without exposure. Ayres's attack would probably have been successful. He was about to go forward when Meade directed all offensive operations to cease. Wright's brigade arriving about half-past eleven, Mahone

*Humphreys calls this a two-gun battery. There were two embrasures and two guns, but only one used. The other did not bear where desired.

made a second attack, which was repulsed principally by the Federal artillery bearing upon the ground.

Between 1 and 2 P. M. Sanders's brigade having arrived, and also the Sixty-first North Carolina from Hoke, a combined movement upon both flanks of the crater was organized. Mahone attacked on the left, with Sanders's brigade, the Sixty-first North Carolina and the Seventeenth South Carolina. Johnson attacked on the right with the Twenty-third South Carolina and the remaining five companies of the Twenty-second, all that could be promptly collected on that flank.

This attack was easily successful. Mahone has stated that the number of prisoners taken in the crater was 1,101, including two brigade commanders, Bartlett and Marshall.

The tabular statement of the medical department gives the Federal casualties of the day as killed 419, wounded 1,679, missing 1,910; total 4,008. Elliott's brigade reported the loss by the explosion as

	Killed	Wounded	Total
In 18th S. C., 4 companies	43	43	86
In 22d S. C., 5 companies	170
In Pegram's Battery out of 30 present	22
Total			278

Including these, Johnson reports the casualties in his division (Elliott, Wise, Ransom, Gracie) as follows:

Killed, 265; wounded, 415; missing, 315. Total, 938.

There are no returns for Mahone's and Hoke's divisions. Hoke's division was composed of Corse's, Clingman's, Fulton's, Hagood's, and Colquitt's brigades, and Mahone's had only three brigades on the field, Weiseger's, Wright's, and Sanders's. Of these eight brigades only Weiseger's had serious losses, but there are no reports except for Colquitt's, who, like the rest of Hoke's division, held a portion of the line not attacked. His casualties were four killed and twenty-seven wounded. The total Confederate loss is given in the tabular statement of the medical department as four hundred killed, six hundred wounded, and two hundred missing, which is perhaps between two hundred and three hundred too small.

The military court censured Generals Burnside, Ledlie, Ferrero, Wilcox, and Colonel Bliss, commanding a brigade. They also expressed their opinion "that explicit orders should have been given assigning one officer to the command of all the troops intended to engage in the assault when the commanding general was not present in person to witness the operations."

There is nothing in the reports to explain this. Grant sent a despatch to Halleck at 10 A. M., saying that he "was just from the front," and about that time Humphreys reports that Meade with Grant's concurrence ordered the cessation of all offensive movements.

THE END

By Robert Gilbert Welsh

We toiled while daylight swept from east to west,
 We sowed in spring, nor stayed that we might reap;
 Our children garner. As for us, we rest.
 We toil no more, praise God, no more we weep.

Pray for us gently, kinsfolk, as we go.
 Pity us not, nor judge us scornfully.
 We wrung from earth our substance—do ye so.
 Dying, we left earth richer—so shall ye!

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

SPRINGFIELD TO WASHINGTON.



AS the date of inauguration approached, formal invitations, without party distinction, came from the legislatures of Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, rendering Mr. Lincoln the hospitalities of those States and their people, and inviting him to sit their capitals on his journey to Washington. Similar invitations also came to him from the municipal authorities of many cities and towns on the route, and railroads tendered him special trains for the use of himself and family. Mr. Lincoln had no fondness for public display, but in his long political career he had learned the importance of personal confidence and the sympathy between representatives and constituents, leaders and people. About to assume unusual duties in extraordinary times, he doubtless felt that it would not only be a gracious act to accept, so far as he could, these invitations, in which all parties had freely concurred, but that both people and executive would be strengthened in their faith and patriotism by a closer acquaintance, even of so brief and ceremonial a character. Accordingly he answered the governors and committees that he would visit the cities of Indianapolis, Columbus, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Pittsburg, Buffalo, Albany, New York, Trenton, Philadelphia, and Harrisburg, while to the governor of Massachusetts he replied that the want of time alone constrained him to omit that State from his route of travel.

Monday, the 11th day of February, was fixed for the time of departure, and a programme and schedule of special trains from point to point were arranged, extending to Saturday, the 23d, the time of arrival in Washington. Early Monday morning (the 11th) found Mr.

Lincoln, his family, and suite at the rather dingy little railroad station in Springfield, with a throng of at least a thousand of his Springfield neighbors who had come to bid him good-bye. It was a cloudy, stormy morning, which served to add gloom and depression to the spirits. The leave-taking became a scene of subdued anxiety, almost of solemnity. Mr. Lincoln took a position in the waiting-room, where his friends filed past him, often merely pressing his hand in silent emotion.

The half-finished ceremony was broken in upon by the ringing bells and the rushing train. The crowd closed about the railroad car into which the President-elect and his party* made their way. Then came the central incident of the morning. Once more the bell gave notice of starting; but as the conductor paused with his hand lifted to the bell-rope, Mr. Lincoln appeared on the platform of the car, and raised his hand to command attention. The bystanders bared their heads to the falling snow-flakes, and standing thus, his neighbors heard his voice for the last time, in the city of his home, in a farewell address† so chaste and pathetic, that it reads as if he already felt the tragic shadow of forecasting fate:

“ My friends : no one, not in my situation, can appreciate my feeling of sadness at this parting. To this place, and the kindness of these people, I owe everything. Here I have lived a quarter of a century, and have passed from a young to an old man. Here my children have been born, and one is buried. I now leave, not knowing when or whether ever I may return, with a task before me greater than that which rested upon Washington. Without the assistance of that Divine Being who ever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance, I cannot fail. Trusting in Him, who can go with me, and remain with you, and be everywhere for good, let us confidently hope that all will yet be well. To His care commending you, as I hope in your prayers you will commend me, I bid you an affectionate farewell.”

Besides these a considerable number of other personal friends and dignitaries accompanied the President from Springfield to Indianapolis, and some of them to places farther on the route.

† This address is here correctly printed for the first time, from the original manuscript, having been written down immediately after the train started, partly by Mr. Lincoln's own hand and partly by that of his private secretary from his dictation.

The presidential party which made the whole journey consisted of the following persons: Mr. Lincoln, Mrs. Lincoln, their three sons, Robert T., William, and Thomas, Lockwood Todd, Doctor W. S. Wallace, John Nicolay, John Hay, Hon. N. B. Judd, Hon. David Davis, Colonel E. V. Sumner, Major David Hunter, Captain George W. Hazard, Captain John Pope, Colonel Ward H. Lamon, Colonel E. E. Ellsworth, J. M. Burgess, George C. Latham, W. S. Wood, and B. Forbes.

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A proper description of the presidential tour which followed would fill a volume. It embraced two weeks of official receptions by committees, mayors, governors, and legislatures; of crowded evening receptions and interminable hand-shakings; of impromptu or formal addresses at every ceremony; of cheers, salutes, bonfires, military parades, and imposing processions, amid miles of spectators.

Political dissension was for the moment hushed in the general curiosity to see and hear the man who by the free and lawful choice of the nation had been called to exercise the duties of the presidential office. The universal eagerness was perhaps heightened by the fact that during the same two weeks the delegates from the States in insurrection were in session at Montgomery, Alabama, occupied with the temporary organization of a government openly pledged to rebellion, and whose doings were daily reported by the telegraph and printed in every newspaper. Personal curiosity was thus supplemented by growing political anxiety, and every word of the President-elect was scanned for some light by which to read the troubled and uncertain future. Mr. Lincoln was therefore obliged to measure his public utterances with unusual caution; and while he managed to avoid any announcement of policy, the country was nevertheless able to read between the lines that it had made no mistake in the man to whom it had confided the preservation of the Government. It would, of course, be impossible in a single chapter to cite his many speeches on this journey, in which there occurred, of necessity, a great deal of repetition. It will, perhaps, give a better idea of their general tenor to reproduce passages from a few of the most noteworthy. In reading these the critic must constantly bear in mind that they were reported and printed under such circumstances of haste and confusion that verbal accuracy could not be expected, and that they are but abstracts, in which the full structure of his sentences is often abridged or transposed to permit the whole to be brought within the limits of an ordinary press dispatch.

The train which left Springfield in the morning arrived in Indianapolis before nightfall, where, in response to an address from Governor Morton, Mr. Lincoln said:

"Most heartily do I thank you for this magnificent reception, and while I cannot take to myself any share of the compliment thus paid, more than that which pertains to a mere instrument, an accidental instrument, perhaps, I should say, of a great cause, I yet must look upon it as a most magnificent reception, and as such most heartily do I thank you for it. You have been pleased to address yourself to me chiefly in behalf of this glorious Union in which we live, in all of which you have my hearty sympathy, and, as far as may be within my power, will have, one and inseparably, my

hearty coöperation. While I do not expect, upon this occasion, or until I get to Washington, to attempt any lengthy speech, I will only say that to the salvation of the Union, there needs but one single thing, the hearts of a people like yours. The people, when they rise in mass in behalf of the Union and the liberties of this country, truly may it be said, 'The gates of hell cannot prevail against them.' In all trying positions in which I shall be placed, and doubtless I shall be placed in many such, my reliance will be upon you and the people of the United States; and I wish you to remember, now and forever, that it is your business, and not mine; that if the union of these States and the liberties of this people shall be lost, it is but little to any one man of fifty-two years of age, but a great deal to the thirty millions of people who inhabit these United States, and to their posterity in all coming time. It is your business to rise up and preserve the Union and liberty for yourselves, and not for me. . . . I appeal to you again to constantly bear in mind that not with politicians, not with Presidents, not with office-seekers, but with you, is the question, Shall the Union and shall the liberties of this country be preserved to the latest generations?"

The ceremonies during his stay here called out another address from him in which he asked the following pertinent questions:

"I am here to thank you much for this magnificent welcome, and still more for the generous support given by your State to that political cause which I think is the true and just cause of the whole country and the whole world. Solomon says there is 'a time to keep silence,' and when men wrangle by the month with no certainty that they mean the same thing, while using the same word, it perhaps were as well if they would keep silence. The words 'coercion' and 'invasion' are much used in these days, and often with some temper and hot blood. Let us make sure, if we can, that we do not misunderstand the meaning of those who use them. Let us get exact definitions of these words, not from dictionaries, but from the men themselves, who certainly appreciate the things they would represent by the use of words. What, then, is 'Coercion'? What is 'Invasion'? Would the marching of an army into South Carolina, without the consent of her people, and with hostile intent towards them, be 'invasion'? I certainly think it would; and it would be 'coercion' also if the South Carolinians were forced to submit. But if the United States should merely hold and retake its own forts and other property, and collect the duties on foreign importations, or even withhold the mails from places where they were habitually violated, would any or all of these things be 'invasion' or 'coercion'? Do our professed lovers of the Union, but who spitefully resolve that they will resist coercion and invasion, understand that such things as these on the part of the United States would be coercion or invasion of a State? If so, their idea of means to preserve the object of their affection would seem exceedingly thin and airy. If sick, the little pills of the homeopathist would be much too large for them to swallow. In their view, the Union, as a family relation, would seem to be no regular marriage, but a sort of 'free-love' arrangement, to be maintained only on 'passional attraction.' By the way, in what consists the special sacredness of a State? I speak not of the position assigned to a State in the Union, by the Constitution; for that, by the bond, we all recognize. That position, however, a State cannot carry out of the Union with it. I speak of that assumed primary right of a State to rule all which is less than itself, and ruin all which is larger than itself. If a State and a county, in a given case, should be equal in extent of territory, and equal in number of inhabitants, in what, as a matter of principle, is the State better than the

county? Would an exchange of names be an exchange of *rights* upon principle? On what rightful principle may a State, being not more than one-fiftieth part of the nation, in soil and population, break up the nation and then coerce a proportionally larger subdivision of itself, in the most arbitrary way? What mysterious right to play tyrant is conferred on a district of country, with its people, by merely calling it a State? Fellow-citizens, I am not asserting anything; I am merely asking questions for you to consider."

At Columbus, Ohio, he said to the legislature of that State, convened in joint session in the hall of the Assembly:

"It is true, as has been said by the President of the Senate, that very great responsibility rests upon me in the position to which the votes of the American people have called me. I am deeply sensible of that weighty responsibility. I cannot but know what you all know, that without a name, perhaps without a reason why I should have a name, there has fallen upon me a task such as did not rest even upon the Father of his Country; and so feeling, I cannot but turn and look for that support without which it will be impossible for me to perform that great task. I turn, then, and look to the American people, and to that God who has never forsaken them. Allusion has been made to the interest felt in relation to the policy of the new Administration. In this I have received from some a degree of credit for having kept silence, and from others some deprecation. I still think that I was right. . . . I have not maintained silence from any want of real anxiety. It is a good thing that there is no more than anxiety, for there is nothing going wrong. It is a consoling circumstance that when we look out, there is nothing that really hurts anybody. We entertain different views upon political questions, but nobody is suffering anything. This is a most consoling circumstance, and from it we may conclude that all we want is time, patience, and a reliance on that God who has never forsaken this people."

During a brief halt of the train at Steubenville, where a large crowd was assembled, he made the following short statement of the fundamental question at issue:

"I fear that the great confidence placed in my ability is unfounded. Indeed, I am sure it is. Encompassed by vast difficulties as I am, nothing shall be wanting on my part, if sustained by the American people and God. I believe the devotion to the Constitution is equally great on both sides of the river. It is only the different understanding of that instrument that causes difficulty. The only dispute on both sides is, 'What are their rights?' If the majority should not rule, who would be the judge? Where is such a judge to be found? We should all be bound by the majority of the American people — if not, then the minority must control. Would that be right? Would it be just or generous? Assuredly not. I reiterate, that the majority should rule. If I adopt a wrong policy, the opportunity for condemnation will occur in four years' time. Then I can be turned out, and a better man with better views put in my place."

Necessarily omitting any description of the magnificent demonstrations, and the multiplied speeches in the great State and city of New York, his addresses in the capital of New Jersey must be quoted, because they show a culminating earnestness of thought and purpose. To the Senate he said:

"I am very grateful to you for the honorable reception of which I have been the object. I cannot but remember the place that New Jersey holds in our early history. In the revolutionary struggle few of the States among the Old Thirteen had more of the battle-fields of the country within their limits than New Jersey. May I be pardoned if, upon this occasion, I mention that away back in my childhood, the earliest days of my being able to read, I got hold of a small book, such a one as few of the younger members have ever seen, 'Weems' Life of Washington.' I remember all the accounts there given of the battle-fields and struggles for the liberties of the country, and none fixed themselves upon my imagination so deeply as the struggle here at Trenton, New Jersey. The crossing of the river; the contest with the Hessians; the great hardships endured at that time, all fixed themselves on my memory more than any single revolutionary event; and you all know, for you have all been boys, how these early impressions last longer than any others. I recollect thinking then, boy even though I was, that there must have been something more than common that these men struggled for. I am exceedingly anxious that that thing — that something even more than National Independence; that something that held out a great promise to all the people of the world to all time to come — I am exceedingly anxious that this Union, the Constitution, and the liberties of the people shall be perpetuated in accordance with the original idea for which that struggle was made, and I shall be most happy indeed if I shall be an humble instrument in the hands of the Almighty, and of this, his almost chosen people for perpetuating the object of that great struggle. You give me this reception, as I understand, without distinction of party. I learn that this body is composed of a majority of gentlemen who, in the exercise of their best judgment in the choice of a chief magistrate, did not think I was the man. I understand, nevertheless, that they came forward here to greet me as the constitutionally elected President of the United States — as citizens of the United States — to meet the man who, for the time being, is the representative of the majesty of the nation — united by the single purpose to perpetuate the Constitution, the Union, and the liberties of the people. As such, I accept this reception more gratefully than I could do did I believe it were tendered to me as an individual."

Passing then to the Assembly Chamber, he addressed the members of the lower house in conclusion:

. . . "You, Mr. Speaker, have well said that this is a time when the bravest and wisest look back with doubt and awe upon the aspect presented by our national affairs. Under these circumstances, you will readily see why I should not speak in detail of the course I shall deem it best to pursue. It is proper that I should avail myself of all the information and all the time at my command, in order that when the time arrives in which I must speak officially, I shall be able to take the ground which I deem the best and safest, and from which I may have no occasion to swerve. I shall endeavor to take the ground I deem most just to the North, the East, the West, the South, and the whole country. I take it, I hope, in good temper, certainly with no malice toward any section. I shall do all that may be in my power to promote a peaceful settlement of all our difficulties. The man does not live who is more devoted to peace than I am, none who would do more to preserve it, but it may be necessary to put the foot down firmly. [Here the audience broke out into cheers so loud and long, that for some moments it was impossible to hear Mr. Lincoln's voice.] And if I do my duty and do right, you will sustain me, will you not? [Loud cheers, and cries of 'Yes, yes, we will.'] Received as I am by the

members of a legislature, the majority of whom do not agree with me in political sentiments, I trust that I may have their assistance in piloting the ship of State through this voyage, surrounded by perils as it is; for if it should suffer wreck now, there will be no pilot ever needed for another voyage."

Perhaps in no one of the many addresses delivered during his tour was he so visibly moved and affected by his surroundings as when he spoke in Independence Hall in Philadelphia, which he visited on the 22d of February, the anniversary of Washington's birthday. He said:

"I am filled with deep emotion at finding myself standing in this place, where were collected together the wisdom, the patriotism, the devotion to principle from which sprang the institutions under which we live. You have kindly suggested to me that in my hands is the task of restoring peace to our distracted country. I can say in return, sirs, that all the political sentiments I entertain have been drawn, so far as I have been able to draw them, from the sentiments which originated in and were given to the world from this hall. I have never had a feeling, politically, that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence. I have often pondered over the dangers which were incurred by the men who assembled here and framed and adopted that Declaration. I have pondered over the toils that were endured by the officers and soldiers of the army who achieved that independence. I have often inquired of myself what great principle or idea it was that kept this Confederacy so long together. It was not the mere matter of separation of the colonies from the motherland, but that sentiment in the Declaration of Independence which gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men and that all should have an equal chance. This is the sentiment embodied in the Declaration of Independence. Now, my friends, can this country be saved on that basis? If it can, I will consider myself one of the happiest men in the world if I can help to save it. If it cannot be saved upon that principle, it will be truly awful. But if this country cannot be saved without giving up that principle, I was about to say I would rather be assassinated on this spot than surrender it. Now, in my view of the present aspect of affairs, there is no need of bloodshed and war. There is no necessity for it. I am not in favor of such a course; and I may say in advance that there will be no bloodshed unless it be forced upon the Government. The Government will not use force, unless force is used against it.

"My friends, this is wholly an unprepared speech. I did not expect to be called on to say a word when I came here. I supposed it was merely to do something towards raising a flag—I may, therefore, have said something indiscreet. [Cries of 'No, No.'] But I have said nothing but what I am willing to live by, and, if it be the pleasure of Almighty God, die by."

In his last speech of the series, delivered in Harrisburg, before the assembled legislature of Pennsylvania, he happily described another interesting ceremony which had taken place that same morning before leaving Philadelphia:

"I appear before you only for a very few, brief remarks, in response to what has been said to me. I thank you most sincerely for this reception, and the generous words in which support has been promised

me upon this occasion. I thank your great commonwealth for the overwhelming support it recently gave, not me personally, but the cause which I think a just one, in the late election. Allusion has been made to the fact—the interesting fact, perhaps, we should say—that I for the first time appear at the capital of the great commonwealth of Pennsylvania upon the birthday of the Father of his Country. In connection with that beloved anniversary connected with the history of this country, I have already gone through one exceedingly interesting scene this morning in the ceremonies at Philadelphia. Under the conduct of gentlemen there, I was for the first time allowed the privilege of standing in the old Independence Hall, to have a few words addressed to me there, and opening up to me an opportunity of expressing, with much regret that I had not more time to express something of my own feelings, excited by the occasion, somewhat to harmonize and give shape to the feelings that had really been the feelings of my whole life. Besides this, our friends there had provided a magnificent flag of the country. They had arranged it so that I was given the honor of raising it. And when it went up, I was pleased that it went to its place by the strength of my own feeble arm. When, according to the arrangement, the cord was pulled, and it floated gloriously to the wind, without an accident, in the bright, glowing sunshine of the morning, I could not help hoping that there was, in the entire success of that beautiful ceremony, at least something of an omen of what is to come. Nor could I help feeling then, as I often have felt, in the whole of that proceeding I was a very humble instrument. I had not provided the flag; I had not made the arrangements for elevating it to its place; I had applied but a very small portion of my feeble strength in raising it. In the whole transaction I was in the hands of the people who had arranged it, and if I can have the same generous coöperation of the people of the nation, I think the flag of our country may yet be kept flaunting gloriously. I recur for a moment but to repeat some words uttered at the hotel, in regard to what has been said about the military support which the general government may expect from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a proper emergency. To guard against any possible mistake do I recur to this. It is not with any pleasure that I contemplate the possibility that a necessity may arise in this country for the use of the military arm. While I am exceedingly gratified to see the manifestation upon your streets of your military force here, and exceedingly gratified at your promise to use that force upon a proper emergency—while I make these acknowledgments I desire to repeat, in order to preclude any possible misconception, that I do most sincerely hope that we shall have no use for them; that it will never become their duty to shed blood, and most especially never to shed fraternal blood. I promise that so far as I may have wisdom to direct, if so painful a result shall in anywise be brought about, it shall be through no fault of mine."

LINCOLN'S SECRET NIGHT JOURNEY.

ON the morning of February 23d the whole country was surprised at the telegraphic announcement, coupled with diverse and generally very foggy explanations, that the President-elect, after his long and almost triumphal journey in the utmost publicity and with well-nigh universal greetings of good-will, had suddenly abandoned his announced programme and made a quick and secret night journey through Baltimore to the Federal capital. Public opinion at the time, and for years afterward, was puzzled by the event, and the utmost contra-

riety of comment, ranging from the highest praise to the severest detraction which caricature, ridicule, and denunciation could express, was long current. In the course of time, the narratives of the principal actors in the affair have been written down and published,* and a sufficient statement of the facts and motives involved may at length be made. The newspapers stated (without any prompting or suggestion from Mr. Lincoln) that an extensive plot to assassinate him on his expected trip through Baltimore about midday of Saturday had been discovered, which plot the earlier and unknown passage on Friday night disconcerted and prevented. This theory has neither been proved nor disproved by the lapse of time; Mr. Lincoln did not entertain it in this form† nor base his course upon it. But subsequent events did clearly demonstrate the possibility and probability of attempted personal violence from the fanatical impulse of individuals, or the sudden anger of a mob, and justified the propriety of his decision.

The threats of secession, revolution, plots to seize Washington, to burn the public buildings, to prevent the count of electoral votes and the inauguration of the new President, which had for six weeks filled the newspapers of the country, caused much uneasiness about the personal safety of Mr. Lincoln, particularly among the railroad officials over whose lines he was making his journey; and to no one of them so much as to Mr. S. M. Felton, the President of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railway, whose line formed the connecting link from the North to the South, from a free to a slave State, from the region of absolute loyalty to the territory of quasi-rebellion. Independently of politics, the city of Baltimore at that time bore a somewhat unenviable reputation as containing a dangerous and disorderly element; her "roughs" had a degree of newspaper notoriety by no means agreeable to quiet and non-combative strangers. But Baltimore and Maryland were also profoundly moved by the incipient rebellion. Governor Hicks had been plied with persuasion, protest, and even threats of personal violence, to induce him to convene the Maryland legislature, so that secession might begin under a legal pretext. The investigation of the Howard Congressional Committee, though it found no organized plot to seize the capital, gave

abundant traces of secession conspiracy of various degrees — especially of half-formed military companies, organizing to prevent Northern troops from passing through Baltimore to Washington or the South. As part and parcel of this scheme, the railroads were to be destroyed and the bridges burned. The events of April, as they actually occurred, had already been planned, informally at least, in January.

Aside from patriotism, the duty of protecting the tracks and bridges of the railroad of which he was president induced Mr. Felton to call to his aid Mr. Allan Pinkerton, chief of a Chicago detective agency, whom he had before employed on an important matter.

"He was a man of great skill and resources," writes Mr. Felton. "I furnished him with a few hints and at once set him on the track with eight assistants. There were then drilling upon the line of the railroad some three military organizations, professedly for home defense, pretending to be Union men, and in one or two instances tendering their services to the railroad in case of trouble. Their propositions were duly considered; but the defense of the road was never intrusted to their tender mercies. The first thing done was to enlist a volunteer in each of these military companies. They pretended to come from New Orleans and Mobile, and did not appear to be wanting in sympathy for the South. They were furnished with uniforms at the expense of the road, and drilled as often as their associates in arms; became initiated into all the secrets of the organizations, and reported every day or two to their chief, who immediately reported to me the designs and plans of these military companies. One of these organizations was loyal; but the other two were disloyal, and fully in the plot to destroy the bridges, and march to Washington, to wrest it from the hands of the legally constituted authorities. Every nook and corner of the road and its vicinity was explored by the chief and his detectives, and the secret working of secession and treason laid bare and brought to light. Societies were joined in Baltimore, and various modes known to and practiced only by detectives were resorted to, to win the confidence of the conspirators and get into their secrets. The plan worked well; and the midnight plottings and daily consultations of the conspirators were treasured up as a guide to our future plans for thwarting them. . . . It was made as certain as strong circumstantial and positive evidence could make it, that there was a plot to burn the bridges and destroy the road, and murder Mr. Lincoln on his way to Washington, if it turned out that he went there before troops were called. If troops were first called, then the bridges were to be destroyed, and Washington cut off and taken possession of by the South. I at once organized and armed a force of about two hundred men, whom I distributed along the line between the Susquehanna and Baltimore, principally at the bridges. These men were drilled secretly and regularly by drill-masters, and were apparently employed in whitewashing the bridges, putting on some six or seven coats of whitewash, saturated with salt and alum,

* See narrative of S. M. Felton, in Schouler, "Massachusetts in the Civil War," Vol. I., pp. 59-65; Judd to Pinkerton, Nov. 3d, 1867, Edwards, "Life of N. B. Judd," pamphlet, pp. 11-17; Pinkerton, "The Spy of the Rebellion," pp. 45-103; Kennedy to Lossing, embracing narrative of Colonel Stone, Lossing, "Civil War," Vol. II., pp. 147-149; Lincoln's statement to Lossing, *Ib.*, Vol. I., pp. 279, 280; Lincoln's statement to Arnold, Arnold, "Lincoln and Slavery," p. 171; and

MS. letters printed in this chapter. Also Lamon, "Life of Lincoln," pp. 511-526.

† Mr. Lincoln, long afterward, declared: "I did not then, nor do I now, believe I should have been assassinated, had I gone through Baltimore as first contemplated; but I thought it wise to run no risk, where no risk was necessary." Hon. I. N. Arnold, in his work, "Lincoln and Slavery," adds in a note, p. 171, that the above was "stated to the author by Mr. Lincoln."

to make the outside of the bridges as nearly fire-proof as possible. This whitewashing, so extensive in its application, became the nine-days' wonder of the neighborhood. Thus the bridges were strongly guarded, and a train was arranged so as to concentrate all the forces at one point in case of trouble. The programme of Mr. Lincoln was changed; and it was decided by him that he would go to Harrisburg from Philadelphia, and thence over the Northern Central road by day to Baltimore, and thence to Washington. We were then informed by our detective that the attention of the conspirators was turned from our road to the Northern Central, and that they would there await the coming of Mr. Lincoln.*

It appeared from the reports of Pinkerton's detectives that among the more suspicious indications were the very free and threatening expressions of a man named Ferrandini, an Italian, sometime a barber at Barnum's Hotel in Baltimore, but who had become captain of one of the military companies organized in that city to promote secession. Ferrandini's talk may not have been conclusive proof of a conspiracy, but it showed his own intent to commit assassination, and conveyed the inference of a plot.† Coupled with the fact that the Baltimore air was full of similar threats, it established the probability of a mob and a riot. Add to this Ferrandini's testimony before the Howard Committee (February 5th, 1861), that he was then drilling a company (fifteen members) of "Constitutional Guards" in Baltimore, formed for the express purpose "to prevent Northern volunteer companies from passing through the State of Maryland . . . to come here [Washington] to help the United States troops, or anybody else, to invade the South in any shape whatever"; also that another corps, called the National Volunteers, had formed, "to protect their State," and began drilling the previous Saturday; also that he had "heard that the Minute Men have fifteen companies in Baltimore"—and we have the direct evidence of extensive organization, and strong presumption of the uses to which it could be turned.‡ Then, if we remember that riot, murder, and bridge-burning actually took place in Baltimore two months later, in exact accordance with the plans and ideas formulated, both in the loose talk and the solemn testimony by Ferrandini and others, we are unavoidably driven to the conclusion that Mr. Felton, General Scott, Governor Hicks, and others had abundant cause for the very serious apprehensions under which they acted.

Hon. N. B. Judd, a resident of Chicago, of peculiar prominence in Illinois politics and the intimate personal friend of Lincoln, was perhaps the most active and influential member of the suite of the President-elect. Pinkerton

the detective knew Judd personally, and, as the presidential party approached, notified him by letter at Buffalo, and by special messenger at New York, of the investigations he was making in Baltimore. Judd as yet said nothing of the matter to any one. When the party arrived in Philadelphia, however, he was instantly called to a conference with Mr. Felton and the detective. Pinkerton laid his reports before the two, and, after an hour's examination, both were convinced that the allegation of a plot to assassinate the President-elect was as serious and important as in the nature of things such evidence can ever be found. He immediately took Pinkerton with him to Mr. Lincoln's room at the Continental Hotel, to whom the whole story was repeated, and where Judd advised that, in the opinion both of Mr. Felton and himself, Mr. Lincoln's safety required him to proceed that same evening on the 11 o'clock train. "If you follow the course suggested," continued Judd, "you will necessarily be subjected to the scoffs and sneers of your enemies, and the disapproval of your friends, who cannot be made to believe in the existence of so desperate a plot." Mr. Lincoln replied that he appreciated these suggestions, but that he could stand anything that was necessary. Then rising from his seat he said: "I cannot go to-night; I have promised to raise the flag over Independence Hall to-morrow morning, and to visit the legislature at Harrisburg. Beyond that I have no engagements."§

Hitherto, all Lincoln's movements had been made under the invitation, arrangements, direction, and responsibility of committees of legislatures, governors of States, and municipal authorities of towns and cities. No such call or greeting, however, had come from Maryland; no resolutions of welcome from her legislature, no invitation from her governor, no municipal committee from Baltimore. The sole proffers of friendship and hospitality out of the commonwealth came from two citizens in their private capacity—Mr. Gittings, President of the Northern Central Railroad, who tendered a dinner to Mr. Lincoln and his family; and Mr. Coleman, of the Eutaw House, who extended a similar invitation to the President-elect and his suite. Appreciating fully these acts of personal courtesy, Mr. Lincoln yet felt that there was no evidence before him that the official and public authority of the city would be exercised to restrain the unruly elements which would on such an occasion densely pack the streets of Baltimore. During their ten-days' experience on the journey thus

* Schouler, "Massachusetts in the Civil War," Vol. I., pp. 61, 62.

† Lamon, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," p. 516.

‡ Report Select Committee of Five (Howard Committee), pp. 133-137.

§ Judd to Pinkerton, November 3d, 1867.

far, both he and his suite had had abundant evidence as to how completely exposed and perfectly helpless every individual of the party, and especially Mr. Lincoln, was at times, even amid the friendliest feeling and the kindest attention. He had been almost crushed in the corridor of the State-house at Columbus; arriving after dark in the Pittsburg depot, a stampede of the horses of a small cavalry escort had seriously endangered his carriage and its occupants; at Buffalo, Major Hunter, of his suite, had his arm broken by a sudden rush of the crowd. If with all the good-will and precautions of police and military such perils were unavoidable in friendly cities, what might happen where authorities were indifferent, where municipal control and public order were lax, and where prejudice, hostility, and smoldering insurrection animated the masses of people surging about the carriages of an unprotected street procession? Yet with all these considerations Mr. Lincoln could not entirely convince himself that a deliberate plot to murder him was in existence.

"I made arrangements, however, with Mr. Judd for my return to Philadelphia the next night, if I should be convinced that there was danger in going through Baltimore. I told him that if I should meet at Harrisburg, as I had at other places, a delegation to go with me to Baltimore, I should feel safe, and go on."*

Mr. Judd devoted the remainder of the afternoon and nearly the whole of the night of February 21st to the discussion and perfection of arrangements for a night journey through Baltimore, as suggested by himself and Mr. Felton, and as conditionally accepted by the President-elect. Only four persons joined in this discussion,—Mr. Judd, Mr. Pinkerton, Mr. Franciscus, General Manager of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and Mr. Henry Sanford, representing Colonel E. S. Sanford, President of the American Telegraph Company. At 4 o'clock A. M. the party separated, having agreed on the following plan: † that after the reception at Harrisburg, a special train consisting of a baggage car and one passenger car, starting at 6 P. M., should convey Mr. Lincoln and one companion back to Philadelphia, the track between the two cities to be kept clear of everything; that Mr. Felton at Philadelphia should detain the 11 o'clock P. M. Baltimore train until the arrival of the special train from Harrisburg; that Pinkerton should have a carriage ready in which to proceed through Philadelphia from one depot to the other; that a Mrs. Warne, an employee of his, should engage berths in the sleeping-car of the Baltimore train; that Mr. Sanford should

so disconnect the wires as to make any telegraphing between the several points within certain hours impossible; and that Mr. Lincoln should have for his single escort and companion Colonel Ward H. Lamon, of his suite, a devoted personal friend from Illinois— young, active, and of almost herculean frame and strength.

At 6 o'clock on the morning of February 22d, the appointed flag-raising by the President-elect, over Independence Hall in Philadelphia, was duly celebrated, and on the trip to Harrisburg, which followed as soon as possible, Mr. Judd communicated the details of his plan to Mr. Lincoln. Before this, however, Lincoln had received at the Continental Hotel the visit of Mr. Frederick W. Seward, who came as a special messenger from his father, in Washington, to place the following correspondence in his hands:

[Seward to Lincoln.]

"WASHINGTON, February 21st, 1861.

"MY DEAR SIR: My son goes express to you. He will show you a report made by our detective to General Scott, and by him communicated to me this morning. I deem it so important as to dispatch my son to meet you wherever he may find you.

"I concur with General Scott in thinking it best for you to reconsider your arrangement. No one here but General Scott, myself, and the bearer is aware of this communication.

"I should have gone with it myself, but for the peculiar sensitiveness about my attendance at the Senate at this crisis.

Very truly yours,

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD." †

[General Scott to Seward.]

"February 21st, 1861.

"MY DEAR SIR: Please receive my friend, Colonel Stone, chief of General Wightman's staff, and a distinguished young officer with me in Mexico. He has an important communication to make.

"Yours truly, WINFIELD SCOTT." †

[Colonel Stone's Report.]

"February 21st, 1861.

"A New York detective officer who has been on duty in Baltimore for three weeks past reports this morning that there is serious danger of violence to, and the assassination of, Mr. Lincoln in his passage through that city, should the time of that passage be known. He states that there are banded rowdies holding secret meetings, and that he has heard threats of mobbing and violence, and has himself heard men declare that if Mr. Lincoln was to be assassinated they would like to be the men. He states further that it is only within the past few days that he has considered there was any danger, but now he deems it imminent. He deems the danger one which the authorities and people in Baltimore cannot guard against. All risk might be easily avoided by a change in the traveling arrangements which would bring Mr. Lincoln and a portion of his party through Baltimore by a night train without previous notice." †

* Lincoln's statement to Lossing. Lossing, "Civil War," Vol. I., p. 280.

† Judd to Pinkerton, November 3d, 1867.
 † Unpublished MS.

Here was a new and most serious additional warning. The investigation on which it was based was altogether independent of that made by Pinkerton, and entirely unknown to him. Colonel Stone, it will be remembered, was the officer to whom General Scott intrusted the organization and command of the District Militia for the defense of Washington and the general supervision and control of the city. The detectives, three in number, were from New York, and at the request of Colonel Stone had been selected and placed on duty by Mr. Kennedy, superintendent of police of New York city.* In both cases similar observations had been made, and similar conclusions arrived at.

Warned thus of danger by concurrent evidence too grave to be disregarded, and advised to avoid it, not only by Judd and Felton in Philadelphia, but now also by Mr. Seward, the chief of his new Cabinet, and by General Scott, the chief of the army, Mr. Lincoln could no longer hesitate to adopt their suggestion. Whether the evidence would prove ultimately true, or whether violence upon him would be attempted, was not the question. The existence of the danger was pointed out and certified by an authority he had no right to disregard; the trust he bore was not merely the personal safety of an individual, but the fortune and perhaps the fate of the Government of the nation. It was his imperative duty to shun all possible and unnecessary peril. A man of less courage would have shrunk from what must inevitably appear to the public like a sign of timidity; but Lincoln on this and other occasions concerned himself only with the larger issues at stake, leaving minor and especially personal consequences to take care of themselves. Mr. Frederick W. Seward was therefore informed by Judd "that he could say to his father that all had been arranged, and that, so far as human foresight could predict, Mr. Lincoln would be in Washington at 6 o'clock the next morning."† With this message Mr. Seward returned to Washington, while Mr. Lincoln and his suite proceeded to Harrisburg, where on that same Friday, the 22d of February, he was officially received by the governor and the legislature of Pennsylvania.

No other member of Mr. Lincoln's suite had as yet been notified of anything connected with the matter; but Mr. Judd had suggested to him that he felt exceedingly the responsibility of the advice he had given and the steps he

had taken, and that he thought it due to the age and standing of the leading gentlemen of the President-elect's party that at least they should be informed and consulted. "To the above suggestions," writes Judd, "Mr. Lincoln assented, adding: 'I reckon they will laugh at us, Judd, but you had better get them together.' It was arranged that after the reception at the State-house, and before dinner, the matter should be fully laid before the following gentlemen of the party: Judge David Davis, Colonel E. V. Sumner, Major David Hunter, Captain John Pope, and Ward H. Lamon."

Mr. Judd's narrative then further recites what occurred:

"The meeting thus arranged took place in the parlor of the hotel, Mr. Lincoln being present. The facts were laid before them by me, together with the details of the proposed plan of action. There was a diversity of opinion, and some warm discussion, and I was subjected to a very rigid cross-examination. Judge Davis, who had expressed no opinion, but contented himself with asking rather pointed questions, turned to Mr. Lincoln, who had been listening to the whole discussion, and said: 'Well, Mr. Lincoln, what is your own judgment upon this matter?' Mr. Lincoln replied: 'I have thought over this matter considerably, since I went over the ground with Pinkerton last night. The appearance of Mr. Frederick Seward, with warning from another source, confirms Mr. Pinkerton's belief. Unless there are some other reasons besides fear of ridicule, I am disposed to carry out Judd's plan.' Judge Davis then said: 'That settles the matter, gentlemen.' Colonel Sumner said: 'So be it, gentlemen; it is against my judgment, but I have undertaken to go to Washington with Mr. Lincoln, and I shall do it.' I tried to convince him that any additional person added to the risk; but the spirit of the gallant old soldier was up, and debate was useless.

"The party separated about 4 P. M., the others to go to the dinner table, and myself to go to the railroad station and the telegraph office. At a quarter to 6 I was back at the hotel, and Mr. Lincoln was still at the table. In a few moments the carriage drove up to the side door of the hotel. Either Mr. Nicolay or Mr. Lamon called Mr. Lincoln from the table. He went to his room, changed his dinner dress for a traveling suit, and came down with a soft hat sticking in his pocket, and his shawl on his arm.‡ As the party passed through the hall I said, in a low tone, 'Lamon, go ahead. As soon as Mr. Lincoln is in the carriage, drive off; the crowd must not be allowed to identify him.' Mr. Lamon went first to the carriage; Colonel Sumner was following close after Mr. Lincoln; I put my hand gently on his shoulder; he turned to see what was wanted, and before I could explain, the carriage was off. The situation was a little awkward, to use no stronger terms, for a few moments, until I said to the Colonel: 'When we get to Washington, Mr. Lincoln shall determine what apology is due to you.'"

It is needless to describe the various stages of Mr. Lincoln's journey. The plan arranged

* See Lossing, "Civil War," Vol. II., pp. 147-149, a letter from Kennedy, and the narrative of Colonel Stone.

† Judd to Pinkerton, November 3d, 1867.

‡ Many caricatures and comments of that day were based upon the following sentence in a dispatch to the "New York Times": "He wore a Scotch plaid cap and

a very long military cloak, so that he was entirely unrecognizable." This description was the pure invention of a newspaper correspondent understood to be Joseph Howard, Jr., who later in the war was imprisoned in Fort Lafayette for publishing a forged proclamation, about the draft, in the New York newspapers.

by the railroad and telegraph officials was carried out to the smallest detail, without delay or special incident, and without coming to the knowledge of any person on the train or elsewhere, except those to whom the secret was confided. The President-elect and his single companion were safely and comfortably carried from Harrisburg to Philadelphia, and at midnight took their berths in the sleeping-

Willard's Hotel, fronting on Pennsylvania Avenue, Mr. Lincoln had a little more than a week to prepare for the inauguration. Of this a part was taken up with the customary introductory visits,—to the outgoing President and Cabinet, where Mr. Buchanan and his counselors received him with cordial politeness; to the two houses of Congress, where he was enthusiastically welcomed by friends and somewhat sullenly greeted by foes; and to the Supreme Court of the United States, whose venerable chief and associate justices extended to him an affable recognition as the lawful successor in constitutional rulership. In his own parlors, also, the President-elect received numerous demonstrations of respect. President Buchanan and his Cabinet officially returned his visit. The Peace Conference, embracing distinguished delegates from all the free States and the border slave-States, and headed by their chairman, ex-President Tyler, waited upon him in a body, in pursuance of a formal and unanimous resolution.* His presidential rivals, Douglas and Breckinridge, each made him a call of courtesy. The mayor and the municipal council came in an official visit of welcome. Several delegations and many high functionaries repeated these ceremonial calls, which again were supplemented by numerous cordial in-



WARD H. LAMON. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

car of the regular train from New York, passing through Baltimore unrecognized and undisturbed, and arriving in Washington at 6 o'clock on the morning of February 23d. Here they were met by Mr. Seward and Mr. Washburne, member of Congress from Illinois, and conducted to Willard's Hotel. The family and the suite made the journey direct from Harrisburg to Baltimore, according to the previously published programme, arriving in Washington late that evening. They encountered in Baltimore no incivility, nor any unusual disorder, though, as elsewhere, dense crowds, very inadequately controlled by the police, surrounded the railroad depots and filled the streets through which their carriages passed. All temptation, however, to commit an assault was now past, since it was everywhere known that Mr. Lincoln was not with the party, but had already arrived at his destination.

LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.

ARRIVED in Washington, and installed in the spacious parlors on the second floor of
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
vitations to private hospitality. While all these tokens of respect were sincere and loyal, there was no concealment of a deep anxiety in public feeling, and a curiosity to learn how the new President would deal with an organized rebellion, which had been allowed by his predecessor to establish itself without the least hindrance, and which, while committing repeated acts of war, had as yet perpetrated no violence or bloodshed,—only, however, because it had met neither official nor military resistance.

Mr. Lincoln's chief labor during this interim was his consultation with the more influential leaders of the Republican party, who, either as members of Congress, delegates in the Peace Conference, or as casual or special visitors to the capital at this moment, had a final word to say to him about the composition of his Cabinet or the policy of his Administration. Thus from the 23d of February to the 4th of March, every moment of the day and many hours of the night were occupied. As his doors were at all times freely opened,

* "Proceedings of Peace Conference," pp. 336-337.

and as his life-long habit was to listen patiently to counsel from all quarters, it is safe to say that no President ever approached his task better informed of the temper of his followers, and none decided more deliberately upon his

seems to have spent the greater part of it in examining the inaugural and in writing out the list of alterations and amendments which he thought advisable. On Sunday evening he wrote the following letter, which with his list of suggestions he sent to Mr. Lincoln :



FREDERICK W. SEWARD. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

general course of conduct. Yet, here as afterwards, he followed the practice of holding his convictions open to the latest moment, and of not irrevocably committing himself to specific acts till the instant of their execution.

Neither in the formation of his Cabinet nor in his proposed administrative policy, however, did this final consultation with his party friends work any essential alteration of his own well-formed opinions. His executive counselors were chosen upon plans long since matured in his own mind; and his inaugural address, composed and privately printed at Springfield, received on the last days several slight changes in the text, and a number of verbal changes, mainly suggested by the very few individuals to whom he submitted it. Judge David Davis read it while in Springfield. Hon. O. H. Browning read it in Indianapolis after the presidential journey was begun, and suggested perhaps the most important modification which he made. Hon. Francis P. Blair, Sr., read it in Washington, and highly commended it, suggesting no changes. As would be natural in any great political leader scanning his successful rival's first act of practical statesmanship, the most careful scrutiny of the document was made by Mr. Seward. The President-elect handed him a copy some time during the day of his arrival; and the next day being Sunday, Mr. Seward

“SUNDAY EVENING, February 24th, 1861.

“MY DEAR SIR: I have suggested many changes of little importance severally, but in their general effect tending to soothe the public mind. Of course the concessions are, as they ought to be, if they are to be of avail, at the cost of the winning, the triumphant party. I do not fear their displeasure. They will be loyal, whatever is said. Not so the defeated, irritated, angered, frenzied party. I, my dear sir, have devoted myself singly to the study of the case here — with advantages of access and free communication with all parties of all sections. I have a common responsibility and interest with you, and I shall adhere to you faithfully in every case. You must, therefore, allow me to speak frankly and candidly. In this spirit, I declare to you my conviction, that the second and third paragraphs, even if modified as I propose in my amendments, will give such advantages to the Disunionists that Virginia and Maryland will secede, and we shall within ninety, perhaps within sixty, days be obliged to fight the South for this capital, with a divided North for our reliance, and we shall not have one loyal magistrate or ministerial officer south of the Potomac.

“In that case the dismemberment of the Republic would date from the inauguration of a Republican administration. I therefore most respectfully counsel the omission of those paragraphs. I know the tenacity of party friends, and I honor and respect it. But I know also that they know nothing of the real peril of the crisis. It has not been their duty to study it, as it has been mine. Only the soothing words which I have spoken have saved us and carried us along thus far. Every loyal man, and indeed every disloyal man, in the South will tell you this.

“Your case is quite like that of Jefferson. He brought the first Republican party into power against and over a party ready to resist and dismember the Government. Partisan as he was, he sank the partisan in the patriot in his inaugural address, and propitiated his adversaries by declaring: ‘We are all Federalists, all Republicans.’ I could wish that you would think it wise to follow this example in this crisis. Be sure that while all your administrative conduct will be in harmony with Republican principles and policy, you cannot lose the Republican party by practicing in your advent to office the magnanimity of a victor.

“Very faithfully your friend,
“[WM. H. SEWARD.]

“THE HONORABLE ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

“General Remarks:

“The argument is strong and conclusive, and ought not to be in any way abridged or modified.

“But something besides or in addition to argument is needful — to meet and remove prejudice and passion in the South, and despondency and fear in the East.


“Some words of affection — some of calm and cheerful confidence.”*

Mr. Seward only suggested two important changes: (1) To omit the reference to the Chicago platform mentioned in his letter, with the announcement that the President would

* Unpublished MS. For the copy of this letter and other valuable manuscripts, we are indebted to Hon. Frederick W. Seward.

follow the principles therein declared. (2) Instead of a declaration of intention to reclaim, hold, occupy, and possess the places and property belonging to the Government, to speak ambiguously about the exercise of

tentious diction. The literary styles of Mr. Seward and Mr. Lincoln differed essentially. Mr. Seward was strongly addicted to and unusually felicitous in long, sonorous sentences, amplifying his thought to general application



WILLIAM H. SEWARD.


power, and to hint rather at forbearance. The other modifications in his list were simple changes of phraseology — affecting only the style, but changing no argument or proposition of policy. Whether these were on the whole an improvement depends perhaps upon the taste of the reader and critic, whether he prefers a full and formal or a direct and sen-

and to philosophic breadth. Mr. Lincoln liked to condense his idea into a short sentence, with legal conciseness and specific point. In the present crisis Mr. Seward's policy, as announced in his 12th of January speech, was "to meet prejudice with conciliation, exaction with concession which surrenders no principle, and violence with the right hand of

peace."* Mr. Lincoln's policy was, without prejudice or passion to state frankly and maintain firmly the position and doctrines assumed by the American people in the late presidential election. Mr. Seward believed himself to be the past and the coming peacemaker; and thus his whole effort was to soften, to postpone, to use diplomacy. His corrections of the inaugural were in this view: a more care-

seized by the rebels, but for the present to declare only that he would hold those yet in possession of the Government. One other somewhat important change Mr. Lincoln himself made. In the original draft any idea of an amendment of the Constitution was rather repelled than invited. In the revision Mr. Lincoln said he should "favor rather than oppose a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it," and further expressed his willingness to accept the amendment recently proposed by Congress. All these various alterations, proposed or adopted, are added as notes to the text of the inaugural in this chapter, where the critical student will compare them with special interest.

It was in the closing paragraph of the inaugural that Mr. Lincoln's mastery in literary art clearly revealed itself. Mr. Seward, as we have seen in the postscript of his letter, thought that "some words of affection — some of calm and cheerful confidence," "to meet and remove prejudice and passion in the South, and despondency and fear in the East," ought to be added. In the original draft the concluding sentence, addressing itself to "my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen," was: "With you and



THE INAUGURATION OF LINCOLN. (FROM A SKETCH BY THEODORE R. DAVIS, MADE AT THE TIME.)

ful qualification of statement, a greater ambiguity of phrase, a gain in smoothness, but a loss in brevity and force. Mr. Lincoln adopted either in whole or in part nearly all the amendments proposed by Mr. Seward. But those which he himself modified, and such further alterations as he added of his own accord, show that whatever the inaugural gained in form and style in these final touches came as much through his own power of literary criticism as from the more practiced pen of Mr. Seward. The most vital change in the document was in adopting a suggestion of his friend Browning, not to announce a purpose to recapture Sumter and other forts and places

not with me is the solemn question, Shall it be peace or a sword?" This ending Mr. Seward proposed to strike out, and submitted two drafts of a closing paragraph to take its place. One of them was long and commonplace; under the other lurked a fine poetic thought awkwardly expressed. This Mr. Lincoln took, but his more artistic sense transformed it into an illustration of perfect and tender beauty.

The acts of the last ten days of Mr. Buchanan's administration were entirely colorless and negative. The deliberations and recommendations of the much-vaunted Peace Conference proved as barren and worthless as Dead Sea fruit. The concluding labors of Congress were of considerable importance, but of no immediate effect. There was, therefore, as little in pub-

* Seward, Senate Speech, January 12th, 1861. *Globe*, 343.

lic affairs as in public advice to cause the President-elect to reconsider or remodel his thoughts and purposes.

Inauguration Day fell on Monday, and the ceremonies took place with somewhat unusual attention to display and very uncommon precautions to insure public order and the safety of all the participants. General Stone, who had charge of the military arrangements, has related them with some minuteness.

"On the afternoon of the 3d of March, General Scott held a conference at his headquarters, there being present his staff, General Sumner, and myself; and then was arranged the programme of the procession. President Buchanan was to drive to Willard's Hotel and call upon the President-elect. The two were to ride in the same carriage, between double files of a squadron of the District of Columbia cavalry. The company of sappers and miners were to march in front of the presidential carriage, and the infantry and riflemen of the District of Columbia were to follow it. Riflemen in squads were to be placed on the roofs of certain commanding houses which I had selected along Pennsylvania Avenue, with orders to watch the windows on the opposite side, and to fire upon them in case any attempt should be made to fire from those windows on the presidential carriage. The small force of regular cavalry which had arrived was to guard the side-street crossings of Pennsylvania Avenue, and to move from one to another during the passage of the procession. A battalion of District of Columbia troops were to be placed near the steps of the Capitol, and riflemen in the windows of the wings of the Capitol. On the arrival of the presidential party at the Capitol the troops were to be stationed so as to return in the same order after the ceremony."^{*}

General Stone does not mention another item of preparation,—that on the brow of the hill, not far from the north entrance to the Capitol, commanding both the approach and the broad plateau of the east front, was stationed a battery of flying artillery, in the immediate vicinity of which General Scott remained a careful observer of the scene during the entire ceremonies, ready to take personal command and direction should any untoward occurrence render it necessary.

The closing duties of the session, which expired at noon, kept President Buchanan at the Capitol till the last moment. Accompanied by the committee of the Senate, he finally reached Willard's and conducted the President-elect to his carriage, in which, side by side, they rode in the procession, undisturbed by the slightest disorder. When they reached the Senate Chamber, already densely packed with officials and civilians, the ceremony of swearing-in the Vice-President was soon performed.

* General C. P. Stone, "Washington on the Eve of the War." THE CENTURY, July, 1883.

† The dramatic element of the scene in another view has been noticed by Dr. Holland, in his "Life of Lincoln," p. 278, where he says: "Mr. Lincoln himself must have wondered at the strange conjunction of personages and events. The 'Stephen' of his first speech in the old senatorial campaign was a defeated candidate

Then in a new procession of dignitaries Mr. Lincoln was escorted through the corridor of the great edifice to the east portico, where below the platform stood an immense throng in waiting. The principal actors—the Senate Committee of Arrangements, the out-going President, the President-elect and his family, the Chief-Justice in his robe, the Clerk of the Court with the Bible—took their places in a central group on the front of the platform, in full view of the waiting multitude. Around this central group other judges in their robes, senators, representatives, officials, and prominent guests crowded to their seats.

To the imaginative spectator there might have been something emblematic in the architectural concomitants of the scene. The construction of the great dome of the Capitol was in mid-progress, and huge derricks held by a network of steel ropes towered over the incomplete structure. In the grounds in front stood the bronze statue of Liberty, not then lifted to the pedestal from which she now greets the rising sun. At that moment, indeed, it required little poetic illusion to fancy her looking with a mute appeal for help to the man who was the center of all eyes and hearts; and could she have done so, her gaze would already have been rewarded with a vision of fateful prophecy. For in the central group of this inauguration ceremony there confronted each other four historic personages in the final act of a political drama which in its scope, completeness, and consequence will bear comparison with those most famous in human record,—Senator Douglas, the author of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, representing the legislative power of the American Government; Chief-Justice Taney, author of the Dred Scott decision, representing the influence of the judiciary; and President Buchanan, who by his Lecompton measures and messages had used the whole executive power and patronage to intensify and perpetuate the mischiefs born of the repeal and the dictum. Fourth in the group stood Abraham Lincoln, President-elect, illustrating the vital political truth announced in that sentence of his Cincinnati speech in which he declared:

"The people of these United States are the rightful masters of both Congresses and Courts, not to overthrow the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution."[†]

When the cheers which greeted his appear-

for the presidency, who then stood patriotically at his side, holding the hat of the republican President, which he had politely taken at the beginning of the inaugural address; 'James' had just walked out of office to make room for him; 'Franklin' had passed into comparative obscurity or something worse; and 'Roger' had just administered to him the oath of office."

ance had somewhat abated, Senator Baker of Oregon rose and introduced Mr. Lincoln to the audience; and stepping forward, the President-elect, in a firm, clear voice, thoroughly practiced in addressing the huge open-air assemblages of the West, read his inaugural, to which every ear listened with the most intense eagerness.

THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES: In compliance with a custom as old as the Government itself, I appear before you to address you briefly, and to take in your presence the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States to be taken by the President "before he enters on the execution of his office."¹

I do not consider it necessary at present for me to discuss those matters of administration about which there is no special anxiety or excitement.

Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States that by the accession of a Republican Administration their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations, and had never recanted them. And, more than this, they placed in the platform for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read:

"Resolved, that the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend, and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil

of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes."

I now reiterate these sentiments; and, in doing so, I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in anywise endangered by the now incoming Administration. I add, too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given² to all the States when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause—as cheerfully to one section, as to another.

There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions:

"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the law-giver is the law. All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution—to this provision as much as to any other. To the proposition then, that slaves, whose cases come within the terms of this clause, "shall be delivered up" their oaths are unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could they not, with nearly equal unanimity, frame and pass a law by means of which to keep good that unanimous oath?

There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced by national or by State authority; but surely that difference is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of but little consequence to him, or to others, by which authority it is done. And should any one, in any case, be content that his oath shall go unkept, on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to *how* it shall be kept?

Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of liberty known in civilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced so that a free man

¹ Mr. Lincoln's original draft contained at this point the following paragraphs:

"The more modern custom of electing a Chief Magistrate upon a previously declared platform of principles supersedes in a great measure the necessity of re-stating those principles in an address of this sort. Upon the plainest grounds of good faith, one so elected is not at liberty to shift his position. It is necessarily implied, if not expressed, that in his judgment the platform which he thus accepts binds him to nothing either unconstitutional or inexpedient.

"Having been so elected upon the Chicago platform, and while I would repeat nothing in it, of aspersion or epithet, or question of motive, against any man or party, I hold myself bound by duty, as well as impelled by inclination, to follow, within the Executive sphere, the principles therein declared. By no other course could I meet the reasonable expectations of the country."

Mr. Seward proposed either to omit the whole, or to amend them as follows:

"The more modern custom of nominating a Chief Magistrate upon a previously declared summary of

principles supersedes in a great measure the necessity of re-stating those principles in an address of this sort. It is necessarily implied, if not expressed, that the summary binds the officer elected to nothing either unconstitutional or inexpedient. With this explanation I deem it my duty, as I am disposed in feeling, to follow, so far as they apply to the Executive sphere, the principles on which I was brought before the American People."

Mr. Lincoln adopted Mr. Seward's preference of the alternative suggestions made, and omitted the whole.

² In the original draft this sentence stood: "The protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given will be cheerfully given to all the States," etc.

Mr. Seward proposed to amend it thus: "will be cheerfully given in every case and under all circumstances to all the States," etc.

Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the suggestion, but himself modified it so as to read: "will be cheerfully given to all the States when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause—"

be not, in any case, surrendered as a slave?³ And might it not be well at the same time to provide by law for the enforcement of that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that "the citizen of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States?"

I take the official oath to-day with no mental reservations and with no purpose to construe the Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules. And while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much safer for all, both in official and private stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts which stand unrepealed, than to violate any of them trusting to find impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional.

It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President under our National Constitution. During that period fifteen different and greatly distinguished citizens have, in succession, administered the Executive branch of the Government. They have conducted it through many perils, and generally with great success.⁴ Yet, with all this scope of precedent, I now enter upon the same task for the brief constitutional term of four years, under great and peculiar difficulty. A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted.⁵

I hold that, in contemplation of universal law, and of the Constitution, the union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all National Governments. It is safe to assert that no Government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our National Constitution, and the Union will endure forever—it being impossible to destroy it except by some action not provided for in the instrument itself.

Again, if the United States be not a Government proper, but an association of States in the nature of contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably un-

made by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so to speak, but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it?

Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that, in legal contemplation, the Union is perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured,⁶ and the faith of all the then thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And, finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was, "to form a more perfect Union."

But if destruction of the Union by one, or by a part only, of the States be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity.⁷

It follows from these views, that no State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; that *resolves* and *ordinances* to that effect are legally void; and that acts of violence, within any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances.⁸

I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States.⁹ Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part; and I shall perform it, so far as practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite means, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary.¹⁰ I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself.¹¹

In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence; and there shall be none, unless it be forced upon

³The remainder of this paragraph was not in the original draft. Mr. Lincoln added it of his own accord.

⁴This sentence stood in the original: "They have conducted it through many perils; and on the whole, with great success."

Mr. Lincoln adopted Mr. Seward's suggestion to make it read: "and generally with great success."

⁵In the original this sentence read: "A disruption of the Federal Union is menaced, and, so far as can be on paper, is already effected. The particulars of what has been done are so familiar and so fresh, that I need not waste any time in recounting them."

Mr. Seward proposed to change it as follows: "A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted."

Mr. Lincoln adopted the suggestion.

⁶This sentence originally stood: "It was further matured and expressly declared and pledged to be perpetual," etc.

Mr. Lincoln of his own accord amended it as follows: "It was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual," etc.

⁷In the original, this paragraph concluded as follows: "The Union is less perfect than before, which contradicts the Constitution, and therefore is absurd."

Mr. Seward proposed to strike out the words "and therefore is absurd." Mr. Lincoln adopted this suggestion, and in addition remodeled the whole sentence, so as

to read: "The Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity."

⁸The first half of this sentence originally closed: "ordinances to that effect are legally nothing," and the second half, "are insurrectionary or treasonable, according to circumstances." Mr. Seward's suggestions to strike out the word "nothing" and substitute the word "void," and to strike out the word "treasonable" and substitute the word "revolutionary," were adopted.

⁹In the original this sentence stood: "I therefore consider that the Union is unbroken; and, to the extent of my ability, I shall take care that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States."

Mr. Seward proposed to amend it as follows: "I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States."

Mr. Lincoln adopted the change.

¹⁰This phrase originally stood: "or in some tangible way direct the contrary."

Mr. Seward's suggestion, to strike out the words "tangible way" and substitute therefor the words "authoritative manner," was adopted.

¹¹This sentence originally closed: "will have its own and defend itself." Mr. Seward's suggestion, to strike out these words and insert "will constitutionally defend and maintain itself," was adopted.

the national authority.¹³ The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. Where hostility to the United States, in any interior locality, shall be so great and universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist in the Government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego for the time the uses of such offices.

The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union.¹⁴ So far as possible, the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection. The course here indicated will be followed unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper, and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised according to circumstances actually existing, and with a

view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections.¹⁴

That there are persons in one section or another who seek to destroy the Union at all events, and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will neither affirm nor deny; but if there be such, I need address no word to them.¹⁵ To those, however, who really love the Union, may I not speak?

Before entering upon so grave a matter as the destruction of our national fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes, would it not be wise to ascertain precisely why we do it?¹⁶ Will you hazard so desperate a step while there is any possibility that any portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you fly from — will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake?

All profess to be content in the Union, if all constitutional rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied?¹⁷ I think not. Happily the human mind is so constituted,¹⁸ that no party can reach to the audacity of doing this. Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly written provision of the Constitution

¹³ In the original draft this paragraph, after the first sentence, stood as follows:

"All the power at my disposal will be used to reclaim the public property and places which have fallen: to hold, occupy, and possess these, and all other property and places belonging to the Government and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion of any State. Where hostility to the United States, in any interior locality, shall be so great and so universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist in the Government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego for the time the uses of such offices."

Mr. Seward proposed to strike out all the above, and to insert the following:

"The power confided to me shall be used indeed with efficacy, but also with discretion in every case and exigency, according to the circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections. There are in this government as in every other, emergencies when the exercise of power lawful in itself is less certain to secure the just ends of administration, than a temporary forbearance from it, with reliance on the voluntary though delayed acquiescence of the people in the laws which have been made by themselves and for their own benefit. I shall not lose sight of this obvious maxim."

Mr. Lincoln, however, did not adopt this proposal, but made a slight change which had been suggested by another friend. At Indianapolis he gave a copy of his original draft to Hon. O. H. Browning, who after carefully reading it on his return, wrote to Mr. Lincoln (February 17th, 1861) referring to this paragraph: "Would it not be judicious so to modify this as to make it read, 'All the power at my disposal will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts, etc., omitting the declaration of the purpose of reclamation, which will be construed into a threat or menace, and will be irritating even in the

border States? On principle the passage is right as it now stands. The fallen places ought to be reclaimed. But cannot that be accomplished as well or even better without announcing the purpose in your inaugural?"

Mr. Lincoln adopted Mr. Browning's advice, and modified his own phraseology as proposed.

He also made in this paragraph another slight change of phraseology. For, "there will be no invasion of any State," he substituted, "there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere."

¹⁴ This phrase originally was, "The mails, unless refused, will continue to be furnished," etc. Mr. Lincoln himself changed this to read: "The mails, unless repelled,"

¹⁵ This paragraph originally closed with the following sentence: "This course will be pursued until current experience shall show a modification or change to be proper." Mr. Lincoln himself changed this so as to read: "The course here indicated will be followed, unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper." He also added a part of the language proposed by Mr. Seward for the previous paragraph, as will be seen by comparison.

¹⁶ This sentence originally stood: "That there are persons who seek to destroy the Union," etc. Mr. Seward proposed to amend so as to make it read: "That there are persons in one section as well as in the other, who seek to destroy the Union," etc. Mr. Lincoln changed the amendment to, "That there are persons in one section or another who seek," etc.

Mr. Seward also proposed to add to the last clause of the sentence, after the word "them," the following: "because I am sure they must be few in number and of little influence when their pernicious principles are fully understood."

Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the suggestion.

¹⁷ Mr. Lincoln himself struck out the word "Union" as it originally appeared in this sentence, and inserted in lieu the words "fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes."

¹⁸ Mr. Seward proposed to insert the word "distinct" after the words, "Is it true, then, that any," in the second sentence of this paragraph.

Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the suggestion.

¹⁹ In this sentence Mr. Lincoln himself changed the word "constructed" to "constituted."

has ever been denied. If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolution—certainly would, if such right were a vital one. But such is not our case. All the vital rights of minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions,¹⁹ in the Constitution, that controversies never arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question which may occur in practical administration.²⁰ No foresight can anticipate, nor any document of reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible questions. Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered by national or by State authority? The Constitution does not expressly say. *May* Congress prohibit slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. *Must* Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say.

From questions of this class spring all our constitutional controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities. If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the Government must cease. There is no other alternative; for continuing the Government is acquiescence on one side or the other.²¹ If a minority in such case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make a precedent which in turn will divide and ruin them; for a minority of their own will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such minority.²² For instance, why may not any portion of a new confederacy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it?²³ All who cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper of doing this.

Is there such perfect identity of interests among the States to compose a new Union as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed secession?²⁴

Plainly, the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people.²⁵ Whoever rejects it does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left.

I do not forget the position, assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding, in any case, upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government.²⁶ And while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled, and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice.²⁷ At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.²⁸ Nor is there in this view any assault upon the

¹⁹ The phrase, "by affirmations and negations," Mr. Seward proposed to make, "by affirmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions."

Mr. Lincoln adopted the suggestion.

²⁰ The phrase, "applicable to every question," Mr. Seward proposed to change to, "applicable to every possible question."

Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the change.

²¹ In this paragraph Mr. Seward proposed to substitute the words "acquiesce" and "acquiescence" for "submit" and "submission."

Mr. Lincoln adopted the suggestion.

²² The original phrase, "a minority of their own number will secede from them," Mr. Lincoln himself changed to, "a minority of their own will secede from them."

²³ In the original these sentences ran as follows: "For instance, why may not South Carolina, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede from a new Southern Confederacy, just as she now claims to secede from the present Union? Her people, and, indeed, all secession people, are now being educated to the precise temper of doing this."

Mr. Seward proposed to substitute the names "Alabama or Florida" for "South Carolina"; and the word "communities" for "people."

Instead of adopting this, Mr. Lincoln re-wrote the whole, as follows: "For instance, why may not any portion of a new confederacy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? All who cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper of doing this."

²⁴ For the original phrase, "a Southern Union," Mr. Lincoln himself substituted, "a new Union."

²⁵ The original sentence, "A constitutional majority is the only true sovereign of a free people," Mr. Seward proposed to change to, "A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign," etc.

Mr. Lincoln adopted the change.

²⁶ In this sentence the final clause, "while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government," was suggested by Mr. Seward and adopted by Mr. Lincoln.

²⁷ In the original this phrase ran: "the greater evils of a different rule." Mr. Seward proposed to substitute "practice" for "rule," and Mr. Lincoln struck out the word "greater," making it read, "the evils of a different practice."

²⁸ In the original this sentence stood: "But if the policy of the Government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, it is plain that the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having turned their government over to the despotism of the few life officers composing the court."

Mr. Seward proposed to amend it as follows: "At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, made in the ordinary course of litigation between parties in personal actions,

I close, We are not we quit not to aliens
or enemies but ~~country~~ fellow countrymen
and brethren, Although passion has strained
our bonds of affection too hardly they must
not be broken ~~they will not~~, I am
sure they will not be broken, The
mystic chords which proceed from every
so many battle fields and gather to
many patriot graves ~~and~~ pass through
all the hearts and hearts all the
hearties in this broad continent of our
will yet. ~~Passion~~ again harmonize in
their ancient music when touched as they
were by the better
angel guardian angel of the nation

SEWARD'S SUGGESTION FOR CLOSE OF INAUGURAL ADDRESS. (FROM THE ORIGINAL MS.)

You can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath
registered in Heaven to destroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn one
to "preserve, protect and defend" it. ~~For the sake of the Union, I~~
~~will not~~ ~~with~~

I am loth to close. We are not enemies,
but friends - We must not be enemies. Though passion may
have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.
The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle
field, and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearth-
stone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the cho-
rus of the Union, when again touched, as sure, they will
be, by the better angels of our nature.

CLOSING PARAGRAPH. (FROM ORIGINAL FROM WHICH THE ADDRESS WAS DELIVERED.)

A cheer greeted the conclusion. Chief-Justice Tancy arose, the clerk opened his Bible, and Mr. Lincoln, laying his hand upon it, with deliberation pronounced the oath:

"I, Abraham Lincoln, do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Then, while the battery on the brow of the hill thundered its salute, citizen Buchanan and President Lincoln returned to their carriage, and the military procession escorted them from the Capitol to the Executive Mansion, on the threshold of which Mr. Buchanan warmly shook the hand of his successor, with heartfelt good wishes for his personal happiness and the national peace and prosperity.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE FORMATION OF THE CABINET.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

LINCOLN'S CABINET.



HERE is distinguished authority† for the statement that the work of framing the new Cabinet was mainly performed on the evening of the presidential election. After the polls were

closed on the 6th of November (so Mr. Lincoln related a year or two later), the superintendent of the telegraph at Springfield invited him to come and remain in his office and read the dispatches as they should come in. He accepted the offer; and, reporting himself in due time at the telegraph office, from which all other visitors were excluded at 9 o'clock, awaited the result of the eventful day. Soon the telegrams came thick and fast — first from the neighboring precincts and counties; then from the great Western cities, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati; and finally from the capitals of the doubtful States, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the Empire State of New York. Here in this little room, in the company of two or three silent operators moving about their mysteriously clicking instruments, and recording with imperturbable gravity the swift-throbbing messages from near and far, Mr. Lincoln read the reports as they came in, first in vague and fragmentary dribblets, and later in the rising and swelling stream of cheering news. There was never a nicer or closer calculator of political probabilities than himself. He was emphatically at home among election figures. All his political life he had scanned tables of returns with as much care and accuracy as he analyzed and scrutinized maxims of government or platforms of parties. Now, as formerly, he was familiar with all the turning-points in contested counties and “close” districts, and knew by heart the value of each and every local loss or gain and its relation to the grand result. In past years, at the close of many a hot campaign he had searched out the comforts of victory from a discouraging and adverse-looking column of figures, or correctly read the fatal omen of defeat in some fragmentary announcement from a precinct or

† Hon. Gideon Welles, conversation. J. G. N., personal memoranda. MS.

county. Silently, as they were transcribed, the operators handed him the messages, which he laid on his knee while he adjusted his spectacles, and then read and re-read several times with deliberation. He had not long to wait for indications. From a scattering beginning, made up of encouraging local fragments, the hopeful news rose to almost uninterrupted tidings of victory. Soon a shower of congratulatory telegrams fell from the wires, and while his partisans and friends from all parts of the country were thus shaking hands with him “by lightning” over the result, he could hear the shouts and speeches of his Springfield followers, gathered in the great hall of the State-house across the street, and fairly making that building shake with their rejoicings.

Of course his first emotions were those of a kindling pleasure and pride at the sweeping completeness of his success. But this was only a momentary glow. He was indeed President-elect; but with that consciousness there fell upon him the appalling shadow of his mighty task and responsibility. It seemed as if he suddenly bore the whole world upon his shoulders, and could not shake it off; and sitting there in the yet early watches of the night, he read the still-coming telegrams in a sort of absent-minded mechanical routine, while his “inner man” took up the crushing burden of his country's troubles, and traced out the laborious path of coming duties. “When I finally bade my friends good-night and left that room,” said Lincoln, “I had substantially completed the framework of my Cabinet as it now exists.”

If the grouping and combining of the new President's intended councilors occurred at this time, it is no less true that some of them were selected at a much earlier date. In the mean time no one was informed of his intentions in this regard. For a full month after the election he gave no intimation whatever of his purpose. Cabinet-making is at all times difficult, as Mr. Lincoln felt and acknowledged, even though he had already progressed thus far in his task. Up to the early days of December he followed the current of newspaper criticism, daily read his budget of private letters, gave numerous interviews to visiting pol-

icians of prominence and influence from other States, and, on the occasion of a short visit to Chicago, met and conferred with Mr. Hamlin, the Vice-President-elect, — all constituting, most probably, little else than a continued study of the Cabinet question. Never arbitrary nor dictatorial in the decision of any matter, he took unusual care on this point to receive patiently and consider seriously all the advice, recommendations, and objections which his friends from different States had to offer.

His personal experience during his service as a member of Congress had given him an insight into the sharp and bitter contentions which grow out of office-seeking and the distribution of patronage. It was therefore doubtless with the view to fortify himself in his selections, that he now determined to make definite offers of some at least of the Cabinet appointments. The question of taking part of his constitutional advisers from among his political opponents, and from the hostile or complaining Southern States, had been thoroughly debated in his own mind. The conclusion arrived at is plainly evinced by the following, written with his own hand, and inserted as a short leading editorial in the Springfield "Journal" on the morning of December 12th (or 13th), 1860 :

"We hear such frequent allusions to a supposed purpose on the part of Mr. Lincoln to call into his Cabinet two or three Southern gentlemen from the parties opposed to him politically, that we are prompted to ask a few questions.

"*First.* Is it known that any such gentleman of character would accept a place in the Cabinet ?

"*Second.* If yea, on what terms does he surrender to Mr. Lincoln, or Mr. Lincoln to him, on the political differences between them, or do they enter upon the administration in open opposition to each other ?"

The high authorship of these paragraphs was not announced, but the *reductio ad absurdum* was so complete that the newspapers were not amiss in guessing whence they emanated.

The selection of enemies being out of the question, Mr. Lincoln, in execution of long-matured plans, proceeded to choose his friends, and those of the best and ablest. On the morning of December 8th, 1860, he penned the following letters :

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 8th, 1860.

MY DEAR SIR: With your permission I shall at the proper time nominate you to the Senate for confirmation as Secretary of State for the United States. Please let me hear from you at your own earliest convenience.

Your friend and obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Washington, D. C.*

(Private and confidential.)

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 8th, 1860.

MY DEAR SIR: In addition to the accompanying and more formal note, inviting you to take charge of the State Department, I deem it proper to address you this. Rumors have got into the newspapers to the ef-

fect that the Department named above would be tendered you as a compliment, and with the expectation that you would decline it. I beg you to be assured that I have said nothing to justify these rumors. On the contrary, it has been my purpose, from the day of the nomination at Chicago, to assign you, by your leave, this place in the Administration. I have delayed so long to communicate that purpose, in deference to what appeared to me a proper caution in the case. Nothing has been developed to change my view in the premises; and I now offer you the place in the hope that you will accept it, and with the belief that your position in the public eye, your integrity, ability, learning, and great experience all combine to render it an appointment preëminently fit to be made.

One word more. In regard to the patronage sought with so much eagerness and jealousy, I have prescribed for myself the maxim, "Justice to all"; and I earnestly beseech your coöperation in keeping the maxim good.

Your friend and obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Washington, D. C.*

This letter, so full of frankness and delicate courtesy, together with the brief note preceding it, was sent to two intimate friends of the President-elect at Washington, with the request, if their judgment concurred in the step, to hand them to Mr. Seward. They were at once delivered, and the recipient wrote the following equally courteous and characteristic answer:

WASHINGTON, December 13th, 1860.

MY DEAR SIR: I have had the honor of receiving as well your note which tenders to me a nomination to the Senate for the office of Secretary of State, as also your private and confidential letter on the same subject.

It would be a violation of my own feelings, as well as a great injustice to you, if I were to leave occasion for any doubt on your part that I appreciate as highly as I ought the distinction which, as the Chief Magistrate of the Republic, you propose to confer upon me, and that I am fully, perfectly, and entirely satisfied with the sincerity and kindness of your sentiments and wishes in regard to my acceptance of it.

You will readily believe that, coming to the consideration of so grave a subject all at once, I need a little time to consider whether I possess the qualifications and temper of a minister, and whether it is in such a capacity that my friends would wish that I should act if I am to continue at all in the public service. These questions are, moreover, to be considered in view of a very anomalous condition of public affairs. I wish, indeed, that a conference with you upon them were possible. But I do not see how it could prudently be held under existing circumstances. Without publishing the fact of your invitation, I will, with your leave, reflect upon it a few days, and then give you my definite answer, which, if I know myself, will be made under the influence exclusively of the most earnest desire for the success of your administration, and through it for the safety, honor, and welfare of the Union.

Whatever may be my conclusion, you may rest assured of my hearty concurrence in your views in regard to the distribution of the public offices as you have communicated them.

Believe me, my dear sir, most respectfully and most faithfully your friend and humble servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

THE HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President-elect of the United States.*

* Unpublished MS.

Before the end of the month, Mr. Lincoln received a short and simple note from Mr. Seward signifying his acceptance. Meanwhile he had sent (December 13th) a verbal message to Hon. Edward Bates, at St. Louis, Mo., that he would come down there the next day to see and consult him about some points connected with the formation of his Cabinet. "I thought I saw an unfitness in his coming to me, and that I ought to go to him,"* writes Mr. Bates with his old-school politeness. Accordingly, the following Saturday (December 15th) found him at Mr. Lincoln's office in Springfield.

They had had a personal acquaintance of some eight years; and after cordial greetings the President-elect proceeded without further prelude to tell him that since the day of the Chicago nomination it had been his purpose to tender him one of the places in his Cabinet. Some of his friends had asked the State Department for him. He could not now offer him this, which was usually considered the first place in the Cabinet, for the reason that he should offer that place to Mr. Seward, in view of his ability, his integrity, his commanding influence, and his fitness for the place. He did this as a matter of duty to the party and to Mr. Seward's many and strong friends, while at the same time it accorded perfectly with his own personal inclinations, notwithstanding some opposition on the part of sincere and warm friends. He would, therefore, offer Mr. Bates what he supposed would be more congenial, and for which he was certainly in every way qualified,—the Attorney-Generalship.†

Within a few days it was announced by authority that Mr. Bates had been tendered and had accepted a place in the new Cabinet. His adhesion was looked upon as a sure indication of a moderate and constitutional policy by the incoming Administration.

The choice of Mr. Seward as the head of the Cabinet, as well as his probable acceptance, was also soon whispered about among leading Republicans in Congress, rumored in the public press; and in due time confirmed by a semi-official statement in the Albany "Evening Journal," the organ of Mr. Seward's friend Thurlow Weed. This action of Mr. Lincoln also gave the party at large general gratification, since up to the Chicago convention Mr. Seward had been its chief favorite. Whatever of antagonism existed between pronounced and conservative Republicans was thus happily neutralized, and the respective partisans of Mr. Seward and Mr. Bates each felt themselves bound to the new Adminis-

tration through the presence of an acknowledged and trusted leader in Mr. Lincoln's councils.

To these two selections a third had in the mean time been virtually added. As the individual held a less prominent position in the nation, and as the choice was merely provisional, it provoked no immediate attention or contest. On December 11th, three days after writing his letter to Mr. Seward, two gentlemen called upon the President-elect to present the claims of Hon. Caleb B. Smith of Indiana, one of the "pivotal States" in the November election, to a seat in the Cabinet. After a very short talk, showing that the question had already gone through the crucible of his judgment, Mr. Lincoln replied, that, being determined to act with caution and not embarrass himself with promises, he could only say that he saw no insuperable objections to Indiana's having a place, or to Smith being the man.‡ To this decision Mr. Lincoln held firm, though, later on, very considerable pressure came upon him in behalf of another citizen of Indiana, already then distinguished and destined to attain still greater eminence. A letter which Mr. Lincoln wrote him, explaining why he adhered to his original choice, will be of interest in this connection as illustrating one of his rules of conduct which contributed so much to his popular strength; namely, neither to forget a friendship nor remember a grudge.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 8th, 1861.

HON. SCHUYLER COLFAX.

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 6th has just been handed me by Mr. Baker of Minnesota. When I said to you the other day that I wished to write you a letter, I had reference, of course, to my not having offered you a Cabinet appointment. I meant to say, and now do say, you were most honorably and amply recommended; and a tender of the appointment was not withheld, in any part, because of anything happening in 1858. Indeed, I should have decided as I did easier than I did, had that matter never existed. I had partly made up my mind in favor of Mr. Smith — not conclusively, of course — before your name was mentioned in that connection. When you were brought forward I said, "Colfax is a young man, is already in position, is running a brilliant career, and is sure of a bright future in any event — with Smith it is now or never." I considered either abundantly competent, and decided on the ground I have stated. I now have to beg that you will not do me the injustice to suppose for a moment that I remember anything against you in malice.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN. †

The next step in Cabinet-making was much more complex as a political and personal adjustment, and proved for the present too difficult of execution. Mr. Lincoln had frequently and without reserve expressed his decided preference for Governor Salmon P. Chase of

* Bates, diary. Unpublished MS.

† J. G. N., personal memoranda. MS.

‡ Unpublished MS. Also partly printed in Hollister, "Life of Colfax."

Ohio as his Secretary of the Treasury,—not only on account of his acknowledged executive talent, but above all because his spotless integrity of character would at once impart tone to and confidence in the national credit, greatly impaired by recent maladministration and now liable to be lost in the convulsions of civil war. There seemed, too, an eminent fitness in this selection. He was looked upon as the most prominent and able representative of the second great constituent element of the Republican party,—the former Democrats of the Northern States whose anti-slavery convictions had joined them to the new party of freedom.

But against this personal preference of the President-elect, to this particular office there rose up the local claim of the State of Pennsylvania and of Senator Simon Cameron as her most prominent citizen. The manufacturing industry of the State created a local sentiment in behalf of a protective tariff stronger than all other party issues. Protection had not, indeed, been a prominent question in the late election, yet the Republican platform proclaimed that the "industrial interests" should be encouraged; the bulk of the new party were former tariff men; Mr. Lincoln himself had been an avowed protectionist in other political campaigns, and was known not to have changed his convictions on this point. Stronger than all was the implied understanding in favor of protection,—unwritten, indeed, but none the less relied upon by politicians and parties. Now that the election was won, Pennsylvania claimed control of the Treasury Department as that branch of the Government which could wield the greatest influence, both upon legislation and administration, for the promotion of her industrial prosperity. Governor Chase had a wider national reputation than Senator Cameron, but each was an unrivaled leader in his own State, each had received the almost unanimous complimentary vote of his own State in the Chicago convention.

In view of these conflicting motives and interests, the President invited Mr. Cameron to visit him at Springfield, and interviews took place between them on the 30th and 31st of December. Their conversations were undoubtedly intended to be frank and explicit, and yet it would appear that a temporary misunderstanding grew out of them, the precise nature of which has never become public history. When Mr. Cameron returned to his home, he bore with him the following note:

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 31st, 1860.

HON. SIMON CAMERON.

MY DEAR SIR: I think fit to notify you now, that by your permission I shall at the proper time nominate you to the U. S. Senate for confirmation as Secretary

of the Treasury, or as Secretary of War — which of the two I have not yet definitely decided. Please answer at your earliest convenience.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.*

The purpose of the President-elect, evidently formed with deliberation, was suddenly changed, but, as the sequel proved, for a time only. If he ever explained his full reason for so doing, it was to witnesses who are long since dead. One of the secondary causes he has himself left on record. It happened that just at this juncture he received, both by letter and through personal visits from Pennsylvania politicians, the indications of a bitter hostility to Cameron from an influential and very active minority in that State, headed by the newly elected governor and the chairman of the State central committee, who protested in harsh and severe terms against Cameron's appointment. The situation required prompt action, and keeping his own counsel, Mr. Lincoln wrote:

(Private.)

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 3d, 1861.

HON. SIMON CAMERON.

MY DEAR SIR: Since seeing you, things have developed which make it impossible for me to take you into the Cabinet. You will say this comes of an interview with McClure; and this is partly, but not wholly, true. The more potent matter is wholly outside of Pennsylvania; and yet I am not at liberty to specify it. Enough that it appears to me to be sufficient. And now I suggest that you write me declining the appointment, in which case I do not object to its being known that it was tendered you. Better do this at once, before things so change that you cannot honorably decline, and I be compelled to openly recall the tender. No person living knows or has an intimation that I write this letter.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

P. S. Telegraph me instantly on receipt of this, saying, "All right."—A. L.*

It will be seen from this that Mr. Lincoln did not offer any explanation of his course; also that he had so well kept his secret, both of the tender and the recall, that, since his judgment so dictated, he could reverse his own action and the world be none the wiser. Still further does it appear from this letter that he had either enjoined or expected an equal discretion on the part of Mr. Cameron. But the latter, in haste to control the party politics of Pennsylvania, and dictate who from that State should succeed him in the Senate, had shown Mr. Lincoln's first note. Mr. Cameron was, therefore, not only unable to telegraph "All right," but was in a measure compelled also to show the recall to a few special friends; and thus the incident, though the correspondence and the actual details were carefully kept out of the newspapers, was more or less understood in the confidential circles of politics.

* Unpublished MS.

As might have been expected, Mr. Cameron's nearest personal friend came at once to Springfield; and the conferences on the subject may be sufficiently inferred from a letter and its inclosure which he carried back to Mr. Cameron:

(Private and confidential.)
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 13th, 1861.

HON. SIMON CAMERON.

MY DEAR SIR: At the suggestion of Mr. Sanderson and with hearty good-will besides, I herewith send you a letter dated Jan. 3d—the same in date as the last you received from me. I thought best to give it that date, as it is in some sort to take the place of that letter. I learn, both by a letter of Mr. Swett and from Mr. Sanderson, that your feelings were wounded by the terms of my letter really of the 3d. I wrote that letter under great anxiety, and perhaps I was not so guarded in its terms as I should have been; but I beg you to be assured I intended no offense. My great object was to have you act quickly, if possible before the matter should be complicated with the Penn. senatorial election. Destroy the offensive letter or return it to me.

I say to you now I have not doubted that you would perform the duties of a Department ably and faithfully. Nor have I for a moment intended to ostracize your friends. If I should make a Cabinet appointment for Penn. before I reach Washington, I will not do so without consulting you, and giving all the weight to your views and wishes which I consistently can. This I have always intended.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

[Inclosure.]

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 3d, 1861.

HON. SIMON CAMERON.

MY DEAR SIR: When you were here, about the last of December, I handed you a letter saying I should at the proper time nominate you to the Senate for a place in the Cabinet. It is due to you and to truth for me to say you were here by my invitation, and not upon any suggestion of your own. You have not as yet signified to me whether you would accept the appointment, and with much pain I now say to you that you will relieve me from great embarrassment by allowing me to recall the offer. This springs from an unexpected complication, and not from any change of my view as to the ability or faithfulness with which you would discharge the duties of the place.

I now think I will not definitely fix upon any appointment for Pennsylvania until I reach Washington.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.*

Before further describing this Cameron dilemma, we must look at another complication which was added to it. On the day on which Mr. Lincoln had given Mr. Cameron his written tender of a place (December 31st), he had also telegraphed to Governor Chase, "In these troublous times I would like a conference with you. Please visit me here at once."† By a curious coincidence, Mr. Chase arrived in Springfield on the very day (January 3d) on which Mr. Lincoln wrote the recall of the tender to Mr. Cameron. As in other instances,

the President-elect waived all ceremony and promptly called on Mr. Chase at his hotel. "I have done with you," said he, "what I would not perhaps have ventured to do with any other man in the country,—sent for you to ask you whether you will accept the appointment of Secretary of the Treasury, without, however, being exactly prepared to offer it to you."‡ He was also informed of the selection of Mr. Seward and Mr. Bates, which he heartily approved. Nothing was, of course, said of the tender to Cameron or its recall; but the opposition of the anti-Cameron minority in Pennsylvania and their urging the selection of Mr. Dayton of New Jersey instead, the apparent acquiescence of all in the choice of Mr. Chase, and the threatening affairs of the nation as well as the strife among Republican factions, were fully talked over during his visit, which lasted two days. Mr. Chase stated that he "was not prepared to say that he would accept that place if offered."† Neither did he positively decline. He valued the trust and its opportunities, but he was reluctant to leave the Senate. It was resolved to ask the advice of friends, and abide the course of events. "A good deal of conversation," writes Mr. Chase, "followed in reference to other possible members of the Cabinet, but everything was left open when we parted."

All these important visits to Springfield were heralded in the newspapers, and the rumors connected therewith proportionately magnified. Particularly did the statement of Mr. Cameron's selection, and its quick contradiction, put both his friends and opponents on the alert. Pennsylvania politics were for the moment at a white heat, and letters showered into Springfield. Politicians are but human, and Mr. Cameron was sorely wounded in pride and weakened in prestige. He felt hurt at the form as well as the substance of the recall, which, being intended to remain secret, was more explicit than conventional. While he did not conceal his chagrin, on the whole he kept his temper, taking the ground that he neither originally solicited the place, nor would he now decline it. His enemies, seeing him at bay, redoubled their efforts to defeat him. They charged him with unfitness, with habitual intrigue, with the odium of corrupt practices. Mr. Lincoln, however, soon noticed that these allegations were vaguely based upon newspaper report and public rumor, and that, when requested to do so, no one was willing to make specific charges and furnish tangible proof.

While the opponents of Mr. Cameron hastened to transmit to Springfield protests against his appointment, his friends were yet more

*Unpublished MS.

† Warden, "Life of Salmon P. Chase."

‡ Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase."

active in forwarding recommendations in his behalf. All through the month of January this epistolary contest seemed the principal occupation of the Pennsylvania Republicans, and to some extent it communicated itself to other localities. Sharp as were the assaults, the defense was yet more earnest, and testimonials came from all ranks and classes,—citizens, clergymen, editors, politicians, and officials of all grades, and in numbers fully as three to one,—indorsing his private and personal worth, his public services, his official uprightness. Astute Washington politicians were nonplused, and frankly confessed that his vindication from aspersion was complete and overwhelming and that they could not account for it,—attributing it, as usual, to his personal intrigue. Reasons aside, it was evident that Pennsylvania demanded Cameron, and in the same connection protested against Chase, in the Treasury Department, insisting that the latter, through his Democratic teachings and party affiliations, was necessarily wedded to the doctrines of free trade, and hence inimical to the manufacturing prosperity of that State, which was anxiously looking forward to protective legislation. Mr. Cameron was highly gratified at this manifestation from his own State, as he had a right to be, and was thereby able to declare himself entirely satisfied with the situation as thus left, and to express his continued good-will towards the President-elect.*

Pending this incident, still another phase of the Cabinet question had more fully developed itself at Washington. The proposition to appoint at least one distinctly Southern man continued from time to time to be urged upon Mr. Lincoln, notably by some of the most prominent and, it may be added, most radical Republican senators and representatives in Congress. To the policy of such a step the President-elect cordially assented; but the real question was, as he had already so sharply defined it, Would any Southern man of character and influence accept such a place? Since Mr. Seward's selection, he too joined in the current suggestion. "I feel it my duty," he wrote, December 25th, "to submit for your consideration the names of Colonel Frémont for Secretary of War, Randall Hunt of Louisiana, and John A. Gilmer or Kenneth Raynor of North Carolina, for other places. Should you think that any of these gentlemen would be likely to be desirable in the Administration, I should find no difficulty, I think, in ascertaining whether they would accept, without mak-

ing the matter public."† In another note, of December 28th, he added the name of Hon. Robert E. Scott of Virginia to his list of Southern candidates. Thereupon Mr. Lincoln sent him authority to make the inquiry, while he himself wrote directly to John A. Gilmer asking him to come to Springfield. Mr. Seward's letters had also urged, in this connection, that in view of the threatened revolution Mr. Lincoln should come to Washington somewhat earlier than usual, and should at once select his Secretaries of War and Navy, that they might begin to devise measures of safety. To all these suggestions Mr. Lincoln sent the following reply:

(Private.)

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 3d, 1861.

HON. W. H. SEWARD.

MY DEAR SIR: Yours without signature was received last night. I have been considering your suggestions as to my reaching Washington somewhat earlier than usual. It seems to me the inauguration is not the most dangerous point for us. Our adversaries have us now clearly at disadvantage. On the second Wednesday of February, when the votes should be officially counted, if the two houses refuse to meet at all, or meet without a quorum of each, where shall we be? I do not think that this counting is constitutionally essential to the election; but how are we to proceed in absence of it?

In view of this, I think it best for me not to attempt appearing in Washington till the result of that ceremony is known. It certainly would be of some advantage if you could know who are to be at the heads of the War and Navy Departments; but, until I can ascertain definitely whether I can get any suitable men from the South, and who, and how many, I cannot well decide. As yet, I have no word from Mr. Gilmer, in answer to my request for an interview with him. I look for something on the subject, through you, before long.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN. ‡


The result of Mr. Seward's inquiries soon came, and revealed precisely the hesitation and difficulty which the President-elect had foretold. "Mr. G. of N. C. says he will consider of the proposition, and that he trusts that before giving an answer he will be able to name a person better calculated than himself for the purpose indicated. I do not think he will find such a person. He will not reply further, until required to do so by you, directly or indirectly. I will communicate with him if you wish. I think he would not decline. I have tried to get an interview on my own responsibility with Mr. Scott, but he has not yet come, though he has promised to do so. . . I still think Randall Hunt of Louisiana would be well chosen."§ And again: "Mr. Gilmer has written home confidentially, and will give me an answer in a few days. He is inquiring

* Morehead to Lincoln, Jan. 27th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Seward to Lincoln, Dec. 25th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

‡ Unpublished MS.

§ Seward to Lincoln, Jan. 4th, 1861. Unpublished MS.



SALMON P. CHASE, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BENDANN.)

about Randall Hunt. What do you know of Meredith P. Gentry of Tennessee?"* To this Mr. Lincoln answered:

(Private.)

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 12th, 1861.

HON. W. H. SEWARD.

MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 8th received. I still hope Mr. Gilmer will, on a fair understanding with us, consent to take a place in the Cabinet. The preference for him over Mr. Hunt or Mr. Gentry is that, up to date, he has a living position in the South, while they have not. He is only better than Winter Davis in that he is farther South. I fear if we could get, we could not safely take, more than one such man — that is, not more than one who opposed us in the election, the danger being to lose the confidence of our own friends.

Your selection for the State Department having become public, I am happy to find scarcely any objection to it. I shall have trouble with every other Northern Cabinet appointment, so much so that I shall have to defer them as long as possible, to avoid being teased to insanity to make changes.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.†

This quest after a loyal member from the South soon terminated. Under date of January 15th Mr. Seward sent an additional report on the subject. "I think," wrote he, "Mr. Scott has been terrified into dropping the subject about which I wrote to you. He has not come to see me; so we will let him pass, if you please. I still think well and have hopes of Gilmer."‡ But Mr. Lincoln was by that time thoroughly satisfied that this last hope would also prove idle; for he himself had a second letter from Mr. Gilmer (dated January 29th) in which that gentleman declined his invitation to come to Springfield, and in which, having missed receiving Mr. Lincoln's former reply, he still pathetically insisted that the President-elect should save the country by writing a letter to satisfy the South.

In this attitude matters remained until towards the end of February, when Mr. Lin-

* Seward to Lincoln, Jan. 8th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Unpublished MS.

‡ Seward to Lincoln, Jan. 15, 1861. Unpublished MS.

coln arrived in Washington; namely, Mr. Seward of New York and Mr. Bates of Missouri had positively accepted definite places in the Cabinet. Mr. Chase of Ohio and Mr. Smith of Indiana had been virtually chosen, but were yet held under advisement; a tender had been made to Mr. Cameron of Pennsylvania, and recalled but not declined; and distinctively Southern men, like Gilmer of North Carolina and Scott of Virginia, had not the courage to accept. In addition to these, Mr. Lincoln had



SIMON CAMERON, SECRETARY OF WAR.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

by this time practically settled in his own judgment upon Hon. Gideon Welles of Connecticut as the New England member, though no interview had been held nor tender made. But as early as the meeting (November 22d) between the President and Vice-President elect at Chicago, this name had been the subject of special consultation; and a friend had obtained from Mr. Welles the latter's written views upon current political questions, especially the fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution. A great number of letters and formal recommendations since received had but confirmed Mr. Lincoln's first impressions as to his fitness, availability, and representative character.

Washington was thronged with politicians, called there by the proceedings of Congress; by the Peace Convention, just closing; by the secession excitement; and especially by the advent of a new and yet untried party in administration. Willard's, then the principal hotel, was never in its history more busy nor more

brilliant. Here Mr. Lincoln and his suite had spacious and accessible rooms, and here during the six or eight working-days which intervened between his arrival and the inauguration was the great political exchange, where politicians, editors, committee-men, delegations, Congressmen, governors, and senators congregated, and besieged the doors of the coming power from morning till midnight.

Mr. Lincoln had a sincere respect for great names in politics and statesmanship, the more so because his own life had in the main been provincial. Nevertheless, he quickly noted that here at the center, as well as in lesser and more distant circles, there was present harmony in the chief party tenets, but that great diversity and cross-purpose, even serious antagonism, as to men and measures in detail were likely to arise in the future; that the powerful cross-lights of the capital only intensified the factional contests, local jealousies, or the national difficulties and dangers he had already viewed more remotely but quite as accurately from Springfield; that the wisdom of trained actors in the political drama was as much beclouded by interest or prejudice as was his own by inexperience and diffidence.

After a week's patient listening he found his well-formed judgment about the composition of his Cabinet unshaken. He had by this time finally determined to place Cameron in the War Department, and Chase was understood to have accepted the Treasury. Hence the East and the West, the great "pivotal States," the Whig and Democratic elements of the Republican party, each by three members were all believed to be fairly and acceptably represented. The slave States too, through Mr. Bates of Missouri, had a voice in the new council; but the charge of sectionalism had been so persistently iterated by the South, that it was thought best to give the single remaining place to Maryland, even then balancing between loyalty and open secession; and the final controversy was whether that choice should fall upon Montgomery Blair, a Democrat, and member of a historic and influential family, or upon Henry Winter Davis, a young Whig of rising fame.

Something of the obstinacy and bitterness of the entire contest was infused into this last struggle over a really minor place. This was partly because so little remained to quarrel about, but mainly because it was supposed to be the casting vote of the new Cabinet, which should decide the dominancy of the Whig Republicans or Democratic Republicans in Mr. Lincoln's administration. In the momentary heat and excitement this phase of the matter expanded beyond any original design, until Mr. Lincoln began to realize that it was

no longer a mere local strife between Blair and Davis in Maryland, but the closing trial of strength and supremacy between Whigs and Democrats of the new party throughout the Union, headed respectively, though perhaps unconsciously, by Seward and Chase. This contingency, too, had been foreseen by the President-elect, and he had long ago determined not to allow himself to be made the football between rival factions. Carrying out, therefore, his motto of "Justice to all," as formulated in his tender to Seward, he now determined to appoint Mr. Blair. When reminded that by this selection he placed four Democrats and only three Whigs in his Cabinet, he promptly replied that "he was himself an old-line Whig, and he should be there to make the parties even." This declaration he repeated, sometimes jocularly, sometimes earnestly, many times afterward. Heated partisans from both factions doubtless found it difficult to persuade themselves that this inexperienced man would persist in attempting to hold an even and just balance between the two. But he had already made up his mind that if the quarrel became irrepressible it should be carried on by both factions outside of his Administration. During the two or three days which elapsed after his selections were finally determined upon and their actual transmission to the Senate for confirmation there were interminable rumors of changes, and, of course, a corresponding rush to influence new combinations. Late one night a friend gained access to him, and in great excitement asked, "Is it true, Mr. Lincoln, as I have just heard, that we are to have a new deal after all, and that you intend to nominate Winter Davis instead of Blair?" "Judd," replied he, "when that slate breaks again, it will break at the top."*

These plottings at last bore mischievous fruit. Superserviceable friends doubtless persuaded Seward that the alleged ascendancy of the Chase faction in the Cabinet was real and ominous. Hence, possibly, the subjoined note :

WASHINGTON, March 2d, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: Circumstances which have occurred since I expressed to you in December last my willingness to accept the office of Secretary of State, seem to me to render it my duty to ask leave to withdraw that consent.

Tendering to you my best wishes for the success of


* Hon. N. B. Judd, conversation. J. G. N., personal memoranda. MS.

your administration, with my sincere and grateful acknowledgments of all your acts of kindness and confidence towards me, I remain very respectfully and sincerely,

Your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

THE HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President-elect. †



GIDEON WELLES, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

This, from the man who now for several months had held intimate counsel with him, had taken active part in the formation of the Cabinet, and had read and partly revised the inaugural, was unexpected. Did it mean that he would now withdraw and complain that he was forced out because a preponderating influence was given to his rival? The note was received on Saturday, and Mr. Lincoln pondered the situation till Monday morning. While the inauguration procession was forming in the streets, he wrote the following and handed it to his private secretary to copy, with the remark, "I can't afford to let Seward take the first trick."

† Unpublished MS.



CALEB B. SMITH, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

It is dated, for form's sake, at the Executive Mansion, though it was written and copied at Willard's:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 4th, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: Your note of the 2d instant, asking to withdraw your acceptance of my invitation to take charge of the State Department, was duly received. It is the subject of the most painful solicitude with me; and I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the withdrawal. The public interest, I think, demands that you should; and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direction. Please consider and answer by 9 o'clock A. M. to-morrow.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD.*

When the inauguration pageant was ended, and the usual public reception and hand-shaking were concluded, Mr. Seward called upon the President at the Executive Mansion, and the two men once more had a long, frank, and confidential talk, in which Seward's answer, sent the following morning, had, perhaps, already been foreshadowed:

March 5th, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: Deferring to your opinions and wishes as expressed in your letter of yesterday, and in our conversation of last evening, I withdraw my letter to you of the 2d instant, and remain, with great respect and esteem,

Your most obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.*

Whereupon, at 12 o'clock, the Senate being convened in extra session, the President sent

* Unpublished MS.

to that body the names of his proposed Cabinet, as follows:

For Secretary of State, William H. Seward of New York.

For Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase of Ohio.

For Secretary of War, Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania.

For Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles of Connecticut.

For Secretary of the Interior, Caleb B. Smith of Indiana.

For Attorney-General, Edward Bates of Missouri.

For Postmaster-General, Montgomery Blair of Maryland.

The Senate confirmed all these nominations without delay; and on the day after, March 6th, most of the appointees were formally inducted into office. That evening occurred the first Cabinet meeting, being, however, merely for mutual introduction and acquaintance; and the new President greeted his Cabinet at the Executive Mansion in composition and membership substantially as he had planned and arranged it, on the night of the November election, in the little telegraph office at Springfield.


Carping critics might indeed at the moment have specified defects, incongruities, jealousies, and seeds of possible discord and disaster in the new Cabinet, but we can now understand that they neither comprehended the man who was to dominate and govern it, nor the storms of State which, as captain and crew, he and they were to encounter and outride. He needed advisers, helpers, executive eyes and hands, not alone in department routine, but in the higher qualities of leadership and influence; above all, his principal motive seems to have been representative character, varied talent,—in a word, combination. Statesmanship implies success; success demands coöperation, popular sympathy and support. He wished to combine the experience of Seward, the integrity of Chase, the popularity of Cameron; to hold the West with Bates, attract New England with Welles; please the Whigs through Smith, and convince the Democrats through Blair. Mr. Lincoln possessed a quick intuition of human nature and of the strength or weakness of individual character. His whole life had been a practical study of the details and rivalries of local partisanship. He was, moreover, endowed in yet unsuspected measure with a comprehensive grasp of great causes and results in national politics. He had noted and heralded the alarming portent of the slavery struggle. With more precision than any

contemporary, he had defined the depth and breadth of the moral issues and rights it involved; he had led the preliminary victory at the November polls. Now that the hydra of secession was raising a threatening head in every cotton-State, his simple logic rose above minor considerations to the peril and the protection of the nation, to the assault on and the defense of the Constitution. He saw but the ominous cloud of civil war in front, and the patriotic faith and enthusiasm of the people behind him. The slogan of a Seward committee, a Chase delegation, or a Cameron clan was but the symbol and promise of a Wide-Awake club to vote for freedom, or of an armed regiment on the battle-field to maintain it. Neither did any one yet suspect his delicate tact in management, strength of will, or firmness of purpose. In weaker hands such a Cabinet would have been a hot-bed of strife; under him it became a tower of strength. He made these selections because he wanted a council of distinctive and diverse, yet able, influential, and representative men, who should be a harmonious group of constitutional advisers and executive lieutenants,—not a confederated board of regents holding the great seal in commission and intriguing for the succession.

THE QUESTION OF SUMTER.

IN his letter of January 4th, General Scott had promised Mr. Lincoln that from time to time he would keep him informed of the situation of military affairs. This promise the General failed to keep; probably not through any intentional neglect, but more likely because in the first place Buchanan's policy of delay, indecision, and informal negotiation with the conspirators left everything in uncertainty; and, secondly, because the attention of the Administration (and measurably of the whole country) was turned to the vague hope of compromise, especially through the labors of the Peace Convention. The rebels, on their part, were absorbed in the formation of the provisional government at Montgomery; Lincoln was making his memorable journey from Springfield to Washington by way of the chief cities of the North; the Fort Pickens truce was practically kept a secret; and thus

the military status was for the time being lost sight of beyond the immediate neighborhood of Charleston. Since the reorganization of Buchanan's cabinet on December 31st, and



EDWARD BATES, ATTORNEY-GENERAL. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

the expulsion or defection of traitors from the departments and from Congress, the whole North had breathed somewhat easier. The firing on the *Star of the West* had indeed created a storm of indignation; but this, too, quickly subsided, and by a sort of common consent all parties and sections looked to the incoming Administration as the only power which could solve the national crisis.


The key-note of such a solution was given in the inaugural of the new President. This announced a decided, though not a violent, change of policy. Buchanan's course had been one professedly of conciliation, but practically of ruinous concession. By argument he had almost justified the insurrection; he had acknowledged the doctrine of non-coercion; he had abdicated the rightful authority and power of the Executive; he had parleyed and stipulated with treason; he had withheld reinforcements. Lincoln, receiving from his hands the precious trust of the Government,—not in its original integrity, but humbled, impaired, diminished, and threatened,—announced his purpose of conciliation and not concession,

but conservation and restoration. "The policy chosen," said he, "looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger ones. It sought only to hold the public places and property not already wrested from the Government, and to collect the revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the mails at Government expense to the very people who were resisting the Government, and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the people or any of their rights. Of all that which a President might constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was forborne without which it was believed possible to keep the Government on foot."*

This pacific purpose was now, however, destined to receive a rude shock. When on the morning of the 5th of March Lincoln went to his office and council chamber in the Executive Mansion, he found a letter from Mr. Holt, still acting as Secretary of War, giving him news of vital importance received on the morning of the inauguration,—namely, that Fort Sumter must, in the lapse of a few weeks at most, be strongly reënforced or summarily abandoned. Major Anderson had in the previous week made an examination of his provisions. There was bread for twenty-eight days; pork for a somewhat longer time; beans, rice, coffee, and sugar for different periods from eight to forty days. He had at the same time consulted his officers on the prospects and possibilities of relief and reënforcement. They unanimously reported that before Sumter could be permanently or effectively succored a combined land and naval force must attack and carry the besieging forts and batteries, and hold the secession militia at bay, and that such an undertaking would at once concentrate at Charleston all the volunteers, not alone of South Carolina, but of the adjacent States as well. "I confess," wrote Anderson, transmitting the reports and estimates of his nine officers, "that I would not be willing to risk my reputation on an attempt to throw reënforcements into this harbor within the time for our relief rendered necessary by the limited supply of our provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined men."† Mr. Holt, quoting from previous instructions to and reports from the major, added that this declaration "takes the De-

partment by surprise, as his previous correspondence contained no such intimation."

Retrospective criticism as to why or how such a state of things had been permitted to grow up was, of course, useless. Here was a most portentous complication, not of Lincoln's own creating, but which he must nevertheless meet and overcome. He had counted on the



MONTGOMERY BLAIR, POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

soothing aid of time: time, on the contrary, was in this emergency working in the interest of rebellion. General Scott was at once called into council, but his sagacity and experience could afford neither suggestion nor encouragement. That same night he returned the papers to the President with a somewhat lengthy indorsement reciting the several events which led to, and his own personal efforts to avert, this contingency, but ending with the gloomy conclusion, "Evacuation seems almost inevitable, and in this view our distinguished Chief Engineer (Brigadier Totten) concurs — if indeed the worn-out garrison be not assaulted and carried in the present week."

This was a disheartening, almost a disastrous, beginning for the Administration. The Cabinet had only that same day been appointed and confirmed. The presidential advisers had not yet taken their posts — all had not even signified their acceptance. There was an impatient multitude clamoring for audience, and behind these swarmed a hungry army of office-seekers. Everything was urgency and confu-

* Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4th, 1861.

† Anderson to Cooper, Feb. 28th, 1861. MS. Partly printed in War Records.

sion, everywhere was ignorance of method and routine. Rancor and hatred filled the breasts of political opponents departing from power; suspicion and rivalry possessed partisan adherents seeking advantage and promotion. As yet, Lincoln virtually stood alone, face to face with the appalling problems of the present and the threatening responsibilities of the future. Doubtless in this juncture he remembered and acted upon a biblical precedent which in after days of trouble and despondency he was wont to quote for justification or consolation. When the children of Israel murmured on the shore of the Red Sea, Moses told them to "stand still and see the salvation of the Lord." Here then, at the very threshold of his presidential career, Lincoln had need to practice the virtue of patience,—one of the cardinal elements of his character, acquired in many a personal and political tribulation of his previous life.

He referred the papers back to General Scott to make a more thorough investigation of all the questions involved. At the same time he gave him a verbal order, touching his future general public policy, which a few days later was reduced to writing, and on the installation of the new Secretary of War transmitted by that functionary to the General-in-chief through the regular official channels, as follows:

"I am directed by the President to say he desires you to exercise all possible vigilance for the maintenance of all the places within the military department of the United States, and to promptly call upon all the departments of the Government for the means necessary to that end."*

On the 9th of March, in written questions Lincoln in substance asked General Scott to inform him: 1st. To what point of time can Anderson maintain his position in Sumter? 2d. Can you, with present means, relieve him within that time? 3d. What additional means would enable you to do so?† This was on Saturday following the inauguration. The chiefs of the several departments, with the exception of Cameron, Secretary of War, had been during the week inducted into office. That night the President held his first Cabinet council on the state of the country; and the crisis at Sumter, with the question of relieving the fort, was for the first time communicated to his assembled advisers. The general effect was one of dismay if not consternation. For such a discussion all were unprepared. Naturally all decision must be postponed, and the assistance of professional advice be sought. What followed has been written down by an eye-witness and participant.

* Cameron to Scott (written by Lincoln). Unpublished MS.

"March 9th, 1861, Saturday night.—A Cabinet council upon the state of the country. I was astonished to be informed that Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, must be evacuated, and that General Scott, General Totten, and Major Anderson concur in opinion, that as the place has but twenty-eight days' provision, it must be relieved, if at all, in that time; and that it will take a force of 20,000 men at least, and a bloody battle, to relieve it!

"For several days after this, consultations were held as to the feasibility of relieving Fort Sumter, at which were present, explaining and aiding, General Scott, General Totten, Commodore Stringham, and Mr. Fox, who seems to be *au fait* in both nautical and military matters. The army officers and navy officers differ widely about the degree of danger to rapid-moving vessels passing under the fire of land batteries. The army officers think destruction almost inevitable, where the navy officers think the danger but slight. The one believe that Sumter cannot be relieved—not even provisioned—without an army of twenty thousand men and a bloody battle. The other (the naval) believe that with light, rapid vessels they can cross the bar at high tide of a dark night, run the enemy's forts (Moultrie and Cumming's Point), and reach Sumter with little risk. They say that the greatest danger will be in landing at Sumter, upon which point there may be a concentrated fire. They do not doubt that the place can be and ought to be relieved.

"Mr. Fox is anxious to risk his life in leading the relief, and Commodore Stringham seems equally confident of success.

"The naval men have convinced me fully that the thing can be done, and yet as the doing of it would be almost certain to begin the war, and as Charleston is of little importance as compared with the chief points in the Gulf, I am willing to yield to the military counsel and evacuate Fort Sumter, at the same time strengthening the forts in the Gulf so as to look down opposition, and guarding the coast with all our naval power, if need be, so as to close any port at pleasure.

"And to this effect I gave the President my written opinion on the 16th of March."‡

This extract from the diary of Edward Bates, the Attorney-General in the new Administration, shows us the drift and scope of the official discussions on the Sumter question. To understand its full bearings, however, we must examine it a little more specifically. The idea of the evacuation and abandonment of the fort was so repugnant that Mr. Lincoln could scarcely bring himself to entertain it: we have his own forcible statement of how the apparently crushing necessity presented itself to his mind. General Scott, on March 11th and 12th, made written replies to the questions the President had propounded, and submitted the draft of an order for evacuation.

He believed Anderson could, in respect to provisions, hold out some forty days without much suffering, but that the assailants, having overpowering numbers, could easily wear out the garrison by a succession of pretended night attacks, and, when ready, take it easily by a single real assault. To supply or reinforce the fort successfully, he should need a fleet of war vessels and transports which it would take


† Unpublished MS.

‡ Bates, diary. Unpublished MS.

four months to collect; and, besides, 5000 regulars and 20,000 volunteers, which it would require new acts of Congress to authorize and from six to eight months to raise, organize, and discipline. "It is therefore my opinion and advice," writes Scott, "that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the fort so long gallantly held by him and his companions, immediately on procuring suitable water transportation, and that he embark with his command for New York."* "In a purely military

destruction consummated. This could not be allowed."†

The dire alternative presented caused a thorough reëxamination and discussion of the various plans of relief which had been suggested; and since the army and the navy showed some considerable disagreement in opinions, these discussions were held in the presence of President and Cabinet in the executive council chamber itself. General Scott's first impulse had been to revive and reorganize the



BUST OF JAMES LOUIS PETIGRU, PRESENTED TO THE CITY OF CHARLESTON BY MAYOR WILLIAM A. COURTENAY.

point of view," says Lincoln, "this reduced the duty of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort. It was believed, however, that so to abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that in fact it would be our national

* Unpublished MS.

Ward expedition, prepared about the middle of February, which was to have consisted of several small Coast Survey steamers. To this end he called Captain Ward to Washington and again discussed the plan. This, however, considering the increase of batteries and channel obstructions, was now by both of them pronounced impracticable. But one other offer seemed worthy of consideration. This was the plan proposed by Gustavus V. Fox, a gentleman thirty-nine years of age, who had been nineteen years in the United States Navy, had been engaged in the survey of the

† Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4th, 1861.

Southern coast of the United States, had commanded United States mail steamers, and had resigned from the navy in 1856 to engage in civil pursuits. He was a brother-in-law of the new Postmaster-General, Blair, who seconded his project with persistence. He had made his proposal to General Scott early in February, and, backed by prominent New York merchants and shippers, urged it as he best might through the whole of that month.

In his various communications Captain Fox thus described his plan :

"I propose to put the troops on board of a large, comfortable sea-steamer, and hire two [or three] powerful light-draught New York tug-boats, having the necessary stores on board; these to be conveyed by the United States steamer *Pawnee*, now at Philadelphia, and the revenue cutter *Harriet Lane*. . . . Arriving off the bar [at Charleston], I propose to examine by day the naval preparations and obstructions. If their vessels determine to oppose our entrance (and a feint or flag of truce would ascertain this), the armed ships must approach the bar and destroy or drive them on shore. Major Anderson would do the same upon any vessels within the range of his guns, and would also prevent any naval succor being sent down from the city. Having dispersed this force, the only obstacles are the forts on Cumming's Point and Fort Moultrie, and whatever adjacent batteries they may have erected, distant on either hand from mid-channel about three-quarters of a mile. At night, two hours before high water, with half the force on board of each tug, within relieving distance of each other, I should run in to Fort Sumter.*

"These tugs are sea-boats, six feet draught, speed fourteen knots. The boilers are below, with three and a half feet space on each side, to be filled with coal. The machinery comes up between the wheel-houses, with a gangway on either hand of five to six feet, enabling us to pack the machinery with two or three thicknesses of bales of cotton or hay. This renders the vulnerable parts of the steamer proof against grape and fragments of shells, but the momentum of a solid shot would probably move the whole mass and disable the engine. The men are below, entirely protected from grape—provisions on deck. The first tug to lead in empty, to open their [the enemy's] fire. The other two to follow, with the force divided, and towing the large iron boats of the *Baltic*, which would hold the whole force should every tug be disabled, and empty they would not impede the tugs."†

The feasibility of Captain Fox's plan thus rested upon his ability to "run the batteries," and on this point the main discussion now turned. As recorded in the diary we have quoted, the army officers believed destruction almost inevitable, while the naval officers thought a successful passage might be effected. Captain Fox, who had come to Washington, finally argued the question in person before the President, Cabinet, and assembled military officers, adducing the recorded evidence of examples and incidents which had occurred in the Crimean war, and the results of Dahlgren's experiments in firing at stationary targets; maintaining that there was no certainty whatever, and even only a minimum of chance, that

land batteries could hit a small object moving rapidly at right angles to their line of fire at a distance of thirteen hundred yards, especially at night.

So far as mere theory could do it, he successfully demonstrated his plan, convincing the President and at least a majority of his Cabinet against all the objections of General Scott and his subordinate officers.

The scheme of Captain Fox presented such favorable chances that the military problem seemed in fair way of solution; nevertheless, as the more important of the two, the political question yet remained to be considered. Resolved on prudent deliberation, President Lincoln now, on March 15th, asked the written answer of his constitutional advisers to the following inquiry :

"Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?"

As requested, the members of the Cabinet returned on the next day a somewhat elaborate reply, setting forth their reasons and conclusions. Two of them, Chase and Blair, agreeing with the President's own inclinations, responded in the affirmative; the five others, Seward, Cameron, Welles, Smith, and Bates, advised against the measure.

"I have not reached my own conclusion," wrote Chase, "without much difficulty. If the proposed enterprise will so influence civil war as to involve an immediate necessity for the enlistment of armies and the expenditure of millions, I cannot, in the existing circumstances of the country and in the present condition of the national finances, advise it."‡

He argued, however, that an immediate proclamation of reasons, and the manifestation of a kind and liberal spirit towards the South, would avert such a result, and he would therefore return an affirmative answer.

Blair had been from the first in favor of prompt and vigorous measures against the insurrection. A Democrat of the Jackson school, he would repeat Jackson's policy against nullification. He had brought forward and urged the scheme of Captain Fox. By the connivance of Buchanan's administration, he argued, the rebellion had been permitted unchecked to grow into an organized government in seven States. It had been practically treated as a lawful proceeding; and, if allowed to continue, all Southern people must become reconciled to it. The rebels believe Northern men are deficient in courage to maintain the Government. The evacuation of Sumter will convince them that the Administration lacks firmness. Sumter reënforced becomes invulnerable, and will

* Fox, memorandum, Feb. 6th, 1861. War Records.

† Fox to Blair, Feb. 23d, 1861. War Records.

‡ Chase to Lincoln, March 16th, 1861.

completely demoralize the rebellion. No expense or care should be spared to achieve this result. The appreciation of our stocks would reimburse the most lavish outlay for this purpose.

"You should give no thought for the commander and his comrades in this enterprise. They willingly take the hazard for the sake of the country, and the honor, which, successful or not, they will receive from you and the lovers of free government in all lands."*

Seward, in the negative, argued the political issue at great length. To attempt to provision Sumter would provoke combat and open civil war. A desperate and defeated majority in the South have organized revolutionary government in seven States. The other slave States are balancing between sympathy for the seceders and loyalty to the Union, but indicate a disposition to adhere to the latter. The Union must be maintained, peaceably if it can, forcibly if it must, to every extremity. But civil war is the most uncertain and fearful of all remedies for political disorders. He would save the Union by peaceful policy without civil war. Disunion is without justification. Devotion to the Union is a profound and permanent national sentiment. Silenced by terror it would, if encouraged, rally, and reverse the popular action of the seceding States. The policy of the time is conciliation. Sumter is practically useless.

"I would not provoke war in any way now. I would resort to force to protect the collection of the revenue, because this is a necessary as well as a legitimate Union object. Even then it should be only a naval force that I would employ for that necessary purpose, while I would defer military action on land until a case should arise when we would hold the defense. In that case, we should have the spirit of the country and the approval of mankind on our side."†

Cameron followed the reasoning of the army officers. Captain Fox, he said, did not propose to supply provisions for more than one or two months. The abandonment of Sumter seemed an inevitable necessity, and therefore the sooner the better.‡ Welles thought the public mind was becoming reconciled to the idea of evacuation as a necessity. The strength, dignity, and character of the Government would not be promoted by a successful attempt, while a failure would be disastrous.§ Smith argued that Sumter is not essential to any of the duties imposed on the Government. There are other and more

effective means to vindicate its honor, and compel South Carolina to obey the laws.|| Bates believed the hazard greater than the gain. "True," wrote he, "war already exists by the act of South Carolina—but this Government has thus far magnanimously forbore to retort the outrage. And I am willing to forbear yet longer in the hope of a peaceful solution of our present difficulties." Pickens, Key West, etc., should, on the contrary, be strongly defended, and the whole coast from South Carolina to Texas be guarded by the entire power of the navy.¶

Against the advice of so decided a majority, Lincoln did not deem it prudent to order the proposed expedition. Neither did his own sense of duty permit him entirely to abandon it. Postponing, therefore, a present final decision of the point, he turned his attention to the investigation of the question immediately and vitally connected with it,—the collection of the revenue. On the 18th of March he once more directed written inquiries to three of his Cabinet officers. To the Attorney-General, whether under the Constitution and laws the Executive has power to collect duties on ship-board off shore?*** To the Secretary of the Treasury, whether, and where, and for what cause any importations are taking place without payment of duties? Whether vessels off shore could prevent such importations or enforce payment? and what number and description of vessels besides those already in the revenue service?†† To the Secretary of the Navy, what amount of naval force he could place at the control of the revenue service, and how much additional in the future?‡‡

Pending the receipt of replies to these inquiries, Lincoln determined to obtain information on two other points,—the first, as to the present actual condition and feeling of Major Anderson; the second, as to the real temper and intentions of the people of Charleston. Captain Fox had suggested the possibility of obtaining leave to visit Sumter through the influence of Captain Hartstene, then in the rebel service at Charleston, but who had in former years been his intimate friend, and comrade in command of a companion steamer of the California line. By order of the President, General Scott therefore sent him to obtain "accurate information in regard to the command of Major Anderson in Fort Sumter."§§ As he an-

* Blair to Lincoln, March 15, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Seward to Lincoln, March 15th, 1861.

‡ Cameron to Lincoln, March 15th, 1861.

§ Welles to Lincoln, March 15th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

|| Smith to Lincoln, March 15th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

¶ Bates to Lincoln, March 15th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

** Lincoln to Bates, March 18th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

†† Lincoln to Chase, March 18th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡‡ Lincoln to Welles, March 18th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§§ Cameron to Scott, March 19th, 1861. War Records.

ticipated, Hartstene introduced him to Governor Pickens, to whom he showed his order, and was, after some delay, permitted to go to the fort under Hartstene's escort, having meanwhile had an interview with General Beauregard.

"We reached Fort Sumter after dark" (March 21st), writes Captain Fox, "and remained about two hours. Major Anderson seemed to think it was too late to relieve the fort by any other means than by landing an army on Morris Island. He agreed with General Scott that an entrance from the sea was impossible; but as we looked out upon the water from the parapet, it seemed very feasible, more especially as we heard the oars of a boat near the fort, which the sentry hailed, but we could not see her through the darkness until she almost touched the landing. I found the garrison getting short of supplies, and it was agreed that I might report that the 15th of April, at noon, would be the period beyond which the fort could not be held unless supplies were furnished. I made no arrangements with Major Anderson for reinforcing or supplying the fort, nor did I inform him of my plan."*

Unlike Fox, Anderson was in no wise encouraged by the conversation.

"I have examined the point," wrote he, "alluded to by Captain Fox last night. A vessel lying there will be under the fire of thirteen guns from Fort Moultrie, and Captain Foster says that at the pan-coupé or immediately on its right,—the best place for her to land,—she would require, even at high tide, if drawing ten feet, a staging of forty feet. The department can decide what the chances will be of a safe debarkation and unloading at that point under these circumstances."†

The other point on which the President sought information revealed equally decisive features. It so happened that S. A. Hurlbut of Illinois (afterwards General), an intimate friend of Lincoln, was at the moment in Washington. This gentleman was of Charleston birth, four years a law student of the foremost citizen and jurist of South Carolina, James L. Petigru, and then in frequent correspondence with him. On March 21st the President called Mr. Hurlbut to him, and explaining that Mr. Seward insisted that there was a strong Union party in the South,—even in South Carolina,—asked him to go personally and ascertain the facts. Mr. Hurlbut telegraphed his sister in Charleston that he was coming on a visit, which, in the threatening aspect of affairs, he might not soon be able to repeat. He traveled as a private citizen, though purposely with some show of publicity. Public curiosity, however, centered itself upon his traveling companion, Colonel Ward H. Lamon, who, coming with an ostensible Government mission to examine some post-office matters, was looked upon as the real presidential messenger, was treated to a formal audience with the governor, and permitted to make a visit to Fort Sumter. While Lamon was hobnobbing with the young secessionists at the Charleston Hotel, Hurlbut, quartered at the house of his

sister, and thus free from the inquisitive scrutiny of newspaper reporters, was quietly visiting and being visited by his former neighbors and friends,—politicians, lawyers, merchants, and representative citizens in various walks of life. Of greater value than all was his confidential interview with his former legal preceptor. Mr. Petigru was at that time the best lawyer in the South, and the strongest man in the State of South Carolina so far as character, ability, and purity went, and never surrendered nor disguised his Union convictions. Mr. Hurlbut was himself an able lawyer, a man of experience and force in politics, and a shrewd and sagacious judge of human nature. His mission remained entirely unsuspected; and after two days' sojourn, he returned to Washington and made a long written report to the President.

"By appointment," he writes, "I met Mr. Petigru at one P. M. and had a private conversation with him for more than two hours. I was at liberty to state to him that my object was to ascertain and report the actual state of feeling in the city and State. Our conversation was entirely free and confidential. He is now the only man in the city of Charleston who avowedly adheres to the Union. . . . From these sources I have no hesitation in reporting as unquestionable—that separate nationality is a fixed fact, that there is an unanimity of sentiment which is to my mind astonishing, that there is no attachment to the Union. . . . There is positively nothing to appeal to. The sentiment of national patriotism, always feeble in Carolina, has been extinguished and overridden by the acknowledged doctrine of the paramount allegiance to the State. False political economy diligently taught for years has now become an axiom, and merchants and business men believe, and act upon the belief, that great growth of trade and expansion of material prosperity will and must follow the establishment of a Southern republic. They expect a golden era, when Charleston shall be a great commercial emporium and control for the South, as New York does for the North."‡

These visits to Charleston added two very important factors or known quantities to the problem from which the Cabinet, and chiefly the President, were to deduce the unknown. Very unexpectedly to the latter, and no doubt to all the former as well, a new light, of yet deeper influence, was now suddenly thrown upon the complicated question. The fate of Sumter had been under general discussion nearly three weeks. The Cabinet and the high military and naval officers had divided in opinion and separated into opposing camps. As always happens in such cases, suspicion and criticism of personal motives began to develop themselves, though, at this very beginning, as throughout his whole after-administration, they

* Fox, Official Report, Feb. 24th, 1865. "Chicago Tribune," Sept. 14th, 1865.

† Anderson to Adj. Gen., March 22d, 1861. War Records.

‡ Hurlbut to Lincoln, Report, March 27th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

were held in check by the generous faith and unvarying impartiality of the President. Hitherto the sole issue was the relief or abandonment of Sumter; but now, by an apparent change of advice and attitude on the part of General Scott, the fate of Fort Pickens was also drawn into discussion.

So far as is known, the loyalty and devotion of General Scott never wavered for an instant; but his proneness to mingle political with military considerations had already been twice manifested. The first was when in his memorandum entitled "Views," etc., addressed to President Buchanan, October 29th, 1860, he suggested the formation of four new American Unions if the old should be dismembered. The second was more recent. On the day preceding Lincoln's inauguration, the General had written a letter to Seward. In this he advanced the opinion that the new President would have to choose one of four plans or policies: 1st. To adopt the Crittenden compromise, and change the Republican to a Union party; 2d. By closing or blockading rebel ports or collecting the duties on ship-board outside; 3d. Conquer the States by invading armies, which he deprecated; and 4th, Say to the seceded States: "Wayward sisters, depart in peace!"* It must be noted that between three of these alternatives he gives no intimation of preference. The letter was simply a sign of the prevailing political unrest, and therefore remained unnoticed by the President, to whom it was referred.

When Lincoln assumed the duties of government, Scott had among other things briefly pointed out the existing danger at Fort Pickens, and the President by his verbal order of March 5th, directing "all possible vigilance for the maintenance of all the places," had intended that that stronghold should be promptly reinforced. He made inquiries on this head four days later, and to his surprise found nothing yet done.† Hence he put his order in writing, and had it duly sent to the War Department for record March 11th, and once more gave special directions in regard to Pickens, assuming the omission had occurred through preoccupation about Sumter. Upon this reminder, Scott bestirred himself, and at his instance the war steamer *Mohawk* was dispatched March 12th, carrying a messenger with orders to Captain Vogdes to land his company at Fort Pickens and increase the garrison.

Both President and Cabinet had since then considered that port disposed of for the moment.

On the evening of March 28th, the first State dinner was given by the new occupant of the Executive Mansion. Just before the hour of leave-taking, Lincoln invited the members of his Cabinet into an adjoining room for an instant's consultation; and when they were alone, he informed them, with evident deep emotion, that General Scott had that day advised the evacuation of Fort Pickens as well as Fort Sumter. The General's recommendation is formulated as follows, in his written memorandum to the Secretary of War:

"It is doubtful, however, according to recent information from the South, whether the voluntary evacuation of Fort Sumter alone would have a decisive effect upon the States now wavering between adherence to the Union and secession. It is known, indeed, that would be charged to necessity, and the holding of Fort Pickens would be adduced in support of that view. Our Southern friends, however, are clear that the evacuation of both the forts would instantly soothe and give confidence to the eight remaining slave-holding States and render their cordial adherence to this Union perpetual. The holding of Forts Jefferson and Taylor on the ocean keys depends on entirely different principle and should never be abandoned; and indeed the giving up of Forts Sumter and Pickens may be best justified by the hope that we should thereby recover the States to which they geographically belong by the liberality of the act, besides retaining the eight doubtful States."

A long pause of blank amazement followed the President's recital, § broken at length by Blair in strong denunciation, not only of the advice, but of Scott's general course regarding Sumter. He charged that Scott was transgressing his professional duties and "playing politician." Blair's gestures and remarks, moreover, were understood by those present as being aimed specially at Seward, whose peace policy he had, with his usual impulsive aggressiveness, freely criticised. Without any formal vote, there was a unanimous expression of dissent from Scott's suggestion, and under the President's request to meet in formal conference next day, the Cabinet retired. That night Lincoln's eyes did not close in sleep. || It was apparent that the time had come when he must meet the nation's crisis. His judgment must guide, his sole will determine, his lips utter the word that should save our most precious inheritance of humanity, the last hope of free government on the earth. Only the imagination may picture that intense and weary vigil.

* Scott to Seward, March 3d, 1861. Scott, "Autobiography," Vol. II., pp. 625-628.

† Meigs, diary, March 31st, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Scott, memorandum, War Records.

§ Blair to Welles, May 17th, 1873. Welles, "Lincoln and Seward," p. 65.

|| Meigs, diary. Unpublished MS.



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JOHN MUIR

The bust above shown is of bronze, and is the work of C. S. Pietro, of New York. It was unveiled recently at Madison, Wisconsin, at the State University, to which the bust was presented by Mr. Thomas E. Brittingham, a resident of Madison. Addresses in eulogy of the eminent naturalist were made by Dr. Van Hise, President of the University, and others.

THE OLD BAND.

IT 'S mighty good to git back to the old town, shore,
Considerin' I 've be'n away twenty year and more.
Sence I moved then to Kansas, of course I see a change,
A-comin' back, and notice things that 's new to me and strange ;
Especially at evenin' when yer new band fellers meet,
In fancy uniforms and all, and play out on the street—
. . . What 's come of old Bill Lindsey and the Sax-horn fellers — say ?
I want to hear the *old* band play.



What 's come of Eastman, and Nat Snow ? And where 's War Barnett at ?
And Nate and Bony Meek ; Bill Hart ; Sam Richa's, and that
Air brother of him played the drum as twicet as big as Jim ;
And old Hi Kerns, the carpenter — say, what 's become o' him ?
I make no doubt yer *new band* now 's a competenter band,
And plays their music more by note than what they play by hand,
And stylisher and grander tunes ; but somehow — *anyway*
I want to hear the *old* band play.



AWAITING THE ENEMY. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE WAR OF THE REBELLION.

BY GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.



TWENTY-TWO years have passed since the termination of the civil war in America; a new generation of men has the destiny of our country in their possession, and we who probably lag superfluous on the stage watch with jealous interest the drift of public opinion and of public events. These are mainly guided by self-interest, by prejudice, by the teachings of books, magazines, and newspapers.

We veterans believe that in 1861-5 we fought a holy war, with absolute right on our side, with pure patriotism, with reasonable skill, and that we achieved a result which enabled the United States of America to resume her glorious career in the interest of all mankind, after an interruption of four years by as needless a war as ever afflicted a people.

The causes which led up to that war have been well described by Mr. Greeley, Dr. Draper, Mr. Blaine, and General Logan — the opposite side by Mr. Davis, Governor Foote, General Johnston, and the recent biographers of General Lee. In addition to these, innumerable volumes have been published, and nearly all the leading magazines of our country have added most interesting narratives of events, conspicuously so *THE CENTURY*. The editors of this magazine, armed with a personal letter from General Grant, applied long ago to have me assist them in their laudable purpose. I declined, but the pendulum of time seems to have swung too far in the wrong direction: one is likely to receive the impression that

the civil war was only a scramble for power by mobs, and not a war of high principle, guided by men of great intelligence according to the best light they possessed. Discovering that one branch of the history of that war, "Grand Strategy," has been overlooked or slighted by writers, I have undertaken to discuss it, not with any hope to do full justice to the subject, but to attract the attention of younger and stronger men to follow up and elaborate it to the end.

War is the conflict of arms between peoples for some real or fancied object. It has existed from the beginning. The Bible is full of it. Homer immortalized the siege and destruction of Troy. Grecian, Roman, and European history is chiefly made up of wars and the deeds of soldiers; out of their experience arose certain rules, certain principles, which made the "art of war" as practiced by Alexander, by Cæsar, by Gustavus Adolphus, and by Frederick the Great.

These principles are as true as the multiplication table, the law of gravitation, of virtual velocities, or of any other invariable rule of natural philosophy. The "art of war" has grown to be the "science of war," and probably reached its summit in the wars of Europe from 1789 to 1815. Its fundamental principles are as clearly defined as are those of the laws of England by Blackstone. Jomini may be assumed as the father of the modern science of war, and he has been supplemented by "great masters" such as Napoleon, Marmont, Wellington, Napier, Hamley, Soady, Chesney, and others, all of whom agree in the fundamental principles; but to me the treatise of France J. Soady,

Lieutenant-Colonel, R. A., published in London, 1870, seems easiest of reference and best suited to my purpose, because he admits the elements of local prejudice and the temperament of the people to enter into the problem of war.

Lieutenant-Colonel Soady divides the "lessons of war as taught by the great masters" into the following heads:

1. Statesmanship in its relationship to war.
2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for offense or invasion.
3. Grand tactics.
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
5. Engineering — the attack and defense of fortifications.
6. Minor tactics.

He further subdivides these "heads," and illustrates by historic examples the following branches: "Aim and principles," "Lines of communication," "Zone of operations," "Offensive and defensive warfare," Fortresses, Battle, Modern improvement in arms, Steamboats and Railroads, the Telegraph; and indeed more nearly approaches the science of war as it exists to-day than any author of whom I have knowledge. Any non-professional reader who will cast his eyes over the 555 pages of Lieutenant-Colonel Soady's volume, as well as those of "The Operations of War," by Colonel (now General) Hamley, will discover that war as well as peace has a large field in the affairs of this world, demanding as much if not more study than most of the sciences in which the human mind is interested.

Every man who does to his neighbor as he wishes his neighbor should do unto him finds on examining the law of the day that he has been a law-abiding citizen; so a soldier or general who goes straight to his object with courage and intelligence will find that he has been a scientific soldier according to the doctrines laid down by the great masters. Many of us in our civil war did not think of Jomini, Napoleon, Wellington, Hamley, or Soady; yet, as we won the battle, we are willing to give these great authors the benefit of our indorsement.

Now in the United States of America, in the year of our Lord 1861, some ambitious men of the Southern States, for their own reasons, good or bad, resolved to break up the union of States which had prospered beyond precedent, which by political means they had governed, but on which they were about to lose their hold. By using the pretext of slavery which existed at the South they aroused their people to a very frenzy, seceded (or their States seceded) from the Union, and established a Southern Confederacy, the capital of which was first at Montgomery, Alabama, afterwards at Richmond, Virginia, with Jefferson

Davis as their president. By a conspiracy as clearly established as any fact in history, they seized all the property of the United States within the seceded States, except a few feebly garrisoned forts along the seaboard, and proclaimed themselves a new nation, with slavery the corner-stone. Old England, the first modern nation to abolish slavery and to enforce the noble resolve that no man could put his foot on English soil without "*eo instante*" becoming a free man, looked on with complacency, and encouraged this enormous crime of rebellion.

The people of the Northern free States, accustomed to the usual criminations of our system of elections, supposed this to be a mere incident of the presidential election of the previous November; went along in their daily vocations in the full belief that this episode would pass away as others had done; and treated the idea of civil war in this land of freedom as a pure absurdity.

In due time, March 4, 1861, the new President, Abraham Lincoln, was installed as the President of the United States. He found the seven cotton-States in a condition which they called "out of the Union," claiming absolute independence, and seeking to take into their confederacy every State which tolerated slavery. In the end they succeeded, except with Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, so that in the spring of 1861, April 12th, when the Southern Confederacy began actual war by bombarding Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, it awakened a response which even they could not misunderstand.

The people of the United States loved their Government and their history; they realized perfectly the advantages they possessed over the inhabitants of other lands, but had no army or navy adequate to meet so grave a crisis. The boom of the cannon in Charleston Harbor was carried by electricity to every city, town, and village of the land, and the citizens realized for the first time that civil war was upon them; they were told to form themselves into companies and regiments, and to go with all expedition to Washington, the national capital, to defend the civil authorities and the archives of government. This done, the cry went up, "On to Richmond!" and the battle of Bull Run resulted. The South was better prepared than the North, and victory went to the former, according to the established rules of war. Had Johnston or Beauregard pushed their success and occupied Washington, it would not have changed the final result, because twenty millions of freemen would never have submitted tamely to the domination of the slave-holder faction. Johnston himself records that his army was as much

confused and disordered as ours, both being green and badly organized and disciplined.

Then began the real preparation. Soady quotes from Napoleon: "When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is difficult to organize an army." We found this perfectly true; yet the people of the United States, on the call of their President, organized voluntarily three hundred regiments of a thousand men each, which were distributed to the places of immediate danger. Soady says further: "Although wars of opinion, national wars and civil wars are sometimes confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice. . . . In a military sense these wars are fearful, since the invading force not only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of an exasperated people."

The very nature of the case required the North to invade the South, to recover possession of the forts, arsenals, dock-yards, mints, post-routes, and public property which had been wrongfully appropriated by the public enemy. We had not only to meet and conquer the armies and the exasperated people of the South, but the obstacles of nature — woods, marshes, rivers, mountains — and the climate of a region nearly as large as all Europe.

Omitting the States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri (3,024,745), which supplied each belligerent a fair quota, the Northern States had a population of 19,089,944 to 9,103,332 in the Confederate States. In the autumn of 1861, these faced each other in angry controversy, the North resolved to maintain the Union, and the South to establish a separate government, necessarily hostile to it. Each side maintained throughout the same form of government, with a president elected by the people as their chief magistrate and commander-in-chief of the army and navy, with a cabinet of his choice to assist in the administration of government, a congress to enact the laws and provide the ways and means, and a supreme court to sit in judgment on those laws. Both parties, following common precedents, raised their armies by the same methods — first by volunteering, and then by a draft of citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, induced by bounties or enforced by severe penalties. At first the Southern youth were clamorous to be led against the detested Yankees and Abolitionists, each claiming to be equal to five of the

shop-keepers and mud-sills of the North; but they soon became convinced that man to man was all they wanted.

According to Captain Frederick Phisterer, in his valuable "Statistical Record of the Armies"* (1883), the "calls" on the North for men were, in the four years of war, 2,763,670, which resulted in an aggregate of 2,772,408; † but as these calls were for three months, one year, two years, three years, and "during the war," the actual soldiers are counted two, three, and four times.

On p. 62 occurs a table, which every officer who has had to fight with men present for duty, instead of on paper, well understands, in which is given, "Present":

July 1, 1861.....	183,588
January 1, 1862.....	527,204
March 31, 1862.....	533,984
January 1, 1863.....	698,802
January 1, 1864.....	611,250
January 1, 1865.....	620,924
March 31, 1865.....	657,747
May 1, 1865.....	797,807

and on the latter date 202,709 absent — aggregating 1,000,516 on the muster-rolls at the end of the war. I have no doubt this is as correct as possible.

The "absent" were not present with the armies at the front, but were generally in rear of the base of supplies; and even of the "present" we had to estimate at least one-third as detached, guarding our long lines of supplies, sick in hospital, company cooks, teamsters, escorts to trains, and absent from the ranks by reason of the many causes incident to war.

Assuming one soldier to sixteen of the population, — at times more, at times less, — the Southern armies must have had an average of 569,000 men. I cannot find even an approximate table of their numbers; but we know they had in their ranks every man they could get, subject to the same causes of absenteeism as the Union armies.

Before I enter upon the real subject of this paper, let me attempt to portray the two great leaders of these mighty hosts, Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, both of whom, in addition to their civil functions, often exercised their unquestioned right to command their respective armies. They, in fact, commissioned all general officers, assigned them to posts, gave military orders, defined the "objects" of campaigns, and often the exact "lines of operation."

than those supplied by the adjutant-general, and are offered in this paper only as approximate, to illustrate the argument and demonstrate the magnitude of these "operations of war." — W. T. S.

† A recent officially revised statement increases this number to 2,778,304. — EDITOR.

* Captain Phisterer in this record gives the date and place of 2261 distinct battles and engagements, and for 149 of them he gives the estimated losses. I do not know the source of his information, but I do know that it is very difficult to ascertain the exact facts even as to the Union forces, much more the Confederate. His tables are more complete and easier of reference

Lincoln was by nature and choice a man of peace. Born in Kentucky, but taken by his parents in early youth to Indiana and Illinois, he grew up to manhood the type of the class of people who inhabit our North-west. He in time became a lawyer in Springfield, the capital of Illinois, had a fair practice, and always took a lively interest in all public questions—in other words, “politics.” He became skilled in debate, and during the discussions which arose from the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the extension of slavery over the vast territories acquired by the Mexican war of 1846–8, he was compelled to meet in debate one of the ablest men of his day, Stephen A. Douglas, whom he fairly excelled, whereby he acquired national fame; was, according to the usage of our country, nominated as the Republican candidate for President, and was duly and fairly elected in November, 1860. At that time he was somewhat a stranger to the country, especially to the South, who regarded him as an Abolitionist, then the vilest of mortals in their estimation. But no sooner was he legally inducted into his office, March 4, 1861, than he began to display those qualities of head and heart which will make him take rank with the most renowned men of earth.

He never professed any knowledge of the laws and science of war, yet in his joyous moments he would relate his *large experience* as a soldier in the Black Hawk war of 1832, and as an officer in the Mormon war at Nauvoo, in 1846. Nevertheless, during the progress of the civil war he evinced a quick comprehension of the principles of the “art,” though never using military phraseology. Thus his letter of April 19, 1862, to General McClellan, then besieging Yorktown, exhibits a precise knowledge of the strength and purpose of each of the many armies in the field, and of the importance of “concentric action.” In his letter of June 5, 1863, to General Hooker, he wrote:

In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river [Rappahannock], like an ox jumped half-way over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way, or to kick the other.

Again, June 10, 1863, writing to General Hooker:

If left to me, I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take it in twenty days. Meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army and not Richmond is your objective point. If he comes toward the Upper Potomac, follow him on his flank and on the inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. If he stop, *fret him* and *fret him*.

This is pure science, though the language is not technical.

It is related by General Grant in his memoirs that when he was explaining how he proposed to use the several scattered armies so as to accomplish the best results, referring to the forces in western Virginia, and saying that he had ordered Sigel to move up the Valley of Virginia from Winchester, make junction with Crook and Averell from Kanawha, and go towards Saltville or Lynchburg—Mr. Lincoln said, “Oh, yes! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin, he must hold a leg while somebody else does.”

In his personal interview with General Grant about March 8, 1864, Mr. Lincoln recounted truly and manfully that

he had never professed to be a military man, or to know how campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them; but the procrastination of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the North and Congress, *which was always with him*, forced him to issuing his series of military orders, one, two, three, etc. He did not know but all were wrong, and did know that some were. All he wanted or ever had wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and *act*, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the Government in rendering such assistance.

At last he had found that man.

Jefferson Davis also was born in Kentucky. He removed in youth to the State of Mississippi, whence he was appointed a cadet to the United States Military Academy at West Point, September 1, 1824. He was graduated No. 23 in a class of 33 members in June, 1828; served on the North-west frontier, now Wisconsin and Iowa, as a lieutenant of the First Infantry, till March 4, 1833, when he was appointed to the First Dragoons as a first lieutenant; with that regiment he served on the frontier of Arkansas, now Fort Gibson in the Indian Territory, till he resigned, in 1835. He was in civil life in his State of Mississippi till the breaking out of the Mexican war, in 1846, when, as colonel of a Mississippi regiment, he took a conspicuous part under General Zachary Taylor at Monterey and at Buena Vista, where he was badly wounded.

With the disbandment of his regiment he resumed his civil and political career; was a senator in the National Congress, 1847–53; Secretary of War under President Pierce, 1853–57; and again a senator, from 1857 to 1861, when he became the President of the Southern Confederacy, and Commander-in-chief of its armies and navy.

He was by nature and education a soldier, giving orders to his armies, laying down plans of campaign, lines of operation, and descending into details which it might have been wiser to have left to subordinates.

No one has ever questioned the personal integrity of Mr. Davis, but we his antagonists have ever held him as impersonating a bad

cause from ambitious motives, often exhibiting malice, arrogance, and pride.

Such, in my judgment, were the two great antagonist forces, and such their leaders in our civil war.

Recurring now to the autumn of 1861, these two forces stood facing each other with one of the most difficult problems of the science of war before them. The line of separation was substantially the Potomac, the Ohio, and a line through southern Missouri and the Indian Territory to New Mexico, fully two thousand miles long; but this naturally divided itself into three parts — the east or Potomac (McClellan), the center or Ohio (Buell), and the west or Missouri (Halleck). Confronting them was the Army of Northern Virginia (Johnston — Lee), that of the Cumberland (Albert Sidney Johnston), and that of the trans-Mississippi (McCulloch — Price). All these were educated and experienced soldiers. The North necessarily took the offensive, and the South the defensive. After much preliminary skirmishing the first significant movement was that of General Thomas, January 20, 1862, who moved forward, attacked, defeated, and killed General Zollicoffer, at Mill Springs, Kentucky; the next was that of General Grant from Cairo, Illinois, up the Tennessee River in conjunction with the gun-boat fleet under Commodore Foote, which captured Fort Henry, and afterwards (February 14th–16th) Fort Donelson, in which the Union losses are reported, 2886, and the Confederate, 15,067,* most of these prisoners of war. The prompt capture of these two fortified positions with their garrisons compelled the Confederate general, Johnston, to abandon his fortified flanks at Bowling Green, Kentucky, and Columbus, on the Mississippi River, and to fall back two hundred miles to a new line along the Memphis and Charleston railroad. The Union armies followed up this movement, the one (Grant) to Shiloh, abreast of Corinth, the other (Pope) directly down the Mississippi River, the real "objective" of this grand campaign. There was still another army, under General S. R. Curtis, an educated and professional soldier, moving southward, west of the Mississippi River, which encountered its enemy at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, on the 6th–8th of March, defeated him, inflicting a loss of 5200* men to his of 1384. These three armies, under the command of General Halleck at St. Louis; were operating from a secure base, with abundant supplies on "concentric lines," with a well-defined and important "objective," the recovery of the Mississippi River, the chief navigable river of the continent, which had been forcibly taken possession of by the enemy, its banks fortified with heavy guns, and with several

fleets of armed gun-boats to patrol and defend it.

The Army of the Ohio, General Buell, moved forward to Nashville and the Tennessee River.

Here the Confederate general, Albert Sidney Johnston, displayed great skill and generalship by using his railroads, collecting all his scattered forces at Corinth, Mississippi, completely reorganizing them and hurling them with terrific energy on Grant at Shiloh, timing his attack so as to overwhelm this army before the arrival of the Army of the Ohio, approaching from the direction of Nashville. On the first day, April 6, 1862, he was partially successful, but met a foe of equal skill and determination, and there lost his life, necessitating a change of commanders in the very crisis of battle. He was succeeded by Beauregard, who continued the attack; but the Union forces under Grant held the key-points of the position till night, when arrived the division of Lew Wallace, which had been detached, and three divisions of the Army of the Ohio. The next morning the Union armies assumed the "offensive," drove the Confederates back to Corinth, and won the victory. The losses are recorded 13,573 to the Union, and 10,699 to the Confederates. This was a highly critical battle, more important in its moral than its physical results. It gave the Union army great confidence in itself, and in its ability not only to defeat the Confederate armies, man to man, but to overcome the "obstacles of nature" and the machinations of an "exasperated people."

While these movements were in progress down the Mississippi, Commodore Farragut, with his sea-going fleet, a flotilla of mortar-boats under Commodore Porter, and a land force under General Butler, was preparing to reach the same "objective" from the mouth of the river. On the 20th of April, Farragut began by breaking the chain of obstacles at Forts Jackson and Saint Philip, both works planned by scientific engineers and built by competent workmen; both were well garrisoned and supplied, with heavy artillery and abundance of ammunition. Then he steamed by these forts, fighting right and left in his "wooden ships with hearts of steel," instantly attacked the Confederate fleet above, utterly annihilated it, went on up to the city of New Orleans and captured it — all inside of ten days. No bolder or more successful act of war was ever done than this, which was fully equal to Nelson's attack on the French fleet at Aboukir, and infinitely more important in its conse-

* The Official Records, while not conclusive, would seem to place this loss at a much smaller figure.—EDITOR.

quences. Had not events elsewhere delayed the movement from the North, the Mississippi would have been ours in the summer of 1862, whereas its recovery was only postponed till 1863.

Almost coincident with the battle of Shiloh, General Pope, operating down the Mississippi in coöperation with the gun-boat fleet of Commodore Foote, attacked the fortified Island No. 10, and on the 8th of April captured it, with all its stores and most of its garrison. The gun-boat fleet, pushing on down the river, encountered Fort Pillow on the 14th of April, again on the 10th of May, and June 4th captured it; and under command of Commodore Davis pushed on to Memphis, where, June 6th, it absolutely destroyed the Confederate fleet of gun-boats, thus leaving no obstacle, except Vicksburg, to the free navigation of the river.

General Halleck, after the battle of Shiloh, ordered General Pope's army by water from Island No. 10 to Shiloh, and proceeded there himself to command the several armies in person. He organized these, viz., of the Ohio, Tennessee and Mississippi, into the usual right and left wings, center, and reserve, and moved, about the end of April, with great deliberation on the Confederate army intrenched at Corinth, Mississippi, a strategic place of value, being the point of intersection of two important railroads. After some immaterial skirmishing the Confederate general, Beauregard, abandoned the place, fell back to Tupelo, fifty miles south on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, and the Union forces occupied Corinth, May 30, 1862. General Halleck then had in hand one of the strongest and best armies ever assembled on this continent, and could easily have pursued Beauregard, scattered his army, marched across to Vicksburg, then unfortified, occupied it, and thus brought to a brilliant conclusion the campaign he had so well begun; he could have made the Mississippi open to commerce, created a complete isolation of the trans-Mississippi department of the Confederates, and thereby set free, for other uses, three-fourths of his army of one hundred thousand men. But the reverses to McClellan in the worthless peninsula of James River, and the appeal of the good Union people of East Tennessee, caused our President and commander-in-chief to break up that army and call General Halleck to Washington, send Buell's army towards Chattanooga, and leave General Grant with the army of the Tennessee to defend a line of one hundred and fifty miles (Tuscumbia to Memphis), placing him on the defensive with a bold, skillful, and enterprising enemy at his front. The Confederate armies of Price and Van Dorn were brought from across the

Mississippi to face Grant from Holly Springs. Bragg, who succeeded Beauregard at Tupelo, moved his army, reinforced by recruits, detachments, and exchanged prisoners, rapidly by rail to Chattanooga to meet Buell, who had marched across from Corinth. Feeling himself equal if not superior to Buell, Bragg, August 21, 1862, began that really bold and skillful campaign which forced Buell back to his base of supplies at Louisville, on the Ohio River. Here, in his turn, Buell received reinforcements and resumed the offensive, encountering Bragg at Perryville, Kentucky, on the 8th of October, 1862, inflicting a loss to the enemy of 7000, to his own of 4348, which induced Bragg to fall back to Murfreesboro', Tennessee.

Meantime Price and Van Dorn began to be aggressive against General Grant's long, thin line of defense; but Grant met them with consummate skill, at every point, as at Iuka, September 19th-20th, and at Corinth, October 3d-4th, the casualties of which are reported 2359 Union and 14,221* Confederate — a fiercely contested battle at which Rosecrans commanded, and which was conclusive of events in that quarter to the end of the war.

Grant then, November, 1862, resumed the original offensive against Vicksburg,— known to be strongly fortified, occupied by a competent garrison, and covered by the armies of Price and Van Dorn, under the command of Lieutenant-General Pemberton, whose headquarters were at Holly Springs, Mississippi. Leaving small detachments to guard the key-points to his rear, Grant moved with all his force straight against Pemberton, who first formed his defensive line behind the Tallahatchie, and, this being too long for his strength, fell behind the Yalabusha at Grenada. Grant moved his scattered forces concentrically on Oxford, Mississippi, which he occupied on the 2d of December, and then resolved to send Sherman back to Memphis with one of his four brigades to organize, out of new troops arrived there and other troops belonging to Curtis at Helena, Arkansas, an expeditionary force to move by the river direct against Vicksburg, whilst he held the main force under Pemberton so occupied that he could not detach any of his men to that fortress. After Sherman had started, Pemberton detached Van Dorn with a strong cavalry command to pass around the flanks of Grant's army, to capture his depot of supplies at Holly Springs, and to go on northward, destroying his line of communication. Van Dorn, an educated soldier, did his work well, and compelled Grant to halt and finally to take up a new base of supplies at Memphis. Meantime Sherman went

* Later compilations make this 4707.— EDITOR.

on to Vicksburg, but, instead of meeting a small garrison, found Vicksburg not only strong by nature and art, but fully reënforced by Pemberton. He failed because the condition of facts had changed. He was superseded by McClernand, and he in time by General Grant, who came in person to direct operations against Vicksburg from the river. Then followed that long period of searching for the possession of some dry land whence Vicksburg could be reached, first above the place, finally below. The passage at night by the gun-boat fleet, led by Admiral Porter in person, accompanied by some transports, was as bold and successful an "operation of war" as was the passage of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip by Farragut the previous year. Then the march of Grant's army by roads which would have been pronounced impracticable by any European engineer, his attack on Grand Gulf, and subsequent landing at Bruinsburg; the movement and battle at Port Gibson; the rapid march to Jackson whereby he interposed his army between those of Pemberton in Vicksburg and of Johnston outside; the battle of Champion's Hill, whereby he drove Pemberton to his trenches and then invested him till his surrender in July — these operations illustrated the highest principles of war, one of whose maxims is to divide your enemy and beat each moiety in detail. I do believe that when this campaign is understood by military critics it will rank with the best of the young Napoleon in Italy, in 1796. The fall of Vicksburg resulted in the fall of Port Hudson below, after which, in the language of Mr. Lincoln, the Mississippi "went unvexed to the sea." In my judgment, the recovery of the Mississippi River was conclusive of the civil war. Whatever power holds that river can govern this continent. Its possession in 1863 set free the armies which were in at the death of the Southern Confederacy, in 1865.

Recurring now to the great central line of operations: I left Bragg on the defensive at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, and Buell at Perryville, Kentucky. The authorities at Washington became dissatisfied with Buell, and replaced him by Rosecrans, who had deservedly won great fame by his defense of Corinth. Soady records, as a standard rule of war, that an army assuming the offensive must maintain the offensive. So Rosecrans moved forward to Nashville, where he picked up Thomas's corps, which had been left there by Buell in his retrograde movement, and then to Murfreesboro' on Stone's River, where, December 31, 1862 — January 2, 1863, ensued one of the bloodiest battles of the war, resulting in a Union loss of 11,578, and a Confederate loss of 25,500 (Phisterer).* The Union forces held

the ground and Bragg gradually fell back to Chattanooga — by nature a strategic place of the first importance, made so because here the main spurs of the Alleghenies are broken by the Tennessee River. To possess this place was Rosecrans's "objective." His army was adequate; his corps, divisions, and brigades were well commanded; yet the great distance from his base of supplies, on the Ohio River, made the logistics very difficult. In September, 1863, he moved forward, crossed the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, sent one corps direct to Chattanooga, and with the other three crossed the Sand Mountain and Raccoon range, debouching into the Valley of the Chickamauga, in rear of Chattanooga. Bragg, detecting this "turning" movement, fell back to Lafayette, in the same valley of the Chickamauga, where he was reënforced by Longstreet's corps from Virginia, and at the critical moment attacked vehemently on the 19th and 20th of September, 1863, breaking the right flank of Rosecrans's army; but when he reached the Fourteenth Corps, General George H. Thomas, he could not move the "Rock of Chickamauga." Rosecrans gained Chattanooga, the object of his campaign, but he was therein besieged by Bragg; his losses were 15,851, to Bragg's 17,804. Calls for reënforcements to that army came: the Eleventh and Twelfth corps under Hooker were sent by rail from Washington, and the Fifteenth Corps, Sherman, from Vicksburg. General Grant also, having finished his task on the Mississippi, was summoned to Louisville by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, and after a consultation was ordered to Chattanooga to supersede Rosecrans. All these combinations were concluded by November, and Bragg had made the fatal mistake, laid down in all the books, of detaching Longstreet's corps to Knoxville, 110 miles away, to capture Burnside's army. He was over-confident in the strength of his position on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, whence he could look down upon his supposed victims, who he believed would by starvation be compelled to surrender. But a master-mind had arrived, who soon solved the question of supplies and then addressed himself to the question of battle. Grant promptly detected Bragg's mistake in detaching Longstreet, and resolved to attack and drive him away the very moment the reënforcements hastening to him could be available. On the 23d of November, 1863, having all his troops in position, he began the attack, beginning on both flanks, and at the right moment hurling his center against Bragg's "unassailable" position on Missionary Ridge, he drove him in defeat and disorder to and through

* Later compilation: Union, 13,249; Confederate, 10,266.—EDITOR.

Ringgold Gap, twenty-six miles; and then only paused because of the necessity to send relief to General Burnside at Knoxville. This was fully accomplished, so that by the end of November the enemy was beaten at all points, and the temporary check at Chickamauga was fully redeemed. The losses in the Union army were 5615, to the Confederate loss of 8684. All the movements were made strictly according to the lessons of war as taught by the great masters, and they will stand the test of the most rigid critic.

I now turn with some degree of hesitation to the great Army of the Potomac, operating directly in front of Washington, and which European and Eastern critics, whose sight apparently could not penetrate beyond the Alleghanies, watched with painful solicitude.

That army was from the beginning to the end of the war the controlling military force of the Union cause; and never was an army more true and loyal to its government, more obedient to its generals, more patient in adversity, more magnanimous in victory than was the Army of the Potomac. After the episode of Bull Run in July, 1861, General McClellan was called from the West by universal acclaim to command it; and on the retirement of General Scott, by reason of age, November 1st, General McClellan was appointed by President Lincoln to command all the armies of the United States. He proceeded with commendable skill and energy to the work of organization, equipment, and transportation; but the season for active operations had passed, and his army remained on the banks of the Potomac at the beginning of 1862. The Confederate army, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Centreville, twenty-six miles south, with outposts in sight of the National Capitol, and had established batteries on the river below threatening the water-line of supply from the direction of the Chesapeake. General McClellan's "Own Story," now a part of history, shows that he was conscious of the impatience of the whole country at his seeming quiescence; and I am not surprised that Mr. Lincoln should have assumed his unquestioned power to issue his General Order No. 1, of January 27th, ordering a simultaneous advance of all the armies on the 22d of February, 1862. The Army of the Potomac advanced directly from their camps to the front at Fairfax and Centreville, to find that the Confederates had gone behind the Rappahannock.

At Fairfax Court House, on the 11th of March, General McClellan received President Lincoln's war order, No. 3, relieving him of the command of the armies of the United States; restricting his authority to the single Army of the Potomac; and in common with

all other department commanders requiring him to report promptly and frequently to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton. Meantime had been fully discussed the plan of campaign, the bases of supply, lines of operation, fortresses, etc., partly by conference, and partly by a correspondence given at length in McClellan's "Own Story," culminating in the two letters of February 3, 1862, on p. 229. The result was the movement against Richmond by way of Fort Monroe, resulting in innumerable delays at Yorktown, Williamsburg, etc., till the 31st of May, when was fought the first considerable battle of "Fair Oaks," or "Seven Pines," near Richmond, at which General Johnston was wounded, and General Lee succeeded him in command of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. Soon followed the battle of Gaines's Mill, and McClellan's "retreat," fighting for seven days (June 25th-July 1st) to reach Harrison's Landing on the James River, twenty-five miles below Richmond, as a new "base" from which to renew his offensive against Richmond, when his army had become rested and reënforced from the North. During his stay at Harrison's Landing, July 2d-August 17th, the temper of his correspondence, official and private, was indicative of a spirit not consistent with the duty of the commanding general of a great army.

After reading McClellan's "Own Story," and the principal histories of that period, coupled with conversations with many of his principal subordinates, I am convinced that McClellan's fatal mistake was in the choice of his "line of operations" in the spring of 1862. I believe that had he moved straight against his antagonist behind the Rappahannock with his then magnificent army, and had he fought steadily and persistently, as Grant did two years later, he would have picked up his detachments, including McDowell's corps, would have reached Richmond with an overwhelming force, would have captured the city, possibly the Confederate army,—at least would have dispersed it,—thus ending the war.

I do not entertain the idea that Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Stanton, Mr. Chase, and General Halleck could have conspired for his defeat, lest McClellan should become a rival presidential candidate, or for any motive whatsoever. He had ample power and adequate force, but failed in his "objective," which should have been the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, instead of the city of Richmond. Of course, the withdrawal of Blenker's division and McDowell's corps at the crisis of his attack on Richmond were large factors in his failure, but these were direct consequences of his own plan of campaign, which involved the defense of Washington as well as the capture of Rich-

mond. General McClellan was unquestionably a man of pure character, of great intelligence, learned in the science of war, and with all the experience possible in our country with its limited military establishment. He was graduated at West Point, No. 2 in the class of 1846; went directly to the war in Mexico, whence he returned with an exalted reputation for soldiership under fire; was selected by the War Department for many scientific purposes, among them to proceed to Sebastopol in 1856, to observe the operations of the armies there engaged; and soon after the outbreak of our Rebellion was chosen with universal assent to command the principal army of the Union. No man knew better than he that the problem of war demanded an aggressive soldier. He failed because he chose a wrong "objective" and a wrong "line of operation"—a common mistake in strategy.

Meantime General Halleck, July 16, 1862, had been summoned from Corinth, Mississippi, to Washington, to command the armies of the United States, and thus the Army of the Potomac had four commanding generals,—the President, the Secretary of War, General Halleck, and General McClellan,—each giving orders, planning campaigns, ordering detachments hither and thither, seemingly without concert, and based on the latest information by "spies and informers." Nothing but Divine Providence could have saved this nation from humiliation at that crisis of our history. General John Pope, whose work at Island No. 10 and at Corinth had been personally seen by General Halleck, was brought east by him and given command of the scattered forces left behind by McClellan to protect Washington against Stonewall Jackson and the Confederate hosts who believed that Washington was synonymous with the Union cause, and that if Washington could be captured "the game was up." General Pope skillfully collected and disposed his forces, and fought them manfully. The Army of the Potomac, by Halleck's orders, was withdrawn from Harrison's Landing and sent as rapidly as possible to the assistance of General Pope, who was threatened by Stonewall Jackson, followed by Lee's whole army. The battle of Groveton, or the second Bull Run, has been the subject of the most critical investigation, and I do not propose to mingle in that controversy; but I believe Pope fought valiantly and well, that he checked Lee in his full career for Washington, and brought his "forlorn-hope" to the defenses of Washington in as good condition as could have been done by any of his critics.

At all events the Army of the Potomac was back in front of Washington about the end of August, 1862, confronting its old enemy com-

manded by Lee, which believed itself invincible. On the 2d of September Major-General McClellan was ordered by the President to "have command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all the troops for the defense of the capital."* Pope's Army of Virginia was merged into that of the Potomac, then commanded by McClellan.

Lee then began his invasive campaign into Maryland, crossing the Potomac by its upper fords east of Harper's Ferry, having detached Stonewall Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry and its garrison, which he did promptly on the 15th of September, at a loss to the Union of 11,783 men, to the Confederates of 500, and thereafter joined Lee at Antietam in time to render material assistance in that battle.

As soon as McClellan became convinced that Lee designed to cross the Potomac, he followed by roads leading north of that river, his left near it and his right extending to Frederick City, which he reached September 12th. The Confederates had been there the day before, and had fallen back along the old National Road by Turner's and Crampton's Gaps of South Mountain (Blue Ridge), where a battle was fought on the 14th, in which the Union loss was 2325 to the Confederate 4343. Lee called in all his detachments and prepared for battle at Sharpsburg, covering a ford of the Potomac River with Antietam Creek to his front, assuming the defensive. McClellan closed down on him and prepared to defeat him with a considerable river to his rear. This battle also has been one which has been discussed with crimination and recrimination in which I do not propose to engage, limiting myself to quotations from Soady:

It is an approved maxim in war never to do what the enemy wishes you to do, for this reason alone—that he desires it. A field of battle, therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitered should be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to fortify or intrench. One consequence deducible from this principle is never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning (Napoleon) [p. 75].

General McClellan at the battle of Antietam, beside that [*sic*] of making his attacks so disconnectedly that they afforded no help to each other, . . . kept 15,000 men in strict reserve to the very end of the battle—a force which properly employed might have been used to obtain some decisive advantage. For any practical effect . . . Porter's corps might as well have been at Washington. There is no example of any great tactician thus making useless his superiority of force of his own choice, except the single one of Napoleon refusing to employ his guard to decide the desperate struggle at Borodino; and although the great emperor had the strongest possible reason for thus reserving his best troops in the enormous distance from his depots which he arrived at, and the consequent impossibility of replacing them, yet he has been more condemned than admired for this striking deviation from his usual practice, which rendered his victory so

* "McClellan's Own Story," p. 536.

indecisive and ultimately so useless. But McClellan was in the very reverse of such a position, and could have had no similar reason; for his reinforcements were near, and those of his opponent exhausted. The only excuse that can be made for his timidity as to the use of his reserve must be in the ignorance he labored under as to the great numerical inferiority of Lee [p. 234].

The battle of Antietam was fought September 17, 1862, soon after which McClellan was superseded by Burnside, who followed Lee up to the old lines of the Rappahannock, crossed at Fredericksburg, and on December 13th fought that desperate battle, losing 12,353 to Lee's loss of 4576; soon after which he was replaced by Hooker, who crossed the Rapidan and May 1-4, 1863, fought Lee at Chancellorsville, losing 16,030 to Lee's 12,281, when he fell back again north of the Rappahannock. Then Lee in his turn assumed the offensive and made his campaign into Pennsylvania, resulting in the famous battle of Gettysburg, fought almost coincident with the capture of Vicksburg, viz., July 1-3, 1863, in which Lee was the assailant, losing 23,186 men to 34,621 on the part of Meade,* who fought purely on the defensive. General Meade is entitled to extraordinary honor for his conduct of that battle, because he was ordered to command that army whilst actually on the march, with no time to reconnoiter, study the ground, or become acquainted with his corps and division commanders,—that too in the presence of a victorious army of unknown strength, commanded by a general of known ability and great repute.

The defeat of the Confederate army at Gettysburg and the capture of Vicksburg should have ended the civil war July 4, 1863,—but no! the leaders demanded the "last ditch," and their followers seemed willing. The Army of Northern Virginia fell back behind the Rappahannock, and the Army of the Potomac followed and occupied their old ground about Warrenton.

On the 4th day of March, 1864, General U. S. Grant was summoned to Washington from Nashville to receive his commission of lieutenant-general, the highest rank then known in the United States, and the same that was conferred on Washington in 1798. He reached Washington on the 7th, had an interview for the first time with Mr. Lincoln, and on the 9th received his commission at the hands of the President, who made a short address, to which Grant made a suitable reply. He was informed that it was desirable that he should come east to command all the armies of the United States, and give his personal supervision to the Army of the Potomac. On the 10th he visited General Meade at Brandy Station,

and saw many of his leading officers, but returned to Washington the next day and went on to Nashville, to which place he had summoned Sherman, then absent on his Meridian expedition. On the 18th of March he turned over to Sherman the command of the western armies and started back for Washington, Sherman accompanying him as far as Cincinnati. Amidst constant interruptions of a business and social nature, these two commanders reached the satisfactory conclusion that as soon as the season would permit, all the armies of the Union would assume the "bold offensive" by "concentric lines" on the common enemy, and would finish up the job in a single campaign if possible. The main "objectives" were Lee's army behind the Rapidan in Virginia, and Johnston's army at Dalton, Georgia.

On reaching Washington, General Grant studied with great care all the minutæ of the organization, strength, qualities, and resources of each of the many armies into which the Union forces had resolved themselves by reason of preceding events, and in due time with wonderful precision laid out the work which each one should undertake. His written instructions to me at Nashville were embraced in his two letters of April 4, and April 19, 1864, both in his own handwriting, which I still possess, and which, in my judgment, are as complete as any of those of the Duke of Wellington contained in the twelve volumes of his published letters and correspondence.

With the month of May came the season for *action*, and by the 4th all his armies were in motion. The army of Butler at Fort Monroe was his left, Meade's army the center, and Sherman at Chattanooga his right. Butler was to move against Richmond on the south of James River, Meade straight against Lee, intrenched behind the Rapidan, and Sherman to attack Joe Johnston and push him to and beyond Atlanta. This was as far as human foresight could penetrate. Though Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac, General Grant substantially controlled it, and on the 4th of May, 1864, he crossed the Rapidan, and at noon next day attacked Lee. He knew that a certain amount of fighting, "killing," had to be done to accomplish his end, and also to pay the penalty of former failures. In the "wilderness" there was no room for grand strategy, or even minor tactics; but the fighting was desperate, the losses to the Union army being, according to Phisterer, 37,737,† to the Confederate loss of 11,400—the difference due to Lee's intrenchments and the blind nature of the country in which the battle was fought. On the night of May 7th both par-

* Later compilations make the losses: Confederate, 25,873; Union, 23,001.—EDITOR.

† Later compilation, 17,666.—EDITOR.

ties paused, appalled by the fearful slaughter; but General Grant commanded "Forward by the left flank." That was, in my judgment, the supreme moment of his life: undismayed, with a full comprehension of the importance of the work in which he was engaged, feeling as keen a sympathy for his dead and wounded as any one, and without stopping to count his numbers, he gave his orders calmly, specifically, and absolutely—"Forward to Spotsylvania." But his watchful and skillful antagonist detected his purpose, having the inner or shorter line, threw his army across Grant's path, and promptly fortified it. These field intrenchments are peculiar to America, though I am convinced they were employed by the Romans in Gaul in the days of Cæsar. A regiment, brigade, division, or corps, halting for the night or for battle, faced the enemy; moved forward to ground with a good outlook to the front; stacked arms; gathered logs, stumps, fence-rails, and anything which would stop a bullet; piled these to their front, and, digging a ditch behind, threw the dirt forward, and made a parapet which covered their persons as perfectly as a granite wall.

When Grant reached Spotsylvania, on the 8th of May, he found his antagonist in his front thus intrenched. He was delayed there till the 20th, during which time there was incessant fighting, because he was compelled to attack his enemy behind these improvised intrenchments. His losses according to Phisterer were 24,461,* to the Confederate loss of 9000. Nevertheless, his renewed order, "Forward by the left flank," compelled Lee to retreat to the defenses of Richmond.

Grant's memoirs enable us to follow him day by day across the various rivers which lay between him and Richmond, and in the bloody assaults at Cold Harbor, where his losses are reported 14,931 † to 1700 by his opponent. Yet ever onward by the left flank, he crossed James River, and penned Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia within the intrenchments of Richmond and Petersburg for ten long months on the pure defensive, to remain almost passive observers of local events, whilst Grant's other armies were absolutely annihilating the Southern Confederacy.

Whilst Grant was fighting desperately from the Rapidan to the James, there were two other armies within the same "zone of operations."—that of the "James" under General Butler, who was expected to march up on the south and invest Petersburg and even Richmond; and that of Sigel at Winchester, who was expected to march up the Valley of Virginia, pick up his detachments from the

Kanawha (Crook and Averell), and threaten Lynchburg, a place of vital importance to Lee in Richmond. Butler failed to accomplish what was expected of him; and Sigel failed at the very start, and was replaced by Hunter, who marched up the Valley, made junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, and pushed on with commendable vigor to Lynchburg, which he invested on the 16th of June.

Lee, who by this time had been driven into Richmond with a force large enough to hold his lines of intrenchment and a surplus for expeditions, detached General Jubal A. Early with the equivalent of a corps to drive Hunter away from Lynchburg. Hunter, far from his base, with inadequate supplies of food and ammunition, retreated by the Kanawha to the Ohio River, his nearest base, thereby exposing the Valley of Virginia, whereupon Early, an educated soldier, promptly resolved to take advantage of the occasion, marched rapidly down this valley northward to Winchester, crossed the Potomac to Hagerstown, and thence boldly marched on Washington, defended at that time only by armed clerks and militia. General Grant, fully alive to the danger, dispatched to Washington by water, from his army investing Petersburg, two divisions of the Sixth Corps and the Nineteenth Corps, just arriving from New Orleans. These troops arrived at the very nick of time,—met Early's army in the suburbs of Washington, and drove it back to the Valley of Virginia, whence it had come.

This most skillful movement of Early demonstrated to General Grant the importance of the Valley of Virginia, not only as a base of supplies for Lee's army in Richmond, but as the most direct, shortest, and easiest route for a "diversion" into the Union territory north of the Potomac. He therefore cast around for a suitable commander for this field of operations, and settled upon Major-General Philip H. Sheridan, whom he had brought from the West to command the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac.

Sheridan promptly repaired to his new sphere of operations, quickly ascertained its strength and resources, and resolved to attack Early in the position which he had chosen in and about Winchester, Va. He delivered his attack across broken ground on the 19th of September, beat his antagonist in fair, open battle, sending him "whirling up the Valley," inflicting a loss of 5500 men to his of 4873, and followed him up to Cedar Creek and Fisher's Hill. There Early recomposed his army and fell upon the Union army on the 19th of October, gaining a temporary advantage during General Sheridan's absence; but on his opportune return his army resumed the

* Later compilation, 18,399.—EDITOR.

† Later compilation, 12,737.—EDITOR.

offensive, defeated Early, captured nearly all his artillery, and drove him completely out of his field of operations, eliminating that army from the subsequent problem of the war. Sheridan's losses were 5995 to Early's 4200; but these losses are no just measure of the results of that victory, which made it impossible to use the Valley of Virginia as a Confederate base of supplies and as an easy route for raids within the Union lines. General Sheridan then committed its protection to detachments and with his main force rejoined General Grant, who still held Lee's army inside his intrenchments at Richmond and Petersburg.

I now turn with a feeling of extreme delicacy to the conduct of that other campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, Savannah, and Raleigh, which with liberal discretion was committed to me by General Grant in his minute instructions of April 4, and April 10, 1864. To all military students these letters must be familiar, because they have been published again and again, and there never was and never can be raised a question of rivalry or claim between us as to the relative merits of the manner in which we played our respective parts. We were as brothers—I the older man in years, but he the higher in rank. We both believed in our heart of hearts that the success of the Union cause was not only necessary to the then generation of Americans, but to all future generations. We both professed to be gentlemen and professional soldiers, educated in the science of war by our generous Government for the very occasion which had arisen. Neither of us by nature was a combative man; but with honest hearts and a clear purpose to do what man could we embarked on that campaign which I believe, in its strategy, in its logistics, in its grand and minor tactics, has added new luster to the old science of war. Both of us had at our front generals to whom in early life we had been taught to look up,—educated and experienced soldiers like ourselves, not likely to make any mistakes, and each of whom had as strong an army as could be collected from the mass of their nine millions of Southern people,—of the same blood as ourselves, brave, confident, and well equipped; in addition to which they had the most decided advantage of operating in their own difficult country of mountain, forest, ravine, and river, affording admirable opportunities for defense, besides the other equally important advantage that we had to invade the country of our unqualified enemy and expose our long lines of supply to the guerrillas of an "exasperated people." Again, as we advanced we had to leave guards to bridges, stations, and intermediate depots, diminishing the fighting force, whilst our ene-

my gained strength by picking up his detachments as he fell back, and with railroads to bring supplies and reinforcements from his rear. In Europe war is confined to actual belligerents wearing uniforms, publicly proclaiming their character. Not so with us. Men professing to be peaceful farmers and physicians—yea, preachers of the Gospel—were apprehended in doing acts of a most damaging nature; and I recall to memory a case when our pickets brought to me three preachers with double-barreled guns who said they were hunting for birds as food for their tables. On drawing the charges, each gun contained twelve buckshot, which would have killed a man at sixty yards. I instance these facts to offset the common assertion that we of the North won the war by brute force, and not by courage and skill.

On the historic 4th day of May, 1864, the Confederate army at my front lay at Dalton, Georgia, composed, according to the best authority, of about 45,000 men, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, who was the equal in all the elements of generalship with General Lee, and who was under instructions from the war powers in Richmond to assume the offensive northward as far as Nashville. But he soon discovered that he would have to conduct a defensive campaign. Coincident with the movement of the Army of the Potomac, as announced by telegraph, I put my armies in motion from our base at Chattanooga. These were the armies of the Ohio, 13,559 men; of the Cumberland, 60,773; of the Tennessee, 24,465—grand total, 98,797 men and 254 guns.

I had no purpose to attack Johnston's position at Dalton in front, but marched from Chattanooga to feign at his front and to make a lodgment in Resaca, eighteen miles to his rear, on "his line of communication and supply." The movement was partially, not wholly, successful; but it compelled Johnston to let go Dalton and fight us at Resaca, where, May 13th–16th, our loss was 2747 and his 2800. I fought offensively and he defensively, aided by earth parapets. He then fell back to Calhoun, Adairsville, and Cassville, where he halted for the battle of the campaign; but, for reasons given in his memoirs, he continued his retreat behind the next spur of mountains to Allatoona.

Pausing for a few days to repair the railroad without attempting Allatoona, of which I had personal knowledge acquired in 1844, I resolved to push on towards Atlanta by way of Dallas; this Johnston quickly detected, and forced me to fight him at New Hope Church, four miles north of Dallas, resulting in losses of 3000 to the Confederates to 2400 to us.

The country was almost in a state of nature — few or no roads, nothing that a European could understand, but where the bullet killed its victim as surely as at Sevastopol. Johnston had meantime picked up his detachments, and had received reënforcements from his rear which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 men, and warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far from our base, and that when the right moment should come he would turn on us and destroy us. We were equally confident and not the least alarmed. He then fell back to his position at Marietta, with Brush Mountain on his right, Kenesaw his center, and Lost Mountain his left. His line of ten miles was too long for his numbers, and he soon let go his flanks and concentrated on Kenesaw. We closed down in battle array, repaired the railroad up to our very camps, and then prepared for the contest. Not a day, not an hour or minute was there a cessation of fire. Our skirmishers were in absolute contact, the lines of battle and batteries but little in rear of the skirmishers; and thus matters continued until June 27th, when I ordered a general assault, with the full coöperation of my great lieutenants, Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, as good and true men as ever lived or died for their country's cause; but we failed, losing 3000 men, to the Confederate loss of 630. Still, the result was that within three days Johnston abandoned the strongest possible position and was in full retreat for the Chattahoochee River. We were on his heels; skirmished with his rear at Smyrna Church on the 4th day of July, and saw him fairly across the Chattahoochee on the 10th, covered and protected by the best line of field intrenchments I have ever seen, prepared long in advance. No officer or soldier who ever served under me will question the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston. His retreats were timely, in good order, and he left nothing behind. We had advanced into the enemy's country 120 miles, with a single track railroad, which had to bring clothing, food, ammunition, everything requisite for 100,000 men and 23,000 animals. The city of Atlanta, the gate city opening the interior of the important State of Georgia, was in sight; its protecting army was shaken but not defeated, and onward we had to go,— illustrating the principle that an army "once on the offensive must maintain the offensive."

We feigned to the right, but crossed the Chattahoochee by the left, and soon confronted our enemy behind his first line of intrenchments at Peach Tree Creek, prepared in advance for this very occasion. At this critical moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable service. Being dis-

satisfied with the Fabian policy of General Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to command the Confederate army. Hood was known to us to be a "fighter," a graduate of West Point of the class of 1853, No. 44, of which class two of my army commanders, McPherson and Schofield, were No. 1 and No. 7. The character of a leader is a large factor in the game of war, and I confess I was pleased at this change, of which I had early notice. I knew that I had an army superior in numbers and *morale* to that of my antagonist; but being so far from my base, and operating in a country absolutely devoid of food and forage, I was dependent for supplies on a poorly constructed, single-track railroad back to Louisville, five hundred miles. I was willing to meet our enemy in the open country, but not behind well-constructed parapets.

Promptly, as expected, the enemy sallied from his Peach Tree line on the 18th of July, about midday, striking the Twentieth Corps (Hooker), which had just crossed Peach Tree Creek by improvised bridges. The troops became commingled and fought hand to hand desperately for about four hours, when the Confederates were driven back within their lines, leaving behind their dead and wounded. These amounted to 4796 men, to our loss of 1710. We followed up, and Hood fell back to the main lines of the city of Atlanta. We closed in, when again, Hood holding these lines by about one-half his force, with the other half made a wide circuit by night, under cover of the woods, and on the 22d of July enveloped our left flank "in air," a movement that led to the hardest battle of the campaign. He encountered the Army of the Tennessee,—skilled veterans who were always ready to fight, were not alarmed by flank or rear attacks, and met their assailants with heroic valor. The battle raged from noon to night, when the Confederates, baffled and defeated, fell back within the intrenchments of Atlanta. Their losses are reported 8499 to ours of 3641; but among these was McPherson, the commander of the Army of the Tennessee. Whilst this battle was in progress, Schofield at the center, and Thomas on the right, made efforts to break through the intrenchments at their fronts, but found them too strong to assault.

The Army of the Tennessee was then shifted, under its new commander (Howard), from the extreme left to the extreme right, to reach, if possible, the railroad by which Hood drew his supplies, when he again, on the 28th of July, repeated his tactics of the 22d, sustaining an overwhelming defeat, losing 4632 men to our 700. These three sallies convinced him that his predecessor, General Johnston, had not erred in standing on the defensive. There-

after the Confederate army in Atlanta clung to his parapets. I never intended to assault these, but gradually worked to the right to reach and destroy his line of supplies, because soldiers, like other mortals, must have food. Our extension to the right brought on numerous conflicts, but nothing worthy of note, till about the end of August I resolved to leave one corps to protect our communications to the rear, and move with the other five to a point (Jonesboro') on the railroad twenty-six miles below Atlanta, *not* fortified. This movement was perfectly strategic, was successful, and resulted in our occupation of Atlanta, on the 3d of September, 1864. The result had a large effect on the whole country at the time, for solid and political reasons. I claim no special merit to myself, save that I believe I followed the teachings of the best masters of the "science of war" of which I had knowledge; and better still, I had pleased Mr. Lincoln, who wanted "success" very much. But I had not accomplished all, for Hood's army, the chief "objective," had escaped.

Then began the real trouble. We were in possession of Atlanta, and Hood remained at Lovejoy's Station, thirty miles south-east, on the Savannah railroad, with an army of about 40,000 veterans inured to war, and with a fair amount of wagons to carry his supplies, independent of the railroads. On the 21st of September he shifted his position to Palmetto Station, twenty-five miles south-west of Atlanta, on the Montgomery and Selma railroad, where he began his systematic preparations for his aggressive campaign against our communications to compel us to abandon our conquests. Here he was visited by Mr. Davis, who promised all possible coöperation and assistance in the proposed campaign; and here also Mr. Davis made his famous speech, which was duly reported to me in Atlanta, assuring his army that they would make my retreat more disastrous than was that of Napoleon from Moscow. Forewarned, I took immediate measures to thwart his plans. One division was sent back to Rome, another to Chattanooga; the guards along our railroad were reënforced and warned of the coming blow. General Thomas was sent back to the headquarters of his department at Nashville, Schofield to his at Knoxville, and I remained in Atlanta to await Hood's "initiative." This followed soon. Hood, sending his cavalry ahead, crossed the Chattahoochee River at Campbelltown with his main army on the 1st of October, and moved to Dallas, detaching a strong force against the railroad above Marietta which destroyed it for fifteen miles, and then sent French's division to capture Allatoona. I followed Hood, reaching Kenesaw Mountain in time to see in the dis-

tance the attack on Allatoona, which was handsomely repulsed by Corse. Hood then moved westward, avoiding Rome, and by a circuit reached Resaca, which he summoned to surrender, but did not wait to attack. He continued thence the destruction of the railroad for about twenty miles to the tunnel, including Dalton, whose garrison he captured. I followed up to Resaca, then turned west to intercept his retreat down the Valley of Chattooga; but by rapid marching he escaped to Gadsden, on the Coosa, I halting at Gaylesville, whence to observe his further movements. Hood, after a short pause, crossed the mountains to Decatur, on the Tennessee River, which, being defended by a good division of troops, he avoided, and finally halted opposite Florence, Alabama, on the Tennessee River. Divining the object of his movement against our communications, which had been thus far rapid and skillful, I detached by rail General Schofield and two of my six corps to Nashville, all the reënforcement that Thomas deemed necessary to enable him to defend Tennessee, and began my systematic preparations for resuming the offensive against Georgia. Repairing the broken railroads, we collected in Atlanta the necessary food and transportation for 60,000 men, sent to the rear all impediments, called in all detachments, and ordered them to march for Atlanta, where by the 14th of November were assembled 4 infantry corps, 1 cavalry division, and 65 field guns, aggregating 60,598 men. Hood remained at Florence, preparing to invade Tennessee and Kentucky, or to follow me. We were prepared for either alternative.

According to the great Napoleon, the fundamental maxim for successful war is to "converge a superior force on the critical point at the critical time." In 1864 the main "objectives" were Lee's and Johnston's armies, and the critical point was thought to be Richmond or Atlanta, whichever should be longest held. Had General Grant overwhelmed or scattered Lee's army and occupied Richmond he would have come to Atlanta; but as I happened to occupy Atlanta first, and had driven Hood off to a divergent line of operations far to the west, it was good strategy to leave him to a subordinate force, and with my main army to join Grant at Richmond. The most practicable route to Richmond was near a thousand miles in distance, too long for a single march; hence the necessity to reach the sea-coast for a new base. Savannah was the nearest point, distant three hundred miles, and this we accomplished from November 12th to December 21, 1864. According to the Duke of Wellington, an army moves upon its belly, not upon its legs; and no army dependent on wagons

can operate more than a hundred miles from its base, because the teams going and returning consume the contents of their wagons, leaving little or nothing for the maintenance of the men and animals at the front, who are fully employed in fighting; hence the necessity to "forage liberally on the country," a measure which fed our men and animals chiefly on the very supplies which had been gathered near the railroads by the enemy for the maintenance of his own armies. "The march to the sea" in strategy was only a shift of base for ulterior and highly important purposes.

Meantime Hood, whom I had left at and near Florence, Alabama, three hundred and seventeen miles to my rear, having completely reorganized and re-supplied his army, advanced against Thomas at Nashville, who had also made every preparation. Hood first encountered Schofield at Franklin, November 30, 1864, attacked him boldly behind his intrenchments, and sustained a positive "check," losing 6252 of his best men, including Generals Cleburne and Adams, who were killed on the very parapets, to Schofield's loss of 2326. Nevertheless he pushed on to Nashville, which he invested. Thomas, one of the grand characters of our civil war, nothing dismayed by danger in front or rear, made all his preparations with cool and calm deliberation; and on the 15th of December sallied from his intrenchments, attacked Hood in his chosen and intrenched positions, and on the next day, December 16th, actually annihilated his army, eliminating it thenceforward from the problem of the war. Hood's losses were 15,000 men to Thomas's 305.

Therefore at the end of the year 1864 the war at the west was concluded, leaving nothing to be considered in the grand game of war but Lee's army, held by Grant in Richmond, and the Confederate detachments at Mobile and along the sea-board north of Savannah. Of course Charleston, ever arrogant, felt secure; but it was regarded by us as a "dead cock in the pit," and fell of itself when its inland communications were cut. Wilmington was captured by a detachment from the Army of the Potomac, aided by Admiral Porter's fleet and by Schofield, who had been brought by Grant from Nashville to Washington and sent down the Atlantic coast to prepare for Sherman's coming to Goldsboro', North Carolina,—all "converging" on Richmond.

Preparatory to the next move, General Howard was sent from Savannah to secure Pocotaligo, in South Carolina, as a point of departure for the north, and General Slocum to Sister's Ferry, on the Savannah River, to secure a safe lodgment on the north bank for the same purpose. In due time—in February,

1865—these detachments, operating by concentric lines, met on the South Carolina road at Midway and Blackville, swept northward through Orangeburg and Columbia to Winnsboro', where the direction was changed to Fayetteville and Goldsboro', a distance of 420 miles through a difficult and hostile country, making junction with Schofield at a safe base with two good railroads back to the sea-coast, of which we held absolute dominion. The resistance of Hampton, Butler, Beauregard, and even Joe Johnston was regarded as trivial. Our "objective" was Lee's army at Richmond. When I reached Goldsboro', made junction with Schofield, and moved forward to Raleigh, I was willing to encounter the entire Confederate army; but the Confederate armies—Lee's in Richmond and Johnston's in my front—held richer interior lines, and could choose the initiative.

Few military critics who have treated of the civil war in America have ever comprehended the importance of the movement of my army northward from Savannah to Goldsboro', or of the transfer of Schofield from Nashville to cooperate with me in North Carolina. This march was like the thrust of a sword towards the heart of the human body; each mile of advance swept aside all opposition, consumed the very food on which Lee's army depended for life, and demonstrated a power in the National Government which was irresistible.

Therefore in March, 1865, but one more move was left to Lee on the chess-board of war—to abandon Richmond; make junction with Johnston in North Carolina; fall on me and destroy me if possible, a fate I did not apprehend; then turn on Grant, sure to be in close pursuit, and defeat him. But no! Lee clung to his intrenchments for political reasons, and waited for the inevitable. At last, on the 1st day of April, General Sheridan, by his vehement and most successful attack on the Confederate lines at the "Five Forks" near Dinwiddie Court House, compelled Lee to begin his last race for life. He then attempted to reach Danville, to make junction with Johnston, but Grant in his rapid pursuit constantly interposed, and finally headed him off at Appomattox, and compelled the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, which for four long years had baffled the skill and courage of the Army of the Potomac and the power of our National Government. This substantially ended the war, leaving only the formal proceedings of accepting the surrender of Johnston's army in North Carolina and of the subordinate armies at the South-west.

All these movements were on a grand scale, strictly in conformity with the lessons of the great masters, and illustrate every branch of

the science of war as defined by Soady,—strategy, logistics, grand and minor tactics, and engineering.

In thus summarizing these controlling events, extending through four years of time and embracing a continent, I have endeavored to confine myself to the chief campaigns and battles which illustrate military principles. The first year of the war was necessarily one of preparation, but in the last three I contend that every principle of the science of war was illustrated and demonstrated by examples in our war. "Divergent" operations were generally useless or failures; "convergent" operations, with good "bases," though far apart, when persevered in resulted in success and victory. All I aim to establish is that the civil war brought forth, on both sides, out of the mass of the American people, the knowledge, talents, and qualities which were necessary to the occasion; that success resulted from the same qualities, the same knowledge and adherence to the rules of war, which have achieved military success in other ages and in other lands; and that military knowledge acquired beforehand was most valuable, though not conclusive. The same knowledge might have been and was acquired in actual war, though often at a terrible expense in human life and misery.

There is an old familiar maxim, "In peace prepare for war," so that I would deem it the part of wisdom for our Government to accumulate in our arsenals a large supply of the best cannon, small arms, ammunition, and military equipments, ready for instant use; to encourage military education, and to foster a national militia.

I will quote here an expression of a personal friend who was a good soldier of the civil war, now a senator in Congress, contained in an address which he recently delivered to the graduating class of a college in Michigan:

Of course knowledge is power, we all know that; but mere knowledge is not power, it is simply possibility. *Action* is power, and its highest manifestation is action with knowledge.

How true this is, is felt by every soldier who has been in battle. 'T is not the man who knows most, but the one who *does* best, that wins. Grant, and Meade, and Sheridan at the close of the war could have been taught many lessons by our learned professors, but none of these could have guided the forces to victory as Grant did at Chattanooga, defended his position as Meade did at Gettysburg, or hurled his masses as Sheridan did at Winchester. Action guided by knowledge is what is demanded of the modern general. He must know as much of the school of the soldier as any man in the ranks; he must know what

men can do, and what they cannot do; he must foresee and forereach to provide in advance the food, clothing, ammunition, and supplies of every nature and kind necessary for the maintenance of his command; and, moreover, he must gain the confidence and affections of all the men committed to his charge. Above all, he must *act* according to the best knowledge and information he can obtain, preferably coupled with experience acquired long in advance. If we demand of the engineer of a locomotive, composed of bits of iron, both knowledge and experience, how much more should we demand these qualities of the commander of an army, composed of living men, of flesh and blood, with immortal souls! There may be such men as born generals, but I have never encountered them, and doubt the wisdom of trusting to their turning up in an emergency.

The aggressive demands a great moral force, the defensive less. A man who has not experienced the feeling cannot comprehend the sensation of hurling masses of men against an intrenched enemy, almost sure to result in the death of thousands, and, worse still, the mangling of more, followed by the lamentations of families at the loss of fathers, brothers, and sons. We in America, with a free press behind us, which sympathized with their neighbors and rarely comprehended the necessities of battle, felt this moral force far more than would any European general with his well-organized corps and battalions which he could move with little more feeling than he would the ivory figures on a chess-board.

In 1872 I visited Europe in the frigate *Wabash*, and was landed at Gibraltar, held by England with a full war garrison, composed of all arms of service, commanded by Sir Fenwick Williams of Kars, a general of great renown, whose officers were thoroughly educated and of marked intelligence. They naturally questioned me as to the conduct of our civil war; they could comprehend how we might, out of our intelligent citizens, create battalions of infantry, but were incredulous when I explained that we had been equally successful with artillery, engineers, ordnance and staff, the scientific branches of the military service; and when I further claimed that most of our campaigns had been conducted according to the highest military principles, as taught by their General Hamley in the staff school at Aldershot, I could read in their faces signs of more than doubt. The same or similar experiences occurred afterwards at Malta, and in the clubs of London.

In Russia I found the army officers specially well informed about American affairs. At Vladi Kavkas, a city at the north base of the

Caucasian range of mountains, Mr. Curtin and I, with our party, were entertained by a brigadier-general and the officers of his command, who welcomed us in a speech referring to Grant and Sheridan, Farragut and Porter, with as much precision as could have been expected at Denver. In Italy also there prevailed a similar public feeling, and there I encountered several who had been to America, and had shared in some of our campaigns.

In Germany the army officers seemed so well satisfied with themselves, by reason of their then recent victories over the French, that they gave little heed to our affairs on this side of the Atlantic. In all their garrisoned towns they were drilling morning, noon, and night, at the squad drill, at the company drill, and in the school of the battalion; and if industry and attention to details are ruling elements in the science of war, then will the German battalions maintain the cohesion and strength they displayed in the war of 1870-71. With such battalions as units, there can be no scarcity of skilled officers and generals.

In like manner the French had not yet recovered from their defeats at Woerth, Metz, Gravelotte, Sedan, and Paris. With them the separation of the officer from the soldier was much more marked than in any other of the military establishments I witnessed in Europe, and one of their most renowned generals attributed to this cause their defeat and national humiliation; specifying that when their armies were hastily assembled on the Rhine, the soldiers did not personally know their captains and company officers, and these in turn could not distinguish their own commanders. I infer, however, from recent accounts, that General Boulanger, who attended our

centennial celebration at Yorktown in 1881, has corrected much of this, and has infused into the French army somewhat of his own youthful ardor and spirit, so that if a new war should arise in Europe we may expect different results.

Nevertheless, for service in our wooded country, where battles must be fought chiefly by skirmishers and "thin lines," I prefer our own people. They possess more individuality, more self-reliance, learn more quickly the necessity for organization and discipline, and will follow where they have skilled leaders in whom they have confidence. Any one of the corps of the Army of the Potomac, or of the West, would not have hesitated to meet after 1863, in open ground, an equal number of the best drilled German troops. This, of course, may seem an idle boast; it is only meant to convey my opinion that the American people need not fear a just comparison in warlike qualities with those of any other nation. We are more likely to err in the other direction, in over-confidence, by compelling inferior numbers and undisciplined men to encounter superior troops, exposing them to certain defeat—a "cruel and inhuman" act on the part of any government. Strength in war results from organization, cohesion, and discipline, which require time and experience; but war is an expensive luxury, too costly to maintain even to secure these important results: therefore the greater necessity for fostering a national militia, and supporting military schools like that at West Point, which has proven its inestimable value to the nation as General Washington predicted, and as every war in America during this century has demonstrated.

W. T. Sherman.

NEW YORK, May 1, 1887.



VALUES.

I MAKE appraisal of the maiden moon
 For what she is to me:
 Not a great globe of cheerless stone
 That hangs in awful space alone,
 And ever so to be;
 But just the rarest orb,
 The very fairest orb,
 The star most lovely-wise
 In all the dear night-skies!

So thou to me, O jestful girl of June!
 I have no will to hear
 Cold calculations of thy worth
 Summed up in beauty, brain, and birth:
 Such coldly strike mine ear.
 Thou art the rarest one,
 The very fairest one,
 The soul most lovely-wise
 That ever looked through eyes!

Richard E. Burton.



The Lee Monument (statue by Mercie) at Richmond, Va.



SILVER PATERA, WITH FIGURE OF HERMES. (BY D. P. H. N., PUBLISHED IN "JOURNAL OF HELLENIC STUDIES.")

THE CLOSING SCENE AT APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE.

BY GENERAL GEORGE A. FORSYTH, U.S.A.

WHEN, on the night of the 8th of April, 1865, the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac reached the two or three little houses that made up the settlement at Appomattox Depot—the station on the South-side Railroad that connects Appomattox Court House with the travelling world—it must have been nearly or quite dark. At about nine o'clock or half past, while standing near the door of one of the houses, it occurred to me that it might be well to try

and get a clearer idea of our immediate surroundings, as it was not impossible that we might have hot work here or near here before the next day fairly dawned upon us.

My "striker" had just left me, with instructions to have my horse fed, groomed, and saddled before daylight. As he turned to go he paused and put this question: "Do you think, Colonel, that we'll get General Lee's army to-morrow?"

"I don't know," was my reply; "but we will have some savage fighting if we don't."

As the sturdy young soldier said "Good-night, sir," and walked away, I knew that if the enlisted men of our army could forecast the coming of the end so plainly, there was little hope of the escape of the Army of Northern Virginia.

I walked up the road a short distance, and looked carefully about me to take my bearings. It was a mild spring night, with a cloudy sky, and the soft mellow smell of earthiness in the atmosphere that not infrequently portends rain. If rain came then it might retard the arrival of our infantry, which I knew General Sheridan was most anxious should reach us at the earliest possible moment. A short distance from where I stood was the encampment of our headquarters escort, with its orderlies, grooms, officers' servants, and horses. Just beyond it could be seen the dying camp fires of a cavalry regiment, lying close in to cavalry corps headquarters. This regiment was in charge of between six and eight hundred prisoners, who had fallen into our hands just at dark, as Generals Custer and Devens, at the head of their respective cavalry commands, had charged into the station and captured four railway trains of commissariat supplies, which had been sent here to await the arrival of the Confederate army, together with twenty-six pieces of artillery. For a few moments the artillery had greatly surprised and astonished us, for its presence was entirely unexpected, and as it suddenly opened on the charging columns of cavalry it looked for a short time as though we might have all unwittingly fallen upon a division of infantry. However, it turned out otherwise. Our cavalry, after the first recoil, boldly charged in among the batteries, and the gunners, being without adequate support, sensibly surrendered. The whole affair was for us a most gratifying termination of a long day's ride, as it must have proved later on a bitter disappointment to the weary and hungry Confederates pressing forward from Petersburg and Richmond in the vain hope of escape from the Federal troops, who were straining every nerve to overtake them and compel a surrender. To-night the cavalry corps was in their front and squarely across the road to Lynchburg, and it was reasonably certain, should our infantry

get up in time on the morrow, that the almost ceaseless marching and fighting of the last ten days were to attain their legitimate result in the capitulation of General Lee's army.

As I stood there in the dark thinking over the work of the twelve preceding days, it was borne in upon me with startling emphasis that to-morrow's sun would rise big with the fate of the Southern Confederacy; and as I began to recall the occurrences that had taken place since the 30th of March, I realized for the first time what a splendid burst it had been for the cavalry corps. Its superb fighting on the 30th and 31st of March at the battle of Dinwiddie Court House, which had been the immediate precursor of the great victory of the battle of Five Forks, won by it and the Fifth Army Corps on the next day, had not only crushed the right of the Confederate line and given us thousands of prisoners, but had also turned the flank of the Army of Northern Virginia. This had rendered its vast line of intrenchments utterly untenable, and by compelling the retreat of the Confederate army from before its capital, which it had defended so long and so successfully, had forced the evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond. The cavalry corps had then immediately taken up the pursuit. The Confederate army, once out of its intrenchments and away from its hoped-for junction with General Joe Johnston's forces, and knowing that the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James were in full cry in pursuit of it, had time and again turned and fought gallantly, desperately even, against odds too great for successful defence, and against troops better equipped, better fed, and of equal gallantry in every respect, and what is more, against men who knew that the capture of the Army of Northern Virginia meant the close of the war, the end of the great rebellion, the dawn of peace, and their return to their homes, their families, and their firesides.

Scarcely had word reached us of the evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond when, without a second glance at the map, General Sheridan concluded that Danville, on the southern border of the State, was General Lee's objective point, and determined at whatever cost, if within his power, that neither he nor his army should reach it. Probably no man in either army was so well fitted by nature

and training to prevent this, if surpassing ability to handle cavalry, an almost intuitive knowledge of topography, a physique that was tireless, dogged tenacity, tremendous energy, and a courage that nothing could daunt, could bring about the desired result. Quick to see and prompt to act, his decision as to the method to be pursued by the cavalry corps was immediate and simple. It was to pursue and attack the left flank of the retreating army at any possible point with the cavalry division that first reached it, and, if possible, compel it to turn and defend its wagon trains and its artillery, then to send another division beyond, and attack the Confederate army again at any other assailable point, and to follow up this method of attack until at some point the whole army would be obliged to turn and deliver battle in the open field to its old opponent, the Army of the Potomac. In vain had General Lee's worn and tired-out cavalry tried to cover his line of retreat and protect his trains, for we were stronger in numbers, far better mounted, and, with no reflection upon our opponents, in a much better state of drill and discipline. Moreover, we had the *élan* of victory and the hope of success, while each succeeding hour they saw their numbers lessening and their hopes fading. Gallant men they were, and, considering the circumstances, bravely and well they fought; but victory for them, with their half-starved men and worn-out horses, was no longer possible.

From the morning of the second of April, when General Merritt with the first cavalry division caught up with the retreating enemy on the Namozine road, near Scotts Corners, we had given them little or no rest. At Greathouse Creek on the third, at Tabernacle Church and Amelia Court House on the fourth, at Fames Cross Roads on the fifth, and when brought to bay at Sailor's Creek on the sixth of April, a portion of their army, under General Ewell, halted and gave battle to the cavalry corps and two divisions of the Sixth Army Corps. Despite their splendid and desperate fighting, nearly eight thousand of their men, with much of their artillery, were compelled to surrender. The cavalry had given them no rest whatever, and right on their heels came our infantry constantly attacking and assailing them whenever and wher-

ever they could overtake them. Still they kept plodding wearily on, weak and hungry as they were, holding themselves well together, and turning and fighting bravely where and how they could, but with ever failing fortune and steadily diminishing numbers. Already many of us, besides General Grant, thought that it was asking too much of these gallant lads in gray to risk their lives longer in support of a confederacy that was tottering to its fall.

General Lee evidently thought otherwise. The next day, the seventh of April, after another fight with the cavalry, at Farmville, he abandoned the idea of reaching Danville, and swinging his retreating army north, from towards the Richmond, Prince Edward, and Danville pike, which had evidently been his objective point, he shaped his course for Lynchburg, Virginia, over the old Lynchburg and Richmond road. The keen perception of General Sheridan had been but a few hours at fault. Realizing that the Confederate general would probably send for supplies to meet his hungry army at some railway station on the road to Lynchburg, near his line of retreat, he at once decided that Appomattox Depot would be the place, and hurried off his scouts in that direction. The cavalry corps at once abandoned its series of flank attacks on General Lee's retreating army, and pushed out rapidly for that station on the South Side Railroad. Its march led over an old grass-grown dirt road by way of Buffalo River, which ran at times almost parallel with General Lee's retreating army, that was marching south, and for the same objective point, only about twelve or fifteen miles away. General Sheridan's opinion had proved correct, and there we were, the enemy's supplies in our hands, and the cavalry corps squarely across the path of the Confederate army on its way to Lynchburg.

Rapidly as I had thought over the campaign, it was later than I realized as I stepped into the little house near the depot at which General Sheridan had made his headquarters for the night. I found my chief stretched at full length on a bench before a bright open fire, wide-awake, and evidently in deep thought. At that time he was thirty-three years of age, with a clean-cut face, high cheek-bones, fine black eyes, an ag-

gressive chin, slightly aquiline nose, firmly set mouth, dark brown mustache, and close-cut black hair, short in stature—being about five feet two in height, very slight but wiry and muscular, with a tremendous breadth of shoulder and long powerful arms, long-bodied too, but with very short legs. He sat tall, though, so

Army of the James, about nine thousand strong), or possibly a general engagement between the two armies, in which case I thought there was no hope for the Confederates.

Just before daylight on the morning of the 9th of April I sat down to a cup of coffee, but had hardly begun to drink it



FIGHTING AGAINST FATE.

that when he was mounted he gave one the impression of being quite the average height.

Turning to the chief of staff, Colonel J. W. Forsyth, I said that if there was nothing for me to do I would turn in. He advised me to do so at once, and I accordingly sought my blankets, in the belief that the next day would be a memorable one, either in the way of a desperate engagement between the Confederate army and our cavalry corps (which was at this time, including the horse-artillery and General Mackenzie's cavalry of the

when I heard the ominous sound of a scattering skirmish fire, apparently in the direction of Appomattox Court House. Hastily swallowing what remained of it, I reported to General Sheridan, who directed me to go to the front at once. Springing into the saddle, I galloped up the road, my heart being greatly lightened by a glimpse of two or three infantrymen standing near a camp fire close by the depot—convincing proof that our hoped-for re-enforcements were within supporting distance.

It was barely daylight as I sped along,

but before I reached the cavalry brigade of Colonel C. H. Smith that held the main road between Appomattox Court House and Lynchburg, a distance of about two miles northeast from Appomattox Depot, the enemy had advanced to the attack, and the battle had opened. When ordered into position late the preceding night, Colonel Smith had felt his way in the dark as closely as possible to Appomattox Court House, and at or near midnight had halted on a ridge, on which he had thrown up a breastwork of rails. This he occupied by dismounting his brigade, and also with a section of horse-artillery, at the same time protecting both his flanks by a small mounted force. As the enemy advanced to the attack in the dim light of early dawn he could not see the led horses of our cavalry, which had been sent well to the rear, and was evidently at a loss to determine what was in his front. The result was that after the first attack he fell back to get his artillery in position, and to form a strong assaulting column against what must have seemed to him a line of infantry. This was most fortunate for us, for by the time he again advanced in full force, and compelled the dismounted cavalry to slowly fall back by weight of numbers, our infantry was hurrying forward from Appomattox Depot (which place it had reached at four o'clock in the morning), and we had gained many precious minutes. At this time most of our cavalry was fighting dismounted, stubbornly retiring. But the Confederates at last realized that there was nothing but a brigade of dismounted cavalry and a few batteries of horse-artillery in their immediate front, and pushed forward grimly and determinedly, driving the dismounted troopers slowly ahead of them.

I had gone to the left of the road, and was in a piece of woods with some of our cavalymen (who by this time had been ordered to fall back to their horses and give place to our infantry, which was then coming up), when a couple of rounds of canister tore through the branches just over my head. Riding back to the edge of the woods in the direction from which the shot came, I found myself within long pistol range of a section of a battery of light artillery. It was in position near a country road that came out from another piece of woods about two hundred yards in its rear, and was pouring a rapid

fire into the woods from which I had just emerged. As I sat on my horse quietly watching it from behind a rail fence, the lieutenant commanding the pieces saw me, and riding out for a hundred yards or more towards where I was, proceeded to cover me with his revolver. We fired together—a miss on both sides. The second shot was uncomfortably close, so far as I was concerned, but as I took deliberate aim for the third shot I became aware that in some way his pistol was disabled; for using both hands and all his strength I saw that he could not cock it. I had him covered, and had he turned I think I should have fired. He did nothing of the sort. Apparently accepting his fate, he laid his revolver across the pommel of his saddle, fronted me quietly and coolly, and looked me steadily in the face. The whole thing had been something in the nature of a duel, and I felt that to fire under the circumstances savored too much of murder. Besides, I knew that at a word from him the guns would have been trained on me where I sat. He, too, seemed to appreciate the fact that it was an individual fight, and manfully and gallantly forbore to call for aid; so lowering and uncocking my pistol, I replaced it in my holster, shook my fist at him, which action he cordially reciprocated, and then turning away, I rode back into the woods.

Within two hundred yards I met one of our infantry brigades slowly advancing through the trees in line of battle. It was part of the Twenty-fourth Corps of the Army of the James, which had marched nearly all the previous night to come to our assistance, and these troops were, I think, the advance of the first division of that corps. I rode up to the commanding officer of these troops and told him where the battery, which was now doing considerable damage among his men, was located, and urged him to dash forward, have the fence thrown down, and charge the guns, which I was sure he could capture. This he refused to do without authority from division or corps headquarters, and while I was earnestly arguing the case, orders came for the line to halt, fall back a short distance, and lie down. I thought then, and do now, that the guns could have been captured with less loss than they finally inflicted on this brigade.

About this time the enemy's artillery

ceased firing, and I again rode rapidly to the edge of the woods, just in time to see the guns limber up and retire down the wood road from which they had come. The lieutenant in command saw me and stopped. We simultaneously uncovered, waved our hats to each other, and bowed. I have always thought he was one of the bravest men I ever faced.

I rode back again, passing through our infantry line, intending to go to the left and find the cavalry, which I knew would be on the flank somewhere. Suddenly I became conscious that firing had ceased along the whole line.

I had not ridden more than a hundred yards when I heard some one calling my name. Turning I saw one of the headquarters aides, who came galloping up, stating that he had been hunting for me for the last fifteen minutes, and that General Sheridan wished me to report to him at once. I followed him rapidly to the

right on the wood path in the direction from which he had come.

As soon as I could get abreast of him I asked if he knew what the General wanted me for.

Turning in his saddle, with his eyes fairly ablaze, he said, "Why, don't you know? A white flag."

All I could say was "Really?"

He answered by a nod; and then we leaned towards each other and shook hands; but nothing else was said.

A few moments more and we were out of the woods in the open fields. I saw the long line of battle of the Fifth Army Corps halted, the men standing at rest, the standards being held butt on earth, and the flags floating out languidly on the spring breeze. As we passed them I noticed that the officers had generally grouped themselves in front of the centre of their regiments, sword in hand, and were conversing in low tones. The men



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were leaning wearily on their rifles, in the position of parade rest. All were anxiously looking to the front, in the direction towards which the enemy's line had withdrawn, for the Confederates had fallen back into a little swale or valley beyond Appomattox Court House, and were not then visible from this part of our line.

Here and there over the field were small groups of medical officers and stretcher-bearers around a dead or wounded man, showing where the last fire of the skirmishers had taken effect; and as we passed along a portion of the front of the Fifth Corps, I think it was Chamberlin's brigade, we saw just in front of one of the New York regiments a group of sad-eyed officers gathered around the body of one of their number, a fine, stalwart-looking lieutenant, who they told us had been killed by the last shot from the Confederate artillery, just before the order was given to cease firing. He was said to have been a fine officer and a good man, promoted from the ranks for bravery, and it seemed, under the circumstances, a particularly hard fate.

We soon came up to General Sheridan and his staff. They were dismounted, sitting on the grass by the side of a broad country road that led to the Court House. This was about one or two hundred yards distant, and, as we afterwards found, consisted of the court-house, a small tavern, and eight or ten houses, all situated on this same road or street. Reporting my return, the General quietly acknowledged my salute with a pleasant nod, saying, in reply to my inquiry, that just then he had no immediate need of my services. I saluted, gave my horse to an orderly, and sat down on the grass with the rest of the staff. All nodded smilingly, one or two of my especial friends leaned over and shook hands with me, but not much was said, for we were a tired and thoughtful group.

Conversation was carried on in a low tone, and I was told of the blunder of one of the Confederate regiments in firing on the General and staff after the flag of truce had been accepted. I also heard that General Lee was then up at the little village awaiting the arrival of General Grant, to whom he had sent a note, through General Sheridan, requesting a meeting to arrange terms of surrender. Colonel Newhall, of our headquarters staff, had been despatched in search of

General Grant, and might be expected up at almost any moment.

It was, perhaps, something more than an hour and a half later, to the best of my recollection, that General Grant, accompanied by Colonel Newhall, and followed by his staff, came rapidly riding up to where we were standing by the side of the road, for we had all risen at his approach. When within a few yards of us he drew rein, and halted in front of General Sheridan, acknowledged our salute, and then, leaning slightly forward in his saddle, said, in his usual quiet tone, "Good-morning, Sheridan; how are you?"

"First-rate, thank you, General," was the reply. "How are you?"

General Grant nodded in return, and said, "Is General Lee up there?" indicating the Court House by a glance.

"Yes," was the response, "he's there." And then followed something about the Confederate army, but I did not clearly catch the import of the sentence.

"Very well, then," said General Grant. "Let's go up."

General Sheridan, together with a few selected officers of his staff, mounted, and joined General Grant and staff. Together they rode to Mr. McLean's house, a plain two-story brick residence in the village, to which General Lee had already repaired, and where he was known to be awaiting General Grant's arrival. Dismounting at the gate, the whole party crossed the yard, and the senior officers present went up on to the porch which protected the front of the house. It extended nearly across the entire house and was railed in, except where five or six steps led up the centre opposite the front door, which was flanked by two small wooden benches, placed close against the house on either side of the entrance. The door opened into a hall that ran the entire length of the house, and on either side of it was a single room with a window in each end of it, and two doors, one at the front and one at the rear of each of the rooms, opening on the hall. The room to the left, as you entered, was the parlor, and it was in this room that General Lee was awaiting General Grant's arrival.

As General Grant stepped on to the porch he was met by Colonel Babcock of his staff, who had in the morning been sent forward with a message to General Lee. He had found him resting at the



THE LAST VICTIM.

side of the road, and had accompanied him to McLean's house.*

General Grant went into the house, accompanied by General Rawlins, his chief of staff; General Seth Williams, his adjutant-general; General Rufus Ingalls, his quartermaster-general; and his two aides, General Horace Porter and Lieutenant-Colonel Babcock. After a little time General Sheridan; General M. R. Morgan, General Grant's chief commissary; Lieutenant-Colonel Ely Parker, his military

secretary; Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. Bowers, one of his assistant adjutants-general; and Captains Robert T. Lincoln and Adam Badeau, aides-de-camp, went into the house at General Grant's express invitation, sent out, I believe, through Colonel Babcock, who came to the hall door for the purpose, and they were, I was afterwards told, formally presented to General Lee. After the lapse of a few more moments quite a number of these officers, including General Sheridan, came out into the hall and on to the porch, leaving General Grant and General Lee, Generals Rawlins, Ingalls, Seth Williams, and Porter, and Lieutenant-Colonels Babcock, Ely Parker, and Bowers, together with Colonel Marshall, of General Lee's staff, in the room, while the terms of the surrender were finally agreed upon and formally signed. These were the only officers, therefore, who were actually present at the official surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia.

After quite a length of time Colonel Babcock came to the door again, opened

* Captain Amos Webster, of General Grant's official staff, was present on this occasion, but informs me that he did not go into the room. Four of the headquarters staff were absent, viz., General C. B. Comstock, who had been sent on a special mission to North Carolina; General F. T. Dent, who was left in charge of field headquarters during General Grant's absence; Captain William McKee Dunn, who had been sent with despatches to General Meade; and Major George K. Lee, A. A. G., who was in Washington. Notwithstanding all the various engravings that have been made of persons who were in the room at Mr. McLean's house at the time of the surrender, I have named all who were actually present in the room at any time during the conference.

it, and glanced out. As he did so he placed his forage-cap on one finger, twirled it around, and nodded to us all, as much as to say, "It's all settled," and said something in a low tone to General Sheridan. Then they, accompanied by General E. O. C. Ord, the commanding general of the Army of the James, who had just ridden up to the house, entered the house together, the hall door being partly closed again after them, leaving quite a number of us staff-officers upon the porch.

While the conference between Generals Grant and Lee was still in progress, Generals Merritt and Custer, of the Cavalry Corps, and several of the infantry generals, together with the rest of General Sheridan's staff-officers, came into the yard, and some of them came up on the porch. Colonel Babcock came out once more, and General Merritt went back to the room with him at his request; but most, if not all, of the infantry generals left us and went back to their respective commands while the conference was still in progress and before it ended.

Just to the right of the house, as we faced it on entering, stood a soldierly looking orderly in a tattered gray uniform, holding three horses—one a fairly well bred looking gray in good heart, though thin in flesh, which, from the accoutrements, I concluded belonged to General Lee; the others, a thoroughbred bay and a fairly good brown, were undoubtedly those of the staff-officer who had accompanied General Lee, and of the orderly himself. He was evidently a sensible soldier too, for as he held the bridles he was baiting his animals on the young grass, and they ate as though they needed all they had a chance to pick up.

I cannot say exactly how long the conference between Generals Grant and Lee lasted, but after quite a while, certainly more than two hours, I became aware from the movement of chairs within that it was about to break up. I had been sitting on the top step of the porch writing in my field note-book, but I closed it at once, and stepping back on the porch leaned against the railing nearly opposite and to the left of the door, and expectantly waited. As I did so the inner door slowly opened and General Lee stood before me. As he paused for a few seconds, framed in by the doorway, ere he slowly

and deliberately stepped out upon the porch, I took my first and last look at the great Confederate chieftain. This is what I saw: A finely formed man apparently about sixty years of age, well above the average height, with a clear ruddy complexion—just then suffused by a deep crimson flush, that rising from his neck overspread his face and even slightly tinged his broad forehead, which, bronzed where it had been exposed to the weather, was clear and beautifully white where it had been shielded by his hat—deep brown eyes, a firm but well-shaped Roman nose, abundant gray hair, silky and fine in texture, with a full gray beard and mustache, neatly trimmed and not overlong, but which nevertheless almost completely concealed his mouth. A splendid uniform of Confederate-gray cloth, that had evidently seen but little service, which was closely buttoned about him, and fitted him to perfection. An exquisitely mounted sword, attached to a gold-embroidered Russia-leather belt, trailed loosely on the floor at his side, and in his right hand he carried a broad-brimmed soft gray felt hat, encircled by a golden cord, while in his left he held a pair of buckskin gauntlets. Booted and spurred, still vigorous and erect, he stood bareheaded looking out of the open doorway, sad-faced and weary; a soldier and a gentleman, bearing himself in defeat with an all-unconscious dignity that sat well upon him.

The moment the open door revealed the presence of the Confederate commander, each officer present sprang to his feet, and as General Lee stepped out on to the porch, every hand was raised in military salute. Placing his hat on his head, he mechanically but courteously returned it, and slowly crossed the porch to the head of the steps leading down to the yard, meanwhile keeping his eyes intently fixed in the direction of the little valley over beyond the Court House, in which his army lay. Here he paused, and slowly drew on his gauntlets, smiting his gloved hands into each other several times after doing so, evidently utterly oblivious of his surroundings. Then, apparently recalling his thoughts, he glanced deliberately right and left, and not seeing his horse, he called in a hoarse, half-choked voice: "Orderly! Orderly!"

"Here, General, here," was the quick response. The alert young soldier was



DEPARTURE OF GENERAL LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

holding the General's horse near the side of the house. He had taken out the bit, slipped the bridle over the horse's neck, and the wiry gray was eagerly grazing on the fresh young grass about him.

Descending the steps the General passed to the left of the house, and stood in front of his horse's head while he was being bridled. As the orderly was buckling the throat-latch, the General reached up and drew the forelock out from under the brow-band, parted and smoothed it, and then gently patted the gray charger's forehead in an absent-minded way, as one who loves horses, but whose thoughts are far away, might all unwittingly do. Then, as the orderly stepped aside, he caught up the bridle reins in his left hand, and seizing the pommel of the saddle with the same hand, he caught up the slack of the reins in his right hand, and placing it on the cantle he put his foot in the stirrup, and swung himself slowly and wearily, but nevertheless firmly, into the saddle (the old dragoon mount), letting his right hand rest for an instant or two on the pommel as he settled into his seat, and as he did so there broke unguardedly from his lips a long, low, deep sigh, almost a groan in its intensity, while the flush on his neck and face seemed, if possible, to take on a still deeper hue.

Shortly after General Lee passed down the steps he was followed by an erect, slightly built, soldierly looking officer in a neat but somewhat worn gray uniform, a man with an anxious and thoughtful face, wearing spectacles, who glanced neither to the right nor left, keeping his eyes straight before him. Notwithstanding this I doubt if he missed anything within the range of his vision. This officer, I was afterwards told, was Colonel Marshall, one of the Confederate adjutants-general, the member of General Lee's staff whom he had selected to accompany him.

As soon as the Colonel had mounted, General Lee drew up his reins, and, with the Colonel riding on his left, and followed by the orderly, moved at a slow walk across the yard towards the gate.

Just as they started, General Grant came out of the house, crossed the porch, and passed down the steps into the yard. At this time he was nearly forty-two years of age, of middle height, not overweighted with flesh, but, nevertheless, stockily and sturdily built, light complexion, mild, gray-blue eyes, finely

formed Grecian nose, an iron-willed mouth, brown hair, full brown beard with a tendency toward red rather than black, and in his manner and all his movements there was a strength of purpose, a personal poise, and a cool, quiet air of dignity, decision, and soldierly confidence that were very good to see. On this occasion he wore a plain blue army blouse with shoulder-straps set with three silver stars equi-distant, designating his rank as Lieutenant-General commanding the armies of the United States; it was unbuttoned, showing a blue military vest, over which and under his blouse was buckled a belt, but he was without a sword. His trousers were dark blue and tucked into top-boots, which were without spurs, but heavily splashed with mud, for once he knew that General Lee was waiting for him at Appomattox Court House, he had ridden rapidly across country, over road and field and through woods, to meet him. He wore a peculiar stiff-brimmed, sugar-loaf crowned, campaign hat of black felt, and his uniform was partly covered by a light-weight, dark blue, water-proof, semi-military overcoat, with a full cape, unbuttoned and thrown back, showing the front of his uniform, for while the day had developed into warm, bright, and beautifully sunny weather, the early morning had been damp, slightly foggy, and presaged rain.

As he reached the foot of the steps and started across the yard to the fence, where, inside the gate, the orderlies were holding his horse and those of several of his staff-officers, General Lee, on his way to the gate, rode across his path. Stopping suddenly, General Grant looked up, and both generals simultaneously raised their hands in military salute. After General Lee had passed, General Grant crossed the yard and sprang lightly and quickly into his saddle. He was riding his splendid bay horse Cincinnati, and it would have been difficult to find a firmer seat, a lighter hand, or better rider in either army.

As he was about to go out of the gate he halted, turned his horse, and rode at a walk towards the porch of the house, where, among others, stood General Sheridan and myself. Stopping in front of the General, he said, "Sheridan, where will you make your headquarters to-night?"

"Here, or near here; right here in this yard, probably," was the reply.

"Very well, then; I'll know where to find you in case I wish to communicate. Good-day."

"Good-day, General," was the response, and with a military salute General Grant turned and rode away.

As he rode forward and halted at the porch to make this inquiry, I had my wished-for opportunity, but my eyes

tears, and to sit down and pen a farewell order, that, to this day, no old soldier of the Army of Northern Virginia can read without moistening eyes and swelling throat.

General Grant, on his way to his field headquarters on this eventful Sunday evening, dismounted, sat quietly down by the road-side, and wrote a short and sim-



THE MESSAGE OF PEACE.

sought his face in vain for any indication of what was passing in his mind. Whatever may have been there, as Colonel Newhall has well written, "not a muscle of his face told tales on his thoughts"; and if he felt any elation, neither his voice, features, nor his eyes betrayed it. Once out of the gate, General Grant, followed by his staff, turned to the left and moved off at a rapid trot.

General Lee continued on his way towards his army at a walk, to be received by his devoted troops with cheers and

ple despatch, which a galloping aide bore full-speed to the nearest telegraph station, that on its reception in the nation's capital was flashed over the wires to every hamlet in the country, causing every steeple in the North to rock to its foundation, and sent one tall, gaunt, sad-eyed, weary-hearted man in Washington to his knees, thanking God that he had lived to see the beginning of the end, and that he had at last been vouchsafed the assurance that he had led his people aright.



AN AUSTRALIAN CRADLE-SONG.

BY JOHN HARRISON WAGNER.

OVER the hills and far away,
Deep in a shady dell,
The crystal fountains leap and play;
A dream of delight is the livelong day,
Over the hills and far away
In the land where the fairies dwell.

Never a trouble or worldly care
Into that dell may come;
The sweetest flowers breathe perfume rare,
The wattle-tree loosens her golden hair,
And softly floats on the languid air
The wild bee's drowsy hum.

The tall fern spreads a graceful wing
To shut the light away;
And ever the fountains laugh and sing,
The moss and the maidenhair climb and cling,
And the bell-bird's note doth sweetly ring,
Like the drip of the silver spray.

Here, when the moon and stars are bright
The fairies dance and sing.
Down thro' the air each tiny sprite
Floats in a robe of filmy white,
On the smooth greensward the livelong night,
To trip in a mystic ring,




"THE WATTLE-TREE LOOSENS HER
GOLDEN HAIR."

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

PREMIER OR PRESIDENT?

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE REBEL GAME.

HE rebel conspirators were not unmindful of the great advantages they had hitherto derived from their complaints, their intrigues, their assumptions, their arrogant demands. No sooner was the provisional government organized at Montgomery than they appointed a new embassy of three commissioners to proceed to Washington and make the fourth effort to assist, protect, and if possible to establish the rebellion through a negotiation. They not only desired to avert a war, but, reasoning from the past, had a well-grounded faith that they would secure a peaceful acquiescence in their schemes. The commissioners were instructed to solicit a reception in their official character, and if that were refused, to accept an unofficial interview; to insist on the *de facto* and *de jure* independence of the Confederate States; but nevertheless to accede to a proposition to refer the subject of their mission to the United States Senate, or to withhold an answer until the Congress of the United States should assemble and pronounce a decision in the premises, provided the existing peaceful status were rigidly maintained.†

This modest programme was made necessary by the half-fledged condition of the rebellion: its personal jealousies were not yet hushed; its notions of State rights were not yet swallowed up in an imperious military dictatorship; above all, its military preparation consisted mainly of a self-sacrificing enthusiasm. Notwithstanding the two months' drill and battery-building at Charleston, Davis did not agree with Governor Pickens that the moment had come to storm Sumter. "Fort Sumter should be in our possession at the earliest moment possible," wrote the rebel war secretary, but "thorough preparation must be made before an attack is attempted. . . . A failure would demoralize our people and injuriously affect us in the opinion of the world as reckless and pre-

cipitate."‡ Therefore they made Beauregard a brigadier-general and sent him to command in the harbor of Charleston. Beauregard's professional inspection justified this prudence.

If Sumter was properly garrisoned and armed [wrote he (March 6th)], it would be a perfect Gibraltar to anything but constant shelling night and day from the four points of the compass. As it is, the weakness of the garrison constitutes our greatest advantage, and we must for the present turn our attention to preventing it from being reënforced. This idea I am gradually and cautiously infusing into the minds of all here; but should we have to open our batteries upon it, I hope to be able to do so with all the advantages the condition of things here will permit. All that I ask is time for completing my batteries and preparing and organizing properly my command.§

The first of the three commissioners, Martin J. Crawford, arrived in Washington the day before Lincoln's inauguration. He would have nothing more to do with Buchanan, he wrote.

His fears for his personal safety, the apprehensions for the security of his property, together with the cares of state and his advanced age, render him wholly disqualified for his present position. He is as incapable now of purpose as a child.¶

With the arrival of the second commissioner, John Forsyth, they prepared to begin operations upon the new Administration. It was comparatively easy to call into caucus the active or disguised secessionists who yet remained in the city. Wigfall, Mason, Hunter, and Breckinridge were still in the Senate; Virginia and the other border States had a number of sympathizing Congressmen in the House; Bell, Crittenden, and Douglas, though loyal, had no love for Lincoln, and could be approached with professions of peace; Seward, in order to gain information, had kept himself during the whole winter in relation with all parties, and had openly proclaimed that his policy was one of peace and conciliation.¶¶

The prospect of beginning negotiations seemed flattering; nevertheless, their first caucus over the inaugural agreed that "it was Lincoln's purpose at once to attempt the col-

† Toombs to commissioners, Feb. 27, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Walker to Pickens. War Records.

§ Beauregard to Walker. War Records.

¶ Crawford to Toombs, March 3, 1861. Unpublished MS.

¶¶ Senate speech, Jan. 12, 1861. "Globe."

lection of the revenue, to reënforce and hold Forts Sumter and Pickens, and to retake the other places."* A day or two later, on comparing the fragmentary gossip they had raked together, in which the difficulties of reënforcing Sumter were dimly reflected, with a general conversation alleged to have been held by one of their informants with Seward, they framed and reported to Montgomery a theory of probable success.

Seward, they thought, was to be the ruling power of the new Administration. Seward and Cameron were publicly committed to a peace policy. They would establish an understanding with the Secretary of State.

This gentleman [they wrote] is urgent for delay. The tenor of his language is to this effect: I have built up the Republican party; I have brought it to triumph; but its advent to power is accompanied by great difficulties and perils. I must save the party and save the Government in its hands. To do this, war must be averted; the negro question must be dropped; the "irrepressible" conflict ignored; and a Union party to embrace the border slave-States inaugurated. I have already whipped Mason and Hunter in their own State. I must crush out Davis, Toombs, and their colleagues in sedition in their respective States. Saving the border States to the Union by moderation and justice, the people of the cotton-States, unwillingly led into secession, will rebel against their leaders and reconstruction will follow.

The commissioners therefore deemed it their duty to support Mr. Seward's policy. "Until we reach the point of pacific negotiations, it is unimportant what may be his subsequent hopes and plans. It is well that he should indulge in dreams which we know are not to be realized." They of course make no mention of the arguments, agencies, and influences which we may infer they employed in their deceitful intent to foster these dreams; unless, indeed, they were instrumental in provoking the Senate debate of March 6th and 7th, in which Clingman attacked the inaugural as an announcement of war, while Douglas defended it as a manifesto of peace, "for the purpose," as Mr. Forsyth wrote that Douglas told him, "of fixing that construction on it and of tomahawking it afterwards if it [the Administration] departed from it."†

Acting upon this assumed anxiety of Seward for delay and for peace, the commissioners now agreed upon what they elaborately described in a long dispatch to Montgomery as a most ingenious plan. They would force the Administration to accept or reject their mission, and thereby confront the immediate issue of peace or war, unless Seward would consent to

maintain the present military status. Having reached this conclusion, they laboriously drew up a memorandum which they purposed to ask Seward to sign, and sent it to the State Department by an "agent," but Mr. Seward was at home ill, and could not be seen.

Their long dispatches home, and their mysterious allusions to conversations, to agents, and intermediaries, convey the impression that they were "in relation" with the Secretary of State; but whether they were duped by others, or whether they were themselves duping the Montgomery cabinet, indisputable indications in these documents contradict their assertions. At last, however, their vigilance was rewarded with what they considered an item of important news, and they hurried off several telegrams to Montgomery: "Things look better here than was believed."‡ "The impression prevails in Administration circles that Fort Sumter will be evacuated within ten days."§ This was on Saturday night, March 9th, and so far from being exclusive or advance information, it was substantially printed in next morning's newspapers.¶ After four days' consideration by the Lincoln government, and extended discussion in a Cabinet meeting, the loss of Sumter seemed unavoidable; and the rumor was purposely given out to prepare the public mind, if the need should finally come for the great sacrifice.

The Jefferson Davis cabinet at Montgomery clutched at the report with avidity. Under this hope they were no longer satisfied with the "existing peaceful status" specified in their instructions of February 27th, and repeated in the prepared memorandum of the commissioners. "Can't bind our hands a day without evacuation of Sumter and Pickens," replied Toombs imperatively by telegraph on Monday, March 11th. || Until Sumter should be evacuated it was idle to talk of peaceful negotiation, he added in his written dispatch to the commissioners, while they were further instructed to "pertinaciously demand" the withdrawal of the troops and vessels from Pickens and Pensacola. ¶

Thus spurred into activity, the commissioners now deemed it incumbent on them to make an effort. The whole tenor of their previous dispatches was calculated to convey the impression that they were twisting the Secretary of State at pleasure between their diplomatic thumb and finger. On Monday, March 11th, they sent him their first message — not the demand of Toombs that day received by tel-

* L. Q. Washington to Walker. War Records.

† Forsyth to Toombs, March 8, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Commissioners to Toombs, March 9, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ "New York Herald," March 10, 1861.

|| Toombs to commissioners, March 11, 1861. Unpublished MS.

¶ Toombs to commissioners, March 14, 1861. Unpublished MS.

ograph, not even the mild suggestion of their original instructions to maintain the status and appeal to Congress, but a meek inquiry whether they would be allowed to make a sort of back-door visit to the State Department. To describe it in their own words: "We availed ourselves of the kind consent of Senator Hunter of Virginia to see Mr. Seward, and learn if he would consent to an informal interview with us."* Mr. Seward of course received Senator Hunter politely, for he still professed to be a loyal senator representing a loyal State, and gave him the stereotyped diplomatic reply, that "he would be obliged to consult the President." The next morning Seward sent Hunter a note of irreproachable courtesy but of freezing conclusiveness. "It will not be in my power," he wrote, "to receive the gentlemen of whom we conversed yesterday. You will please explain to them that this decision proceeds solely on public grounds and not from any want of personal respect."†

This was a cold bath to the commissioners, and the theories of their own finesse, and of the torturing perplexities into which Seward had been thrown, became untenable.

To-day at 11 o'clock [so runs their own report] Mr. Hunter brought us the promised reply, a copy of which is appended to this dispatch. It is polite; but it was considered by us at once as decisive of our course. We deemed it not compatible with the dignity of our Government to make a second effort, and took for granted that having failed in obtaining an unofficial interview with the Secretary of State, we should equally fail with the President. Our only remaining course was plain, and we followed it at once in the preparation of a formal note to the State Department informing the United States Government of our official presence here, the objects of our mission, and asking an early day to be appointed for an official interview.

They then repeat the gossip of the day — what Mr. Lincoln was said to have told a gentleman from Louisiana, that "there would be no war and that he was determined to keep the peace"; also what Crittenden told Crawford, "that General Scott was also for peace and would sustain Mr. Seward's policy." Finally, showing in what complete ignorance they were of events happening about them, they ask with bewildered curiosity, "Can it be that while they refuse to negotiate with us to keep the Republican party in heart, they mean to abandon both forts on military grounds and thus avoid the occasion of a collision, or do they mean to refer the questions raised by our note to the Senate? Time only can determine, and we await the result.

* Commissioners to Toombs, March 12, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Seward to Hunter, March 12, 1861. Unpublished MS.

We are still of the opinion that Fort Sumter will be evacuated. The opinion gains ground here that Lieutenant Slemmer and garrison will also be withdrawn from Fort Pickens."*

Toombs was ready to sue or bluster as occasion demanded.

You have shown to the Government of the United States [he wrote back to the commissioners] with commendable promptness and becoming dignity that you were not supplicants for its grace and favor, and willing to loiter in the antechambers of officials to patiently await their answer to your petition; but that you are the envoys of a powerful confederacy of sovereignties, instructed to present and demand their rights.

Nevertheless, instead of recalling these neglected envoys, he instructs them to "communicate freely and often," and to employ a secretary to assist them, "at such monthly compensation as you may deem reasonable."‡

The hint to remain was hardly necessary. The commissioners apparently had no idea of abandoning their intrigues, unpromising as they were.

Their secretary, John T. Pickett, now besieged the State Department for an answer to the commissioners' formal note. Seward replied (March 15th) in a lengthy and courteous but dignified memorandum that he did not perceive in the "Confederate States" a rightful and accomplished revolution or an independent nation; that he could not act on the assumption or in any way admit that they constituted a foreign power with which diplomatic relations ought to be established; that he had no authority, nor was he at liberty, to recognize the commissioners as diplomatic agents, or hold correspondence or other communication with them.§

This paper, if delivered, would have terminated the labors and functions of the commissioners. But they were in no hurry to return empty-handed to Montgomery, and still fondly nursed the theory so elaborately described in their long dispatches. One of them repeated it with emphasis in a private letter to a member of the Montgomery cabinet:

We are feeling our way here cautiously. We are playing a game in which time is our best advocate, and if our Government could afford the time I feel confident of winning. There is a terrific fight in the Cabinet. Our policy is to encourage the peace element in the fight, and at least blow up the Cabinet on the question. ||

This dispatch is a frank confession that the rebel embassy was so far a complete failure,

‡ Toombs to commissioners, March 20, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ Seward, memorandum. "Rebellion Record."

|| Forsyth to Walker, March 14, 1861. Unpublished MS.

and that its future opportunity lay solely in the barren regions of hotel gossip and newspaper rumors. The commissioners would have merited no further historical mention had they not unexpectedly secured a most important ally — John A. Campbell, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, appointed from Alabama, and therefore in the confidence and, as it soon turned out, in the secret interest of the South and the rebellion. Justice Campbell now made himself the voluntary intermediary between the commissioners and the Secretary of State. Owing to his station and his professions, Seward gave him undue intimacy and confidence, enabling Campbell, under guise of promoting peace, to give aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States, in violation of his oath and duty. The details of the intrigue rest entirely upon rebel statements, and mainly upon those of Campbell himself, who gave both a confidential and a semi-official version to Jefferson Davis; the latter Davis transmitted in a special message to the Confederate Congress to “fire the Southern heart.” Campbell having thus made his share of the transaction official, and having for a quarter of a century stood before the public accusing Seward and the Lincoln administration of “equivocating conduct” and “systematic duplicity,” history must adjudge the question as well as it may with the help of his own testimony.

It has already been stated that Seward's official refusal to receive the commissioners was being prepared at the State Department. The Assistant Secretary had promised to send it to the commissioners' hotel. The commissioners thus relate the beginning of Campbell's intrigue :

The interview between Colonel Pickett and the Assistant Secretary of State occurred on Friday morning the 14th* inst. Immediately thereafter, and within a brief space of time after Colonel Pickett's statement to us, the Hon. John A. Campbell, of the Supreme Court of the United States, sought an interview with Mr. Crawford of this commission, and after stating what he knew to be the wish and desire of Mr. Seward to preserve the peace between the two Governments, asked if there could be no further delay for an answer to our note to the Government, stating at the same time that he had no doubt if it were pressed that a most positive though polite rejection would be the result. †

Commissioner Crawford's official reply to this overture is best described by Toombs's formula that he should “pertinaciously demand” the evacuation of Sumter and maintenance of the “status” elsewhere; the alterna-

tive and confidential reply we can only conjecture. But it may well be presumed that Campbell fully revealed to Crawford his sympathy with the rebellion and his purpose to aid it, and that he was in return thoroughly instructed in the game, which was “to encourage the peace element in the fight, and at least blow up the Cabinet on the question.”

Thus instructed and prepared, Justice Campbell on the same day (March 14th or 15th) made a voluntary call on Mr. Seward, and in the general conversation which he induced evidently played his part of the game of peace and reconciliation with consummate ability. He probably painted the “dreams which we know are not to be realized” in such rosy colors as to call forth from Seward the hopeful observation “that a civil war might be prevented by the success of my [Campbell's] mediation.” ‡ The impression upon Seward that Campbell was laboring honestly for the preservation of the Union was also strengthened by his having brought Justice Nelson with him, to whom the slightest suspicion of disloyalty has never attached. It seems clear that these professions of patriotic zeal threw Mr. Seward off his guard as to Campbell's motives, and that he accepted his intervention as a Union peacemaker, not as a rebel emissary.

Seward replied confidentially, “that it was impossible to receive the commissioners in any diplomatic capacity or character, or even to see them personally.” Campbell adds that he said “it was not desirable to deny them or to answer them.” § As part of a general policy of delay and avoidance of conflict he may have said and meant it: as an immediate and urgent diplomatic step he certainly did not mean it, because his Assistant Secretary had already promised to send the answer to the commissioners' hotel, when for mere temporary delay dozens of expedients might have been used. Continuing his conversation and unguardedly enlarging his confidence, Seward, in answer to Campbell's direct inquiry, ventured the opinion that Sumter would be evacuated and collision avoided at Charleston. The idea was not new; the rumor had been openly and half-officially printed in the newspapers nearly a whole week; the commissioners had telegraphed it to Montgomery. Campbell, however, caught eagerly at the suggestion, and proposed to write the peaceful news to Jefferson Davis; and Seward, with a momentary excess of enthusiasm, authorized him (so Campbell relates) to write: “Before this letter

* The almanac shows that Friday was the 15th. There is, therefore, an error either in the day of the week or day of the month.

† Campbell to Seward. “Rebellion Record.”

‡ Commissioners to Toombs, March 22, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ Campbell to Jefferson Davis, April 3, 1861. Unpublished MS.

reaches you Sumter will be evacuated, or the orders will have issued for that purpose — and no change is contemplated at present in respect to Pickens.”* Campbell rushed off in a fever of delight to tell the commissioners, and magnified the confidence to the proportions of a pledge. The incident began to grow more rapidly than the story of the three black crows. The commissioners, on their part, hurried a telegram to Montgomery :

By pressing we can get an answer to our official note to-morrow. If we do, we believe it will be adverse to recognition and peace. We are sure that within five days Sumter will be evacuated. We are sure that no steps will be taken to change the military status. With a few days' delay a favorable answer may be had. Our personal interests command us to press. Duty to our country commands us to wait. What shall we do ? †

To all of which Toombs answered laconically, “Wait a reasonable time and then ask for instructions.”

It is needless to point out the absurd variance of this announcement with Seward's alleged statement, which was simply an opinion that orders would be issued to evacuate Sumter within five days. He undoubtedly believed every word of this at the moment. Seward was then, as he declared to Lincoln in writing, in favor of evacuation; ‡ and Scott's written draft of an order to that effect, under date of the 11th, was in the President's hands. The President had as yet announced no decision. On the 15th, for the first time, the Cabinet voted — five to evacuate, two to attempt to supply. Seward still had every reason to suppose that the necessity, the Cabinet majority, General Scott's influence, and Lincoln's desire to avoid war would, acting together, verify his prediction. Presuming that he was talking to a friend and not an enemy, to a judge and not an advocate, to a Unionist and not a rebel, he undoubtedly and properly thought his words were received as a prediction, and not as a pledge.

The five days elapsed, but Lincoln sent no order to Anderson, and announced no decision to the Cabinet. He was still patiently seeking, and had not found his way out of the dilemma. He had not yet beheld “the salvation of the Lord.” He was neither optimist nor pessimist. He wished to decide, not upon impulse or even necessity, but upon judgment and advantage. He was neither stubbornly headstrong nor cravenly submissive. If, like the farmer in his favorite illustration, he could not plow through the log, perhaps he might plow around it. He

was meditating on the visit of Fox to Sumter, of Lamon and Hurlbut to Charleston; he was deliberating about a diversion upon the Virginia convention; above all, he was waiting to hear from his order to reënforce Pickens, dispatched on the 12th of March. His Cabinet ministers did not yet understand him. Seward on the one hand, and Blair on the other, unused to men of his fiber, began to fear this was vacillation, indecision, executive incompetence. The atmosphere of Washington had hitherto largely produced two classes of men — those who bluster and domineer, those who protest and yield. Lincoln belonged to neither class; and his persistent non-committal, his silent hopefulness, his patient and well-considered inaction, baffled their prophecy. Such tenacity of purpose, combined with such reticence of declaration, was an anomaly in recent Federal administration.

The hopes of the rebels, so unexpectedly inflated, began once more to collapse. Governor Pickens sent inquiries to the commissioners. Toombs telegraphed them, “We can't hear from you.”§ Campbell was summoned and dispatched post-haste to the State Department. He had interviews on March 21st and 22d. But in reality Seward was no wiser than he had been in the previous interviews, and could only repeat his beliefs and his predictions, and declare, in his philosophic vein, that “governments could not move with bank accuracy.” ||

For a third time the conspirators grew impatient, and again Campbell, on Saturday, March 30th, and Monday, April 1st, went to the State Department as the messenger of rebellion.¶ By this time Seward had real information. A second Cabinet vote had been taken, on March 29th, in which the majority was reversed. The President had ordered the preparation of the Sumter expedition; and Seward himself, though still advising the abandonment of Sumter, was personally preparing an expedition to reënforce Fort Pickens.

Seward at this point must have realized how injudicious he had been to give Campbell any confidence whatever, since to preserve secrecy for his own project he must abruptly break off the intimacy. Perhaps he had by this time divined that he was dealing with a public enemy. At all events, whatever may have been his reasons, he took occasion to correct any misunderstanding which might previously have sprung up by giving Campbell a written mem-

* Campbell to Jefferson Davis, April 3, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Commissioners to Toombs, March 15, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Seward to Lincoln, March 15, 1861. Opinion on Sumter.

§ Toombs to commissioners, March 20, 1861. Unpublished MS.

|| Commissioners to Toombs, March 22, 1861. Unpublished MS.

¶ Campbell to Seward. “Rebellion Record.”

orandum (April 1st), as follows: "The President may desire to supply Sumter, but will not do so without giving notice to Governor Pickens"; adding verbally (Campbell says) that he still did not believe the attempt would be made, and that there was no design to reënforce Sumter. Campbell acknowledges that he took notice of this very important correction and definition. "There was a departure here from the pledges of the previous month," he writes; "but with the verbal explanation I did not consider it a matter then to complain of."*

The commissioners and their game here drop into the background, and Mr. Justice Campbell takes up the rôle of leading conspirator. History will ask, Of what had this high minister of the law any right to complain? Two days afterward we find him making a confidential report to the insurrectionary chief at Montgomery, as follows:

I do not doubt that Sumter will be evacuated shortly, without any effort to supply it; but in respect to Pickens I do not think there is any settled plan, and it will not be abandoned spontaneously, and under any generous policy, though perhaps they may be quite willing to let it be beleaguered and reduced to extremities. I can only infer as to this. All that I have is a promise that the status will not be attempted to be changed prejudicially to the Confederate States without notice to me. It is known that I make these assurances on *my own responsibility*. I have no right to mention any name or to pledge any person. I am the only responsible person to you, I consenting to accept such assurances as are made to me and to say, "I have confidence that this will or will not be done." I have no expectation that there will be bad faith in the dealings with me.

Now I do not see that I can do more. I have felt them in a variety of forms as to the practicability of some armistice or truce that should be durable and would relieve the anxiety of the country. But at present there can be no compact, treaty, recognition of any kind. There will be no objection to giving the commissioners their answer; but if the answer is not called for it will not be sent, and it is intimated that it would be more agreeable to withhold it. So far as I can judge, the present desire is to let things remain as they are, without action of any kind. There is a strong indisposition for the call of Congress, and it will not be done except under necessity. The radicals of the Senate went off in anger, and Trumbull's coercion resolution was offered after a contumelious interview with the President. My own notion is that the inactive policy is as favorable to you as any that this Administration could adopt for you, and that I would not interrupt it.

Here the learned judge might have stopped, and perhaps would have left posterity to question his method rather than his motives. But inexorable History demanded her tribute of truth: under her master-spell he went on, and in the concluding paragraph of the letter his own hand recorded a confession little to have

been expected from an officer whose duty it was to expound and to administer the law of treason as written in the Constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress.

The great want [he continued] of the Confederate States is peace. I shall remain here some ten or fifteen days. My own future course is in some manner depending upon circumstances and the opinions of friends. At present I have access to the Administration I could not have except under my present relations to the Government, and I do not know who could have the same freedom. I have therefore deferred any settlement on the subject until the chance of being of service at this critical period has terminated. This letter is strictly confidential and private. †

There is no need of comment on this "aid and comfort" to the enemies of his Government by a member of the highest court of the United States. It only remains to note the acknowledgment and estimate of it by Jefferson Davis, replying from Montgomery under date of April 6th:

Accept my thanks for your kind and valuable services to the cause of the Confederacy and of peace between those who, though separated, have many reasons to feel towards each other more than the friendships common among nations. Our policy is, as you say, peace. . . . In any event I will gratefully remember your zealous labor in a sacred cause, and hope your fellow-citizens may at some time give you acceptable recognition of your service, and appreciate the heroism with which you have encountered a hazard from which most men would have shrunk. ‡

While this direct correspondence between Davis and Campbell was being carried on, the commissioners, to whom Mr. A. B. Roman had been sent as a reënforcement, were, partly as a matter of form, partly for ulterior purposes, kept in Washington by the Montgomery cabinet to "loiter in the ante-chambers of officials." The occupation seems to have grown irksome to them; for, nowise deceived or even encouraged by Campbell's pretended "pledges," they asked, under date of March 26th, "whether we shall dally longer with a Government hesitating and doubting as to its own course, or shall we demand our answer at once?" § On April 2d, Toombs gave them Jefferson Davis's views at length. He thought the policy of Mr. Seward would prevail. He cared nothing for Seward's motives or calculations. So long as the United States neither declare war nor establish peace, "it affords the Confederate States the advantages of both conditions, and enables them to make all the necessary arrangements for the public defense, and the solidifying of their Government, more safely, cheaply, and expeditiously than they could were the attitude of the United States more definite and decided." || The commis-

* Campbell to Seward. "Rebellion Record."

† Campbell to Jefferson Davis, April 3, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Jefferson Davis to Campbell, April 6, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ Commissioners to Toombs, March 26, 1861. Unpublished MS.

|| Toombs to commissioners, April 2, 1861. Unpublished MS.



A. B. ROMAN, CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONER.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

herself the teacher of original statesmanship; whereas she had become the unreasoning follower of Calhoun's disciples—the Ruffins, the Rhetts, and the Yanceys of the ultra South.


The political demoralization of Virginia was completed by the John Brown raid. From that time she dragged her anchors of state; her faith in both constitution and liberty was gone. The true lesson of that affair was indeed the very reverse. The overwhelming popular sentiment of the North denounced the outrage; the national arms defended Virginia and suppressed the invasion; the State vindicated her local authority by hanging the captured offenders. Thus public opinion, Federal power, and State right united in a precedent amounting of itself to an absolute guaranty, but which might have been easily crystallized into statute or even constitutional law. Sagacious statesmanship would have plucked this flower of safety. On the contrary, her blind partisanship spurned the opportunity, distrusted government, and sought refuge in force. Her then governor confesses that from that period

we began to prepare for the worst. We looked carefully to the State armory; and whilst we had the selection of the State quota of arms we were particular to take field ordnance instead of altered muskets; and when we left the gubernatorial chair, there were in the State armory at Richmond 85,000 stand of infantry arms and 130 field-pieces of artillery, besides \$30,000 worth of new revolving arms purchased from Colt. Our decided opinion was that a preparation of the Southern States in full panoply of arms, and prompt action, would have prevented civil war.*


* Wise, "Seven Decades."

VIRGINIA.

CIVIL war, though possible, did not at the moment seem imminent or necessary: Lincoln had declared in his inaugural that he would not begin it; Jefferson Davis had written in his instructions to the commissioners that he did not desire it. This threw the immediate contest back upon the secondary question—the control and adhesion of the border slave-States; and of these Virginia was the chief subject of solicitude. The condition of Virginia had become anomalous; it was little understood by the North, and still less by her own citizens. She retained all the ideal sentiment growing out of her early devotion to and sacrifices for the Union; but it was warped by her coarser and stronger material interest in slavery. She still deemed she was the mother of presidents; whereas she had degenerated into being, like other border States, the mother of slave-breeders and of an annual crop of black-skinned human chattels to be sold to the cotton, rice, and sugar planters of her neighboring commonwealths. She thought herself the leader of the South; whereas she was only a dependent of the Gulf States. She yet believed



JOHN FORSYTH, CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONER.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)



MARTIN J. CRAWFORD, CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONER.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

Many strong external signs indicated the persistent adherence of Virginia to the Union. Her legislature refused the proposition of South Carolina for a conference of the Southern States, made in the winter of 1859-60. In the presidential election her citizens voted overwhelmingly for Bell and Everett and their platform of "The Union, the Constitution, and the enforcement of the laws." Notwithstanding these manifestations of allegiance, public sentiment took on a tone and a determination which, paradoxical as it may seem, was rebellion in guise of loyalty. It is perhaps best illustrated by the declaration of ex-Governor Wise that he meant to fight in the Union,* not out of it. To the nation at large the phrase had a pretty and patriotic sound; but when explained to be a determination to fight the Federal Government "in the Union," it becomes as rank treason as secession itself.

However counterfeit logic or mental reservations concealed it, the underlying feeling was to fight, no matter whom, and little matter how, for the protection of slavery and slave

* "As to parting from the Union in my affections, I shall never do that. As to leaving its flag, whenever I leave this confederacy, this north star confederacy, which makes the needle tremble northward, sir, I shall carry the old flag of the Union out with me; and if ever I have to fight,—so help me, God!—I will fight with the star-spangled banner still in one hand and my musket in the other. I will never take any Southern cross or any palmetto for my flag. I will never admit that a Yankee can drive me from the Union and

property. In this spirit Virginia continued her military preparations. To this end half a million dollars were voted in the winter of 1859-60, and a million more in that of 1860-61. Commissioners were appointed to purchase arms; companies were raised, officers appointed, regiments organized, camps of instruction formed. It was one of these that Floyd sent Hardee to inspect and drill in November, 1860. Before the end of January, this appeal to military strength by Virginia was duly paraded in the United States Senate as a menace, to extort a compromise and constitutional guarantees for slavery. Nor did the threat seem an empty one. The State professed to have an actual army of 62 troops of cavalry, numbering 2547 men; 14 companies of artillery, numbering 820 men; and 149 companies of infantry, numbering 7180 men. All these were uniformed and armed; while 6000 men additional were formed into companies, ready to have arms put into their hands.†

Governor Letcher, the successor of Wise, had begun his administration with the announced belief that disunion was "not only a possible but a highly probable event."‡ The defeat of his favorite, Douglas, and the success of Lincoln, served therefore as a pretended justification of his fears, if not an actual stimulant of his hopes. The presidential election was scarcely over when he called an extra session of the legislature, to "take into consideration the condition of public affairs" consequent on the excitement produced by "the election of sectional candidates for President and Vice-President."|| That body met January 7, 1861; the doctrine of non-coercion, South Carolina secession, and the Fort Sumter affair had become every-day topics, and the South generally was in a seething ferment. On Federal affairs Governor Letcher's message was a medley of heterogeneous and contradictory arguments and recommendations. He declared a disruption of the Union inevitable. He desired a national convention. He thought that four republics might be formed. He scolded South Carolina for her precipitate action. He joined a correct and a false quotation of Lincoln's sentiments. He opposed a State convention. He recommended sending commissioners to other slave-States. He proposed terms to the North, and thought they

take from me our capital. I will take from him forts; I will take from him flags; I will take from him our capital; I will take from him, if I can, my whole country, and save the whole. Will that satisfy the gentleman as to fighting in the Union?" [Speech of H. A. Wise in the Virginia Convention, April 10, 1861. "Richmond Enquirer."]

† Report Adj.-General of Virginia, Feb. 27, 1861.

‡ Inaugural message, Jan. 7, 1860.

|| Governor Letcher, proclamation, Nov. 15, 1860.

would be "freely, cheerfully, and promptly assented to." He said, "Let the New England States and western New York be sloughed off." He wanted railroads to Kansas and direct trade to Europe. And finally he summed up: "Events crowd upon each other with astonishing rapidity. The scenes of to-day are dissolved by the developments of to-morrow. The opinions now entertained may be totally revolutionized by unforeseen and unanticipated occurrences that an hour or a day may bring forth." The simple truth was, that in Governor Letcher's hands the "Old Dominion" was adrift towards rebellion without rudder or compass.

His quarrel with South Carolina turned upon an important point. The irascible Palmetto State was offended that Virginia had a year before rejected her proposal for a Southern conference. In retaliation she now intimated that she would help to destroy Virginia's slave-market. "The introduction of slaves from other States," said her governor, "which may not become members of the Southern Confederacy, and particularly the border States, should be prohibited by legislative enactment, and by this means they will be brought to see that their safety depends upon a withdrawal from their enemies, and a union with their friends and natural allies."* Mississippi made a similar threat. "As it is more than probable," said her executive, "that many of the citizens of the border States may seek a market for their slaves in the cotton-States, I recommend the passage of an act prohibiting the introduction of slaves into this State unless their owners come with them and become citizens, and prohibiting the introduction of slaves for sale by all persons whomsoever." Governor Letcher grew very indignant over these declarations. "These references to the border States," said he, "are pregnant with meaning, and no one can be at a loss to understand what that meaning is. While disavowing any unkind feeling towards South Carolina and Mississippi, I must still say that I will resist the coercion of Virginia into the adoption of a line of policy whenever the attempt is made by Northern or Southern States."†

Incensed against the North and distrustful of the South, the governor pushed forward his military preparations. Especially did he cast a longing eye at Fort Monroe. "As far back as January 8th" (1861), says he, "I consulted with a gentleman whose position enabled him to know the strength of that fortress, and whose experience in military matters enabled him to form an opinion as to the number of men that would be required to capture it. He represented it to be one of the strongest fortifications in the world, and expressed his

doubts whether it could be taken unless assailed by water as well as by land, and simultaneously."‡ Since Governor Letcher had neither a fleet nor a properly equipped army, he did not follow up this design. The discussion of the project, however, illustrates the condition of his allegiance to the flag of his country and the constitution he was then under oath to uphold.

Like the governor, the legislature at once put itself in an attitude of quasi-rebellion by resolving, on the second day of the session, that it would resist any attempt of the Federal Government to coerce a seceding State. It soon passed an act to assemble a convention; and by a large appropriation for defense, already mentioned, by issuing treasury notes,



JOHN LETCHER, GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY A. A. TURNER.)

by amending the militia laws, and by authorizing counties to borrow money to purchase arms, and especially by its debates, further fostered and stimulated the prevailing secession undertow during the whole of its extra session, from January 7th to April 4th.

The election for a convention was held February 4th, and provoked a stirring contest. Its result was apparently for union; the Union members claimed a majority of three to one. This was, however, evidently an exaggerated estimate. The precise result could not be well defined. Politics had become a Babel. Discussion was a mere confusion of tongues.

* Governor Gist, message.

† Governor Letcher, message, Jan. 7, 1861.


‡ Governor Letcher, message, Dec. 2, 1861.

Party organization was swallowed up in intrigue; and conspiracy, not constitutional majorities, became the basis and impulse of legislation.

The Virginia convention met February 13th, and its proceedings reflect a maze of loose declamation and purposeless resolves. It had no fixed mind, and could, therefore, form no permanent conclusion. The prevailing idea of the majority seemed to be expressed in a single phrase of one of its members, that "he would neither be driven by the North nor dragged by the cotton-States." It was virtually a mere committee of observation, waiting the turn of political winds and tides. It gave, however, two encouraging though negative signs of promise; the first, that it had undoubtedly been chosen by a majority of voters really attached to the Union and desiring to remain in it; the second, that during a session of well-nigh a month it had not as yet passed an ordinance of secession, which had so far been a quick result in other State conventions.

As said at the beginning of this chapter, the course of the border States, and especially of Virginia, was on all hands the subject of chief solicitude. Her coöperation was absolutely essential to the secession government at Montgomery. This point, though not proclaimed was understood by Jefferson Davis, and to powerful intrigues from that quarter many otherwise unaccountable movements may doubtless be ascribed. Neither was her adherence to the Union undervalued by Lincoln. Seward was deeply impressed both with the necessity and the possibility of saving her from secession "as a brand from the burning." He relied (too confidently, as the event proved) on the significance of the late popular vote. He sent an agent to Richmond, who brought him hopeful news. He had already proposed to strengthen the hands of the Virginia Unionists by advising Lincoln to nominate George W. Summers to fill the existing vacancy on the bench of the United States Supreme Court.* Under his prompting, no doubt, Lincoln now perhaps thought it possible to bring his personal influence to bear on the Virginia convention. He authorized Seward to invite Summers, or some equally influential and determined Union leader, to come to Washington. It is not likely that he had any great faith in such an effort; for the refusal or neglect of Scott, Gilmer, and Hunt to accept a cabinet appointment, offered each of them with more or less distinctness, had proved that Southern Unionism of this type was mere lip-service and not a living principle. It so turned

* Seward to Lincoln, March 9, 1861. Unpublished MS.



JOHN MINOR BOTTS.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

out in this instance. Summers, pleading important business in the convention, excused himself from coming. It would appear, however, that he and others selected one John B. Baldwin as a proper representative, who came to Washington and had an interview with the President on the morning of April 4, 1861. There is a direct conflict of evidence as to what occurred at this interview. The witnesses are Mr. Baldwin himself and Mr. John Minor Botts, both of whom gave their testimony under oath before the Reconstruction Committee of Congress in 1866, after the close of the war.

Mr. Botts testifies that on the 7th of April he called upon the President, who related to him, in confidence, that a week or ten days previously he had written to Summers to come to Washington, and he, instead of obeying the summons, had, after that long delay, sent Baldwin. On Baldwin's arrival (on the 5th of April, as Botts relates the story) Lincoln took him into a private room in the Executive Mansion, and said to him in substance:

Mr. Baldwin, why did you not come here sooner? I have been waiting and expecting some of you gentlemen of that convention to come to me for more than a week past. I had a most important proposition to make to you. But I am afraid you have come too late. However, I will make the proposition now. We have in Fort Sumter, with Major Anderson, about eighty men. Their provisions are nearly exhausted. I have not only written to Governor Pickens, but I have sent a special messenger† to him to say that I will not permit these

† This messenger was not sent until the evening of April 6th.

people to starve; that I shall send them provisions. If he fires on that vessel, he will fire upon an unarmed vessel loaded with bread. But I shall at the same time send a fleet along with her, with instructions not to enter the harbor of Charleston unless that vessel is fired into; and if she is, then the fleet is to enter the harbor and protect her. Now, Mr. Baldwin, that fleet is now lying in the harbor of New York, and will be ready to sail this afternoon at 5 o'clock; and although I fear it is almost too late, yet I will submit the proposition which I intended when I sent for Mr. Summers. Your convention in Richmond has been sitting now nearly two months, and all that they have done has been to shake the rod over my head. You have recently taken a vote in the Virginia convention on the right of secession, which was rejected by ninety to forty-five, a majority of two-thirds, showing the strength of the Union party in that convention. If you will go back to Richmond, and get that Union majority to adjourn and go home without passing the ordinance of secession, so anxious am I for the preservation of the peace of this country, and to save Virginia and the other border States from going out, that I will take the responsibility of evacuating Fort Sumter, and take the chance of negotiating with the cotton-States.

Mr. Botts here asked how Baldwin received that proposition.

Sir [replied Lincoln, with a gesture of impatience], he would not listen to it for a moment; he hardly treated me with civility. He asked me what I meant by an adjournment; did I mean an adjournment *sine die*? Why, of course, Mr. Baldwin, said I. I mean an adjournment *sine die*. I do not mean to assume such a responsibility as that of surrendering that fort to the people of Charleston upon your adjournment, and then for you to return in a week or ten days and pass your ordinance of secession.

Mr. Botts then relates that he asked permission of the President to go himself and submit that proposition to the Union members of the convention, but that Lincoln replied it was too late, the fleet had sailed. Further, that Baldwin returned to Richmond without even disclosing the President's offer; and that he eventually became an active secessionist, and held a commission in the rebel army.*

On the material point Baldwin's testimony is directly to the contrary. He states that Seward's messenger reached Richmond April 3d; that at the request of Summers he immediately returned with him to Washington and called on the President on the morning of April 4th; that Lincoln took him into a private room and said, in substance: "I am afraid you have come too late; I wish you could have been here three or four days ago. Why do you not adjourn the Virginia convention?" "Adjourn it how?" asked Baldwin. "Do you mean *sine die*?" "Yes," said Lincoln; "*sine die*. Why do you not adjourn it? It is a

standing menace to me which embarrasses me very much."

Baldwin then relates how he made a grandiloquent speech to the President about the balance of power, the safeguards of the Constitution, and the self-respect of the convention; that the Union members had a clear majority of nearly three to one; they were controlling it for conservative results, and desired to have their hands upheld by a conciliatory policy; that if he had the control of the President's thumb and finger for five minutes he could settle the whole question. He would issue a proclamation, call a national convention, and withdraw the forces from Sumter and Pickens. But Mr. Baldwin declares and reiterates that he received from Mr. Lincoln "no pledge, no undertaking, no offer, no promise of any sort." "I am as clear in my recollections," he says, "as it is possible to be under the circumstances, that he made no such suggestion as I understood it, and said nothing from which I could infer it." ††

A careful analysis and comparison with established data show many discrepancies and errors in the testimony of both these witnesses. Making due allowances for the ordinary defects of memory, and especially for the strong personal and political bias and prejudice under which they both received their impressions, the substantial truth probably lies midway between their extreme contradictory statements. The actual occurrence may therefore be summed up about as follows:

Mr. Seward had an abiding faith in the Unionism and latent loyalty of Virginia and the border States. He wished by conciliation to re-awaken and build it up; and thereby not merely retain these States, but make them the instruments, and this feeling the agency, to undermine rebellion and finally reclaim the cotton-States. Lincoln did not fully share this optimism; nevertheless he desired to avoid actual conflict, and was willing to make any experimental concession which would not involve the actual loss or abandonment of military or political advantage. The acts of the previous Administration had placed Fort Sumter in a peril from which, so the military authorities declared, he could not extricate it. His Cabinet advised its evacuation. Public opinion would justify him in sacrificing the fort to save the garrison. He had ordered Fort Pickens reinforced; he was daily awaiting news of the execution of his announced policy to "hold, occupy, and possess" the Government posts. Pickens once triumphantly secured, the

* Testimony of John Minor Botts. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1st sess. 39th Cong.

† Testimony of John B. Baldwin. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1st sess. 39th Cong.

‡ The article "A Piece of Secret History," in the "Atlantic Monthly" for April, 1875, contains only the substance of Baldwin's testimony before the Reconstruction Committee.

loss of Sumter could be borne. But might not the loss of Sumter be compensated? Might he not utilize that severe necessity, and make it the lever to procure the adjournment of the Virginia convention, which, to use his own figure, was daily shaking the rod over his head? This we may assume was his reasoning and purpose when about March 20th, either directly or through Seward, he invited Summers, the acknowledged leader of the Union members of the convention, to Washington.

Summers, however, hesitated, delayed, and finally refused to come. His plea of business was evidently a pretext, not a valid excuse. Meanwhile things had changed. The anxiously-looked-for news of the reënforcement of Fort Pickens did not arrive. The Cabinet once more voted, and changed its advice. The President ordered the preparation of the Sumter expedition. A second expedition to Fort Pickens had been begun. Another perplexing complication, to be hereafter mentioned, had occurred. At this juncture Baldwin made his appearance, but clearly he had come too late. By this time (April 4, 1861) his presence was an embarrassment, and not a relief. Fully to inform him of the situation was hazardous, impossible; to send him back without explanation was impolite and would give alarm at Richmond. Lincoln therefore opened conversation with him, manifesting sufficient personal trust to explain what he intended to have told Summers. This called forth Baldwin's dogmatic and dictatorial rejoinder, from which Lincoln discovered two things: first, that Baldwin was only an embryo secessionist; and, second, that the Virginia convention was little else than a warming-pan for the rebellion. Hence the abrupt termination of the interview, and the unexplained silence at Richmond.

PREMIER OR PRESIDENT?

At noon on the 29th of March the Cabinet assembled and once more took up the all-absorbing question of Sumter. All the elements of the problem were now before them—Anderson's condition and the prospects of relief as newly reported by Fox; the state of public opinion in Charleston as described by Hurlbut; the Attorney-General's presentation of the legal aspects of an attempt at collecting the customs on shipboard; the Secretary of the Treasury's statement of the condition and resources of the revenue service; the report of the Secretary of the Navy as to what ships of war he could supply to blockade the port of Charleston; and, finally, the unexpected

attitude of General Scott in advising the evacuation of Fort Pickens. All these features called out so much and such varied discussion, that at length the Attorney-General, taking up a pen, rapidly wrote on a slip of paper a short summing-up of his own conclusions. This he read aloud to the President, who thereupon asked the other members of the Cabinet to do the same.* They all complied, and we have therefore the exact record of the matured opinions of the Cabinet members then present. The importance of the occasion renders these memoranda of enduring interest. Placed in their order they read as follows:

By Mr. Seward:

First. The dispatch of an expedition to supply or reënforce Sumter would provoke an attack, and so involve a war at that point.

The fact of preparation for such an expedition would inevitably transpire and would therefore precipitate the war—and probably defeat the object. I do not think it wise to provoke a civil war beginning at Charleston and in rescue of an untenable position.

Therefore I advise against the expedition in every view.

Second. I would call in Captain M. C. Meigs forthwith. Aided by his counsel I would at once and at every cost prepare for a war at Pensacola and Texas, to be taken, however, only as a consequence of maintaining the possessions and authority of the United States.

Third. I would instruct Major Anderson to retire from Sumter forthwith. †

By Mr. Chase:

If war is to be the consequence of an attempt to provision Fort Sumter, war will just as certainly result from the attempt to maintain possession of Fort Pickens.

I am clearly in favor of maintaining Fort Pickens, and just as clearly in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter.

If that attempt be resisted by military force Fort Sumter should, in my judgment, be reënforced.

If war is to be the result, I perceive no reason why it may not be best begun in consequence of military resistance to the efforts of the Administration to sustain troops of the Union stationed, under the authority of the Government, in a fort of the Union, in the ordinary course of service. ‡

By Mr. Welles:

I concur in the proposition to send an armed force off Charleston, with supplies of provisions and reënforcements for the garrison at Fort Sumter, and of communicating at the proper time the intentions of the Government to provision the fort, peaceably if unmolested. There is little probability that this will be permitted, if the opposing forces can prevent it. An attempt to force in provisions without reënforcing the garrison at the same time might not be advisable; but armed resistance to a peaceable attempt to send provisions to one of our own forts will justify the Government in using all the power at its command to reënforce the garrison and furnish the necessary supplies.

Fort Pickens and other places retained should be strengthened by additional troops, and, if possible, made impregnable.

The naval force in the Gulf and on the Southern coast should be increased. Accounts are published that vessels having on board marketable products for the

* Bates, diary. Unpublished MS.

† Seward, memorandum. Unpublished MS.

‡ Chase, memorandum. Unpublished MS.

crews of the squadron at Pensacola are seized—the inhabitants we know are prohibited from furnishing the ships with provisions or water; and the time has arrived when it is the duty of the Government to assert and maintain its authority.*

By Mr. Smith :

Viewing the question whether Fort Sumter shall be evacuated as a political one, I remark that the effect of its evacuation upon the public mind will depend upon the concurrent and subsequent action of the Government. If it shall be understood that by its evacuation we intend to acknowledge our inability to enforce the laws, and our intention to allow treason and rebellion to run its course, the measure will be extremely disastrous and the Administration will become very unpopular. If, however, the country can be made to understand that the fort is abandoned from necessity, and at the same time Fort Pickens and other forts in our possession shall be defended, and the power of the Government vindicated, the measure will be popular and the country will sustain the Administration.

Believing that Fort Sumter cannot be defended, I regard its evacuation as a necessity, and I advise that Major Anderson's command shall be unconditionally withdrawn.

At the same time I would adopt the most vigorous measures for the defense of the other forts, and if we have the power I would blockade the Southern ports, and enforce the collection of the revenue with all the power of the Government. †

By Mr. Blair :

First. As regards General Scott, I have no confidence in his judgment on the questions of the day. His political views control his judgment, and his course as remarked on by the President shows that, whilst no one will question his patriotism, the results are the same as if he was in fact traitorous.

Second. It is acknowledged to be possible to relieve Fort Sumter. It ought to be relieved without reference to Pickens or any other possession. South Carolina is the head and front of this rebellion, and when that State is safely delivered from the authority of the United States it will strike a blow against our authority from which it will take years of bloody strife to recover.

Third. For my own part, I am unwilling to share in the responsibility of such a policy. ‡

By Mr. Bates :

It is my decided opinion that Fort Pickens and Key West ought to be reinforced and supplied, so as to look down opposition at all hazards—and this whether Fort Sumter be or be not evacuated.

It is also my opinion that there ought to be a naval force kept upon the Southern coast sufficient to command it, and if need be actually close any port that practically ought to be closed, whatever other station is left unoccupied.

It is also my opinion that there ought to be immediately established a line of light, fast-running vessels, to pass as rapidly as possible between New York or Norfolk at the North and Key West or other point in the Gulf at the South.

As to Fort Sumter—I think the time is come either to evacuate or relieve it. §

The majority opinion of the Cabinet on the 15th of March had been against the expediency of an attempt to provision Fort Sumter; but now, after a lapse of two weeks, the feeling was changed in favor of the proposed measure. Irrespective of this fresh advice, however, the President's own opinion was already made up. On the day previous he had instructed Captain Fox to prepare him a short order for the ships, men, and supplies he would need for his expedition, || and that officer complied with characteristic and promising brevity :

Steamers *Pocahontas* at Norfolk, *Pawnee* at Washington, *Harriet Lane* at New York, to be under sailing orders for sea, with stores, etc., for one month. Three hundred men to be kept ready for departure from on board the receiving ships at New York. Two hundred men to be ready to leave Governor's Island in New York. Supplies for twelve months for one hundred men to be put in portable shape, ready for instant shipping. A large steamer and three tugs conditionally engaged. ¶

The Cabinet meeting over, the President wrote at the bottom of this preliminary requisition the following order to the Secretary of War: "Sir: I desire that an expedition, to move by sea, be got ready to sail as early as the 6th of April next, the whole according to memorandum attached, and that you coöperate with the Secretary of the Navy for that object."*** This order and its duplicate to the Secretary of the Navy †† duly signed and transmitted to the two departments, Captain Fox hurried away to New York to superintend the further details of preparation in person.

It will be observed that the President's order is simply to prepare the expedition; "which expedition," in his own language, was "intended to be ultimately used or not, according to circumstances." †† But he was by this time convinced that the necessity would arise. Nothing had yet been heard from the order to reinforce Fort Pickens sent two weeks previously; on the contrary, there were rumors through the Southern newspapers that the *Brooklyn*, containing the troops, had left her anchorage off Pensacola and gone to Key West. As a matter of fact, she had first transferred her troops to the *Sabine*; but this was not and could not be known, and the necessary inference was that the *Brooklyn* had carried them away with her. The direction to land them would therefore unavoidably fail, and both Sumter and Pickens be thus left

* Welles, memorandum. Unpublished MS.

† Smith, memorandum. Unpublished MS.

‡ Blair, memorandum. Unpublished MS.

§ Bates, memorandum. Unpublished MS.

|| Fox to Lincoln, March 28, 1861. MS.

¶ Fox, memorandum. War Records.

** Lincoln to Secretary of War, March 29, 1861. War Records.

†† Lincoln to Secretary of Navy, March 29, 1861. "Galaxy," Nov., 1870.

‡‡ Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4, 1861.

within the grasp of the secessionists. Such was the contingency which had decided the President to prepare the Sumter expedition.*

The logic of daily events had by this time also wrought a change in the mind of Seward. In his written opinion of March 15th he had declared, "I would not provoke war in any way now"; but on the 29th, apparently alarmed, like the rest, at the advice of General Scott to make further concession to the rebels, he wrote, "I would at once, and at every cost, prepare for a war at Pensacola and Texas." That very afternoon, as he had suggested in this same paper, he brought Captain M. C. Meigs, the engineer officer in charge of the work on the new wings of the Capitol building, to the President. One reason for selecting him, in addition to his special training and acknowledged merit, was that he had in January personally accompanied the reinforcements then sent to Key West and Tortugas. On the way to and from the President's, Seward explained to Meigs that he wished the President to see some military man who would not talk politics; that they had Scott and Totten, but no one would think of putting either of those old men on horseback. They were in a difficulty. Scott had advised giving up both Sumter and Pickens. For his part, his policy had been to give up Sumter; but he wished to hold Pickens, making the fight there and in Texas, throwing the burden of the war, which all men of sense saw must come, upon those who, by revolting, had provoked it.†

The President talked freely with Captain Meigs, and after some inquiries about Sumter asked him whether Fort Pickens could be held. Meigs replied, "Certainly, if the navy would do its duty." The President then asked him whether he could go down there again and take general command of those three great fortresses, Taylor, Jefferson, and Pickens, and keep them safe. Meigs answered that he was only a captain, and could not command the majors who were there. Here Seward broke in with: "I understand how that is; Captain Meigs must be promoted." "But there is no vacancy," answered the modest captain. Mr. Seward, however, made light of all difficulties, and told the President if he wanted this thing done to put it in Meigs's charge. When Pitt wished to conquer Canada, he said, he sent for a young man whom he had noticed in the society of London, and told him to take Quebec,—to ask for the necessary means and do it,—and it was done. Would the President do this now? Lincoln

replied he would consider it, and let him know in a day or two.

Two days afterward (Sunday, March 31st) Meigs was about starting for church when Colonel Keyes, General Scott's military secretary, called and took him to Mr. Seward, who requested them to go forthwith and in consultation with General Scott to put upon paper an estimate and project for relieving and holding Fort Pickens, and to bring it to the President before 4 o'clock that afternoon. The two officers went directly to the engineer's bureau to inspect the necessary charts of Pensacola Harbor and drawings of the fortifications, and over these they matured their plans. The rapid lapse of the few hours allowed compelled them to report back to the President before seeing General Scott. Lincoln heard them read their paper, and then directed them to submit it to the general. "Tell him," said he, "that I wish this thing done, and not to let it fail unless he can show that I have refused him something he asked for as necessary."† The officers obeyed, and on the way encountered Mr. Seward, who went with them. "General Scott," said he, on entering the old soldier's presence, "you have formally reported to the President your advice to evacuate Fort Pickens; notwithstanding this, I now come to bring you his order, as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, to reinforce and hold it to the last extremity." The old general had his political crotchets, but he was at heart a soldier and a disciplinarian. "Sir," replied he, drawing himself up to his full height, "the great Frederick used to say, 'When the king commands, all things are possible.' It shall be done." Meigs and Keyes submitted their plan, which he approved in the main, adding a few details they had in their haste overlooked; the project was further discussed and definitely adopted.

Fort Pickens stands on the western extremity of Santa Rosa Island, and serves, in connection with its twin fort, McRae, on the mainland opposite, to guard the entrance to Pensacola Harbor. But in this case the two forts intended to render mutual assistance were held by opposing forces, bent not upon protecting but upon destroying each other, and restrained only by the existence of the "Sumter and Pickens truce," described in a previous chapter. So far as a mere cannonade might go, Pickens was perhaps as strong as McRae; but Lieutenant Slemmer in Pickens had only a handful of Union men, forty-six soldiers and thirty ordinary seamen all told, while some thousands of rebels were either encamped or within reach of the secession General Bragg, himself a trained and skillful soldier. The chief danger was that Bragg might organize a large

* Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4, 1861.

† Meigs, diary. Unpublished MS.

body of men, and by means of boats, crossing the bay at night or in a fog, carry Fort Pickens by a sudden assault long before the reënforcements in the Union fleet could be landed, as they were by the terms of the truce authorized to do in such an emergency. The substance of Meigs's plan was, that while a transport vessel bearing troops and stores landed them at Fort Pickens, outside the harbor, a ship-of-war, arriving simultaneously, should boldly steam past the hostile batteries of Fort McRae, enter the harbor, and take up such a position within as to be able to prevent any crossing or landing by the rebels. The ship destined to run the batteries would necessarily encounter considerable peril, not only from the guns of McRae, but also from those of Fort Barrancas and supposed batteries at the navy yard — all, like McRae, on the mainland, and forming part of the harbor defenses.

For such coöperation Meigs needed a young, talented, and daring naval officer, and accordingly he made choice of Lieutenant David D. Porter, a companion and intimate friend, who, as he believed, combined the requisite qualities.

One important characteristic of this Pickens expedition was to be its secrecy. Seward in his argument on Sumter had much insisted that preparation for reënforcement would unavoidably come to the knowledge of the rebels, and enable them to find means to oppose it. This argument applied with even greater force to Fort Pickens; the rebels controlled both the post and the telegraph throughout the South, and it was thought that upon the first notice of hostile design Bragg would assault and overwhelm the fort. Besides, the orders transmitted through regular channels two weeks before had apparently failed. But now that the ships to supply Sumter were being got ready, it was doubtless thought that under this guise the Pickens relief could be prepared without suspicion. On Monday, April 1, 1861, Captain Meigs, Colonel Keyes, and Lieutenant Porter were busy, under the occasional advice of Seward and General Scott, in perfecting the details of their plans and in drawing up the formal orders required. These were in due time signed by the President himself, it being part of the plan that no one but the officers named, not even the Secretaries of War or Navy, should have knowledge of them.* This was an error which only the anomalous condition and extreme peril of the Government would have drawn Lincoln into, and it was never repeated. He doubtless supposed they were entirely consistent with the Sumter plans, especially as General Scott's written request for his signature

accompanied the papers — the general being perfectly cognizant of both expeditions.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, April 1, 1861.

DEAR SIR: The immediate departure of a war steamer, with instructions to enter Pensacola Harbor and use all measures in his power to prevent any attack from the mainland upon Fort Pickens, is of prime importance. If the President, as Commander-in-chief, will issue the order of which I inclose a draft, an important step towards the security of Fort Pickens will be taken. I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

HON. W. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, etc. †

But although useful to secrecy, this course was bound to produce confusion and bad discipline; and such was its immediate result. That afternoon the commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard received two telegrams, in very similar language, directing him to "fit out the *Powhatan* to go to sea at the earliest possible moment." One was signed by the Secretary of the Navy, the other by the President; the former intending the ship to go to Sumter, the latter to Pickens, and neither being aware of the other's action. Neither had reason to anticipate any such conflict of orders: the *Powhatan* was not included in Fox's original requisition, and Meigs did not even know that the Sumter expedition was being prepared.

On the same afternoon several additional orders, made out under Seward's supervision, were brought to Lincoln. Supposing they all related to this enterprise, he signed them without reading; but it soon turned out that two of them related to a matter altogether different. These orders changed the duty of several naval officers: Captain Pendergrast was to be sent to Vera Cruz on account of "important complications in our foreign relations"; and Captain Stringham was to go to Pensacola.

When these last-mentioned orders reached the hands of the Secretary of the Navy, to whom they were addressed and immediately transmitted, that official was not only greatly mystified but very seriously troubled in mind. He hastened to the President, whom he found alone in the executive office, writing. "What have I done wrong?" Lincoln inquired playfully, as he raised his head, and with his ever-accurate intuition read trouble in the countenance of his Secretary. Mr. Welles presented the anomalous papers and asked what they meant; he had heard of no "foreign complications," and he preferred Stringham in his present duty.

The President [says Mr. Welles] expressed as much surprise as I felt, that he had signed and sent me such a document. He said Mr. Seward, with two or three young men, had been there through the day on a matter which Mr. Seward had much at heart; that he had yielded to the project of Mr. Seward, but

* Meigs, in "National Intelligencer," Sept. 16, 1865.

† Unpublished MS.

as it involved considerable detail, and he had his hands full, and more too, he had left Mr. Seward to prepare the necessary papers. These papers he had signed, some of them without reading, trusting entirely to Mr. Seward, for he could not undertake to read all papers presented to him; and if he could not trust the Secretary of State, whom could he rely upon in a public matter that concerned us all? He seemed disinclined to disclose or dwell on the project, but assured me he never would have signed that paper had he been aware of its contents, much of which had no connection with Mr. Seward's scheme. . . . The President reiterated they were not his instructions, and wished me distinctly to understand they were not, though his name was appended to them—said the paper was an improper one—that he wished me to give it no more consideration than I thought proper—to treat it as canceled—as if it had never been written.*

Mr. Welles acted upon this verbal assurance, and was highly gratified that the President thus corrected what he felt to be an encroachment upon the duties and powers of the Navy Department. Nevertheless it is apparent that he had his doubts whether Lincoln had fully and unreservedly given him his confidence in this affair. In these surmises he was correct; a circumstance had occurred between the President and Seward which the former could not communicate, and so far as is known never did communicate to any person but his private secretary, and of which the President's private papers have also preserved the interesting record. In order rightly to understand it, a brief glance at contemporary affairs is needful.

It will hardly be possible for the readers of history in our day to comprehend the state of public sentiment in the United States during the month of March, 1861. The desire for peace; the hope of compromise; the persistent disbelief in the extreme purposes of the South; and, strongest of all, a certain national lethargy, utterly impossible to account for,—all marked a positive decadence in patriotic feelings. The phenomenon is attested not only in the records of many public men willing to abandon constitutional landmarks and to sacrifice elementary rights of mankind, but also shown in the words and example of military officers like Scott and Anderson in their consenting to shut their eyes to the truths and principles of their own profession,—that it is the right of the Government to repel menaces as well as blows, and that building batteries is as effective and aggressive war as firing cannon-balls.

This perversion of public opinion in fact extended back to the meeting of Congress in December. Under the spell of such a political nightmare the revolution had been half accomplished. The Union flag had been fired upon, the Federal laws defied, the secession government organized and inaugurated. The

work of the conspirators was done, but the popular movement had not yet fully ratified it. Ours is preëminently a country of mass meetings and conventions, of high-sounding resolves and speeches of flaming rhetoric. Perhaps their constant recurrence makes us less critical than we ought to be in scanning their real or fictitious value. Because a certain number of delegates assembled at Montgomery and framed a paper government, it did not necessarily follow that the people of the cotton-States stood behind them. In this case it was even so; but the military thrall by which revolution swept away conservatism was not understood by the North. The difficult problem was presented to the Lincoln administration, not alone whether it should endeavor to knock down the revolutionary edifice half built, but also whether such an effort might not excite the whole Southern people to rise *en masse* to complete it. The disease of rebellion existing in an advanced stage, could the cure be best effected with sedatives or irritants?

From our point of view the answer is easy; but it was not of so ready solution in March, 1861. Lincoln in his hesitation to provision Sumter at all hazards was not executing his own inclinations, but merely submitting to what for the time seemed the military and, more than all, the political necessities of the hour. The Buchanan administration had first refused and then postponed succor to the fort. Congress had neglected to provide measures and means for coercion. The conservative sentiment of the country protested loudly against everything but concession. His own Cabinet was divided in council. The times were "out of joint." Public opinion was awry. Treason was applauded and patriotism rebuked. Laws were held to be offenses, and officials branded as malefactors. In Lincoln's own forcible simile, sinners were "calling the righteous to repentance."

It must be remembered too, that during the month of March, 1861, Lincoln did not yet know the men who composed his Cabinet. Neither, on the other hand, did they know him. He recognized them as governors, senators, and statesmen, while they yet looked upon him as a simple frontier lawyer at most, and a rival to whom chance had transferred the honor they felt to be due to themselves. The recognition and establishment of intellectual rank is difficult and slow. Perhaps the first real question of the Lincoln cabinet was, "Who is the greatest man?" It is pretty safe to assert that no one—not even he himself—believed it was Abraham Lincoln. Bearing this in mind, we shall be better able to understand and explain acts done and acts omitted during that memorable month.

* Welles, in "Galaxy," November, 1870.

In this state of affairs the policy of the new Administration was necessarily passive, expectant, cautious, and tentative. Other causes contributed to their embarrassments. The change from a long Democratic to a Republican régime involved a sweeping change of functionaries and subordinates. The impending revolution made both sides suspicious and vindictive; the new appointees could not, as in ordinary times, lean upon the experience and routine knowledge of the old. Passion swayed the minds of men. There was little calm reasoning or prudent counsel. The new party was not yet homogeneous. A certain friction mutually irritated Republicans of Whig, of Democratic, or of Free-soil antecedents against each other. Douglas was artfully leading a Senate debate to foster and strengthen the anti-war feeling of the North. The Cabinet had not become a working unit. Each Cabinet minister was beset by a horde of applicants, by over-officious friends, by pressing and most contradictory advice.

Seward naturally took a leading part in the new Cabinet. This was largely warranted by his prominence as a party manager; his experience in the New York governorship and in the United States Senate; the quieting and mediating attitude he had maintained during the winter; the influence he was supposed to wield over the less violent Southerners; the information he had gained from the Buchanan cabinet; his intimacy with General Scott; his acknowledged ability and talent; his optimism, which always breathed hope and imparted confidence. During the whole of March he had been busy with various measures of tentative administration. He had advised appointments, written diplomatic notes and circulars, carried on a running negotiation with the rebel commissioners, sought to establish relations with the Virginia convention, sent Lander to Texas to kindle a "back fire" against secession, elaborated his policy of evacuating Sumter, proposed a change of party name and organization, and set on foot the secret expedition to Fort Pickens. All this activity, however, did not appear to satisfy his desires and ambition. His philosophic vision took a yet wider range. He was eager to enlarge the field of his diplomacy beyond the boundaries of the republic. Regarding mere partisanship as a secondary motive, he was ready to grapple with international politics. He would heal a provincial quarrel in the zeal and fervor of a continental crusade. He would smother a domestic insurrection in the blaze and glory of a war which must logically be a war of conquest. He would supplant the slavery question by the Monroe Doctrine. And who shall say that these im-

perial dreams did not contemplate the possibility of changing a threatened dismemberment of the Union into the triumphant annexation of Canada, Mexico, and the West Indies?

On this same first day of April, while Meigs and Porter were busy with plans and orders about Fort Pickens, Seward submitted to Lincoln the following extraordinary state paper, unlike anything to be found in the political history of the United States:

SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION, April 1, 1861.

First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.

Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters.

Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the Administration, but danger upon the country.

Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But how? I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.

Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is built upon this *idea* as a ruling one, namely, that we must

CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION.

In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to one of *Patriotism or Union*.

The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so *regarded*. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and even by Union men in the South.

I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last Administration created the necessity.

For the rest I would simultaneously defend and reinforce all the forts in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under martial law.

This will raise distinctly the question of *Union or Disunion*. I would maintain every fort and possession in the South.

FOR FOREIGN NATIONS.

I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once.

I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention.

And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France,

Would convene Congress and declare war against them.

But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.

For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly.

Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.

It is not in my especial province.

But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility.*

The conscientious historian must ask the reader to pause and re-read this most remarkable and pregnant document. It is a little difficult to imagine what must have been the feelings of a President, and particularly of a frank, loyal, and generous nature like that of Lincoln, to receive from his principal councilor and anticipated mainstay of his Administration such a series of proposals. That he should delegate his presidential functions and authority; that he should turn his back upon the party which elected him; that he should ignore the political battle which had been fought and the victory for moral government which had been won; that he should by an arbitrary act plunge the nation into foreign war; that he should ask his rival to rule in his stead — all this might be romantic statesmanship, but to the cool, logical mind of the President it must have brought thoughts excited by no other event of his most eventful life. What was to be said in answer? The tender of a grave issue like this presupposed grave purposes and determinations. Should he by a fitting rebuke break up his scarcely formed Cabinet and alienate the most powerful leader after himself, who might perhaps carry with him the organized support of all the Northern States which had voted for this rival at Chicago?

The President sent his reply the same day. He armed himself with his irresistible logic, his faultless tact, his limitless patience, his kindest but most imperturbable firmness. Only the "hand of iron in the glove of velvet" could have written the following answer:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861.

HON. W. H. SEWARD.

MY DEAR SIR: Since parting with you I have been considering your paper dated this day, and entitled "Some thoughts for the President's consideration." The first proposition in it is, "First, We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign."

At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said, "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts." This had your distinct approval at the time; and, taken in connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, directing him to employ every

means in his power to strengthen and hold the fort comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.

Again, I do not perceive how the reinforcement of Fort Sumter would be done on a slavery or party issue while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national and patriotic one.

The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that time we have been preparing circulars and instructions to ministers at the like, all in perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that we had no foreign policy.

Upon your closing proposition, that "whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it,

"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly,

"Either the President must do it himself, and be at the while active in it, or

"Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide, I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, I suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the Cabinet.

Your Ob't Serv't,

A. LINCOLN. †

In this reply not a word is omitted which was necessary, and not a hint or allusion is contained that could be dispensed with. The answer was conclusive and ended the argument. So far as is known, the affair never reached the knowledge of any other member of the Cabinet, or even the most intimate of the President's friends; nor was it probably ever again alluded to by either Lincoln or Seward. Doubtless it needed only the President's note to show the Secretary of State how serious a fault he had committed, for all his tireless industry and undivided influence continued to be given for four long years to his chief, not only without reserve, but with a sincere and devoted personal attachment. Lincoln, on his part, easily dismissed the incident from his thought with that grand and characteristic charity which sought only to cherish the virtues of men — which readily recognized the strength and acknowledged the services of his Secretary, to whom he unselfishly gave, to his own last days, his generous and unwavering trust.

* Unpublished MS.

† Unpublished MS.

UNDER THE FOAM.

LIGHTNESS and laughter are with such as he
 Only the surf upon the soul's deep sea;
 Passions of time but froth the upper main,
 While far beneath, eternal passions reign.

Charlotte Fiske Bates.

canons' homes, each set back in its luxuriant little garden. To the north is another expanse of green and then more houses. Most of the dwellings are of Elizabethan design, or of one of those Queen Anne or Georgian patterns which in this country we call "colonial." In size and shape they constantly remind us of things we have seen at home, but in material and color they are wholly English. They have fine red-tiled roofs, and their walls are of brick, or of brick and plaster, or of stone and flint; and where the stones have been patched with ruddy bricks there is no effort to conceal the disparity in material which gives so beautiful a variety in tint. Vines cover, trees empower, and flowers encircle them. The color effect as a whole is enchanting, and the air of mingled dignity, unworldliness, and peace which broods over the church itself broods over the dwellings of its ministrants as well.

Richard Poore, who, as bishop of Salisbury, founded its new church, was the same who a little later, as bishop of Durham, founded there the Chapel of the Nine Altars. It is unlikely that

he was in either case the architect; and though the Early-English style is used in both buildings, it is so differently used as not to suggest that their designer was one and the same. The utmost simplicity of which the Lancet Pointed style is capable rules at Salisbury, the utmost luxuriance at Durham — as regards not profuseness of ornament alone but the constructional forms themselves. It is a singular coincidence, therefore, but doubtless nothing more, that the first man whom we know to have actually built at Salisbury — perhaps as architect, perhaps merely as clerk-of-the-works — bears the name of the northern town, Elias de Derham.

Although Salisbury was a cathedral church from very early times, much of its history is as void of great prelatial names as the history of Peterborough, which was merely an abbey church until the sixteenth century. Not the bishops but the earls of Salisbury, whose cross-legged effigies may be seen in the nave, made the name of their town a power in the world.

M. G. van Rensselaer.


ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE CALL TO ARMS.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE FALL OF SUMTER.

MILITARY and naval expeditions rarely move at their first appointed time. That prepared by Captain Fox for Sumter was, by the President's order, directed to sail on April 6, but did not actually start till the 9th; that prepared by Captain Meigs for Fort Pickens was to have got off on the 2d, but only sailed on the 6th. The fitting out of both went on simultaneously at New York, but the officers concerned were not cognizant of each other's plans and measures, and it so happened that, through a misunderstanding which did not come to light until after the sailing of the latter, the war ship *Powhatan*, upon which Captain Fox depended for his most effective aid in his proposed efforts to relieve Fort Sumter, was transferred to the command of Lieutenant Porter, and sailed to Fort Pickens instead. The details of the incident are too long for the pages of this magazine and must be passed, with the simple statement that the



GENERAL M. C. MEIGS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

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Meigs expedition, in conjunction with the successful delivery of fresh orders to the fleet at Pensacola, made Fort Pickens entirely secure against assault by the rebel forces under Bragg, and also rendered more safe the Federal forts at Key West and Tortugas.

Meanwhile affairs at Fort Sumter were hastening to a crisis more rapidly than President Lincoln had been led to expect. The various occurrences during the month of March had created in Anderson the strong expectation that he would receive orders to evacuate the fort, and under this belief less care was taken to make his provisions hold out than might have been done. His letter of the 31st gave notice that "the last barrel of flour was issued day before yesterday"; and on the first day of April he once more wrote:

The South Carolina Secretary of War has not sent the authority asked for yesterday to enable me to send off the discharged laborers. Having been in daily expectation since the return of Colonel Lamon to Washington of receiving orders to vacate this post, I have kept these men here as long as I could. . . . I told Mr. Fox that if I placed the command on short allowance I could make the provisions last until after the 10th of this month; but as I have received no instructions from the Department that it was desirable I should do so, it has not been done. If the governor permits me to send off the laborers, we will have rations enough to last us about one week longer.*

Upon receipt of this notice President Lincoln issued his final order for the departure of the Sumter expedition, of which he gave notice to Anderson in the following instructions, drafted with his own hand:

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1861.

SIR: Your letter of the 1st instant occasions some anxiety to the President. On information of Captain Fox he had supposed you could hold out till the 15th instant without any great inconvenience, and had prepared an expedition to relieve you before that period. Hoping still that you will be able to sustain yourself till the 11th or 12th instant, the expedition will go forward; and, finding your flag flying, will attempt to provision you, and, in case the effort is resisted, will endeavor also to reënforce you.

You will therefore hold out, if possible, till the arrival of the expedition. It is not, however, the intention of the President to subject your command to any danger or hardship beyond what, in your judgment, would be usual in military life, and he has entire confidence that you will act as becomes a patriot and a soldier, under all circumstances. Whenever, if at all, in your judgment, to save yourself and command, a capitulation becomes a necessity, you are authorized to make it.†

* Anderson to Thomas, April 1, 1861. War Records.

† Lincoln, Autograph MS.



CAPTAIN GUSTAVUS V. FOX. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY CUDLIP.)

This manuscript draft, in words so brief and explicit, in tone so considerate and humane, in foresight and moderation so eminently characteristic of its author, as manifested in almost every important document of his administration, was sent to the War Department, where it was copied in quadruplicate, addressed to Major Robert Anderson, signed by Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, and one copy immediately transmitted by mail to Fort Sumter,‡ while other copies were dispatched by other methods. That same afternoon the Secretary of War and General Scott gave Captain Fox—who, having completed his preliminary arrangements, had come to Washington for the purpose—his final and confidential orders for the command, the destination, the supplies, and the reënforcements of the expedition. In a conversation that afternoon Fox reminded Lincoln that but nine days would remain in which to reach Charleston from New York, a distance of six hundred and thirty-seven miles, and that with this diminished time his chances were greatly reduced. But the President, who had calculated all the probabilities of failure, and who with more comprehensive statesmanship was looking through and beyond the Sumter expedition to the now inevitable rebel attack and the response of an awakened and united North, calmly assured him that he should best fulfill

‡ Anderson to Thomas, April 8, 1861. War Records.

his duty to make the attempt.* Captain Fox returned to New York April 5, with the orders of the Secretary of the Navy for the necessary coöperation of the war vessels. On the evening of April 8 the merchant steamer *Baltic*, bearing two hundred recruits, the required supplies, and Captain Fox, dropped down the bay and went to sea early next morning, with the belief and understanding that the war ships *Powhatan*, *Pawnee*, *Pocahontas*, and *Harriet Lane*, and the steam-tugs *Uncle Ben*, *Yankee*, and *Freeborn*, should meet the *Baltic* at the appointed rendezvous ten miles off Charleston bar, due east of the light-house, on the morning of the 11th of April.

Towards the end of March, while the interviews and conversations were going on between Judge Campbell and Seward, and the Sumter affair was a daily topic of discussion, Lincoln (to use his own words)

told Mr. Seward he might say to Judge Campbell that I should not attempt to provision the fort without giving them notice. That was after I had duly weighed the matter and come to the deliberate conclusion that that would be the best policy. If there was nothing before to bind us in honor to give such notice, I felt so bound after this word was out.†

It is impossible to fix the exact date of this presidential instruction; but several allusions indicate it with sufficient nearness. A dispatch of the commissioners under date of March 22 uses the phrase: "and what is of infinite importance to us, that notice will be given him [Campbell] of any change in the existing status."‡ So also Mr. Welles, advising the Fox expedition in the Cabinet meeting of March 29, adds, "and of communicating at the proper time the intentions of the Government to provision the fort peaceably if unmolested."§ Finally, as already stated, Mr. Seward, on April 1, gave Campbell the written memorandum. "The President may desire to supply Sumter, but will not do so without giving notice to Governor Pickens."||

Now that the Fox expedition was ready and ordered to sail, President Lincoln proceeded to carry out this part of his plan. Again, with his own hand, he prepared the following instructions:

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1861.

SIR: You will proceed directly to Charleston, South Carolina, and if, on your arrival there, the flag of the United States shall be flying over Fort Sumter, and the fort shall not have been attacked, you will procure an interview with Governor Pickens, and read to him as

* Fox, Report to Welles, Feb. 24, 1865.

† J. G. N., personal memoranda. MS.

‡ Commissioners to Toombs, March 22, 1861. MS.

§ Welles to Lincoln, Cabinet opinion, March 29, 1861. MS.

|| Campbell to Seward, April 13, 1861. "Rebellion Record."

follows: "I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only; and that, if such an attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition will be made without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort." After you shall have read this to Governor Pickens, deliver to him the copy of it here inclosed, and retain this letter yourself.

But if, on your arrival at Charleston, you shall ascertain that Fort Sumter shall have been already evacuated, or surrendered by the United States force, or shall have been attacked by an opposing force, you will seek no interview with Governor Pickens, but return here forthwith.¶

This autograph manuscript draft of Lincoln's was also copied, and signed "Simon Cameron, Secretary of War," and placed in the hands of Mr. R. S. Chew, a faithful clerk of the State Department, who proceeded to Charleston and delivered it to Governor Pickens.

Thus, on the evening of April 8, 1861, the Montgomery authorities received decisive information that all their hopes of recognition and peaceful disunion were at an end, and that the desperate trial of war was at length upon them. Already, to some extent, forewarned of this contingency, they hastened to make dispositions to meet it. The seven States of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were now united in the rebel Government; they were promptly notified of the changed condition of affairs, and each asked to raise a contingent of three thousand volunteers. Bragg, at Pensacola, was notified that "Our commissioners at Washington have received a flat refusal,"** and was instructed to put himself on the defensive, while officers, supplies, and soldiers were ordered to his support with a somewhat spasmodic energy. Beauregard was again put on the alert and ordered to increase his vigilance and vigor. "Under no circumstances are you to allow provisions to be sent to Fort Sumter."†† "Major Anderson's mails must be stopped. The fort must be completely isolated."‡‡ Beauregard complied with alacrity; issued orders, and sent detachments to his posts and batteries; armed additional guard-boats to patrol the harbor; and called out the entire balance of the contingent of five thousand men which had been authorized.

President Lincoln in deciding the Sumter question had adopted a simple but effective policy. To use his own words, he determined to "send bread to Anderson"; if the rebels fired on that, they would not be able to con-

¶ Lincoln, instructions, April 5, 1861. Autograph MS.

** Walker to Bragg, April 8, 1861. War Records.

†† Walker to Beauregard, April 8, 1861. War Records.

‡‡ Walker to Beauregard, April 9, 1861. War Records.

vince the world that he had begun civil war. All danger of misapprehension, all accusations of "invasion" and "subjugation," would fall to the ground before that paramount duty not only to the nation, but to humanity. This was universal statesmanship reduced to its simplest expression. To this end he had ordered the relief expedition to sail, and sent open notice to Governor Pickens of its coming. His own duty thus discharged, no less in kindness than in honesty, the American people would take care of the result. It is the record of history that he was right in both his judgment and his faith.

That he by this time expected resistance and hostilities, though unrecorded, is reasonably certain. The presence of armed ships with the expedition, and their instructions to fight their way to the fort in case of opposition, show that he believed the arbitrament of the sword to be at hand. His authorization to Anderson to capitulate after the ordinary risks of war is evidence that he did not expect a decisive battle or a conclusive victory. Whether the expedition would fail or succeed was a question of minor importance. He was not playing a game of military strategy with Beauregard. He was looking through Sumter to the loyal States; beyond the insulted flag to the avenging nation.

The rebels, on their part, had only a choice of evils. They were, as wrong-doers are sure to be, on the horns of a dilemma. Their scheme of peaceable secession demanded incompatible conditions — the union of the South and the division of the North. To preserve the former was to destroy the latter. If they set war in motion, they would lose their Democratic allies in the free States. If they hesitated to fight, the revolution would collapse in the slave-States. As usual on such occasions, rash advice carried the day. "Gentlemen," said an uncompromising fire-eater to Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet, "unless you sprinkle blood in the face of the people of Alabama, they will be back in the old Union in less than ten days."*

The possibility suggested to Captain Hartstene, that Sumter might be relieved by boats on a dark night, evidently decided the rebel authorities to order an immediate attack of

the fort.† They could not afford the risk of its successful defense. Its capture was the very life of the rebellion.

Therefore, on the 10th of April, they telegraphed to Beauregard:

If you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent who communicated to you the intention of the Washington government to supply Fort Sumter by force, you will at once demand its evacuation, and, if this is refused, proceed in such a manner as you may determine to reduce it.‡

At 2 P. M. on the 11th that officer accordingly made the demand, offering facilities to remove the troops, with their arms and private property, and the privilege of saluting their flag.§ The demand was laid before a council of officers, who voted a unanimous refusal.¶ "I have the honor," thereupon replied Anderson, "to acknowledge the receipt of your communication demanding the evacuation of this fort; and to say in reply thereto, that it is a demand with which I regret that my sense of honor, and of my obligations to my Government, prevent my compliance"; at the same time thanking him for his compliments and courteous terms.¶¶ The rebel aides-de-camp who bore these messages engaged in informal conversation with Anderson, in the course of which, with somewhat careless freedom, he said to them: "Gentlemen, if you do not batter the fort to pieces about us, we shall be starved out in a few days."** The phrase was telegraphed to Montgomery, whence instructions came back once more to offer time to deliver up the fort; whereupon, near midnight of the 11th, Beauregard again wrote:

If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter, and agree that in the mean time you will not use your guns against us unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire upon you.††

It was long past midnight when the aides once more reached the fort and handed this second message to Anderson. Anderson in return submitted to them the following proposition in writing:

I will, if provided with the proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th instant should I not receive prior to that time controlling instructions from my Government, or additional supplies; and that I will not in the mean

* McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," pp. 112, 113.

† As, in consequence of a communication from the President of the United States to the Governor of South Carolina, we were in momentary expectation of an attempt to reënforce Fort Sumter, or of a descent upon our coast to that end from the United States fleet then lying at the entrance of the harbor, it was manifestly an imperative necessity to reduce the fort as speedily as possible, and not to wait until the ships and the fort should unite in a combined attack upon us. Beauregard, Report, April 27, 1861. War Records.

‡ Walker to Beauregard, April 10, 1861. War Records.

§ Beauregard to Anderson, April 11, 1861. War Records.

¶ Foster, journal, April 11, 1861. War Records.

¶¶ Anderson to Beauregard, April 11, 1861. War Records.

** Chesnut, Lee, and Chisholm to Adj.-Gen. Jones, April 11, 1861. War Records.

†† Beauregard to Anderson, April 11, 1861, 11 P. M. Victor, "History Southern Rebellion."

time open my fire upon your forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort or the flag of my Government, by the forces under your command or by some portion of them, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile intention on your part against this fort or the flag it bears.*

This cautious and resolute answer was not what the rebel commander desired; but apparently he expected nothing else, for he had given his aides discretionary authority to refuse the stipulation. They retired to an adjoining room to consult and compose their answer, and at twenty minutes past three o'clock on the morning of Friday, April 12, 1861, handed Anderson their written notice that the rebel batteries would open their fire upon the fort in one hour. Then taking their leave, they entered their boat and proceeded directly to Fort Johnson, and gave to the officer commanding that post "the order to open fire at the time indicated."†

Unwelcome as was the prospect of the impending conflict, it must in one sense have been a relief as a contrast to the uncertainty in which the fate of the garrison had hung for more than three months. The decisive moment of action was at last reached, and the spirit and strength of every inmate of the fort leaped into new life under the supreme impulse of combat. Until the full dawning of the morning, nothing could be done within the fort. Anderson gave the necessary orders about the coming attack. The sentinels were all withdrawn from their exposed stations on the parapet; every gate and opening was closed; the men were strictly enjoined not to leave the shelter of the casemates except on special summons. These few preparations hastily completed, Sumter seemed to the outside world to have relapsed into the security and silence of a peaceful sleep.

The fort had been built on an artificial island midway in the mouth of Charleston harbor; it was three miles from the city, but projecting points of the neighboring islands inclosed it in a triangle. On these the rebels had built their siege works — to the north-east Fort Moultrie on Sullivan's Island, distant 1800 yards; to the south, the Cumming's Point batteries on Morris Island, distant 1300 yards; to the west, Fort Johnson on James Island, distant 2500 yards. Some were built merely to oppose the expected reinforcements through the harbor channels; most of them were earth-works. Two were constructed of wood and protected with railroad iron; one of these had been designed to serve as a floating battery, but proving a

failure in this object, was now advantageously grounded behind a protecting sea-wall. Altogether there were from fourteen to nineteen of these batteries, mounting a total of thirty guns and seventeen mortars, manned and supported by a volunteer force of four to six thousand men. The greater part of them were holiday soldiers, but among their officers were a dozen or two formerly belonging to the Federal army and possessed of a thorough military education. To these the management of the enterprise was mainly confided.

Fort Sumter, on its part, was a scarcely completed work, dating back to the period of smooth-bore guns of small caliber; its walls were of brick, forty feet high and eight feet thick; it was pierced for one hundred and forty guns, to be mounted in two tiers of casemates and on the parapet. But when Anderson inspected it on his arrival in November previous, the brick-work of walls and casemates was still unfinished, and only a few guns were mounted.‡ Foster, the engineer in charge, had, with limited help and materials, and in the face of constant obstacles and discouragements, pushed the work towards completion. There was now a total of forty-eight guns mounted and ready for use, though furnished with very rude and insufficient appliances. Of these, twenty-one were in the casemates and twenty-seven on the parapet. To man and support them Anderson had a garrison of nine commissioned officers, sixty-eight non-commissioned officers and privates, eight musicians, and forty-three non-combatant laborers — a total of one hundred and twenty-eight souls. We shall see that while the opposing artillery was nearly equal in number, there existed, in fact, a great disparity in its quality. Not only was Anderson's fire diffused and that of the enemy concentrated, but the rebels had on their side seventeen ten-inch mortars, which could deliver a vertical fire and drop large shells into the fort; while Anderson had nothing to answer them but the horizontal fire of his guns to throw missiles against the face of the rebel bomb-proofs, formed of heavy sand-banks or sloping railroad iron.

The inhabitants of Charleston were informed of the intended bombardment; months of speech-making, drilling, and war preparation had excited an intense eagerness to witness the fight. In the yet prevailing darkness they came pouring out of their houses by a common impulse, and thronged to the wharves and buildings on the bay, where they sought advantageous positions to behold the long-wished-for spectacle. At about half-past four, as the dim outline of Fort Sumter began to define itself in the morning twilight, they saw a shell rise from the mortar batteries near Fort

* Anderson to Beauregard, April 12, 1861, 2.30 A. M. Victor, "Southern Rebellion."

† Chesnut and Lee to Jones, April 12, 1861. War Records.

‡ F. J. Porter, Inspection Report. War Records.

Johnson, and make its slow and graceful curve upon Sumter. This was the signal. Gun after gun and battery after battery responded to its summons, and in less than an hour all the besieging works were engaged in an active cannonade.

Inside of Sumter the garrison received the assault with a certain degree of deliberation. The first care was to note the effect of the firing. The opening shots of the rebels were badly aimed, and fell wide of the mark. With the advancing daylight their gunners obtained a better range; the solid shot began to strike the face of the wall, and the shells from the mortars to explode with alarming precision over the parapet. Nevertheless, no great or rapid damage was done. One vital point was, however, quickly decided. Housed in the casemates, the garrison was comparatively safe; but out on the unprotected parapet, under the concentrated fire of all the rebel artillery, Anderson's little handful of cannoneers would melt away like frost in the morning sun. With a full war garrison he could have replaced officers and men as they were shot down; but with only sufficient trained force to work nine guns, he dared not risk the loss of a single man. His first reluctant duty, therefore, was to order the abandonment of all his barbette guns. These were twenty-seven in number, more than half his available armament, and comprising nearly all his pieces of large caliber. Through this necessity alone, Fort Sumter was largely shorn of its offensive power. His twenty-one casemate guns, of which only four were forty-two pounders, and the remainder thirty-twos, constituted the total of his fighting artillery.

The rations of bread having been exhausted a day or two before, the command breakfasted on pork and water, and at about 7 o'clock Captain Abner Doubleday, the ranking officer, took his station at a casemate gun and hurled the defiance of Sumter, with a solid shot, against the formidable iron-clad battery on Cumming's Point. Fully roused by the combined excitements of resentment and danger, the men sprang with alacrity to their duty; even the forty-three engineer workmen, forgetting their character of non-combatants, eagerly volunteered and rendered active service in the defense. In fact, the enthusiasm of the garrison somewhat outstripped its prudence. They began the engagement with a supply of only seven hundred cartridges; by the middle of the day this stock had become so much reduced that the fort was compelled to slacken its fire. From this time on only six guns were kept in action — two towards Morris Island, two towards Fort Moultrie, and two towards the batteries on the west end of Sulli-

van's Island. These were also fired at longer intervals, while the only six needles in the fort were kept busy sewing up cartridge-bags out of the extra clothing, blankets, hospital sheets, and even coarse paper.

So the unequal combat went on throughout the first day. The journal of the bombardment kept by Captain Foster shows that no very decisive damage was effected on either side. From the fort there were occasional good shots. The iron-clad batteries were repeatedly struck, but the light balls bounded off their sloping roofs. At other batteries they buried themselves harmlessly in the impervious rebel sand-banks. Embrasures were struck; groups of rebel officers and men allowing their curiosity to draw them out from their shelter were hustled pell-mell back into their bomb-proofs; an incautious schooner, receiving a ball, hauled down her Confederate flag and hurried out of range; the two forty-two pounders bearing on Moultrie silenced a gun, riddled the barracks and quarters, and tore three holes through the rebel flag.

The effect of the enemy's fire upon Fort Sumter [says Foster] during the day was very marked in respect to the vertical fire. This was so well directed, and so well sustained, that from the seventeen mortars engaged in firing ten-inch shells one-half of the shells came within or exploded above the parapet of the fort, and only about ten buried themselves in the soft earth of the parade without exploding. . . . The effect of the direct fire from the enemy's guns was not so marked as the vertical. For several hours' firing from the commencement, a large proportion of their shot missed the fort. Subsequently it improved, and did considerable damage to the roof and upper story of the barracks and quarters, and to the tops of the chimneys on the gorge. . . . The shots from the guns in the batteries on the west end of Sullivan's Island did not produce any considerable direct effect, but many of them took the gorge in reverse in their fall, completely riddling the officers' quarters, even down to the first story, so great was the angle of fall of many of the balls.

One additional danger manifested itself: three times during the day the wooden buildings in the fort caught fire, but were extinguished without great difficulty, being low and easily accessible. The rebel batteries, provided with several furnaces, now and then fired a hot shot; but whether these or bursting shells started the burning the officers themselves could not determine. The very work of ruin going on in the building used as officers' quarters aided in restraining the flames. The hallways were provided with iron water-tanks, which, being soon perforated by cannon-balls, deluged the chambers, and rendered the wood difficult to ignite.

Amid experience of this kind the eventful 12th of April, the first day of the Sumter bombardment, at length drew to a close. The fire of Sumter ceased; the direct fire of the

rebel batteries slackened, and was finally discontinued; only the mortars kept up a slow and sullen bombardment through the night at intervals of from ten to fifteen minutes. The work of sewing up cartridge-bags was continued until midnight; sentinels and lookouts were stationed to watch for the possible coming of boats from the fleet—possibly of boats bearing a storming party from the rebel camps. But the night proved dark and rainy, with a continuance of the prevailing gale, making the waters of the harbor too rough for either of these undertakings. Under cover of the thick gloom, Foster, the engineer, ventured outside the walls and satisfied himself “by personal inspection that the exterior of the work was not damaged to any considerable extent, and that all the facilities for taking in supplies in case they arrived were as complete as circumstances would admit.”* Three United States men-of-war had been seen off the bar during the afternoon, and the fort had dipped its flag in signal to them. What was the fleet doing?

The several vessels of the Fox expedition were scarcely at sea when they encountered a driving gale. Captain Fox himself, who sailed in the *Baltic* on the morning of the 9th, was yet ignorant of the changed destination of the flag-ship *Powhatan*. This was doubtless an entirely unintentional omission, arising through the cares, the dangers, the confusion, the cross-purposes, the system of profound secrecy which for a few days prevailed at Washington. The *Baltic* reached the rendezvous off Charleston just in time to hear the opening guns of the bombardment. The *Harriet Lane* was already there. The *Pawnee* arrived at daylight. There was an apparent conflict of orders, and a hesitation to coöperate. The *Baltic* and the *Harriet Lane* stood in to offer to carry provisions to the fort; but as they neared the bar of the harbor, they saw by the quick-flashing rebel guns that the war was already begun. At this intelligence, the commander of the *Pawnee* declared his intention to go in and “share the fate of his brethren of the army.” Fox, cool and practical, brought him back to reason by explaining the Government instructions, and induced him to await the chance of rendering more effective service. The two ships of war anchored near the bar, and the *Baltic* stood off and on to await the arrival of the *Powhatan* and the tugs. This, however, was a vain hope. The *Powhatan* was on her way to Pensacola, the tugs had been scattered by the storm. The *Freeborn* was not permitted to leave New York. The *Uncle Ben* was driven into Wilmington and fell into the hands of the rebels. The *Yankee* failed to

reach the rendezvous till long after the whole affair was over. But, still ignorant of these disasters, and hoping hourly for the arrival of the missing vessels, the fleet waited and made signals all the long afternoon and through the dark and stormy night, while the lookouts in the garrison were anxiously scanning the turbulent waters of the bay for the coming of the boats, and the rebel gunners stood by their channel batteries in the drenching rain hoping to intercept and sink them.

Captain Fox and the officers of the fleet were sorely disappointed at the non-arrival of the *Powhatan* and the tugs. The former had on board the armed launches and the necessary sailors to man them; the tugs were to have carried the supplies and perhaps drawn the boats in tow. With these facilities for transportation, there is every probability that they would have reached the fort. The storm was both an advantage and a hindrance; it increased the friendly darkness to hide them from the rebel gunners, but at the same time it lashed the waters of the bay into fury. When morning came, such had been the pitchy gloom of the night and the roaring of the rain and the surf, that the commanders of the rebel batteries were unable to report that their watch and guard had been completely effective. “Opinions differ,” wrote one of their best officers, “as to whether anything got into Sumter last night. They may or may not. The night was dark and occasionally stormy, and a heavy sea running. If anything did, it could not have been very extensive.”†

With the morning of the 13th, Captain Fox and the officers began to despair of the *Powhatan* and the tugs. Unwilling to remain mere idle spectators of the fight, they cast about to use such expedients as presented themselves. Among the merchant vessels by this time collected at the bar, awaiting the issue of the contest, was an ice schooner; this they impressed and began to prepare for an attempt to enter the following night. There were plenty of volunteers among both officers and seamen for the hazardous duty; but long before night-fall the bombardment had come to an end. That Captain Fox’s undertaking thus terminated without direct practical result was not his fault. With characteristic firmness and generosity, President Lincoln took upon himself the principal blame for its failure.

The practicability of your plan [so he wrote to Fox soon afterward] was not in fact brought to a test. By reason of a gale well known in advance to be possible and not improbable, the tugs, an essential part of the plan, never reached the ground; while, by an accident for which you were in nowise responsible, and possibly I to some extent was, you were deprived of a war-vessel, with her men, which you deemed of great im-

* Foster, journal, April 12, 1861. War Records.

† Whiting to Beauregard, April 13, 1861. MS.

portance to the enterprise. . . . You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter, even if it should fail; and it is no small consolation now to feel that our anticipation is justified by the result.*

"Fort Sumter opened early and spitefully, and paid especial attention to Fort Moultrie—almost every shot grazing the crest of the parapet, and crashing through the quarters.†" This was the rebel report of the beginning of the second day's bombardment, April 13. The garrison of Sumter was refreshed by a night of comparatively secure rest in their casemates, and, no doubt, a hearty breakfast of pork and water, and, so long as the stock of cartridges made up during the night held out, they kept up so brisk a fire from their few guns that the rebels began to be confirmed in the opinion that the fort had really been reënforced. On their side the besiegers also increased both the speed of firing and their accuracy of aim, and seeing that they were making no headway in the test of breaching the walls, they began to pay more attention to the use of red-hot shot.‡

Thus far this unequal contest of nearly fifty concentrating guns, replied to by about six, had gone on without material damage to either party—showing, in proportion to the strength of each, nothing but indented brick walls or displaced sand-bags, battered chimneys and perforated barracks, a few slight contusions from splinters, and one or two disabled guns. According to all the reports, it might have proceeded at this rate the whole week, and the waste of ammunition would have been its most serious feature. But at this stage a new element entered into the strife, and soon turned the fortune of the day against the unlucky garrison of Sumter.

At about 9 o'clock in the morning, the roof of the officers' quarters once more caught fire, either from a bursting shell or a red-hot shot; and this time a distance from water, and the exposure to the enemy's missiles, made it impossible to extinguish the flames. Worse than all, it quickly became evident that the fire would soon encircle the magazine and make it imperative to close it. At Captain Foster's suggestion, all hands not employed at the guns now sprang to the work of taking out a supply of powder. About fifty barrels were thus secured, distributed for safety in the various casemates, and covered with wet blankets, when the fire and heat so far increased that it was necessary to close the heavy metal doors of the magazine and bank it up with earth. The enemy, observing the smoke, redoubled the fire of the batteries; a strong

south wind carried the flame to all the barracks inside the fort; and though the men fought the advance of the fire, they were at length compelled to give way and take refuge in the casemates. Even here they were not safe; the course of the wind was such as to fill every nook and corner of the fort with blinding, stifling smoke; the men crouched close down to the floors, covered their faces with wet handkerchiefs, or took exposed stations near the embrasures to obtain a breath of fresh air. As if this were not enough, a still subtler danger pursued them. The rapid conflagration and sweeping wind had filled the air with fire-flakes, and these drifted on the strong currents and counter-currents into the casemates to such an extent as to ignite the beds, boxes, and various small articles hastily collected there. Under such circumstances the fifty barrels of powder saved with so much exertion from the magazine could no longer be kept, and upon Anderson's order all but five barrels were thrown through the embrasures of the fort into the sea. Noon had meanwhile come, and, engaged in these pressing occupations, the garrison had ceased firing. By-and-by the wind changed a little, rendering the situation somewhat safer and more comfortable. There were but few cartridges left; still an occasional shot was fired, which the rebels themselves, roused to admiration of the garrison, received with cheers.

A new incident now engaged general attention. The flag-staff of the fort, struck seven different times during the first day and three the second, fell at about one o'clock in the afternoon. Lieutenant Snyder and a couple of men, without much delay, again hoisted the flag on a jury-mast extemporized on the parapet. The rebels had meanwhile noted the fall of the flag, and sent several different communications to Sumter. The first messenger was the ubiquitous and eccentric Senator Wigfall. Beauregard, to get rid of him, sent him as an aide to the commander of Morris Island. From there, after a short consultation among the rebel officers, he was dispatched to Fort Sumter to make inquiries. He crossed the bay dramatically in an open boat, with his handkerchief tied to his sword for a flag of truce, and clambered up the wall to an accessible embrasure, where, one account says, an astonished artilleryman, seeing this unique apparition, summarily made him a prisoner of war.§

Officers soon came, however, and after a somewhat spirited dialogue, and some further waving of Wigfall's sword and handkerchief out of an embrasure, to which the rebel batteries paid no attention, he was brought into

* Lincoln to Fox, May 1, 1861.

† Ripley, Report, April 16, 1861. War Records.

‡ Foster, journal, April 13, 1861. War Records.

§ Doubleday, "Forts Sumter and Moultrie."

Anderson's presence. He made a complimentary speech to Anderson, requesting that hostilities might be suspended and terms of evacuation arranged. What then occurred Captain Foster reports as follows:

The commanding officer desiring to know what terms he came to offer, Mr. Wigfall replied, "Any terms that you may desire,—your own terms,—the precise nature of which General Beauregard will arrange with you." The commanding officer then accepted the conditions, saying that the terms he accepted were those proposed by General Beauregard on the 11th, namely: to evacuate the fort with his command, taking arms and all private and company property, saluting the United States flag as it was lowered, and being conveyed, if he desired it, to any Northern port. With this understanding Mr. Wigfall left, and the white flag was raised and the United States flag lowered by order of the commanding officer.

The officious Wigfall had not been gone a great while when two different messages arrived at Sumter from General Beauregard—the first to inquire whether Anderson needed assistance, and the second to tender him the use of a fire-engine and the services of a surgeon, both of which they had brought from the city. All of these Anderson declined with thanks, saying he had no wounded, that the fire was by this time nearly burned out, and that he thought the magazine safe. From these interviews Anderson now learned that Beauregard was entirely ignorant of Wigfall's mission or his own capitulation. He explained the circumstances, and threatened to hoist again his flag. He was persuaded, however, first to submit the matter to be fully reported at headquarters. General Beauregard, after some parley, ratified Wigfall's unauthorized proceeding and accepted Anderson's terms in detail. By eight o'clock on Saturday evening the capitulation was definitely arranged, and on the following day, Sunday, April 14, Anderson and his command sailed northward in the *Baltic*, which had come to the relief of Sumter.

In a military point of view, Anderson's capitulation was hasty. The defense of the fort can hardly be called heroic; there was not a man killed, not a casemate gun disabled, not a breach in the walls, plenty of ammunition in the magazine, and starvation not immediately impending.

The burning of the quarters [says Captain Foster] produced a great effect on the defense while the fire lasted, inasmuch as the heat and smoke were almost stifling, and as the fire burned all around the magazines, obliging them to be closed, and thus preventing our getting powder to continue the firing. It also destroyed the main gates and the gun-carriages on the

parapet of the gorge. But we could have resumed the firing as soon as the walls cooled sufficiently to open the magazine, and then, having blown down the wall left projecting above the parapet, so as to get rid of flying bricks, and built up the main gates with stones and rubbish, the fort would actually have been in a more defensible condition than when the action commenced. . . . The want of provisions would soon have caused the surrender of the fort, but with plenty of cartridges the men would have cheerfully fought five or six days, and, if necessary, much longer, on pork alone, of which we had a sufficient supply. I do not think that a breach could have been effected in the gorge at the distance of the battery on Cumming's Point within a week or ten days; and even then, with the small garrison to defend it and means for obstructing it at our disposal, the operation of assaulting it, with even vastly superior numbers, would have been very doubtful in its results.*

An ambitious and combative commander, therefore, carefully noting these elements of strength and resistance, and seeing a relieving fleet at the mouth of the harbor, would have "held the fort," and sent back a message of defiance. But when Anderson first took command of Sumter he wrote that "my position here is rather a politico-military than a military one," and on this assumption he seems to have acted throughout. Viewed in a political light, his conduct is perfectly justifiable. He had faithfully maintained the authority of the Government and the honor of the flag. He had repelled force by force. Obeying President Lincoln's instructions, he had incurred the ordinary risks of war, and now possessed full authority to save himself and his command by capitulation.

In the bombardment of Sumter the insurgents for the third time made active, aggressive war upon the United States, even if we leave out of sight the occupation of forts by simple entrance or by the show of force, the building of batteries to menace Sumter, and receiving the surrender made by Twiggs in Texas. In fact, since the 27th of December, a continued series of acts had been perpetrated by them, not only outraging the authority of, but levying actual war against, the United States.

The rebels indulged in great rejoicing over their victory. Charleston, which had for two days witnessed the bombardment almost *en masse*, was once more vociferous with speeches and ablaze with bonfires; while at Montgomery the insurgent Secretary of War ordered an official salute to celebrate the surrender, and to emphasize the prediction of the previous evening that the rebel flag would

It cannot be touched from Cumming's Point. The late bombardment shows that. Let the enemy occupy it [Morris Island] entirely. We can shell him out from our remaining mortar batteries and keep him at a distance." Whiting to Beauregard, April 17, 1861. MS.

* The opinion of the rebel engineer, after the bombardment, agrees with that of Captain Foster. Major Whiting wrote as follows to Beauregard, on the 17th of April, proposing to abandon Morris Island: "Fort Sumter cannot be retaken from Morris Island alone. Your mortar batteries have accomplished that work.

"float over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington before the 1st of May."*

Looking back now at the events of the first month of Lincoln's administration, we must wonder at the impression which prevailed then, and which has so often been expressed by impulsive men since, that he was too slow in making his decision to provision and re-enforce Fort Sumter.

We find that on the 15th of March, only ten days after his first information about the condition of the fort, he formally asked the written opinion of his Cabinet on the subject; and that on the 6th of April, only three weeks later, he gave his final order that the expedition should proceed on its mission. The intervening time was spent by him in consulting his Cabinet and his military and naval officers about possible plans for relief and reënforcement; about alternative policies to be pursued; watching the culminating treason in the South and the slowly swelling loyalty in the North; awaiting the end of the contradictory words and acts of the Virginia Convention, whose majority protested Unionism in public and at last voted secession in secret; allowing his Secretary of State, by an unofficial negotiation with the rebel commissioners, to disclose the attitude of the Montgomery cabinet; using the delay which the rebels supposed they had contrived for their own benefit for preparing the Sumter expedition; making the individual members of his Cabinet responsible to the party and to the country for the advice they gave; and finally, by all this, to gain a coveted "choice of position" and compel the rebels to attack and thus consolidate the North.

When he finally gave the order that the fleet should sail he was master of the situation; master of his Cabinet; master of the moral attitude and issues of the struggle; master of the public opinion which must arise out of the impending conflict; master if the rebels hesitated or repented, because they would thereby forfeit their prestige with the South; master if they persisted, for he would then command a united North. And all this was done, it must be remembered, not in the retirement which gives calm reflection, but after the rush and hurry of a triumphal journey and the parade of an inauguration, in the confusion of conflicting counsel, the worry of preliminary appointments, the prevalence of an atmosphere of treason and insurrection, the daily defection of Government officials.

In the face of such self-assertion and victory, the verdict of history can never be that he was tardy or remiss; to have acted more

peremptorily in that strange crisis, when all men's minds were simply groping and drifting, would have brought upon him the just criticism of recklessness. No act of his will gain him greater credit than his kindly forbearance and patient wisdom in allowing full time and reflection for the final decision at this supreme juncture. He had said in his inaugural: "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors." This promise to the South he kept in its most vital spirit and meaning. An autocratic ruler might have acted more arbitrarily; but in a representative government it would have been imprudent to do otherwise than to await and rely upon the slow but mighty anger of an outraged patriotism.

THE CALL TO ARMS.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S decision and orders to prepare the Sumter and Pickens expeditions brought him face to face with the serious possibilities of civil war; and better to understand any military problems with which he might have to deal, he wrote to General Scott on the 1st of April, as follows:

Would it impose too much labor on General Scott to make short, comprehensive, daily reports to me of what occurs in his department, including movements by himself, and under his orders, and the receipt of intelligence? If not, I will thank him to do so.†

General Scott at once complied with the request, and from the 1st of April to the 4th of May sent the President nearly every day a short memorandum in his own handwriting, inclosed in an envelope marked "confidential"—the whole series forming collectively a sort of historical journal of the highest interest and authenticity; and portions of it show better than any comment what was being done by the new Administration to meet the crisis which the Fort Sumter bombardment precipitated upon the country.

"General Scott's daily report, No. 3,"—so indorsed in Lincoln's handwriting and dated April 3, 1861,—in part runs thus:

There will remain in Washington a detachment of cavalry recruits from Carlisle recruiting depot, about 80 men and horses; Magruder's horse artillery; Griffin's ditto, belonging to the Military Academy and now needed there; Elsey's foot artillery and Haskin's ditto. The companies of foot artillery are acting as infantry. The number of marines at the Washington Navy Yard varies. We heard to-day that the number now there is some 200. There is not another company of regulars within reach of Washington, except 7 at Fort Monroe, making about 400 men, the minimum force needed there under existing circumstances; one company at the Fayetteville arsenal, N. C., to guard arms and ammunition against a thick population of blacks; a garrison of recruits (50) at Ft. Washington, ten miles

* "Rebellion Record."

† Unpublished MS.

below us; a garrison of 100 recruits in Fort McHenry, Baltimore; about 750 recruits in New York harbor; 220 ditto at Newport Barracks opposite to Cincinnati, and about 350 men at Jefferson Barracks and the St. Louis arsenal near by, mostly recruits.*

This memorandum was supplemented two days later (April 5, 1861) by a detailed report from the Adjutant-General to the President, which showed the full strength of the army of the United States and its distribution to be as follows:

Department of the East, 3894; Department of the West, 3584; Department of Texas, 2258; Department of New Mexico, 2624; Department of Utah, 685; Department of the Pacific, 3382; miscellaneous, 686; grand total, officers and men, 17,113.*

General Scott's daily report, April 5, 1861:

I have nothing of special interest to report to-day; but that machinations against the Government and this capital are secretly going on all around us, in Virginia, in Maryland, and here, as well as farther south, I have no doubt. I cannot, however, say that they are as yet formidable, or are likely ever to come to a head. I have no policemen at my service, and no fund for the payment of detectives, but under the circumstances recommend that such agents should be at once employed in Baltimore, Annapolis, Washington, Alexandria, Richmond, and Norfolk. For the reasons stated, I am not prepared to suggest that a militia force should be called out to defend this Capital, under section 2 of the militia act, passed February 28, 1795. The necessity of such call, however, may not be very distant.*

General Scott's daily report, April 6, 1861:

A second steamer will arrive from Texas at New York in a day or two, with six troops of dismounted cavalry. In advance, I have ordered two of those companies or troops to proceed from the ship to this place, to be filled up with men (cavalry recruits) here. . . . The other four troops of cavalry I have ordered to proceed from the ship to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to be remounted there, whence they can be readily brought here if deemed necessary.*

General Scott's daily report, April 8, 1861:

For the defense of the Government, more troops are wanted. The steamer with the dismounted cavalry (six companies) from Texas, must be in New York to-day or to-morrow, to be followed by another steamer, with about the same number of troops, from Texas, in a week. There is a growing apprehension of danger here in the meantime. I rely on the presence of a third battery of flying artillery (Sherman's) by Saturday next. It is coming from Minnesota. Three other companies of artillery on foot, serving as infantry, will be at New York, from the same quarter, in fourteen days. All these reinforcements, excepting Sherman's battery, may be too late for this place. For the interval I have sent Colonel Smith (the immediate commander of all the forces in the District of Columbia) to learn what number of reliable volunteers can be obtained in this city, and have also desired him to see whether the companies already here may not be advantageously concentrated near to the President's square. I beg leave to suggest that a small war steamer, to cruise between Alexandria and the Long Bridge over the Potomac, would be of great importance to the system of defense that we are planning.*

* Unpublished MS.

General Scott's daily report, April 9, 1861:

I suggested to the Secretary of War yesterday the calling out, say ten companies, of the militia or (by substitution) uniformed volunteers of this city to aid in the defense of the public buildings and other public property of the Capital against "an invasion or insurrection, or probable prospect thereof." The necessity for this additional force, and the manner of employing it, were yesterday pretty fully discussed before the Secretary of War by Colonel Smith, Colonel Stone (two most excellent officers), and myself. Colonel Stone, inspector-general to Major-General Weightman's division, thinks that twice that number of loyal volunteers can be promptly furnished by the division, and I apprehend that the twenty companies may be deemed necessary in a few days. I hope that the President may give the Secretary of War the authority to make the call for ten companies at once. . . . I have this moment received the President's instructions of this date, through the Secretary of War, on the safety of this District.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 9, 1861.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SCOTT.

Sir: I am instructed by the President of the United States to direct you to take all necessary precautions for protecting this Capital against a surprise or any assault whatever, and that for this object, among other means, you proceed forthwith to mature a plan under the 24th Section of the Act of Congress entitled "An Act more effectually to provide for the organization of the militia of the District of Columbia," approved March 3, 1803, and that you advise the President whenever in your judgment the occasion shall have arisen for the President's action under said section.

Very respectfully,

SIMON CAMERON,

Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJ.-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1861.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 9.

I. A Military Department to be taken from the Department of the East and called the Department of Washington is hereby constituted, to consist of the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia, according to its original boundary.

Brevet-Colonel C. F. Smith, 10th Infantry, is assigned to the command of this Department according to his brevet rank. Headquarters at Washington City. . . . By order:

L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General* †

General Scott's daily report, April 11, 1861:

Several companies of District volunteers were mustered into the pay and service of the United States yesterday and this forenoon, and the process is still going on. A few individuals in several companies declining to take the oath of allegiance to the United States were of course rejected; but I am happy to report that five or six other companies have sworn allegiance without excepting a man. The stripping of the rejected men yesterday of their arms, accoutrements and uniforms, by their own officers, has, I learn, had a fine effect upon the patriotism and devotion of the entire militia of the District. A fine company, not one of the ten called for, having presented itself this morning, of its own motion, and requested it might be accepted, I did not hesitate to consent, and hope for approval. Before night we shall have probably eleven companies sworn in. The Clerk of the House of Representatives having, through the Secretary of War, desired that a company might be assigned to guard the Capitol, I shall instruct Col. Smith to comply with that reasonable request.*

† War Records.

General Scott's daily report, April 13, 1861 :

The two companies of dismounted cavalry arrived last night, as I had anticipated in my report of yesterday. At my instance the Secretary of War has called for four other companies of District volunteers, which will make in all fifteen companies of this description for the defense of the Capital, besides six companies of regulars, the marines at the Navy Yard, and (I hope very soon) the war steamer to cruise on the Potomac between the Long Bridge and a point a little below Alexandria. The next regular reinforcements to be expected here are: Sherman's battery of flying artillery from Minnesota, and the companies of foot artillery from the same quarter, in five and seven days; and a portion of the troops expected in the next steamer from Texas. From the same steamer I shall have the means of reinforcing Fort McHenry (at Baltimore), a most important point.*

These extracts show us the steps which were being quietly taken by the Government to meet the possible dangers growing out of the Fox expedition to Charleston. They included every resource which the regular army then afforded; and to call upon the militia of the States was, of course, at that moment out of the question, as it would have frustrated the very result the President had planned and anticipated.

The Sumter fleet finally at sea, the official notice sent to Governor Pickens, and the work of enrolling militia for the defense of Washington progressing so satisfactorily, Lincoln again set himself, during the brief respite, to the work of making the new appointments. Ordinarily this was only an act of official favor or partisan reward, which might be performed at leisure; but now it was also a work of pressing need, because of the imperative duty of substituting faithful and loyal agents for indifferent or treasonable ones in the public service. That such abounded, the numerous resignations and still more plentiful avowals made manifest beyond a doubt. The city was full of strangers; the White House full of applicants from the North. At any hour of the day one might see at the outer door and on the staircase one file going, one file coming. In the anteroom and in the broad corridor adjoining the President's office there was a restless and persistent crowd,—ten, twenty, sometimes fifty, varying with the day and hour,—each one in pursuit of one of the many crumbs of official patronage. They walked the floor; they talked in groups; they scowled at every arrival and blessed every departure; they wrangled with the door-keepers for right of entrance; they intrigued with them for surreptitious chances; they crowded forward to get even as much as an instant's glance through the half-opened door into the Executive chamber. They besieged the representatives and senators who had privilege of

precedence; they glared with envy and growled with jealousy at the Cabinet ministers who, by right and usage, pushed through the throng and walked unquestioned through the doors. At that day the arrangement of the rooms compelled the President to pass through this corridor and the midst of this throng when he went to his meals in the other end of the Executive Mansion; and thus, once or twice a day, the waiting expectants would be rewarded by the chance of speaking a word, or handing a paper direct to the President himself—a chance which the more bold and persistent were not slow to improve.

At first, Lincoln bore it all with the admirable fortitude acquired in Western political campaigns. But two weeks of this experience on the trip from Springfield to Washington, and six weeks more of such beleaguering in the Executive office, began to tell on his nerves. What with the Sumter discussion, the rebel negotiation, the diplomatic correspondence, he had become worked into a mental strain and irritation that made him feel like a prisoner behind the Executive doors, and the audible and unending tramp of the applicants outside impressed him like an army of jailers. We can well imagine how it intensified the suspense with which he awaited the news from the fleet and the answer to his official communication to the governor of South Carolina.

Amid such surroundings and labors the President received the news which now reached the whole country from Sumter. It came very gradually—first the military scurry about Charleston; then Beauregard's demand for a surrender, followed by Anderson's prompt refusal; and finally, on the morning of Saturday, April 13, the newspapers of Washington, like those of every city in the Union, North and South, were filled with the startling head-lines and the thrilling details of the beginning and progress of an actual bombardment. That day, however, there was little change in the routine of the Executive office. Mr. Lincoln was never liable to sudden excitement or sudden activity. Through all his life, and through all the unexpected and stirring events of the rebellion, his personal manner was one of steadiness of word and act. It was this quality which, in the earlier stages of the war, conveyed to many of his visitors the false impression of his indifference. His sagacity gave him a marked advantage over other men in enabling him to forecast probable events; and when they took place, his great caution restrained his comments and controlled his outward bearing. Oftentimes, when men came to him in the rage and transport of a first indignation over some untoward incident,

* Unpublished MS.

they were surprised to find him quiet, even serene,—perhaps with a smile on his face and a jest on his lips,—engaged in routine work, and prone to talk of other and more commonplace matters. Of all things the strut and stagey exhibition of mock-heroism were foreign to his nature. Generally it happened that when others in this mood sought him, his own spirit had already been through the fiery trial of resentment—but giving no outward sign, except at times with lowered eyebrow, a slight nodding and shaking of the head, a muttering motion or hard compression of the lips, and, rarely, an emphatic downward gesture with the clenched right hand. His judgment, like his perception, far outran the average mind. While others fumed and fretted at things that were, all his inner consciousness was abroad in the wide realm of possibilities busily searching out the dim and difficult path towards things to be. His easy and natural attention to ordinary occupations afforded no indication of the double mental process which was habitual with him.

So, while the Sumter telegrams were on every tongue and revengeful indignation was in every heart, there was little variation in the business of the Executive Mansion on that eventful Saturday. The miscellaneous gathering was larger there, as it was larger at the Departments, the newspaper and telegraph offices, and the hotels. More leading men and officials called to learn or to impart news. The Cabinet, as by a common impulse, came together and deliberated awhile. All talk, however, was brief, sententious, informal. The issue had not yet been reached. Sumter was still under fire. Nevertheless, the main question required no discussion, not even decision, scarcely an announcement. Jefferson Davis's order and Beauregard's guns had sufficiently defined the coming action of the Government. After this, President, functionaries, and people had but a single purpose, a single duty. Lincoln said little beyond making inquiries about the current reports and criticising the probability or accuracy of their details, and went on receiving visitors, listening to suggestions or recommendations, and signing routine papers as usual throughout the day.

One important exception deserves to be noticed. A committee from the Virginia convention had an appointment for a formal audience with him that morning. The doubling and drifting attitude of the Old Dominion has already been described. The boasted conservatism of that convention was a sham. Its Unionism was vague and traditional; its complaint and contumacy were real and present. Day by day, with the loudest professions of loyalty on their lips, its majority was apolo-

gizing to its minority, and by labored argument against secession steadily convincing itself that treason was a necessity if not a duty. Recoiling from the fire of civil war, it yielded itself the more than half-willing cat's-paw of conspiracy. Bewailing the denial of shadowy claims of constitutional rights, it soon voluntarily put on the handcuffs of a grinding military despotism. A step in this road to political ruin was the appointment of a committee to visit Lincoln, requesting that he should define his policy, which request was only a covert and threatening demand for the evacuation of the Southern forts.

To this committee, Messrs. Preston, Stuart, and Randolph, respectively a "conservative," a "Unionist," and a "secessionist," the President read his reply just written,* on this morning of Saturday, April 13. The paper is temperate and dispassionate even to coldness, and indicates his ability to lift questions of public consideration out of the hot, blinding plane of personal feeling into the cool light of reason and expediency. While the rebel guns were still raining bombs and red-hot shot on Sumter, he had already mapped out his course of procedure, based on the facts within his knowledge, but free from all trace of excitement or feeling of revenge.

He told them he had distinctly defined his policy in the inaugural address. It was still the plain and unmistakable chart of his intentions. It had been his plan to hold only the forts still occupied by the Government when he became President.

But if [he continued], as now appears to be true, in pursuit of a purpose to drive the United States authority from these places an unprovoked assault has been made upon Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty to repossess, if I can, like places which had been seized before the Government was devolved upon me. And in every event I shall, to the extent of my ability, repel force by force. In case it proves true that Fort Sumter has been assaulted, as is reported, I shall perhaps cause the United States mails to be withdrawn from all the States which claim to have seceded, believing that the commencement of actual war against the Government justifies and possibly demands this. I scarcely need to say that I consider the military posts and property situated within the States which claim to have seceded as yet belonging to the Government of the United States as much as they did before the supposed secession. Whatever else I may do for the purpose, I shall not attempt to collect the duties and imposts by any armed invasion of any part of the country; not meaning by this, however, that I may not land a force deemed necessary to relieve a fort upon a border of the country. From the fact that I have quoted a part of the inaugural address, it must not be inferred that I repudiate any other part, the whole of which I reaffirm, except so far as what I now say of the mails may be regarded as a modification.†

* Committee, Report. "Richmond Enquirer," April 16, 1861.

† Lincoln to committee, April 13, 1861. MS.

In this reply of the President we have his entire administrative policy regarding the rebellion; but it must be noted that it goes only to the extent of his actual information — it deals only with accomplished facts. The programme of the inaugural is already modified; the modification is slight but significant, and based not upon caprice or resentment, but on necessity. According to fair interpretation of language, the programme of the inaugural was that he would execute the laws of the Union in all the States to the extent of his ability; hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and collect the duties and imposts. This he would do, however, only so far as it was necessary to protect and defend the Federal authority, not merely against domestic violence, but more especially against foreign influence or aggression. He would not invade, subjugate, menace, or harass local communities. All boundaries of the nation, sea-board or inland, he must, of necessity, hold and guard; he must occupy and control every custom-house or an efficient equivalent for it. The favorite theory was that duties might be collected on ship-board in insurgent ports, and thus avoid the friction of customs officers with the local populace. On inland boundaries other substitutes might perhaps be devised. So, also, he explains in his reply, the military posts he had intended to "hold, occupy, and possess" were this cordon of forts on the exterior boundary, all of which were still in Union hands when he was inaugurated. The interior places seized under Buchanan's administration he would not immediately grasp at with the military hand; he would forego the exercise of Federal offices in disaffected districts in the interior; as a means of reassurance and reconciliation he would even send the malcontents their regular mails, if they would permit him. All this not as a surrender of a single Federal right, but to avoid violence, bloodshed, irritation; to create a feeling of safety; to induce calm reflection; to maintain peace; to restore fraternal sympathies and affections. "You can have no conflict," he had told them, "without being yourselves the aggressors."

But, in immediate connection with the tender of this benign policy, he had also warned them that it would be modified or changed if "current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper." That experience had now come. The rebels had rejected the tendered immunity, spurned the proffered peace, become the aggressors, opened the conflict in deliberate malice. He therefore modified his plan. He would repel force by force. He would withdraw the mails. He would recapture Sumter, taken since his in-

auguration, and, if he could, such other forts and places taken under his predecessor as were essential to safety. Thus much was necessary for protection and for precaution. Less he could not do and fulfill his oath of office. Once more he told them that while he now felt himself by their act compelled to close and bolt the strong doors of Federal authority, he would yet refrain from even the appearance of punishment. Though he gave them to understand that he might attack the rebel batteries on Morris Island, or recapture Pensacola Navy Yard, or build a fort on Arlington Heights to protect Washington, yet he would "not attempt to collect the duties and imposts by any armed invasion of any part of the country."

His reply to the committee must be received with the same qualification which he attached to his inaugural. He still reserved the right to use his best discretion in every exigency, and to change his acts under the inspiration of current events and experiences. The events of the day were his beacons; the necessities of the hour formed his chart. Throughout the tedious four-years' war he pretended to no prophecy and recorded no predictions. When souls of little faith and great fear came to him with pertinacious questioning, he might possibly tell them what he had done; he never told them what he intended to do. "My policy is to have no policy," was his pithy axiom oftentimes repeated; whence many illogically and most mistakenly inferred him to be without plans or expedients. His promise to the Virginia committee must therefore be regarded as binding under the conditions of that day, namely: seven cotton-States leagued in rebellion; actual war begun; seven thousand rebels in arms at Charleston; Sumter under fire with prospect of capitulation; Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and other border States yet in the Union under loud protestations of loyalty and unceasing deprecation of civil war. Lincoln's reservation was well considered. One week from that day these conditions were transformed almost beyond comparison, compelling him to a widely different line of action. On the day they received their answer, the Virginia committee had an engagement to dine with Secretary Seward; but in view of the Sumter telegrams, they excused themselves and hurried back to Richmond.

By the next morning (Sunday, April 14) the news of the close of the bombardment and capitulation of Sumter was in Washington. In the forenoon, at the time Anderson and his garrison were evacuating the fort, Lincoln and his Cabinet, together with sundry military officers, were at the Executive Mansion, giving final shape to the details of the action the

Government had decided to take. A proclamation, drafted by himself, copied on the spot by his secretary, was concurred in by his Cabinet, signed, and sent to the State Department to be sealed, filed, and copied for publication in the next morning's newspapers. The document bears date April 15 (Monday), but was made and completed on Sunday. This proclamation, by authority of the Act of 1795, called into service seventy-five thousand militia for three months, and convened Congress in extra session on the coming 4th of July. It commanded treasonable combinations to disperse within twenty days, and announced that the first object of this military force was to repossess the forts and places seized from the Union.* This limit of time was made obligatory by the terms of the second section of the Act of 1795, under which the call was issued. It was necessary to convene Congress, and the law only authorized the use of the militia "until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the then next session of Congress."

In view of the subsequent gigantic expansion of the civil war, eleventh-hour critics continue to insist that a larger force should have been called at once. They forget that this was nearly five times the then existing regular army, and that in the Mexican war Scott had marched from Vera Cruz to the capital with twenty-five thousand men. They forget that only very limited quantities of arms, equipments, and supplies were in the Northern arsenals. They forget that the treasury was bankrupt, and that an insignificant eight million loan had not two weeks before been discounted nearly six per cent. by the New York bankers, some bids ranging as low as eighty-five.† They forget that the shameful events of the past four months had elicited scarcely a single spark of war feeling; that the great American public had suffered the siege of Sumter and firing on the *Star of the West* with a dangerous indifference. They forget the doubt and dismay, the panic of commerce, the division of counsels, the attacks from within, the sneers from without — that faith seemed gone and patriotism dead. Twenty-four hours later all this was measurably changed. But it was under such circumstances that Lincoln issued his call for seventy-five thousand men to serve three months. Even that number appeared a hazardous experiment — an immense army,

a startling expenditure. As matters stood, it seemed enough to cope with the then visible forces of the rebellion; the President had no means of estimating the yet undeveloped military power of the insurgent States. The ordinary *indicia* to accurate administration were wanting. To a certain degree the Government was compelled to sail in a fog. But it is precisely in such emergencies that men like Lincoln are the inestimable possession of free nations. Hopeful, moderate, steadfast, he never for an instant forgot that he was the pilot, not the ship. He remembered what he had said in the inaugural:

If the Almighty Ruler of nations with his eternal truth and justice be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the American people.

He felt quite as confident that this popular justice would ultimately translate itself into armed might. But, holding this faith, he was not carried away by any too sanguine impulses. While discussing the proclamation, some of his advisers made a disparaging contrast of Southern enterprise and endurance with the Northern. This indulgent self-deception he checked at the very outset.

We must not forget [he said] that the people of the seceded States, like those of the loyal ones, are American citizens, with essentially the same characteristics and powers. Exceptional advantages on one side are counterbalanced by exceptional advantages on the other. We must make up our minds that man for man the soldier from the South will be a match for the soldier from the North and *vice versa*. ‡

The action of the Government brought in its train countless new duties and details. Both at the departments and the Executive Mansion the Sunday was one of labor, not of rest — no end of plans to be discussed, messages to be sent, orders to be signed. The President's room was filled all day as by a general reception. Already the patriotic echoes were coming in from an excited country. Governor Ramsey of Minnesota telegraphed that he could send a thousand men, and other localities made similar tenders. Senators and representatives yet in Washington felt authorized to pledge the support of their States by voice and arms. Of all such words of cheer, it is safe to say none were personally so welcome and significant as the unreserved encouragement and adhesion of Senator Douglas of Illinois.

* Lincoln, proclamation April 15, 1861.

† The following letter to President Lincoln, dated Treasury Department, April 2, 1861, is from unpublished MS.:

MY DEAR SIR: The bids for the \$8,000,000 loan exceed 33,000,000 — the average advance from Mr. Dix's loan is from 3 to 4 per cent. The highest bid —

for only \$1000 though — is par, and near \$3,000,000 at 94; and I hardly think of taking any at lower rates. I am offered $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. premium on \$2,000,000 treasury notes. All this shows decided improvement in finances and will gratify you.

Yours, most truly,

S. P. CHASE.

‡ J. G. N., personal recollection.

Having, through a friend, signified his desire for an interview, Douglas went to the Executive Mansion between 7 and 8 o'clock on this same Sunday evening, April 14, and being privately received by the President, these two remarkable men sat in confidential interview, without a witness, nearly two hours. What a retrospect their singular careers must have forced into memory, if not into words, in this eventful meeting!—their contemporary beginnings in Illinois; the flat-boatman in Sangamon, the auctioneer's clerk in Scott county; their first meetings in country lawsuits; their encounters in the legislature; their greetings in society; their intellectual wrestlings on the stump; their emulation in local politics; their simultaneous leadership of opposing parties in the State; their champion contest for the Senate, ending in Douglas's triumph; their rival nominations for the Presidency, resulting in Lincoln's success. This was not the end. Both men were in the conscious prime of intellect; both believed themselves still in the undiminished vigor of physical manhood. Recognizing his defeat, Douglas was by no means conquered. If Lincoln was in the White House, he was yet in the Senate. Already in a Senate debate he had opened his trenches to undermine and wreck Lincoln's administration. Already he had set his subtle sophistry to demonstrate that the revenue laws gave the Executive no authority for coercion. His usual skill in debate, however, failed him on this occasion; and allowing himself to be carried along in a singularly weak and illogical argument, intended to force Mr. Lincoln and the Republican party into compromises to satisfy the border States and through their influence reclaim the cotton-States, he committed the serious blunder of declaring it unlawful and unwise to enforce the revenue laws in the insurrectionary ports or to recapture or hold their harbor defenses, except at Key West and Tortugas, which alone, he seemed to think, were "essentially national." He strongly deprecated the "reduction" and "subjugation" of the seceded States; and, declaring himself in favor of peace, said, with emphasis: "War is disunion. War is final, eternal separation." Perhaps intending merely to emphasize his attitude of mediation, he carelessly permitted himself to make a plea to tolerate accomplished secession.* All this was very far short of the language of his letter of acceptance, that "the laws must be administered, the constituted authorities upheld, and all unlawful resistance to these things must be put down with firmness,

impartiality, and fidelity." The adjournment of the Senate had terminated the debate without issue. Douglas was still lingering in Washington, when suddenly the whole country was holding its breath at the report of the outrage in Charleston harbor.

Wedded too closely to the acts of the demagogue, Douglas nevertheless possessed the vision and power of the statesman in a high degree. Past failures had come to him not so much through lack of ability, as through adherence to vicious methods. Estimating success above principle, he had adopted reckless expedients, and leagued himself with questionable and dangerous combinations; and his speech of the 15th of March was only a new instance of his readiness to risk his consistency and his fame for a plausible but delusive trick in party strategy. Until this time, throughout all his minor heresies, he had kept himself true and unspotted on one high point of political doctrine. The Union must be preserved, the laws enforced. In the face of temptation and defeat, in New Orleans and in Norfolk as boldly as in New York, he had declared that if Lincoln were elected he must be inaugurated and obeyed. This was popular sovereignty, genuine and undefiled. It was against this principle that the challenge had been hurled at Sumter, and the incident furnished Douglas the opportunity to retrieve the serious mistake of his recent Senate speech. That assault could no longer be disguised as lawful complaint or constitutional redress—it was the spring of a wild beast at the throat of the nation. It changed the issue from coercion to anarchy.† No single act of Douglas's life so strongly marks his gift of leadership as that he now saw and accepted the new issue, and without a moment's hesitation came forward and placed himself beside Lincoln in defense of the Government—the first as well as the greatest "war Democrat." An army with banners, not a marshal with a writ, was now the constitutional remedy. In the face of unprovoked military assault Douglas waived all personal rivalry and party issues, and assured Lincoln, without questions or conditions, of his help to maintain the Union.

With frankness and generosity as Lincoln's ruling instincts, his long-continued political contests with Douglas had always been kept within the bounds of personal and social courtesy, if we except their Illinois joint debates, where the heat of discussion had once or twice carried them to the verge of a personal quarrel. Those passages, however, were long since

* Douglas, Senate speech, March 15, 1861. "Globe."

† The very existence of the people in this great valley depends upon maintaining inviolate and forever that

great right secured by the Constitution, of freedom of trade, of transit, and of commerce, from the center of the continent to the ocean that surrounds it. . . .


forgotten by both. The present emergency was too grave for party feeling. Lincoln knew Douglas too well to underrate him. It was the President's method to apply the representative principle to problems of statesmanship. It did not need an instant's reflection to remember that next in value to the rank and file of the Republican party was the voluntary alliance of a great leader whom more than a million voters in the North had so lately followed unflinchingly to inevitable political defeat, and with whom that leader now offered to reënforce the defenders of the Union. If Lincoln had ever doubted the wisdom of his Sumter policy, which had kept

open the road to this alliance, it was here vindicated. On the following morning, side by side with Lincoln's proclamation, the whole country read the telegraphic announcement of the interview and the authorized declaration that while Douglas was yet "unalterably opposed to the Administration on all its political issues, he was prepared to sustain the President in the exercise of all his constitutional functions to preserve the Union, and maintain the Government, and defend the Federal capital."* If there had been any possible uncertainty in the premises before, this was sufficient to make the whole North a unit in demanding the suppression of the rebellion.

The proposition now is to separate these United States into little petty confederacies. First, divide them into two; and then, when either party gets beaten at the next election, subdivide again; then, whenever one gets beaten again, another subdivision; and then, when you beat on governor's election, the discomfited will rebel again, and so it will go on. And if this new system of resistance by the sword and bayonet to the results of the ballot-box shall prevail here in this coun-

try of ours, the history of the United States is already written in the history of Mexico. . . . It is not a question of union or disunion. It is a question of order; of the stability of the Government; of the peace of communities. The whole social system is threatened with destruction and with disruption. Douglas, speech at Bellair, April 22, 1861.

* Press telegram, April 15, 1861.



AN EASTERN LEGEND.

AT his Beloved's door he knocked, unheeding
 The mocking echoes drifting idly by:
 Then called a voice — the while his glad heart bounded —
 "Ah, who is there?" He answered, "It is I."
 "Think not these walls," the sweet, clear voice resounded,
 "These palace walls will me and thee contain."
 The shining door stood barred! His fervent pleading
 Was spent in vain.

In solitude, where desert sands are gleaming,
 Burned on his changeless love through patient years;
 Once more he comes, and knocks with trembling fingers;
 Once more his soul a thrilling music hears.
 Once more that voice across the silence lingers —
 "Ah, who is there?" He answers, "*It is thou!*"
 The door flies back! The sudden splendor, streaming,
 Enfolds him now!

Charlotte W. Thurston.

A FAR CRY TO HEAVEN.

WHAT! dost thou pray that the outgone tide be rolled back on the strand,
 The flame be rekindled that mounted away from the smoldering brand,
 The past-summer harvest flow golden through stubble-lands naked and sear,
 The winter-gray woods up-gather and quicken the leaves of last year? —
 Thy prayers are as clouds in a drouth; regardless, unfruitful, they roll;
 For this, that thou prayest vain things, 't is a far cry to Heaven, my soul,—
 Oh, a far cry to Heaven!

Thou dreamest the word shall return, shot arrow-like into the air,
 The wound in the breast where it lodged be balmed and closed for thy prayer,
 The ear of the dead be unsealed till thou whisper a boon once denied,
 Thy white hour of life be restored, that passed thee unprized, undescried! —
 For this, that thou prayest fond things, thy prayers shall fall wide of the goal;
 God bloweth them back with a breath, 't is a far cry to Heaven, my soul,—
 Oh, a far cry to Heaven!

And cravest thou fondly the quivering sands shall be firm to thy feet,
 The brackish pool of the waste to thy lips be made wholesome and sweet?
 And cravest thou subtly the bane thou desirest be wrought to thy good,
 As forth from a poisonous flower a bee conveyeth safe food? —
 For this, that thou prayest ill things, thy prayers are an anger-rent scroll;
 The chamber of audit is closed,—'t is a far cry to Heaven, my soul,—
 Oh, a far cry to Heaven!

Edith M. Thomas.

EVE.

LONE in the sunrise of primeval day,
 More lovely than the virgin world around,
 With fingers pressed on lips that made no sound,
 She stood and gazed. Spread out before her lay
 The future—and the clouds were rolled away.
 The war of kings in empires still unfound,
 The crash of cannon that should yet resound,
 She heard, and saw the great world rock and sway.
 Across the crimson sky above her head
 There came a cry of children asking food;
 A wail of women for the nations' dead
 Went upward to the stars. So pale she stood;
 Then to some secret place in Eden fled,
 And wept in presage of her motherhood.


W. J. Henderson.



SCULPTOR, CHR. ROTH.

ENGRAVED BY J. H. E. WHITNEY, AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY CHARLES HIDEUX.

PRINCE OTTO EDWARD LEOPOLD BISMARCK.



COLONEL ROSE'S TUNNEL AT LIBBY PRISON.

AMONG all the thrilling incidents in the history of Libby Prison none exceeds in interest the celebrated tunnel escape which occurred on the night of February 9, 1864. I was one of the 109 Union officers who passed through the tunnel, and one of the ill-fated 48 that were retaken. I and two companions — Lieutenant Charles H. Morgan of the 21st Wisconsin regiment, who has since served several terms in Congress from Missouri, and Lieutenant William L. Watson of the same company and regiment — when recaptured by the Confederate cavalry were in sight of the Union picket posts. Strange as it may appear, no accurate and complete account has ever been given to the public of this most ingenious and daring escape made on either side during the civil war. Twelve of the party of fifteen who dug the tunnel are still living, including their leader.

Thomas E. Rose, colonel of the 77th Pennsylvania Volunteers, the engineer and leader in the plot throughout, — now a captain in the 16th United States Infantry, — was taken prisoner at the battle of Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. On his way to Richmond he escaped from his guards at Weldon, N. C., but, after a day's wandering about the pine forests with a broken foot, was retaken by a detachment of Confederate cavalry and sent to Libby Prison, Richmond, where he arrived October 1, 1863.

Libby Prison fronts on Carey street, Richmond, and stands upon a hill which descends abruptly to the canal, from which its southern wall is only divided by a street and having a vacant lot on the east. The building was wholly detached, making it a comparatively easy matter to guard the prison securely with a small force and keep every door and window in full view from without. As an additional measure of safety, prisoners were not allowed on the

ground-floor, except that in the day-time they were permitted to use the first floor of the middle section for a cook-room. The interior embraced nine large warehouse-rooms 105 x 45, with eight feet from each floor to ceiling, except the upper floor, which gave more room, owing to the pitch of the gable roof. The abrupt slant of the hill gives the building an additional story on the south side. The whole building really embraces three sections, and these were originally separated by heavy blank walls. The Confederates cut doors through the walls of the two upper floors, which comprised the prisoners' quarters, and they were thus permitted to mingle freely with each other,




COLONEL THOMAS E. ROSE.

but there was no communication whatever between the three large rooms on the first floors. Beneath these floors were three cellars of the same dimensions as the rooms above them, and, like them, were divided from each other by massive blank walls. For ready comprehension, let these be designated the east, middle, and west cellars. Except in the lofts known as "Streight's room" and "Milroy's room," which were occupied by the earliest inmates of Libby in 1863, there was no furniture in the building, and only a few of the early comers possessed such a luxury as an old army blanket

No consideration of personal convenience was permitted to interfere with the general comfort of the "squad." Thus, when the hard floor could no longer be endured on the right side,—especially by the thin men,—the captain gave the command, "Attention, Squad Number Four! Prepare to spoon! One—two—spoon!" And the whole squad flopped over on the left side.

The first floor on the west of the building was used by the Confederates as an office and for sleeping-quarters for the prison officials, and a stair-way guarded by sentinels led from this to Milroy's room just above it. As before



LIBBY PRISON IN 1865.

or a knife, cup, and tin-plate. As a rule, the prisoner, by the time he reached Libby, found himself devoid of earthly goods save the meager and dust-begrimed summer garb in which he had made his unlucky campaign.

At night the six large lofts presented strange war-pictures, over which a single tallow-candle wept copious and greasy tears that ran down over the petrified loaf of corn-bread, Borden's condensed milk can, or bottle in which it was set, and where it struggled on until "taps," when the guards, with unconscious irony, shouted, "Lights out!" at which signal it usually disappeared amid a shower of boots and such other missiles as were at hand. The sleepers covered the six floors, lying in ranks, head to head and foot to foot, like prostrate lines of battle. For the general good, and to preserve something like military precision, these ranks (especially when cold weather compelled them to lie close for better warmth) were subdivided into convenient squads under charge of a "captain," who was invested with authority to see that every man lay "spoon fashion."

explained, the middle room was shut off from the office by a heavy blank wall. This room, known as the "Kitchen," had two stoves in it, one of which stood about ten feet from the heavy door that opened on Carey street sidewalk, and behind the stove was a fire-place. The room contained also several long pine tables with permanent seats attached, such as may be commonly seen at picnic grounds. The floor was constantly inundated here by several defective and overworked water-faucets and a leaky trough.

A stair-way without banisters led up on the south-west end of the floor, above which was a room known as the "Chickamauga room," and chiefly occupied by Chickamauga prisoners. The sentinel who had formerly been placed at this stair-way at night, to prevent the prisoners from entering the kitchen, had been withdrawn when, in the fall of 1863, the horrible condition of the floor made it untenable for sleeping purposes.

The uses to which the large ground-floor-room east of the kitchen was put varied during the first two years of the war, but early in

October of 1863, and thereafter, it was permanently used and known as the hospital, and it contained a large number of cots, which were never unoccupied. An apartment had been made at the north or front of the room, which served as a doctor's office and laboratory. Like those adjoining it on the west, this room had a large door opening on Carey street which was heavily bolted and guarded on the outside.

The arrival of the Chickamauga prisoners greatly crowded the upper floors, and compelled the Confederates to board up a small portion of the east cellar at its south-east corner as an additional cook-room, several large caldrons having been set in a rudely built furnace; so, for a short period, the prisoners were allowed down there in the day-time to cook. A stair-way led from this cellar to the room above, which subsequently became the hospital.

Such, in brief, was the condition of things when Colonel Rose arrived at the prison. From the hour of his coming, a means of escape became his constant and eager study; and, with this purpose in view, he made a careful and minute survey of the entire premises.

From the windows of the upper east or "Gettysburg room" he could look across the vacant lot on the east and get a glimpse of the yard between two adjacent buildings which faced the canal and Carey street respectively, and he estimated the intervening space at about seventy feet. From the south windows he looked out across a street into the canal and James River, running parallel with each other, the two streams at this point being separated by a low and narrow strip of land. This strip periodically disappeared when protracted seasons of heavy rains came, or when spring floods so rapidly swelled the river that the latter invaded the cellars of Libby. At such times it was common to see enormous swarms of rats come out from the lower doors and windows of the prison and make head for dry land in swimming platoons amid the cheers of the prisoners in the upper windows. On one or two occasions Rose observed workmen descending from the middle of the south side street into a sewer running through its center, and concluded that this sewer must have various openings to the canal both to the east and west of the prison.

The north portion of this cellar contained a large quantity of loose packing straw, covering the floor to an average depth of two feet; and this straw afforded shelter, especially at night, for a large colony of rats, which gave the place the name of "Rat Hell."

In one afternoon's inspection of this dark end Rose suddenly encountered a fellow-prisoner, Major A. G. Hamilton, of the 12th Kentucky Cavalry. A confiding friendship



MAJOR A. G. HAMILTON.

followed, and the two men entered at once upon the plan of gaining their liberty. They agreed that the most feasible scheme was a tunnel, to begin in the rear of the little kitchen apartment at the south-east corner of Rat Hell. Without more ado they secured a broken shovel and two case-knives and began operations.

Within a few days the Confederates decided upon certain changes in the prison for the greater security of their captives. A week afterward the cook-room was abandoned, the stair-way nailed up, the prisoners sent to the upper floors, and all communication with the east cellar was cut off. This was a sore misfortune, for this apartment was the only possible base of successful tunnel operations. Colonel Rose now began to study other practicable means of escape, and spent night after night examining the posts and watching the movements of the sentinels on the four sides of Libby. One very dark night, during a howling storm, Rose again unexpectedly met Hamilton in a place where no prisoner could reasonably be looked for at such an hour. For an instant the impenetrable darkness made it impossible for either to determine whether he had met a friend or foe: neither had a weapon, yet each involuntarily felt for one, and each made ready to spring at the other's throat, when a flash of lightning revealed their identity. The two men had availed themselves of the darkness of the night and the roar of the storm to attempt an escape

from a window of the upper west room to a platform that ran along the west outer wall of the prison, from which they hoped to reach the ground and elude the sentinels, whom they conjectured would be crouched in the shelter of some door-way or other partial refuge that might be available; but so vivid and frequent were the lightning flashes, that the attempt was seen to be extremely hazardous.

Rose now spoke of an entrance from the south side street to the middle cellar, having frequently noticed the entrance and exit of workmen at that point, and expressed his belief that if an entrance could be effected to this cellar it would afford them the only chance of slipping past the sentinels.

He hunted up a bit of pine-wood which he whittled into a sort of wedge, and the two men went down into the dark, vacant kitchen directly over this cellar. With the wedge Rose pried a floor-board out of its place, and made an opening large enough to let himself through it. He had never been in this middle cellar, and was wholly ignorant of its contents or whether it was occupied by Confederates or workmen; but as he had made no noise and the place was in profound darkness, he decided to go down and reconnoiter.

He wrenched off one of the long boards that formed a table-seat in the kitchen, and found that it was long enough to touch the cellar base and protrude a foot or so above the kitchen floor. By this means he easily descended, leaving Hamilton to keep watch above.

The storm still raged fiercely, and the faint beams of a street lamp revealed the muffled form of the sentinel slowly pacing his beat and carrying his musket at a "secure" arms. Creeping softly towards him along the cellar wall, he now saw that what he had supposed was a door was simply a naked opening to the street; and further inspection disclosed the fact that there was but one sentinel on the south side of the prison. Standing in the dark shadow, he could easily have touched this man with his hand as he repeatedly passed him. Groping about, he found various appurtenances indicating that the south end of this cellar was used for a carpenter's shop, and that the north end was partitioned off into a series of small cells with padlocked doors, and that through each door a square hole, a foot in diameter, was cut. Subsequently it was learned that these dismal cages were alternately used for the confinement of "troublesome prisoners"—*i. e.*, those who had distinguished themselves by ingenious attempts to escape—and also for runaway slaves, and Union spies under sentence of death.

At the date of Rose's first reconnoissance to this cellar, these cells were vacant and un-

guarded. The night was now far spent, and Rose proceeded to return to the kitchen, where Hamilton was patiently waiting him.

The very next day a rare good fortune befell Rose. By an agreement between the commissioners of exchange, several bales of clothing and blankets had been sent by our Government to the famishing Union prisoners on Belle Isle, a number of whom had already frozen to death. A committee of Union officers then confined in Libby, consisting of General Neal Dow, Colonel Alexander von Schrader, Lieut.-Colonel Joseph F. Boyd, and Colonel Harry White, having been selected by the Confederates to supervise the distribution of the donation, Colonel White had, by a shrewd bit of finesse, "confiscated" a fine rope by which one of the bales was tied, and this he now presented to Colonel Rose. It was nearly a hundred feet long, an inch thick, and almost new.

It was hardly dark the following night before Rose and Hamilton were again in the kitchen, and as soon as all was quiet Rose fastened his rope to one of the supporting posts, took up the floor-plank as before, and both men descended to the middle cellar. They were not a little disappointed to discover that where there had been but one sentinel on the south side there were now two. On this and for several nights they contented themselves with sly visits of observation to this cellar, during which Rose found and secreted various tools, among which were a broad-ax, a saw, two chisels, several files, and a carpenter's square. One dark night both men went down and determined to try their luck at passing the guards. Rose made the attempt and succeeded in passing the first man, but unluckily was seen by the second. The latter called lustily for the corporal of the guard, and the first excitedly cocked his gun and peered into the dark door through which Rose swiftly retreated. The guard called, "Who goes there?" but did not enter the dark cellar. Rose and Hamilton mounted the rope and had just succeeded in replacing the plank when the corporal and a file of men entered the cellar with a lantern. They looked into every barrel and under every bench, but no sign of Yankees appeared; and as on this night it happened that several workmen were sleeping in an apartment at the north end, the corporal concluded that the man seen by the sentinel was one of these, notwithstanding their denial when awakened and questioned. After a long parley the Confederates withdrew, and Hamilton and Rose, depressed in spirits, went to bed, and Rose as usual concealed his rope.

Before the week was out they were at it again. On one of these nights Rose suddenly came upon one of the workmen, and, swift as


thought, seized the hidden broad-ax with the intention of braining him if he attempted an alarm; but the poor fellow was too much paralyzed to cry out, and when finally he did recover his voice and his wits, it was to beg Rose, "for God's sake," not to come in there again at night. Evidently the man never mentioned the circumstance, for Rose's subsequent visits, which were soon resumed, disclosed no evidence of a discovery by the Confederates.

Hamilton agreed with Rose that there remained apparently but one means of escape, and that was by force. To overpower the two sentinels on the south side would have been an easy matter, but how to do it and not alarm

sought by their questioners to admit them to their confidence.

Hamilton and Rose now decided to organize an escaping party. A number of men were then sworn to secrecy and obedience by Colonel Rose, who was the only recognized leader in all operations that followed. This party soon numbered seventy men. The band was then taken down by Rose in convenient details to the middle cellar or carpenter's shop on many nights, to familiarize each man with the place and with his special part in the plot, and also to take advantage of any favoring circumstances that might arise.

When all had by frequent visits become familiar with the rendezvous, Rose and the



LIBBY PRISON AS IT NOW IS.

the rest of the guard, and, in consequence, the whole city, was the problem. To secure these sentinels, without alarming their comrades on the east, west, and north side of the prison, would require the swift action of several men of nerve acting in concert. Precious time was passing, and possibly further alterations might be decided upon that would shut them off from the middle cellar, as they had already been from their original base of operations. Moreover, a new cause of anxiety now appeared. It soon transpired that their nocturnal prowlings and close conferences together had already aroused the belief among many observant prisoners that a plan of escape was afoot, and both men were soon eagerly plied with guarded inquiries, and be-

whole party descended one night with the determination to escape at whatever hazard. The men were assigned to their several stations as usual, and a selected few were placed by the leader close to the entrance, in front of which the sentinel was regularly passing. Rose commanded strict silence, and placed himself near the exit preparatory to giving the signal. It was an exciting moment, and the bravest heart beat fast. A signal came, but not the one they looked for. At the very moment of action, the man whom Rose had left at the floor-opening in the kitchen gave the danger signal! The alert leader had, with consummate care, told every man beforehand that he must never be surprised by this signal,—it was a thing to be counted upon,—and that noise

and panic were of all things to be avoided as fatal folly in their operations. As a consequence, when this signal came, Rose quietly directed the men to fall in line and re-ascend to the kitchen rapidly, but without noise, which they did by the long rope which now formed the easy means of communication from the kitchen to the cellar.

Rose remained below to cover the retreat, and when the last man got up he followed him, replaced the board in the floor, and concealed the rope. He had barely done so when a detail of Confederate guards entered the kitchen from the Carey street door, and, headed by an officer, marched straight in his direction. Meantime the party had disappeared up the stair-way and swiftly made their way over their prostrate comrades' forms to their proper sleeping places. Rose, being the last up, and having the floor to fix, had now no time to disappear like his companions, at least without suspicious haste. He accordingly took a seat at one of the tables, and, putting an old pipe in his mouth, coolly awaited the approach of the Confederates. The officer of the guard came along, swinging his lantern almost in his face, stared at him for a second, and without a remark or a halt marched past him and ascended with his escort to the Chickamauga room. The entrance of a guard and their march around the prison, although afterward common enough after taps, was then an unusual thing, causing much talk among the prisoners, and to the mind of Rose and his fellow-plotters was indicative of aroused suspicion on the part of the Confederates.

The whispering groups of men next day, and the number of his eager questioners, gave the leader considerable concern; and Hamilton suggested, as a measure of safety rather than choice, that some of the mischievous talk of escape would be suppressed by increasing the party. This was acted upon; the men, like the rest, were put under oath by Rose, and the party was thus increased to four hundred and twenty. This force would have been enough to overpower the prison guard in a few minutes, but the swift alarm certain to ensue in the streets and spread like wild-fire over Richmond, the meager information possessed by the prisoners as to the strength and position of the nearest Federal troops, the strongly guarded labyrinth of breastworks that encircled the city, and the easy facilities for instant pursuit at the command of the Confederates, put the success of such an undertaking clearly out of the range of probability, unless, indeed, some unusual favoring contingency should arise, such as the near approach of a cooperating column of Federal cavalry.

Nor was this an idle dream, as the country

now knows, for even at this period General Kilpatrick was maturing his plans for that bold expedition for the rescue of the prisoners at Richmond and Belle Isle in which the lamented and heroic young cripple, Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, lost his life. Rose saw that a break out of Libby without such outside assistance promised nothing but a fruitless sacrifice of life and the savage punishment of the survivors. Hence the project, although eagerly and exhaustively discussed, was prudently abandoned.

All talk of escape by the general crowd now wholly ceased, and the captives resigned themselves to their fate and waited with depressed spirits for the remote contingency of an exchange. The quiet thus gained was Rose's opportunity. He sought Hamilton and told him that they must by some stratagem regain access to Rat Hell, and that the tunnel project must be at once revived. The latter assented to the proposition, and the two began earnestly to study the means of gaining an entrance without discovery into this coveted base of operations.

They could not even get into the room above the cellar they wanted to reach, for that was the hospital, and the kitchen's heavy wall shut them off therefrom. Neither could they break the heavy wall that divided this cellar from the carpenter's shop, which had been the nightly rendezvous of the party while the break-out was under consideration, for the breach certainly would be discovered by the workmen or Confederates, some of whom were in there constantly during daylight.

There was, in fact, but one plan by which Rat Hell could be reached without detection, and the conception of this device and its successful execution was due to the stout-hearted Hamilton. This was to cut a hole in the back of the kitchen fire-place; the incision must be just far enough to preserve the opposite or hospital side intact. It must then be cut downward to a point below the level of the hospital floor, then eastward into Rat Hell, the completed opening thus to describe the letter "S." It must be wide enough to let a man through, yet the wall must not be broken on the hospital side above the floor, nor marred on the carpenter's-shop side below it. Such a break would be fatal, for both of these points were conspicuously exposed to the view of the Confederates every hour in the day. Moreover, it was imperatively necessary that all trace of the beginning of the opening should be concealed, not only from the Confederate officials and guards, who were constantly passing the spot every day, but from the hundreds of uninitiated prisoners who crowded around the stove just in front of it from dawn till dark.



WORKING AT THE TUNNEL.

Work could only be possible between the hours of 10 at night, when the room was generally abandoned by the prisoners because of its inundated condition, and 4 o'clock in the morning, when the earliest risers were again astir. It was necessary to do the work with an old jack-knife and one of the chisels previously secured by Rose. It must be done in darkness and without noise, for a vigilant sentinel paced on the Carey street sidewalk just outside the door and within ten feet of the fire-place. A rubber blanket was procured, and the soot from the chimney carefully swept into it. Hamilton, with his old knife, cut the mortar between the bricks and pried a dozen of them out, being careful to preserve them whole.

The rest of the incision was made in accordance with the design described, but no conception could have been formed beforehand of the sickening tediousness of cutting an "S" shaped hole through a heavy wall with a feeble old jack-knife, in stolen hours of darkness. Rose guarded his comrade against the constant danger of interruption by alert enemies on one side and by blundering friends on the other; and, as frequently happens in human affairs, their friends gave them more trouble than their foes. Night after night passed, and still the two men got up after taps from their hard beds, and descended to the dismal and reeking kitchen to bore for liberty. When the sentinel's call at Castle Thunder and at Libby announced 4 o'clock, the dis-

lodged bricks were carefully replaced, and the soot previously gathered in the gum blanket was flung in handfuls against the restored wall, filling the seams so entirely between the bricks as to defy detection. At last, after many weary nights, Hamilton's heroic patience and skill were rewarded, and the way was open to the coveted base of operations, Rat Hell.

Now occurred a circumstance that nearly revealed the plot and nearly ended in a tragedy. When the opening was finished, the long rope was made fast to one of the kitchen supporting posts, and Rose proceeded to descend and reconnoiter. He got partly through with ease, but lost his hold in such a manner that his body slipped through so as to pinion his arms and leave him wholly powerless either to drop lower or return — the bend of the hole being such as to cramp his back and neck terribly and prevent him from breathing. He strove desperately, but each effort only wedged him more firmly in the awful vise. Hamilton sprang to his aid and did his utmost to effect his release; but, powerful as he was, he could not budge him. Rose was gasping for breath and rapidly getting fainter, but even in this fearful strait he refrained from an outcry, that would certainly alarm the guards just outside the door. Hamilton saw that without speedy relief his comrade must soon smother. He dashed through the long, dark room up the stairway, over the forms of several hundred men, and disregarding consequences and savage curses in the dark and crowded room, he trampled upon arms, legs, faces, and stomachs, leaving riot and blasphemy in his track among the rudely awakened and now furious lodgers of the Chickamauga room. He sought the sleeping-place of Major George H. Fitzsimmons, but he was missing. He however found Lieutenant F. F. Bennett, of the 18th Regulars (since a major in the 9th United States Cavalry), to whom he told the trouble in a few hasty words. Both men fairly flew across the room, dashed down the stairs, and by their united efforts, Rose, half-dead and quite speechless, was drawn up from the fearful trap.

Hamilton managed slightly to increase the size of the hole and provide against a repetition of the accident just narrated, and all being now ready, the two men entered eagerly upon the work before them. They appropriated one of the wooden spittoons of the prison, and to each side attached a piece of clothes-line which they had been permitted to have to dry clothes on. Several bits of candle and the larger of the two chisels were also taken to the operating-cellar. They kept this secret well and worked alone for many nights. In fact, they would have so continued, but they found that

after digging about four feet their candle would go out in the vitiated air. Rose did the digging, and Hamilton fanned air into him with his hat: even then he had to emerge into the cellar every few minutes to breathe. Rose could dig, but needed the light and air; and Hamilton could not fan, and drag out, and deposit the excavated earth, and meantime keep a lookout. In fact, it was demonstrated that there was slim chance of succeeding without more assistance, and it was decided to organize a party large enough for effective work by reliefs. As a preliminary step, and to afford the means of more rapid communication with the cellar from the fire-place opening, the long rope obtained from Colonel White was formed by Hamilton into a rope-ladder with convenient wooden rungs. This alteration considerably increased its bulk and added to Rose's difficulty in concealing it from curious eyes.

He now made a careful selection of thirteen men beside himself and Hamilton, and bound them by a solemn oath to secrecy and strict obedience. To form this party as he wanted it required some diplomacy, as it was known that the Confederates had, on more than one occasion, sent cunning spies into Libby disguised as Union prisoners, for the detection of any contemplated plan of escape. Unfortunately, the complete list of the names of the party now formed has not been preserved, but among the party, besides Rose and Hamilton, were Captain John Sterling, 30th Indiana; Captain John Lucas, 5th Kentucky Cavalry; Captain Isaac N. Johnson, 6th Kentucky Cavalry; and Lieutenant F. F. Bennett, 18th Regulars.

The party being now formed were taken to Rat Hell and their several duties explained to them by Rose, who was invested with full authority over the work in hand. Work was begun in rear of the little kitchen-room previously abandoned at the south-east corner of the cellar. To systematize the labor, the party was divided into squads of five each, which gave the men one night on duty and two off, Rose assigning each man to the branch of work in which experiments proved him the most proficient. He was himself, by long odds, the best digger of the party; while Hamilton had no equal for ingenious mechanical skill in contriving helpful little devices to overcome or lessen the difficulties that beset almost every step of the party's progress.

The first plan was to dig down alongside the east wall and under it until it was passed, then turn southward and make for the large street sewer next the canal and into which Rose had before noticed workmen descending. This sewer was a large one, believed to be fully six feet high, and, if it could be gained,

there could be little doubt that an adjacent opening to the canal would be found to the eastward. It was very soon revealed, however, that the lower side of Libby was built upon ponderous timbers below which they could not hope to penetrate with their meager stock of tools—such, at least, was the opinion of nearly all the party. Rose nevertheless determined that the effort should be made, and they were soon at work with old pen-knives and case-knives hacked into saws. After infinite labor they at length cut through the great logs, only to be met by an unforeseen and still more formidable barrier. Their tunnel, in fact, had penetrated below the level of the canal. Water began to filter in—feebly at first, but at last it broke in with a rush that came near drowning Rose, who barely had time to make his escape. This opening was therefore plugged up; and to do this rapidly and leave no dangerous traces put the party to their wit's end.

An attempt was next made to dig into a small sewer that ran from the south-east corner of the prison into the main sewer. After a number of nights of hard labor, this opening was extended to a point below a brick furnace in which were incased several caldrons. The weight of this furnace caused a cave-in near the sentinel's path outside the prison wall. Next day, a group of officers were seen eyeing the break curiously. Rose, listening at a window above, heard the word "rats" repeated by them several times and took comfort. The next day he entered the cellar alone, and felt that if the suspicions of the Confederates were really awakened a trap would be set for him in Rat Hell, and determined, if such were really the case, that he would be the only victim caught. He therefore entered the little partitioned corner room with some anxiety, but there was no visible evidence of a visit by the guards, and his spirits again rose.

The party now reassembled, and an effort was made to get into the small sewer that ran from the cook-room to the big sewer which Rose was so eager to reach; but soon it was discovered, to the utter dismay of the weary party, that this wood-lined sewer was too small to let a man through it. Still, it was hoped by Rose that by removing the plank with which it was lined the passage could be made. The spirits of the party were by this time considerably dashed by their repeated failures and sickening work; but the undaunted Rose, aided by Hamilton, persuaded the men to another effort, and soon the knives and toy saws were at work again with vigor. The work went on so swimmingly that it was confidently believed that an entrance to the main sewer would be had on the night of January 26, 1864.

On the night of the 25th two men had been left down in Rat Hell to cover any remaining traces of a tunnel, and when night came again it was expected that all would be ready for the escape between 8 and 9 o'clock the following night. Meantime, the two men were to enter and make careful examination of the main sewer and its adjacent outlets. The party, which was now in readiness for its march for the Federal camps, waited tidings from these two men all next day in tormenting anxiety, and the weary hours went by on leaden wings. At last the sickening word came that the planks yet to be removed before they could enter the main sewer were of seasoned oak—hard as bone, and three inches thick. Their feeble tools were now worn out or broken; they could no longer get air to work or keep a light in the horrible pit which was reeking with cold mud; in short, any attempt at further progress, with the utensils at hand, was foolish.

Most of the party were now really ill from the foul stench in which they had lived so long. The visions of liberty that had first lured them to desperate efforts under the inspiration of Rose and Hamilton had at last faded, and one by one they lost heart and hope and frankly told Colonel Rose that they could do no more. The party was therefore disbanded, and the yet sanguine leader, with Hamilton for his sole helper, continued the work alone. Up to this time thirty-nine nights had been spent in the work of excavation. The two men now made a careful examination of the north-east corner of the cellar, at which point the earth's surface outside the prison wall, being eight or nine feet higher than at the canal or south side, afforded a better place to dig than the latter, being free from water and with clay-top enough to support itself. The unfavorable feature of this point was that the only possible terminus of a tunnel was a yard between the buildings beyond the vacant lot on the east of Libby. Another objection was that, even when the tunnel should be made to that point, the exit of any escaping party must be made through an arched wagon-way under the building that faced the street on the canal side, and every man must emerge on the sidewalk in sight of the sentinel on the south side of the prison, the intervening space being in the full glare of a gas-lamp. It was carefully noted, however, by Rose, long before this, that the west end of the beat of the nearest sentinel was between fifty and sixty feet from the point of egress, and it was concluded that by walking away at the moment the sentinel commenced his pace westward, one would be far enough into the shadow to make it improbable that the color

of his clothing could be made out by the sentinel when he faced about to return towards the eastern end of his beat, which terminated ten to fifteen feet east of the prison wall. It was further considered that as these sentinels had for their special duty the guarding of the prison, they would not be eager to burden themselves with the duty of molesting persons seen in the vicinity outside of their jurisdiction, provided, of course, that the retreating forms—many of which they must certainly see—were not recognized as Yankees. All others they might properly leave for the challenge and usual examination of the provost guard who patrolled the streets of Richmond.

The wall of that east cellar had to be broken in three places before a place was found where the earth was firm enough to support a tunnel. The two men worked on with stubborn patience, but their progress was painfully slow. Rose dug assiduously, and Hamilton alternately fanned air to his comrade and dragged out and hid the excavated dirt, but the old difficulty confronted him. The candle would not burn, the air could not be fanned fast enough with a hat and the dirt hidden, without better contrivances or additional help.

Rose now reassembled the party and selected from them a number who were willing to renew the attempt.* Against the east wall stood a series of stone fenders abutting inward, and these, being at uniform intervals of about twenty feet, cast deep shadows that fell towards the prison front. In one of these dark recesses the wall was pierced, well up towards the Carey street end. The earth here has very densely compressed sand, that offered a strong resistance to the broad-bladed chisel, which was their only effective implement, and it was clear that a long turn of hard work must be done to penetrate under the fifty-foot lot to the objective point. The lower part of the tunnel was about six inches above the level of the cellar floor, and its top about two and a half feet. Absolute accuracy was of course impossible, either in giving the hole a perfectly horizontal direction or in preserving uniform dimensions; but a fair level was preserved, and the average diameter of the tunnel was a little over two feet. Usually one man would dig, and fill the spittoon with earth; upon the signal of a gentle pull, an assistant would drag the load into the cellar by the

clothes-lines fastened to each side of this box, and then hide it under the straw; a third constantly fanned air into the tunnel with a rubber blanket stretched across a frame, the invention of the ingenious Hamilton; a fourth would give occasional relief to the last two; while a fifth would keep a lookout.

The danger of discovery was continual, for the guards were under instructions from the prison commandant to make occasional visits to every accessible part of the building; so that it was not unusual for a sergeant and several men to enter the south door of Rat Hell in the day-time, while the diggers were at labor in the dark north end. During these visits the digger would watch the intruders with his head sticking out of the tunnel, while the others would crouch behind the low stone fenders, or crawl quickly under the straw. This was, however, so uninviting a place, that the Confederates made this visit as brief as a nominal compliance with their orders permitted, and they did not often venture into the dark north end. The work was fearfully monotonous, and the more so because absolute silence was commanded, the men moving about mutely in the dark. The darkness caused them frequently to become bewildered and lost; and as Rose could not call out for them, he had often to hunt all over the big dungeon to gather them up and pilot them to their places.

The difficulty of forcing air to the digger, whose body nearly filled the tunnel, increased as the hole was extended, and compelled the operator to back into the cellar often for air, and for air that was itself foul enough to sicken a strong man.

But they were no longer harassed with the water and timbers that had impeded their progress at the south end. Moreover, experience was daily making each man more proficient in the work. Rose urged them on with cheery enthusiasm, and their hopes rose high, for already they had penetrated beyond the sentinels' beat and were nearing the goal.

The party off duty kept a cautious lookout from the upper east windows for any indication of suspicion on the part of the Confederates. In this extreme caution was necessary, both to avert the curiosity of prisoners in those east rooms and to keep out of the range of bullets from the guards, who were under a standing order to fire at a head if seen at a

* The party now consisted of Colonel Thomas E. Rose, 77th Pennsylvania; Major A. G. Hamilton, 12th Kentucky; Captain Terrance Clark, 79th Illinois; Major George H. Fitzsimmons, 30th Indiana; Captain John F. Gallagher, 2d Ohio; Captain W. S. B. Randall, 2d Ohio; Captain John Lucas, 5th Kentucky; Captain I. N. Johnson, 6th Kentucky; Major B. B. McDonald, 101st Ohio; Lieutenant N. S. McKean,

21st Illinois; Lieutenant David Garbett, 77th Pennsylvania; Lieutenant J. C. Fislar, 7th Indiana Artillery; Lieutenant John D. Simpson, 10th Indiana; Lieutenant John Mitchell, 79th Illinois; and Lieutenant Eli Foster, 30th Indiana. This party was divided into three reliefs, as before, and the work of breaking the cellar wall was successfully done the first night by McDonald and Clark.

window, or at a hand if placed on the bars that secured them. A sentinel's bullet one day cut a hole in the ear of Lieutenant Hammond; another officer was wounded in the face by a bullet, which fortunately first splintered against one of the window-bars; and a captain of an Ohio regiment was shot through the head and instantly killed while reading a newspaper. He was violating no rule whatever, and when shot was from eight to ten feet inside the window through which the bullet came. This was a wholly unprovoked and wanton murder; the cowardly miscreant had fired the shot while he was off duty, and from the north sidewalk of Carey street. The guards (home guards they were) used, in fact, to gun for prisoners' heads from their posts below pretty much after the fashion of boys after squirrels; and the whiz of a bullet through the windows became too common an occurrence to occasion remark unless some one was shot.

Under a standing rule, the twelve hundred prisoners were counted twice each day, the first count being made about 9 in the morning, and the last about 4 in the afternoon. This duty was habitually done by the clerk of the prison, E. W. Ross, a civilian employed by the commandant. He was christened by the prisoners, by reason of his diminutive size, "Little Ross."* Ross was generally attended by either "Dick" Turner, Adjutant Latouche, or Sergeant George Stansil, of the 18th Georgia, with a small guard to keep the prisoners in four closed ranks during the count. The commandant of the prison, Major Thomas P. Turner (no relative of Dick's), seldom came upstairs.

To conceal the absence of the five men who were daily at work at the tunnel, their comrades of the party off digging duty resorted, under Rose's supervision, to a device of "repeating." This scheme, which was of vital importance to hoodwink the Confederates and avert mischievous curiosity among the uninformed prisoners, was a hazardous business that severely taxed the ingenuity and strained the nerve of the leader and his coadjutors. The manner of the fraud varied with circumstances, but in general it was worked by five of Rose's men, after being counted at or near the head of the line, stooping down and running towards the foot of the ranks, where a few moments later they were counted a second time, thus making Ross's book balance. The whole five, however, could not always do this undiscovered, and perhaps but three of the number could repeat. These occasional mishaps threatened to dethrone the reason of the puzzled clerk;

* "Little Ross" was burned to death with other guests at the Spotswood House, Richmond, in 1873.

but in the next count the "repeaters" would succeed in their game, and for the time all went well, until one day some of the prisoners took it into their heads, "just for the fun of the thing," to imitate the repeaters. Unconscious of the curses that the party were mentally hurling at them, the meddlers' sole purpose was to make "Little Ross" mad. In this they certainly met with signal success, for the reason of the mystified clerk seemed to totter as he repeated the count over and over in the hope of finding out how one careful count would show that three prisoners were missing and the next an excess of fifteen. Finally Ross, lashed into uncontrollable fury by the sarcastic remarks of his employers and the heartless merriment of the grinning Yanks before him, poured forth his goaded soul as follows:

"Now, gentlemen, look yere: I can count a hundred as good as any blank man in this yere town, but I'll be blank blanked if I can count a hundred of you blanked Yankees. Now, gentlemen, there's one thing sho, there's eight or ten of you-uns yere that ain't yere!"

This extraordinary accusation "brought down the house," and the Confederate officers and guards, and finally Ross himself, were caught by the resistless contagion of laughter that shook the rafters of Libby.

The officials somehow found a balance that day on the books and the danger was for this once over, to the infinite relief of Rose and his anxious comrades. But the Confederates appeared dissatisfied with something, and came upstairs next morning with more officers and with double the usual number of guards; and some of these were now stationed about the room so as to make it next to impossible to work the repeating device successfully. On this day, for some reason, there were but two men in the cellar, and these were Major B. B. McDonald and Captain I. N. Johnson.

The count began as usual, and, despite the guard in rear, two of the party attempted the repeating device by forcing their way through the center of the ranks towards the left; but the "fun of the thing" had now worn out with the unsuspecting meddlers, who resisted the passage of the two men. This drew the attention of the Confederate officers, and the repeaters were threatened with punishment. The result was inevitable, the count showed two missing: it was carefully repeated, with the same result. To the dismay of Rose and his little band, the prison register was now brought upstairs and a long, tedious roll-call by name was endured, each man passing through a narrow door as his name was called, and between a line of guards.

No stratagem that Rose could now invent could avert the discovery by the Confederates

that McDonald and Johnson had disappeared, and the mystery of their departure would be almost certain to cause an inquiry and investigation that would put their plot in peril and probably reveal it.

At last, the "J's" were reached and the name of I. N. Johnson was lustily shouted and repeated, with no response. The roll-call proceeded until the name of B. B. McDonald was reached. To the increasing amazement of everybody but the conspirators, he also had vanished. A careful note was taken of these two names by the Confederates, and a thousand tongues were now busy with the names of the missing men and their singular disappearance.

The conspirators were in a tight place, and must choose between two things. One was for the men in the cellar to return that night and face the Confederates with the most plausible explanation of their absence that they could invent, and the other alternative was the revolting one of remaining in their horrible abode until the completion of the tunnel.

When night came the fire-place was opened, and the unlucky pair were informed of the situation of affairs and asked to choose between the alternatives presented. McDonald decided to return and face the music; but Johnson, doubtful if the Confederates would be hoodwinked by any explanation, voted to remain where he was and wait for the finish of the tunnel.

As was anticipated, McDonald's return awakened almost as much curiosity among the inhabitants of Libby as his disappearance, and he was soon called to account by the Confederates. He told them he had fallen asleep in an out-of-the-way place in the upper west room, where the guards must have overlooked him during the roll-call of the day before. McDonald was not further molested. The garrulous busybodies, who were Rose's chief dread, told the Confederate officials that they had certainly slept near Johnson the night before the day he was missed. Lieutenant J. C. Fislar (of the working-party), who also slept next to Johnson, boldly declared this a case of mistaken identity, and confidently expressed his belief to both Confederates and Federals who gathered around him that Johnson had escaped and was by this time, no doubt, safe in the Union lines. To this he added the positive statement that Johnson had not been in his accustomed sleeping-place for a good many nights. The busybodies, who had indeed told the truth, looked at the speaker in speechless amazement, but reiterated their statements. But others of the conspirators took Fislar's bold cue and stoutly corroborated him.

Johnson was, of course, nightly fed by his companions, and gave them such assistance as he could at the work; but it soon became apparent that a man could not long exist in such a continuously pestilential atmosphere. How long were the days and nights the poor fellow passed among the squealing rats no tongue can tell — the sickening air, the deathly chill, the horrible, interminable darkness. One day out of three was an ordeal for the workers, who at least had a rest of two days afterward. As a desperate measure of relief it was arranged, with the utmost caution, that late each night Johnson should come upstairs, when all was dark and the prison in slumber, and sleep among the prisoners until just before the time for closing the fire-place opening, about 4 o'clock each morning. As he spoke to no one and the room was dark, his presence was never known, even to those who lay next to him; and indeed he listened to many earnest conversations between his neighbors regarding his wonderful disappearance.*

As a matter of course, the incidents above narrated made day-work on the tunnel too hazardous to be indulged in, on account of the increased difficulty of accounting for absentees, but the party continued the night-work with unabated industry.

When the opening had been extended nearly across the lot, some of the party believed they had entered under the yard which was the intended terminus; and one night when McDonald was the digger, so confident was he that the desired distance had been made, that he turned his direction upward, and soon broke through to the surface. A glance showed him his nearly fatal blunder, against which, indeed, he had been earnestly warned by Rose, who from the first had carefully estimated the intervening distance between the east wall of Libby and the terminus. In fact, McDonald saw that he had broken through in the open lot which was all in full view of a sentinel who was dangerously close. Appalled by what he had done, he retreated to the cellar and reported to his companions the disaster. Believing that discovery was now certain, the party sent one of their number up the rope to report to Rose, who was asleep. The hour was about midnight when the leader learned of the mischief. He quickly got up, went down cellar, entered the tunnel, and examined the break. It was not so near the sentinel's path as McDonald's excited report indicated, and fortunately the breach was at a point whence the surface sloped downward towards the east. He took off his blouse and stuffed it into the

* In a volume entitled "Four Months in Libby," Captain Johnson has related his experience at this time, and his subsequent escape.

opening, pulling the dirt over it noiselessly, and in a few minutes there was little surface evidence of the hole. He then backed into the cellar in the usual crab fashion, and gave directions for the required depression of the tunnel and vigorous resumption of the work. The hole made in the roof of the tunnel was not much larger than a rat hole, and could not be seen from the prison. But the next night Rose shoved an old shoe out of the hole, and the day afterward he looked down through the prison-bars and saw the shoe lying where he had placed it, and judged from its position that he had better incline the direction of the tunnel slightly to the left.

Meantime Captain Johnson was dragging out a wretched existence in Rat Hell, and for safety was obliged to confine himself by day to the dark north end, for the Confederates often came into the place very suddenly through the south entrance. When they ventured too close, Johnson would get into a pit that he had dug under the straw as a hiding-hole both for himself and the tunnelers' tools, and quickly cover himself with a huge heap of short packing straw. A score of times he came near being stepped upon by the Confederates, and more than once the dust of the straw compelled him to sneeze in their very presence.

On Saturday, February 6, a larger party than usual of the Confederates came into the cellar, walked by the very mouth of the tunnel, and seemed to be making a critical survey of the entire place. They remained an unusually long time and conversed in low tones; several of them even kicked the loose straw about; and in fact everything seemed to indicate to Johnson—who was the only one of the working party now in the cellar—that the long-averted discovery had been made. That night he reported matters fully to Rose at the fire-place opening.

The tunnel was now nearly completed, and when Rose conveyed Johnson's message to the party it caused dismay. Even the stout-hearted Hamilton was for once excited, and the leader whose unflinching fortitude had thus far inspired his little band had his brave spirits dashed. But his buoyant courage rose quickly to its high and natural level. He could not longer doubt that the suspicions of the Confederates were aroused, but he felt convinced that these suspicions had not as yet assumed such a definite shape as most of his companions thought; still, he had abundant reason to believe that the success of the tunnel absolutely demanded its speedy completion, and he now firmly resolved that a desperate effort should be made to that end. Remembering that the next day was Sunday, and that

it was not customary for the Confederates to visit the operating-cellar on that day, he determined to make the most in his power of the now precious time. He therefore caused all the party to remain upstairs, directing them to keep a close watch upon the Confederates from all available points of observation, to avoid being seen in whispering groups,—in short, to avoid all things calculated to excite the curiosity of friends or suspicion of enemies,—and to await his return.

Taking McDonald with him, he went down through the fire-place before daylight on Sunday morning, and, bidding Johnson to keep a vigilant watch for intruders and McDonald to fan air into him, he entered the tunnel and began the forlorn hope. From this time forward he never once turned over the chisel to a relief.

All day long he worked with the tireless patience of a beaver. When night came, even his single helper, who performed the double duty of fanning air and hiding the excavated earth, was ill from his hard, long task and the deadly air of the cellar. Yet this was as nothing compared with the fatigue of the duty that Rose had performed; and when at last, far into the night, he backed into the cellar, he had scarcely strength enough to stagger across to the rope-ladder.

He had made more than double the distance that had been accomplished under the system of reliefs on any previous day, and the non-appearance of the Confederates encouraged the hope that another day, without interruption, would see the work completed. He therefore determined to refresh himself by a night's sleep for the finish. The drooping spirits of his party were revived by the report of his progress and his unalterable confidence.

Monday morning dawned, and the great prison with its twelve hundred captives was again astir. The general crowd did not suspect the suppressed excitement and anxiety of the little party that waited through that interminable day, which they felt must determine the fate of their project.

Rose had repeated the instructions of the day before, and again descended to Rat Hell with McDonald for his only helper. Johnson reported all quiet, and McDonald taking up his former duties at the tunnel's mouth, Rose once more entered with his chisel. It was now the seventeenth day since the present tunnel was begun, and he resolved it should be the last. Hour after hour passed, and still the busy chisel was plied, and still the little wooden box with its freight of earth made its monotonous trips from the digger to his comrade and back again.

From the early morning of Monday, Febru-

ary 8, 1864, until an hour after midnight the next morning his work went on. As midnight approached, Rose was nearly a physical wreck: the perspiration dripped from every pore of his exhausted body; food he could not have eaten if he had had it. His labors thus far had given him a somewhat exaggerated estimate of his physical powers. The sensation of fainting was strange to him, but his staggering senses warned him that to faint where he was meant at once his death and burial. He could scarcely inflate his lungs with the poisonous air of the pit; his muscles quivered with increasing weakness and the warning spasmodic tremor which their unnatural strain induced; his head swam like that of a drowning person.

By midnight he had struck and passed beyond a post which he felt must be in the yard. During the last few minutes he had turned his course upward, and to relieve his cramped limbs he turned upon his back. His strength was nearly gone: the feeble stream of air which his comrade was trying, with all his might, to send to him from a distance of fifty-three feet could no longer reach him through the deadly stench. His senses reeled; he had not breath nor strength enough to retreat backward through his narrow grave. In the agony of suffocation he dropped the dull chisel and beat his two fists against the roof of his grave with the might of despair — when, blessed boon! the crust gave way and the loosened earth showered upon his dripping face, purple with agony; his famished eye caught sight of a radiant star in the blue vault above him; a flood of light and a volume of cool, delicious air poured over him. At that very instant the sentinel's cry rang out like a prophecy — "Half-past one, and all 's well!"

Recovering quickly under the inspiring air, he dragged his body out of the hole and made a careful survey of the yard in which he found himself. He was under a shed, with a board fence between him and the east-side sentinels, and the gable end of Libby loomed grimly against the blue sky. He found the wagon-way under the south-side building closed from the street by a gate fastened by a swinging bar, which, after a good many efforts, he succeeded in opening. This was the only exit to the street. As soon as the nearest sentinel's back was turned he stepped out and walked quickly to the east. At the first corner he turned north, carefully avoiding the sentinels in front of the "Pemberton Buildings" (another military prison north-east of Libby), and at the corner above this he went westward, then south to the edge of the canal, and thus, by cautious moving, made a minute examination of Libby from all sides.

Having satisfied his desires, he retraced his steps to the yard. He hunted up an old bit of heavy plank, crept back into the tunnel, feet first, drew the plank over the opening to conceal it from the notice of any possible visitors to the place, and crawled back to Rat Hell. McDonald was overjoyed, and poor Johnson almost wept with delight as Rose handed one of them his victorious old chisel and gave the other some trifle he had picked up in the outer world as a token that the Underground Railroad to God's Country was open.

Rose now climbed the rope-ladder, drew it up, rebuilt the fire-place wall as usual, and, finding Hamilton, took him over near one of the windows and broke the news to him. The brave fellow was almost speechless with delight, and, quickly hunting up the rest of the party, told them that Colonel Rose wanted to see them down in the dining-room.

As they had been waiting news from their absent leader with feverish anxiety for what had seemed to them all the longest day in their lives, they instantly responded to the call and flocked around Rose a few minutes later in the dark kitchen where he waited them. As yet they did not know what news he brought, they could scarcely wait for him to speak out; and when he announced, "Boys, the tunnel is finished," they could hardly repress a cheer. They wrung his hand again and again, and danced about with childish joy.

It was now nearly 3 o'clock in the morning. Rose and Hamilton were ready to go out at once, and indeed were anxious to do so, since every day of late had brought some new peril to their plans. None of the rest, however, were ready; and all urged the advantage of having a whole night in which to escape through and beyond the Richmond fortifications, instead of the few hours of darkness which now preceded the day. To this proposition Rose and Hamilton somewhat reluctantly assented. It was agreed that each man of the party should have the privilege of taking one friend into his confidence, and that the second party of fifteen thus formed should be obligated not to follow the working party out of the tunnel until an hour had elapsed. Colonel H. C. Hobart, of the 21st Wisconsin, was deputed to see that the programme was observed. He was to draw up the rope-ladder, hide it, and rebuild the wall; and the next night was himself to lead out the second party, deputing some trustworthy leader to follow with still another party on the third night; and thus it was to continue until as many as possible should escape.

On Tuesday evening, February 9, at 7 o'clock, Colonel Rose assembled his party in

the kitchen, and, posting himself at the fire-place, which he opened, waited until the last man went down. He bade Colonel Hobart good-by, went down the hole, and waited until he had heard his comrade pull up the ladder and finally heard him replace the bricks in the fire-place and depart. He now crossed Rat Hell to the entrance into the tunnel, and placed the party in the order in which they were to go out. He gave each a parting caution, thanked his brave comrades for their faithful labors, and, feelingly shaking their hands, bade them God-speed and farewell.

He entered the tunnel first with Hamilton next, and was promptly followed by the whole party through the tunnel and into the yard. He opened the gate leading towards the canal and signaled the party that all was clear. Stepping out on the sidewalk as soon as the nearest sentinel's back was turned, he walked briskly down the street to the east, and a square below was joined by Hamilton. The others followed at intervals of a few minutes, and disappeared in various directions in groups usually of three.

The plan agreed upon between Colonels Rose and Hobart was frustrated by information of the party's departure leaking out; and before 9 o'clock the knowledge of the existence of the tunnel and of the departure of the first party was flashed over the crowded prison, which was soon a convention of excited and whispering men. Colonel Hobart made a brave effort to restore order, but the frenzied crowd that now fiercely struggled for precedence at the fire-place was beyond human control.

Some of them had opened the fire-place and were jumping down like sheep into the cellar one after another. The Colonel implored the maddened men at least to be quiet, and put the rope-ladder in position and escaped himself.

My companion, Sprague, was already asleep when I lay down that night; but my other companion, Duenkel, who had been hunting for me, was very much awake, and seizing me by the collar, he whispered excitedly the fact that Colonel Rose had gone out at the head of a party through a tunnel. For a brief moment the appalling suspicion that my friend's reason had been dethroned by illness and captivity swept over my mind; but a glance towards the window at the east end showed a quiet but apparently excited group of men from other rooms, and I now observed that several of them were bundled up for a march. The hope of regaining liberty thrilled me like a current of electricity. Looking through the window I could see the escaping men appear one by one on the sidewalk below, opposite the exit-yard, and silently disappear,

and without hindrance or challenge by the prison sentinels. While I was eagerly surveying this scene I lost track of Duenkel, who had gone in search of further information, but ran against Lieutenant Harry Wilcox, of the 1st New York, whom I knew, and who appeared to have the "tip" regarding the tunnel. Wilcox and I agreed to unite our fortunes in the escape. My shoes were nearly worn out and my clothes were thin and ragged. I was ill prepared for a journey in midwinter through the enemy's country: happily I had my old overcoat, and this I put on. I had not a crumb of food saved up, as did those who were posted; but as I was ill at the time, my appetite was feeble.

Wilcox and I hurried to the kitchen, where we found several hundred men struggling to be first at the opening in the fire-place. We took our places behind them and soon two hundred more closed us tightly in the mass. The room was pitch dark and the sentinel could be seen through the door-cracks, within a dozen feet of us. The fight for precedence was savage, though no one spoke; but now and then fainting men begged to be released. They begged in vain: certainly some of them must have been permanently injured. For my own part, when I neared the stove I was nearly suffocated; but I took heart when I saw but three more men between me and the hole. At this moment a sound as of tramping feet was heard, and some idiot on the outer edge of the mob startled us with the cry, "The guards, the guards!" A fearful panic ensued, and the entire crowd bounded towards the stair-way leading up to their sleeping-quarters. The stair-way was unbanistered, and some of the men were forced off the edge and fell on those beneath. I was among the lightest in that crowd; and when it broke and expanded I was taken off my feet, dashed to the floor senseless, my head and one of my hands bruised and cut, and my shoulder painfully injured by the boots of the men who rushed over me. When I gathered my swimming wits I was lying in a pool of water. The room seemed darker than before; and, to my grateful surprise, I was alone. I was now convinced that it was a false alarm, and quickly resolved to avail myself of the advantage of having the whole place to myself. I entered the cavity feet first, but found it necessary to remove my overcoat and push it through the opening, and it fell in the darkness below.

I had now no comrade, having lost Wilcox in the stampede. Rose and his party, being the first out, were several hours on their journey; and I burned to be away, knowing well that my salvation depended on my passage beyond the city defenses before the pursuing



FIGHTING THE RATS.

guards were on our trail, when the inevitable discovery should come at roll-call. The fact that I was alone I regretted; but I had served with McClellan in the Peninsula campaign of 1862, I knew the country well from my frequent inspection of war maps, and the friendly North Star gave me my bearings. The rope-ladder had either become broken or disarranged, but it afforded me a short hold at the top; so I balanced myself, trusted to fortune, and fell into Rat Hell, which was a rayless pit of darkness, swarming with squealing rats, several of which I must have killed in my fall. I felt a troop of them run over my face and hands before I could regain my feet. Several times I put my hand on them, and once I flung one from my shoulder. Groping around, I found a stout stick or stave, put my back to the wall, and beat about me blindly but with vigor.


In spite of the hurried instructions given me by Wilcox, I had a long and horrible hunt over the cold surface of the cellar walls in my efforts to find the entrance to the tunnel; and in two minutes after I began feeling my way with my hands I had no idea in what part of the place was the point where I had fallen: my bearings were completely lost, and I must have made the circuit of Rat Hell several times. At my entrance the rats seemed to receive me with cheers sufficiently hearty, I thought, but my vain efforts to find egress

seemed to kindle anew their enthusiasm. They had received large reinforcements, and my march around was now greeted with deafening squeaks. Finally, my exploring hands fell upon a pair of heels which vanished at my touch. Here at last was the narrow road to freedom! The heels proved to be the property of Lieutenant Charles H. Morgan, 21st Wisconsin, a Chickamauga prisoner. Just ahead of him in the tunnel was Lieutenant William L. Watson, of the same company and regiment. With my cut hand and bruised shoulder the passage through the cold, narrow grave was indescribably horrible, and when I reached the terminus in the yard I was sick and faint. The passage seemed a mile long; but the crisp, pure air and first glimpse of freedom, the sweet sense of being outdoors, and the realization that I had taken the first step towards liberty and home, had a magical effect in my restoration.

I have related before, in a published reminiscence,* my experience and that of my two companions above named in the journey towards the Union lines, and our recapture, but the more important matter relating to the plot itself has never been published. This is the leading motive of this article, and therefore I will not intrude the details of my personal experience into this narrative. It is enough to say that it was a chapter of hair-breadth escapes, hunger, cold, suffering, and, alas! failure. We were run down and captured in a swamp several miles north of Charlottesville, and when we were taken our captors pointed out to us the smoke over a Federal outpost. We were brought back to Libby and put in one of the dark, narrow dungeons. I was afterwards confined in Macon, Georgia; Charleston and Columbia, South Carolina; and in Charlotte, North Carolina. After a captivity of just a year and eight months, during which I had made five escapes and was each time retaken, I was at last released on March 1, 1865, at Wilmington, North Carolina.

Great was the panic in Libby when the next morning's roll revealed to the astounded Confederates that 109 of their captives were missing; and as the fire-place had been rebuilt by some one and the opening of the hole in the yard had been covered by the last man who went out, no human trace guided the keepers towards a solution of the mystery. The Richmond papers having announced the "miraculous" escape of 109 Yankee officers from Libby, curious crowds flocked thither for several days until some one, happening to remove the plank in the yard, revealed the tunnel. A terrified negro was driven into the hole at the point of the

* "Philadelphia Times," Oct. 28, 1882.



SECTION OF INTERIOR OF


1. Straight's room; 2. Milroy's room; 3. Commandant's office; 4. Chickamauga room (upper); 5. Chickamauga room (lower); 11. East or "Rat Hell" cellar; 12. South side Canal street, ten feet lower than Carey street; 17. Shed; 18. Kerr's warehouse; 19. Office James River Towing Co.

bayonet, and thus made a trip to Rat Hell that nearly turned him white.

Several circumstances at this time combined to make this escape peculiarly exasperating to the Confederates. In obedience to repeated appeals from the Richmond newspapers, iron bars had but recently been fixed in all the prison windows for better security, and the guard had been considerably reinforced. The columns of these same journals had just been aglow with accounts of the daring and suc-

cessful escape of the Confederate General John Morgan and his companions from the Columbus, Ohio, jail. Morgan had arrived in Richmond on the 8th of January, exactly a month prior to the completion of the tunnel, and was still the lion of the Confederate capital.


At daylight a plank was seen suspended on the outside of the east wall; this was fastened by a blanket-ropes to one of the window-bars and was, of course, a trick to mislead the Confederates. General John H. Winder, then in charge of all the prisoners in the Confederacy, with his headquarters in Richmond, was furious when the news reached him. After a careful external examination of the building and a talk, not of the politest kind, with Major Turner, he reached the conclusion that such an escape had but one explanation—the guards had been bribed. Accordingly, the sentinels on duty were marched off under arrest to Castle Thunder, where they were locked up and searched for "greenbacks." The thousand and more prisoners still in Libby were compensated, in a measure, for their failure to escape by the panic they saw among the "Rebs." Messengers and dispatches were soon flying in all directions, and all the horse, foot, and dragoons of Richmond were in pursuit of the fugitives before noon. Only one man of the whole escaping party was retaken inside of the city limits.* Of the 109 who got out that night 59 reached the Union lines, 48 were recaptured, and 2 were drowned.



GROUND PLAN OF LIBBY PRISON AND SURROUNDINGS.

A. Break in fire-place on floor above; B. End of tunnel; C.C.C. Course of party escaping; D. Shed; E. Cook room (abandoned Oct., '63); F. Lumber room; G. Office of James River Towing Company; H.H. Gates; H.H. Doors; J. Cells for condemned prisoners; K. First tunnel (abandoned); L. Fence.

* Captain Gates, of the 33d Ohio.



LIBBY PRISON AND TUNNEL.

6. Dining room; 7. Carpenter's shop (middle cellar); 8. Gettysburg room (upper); 9. Gettysburg room (lower); 10. Hospital room; 13. North side Carey street, ground sloping towards Canal; 14. Open lot; 15. Tunnel; 16. Fence; 20. Gate; 21. Prisoners escaping; 22. West cellar.

Colonel Streight and several other officers who had been chosen by the diggers of the tunnel to follow them out, in accordance with the agreement already referred to, lay concealed for a week in a vacant house, where they were fed by loyal friends, and escaped to the Federal lines when the first excitement had abated.

After leaving Libby, Rose and Hamilton turned northward and cautiously walked on a few squares, when suddenly they encountered some Confederates who were guarding a military hospital. Hamilton retreated quickly and ran off to the east; but Rose, who was a little in advance, walked boldly by on the opposite walk and was not challenged, and thus the two friends separated.

Hamilton, after several days of wandering and fearful exposure, came joyfully upon a Union picket squad, and received the care he painfully needed and was soon on his happy journey home.

Rose passed out of the city of Richmond to the York River Railroad, and followed its track to the Chickahominy bridge. Finding this guarded, he turned to the right, and, as the day was breaking, he came upon a camp of Confederate cavalry. His blue uniform made it exceedingly dangerous to travel in daylight in this region; and seeing a large sycamore log that was hollow, he crawled into it. The February air was keen and biting, but he kept his cramped position until late in the afternoon, and all day he could hear the loud talk in the camp and the neighing of the

horses. Towards night he came cautiously forth, and finding the Chickahominy fordable within a few hundred yards, he succeeded in wading across: the uneven bed of the river, however, led him into several deep holes, and before he reached the shore his scanty raiment was thoroughly soaked. He trudged on through the woods as fast as his stiffened limbs would bear him, borne up by the hope of early deliverance, and made a brave effort to shake off the horrible ague. He had not gone far, however, when he found himself again close to some Confederate cavalry, and was compelled once more to seek a hiding-place. The day seemed of interminable length, and he tried vainly in sleep to escape from hunger and cold. His teeth chattered in his head, and when he rose at dark to continue his journey his tattered clothes were frozen stiff. In this plight he pushed on resolutely, and was obliged to wade to his waist for hundreds of yards through one of those deep and treacherous morasses that proved such deadly fever-pools for McClellan's army in the campaign of 1862. Finally he reached the high ground, and as the severe exertion had set his blood again in motion and loosened his limbs, he was making better progress, when suddenly he found himself near a Confederate picket. This picket he easily avoided, and, keeping well in the shadow of the forest and shunning the roads, he pressed forward with increasing hopes of success. He had secured a box of matches before leaving Libby; and as the cold night came on and he felt that he was

really in danger of freezing to death, he penetrated into the center of the cedar grove and built a fire in a small and secluded hollow. He felt that this was hazardous, but the necessity was desperate, since with his stiffened limbs he could no longer move along fast enough to keep the warmth of life in his body. To add to his trouble, his foot, which had been broken in Tennessee previous to his capture, was now giving him great pain, and threatened to cripple him wholly; indeed, it would stiffen and disable the best of limbs to compass the journey he had made in darkness over strange, uneven, and hard-frozen ground, and through rivers, creeks, and bogs, and this without food or warmth.

The fire was so welcome that he slept soundly — so soundly that waking in the early morning he found his boot-legs and half his uniform burned up, the ice on the rest of it probably having prevented its total destruction.

Resuming his journey much refreshed, he reached Crump's cross-roads, where he successfully avoided another picket. He traveled all day, taking occasional short rests, and before dark had reached New Kent Court House. Here again he saw some pickets, but by cautious flanking managed to pass them; but in crossing an open space a little farther on he was seen by a cavalryman, who at once put spurs to his horse and rode up to Rose, and, saluting him, inquired if he belonged to the New Kent Cavalry. Rose had on a gray cap, and seeing that he had a stupid sort of fellow to deal with, instantly answered, "Yes," whereupon the trooper turned his horse and rode back. A very few moments were enough to show Rose that the cavalryman's report had failed to satisfy his comrades, whom he could see making movements for his capture. He

plunged through a laurel thicket, and had no sooner emerged than he saw the Confederates deploying around it in confidence that their game was bagged. He dashed on as fast as his injured foot would let him, and entered a tract of heavily timbered land that rose to the east of this thicket. At the border of the grove he found another picket post, and barely escaped the notice of several of the men. The only chance of escape lay through a wide, clear field before him, and even this was in full view from the grove that bordered it, and this he knew would soon swarm with his pursuers.

Across the center of this open field, which was fully half a mile wide, a ditch ran, which, although but a shallow gully, afforded a partial concealment. Rose, who could now hear the voices of the Confederates nearer and nearer, dove into the ditch as the only chance, and dropping on his hands and knees crept swiftly forward to the eastward. In this cramped position his progress was extremely painful, and his hands were torn by the briars and stones; but forward he dashed, fully expecting a shower of bullets every minute. At last he reached the other end of the half-mile ditch, breathless and half-dead, but without having once raised his head above the gully.

Emerging from this field he found himself in the Williamsburg road, and bordering the opposite side was an extensive tract thickly covered with pines. As he crossed and entered this tract he looked back and could see his enemies, whose movements showed that they were greatly puzzled and off the scent. When at a safe distance he sought a hiding-place and took a needed rest of several hours.

He then resumed his journey and followed the direction of the Williamsburg road, which he found picketed at various points, so that it



was necessary to avoid open spaces. Several times during the day he saw squads of Confederate cavalry passing along the road so near that he could hear their talk. Near nightfall he reached Dياسن Bridge, where he successfully passed another picket. He kept on until nearly midnight, when he lay down by a great tree and, cold as he was, slept soundly until daylight. He now made a careful reconnoissance and found near the road the ruins of an old building, which, he afterwards learned, was called "Burnt Ordinary."

He now found himself almost unable to walk with his injured foot, but, nerved by the yet bright hope of liberty, he once more went his weary way in the direction of Williamsburg. Finally he came to a place where there were some smoking fagots and a number of tracks, indicating it to have been a picket post of the previous night. He was now nearing Williamsburg, which, he was inclined to believe, from such meager information as had reached Libby before his departure, was in possession of the Union forces. Still, he knew that this was territory that was frequently changing hands, and was therefore likely to be under a close watch. From this on he avoided the roads wholly and kept under cover as much as it was possible; and if compelled to cross an open field at all, he did so in a stooping position. He was now moving in a south-easterly direction, and coming again to the margin of a wide opening, he saw, to his unutterable joy, a body of Union troops advancing to the road towards him.

Thoroughly worn out, Rose, believing that his deliverers were at hand, sat down to await their approach. His pleasant reverie was disturbed by a sound behind and near him, and turning quickly he was startled to see three soldiers in the road along which the troops first seen were advancing. The fact that these men had not been noticed before gave Rose some uneasiness for a moment, but, as they wore blue uniforms, and moreover seemed to take no note of the approaching Federal troops, all things seemed to indicate that they were simply an advanced detail of the same body. This seemed to be further confirmed by the fact that the trio were now moving down the road, apparently with the intent of joining the larger body; and as the ground to the east rose to a crest, both of the bodies were a minute later shut off from Rose's view.

In the full confidence that all was right he rose to his feet and walked towards the crest, to get a better view of everything and greet his comrades of the loyal blue. A walk of a hundred yards brought him again in sight of the three men, who now noticed and challenged him.

In spite of appearances a vague suspicion forced itself upon Rose, who however obeyed the summons and continued to approach the party, who now watched him with fixed attention. As he came closer to the group, the brave but unfortunate soldier saw that he was lost.

For the first time the three seemed to be made aware of the approach of the Federals, and to show consequent alarm and haste. The unhappy Rose saw before the men spoke that their blue uniform was a disguise, and the discovery brought a savage expression to his lips. He hoped and tried to convince his captors that he was a Confederate, but all in vain; they retained him as their prisoner, and now told him that they were Confederates. Rose, in the first bitter moment of his misfortune, thought seriously of breaking away to his friends so temptingly near; but his poor broken foot and the slender chance of escaping three bullets at a few yards made this suicide, and he decided to wait for a better chance, and this came sooner than he expected.

One of the men appeared to be an officer, who detailed one of his companions to conduct Rose to the rear in the direction of Richmond. The prisoner went quietly with his guard, the other two men tarried a little to watch the advancing Federals, and now Rose began to limp like a man who was unable to go farther. Presently the ridge shut them off from the view of the others. Rose, who had slyly been staggering closer and closer to the guard, suddenly sprang upon the man, and before he had time to wink had twisted his gun from his grasp, discharged it into the air, flung it down, and ran off as fast as his poor foot would let him towards the east and so as to avoid the rest of the Confederates. The disarmed Confederate made no attempt at pursuit, nor indeed did the other two, who were now seen retreating at a run across the adjacent fields.

Rose's heart bounded with new hope, for he felt that he would be with his advancing comrades in a few minutes at most. All at once a squad of Confederates, hitherto unseen, rose up in his very path, and beat him down with the butts of their muskets. All hands now rushed around and secured him, and one of the men called out excitedly, "Hurry up, boys; the Yankees are right here." They rushed their prisoner into the wooded ravine, and here they were joined by the man whom Rose had just disarmed. He was in a savage mood, and declared it to be his particular desire to fill Rose full of Confederate lead. The officer in charge rebuked the man, however, and compelled him to cool down, and he went along with an injured air that excited the merriment of his comrades.

The party continued its retreat to Barhamsville, thence to the White House on the Pamunkey River, and finally to Richmond, where Rose was again restored to Libby, and, like the writer, was confined for a number of days in a narrow and loathsome cell. On the 30th of April his exchange was effected for a Confederate colonel, and on the 6th of July, 1864, he rejoined his regiment, in which he served with conspicuous gallantry to the close of the war.

As already stated, Hamilton reached the Union lines safely after many vicissitudes, and did brave service in the closing scenes of the rebellion. He is now a resident of Reedyville, Kentucky. Johnson, whose enforced confinement in Rat Hell gave him a unique fame in Libby, also made good his escape, and now lives at North Pleasantville, Kentucky.

Of the fifteen men who dug the successful tun-

nel, four are dead, viz.: Fitzsimmons, Gallagher, Garbett, and McDonald. Captain W. S. B. Randall lives at Hillsboro, Highland County, Ohio; Colonel Terrance Clark at Paris, Edgar County, Illinois; Captain Eli Foster at Chicago; Colonel N. S. McKean at Collinsville, Madison County, Illinois; and Captain J. C. Fislar at Lewiston, I. T. The addresses of Captains Lucas, Simpson, and Mitchell are unknown at this writing.

Colonel Rose has served faithfully almost since the end of the war with the 16th United States Infantry, in which command he holds a captain's commission; and no one meeting him in these peaceful days would hear from his reticent lips, or read in the placid face of the veteran, the thrilling story that links his name in so remarkable a manner with the history of the famous Bastille of the Confederacy.

Frank E. Moran.



THE ROADS THAT MEET.

ART.

ONE is so fair, I turn to go,
As others go, its beckoning length;
Such paths can never lead to woe,
I say in eager, early strength.
What is the goal?
Visions of heaven wake;
But the wind's whispers round me roll:
"For you, mistake!"

LOVE.

ONE leads beneath high oaks, and birds
Choose there their joyous revelry;
The sunbeams glint in golden herds,
The river mirrors silently.
Under these trees
My heart would bound or break;
Tell me what goal, resonant breeze?
"For you, mistake!"

CHARITY.

WHAT is there left? The arid way,
The chilling height, whence all the world
Looks little, and each radiant day,
Like the soul's banner, flies unfurled.
May I stand here?
In this rare ether slake
My reverential lips,— and fear
No last mistake.

Some spirits wander till they die,
With shattered thoughts and trembling hands
What jarred their natures hopelessly
No living wight yet understands.
There is no goal,
Whatever end they make;
Though prayers each trusting step control
They win mistake.

This is so true, we dare not learn
Its force until our hopes are old,
And, skyward, God's star-beacons burn
The brighter as our hearts grow cold.
If all we miss,
In the great plans that shake
The world, still God has need of this,—
Even mistake.

Rose Hawthorne Lathrop.



TWO KENTUCKY GENTLEMEN OF THE OLD SCHOOL.

THE woods are hushed, their music is no more :
The leaf is dead, the yearning passed away :
New leaf, new life—the days of frost are o'er :
New life, new love, to suit the newer day.

TENNYSON.

THE WOODS ARE HUSHED.

IT was near the middle of the afternoon of an autumnal day, on the wide, elevated, rich, grassy plateau of central Kentucky. The Eternal Power seemed to have quitted the universe and left all nature folded in the calm of the Eternal Peace. Around the pale-blue dome of the heavens a few pearl-colored clouds hung motionless, as though the wind had been withdrawn to other skies. Not a crimson leaf floated downwards through the soft, silvery light that filled the atmosphere and created the sense of lonely unimaginable spaces. This light overhung the far-rolling landscape of field and meadow and wood, crowning with faint radiance the remoter low-swellling hills and deepening into dreamy half-shadows on their eastern slopes. Nearer, it fell in a white flake on an unstirred sheet of water which lay along the edge of a mass of somber-hued woodland, and nearer still it touched to spring-like brilliancy a level, green meadow on the hither edge of the water, where a group of Durham cattle stood with reversed flanks near the gleaming trunks of some leafless sycamores. Still nearer, it caught the top of the brown foliage of a little bent oak-tree and burnt it into a silvery flame. It lit on the back and the wings of a crow flying heavily in the path of its rays, and made his blackness as white as the breast of a swan. In the immediate foreground, it sparkled in minute gleams along the stalks of the coarse, dead weeds that fell away from the legs and the flanks of a white horse, and slanted across the face of the rider and through the ends of his gray hair, which straggled from beneath his soft black hat. The horse, old and patient and gentle, stood

with low-stretched neck and closed eyes half-asleep in the faint glow of the waning heat ; and the rider, the sole human presence in all the scene, sat looking across the silent autumnal landscape, sunk in long, deep reverie. Both horse and rider seemed but harmonious elements in the panorama of still-life, and completed the picture of a closing scene.

To the man it was a closing scene. From the rank fallow field through which he had been riding and in which he had paused he was now surveying, for the last time, the many features of a landscape that had been familiar to him almost from the beginning of memory. In the afternoon and the autumn of his age he was about to rend the last ties that bound him to his former life, and, like one who had survived his own destiny, turn his face towards a future that was void of everything he held significant or dear. An old man on an old horse—the solitary, motionless, abstracted figure of the dying landscape—he seemed a white-haired personification of the very Past ; and such, indeed, he was.

The civil war had only the year before reached its ever-memorable close. From where he sat there was not a home in sight, as there was not one beyond the reach of his vision, but had felt its influence. Some of his old neighbors had come home from its camps and prisons, aged or altered as though by half a lifetime of years. The bones of some lay whitening on its battle-fields. Families reassembled around their hearthstones spoke in low tones unceasingly of defeat and victory, heroism and death. Suspicion and distrust and estrangement prevailed. Former friends met each other on the turnpikes without speaking ; brothers avoided each other in the streets of the neighboring town. The rich had grown poor ; the poor had become rich. Many of

the latter were preparing to move West. The negroes were drifting blindly hither and thither, deserting the country and flocking to the towns. Even the once united rural church was jarred by the unstrung and discordant spirit of the times. At affecting passages in the sermons men grew pale and set their teeth fiercely; women suddenly lowered their black veils and rocked to and fro in their pews; for it is always at the bar of Conscience and before the very altar of God that the human heart is most wrung by a sense of its losses and the memory of its wrongs. The war had divided the people of Kentucky as the false mother would have severed the child.

It had not left the old man unscathed. His younger brother had fallen early in the conflict, borne to the end of his brief warfare by his impetuous valor; his aged mother had sunk under the tidings of the death of her latest-born; his sister was estranged from him by political differences with her husband; his old family servants, men and women, had left him, and grass and weeds had already grown over the doorsteps of the shut, noiseless cabins. Nay, the whole vast social system of the old régime had fallen, and he was henceforth but a useless fragment of the ruins.

All at once his eye turned from the cracked and smoky mirror of the times and dwelt fondly upon the scenes of the past. The silent fields around him seemed again alive with the negroes, singing as they followed the plows down the corn-rows or swung the cradles through the bearded wheat. Again, in a frenzy of merriment, the strains of the old fiddles issued from crevices of cabin-doors to the rhythmic beat of hands and feet that shook the rafters and the roof. Now he was sitting on his porch, and one little negro was blacking his shoes, another leading his saddle-horse to the stiles, a third bringing his hat, and a fourth handing him a glass of ice-cold sangaree; or now he lay under the locust-trees in his yard, falling asleep in the drowsy heat of the summer afternoon, while one waved over him a bough of pungent walnut leaves, until he lost consciousness and by-and-by awoke to find that they both had fallen asleep side by side on the grass and the abandoned fly-brush lay full across his face. From where he sat also were seen slopes on which picnics were danced under the broad shade of maples and elms in June by those whom death and war had scattered like the transitory leaves that once had sheltered them. In this direction lay the district school-house where on Friday evenings there were wont to be speeches and debates; in that, lay the blacksmith's shop where of old he and his neighbors had met on horseback of

Saturday afternoons to hear the news, get the mails, discuss elections, and pitch quoits. In the valley beyond stood the church at which all had assembled on calm Sunday mornings like the members of one united family. Along with these scenes went many a chastened reminiscence of bridal and funeral and simpler events that had made up the annals of his country life.

The reader will have a clearer insight into the character and past career of Colonel Romulus Fields by remembering that he represented the flower of that social order which had bloomed in rank perfection over the blue-grass plains of Kentucky during the final decades of the old régime. Perhaps of all agriculturists in the United States the inhabitants of that region had spent the most nearly idyllic life, on account of the beauty of the climate, the richness of the land, the spacious comfort of their homes, the efficiency of their negroes, and the characteristic contentedness of their dispositions. In reality they were not farmers, but rural, idle gentlemen of easy fortunes whose slaves did their farming for them. Thus nature and history combined to make them a peculiar class, a cross between the aristocratic and the bucolic, being as simple as shepherds and as proud as kings, and not seldom exhibiting among both men and women types of character which were as remarkable for pure, tender, noble states of feeling as they were commonplace in powers and cultivation of mind. It was upon this luxurious social flower that the war naturally fell as a killing frost, and upon no single specimen with more blighting power than upon Colonel Fields. For destiny—to change the figure—had absolutely quarried and chiseled him, to serve as an ornament in the barbaric temple of human bondage. There were ornaments in that temple, and he was one. A slaveholder with Southern sympathies, a man educated not beyond the ideas of his generation, convinced that slavery was an evil, yet seeing no present way of removing it, he had of all things been a model master. As such he had gone on record in Kentucky, and no doubt in a Higher Court; and as such his efforts had been put forth to secure the passage of many of those milder laws for which his State was distinguished. Often, in those dark days, his face, anxious and sad, was to be seen amidst the throng that surrounded the blocks on which slaves were sold at auction; and more than one poor wretch he had bought to save him from separation from his family or from being sold into the plantations,— afterwards riding far and near to find him a home on one of the neighboring farms.

Now all was changed. He had but to place

the whole picture of the present beside the whole picture of the past to realize what the contrast meant for him.

At length he gathered the bridle reins from the neck of his old horse and turned his head homeward. As he rode slowly on, every spot gave up its memories. He dismounted when he came to the cattle and walked among them, stroking their soft flanks and feeling in the palm of his hand the rasp of their tongues; on his sideboard at home was many a silver cup which told of premiums at the great fairs. It was in this very pond that as a boy he had learned to swim on a cherry rail. When he entered the woods, the sight of the walnut-trees and the hickory-nut trees, loaded on the topmost branches, gave him a sudden pang. Beyond the woods he came upon the garden, which he had kept as his mother had left it,—an old-fashioned garden with an arbor in the center, covered with Isabella grape-vines on one side and Catawba on the other; with walks branching thence in four directions, and along them beds of jump-up-Johnnies, sweet-williams, daffodils, sweet-peas, larkspur, and thyme, flags and the sensitive plant, celestial and maiden's-blush roses. He stopped and looked over the fence at the very spot where he had found his mother on the day when the news of the battle came. She had been kneeling, trowel in hand, driving away vigorously at the loamy earth, and, as she saw him coming, had risen and turned towards him her face with the ancient pink bloom on her clear cheeks and the light of a pure, strong soul in her gentle eyes. Overcome by his emotions, he had blindly faltered out the words, "Mother, John was among the killed!" For a moment she had looked at him as though stunned by a blow. Then a violent flush had overspread her features, and then an ashen pallor; after which, with a sudden proud dilating of her form as though with joy, she had sunk down like the tenderest of her lily-stalks, cut from its root.

Beyond the garden he came to the empty cabin and the great woodpile. At this hour it used to be a scene of hilarious activity,—the little negroes sitting perched in chattering groups on the topmost logs or playing leap-frog in the dust, while some picked up baskets of chips or dragged a back-log into the cabins.

At last he drew near the wooden stiles and saw the large house of which he was the solitary occupant. What darkened rooms and noiseless halls! What beds, all ready, that nobody now came to sleep in, and cushioned old chairs that nobody rocked! The house and the contents of its attic, presses, and drawers could have told much of the history of Kentucky from almost its beginning; for its foundations had been laid by his

father near the beginning of the century, and through its doors had passed a long train of forms, from the veterans of the Revolution to the soldiers of the civil war. Old coats hung up in closets; old dresses folded away in drawers; saddle-bags and buckskin-leggins; hunting-jackets, powder-horns, and militia-men hats; looms and knitting-needles; snuff-boxes and reticules,—what a treasure-house of the past it was! And now the only thing that had the springs of life within its bosom was the great, sweet-voiced clock, whose faithful face had kept unchanged amidst all the swift pageantry of changes.

He dismounted at the stiles and handed the reins to a gray-haired negro, who had hobbled up to receive them with a smile and a gesture of the deepest respect.

"Peter," he said very simply, "I am going to sell the place and move to town. I can't live here any longer."

With these words he passed through the yard-gate, walked slowly up the broad pavement, and entered the house.

MUSIC NO MORE.

ON the disappearing form of the colonel was fixed an ancient pair of eyes that looked out at him from behind a still more ancient pair of silver-rimmed spectacles with an expression of indescribable solicitude and love. These eyes were set in the head of an old gentleman—for such he was—named Peter Cotton, who was the only one of the colonel's former slaves that had remained inseparable from his person and his altered fortunes. In early manhood Peter had been a wood-chopper; but he had one day had his leg broken by the limb of a falling tree, and afterwards, out of consideration for his limp, had been made supervisor of the woodpile, gardener, and a sort of nondescript servitor of his master's luxurious needs. Nay, in larger and deeper characters must his history be writ, he having been, in days gone by, one of those ministers of the gospel whom conscientious Kentucky masters often urged to the exercise of spiritual functions in behalf of their benighted people. In course of preparation for this august work, Peter had learned to read and had come to possess a well-chosen library of three several volumes,—Webster's Spelling-Book, Pilgrim's Progress, and the Bible. But even these unusual acquisitions he deemed not enough; for being touched with a spark of poetic fire from heaven, and enthused by the African's fondness for all that is conspicuous in dress, he had conceived for himself the creation of a unique garment which should symbolize in perfection the claims and consolations of his

apostolic office. This was nothing less than a sacred blue-jeans coat that he had had his old mistress make him, with very long and spacious tails, whereon, at his further direction, she embroidered sundry texts of Scripture which it pleased him to regard as the fit visible annunciations of his holy calling. And inasmuch as his mistress, who had had the coat woven on her own looms, from the wool of her finest sheep, was, like other gentlewomen of her time, rarely skilled in the accomplishments of the needle, and was moreover in full sympathy with the piety of his intent, she wrought of these passages a border enriched with such intricate curves, marvelous flourishes, and harmonious letterings, that Solomon never reflected the glory in which Peter was arrayed whenever he put it on. For after much prayer that the Almighty wisdom would aid his reason in the difficult task of selecting the most appropriate texts, Peter had chosen seven — one for each day in the week — with such tact and no doubt heavenly guidance, that when braided together they did truly constitute an eloquent epitome of Christian duty, hope, and pleading.

From first to last they were as follows: "Woe is unto me if I preach not the gospel"; "Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh"; "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden"; "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin"; "Now abideth faith, hope, and charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity"; "I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep"; "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

This concatenation of texts Peter wished to have duly solemnized, and therefore, when the work was finished, further requested his mistress to close the entire chain with the word "Amen," introduced in some suitable place; but this gave rise to a rather unfortunate effect; for since, in the disposition of the various passages over the skirts, the final word of the last quotation had fallen a little to one side of the central line of his back, when this additional word was wrought in, it filled a vacant spot in the middle of his coat-tails, just half-way between the brass buttons and the hem; so that any one standing full in Peter's rear could but marvel to see clearly from that point only this word, so awful and so unaccountably placed:

AMEN.

Panoplied in this robe of righteousness, and with a worn leathern Bible in his hand, Peter used to go around of Sundays, and during the

week by night, preaching from cabin to cabin the gospel of his heavenly Master.

The angriest lightnings of the sultriest skies often played amidst the awful darkness upon those sacred coat-tails and around that girdle of everlasting texts, as though the evil spirits of the air would fain have burnt them and scattered their ashes on the roaring winds. The slow-sifting snows of winter whitened them as though to chill their spiritual fires; but winter and summer, year after year, in weariness of body, often in sore distress of mind, for miles along this lonely road and for miles across that rugged way, Peter trudged on and on, withal perhaps as meek a spirit as ever grew footsore in the paths of its Master since inspired feet trod for the last time the hills of the Holy Land. Many a poor overburdened slave took fresh heart and strength from the sight of that celestial raiment; many a stubborn, rebellious spirit, whose flesh but lately quivered under the lash, was brought low by its humble teaching; many a worn-out old frame, racked with pain in its last illness, pressed a fevered lip to its hopeful hem; and many a dying eye closed in death peacefully fixed on its immortal pledges.

When Peter started abroad, if a storm threatened, he carried an old cotton umbrella of immense size; and as the storm burst, he gathered the tails of his coat carefully up under his arm-pits that they might be kept dry. Or if caught by a tempest without his umbrella, he would take his coat off and roll it up inside out, leaving his body exposed to the fury of the elements. No care, however, could keep it from growing old and worn and faded; and when the slaves were set free and he was called upon by the interposition of Providence to lay it finally aside, it was covered by many a patch and stain as proofs of its devoted usage.

One after another the colonel's old servants, gathering their children about them, had left him, to begin their new life. He bade them all a kind good-bye, and into the palm of each silently pressed some token that he knew would soon be needed. But no inducement could make Peter or Phillis, his wife, budge from their cabin. "Go, Peter! Go, Phillis!" the colonel had said time and again. "No one is happier that you are free than I am; and you can call on me for what you need to set you up in business." But Peter and Phillis asked to stay with him. Then suddenly, several months before the time at which this sketch opens, Phillis had died, leaving the colonel and Peter as the only relics of that populous life which had once filled the house and the cabins. The colonel had succeeded in hiring a woman to do Phillis's work; but her presence was a strange note of discord in

the old domestic harmony, and only saddened the recollections of its vanished peace.

Peter had a short, stout figure, dark-brown skin, smooth-shaven face, eyes round, deep-set and wide apart, and a short, stub nose which dipped suddenly into his head, making it easy for him to wear the silver-rimmed spectacles left him by his old mistress. A peculiar conformation of the muscles between the eyes and the nose gave him the quizzical expression of one who is about to sneeze, and this was heightened by a twinkle in the eyes which seemed caught from the shining of an inner sun upon his tranquil heart.

Sometimes, however, his face grew sad enough. It was sad on this afternoon, as has been said, while he watched the colonel walk slowly up the pavement, well overgrown with weeds, and enter the house, which the setting sun touched with the last radiance of the finished day.

NEW LIFE.

ABOUT two years after the close of the war, therefore, the colonel and Peter were to be found in the city, ready to turn over a new leaf in the volumes of their lives, which already had an old-fashioned binding, a somewhat musty odor, and but few written leaves remaining.

After a long, dry summer you may have seen two gnarled old apple-trees, that stood with interlocked arms on the western slope of some quiet hill-side, make a melancholy show of blooming out again in the autumn of the year and dallying with the idle buds that mock their sapless branches. Much the same was the belated, fruitless efflorescence of the colonel and Peter.

The colonel had no business habits, no political ambition, no wish to grow richer. He was too old for society, and without near family ties. For some time he wandered through the streets like one lost,—sick with yearning for the fields and woods, for his cattle, for familiar faces. He haunted Cheapside and the court-house square, where the farmers always assembled when they came to town; and if his eye lighted on one, he would button-hole him on the street-corner and lead him into a grocery and sit down for a quiet chat. Sometimes he would meet an aimless, melancholy wanderer like himself, and the two would go off and discuss over and over again their departed days; and several times he came unexpectedly upon some of his old servants who had fallen into bitter want, and who more than repaid him for the help he gave by contrasting the hardships of a life of freedom with the ease of their shackled years.

In the course of time, he could but observe

that human life in the town was reshaping itself slowly and painfully, but with resolute energy. The colossal structure of slavery had fallen, scattering its ruins far and wide over the State; but out of the very débris was being taken the material to lay the deeper foundations of the new social edifice. Men and women as old as he were beginning life over and trying to fit themselves for it by changing the whole attitude and habit of their minds,—by taking on a new heart and spirit. But when a great building falls, there is always some rubbish, and the colonel and others like him were part of this. Henceforth they possessed only an antiquarian sort of interest, like the stamped bricks of Nebuchadnezzar.

Nevertheless he made a show of doing something, and in a year or two opened on Cheapside a store for the sale of hardware and agricultural implements. He knew more about the latter than anything else; and, furthermore, he secretly felt that a business of this kind would enable him to establish in town a kind of headquarters for the farmers. His account books were to be kept on a system of twelve months' credit; and he mentally resolved that if one of his customers could not pay then, he should have another year's time.

Business began slowly. The farmers dropped in and found a good lounging-place. On county-court days, which were great market-days for the sale of sheep, horses, mules, and cattle in front of the colonel's door, they swarmed in from the hot sun and sat around on the counter and the plows and machines till the entrance was blocked to other customers. When a customer did come in, the colonel, who was probably talking with some old acquaintance, would tell him just to look around and pick out what he wanted and the price would be all right. If one of those acquaintances asked for a pound of nails, the colonel would scoop up some ten pounds and say, "I reckon that 's about a pound, Tom." He had never seen a pound of nails in his life; and if one had been weighed on his scales, he would have said the scales were wrong. He had no great idea of commercial dispatch. One morning a lady came in for some carpet tacks, an article that he had overlooked. But he at once sent off an order for enough to have tacked a carpet pretty well all over Kentucky; and when they came, two weeks later, he told Peter to take her up a double-handful with his compliments. He had laid in, however, an ample and especially fine assortment of pocket-knives, for that instrument had always been to him one of gracious and very winning qualities. Then when a friend dropped in he would say, "General, don't you need a new pocket-knife?" and, taking out one, would

open all the blades and commend the metal and the handle. The "general" would inquire the price, and the colonel, having shut the blades, would hand it to him, saying in a careless, fond way, "I reckon I won't charge you anything for that." His mind could not come down to the low level of such ignoble barter, and he gave away the whole case of knives.

These were the pleasanter aspects of his business life, which did not lack as well its tedium and crosses. Thus there were many dark stormy days when no one he cared to see came in; and he then became rather a pathetic figure, wandering absently around amidst the symbols of his past activity, and stroking the plows, like dumb companions. Or he would stand at the door and look across at the old court-house, where he had seen many a slave sold and had listened to the great Kentucky orators. Once, too, while he was deep in conversation, a brisk young farmer drove up to the door in a sulky and called in pretty sharply that he wanted him to go out and set up a machine. The colonel's mind just then was busy with certain scenes of great power in his own past life, and had swelled to the old heroic proportions; wherefore, burning over the indignity, he seized an ax-handle and started out in a manner that led the young man to drive quickly away.

But what hurt him most was the talk of the newer farming and the abuse of the old which he was forced to hear; and he generally refused to handle the improved implements and mechanical devices by which labor and waste were to be saved.

Altogether he grew tired of "the thing," and sold out at the end of the year with a loss of over a thousand dollars, though he insisted he had done a good business.

As he was then seen much on the streets again and several times heard to make remarks in regard to the sidewalks, gutters, and crossings, when they happened to be in bad condition, the "Daily Press" one morning published a card stating that if Colonel Romulus Fields would consent to make the race for mayor he would receive the support of many Democrats, adding a tribute to his virtues and his influential past. It touched the colonel, and he walked down town with a rather commanding figure. But it pained him to see how many of his acquaintances returned his salutations very coldly; and just as he was passing the Northern Bank he met the young opposition candidate,—a little red-haired fellow, walking between two ladies, with a rose-bud in his button-hole,—who refused to speak at all, but made the ladies laugh by some remark he uttered as the colonel passed. The card had been inserted humorously, but he took it seriously;

and when his friends found this out, they rallied round him. The day of election drew near. They told him he would have to buy votes. He said he would n't buy a vote to be mayor of the New Jerusalem. They told him he must "mix" and "treat." He refused. Foreseeing he had no chance, they besought him to withdraw. He said he would not. They told him he would n't poll twenty votes. He replied that *one* would satisfy him, provided it was neither begged nor bought. When his defeat was announced he accepted it as another evidence that he had no part in the newer day, and regretted it only because there was thus lost to him another chance of re-deeming his idleness.

A sense of this weighed heavily on him at times; but it is not likely that he realized how pitifully he was undergoing a moral shrinkage in consequence of mere disuse. Actually, extinction had set in with him long prior to dissolution, and he was dead years before his heart ceased beating. The very basic virtues on which had rested his once spacious and stately character were now but the moldy corner-stones of a crumbling ruin.

It was a subtle evidence of deterioration in manliness that he had taken to dress. When he had lived in the country, he had never dressed up unless he came to town. When he had moved to town, he thought he must remain dressed up all the time; and this fact first fixed his attention on a matter which afterwards began to be loved for its own sake. Usually he wore a Derby hat, a black diagonal coat, gray trousers, and a white necktie. But the article of attire in which he took chief pleasure was hose; and the better to show the gay colors of these, he wore low-cut shoes of the finest calf-skin, turned up at the toes. Thus his feet kept pace with the present, however far his head may have lagged in the past; and it may be that this stream of fresh fashions, flowing perennially over his lower extremities like water about the roots of a tree, kept him from drying up altogether. Peter always polished his shoes with too much blacking, perhaps thinking that the more the blacking the greater the proof of love. He wore his clothes about a season and a half—having several suits—and then passed them on to Peter, who, foreseeing the joy of such an inheritance, bought no new ones. In the act of transferring them the colonel made no comment until he came to the hose, from which he seemed unable to part without a final tribute of esteem, as: "These are fine, Peter"; or, "Peter, these are nearly as good as new." Thus Peter too was dragged through the whims of fashion. To have seen the colonel walking about his grounds and garden followed by Peter, just a

year and a half behind in dress and a yard and a half behind in space, one might well have taken the rear figure for the colonel's double, slightly the worse for wear, somewhat shrunken, and cast into a heavy shadow.

Time hung so wearily on his hands at night that he added a dress-coat to his wardrobe and accepted the first invitation to an evening party. While dressing he asked Peter nervously a great many times how he looked, in order to be soothed by the assurances of that partial critic. But his heart sank before he reached his hostess's, and he spent most of the evening in the gentlemen's room, bewildered and with a sense of loneliness. He had touched the new human life around him at various points: as he now stretched out his arms towards its society, for the first time he completely realized how far removed it was from him. Here he saw a younger generation,—the flowers of the new social order,—sprung from the very soil of fraternal battle-fields, but blooming together as the emblems of oblivious peace. He saw fathers, who had fought madly on opposite sides, talking quietly in corners as they watched their children dancing, or heard them toasting their old generals and their campaigns and the newer day over their champagne in the supper-room. He was glad of it all; but it made him feel, at the same time, that, instead of treading the velvety floors, he ought to step up and take his place among the canvases of old-time portraits that looked down from the walls. The dancing he had done had been perfected not under the blinding glare of gas-light, but by the glimmer of tallow-dips and star-candles and the ruddy glow of cavernous firesides,—not to the accompaniment of an orchestra of wind-instruments and strings, but to a chorus of girls' sweet voices, as they trod simpler measures, or to the maddening sway of a gray-haired negro fiddler standing on a chair in the chimney corner. Still, it is significant to note that his saddest thought, long after leaving, was that his shirt bosom had not lain down smooth, but stuck out like a huge cracked egg-shell; and that when, in imitation of the others, he had laid his white silk handkerchief across his bosom inside his vest, it had slipped out during the evening and had been found by him, on confronting a mirror, flapping over his stomach like a little white masonic apron.

Peter, meantime, had been finding out that his occupation too was gone.

Soon after moving to town, he had tendered his pastoral services to one of the fashionable churches of the city,—not because it was fashionable, but because it was made up of his brethren. In reply he was invited to preach a trial sermon, which he did with gracious unction. It was a strange scene, as one calm Sunday

morning he stood on the edge of the pulpit, dressed in a suit of the colonel's old clothes, with one hand in his trousers pocket, and his lame leg set a little forward at an angle familiar to those who know the statues of Henry Clay.

How self-possessed he seemed, yet with what a rush of memories did he pass his eyes slowly over that vast assemblage of his emancipated people! With what feelings must he have contrasted those silk hats, and walking-canes, and broadcloths; those gloves and satins, laces and feathers, jewelry and fans—that whole many-colored panorama of life—with the weary, sad, and sullen audiences that had often heard him of old under the forest trees or by the banks of some turbulent stream!

In a voice husky, but heard beyond the flirtation of the uttermost pew, he took his text: "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin." From this he tried to preach a new sermon, suited to the newer day. But several times the thoughts of the past were too much for him, and he broke down with emotion. The next day a grave committee waited on him and reported that the sense of the congregation was to call a colored gentleman from Louisville. Private objections to Peter were that he had a broken leg, wore Colonel Fields's second-hand clothes, which were too big for him, preached in the old-fashioned way, and lacked self-control and repose of manner.

Peter accepted his rebuff as sweetly as Socrates might have done. Humming the burden of an old hymn, he took his righteous coat from a nail in the wall and folded it away in a little brass-nailed deer-skin trunk, laying over it the spelling-book and the Pilgrim's Progress, which he had ceased to read. Thenceforth his relations to his people were never intimate, and even from the other servants of the colonel's household he stood apart. In paying them, the colonel would sometimes say, "Peter, I reckon I 'd better begin to pay you a salary; that's the style now." But Peter would turn off, saying he did n't "have no use fur no salary."

Thus both of them dropped more and more out of life, but as they did so, only drew more and more closely to each other. The colonel had bought a home on the edge of the town, with some ten acres of beautiful ground surrounding. A high osage-orange hedge shut it in, and forest trees, chiefly maples and elms, gave to the lawn and house abundant shade. Wild-grape vines, the Virginia creeper, and the climbing oak swung their long festoons from summit to summit, while honeysuckles, clematis, and the Mexican vine clambered over arbors and trellises, or along the chipped stone

of the low, old-fashioned house. Just outside the door of the colonel's bedroom slept an ancient sun-dial.

The place seemed always in half-shadow, with hedge rows of box, clumps of dark holly, darker firs half a century old, and aged, crape-like cedars.

It was in the seclusion of this retreat, which looked almost like a wild bit of country set down on the edge of the town, that the colonel and Peter spent more of their time as they fell farther in the rear of onward events. There were no such flower-gardens in the city, and pretty much the whole town went thither for its flowers, preferring them to those that were to be had for a price at the nurseries. There was perhaps a suggestion of pathetic humor in the fact that it should have called on the colonel and Peter, themselves so nearly defunct, to give the flowers for so many funerals; but, it is certain, almost weekly the two old gentlemen received this chastening admonition of their all-but-spent mortality. The colonel cultivated the rarest fruits also, and had under glass varieties that were not friendly to the climate; so that by means of the fruits and flowers there was established a pleasant social bond with many who otherwise would never have sought them out. But others came for better reasons. To a few deep-seeing eyes the colonel and Peter were momentous figures, disappearing types of a once vast social system, ruined landmarks on a fading historic landscape, and their devoted friendship was the last steady burning-down of that pure flame of love which can never again shine out in the future of the two races. Hence a softened charm invested the drowsy quietude of that shadowy paradise in which the old master without a slave and the old slave without a master still kept up a brave pantomime of their obsolete relations. No one ever saw in their intercourse aught but the finest courtesy, the most delicate consideration. The very tones of their voices in addressing each other were as good as sermons on gentleness, their antiquated playfulness as melodious as the babble of distant water. To be near them was to be exorcised of evil passions. The sun of their day had indeed long since set; but, like twin clouds lifted high and motionless into some far quarter of the gray twilight skies, they were still radiant with the glow of the invisible orb.

Henceforth the colonel's appearances in public were few and regular. He went to church on Sundays, where he sat on the edge of the choir in the center of the building, and sang an ancient bass of his own improvisation to the older hymns, and glanced furtively around to see whether any one noticed that he could not sing the new ones. At the Sun-

day-school picnics the committee of arrangements allowed him to carve the mutton, and after dinner to swing the smallest children gently beneath the trees. He was seen on Commencement Day at Morrison Chapel, where he always gave his bouquet to the val-edictorian, whose address he preferred to any of the others. In the autumn he might sometimes be noticed sitting high up in the amphitheater at the fair and looking over into the ring where the judges were grouped around the music-stand. Once he had been a judge himself, with a blue ribbon in his button-hole, while the band played "Sweet Alice, Ben Bolt," and "Gentle Annie." The ring seemed full of young men now, and no one thought of offering him the privileges of the grounds. In his day the great feature of the exhibition had been cattle; now everything was turning into a horse show. He was always glad to get home again to Peter, his true yoke-fellow. For just as two old oxen — one white and one black — that have long toiled under the same yoke will, when turned out to graze at last in the widest pasture, come and put themselves horn to horn and flank to flank, so the colonel and Peter were never so happy as when ruminating side by side.

NEW LOVE.

IN their eventless life the slightest incident acquired the importance of a history. Thus, one day in June, Peter discovered a young couple love-making in the shrubbery, and with the deepest agitation reported the fact to the colonel. Never before, probably, had the fluttering of the dear god's wings brought more dismay than to these ancient involuntary guardsmen of his hiding-place. The colonel was at first for breaking up what he considered a piece of underhand proceedings, but Peter reasoned stoutly that if the pair were driven out they would simply go to some other retreat; and without getting the approval of his conscience to this view, the colonel contented himself with merely repeating that they ought to go straight and tell the girl's parents. Those parents lived just across the street outside his grounds. The young lady he knew very well himself, having a few years before given her the privilege of making herself at home among his flowers. It certainly looked hard to drive her out now, just when she was making the best possible use of his kindness. Moreover, Peter walked down street and ascertained that the young fellow was an energetic farmer living a few miles from town and son of one of the colonel's former friends; on both of which accounts the latter's heart went out to him. So when, a few days later,



PETER'S LOVE-STORY.

the colonel, followed by Peter, crept up breathlessly and peeped through the bushes at the pair strolling along the shady perfumed walks, and so plainly happy in that happiness which comes but once in a lifetime, they not only abandoned the idea of betraying the secret, but ever afterwards kept away from that part of the grounds, lest they should be an interruption.

"Peter," stammered the colonel, who had been trying to get the words out for three days, "do you suppose he has already — asked her?"

"Some 's pow'ful quick on de trigger, en some 's mighty slow," replied Peter, neutrally. "En some," he added exhaustively, "don' use de trigger 't all!"

"I always thought there had to be asking done by somebody," remarked the colonel, a little vaguely.

"I niver axed Phillis!" exclaimed Peter, with a certain air of triumph.

"Did Phillis ask *you*, Peter?" inquired the colonel, blushing and confidential.

"No, no, Marse Rom! I could n't er stood dat from no 'oman!" replied Peter, laughing and shaking his head.

The colonel was sitting on the stone steps in front of the house, and Peter stood below, leaning against a Corinthian column, hat in hand, as he went on to tell his love-story.

"Hit all happ'n dis way, Marse Rom. We wuz gwine have pra'r-meetin', en I 'lowed to walk home wid Phillis en ax 'er on de road. I been 'lowin' to ax 'er heap o' times befo', but I ain' jes niver done so. So I says to myse'f, says I, 'I jes mек my sermon to-night kiner lead up to whut I gwine tell Phillis on de road home.' So I tuk my tex' from de *lef*' tail o' my coat: 'De greatest' o' dese is char-

ity'; caze I knowed charity wuz same ez love. En all de time I wuz preachin' an' glorifyin' charity en identifyin' charity wid love, I could n' he'p thinkin' 'bout what I gwine say to Phillis on de road home. Dat mek me feel better; en de better I *feel*, de better I *preach*, so hit boun' to mek my *heahs* feel better likewise.—Phillis 'mong um. So Phillis she jes sot dah listenin' en listenin' en lookin' like we wuz a'ready on de road home, till I got so wuked up in my feelin's I jes knowed de time wuz come. By en by, I had n' mo' 'n done preachin' en wuz lookin' roun' to git my Bible en my hat, 'fo' up popped dat big Charity Green, who been settin' 'longside o' Phillis en tekin' ev'y las' thing I said to *hersef*. En she tuk hole o' my han' en squeeze it, en say she felt mos' like shoutin'. En 'fo' I knowed it, I jes see Phillis wrap 'er shawl roun' 'er head en tu'n 'er nose up at me right quick en flip out de dooh. De dogs howl mighty mou'nfal when I walk home by mysef *dat night*," added Peter, laughing to himself, "en I ain' preach dat sermon no mo' tell atter me en Phillis wuz married.

"Hit wuz long time," he continued, "'fo' Phillis come to heah me preach any mo'. But 'long 'bout de nex' fall we had big meetin', en heap mo' 'um j'ined. But Phillis, she ain't niver j'ined yit. I preached mighty nigh all roun' my coat-tails till I say to mysef, D' ain't but one tex' lef, en I jes got to fetch 'er wid dat! De text wuz on de *right tail* o' my coat: 'Come unto me, all ye dat labor en is heavy laden.' Hit wuz a ve'y momentous sermon, en all 'long I jes see Phillis wras'lin' wid 'ersef, en I say, 'She *got* to come *dis* night, de Lohd he'pin' me.' En I had n' mo' 'n said de word, 'fo' she jes walked down en guv me 'er han'. Den we had de baptizin' in Elkhorn Creek, en de watter wuz deep en de curren' tol'ble swif'. Hit look to me like dere wuz five hundred uv 'um on de creek side. By en by I stood on de edge o' de watter, en Phillis she come down to let me baptize 'er. En me en 'er j'ined han's en waded out in de creek, mighty slow, caze Phillis did n' have no shot roun' de bottom uv 'er dress, en it kep' floatin' on top de watter till I pushed it down. But by en by we got 'way out in de creek, en bof uv us wuz tremblin'. En I says to 'er ve'y kin'ly, 'When I put you un'er de watter, Phillis, you mus' try en hole yo'se'f stiff, so I can lif' you up easy.' But I had n't mo' 'n jes got 'er laid back over de watter ready to souze 'er un'er when 'er feet flew up off de bottom uv de creek, en when I retched out to fetch 'er up, I stepped in a hole; en 'fo' I knowed it, we wuz flounderin' roun' in de watter, en de hymn dey was singin' on de bank sounded

mighty confused-like. En Phillis she swallowed some watter, en all 't onct she jes grap me right tight roun' de neck, en said mighty quick, says she, 'I gwine marry whoever gits me out'n dis yere watter!'

"En by en by, when me en 'er wuz walkin' up de bank o' de creek, drippin' all over, I says to 'er, says I:

"'Does you 'member whut you said back yon'er in de watter, Phillis?'

"'I ain' out'n no watter yit,' says she, ve'y contemptuous.

"'When does you consider yo'se'f out'n de watter?'

"'When I get dese soakin' clo'es off 'n my back,' says she.

"'Hit wuz good dark when we got home, en atter a while I crope up to de dooh o' Phillis's cabin en put my eye down to de key-hole, en see Phillis jes settin' 'fo' dem blazin' walnut logs dressed up in 'er new red linsey dress, en 'er eyes shinin'. En I shuk so I 'mos' faint. Den I tap easy on de dooh, en say in a mighty tremblin' tone, says I:

"'Is you out'n de watter yit, Phillis?'

"'I got on dry dress,' says she.

"'Does you 'member whut you said back yon'er in de watter, Phillis?'

"'De latch-string on de outside de dooh,' says she, mighty sof'.

"'En I walked in.'"

As Peter drew near the end of this reminiscence, his voice sank to a key of inimitable tenderness; and when it was ended, the ensuing silence was broken by his merely adding:

"Phillis been dead heap o' years now"; after which he turned away.

This recalling of the scenes of a time long gone by may have awakened in the breast of the colonel some gentle memory; for after Peter was gone he continued to sit awhile in silent musing. Then getting up, he walked in the falling twilight across the yard and through the gardens until he came to a secluded spot in the most distant corner. There he stooped or rather knelt down and passed his hands, as though with mute benediction, over a little bed of old-fashioned China pinks. When he had moved in from the country he had brought nothing away from his mother's garden but these, and in all the years since no one had ever pulled them, as Peter well knew; for one day the colonel had said, with his face turned away:

"Let them have all the flowers they want; but leave the pinks."

He continued kneeling over them now, touching them softly with his fingers, as though they were the fragrant, never-changing symbols of voiceless communion with his past. Still it may have been only the early dew of the even-

ing that glistened on them when he rose and slowly walked away, leaving but the pale moonbeams to haunt the spot.

Certainly it was true that after this day he showed increasing concern in the young lovers who were holding clandestine meetings in his grounds.

"Peter," he would say, "why, if they love each other, do they not get married? Something may happen."

"I been spectin' some'n' to happ'n fur some time, ez dey been quar'lin' right smart lately," replied Peter.

Whether or not he was justified in this prediction, before the end of another week the colonel read a notice of their elopement and marriage; and several days later he came up from down-town and told Peter that everything had been forgiven the young pair, who had gone to housekeeping in the country. It gave him pleasure to think he had helped to perpetuate the race of farmers.

THE YEARNING PASSED AWAY.

IT was in the twilight of a late autumn day in the same year that nature gave the colonel the first direct intimation to prepare for the last summons. They had been passing along the garden walks, where a few pale flowers were trying to flourish up to the very winter's edge, and where the dry leaves had gathered unswept and rustled beneath their feet. All at once the colonel turned to Peter, who was a yard and a half behind, as usual, and said:

"Give me your arm, Peter"; and thus the two, for the first time in all their lifetime walking abreast, passed slowly on.

"Peter," said the colonel gravely, a minute or two later, "we are like two dried-up stalks of fodder. I wonder the Lord lets us live any longer."

"I reck'n He 's managin' to use us *some* way, or we would n' be heah," said Peter.

"Well, all I have to say is, that if He 's using me, He can't be in much of a hurry for his work," replied the colonel.

"He uses snails, en I *know* we ain' ez slow ez *dem*," argued Peter, composedly.

"I don't know. I think a snail must have made more progress since the war than I have."

The idea of his uselessness seemed to weigh on him, for a little later he remarked, with a sort of mortified smile:

"Do you think, Peter, that we would pass for what they call representative men of the New South?"

"We done *had* ou' day, Marse Rom." replied Peter. "We got to pass fur what

we *wuz*. Mebbe de Lohd 's got mo' use fur us yit 'n people has," he added, after a pause.

From this time on the colonel's strength gradually failed him; but it was not until the following spring that the end came. A night or two before his death his mind wandered backward, after the familiar manner of the dying, and his delirious dreams showed the shifting, faded pictures that renewed themselves for the last time on his wasting memory. It must have been that he was once more amidst the scenes of his active farm life, for his broken snatches of talk ran thus:

"Come, boys, get your cradles! Look where the sun is! You are late getting to work this morning. That is the finest field of wheat in the county. Be careful about the bundles! Make them the same size and tie them tight. That swath is too wide, and you don't hold your cradle right, Tom. . . .

"Sell Peter! Sell Peter Cotton! No, sir! You might buy *me* some day and work *me* in your cotton-field; but as long as he 's mine, you can't buy Peter, and you can't buy any of my negroes. . . .

"Boys! boys! If you don't work faster, you won't finish this field to-day. . . . You'd better go in the shade and rest now. The sun 's very hot. Don't drink too much ice-water. There 's a jug of whisky in the fence-corner. Give them a good dram around, and tell them to work slow till the sun gets lower." . . .

Once during the night a sweet smile played over his features as he repeated a few words that were part of an old rustic song and dance. Arranged, not as they now came broken and incoherent from his lips, but as he once had sung them, they were as follows:

"O Sister Phœbe! How merry were we
When we sat under the juniper-tree,
The juniper-tree, heigho!"

Put this hat on your head! Keep your head warm:
Take a sweet kiss! It will do you no harm,
Do you no harm, I know!"

After this he sank into a quieter sleep, but soon stirred with a look of intense pain.

"Helen! Helen!" he murmured. "Will you break your promise? Have you changed in your feeling towards me? I have brought you the pinks. Won't you take the pinks, Helen?"

Then he sighed as he added, "It was n't her fault. If she had only known—"

Who was the Helen of that far-away time? Was this the colonel's love-story? How much remained untold?

But during all the night, whithersoever his mind wandered, at intervals it returned to the burden of a single strain,—the harvesting.



PETER'S LAST SERMON.

Towards daybreak he took it up again for the last time:

"O boys, boys, *boys!* If you don't work faster you won't finish the field to-day. Look how low the sun is! . . . I am going to the house. They can't finish the field to-day. Let them do what they can, but don't let them work late. I want Peter to go to the house with me. Tell him to come on." . . .

In the faint gray of the morning, Peter, who had been watching by the bedside all night, stole out of the room, and going into the garden pulled a handful of pinks,— a thing

he had never done before,— and, reëntering the colonel's bedroom, put them in a vase near his sleeping face. Soon afterwards the colonel opened his eyes and looked around him. At the foot of the bed stood Peter, and on one side sat the physician and a friend. The night-lamp burned low, and through the folds of the curtains came the white light of early day.

"Put out the lamp and open the curtains," he said feebly. "It's day." When they had drawn the curtains aside, his eyes fell on the pinks, sweet and fresh with the dew on them.

He stretched out his hand and touched them caressingly, and his eyes sought Peter's with a look of grateful tenderness.

"I want to be alone with Peter for a while," he said, turning his face towards the others.

When they were left alone, it was some minutes before they could speak. Peter, not knowing what he did, had gone to the window and hid himself behind the curtains, drawing them tightly around his form as though to shroud himself from the coming sorrow.

At length the colonel said, "Come here!"

Peter, almost staggering forward, fell at the foot of the bed, and, clasping the colonel's feet with one arm, pressed his cheek against them.

"Come closer!"

Peter crept on his knees and buried his head on the colonel's thigh.

"Come up here,—*closer*"; and putting one arm around Peter's neck he laid the other hand softly on his head, and looked long and tenderly into his eyes.

"Peter," he said, with ineffable gentleness, "if I had served my Master as faithfully as you have served yours, I should not feel ashamed to stand in his presence."

"If my Marseter is ez mussiful to me ez you have been, he will save my soul in heaven."

"I have fixed things so that you will be comfortable after I am gone. When your time comes, I should like you to be laid close to me. We can take the long sleep together. Are you willing?"

"That 's whar I want to be laid."

The colonel stretched out his hand to the vase, and, taking the bunch of pinks, said very calmly:

"Leave these in my hand when I am dead; I'll carry them with me." A moment more, and he added:

"If I should n't wake up any more, good-bye, Peter!"

"Good-bye, Marse Rom!"

And they shook hands. After this the colonel lay back on the pillows. His soft, silvery hair contrasted strongly with his child-like, unspoiled, open face. To the day of his death, as is apt to be true of those who have lived pure lives but never married, he had a boyish strain in him,—a softness of nature, showing itself even now in the gentle expression of his mouth. His brown eyes had in them the same boyish look when, just as he was falling asleep, he scarcely opened them to say:

"Pray, Peter."

Peter, on his knees, and looking across the colonel's face towards the open door, through which the rays of the rising sun streamed in upon his hoary head, prayed, while the colonel fell asleep, adding a few words for himself now left alone.

Several hours later, memory led the colonel back again through the dim gateway of the past, and out of that gateway his spirit finally took flight into the future.

Peter lingered a year. The place went to the colonel's sister, but he was allowed to remain in his quarters. With much thinking of the past, his mind fell into a lightness and a weakness. Sometimes he would be heard crooning the burden of old hymns, or sometimes seen sitting beside the old brass-nailed trunk, fumbling with the spelling-book and the Pilgrim's Progress. Often, too, he walked out to the cemetery on the edge of the town, and each time could hardly find the colonel's grave amidst the multitude of the dead. One gusty day in spring, the Scotch sexton, busy with the blades of blue-grass springing from the animated mold, saw his familiar figure standing motionless beside the colonel's resting-place. He had taken off his hat — one of the colonel's last bequests — and laid it on the colonel's headstone. On his body he wore a strange coat of faded blue, patched and weather-stained and so moth-eaten that parts of the curious tails had dropped entirely away. In one hand he held an open Bible, and on a much-soiled page he was pointing with his finger to the following words:


"I would not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep."

It would seem that, impelled by love and faith, and guided by his wandering reason, he had come forth to preach his last sermon on the immortality of the soul over the dust of his dead master.

The sexton led him home, and soon afterwards a friend, who had loved them both, laid him beside the colonel.

It was perhaps fitting that his winding-sheet should be the vestment in which, years ago, he had preached to his fellow-slaves in bondage; for if it so be that the dead of this planet shall come forth from their graves clad in the trappings of mortality, then Peter should arise on the Resurrection Day wearing his old jeans coat.

James Lane Allen.



MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

The Opening of the Atlanta Campaign.

IN the August CENTURY General Joseph E. Johnston — *clarum et venerabile nomen* — writes :

Cantey with his division arrived at Resaca that evening (7th) and was charged with the defense of the place. During the day our cavalry was driven from the ground west of Rocky-face through the gap. Grigsby's brigade was placed near Dug Gap, — the remainder in front of our right. About 4 o'clock P. M. of the 8th, Geary's division of Hooker's corps attacked two regiments of Reynolds's Arkansas brigade guarding Dug Gap. They were soon joined by Grigsby's brigade on foot. The increased sound of musketry indicated so sharp a conflict that Lieutenant-General Hardee was requested to send Granbury's Texan brigade to the help of our people, and to take command there himself. These accessions soon decided the contest, and the enemy was driven down the hill. . . .

Information had been received of the arrival of the Army of the Tennessee in Snake Creek Gap, on the 8th. At night on the 9th General Cantey reported that he had been engaged with those troops until dark. Lieutenant-General Hood was dispatched to Resaca with three divisions immediately.

It so happened that the brigade of Kentucky cavalry was present at Dug Gap and Snake Creek Gap, and that the regiment I commanded — the 9th Kentucky Cavalry — was in front at both places; and it may not be improper to put on record an account of those affairs, and thereby correct the unintentional mistakes in the meager statements given above.

The winter having ended and all possible preparations having been made, the operations known as the Dalton-Atlanta campaign opened on May 5, 1864, by the advance of General Thomas on Tunnel Hill, and on May 7 the withdrawal of our forces within Mill Creek Gap marked the beginning of the long retreat. Including the corps of General Polk, then under orders to join him, General Johnston had under his command, available for strategic purposes, between 65,000 and 70,000 men of all arms. It was a superb army of veterans, with implicit confidence in its general, and capable of great achievements. Deficient to a certain extent in supplies, it had enough for any possible movement its commander could order. Being a Confederate army, it necessarily was inferior to the army before it in numbers, equipment, and supplies. This was generally the case. It was necessarily so. With five millions to over twenty millions; with no market, no ships, no factories, no credit; against a people commanding the sea, rich in all resources, and with all the world to buy from, — it was the fate of the Southern armies to confront larger, better equipped, and admirably supplied armies. Unless we could by activity, audacity, aggressiveness, and skill overcome these advantages it was a mere matter of time as to the certain result. It was therefore the first requisite of a Confederate general that he should be willing to meet his antagonist on these unequal terms, and on such terms make fight. He must of necessity take great risks and assume grave responsibilities. While these differences between the two armies that confronted each other in the mountains of North Georgia existed, they were no greater than always existed, and for which every Con-

federate general must be presumed to have prepared. I repeat, it was a superb army. While it had met defeat, and knew what retreat meant, it had fought battles which were, and are, among the bloodiest in all the annals of war; and it felt that under Johnston it could parallel Chickamauga and renew the glories of Shiloh.

It lay behind an impassable ridge, through which, on its left flank, were only two accessible gaps, — Dug Gap, less than four miles south-west from Dalton, on the main road from Dalton to Lafayette, and perhaps six miles from Mill Creek Gap, and Snake Creek Gap, some eighteen miles south from Mill Creek Gap. With these gaps fortified, the left flank and rear of that army were absolutely safe; for while the Rocky-face and Chattooga ridges protected our flank, through these gaps we had access to attack the flank of the enemy if he attempted to make a march so far to the left and rear as to threaten our communication south of the Oostenaula or Coosa. These gaps were capable of easy and impregnable fortification. Dug Gap was a mere road cut out of the mountain-side, and really needed no breastworks, for the natural palisades and contour of the mountain rendered easy its defense by resolute men. Snake Creek Gap was a gorge apparently cut through the mountains by the creek which ran through it. It was a narrow defile between Milk Mountain and Horn Mountain, which are merely a prolongation of the Chattooga Mountains, and capable of impregnable defense.

These gaps were well known to both armies. Through them ran public roads, and soldiers of both armies had marched through both. Late in February Dug Gap had been seized by an Indiana regiment and held until Cleburne retook it. As early as February General Thomas, knowing that at that time Snake Creek Gap was unguarded, proposed a campaign, the plan being to attract General Johnston's attention by a demonstration on Buzzard Roost, and to throw the main body of the army through Snake Creek Gap, and cut his communications between Dalton and the Oostenaula.

Neither of these gaps was fortified, and on May 5, when the campaign opened, Dug Gap was guarded by a small command of Arkansas troops under Colonel Williamson, numbering perhaps 250, and Snake Creek Gap was left wholly unprotected. At Resaca, where the railroad crosses the Oostenaula, Cantey's brigade was held on the evening of the 7th of May, on its route from Rome to Dalton.

General Sherman had in hand for attack nearly 100,000 men and 254 guns, divided into three armies, — the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General Thomas, numbering 60,773; the Army of the Tennessee, General McPherson, 24,465; the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield, 13,559. It was a superb army, admirably equipped, abundantly supplied, excellently led. It was veteran, and had known victory. It had pushed its antagonist out of Kentucky with the surrender of Donelson; had captured Tennessee; captured

Vicksburg; repossessed the Mississippi River; driven its foe over Missionary Ridge in flight. It knew how to fight, and was willing to fight.

On May 7 our cavalry was driven through Mill Creek Gap. On that night, after we had gone into camp, Colonel Grigsby, who commanded the Kentucky cavalry brigade, was ordered to send a regiment to the front of Dug Gap, to guard the approaches to it. In obedience to that order the 9th Kentucky Cavalry passed over Rocky-face Ridge, and near to midnight bivouacked on Mill Creek, about a mile from, and in front of, Dug Gap. Heavy picket lines were thrown out on all the roads leading down the valley. There were several of these roads, and scouts were sent out to ascertain the movements of the enemy. By daylight it was discovered that very large bodies of troops were moving down the valley on all the roads leading to the south. General McPherson had marched from Chattanooga to Rossville, thence west of Chickamauga Mountain to Shipp's Gap and to Villanow, where the road forks,—one branch leading down the east foot of Taylor's Ridge, the other leading across towards Rocky-face; this road again forks, one leading through Dug Gap, the other down the valley to Snake Creek Gap. Until McPherson reached Villanow it was only a conjecture as to his course, and until the head of his column turned towards Snake Creek Gap his destination was uncertain. His march was concealed by Hooker's corps of the Army of the Cumberland, which corps, forming Thomas's right, marching from Ringgold via Nickajack Gap and Trickum, hid the flank movement of McPherson. The plan was for Hooker to seize Dug Gap and push forward sufficiently to protect the flank of McPherson, and strike the flank of Johnston if he turned on McPherson; while McPherson, marching through Snake Creek Gap to Resaca, should not only destroy but hold the only railroad tributary to Johnston. The possession of Dug Gap by Hooker not only rendered Dalton untenable, but made a retreat from Dalton by the line of the railroad extremely hazardous, and it completely protected McPherson from attack on his left flank. With Hooker descending from Rocky-face on our left flank and rear, McPherson holding Resaca, Thomas, with the corps of Howard and Palmer, pushing to Dalton, and Schofield to his left, our army would have been in perilous posture.

The march of Hooker and McPherson was discovered early on the morning of May 8 by the scouts of the 9th Kentucky Cavalry, and timely information given that at least an attack on Dug Gap was certain, and that the columns on the march were very heavy, and their movements guarded by forces too large to be either resisted or developed by the detachments sent out by the 9th Kentucky. On this information the remainder of Grigsby's brigade was ordered to Dug Gap, and reached there none too soon. All possible delay to the march of Hooker's corps was made, but about 2 P. M. Geary's division of that corps drove the 9th Kentucky across the creek and slowly up the mountain-side, until the regiment fell back in its proper position in the gap, where it found the brigade drawn in mere skirmish line along the edge of the mountain-side. As one-fourth of cavalry soldiers hold the horses, I presume that we had about 800 of our brigade in the fight and 250 Arkansas troops; and this handful of men held that gap until nightfall, repelling every

assault. After nightfall Granbury's Texas brigade relieved us, but the assault was over. Hooker had failed in his part of the mission. That flank of our army was safe.

The importance of holding that gap was so manifest that Generals Hardee and Cleburne, with their staffs, galloped to the scene to encourage us by their presence and to aid Colonel Grigsby by their suggestions; and though the fight was made under their eye, that command needed no encouragement, and its officers and men knew that they were holding one of the doors to Dalton.

I hold in my hand the official report of General Geary, by whom that attack was made, and on the whole it is a fair and soldierly report. But he is mistaken in his belief that we had two lines of intrenchments, or that we were ever driven from our first position. Our loss was very small—in killed and wounded not a score. He reports that he made that attack with two brigades of infantry and two batteries, being an aggregate of perhaps 4500 men, or about four to one, besides the batteries. Assault after assault was made from 3 o'clock until after dark, and each assault repulsed with loss. At first, in a mere spirit of exuberant fun, some of the men rolled stones down the mountain-side; but when the effect was noticed they were directed to use these means as part of our defense; great stones were rolled down on the supporting lines on the mountain-sides or at its foot; and as these boulders would go leaping, crashing, breaking off limbs, crushing down saplings, we fancied we could see the effect of the unexpected missiles. It also proved a valuable resource to us, for our ammunition would have given out, and was about exhausted when the attack ceased.

General Geary reports an aggregate loss of 357 officers and men, of whom some 50 were the adventurous advance, who actually reached the crest, only to be made prisoners. After dark our brigade, being relieved by the Texas brigade of Granbury, was ordered to the foot of the mountain to feed and to obtain ammunition.

While this attack had been going on, McPherson had steadily marched towards Snake Creek Gap, to protect which gap no steps had been taken. Undoubtedly if a cavalry force had been started to Snake Creek Gap at the same moment Grigsby was ordered to Dug Gap, it would have reached there before McPherson, and held it during the night of the 8th, during which time infantry support could have reached there. I do not wish to be understood as offering any criticism on these facts; I am merely stating the facts as I believe them. Why these gaps were left unguarded, why a prompt effort was not made to hold Snake Creek Gap, I neither pretend to know nor venture to guess; nor do I offer any criticism. That they were not guarded, and that this gave Sherman the easy means of causing the evacuation of Dalton and the retreat to Resaca, are undoubtedly true. That we could have held Dalton or made an attack on Sherman if these gaps had been held is a problem over which military men may differ. Whatever may have been the reason or cause, the fact is that the provision made to hold Snake Creek Gap was an order to Grigsby during the night of the 8th to move his brigade to its mouth. The 9th Kentucky had been on duty continuously for over twenty-four hours; the whole brigade for over twelve hours, and

under fire all the afternoon. But with cheerful alacrity the command began its march as soon as it could feed, after being relieved by Granbury,—possibly about 10 o'clock. The night was dark, the road rough and unfamiliar, and it was difficult to find guides. But just at dawn we came in sight of the eastern mouth of the gap, and, contrary to our information, found it in possession of the enemy. Colonel Grigsby had been informed that a company of Georgia troops were on picket on the road to the gap, and at or near its eastern outlet. We had not seen that company, and Colonel Grigsby naturally concluded that the troops we saw a few hundred yards before us were those. The usual confusion of an all-night march and the halt of the head of the column had jammed the different organizations somewhat together in a narrow lane. The advanced vidette reported the troops to be Federals. Colonel Grigsby, still supposing them to be Georgians, ordered a small scout to the front. In these few minutes the enemy, having discovered us and being concealed by the character of the ground and the forest, had formed line of battle, while our column had become more confused by many of the men dismounting to rest. Between us and the foot of the mountain was a fallow cotton-field, on the near edge of which was a row of deserted cabins. The road ran along this field a few hundred yards with a gradual descent until it passed through a fringe of willows and underbrush, beyond which there were other open fields, and then on both sides of these open fields were also thick woods.

Suddenly a long skirmish-line broke from the woods, ran to the fringe of willows, and directly through towards the row of cabins, keeping up a brisk fire as they ran. Behind the skirmish-line was developed a line of infantry. For a moment the fire staggered the head of the column, and the order to fall back and form could not be executed. The 9th Kentucky was in front, and very quickly its front companies were dismounted and a dash made for the cabins. Fortunately our men reached them first and drove the Federal skirmishers back. This gave breathing time, of which immediate and brilliant advantage was taken by Major J. Q. Chenoweth, who led a portion of the 1st Kentucky, on horseback, on a détour to the right through the woods until he reached the fringe of willows, when at full run he charged the skirmish-line on the left, and the dismounted men of the 9th Kentucky charged on foot through the open field. The audacity of this sudden and unexpected dash caused the skirmish-line to run at break-neck speed, and the line of infantry to halt and to await reinforcements. This gave ample time to form the brigade for its day's work of retreating fight.

The immediate result of this was a delay to the Federal column of several hours, increased caution on the part of McPherson in his march during the day, and prompt information of his movement to our army headquarters.

The force under McPherson was so large that our small brigade of cavalry could not force it to develop its line. All that was possible was to cause the march to be as slow as that of a skirmish-line. This was done. It was late in the afternoon when McPherson drove us into the works before Resaca, which were defended only by Cantey's brigade and ours.

It was a gloomy prospect. We knew that McPherson had a force of from 15,000 to 20,000, and that there was no possibility of our receiving any reinforcements that afternoon and night. One serious attack by McPherson and Resaca must have been captured.

Fortunately McPherson knew that Hooker had failed in his attempt to seize Dug Gap, and consequently the road from Dalton was free to any Confederate column moving on him. The intrenchments at Resaca were formidable, and when McPherson felt the lines, the response was resolute and spirited. As Hardee came as reinforcements at Dug Gap, so here Hood joined us. He and part of his staff came to share our fate. Calmly we waited for the inevitable assault. We did not doubt that it would be made. McPherson was young, ambitious, and able. In our ranks he was accounted the equal, perhaps the superior, of Sherman. Here was an opportunity that Sherman might well say "does not occur twice in a single life"; and not for a moment did we doubt that such a soldier, with such an army, would seize such an opportunity.

I recall the scene, as a group stood on a knoll and watched the skirmishers advance. As the puffs of smoke arose in the distance, as the sharpshooters paid compliments to this group, General Hood rode up, and after a few moments' gaze turned the head of his horse and rode a few feet, and by motion called Colonel Grigsby to him; in another moment Grigsby called me, and General Hood said in a cheery yet grave tone, "We must hold until night."

Just at dusk the enemy began to fall back, and to our surprise the retrograde movement ended near to where we had commenced our fight in the morning.

Wm. C. P. Breckinridge.

LEXINGTON, KY., August 27, 1867.

Kershaw's Brigade at Fredericksburg.

GENERAL RANSOM'S letter, in *THE CENTURY* for December, 1887, in regard to his services at Fredericksburg, contains an error in relation to the operations of my brigade. In the morning of that day, my troops were stationed at the foot of Lee's Hill. After the assaults on General Cobb's position had commenced, I was directed to send two of my regiments to reinforce Cobb, and did so. Before they had reached him, tidings arrived of the fall of General Cobb, and I was immediately ordered to take the rest of my brigade to the position held by his forces, and assume command of the troops of McLaws's division there. I preceded my troops, and as soon as possible arrived at the Stevens House at the foot of Marye's Hill. As my brigade arrived they were placed—two regiments, 3d and 7th South Carolina, at Marye's house, on the hill, and the rest of them in the sunken road, with the left resting about the Stevens House. The last regiment that arrived was the 15th South Carolina (Colonel De Saussure's). He sheltered his command behind the cemetery on the hill until his proper position was made known, when he moved deliberately and in perfect order down the road to the Stevens House, and proceeded to the right of my line. Instead of having two regiments engaged at that point, as General Ransom supposes, I had five regiments and a battalion (my entire brigade), each of which suffered more or less severely. During these operations I received no

orders or directions from any officer but my division commander, General McLaws. I requested not to be relieved that night, and remained in that position until the evacuation of Fredericksburg by the Union forces. These facts were officially reported at the time, and were then too well known to be the subject of mistake.

J. B. Kershaw.

CAMDEN, S. C., Dec. 6, 1887.

The Last Victim of the War.

TO THE traveler on the old Walnut Hills road, Cincinnati, at noon, May 11, 1865, an unwonted spectacle presented itself. To the south of the road along the ravine near by stood, in solemn silence, a regiment of soldiers facing the road, the companies at each wing at right angles, forming a hollow square. Within this, near the left, stood a squad of soldiers, arms at the shoulder, bearing upon the breast of a youth kneeling erect beside his coffin and facing them at eight paces, with hands unbound and tremorless at his side, and eyes bandaged with a white handkerchief. At the word of command the guns were fired and the youth fell dead.

Thus perished Thomas Martin, the last victim of the great civil war. The war was over, Lee had surrendered, Richmond had been taken, Johnston had yielded, Davis had been captured. Federal and Confederate, the blue and the gray, were fraternizing everywhere save in that lonely ravine, within the corporate limits of Cincinnati, where was being transacted the most revolting deed of war—the deliberate killing by overwhelming power of an unresisting human being.

Few of the citizens of Cincinnati were aware of the tragedy at the time; and how few now, as they read this narrative, will recall it. We are living in a time of reminiscences, and the history of this poor Confederate soldier may have its lesson.

Nearly a year before this execution, its victim, a native of Kentucky, had been captured in that State and brought to Cincinnati as a prisoner; there he had been brought before a court-martial upon the charge of being a guerrilla, and had been convicted and sentenced to be shot. He was a mere boy, quite illiterate, unable to read or write: he claimed that he was a regular Confederate soldier, and evidently the distinction between such a soldier and a guerrilla was beyond his knowledge.

At the time this sentence was rendered, no one expected it would be carried into execution. No member of the court, and certainly the military commandant of the city, General Willich, did not. The sentence had been rendered for its deterrent effect upon the guerrillas in Kentucky. So little did General Willich think the sentence would be executed that he gave the boy his liberty, the freedom of the city, using him as a sort of orderly; and in his intercourse with him he became attached to him. Time passed; and the day when General Hooker would leave the department, of which he had had command since General Sherman's action retired him from the front, was approaching.

In an evil moment for the victim, General Hooker, in the first days of May, 1865, asked an aide to read over the papers on file in the department, so that he might dispose of them. In so doing, the papers relating to this boy were found. The general had forgotten the case. He inquired whether sentence had been executed. Learning that it had not, he sent for General

Willich, his subordinate, and asked for the facts. General Willich stated them as above given. Next day, he received an order from General Hooker directing him to shoot the boy on the 5th of May, then only a few days off. General Willich was dumfounded. To shoot the boy who had been his attendant for nearly a year, and whom he had respected for his faithful conduct, was too much for the stern old soldier of many years and many wars. With tears in his eyes he rushed to Judge Stallo, now our minister at Rome, and besought his interference. Judge Stallo, in turn, came to me and solicited my aid.

Meanwhile General Hooker had left the city to attend the funeral of Mr. Lincoln at Springfield. Therefore I could not reach him. At my request, Mr. Gaither, then Superintendent of Adams Express Company, sent a telegram to Major Eckert to be laid before Mr. Stanton, requesting his intervention. But no order came, and preparations were made for the execution.

The boy was dressed for death. The priest, Father Garesché, brother to General Rosecrans's chief of staff,—who fell at Stone's River,—attended him. The mournful procession took its way to the ravine, yet General Willich moved slowly, hoping the order for suspension would be received. He left a mounted orderly to wait until the last moment for a telegram from Stanton. Anxiously, imploringly, he looked back for his messenger. At length, to his great joy, in the distance he saw him coming at full speed, holding in his outstretched hand a paper. It was this telegram:

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 5, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER: Suspend the execution of Thomas Martin, to be executed in Cincinnati this day, until further orders.

By order of the President.

E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Great was the rejoicing. The soldiers who were to shoot the boy now congratulated him on his escape, and all returned to the city. Alas, how short-lived was this joy!

It had been my purpose to advise General Hooker, on his return, of what I had done; but my first knowledge of this was from an aide of his, who delivered a note from the general requesting my presence at his headquarters.

The moment I saw Hooker, I discovered that he was under great excitement, which he was striving to suppress, and in this effort he fairly succeeded. He did not look me full in the face, but sat sideways, looking obliquely, ever and anon casting upon me furtive glances. In slow and measured tones, he said:

"Judge Dickson, I was very angry at you on my return and had ordered your arrest; but reconsidered it, and am now more composed."

"Why, you surprise me, General! What is the matter?"

"Why, sir, on my return to the city I found my administration of this department had been interfered with; that Martin, whom I had ordered shot, had not been shot; that Mr. Stanton had suspended my order. I immediately telegraphed him, demanding why he interfered. He replied that it was in response to the Gaither telegram—your work. I demanded of him to send me a copy of this telegram, which he did. Oh, yes, sir! I have got it. I know all you did."

"Well, General, was it not all right?"

"No, sir; it was not right. No, sir. Why, sir, when I was in command of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln would not let me kill a man. Lee killed men every day, and Lee's army was under discipline; and now, sir, Lincoln is dead, and I will kill this man. Yes, sir, I will. The order is given to shoot him to-morrow, and he will be shot; and don't you interfere."

"Did Stanton order you to shoot him?" I inquired.

"No, sir. He left the matter in my hands, and I demanded that he be shot—and shot he will be."

"Well, General," I again interposed, "this boy was only a guerrilla. The war is over. He belonged to Colonel Jesse's command. The papers of this morning tell us that the Government has given Jesse the same terms given Lee; that he is now in Louisville, where he has been feasted and fraternized with by Union officers. Will it not be shocking to shoot here one of his deluded followers?"

"It makes no difference," replied the general. "Louisville is not in my department. I am not responsible for what is done there. I will do my duty in my own. I will kill him. Yes, sir, I will; and that to-morrow."

The image of the speaker rises before me with startling distinctness. The manner as well as the words indicated that his mind was oppressed with the thought that Lincoln's humanity had thwarted his career. In some way it seemed to him a relief to sacrifice this boy. Hence his eagerness that the opportunity should not escape him.

As I gazed upon the man the uppermost thought in my mind was, not the brutality of his act, nor yet pity for the fated youth,—though these thoughts were not absent,—but simple amazement that such a man, only a few months before, in a supreme crisis, should have held in the hollow of his hand, as it were, the fate of this mighty nation.

But why revive these harrowing incidents of the war? As well ask, Why tell the story of the war at all? If it is to be told, let us have the whole. Let the young not be misled; the dread reality has something else than the pomp and circumstance, however glorious. Besides, there will be other wars and other generals. Let these remember that an abuse of power will sooner or later rise up in judgment against them.

W. M. Dickson.

Hooker on the Chancellorsville Campaign.

[THE subjoined letter has been kindly furnished to us for publication by Lieutenant Worth G. Ross, son of the late Colonel Samuel Ross, to whom it is addressed. It is believed that it has not before been printed.—EDITOR.]

LOOKOUT VALLEY, TENN., Feb. 28, 1864.

MY DEAR COLONEL: For some reason your letter was a long time in reaching me. When the Eleventh Corps gave way on Saturday, Berry's division and Hays's brigade were dispatched to seize and hold the ground occupied by the left of that corps. Berry double-quickened his men to the point, but was too late. The enemy were already in possession. When this was reported to me I directed my engineers to establish a new line, which was pointed out to them on the map, and at the same time stated to them that we would

probably have to move on it as soon as the enemy opened on us in the morning, as his batteries would sweep the plain in front of the Chancellorsville House, and, besides, enfilade the line held by the Second and Twelfth Corps nearly its entire length. Soon after these instructions were given to the engineers, peremptory orders were sent to General Sedgwick to advance over the plank road from Fredericksburg and attack the enemy in front of the Second and Twelfth Corps at daylight. My single object in holding on to the position as long as I did was to hear Sedgwick's guns, which I momentarily expected, of course. General Warren had been sent to guide him. The orders reached him between 10 and 11 o'clock, [he] had but eight miles to march, a bright moonlight night, with only a small force to oppose. Probably had he marched as directed, not a gun would have been fired. With Lee in my front and Jackson on my flank I was unwilling to attempt to force my way through Lee, especially as the roads through the forests would only enable me to present my columns with narrow fronts, which the enemy could cut down as fast as they were exposed. I knew that I could do this, and I gave the enemy credit for being able to do as much as I could, but no more. Had Sedgwick come up on Lee's rear, the latter would have found himself between two armies, and would doubtless have followed Jackson's flank movement, which I desired, as that would throw the enemy off the short road to Richmond and our troops on it. I do not know that you ever heard that I had one and a half millions of rations afloat in the Potomac to throw up the Pamunkey River in view of this contingency.

I recrossed the Rappahannock, expecting to return at or near Franklin's Crossing, where I had elbow room, and at least an even chance for being victorious, and so stated to the President at the time. No general battle was fought at Chancellorsville, for I was unwilling to give battle with such great odds against me. I rejoice that what was not gained was not lost.

We lost no honors at Chancellorsville. With all of our misfortunes the enemies' loss exceeded our own by one-third. Of this I have abundant evidence in the official returns of the enemies' casualties, as they have from time to time been published. If I did not cross the river again it will appear that it was for reasons over which I had no control. The rains had nothing to do with our returning from Chancellorsville, for it had been determined on in my mind long before the rain commenced falling. I do not like to be quoted as authority on this subject until after the official report is published, and for the flattering terms in which you speak of me—*not ever*. I hope that you and yours are well. My kindest regards to Mrs. Ross and my best wishes for yourself.

Your friend,
JOSEPH HOOKER.

COLONEL SAMUEL ROSS,
Commanding Brigade, Twelfth Corps.

Erratum.

A TYPOGRAPHICAL error in General Sherman's "Grand Strategy of the Civil War," in the February number, gave General Thomas's loss at Nashville as 305 instead of 3057 (revised compilation).

Strength of the Confederate Army at Chickamauga.

ON this moot subject an examination of the original returns in the War Department, which I have personally made, shows the following result :

General Bragg's return, 31st of August, 1863, shows under the heading "present for duty," officers and men, 48,998.

This return does not include the divisions of General Breckinridge or General Preston, the brigades of Generals Gregg and McNair, or the reënforcement brought by General Longstreet. The strength of each is accurately given in Confederate official returns. The

total Confederate force available for battle at Chickamauga was as follows :

General Bragg's army, 31st of August, 1863, for duty	48,998
Longstreet's command (Hood's and McLaws's divisions), by return of Army of Northern Virginia, 31st of August, 1863, for duty	11,716
Breckinridge's division, by his official report in "Confederate Reports of Battles," for duty	3,769
Preston's division, by his official report in "Confederate Reports of Battles," for duty	4,509
Brigades of Gregg and McNair, by General Bushrod Johnson's official report (So. Hist. Soc. Papers, Vol. XIII.), for duty	2,550
Total	71,551

CINCINNATI, O.

E. C. Dawes.

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

Shall Fortunes be Limited by Law ?

THE leveling instincts of a democracy are apt to answer the question with an emphatic Yes. The equalization of men in their standing before the law, in their political privileges, in their opportunities in the administrative service of the country, in their educational advantages, and in the position of their sects before the State is apt to find in the eyes of many only its next step in the equalization of wealth, or at least in the prevention of the development of extremes. On the other hand, he who pins his faith to the political power of the State, who believes that the State has the right to regulate property because it makes property possible, has only to be convinced that great fortunes are dangerous to the State to echo the democratic answer with another and as hearty an affirmative. The proposal finds even a more favorable soil in our own country for the reason that our whole political system has been consciously set from the beginning against the development of permanent great fortunes, and that with a success in which we have taken considerable pride. Our legislation has aimed at removing every artificial obstacle to the dispersion of great fortunes: primogeniture has been forbidden; entails have been limited; equal division of the property of intestates has become the legal rule; and the result has been, until comparatively recent years, that "from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves were three generations."

The old rule, however, no longer holds good. Representative fortunes have come to be enormously larger—larger, indeed, than were really conceivable fifty years ago; and this one fact has quite altered most of the conditions of the case. Almost any division of the "large fortune" of a half-century ago gave as a result several small fortunes, usually so small as to have in them no power of recuperation and self-increase. But a reasonably equitable division of a fortune of two hundred millions gives at least one fortune whose annual income is so much beyond anything that the heir is at all likely to spend, that its own natural increase will carry the principal up again to its original limit within an ordinary life-time, without any special ability in the owner beyond that of care-taking. The general principle that all the children ought to have a share will no longer suffice to break up and disperse all the fortunes of the republic; the very magnitude of

the estates has already given us some of the phases of a system of primogeniture, from which it had been persistently assumed that we had escaped at the Revolution. An entire escape from all its phases can now be found only in a failure of direct heirs or in the succession of an incorrigible spendthrift. And it is a fact too, to be carefully kept in mind, that the succession of incorrigible spendthrifts is no longer so common as it once was. The larger the estate, the more apt is the heir to be a plain, hard-working young man, who shows more signs of uneasiness at assuming the responsibility of managing the property than of elation over his opportunities of squandering it. Every indication goes to show that our very large fortunes, instead of being dispersed, are to hold their own and even to grow from generation to generation until they reach that natural limit placed by the ability of one person to manage an estate.

It is very natural, then, that those who feel that law and social conditions together have failed in the work which they were considered competent to do should every year have a stronger desire to put new legal limitations on the growth of American fortunes. The dangers of enormous accumulations of wealth in the hands of single persons in a republic, the contrast between the daily income of the "plutocrat" and the amount which the long struggle of a workingman's whole life will bring, the passions aroused by the vulgar display affected by so many of the smaller "large fortunes," are all forces bearing in the same direction. The proposals of prohibitory succession duties on inheritances above a limited amount, of prohibitions of gifts above the same amount, unless to public or charitable uses, or of an income tax rising in percentage with the amount of the income to a prohibitory tax on all incomes above a legal limit, are various forms of a single purpose—that the very rich shall become no richer, and that they shall not be permitted to transmit their present wealth undiminished to an indefinite line of successors.

It is well, however, to weigh carefully the fact that, in the mass of cases, wealth means the sum of some service done to the public, which would not have been done but for the reward found in the legal permission to accumulate and transmit wealth. He who has retired with a snug fortune has been engaged in a life-long struggle to provide dry-goods for the public a

MARSE PHIL.

WELL, well, you is Marse Phil's son — yo' favor 'm might'ly too; —
We wuz like brothers, we wuz — me an' him;
You tried to fool d' ole nigger, but, marster, 't would n' do —
Not ef you is done growed so tall an' slim.

Hi! Lord! I 'se knowed you, honey, sence long befo' you born —
I mean, I 'se knowed de fambly dat long;
An' dee 's all white-folks, marster, dee hands white as young corn;
An' ef dee want to — could n' do no wrong.

You' gran'pa buyed my mammy at Gen'l Nelson's sale;
An' Deely she come out de same estate;
An' blood is jes like pra'r is, hit tain' gwine nuver fail —
Hit 's sutney gwine to come out soon or late.

When I was born, you' gran'pa gi' me to young Marse Phil,
To be his body-servent like, you know;
An' we growed up togerr, like two stalks in one hill,
Bofe tasslin' an' den shootin' in de row.

Marse Phil was born in harves', an' I dat Christmas-come,
My mammy nussed bofe on we de same time;
No matter what one got, suh, de urr one sho git some,
We wuz two fibe-cent pieces in one dime.

We cotch ole hyahs togerr, an' 'possums, him an' me;
We fished dat mill-pawn over night an' day,
Rid horses to de water, treed coons up de same tree;
An' when you see one, turr warn' fur away.

When Marse Phil went to college, 't wuz, "Sam — Sam's got to go" —
Ole marster say, "Dat boy 's a fool 'bout Sam."
Ole Mistis jes say, "Dear, Phil wants him." An', you know,
Dat *Dear* hit use' to sooth' him like a lamb.

So we all went to college, way down to Williamsbu'g,
But 't warn' much larnin' out o' books we got;
Dem urrs warn' no mo' to him 'n a' ole wormy lug —
Yes, suh, we wuz de ve'y top de pot.

An' ef he did n't study dem Latins an' sich things
He wuz de popularitest all de while;
De ladies use' to call him a' "angel widout wings,"
An' when he come I lay, dee use' to smile!

You see he wuz ole marster's on'y chile — besides,
He had a body-servent at he will;
An' wid dat big plantation dee 'd all like to be brides,
Dat is, ef dee could have de groom Marse Phil.

'T wuz dyah he meet young mistis, — she is you' ma, of co'se!
I disremembers now which mont' it wuz;
One night he come, an', says he, "Sam, I need new clo'es";
An' I says, "Marse Phil, yes, suh, so you does."



Well, suh, he made dat tailor meck ev'ything bran' new ;
He would n' wear one stitch he had on han'—
Jes th'owed 'em in de chip-box, an' says, " Sam, dem 's for you "—
Marse Phil, I tell you, wuz a gentleman !

So Marse Phil cotes de mistis, an' Sam he cotes de maid —
We al'ays sot we traps upon one parf ;
An' when ole marster hear we bofe wuz gwine, he say'd,
" All right ; we 'll have to kill de fatted calf."

An' dat wuz what dee did, suh ; de Prodigal was home ;—
Dee put de ring an' robe upon you' ma ;
Den you wuz born, young marster, an' den de storm hit come —
An' den de darkness settled from afar.

De storm hit comed, an' wrenched de branches from de tree,
De war,— you' pa,— he 's sleep dyah on de hill ;
An' dough I know, young marster, de war hit sot me free,
I jes says, " Yes, but tell me, whar 's Marse Phil ? "

— " A dollar "— thankee, marster, you sutney is his son ;
His ve'y spi't-an'-image, I declar' !
What say, young marster ? Yes, suh, you say, it's " *fibe*, not one " —
You favors, honey, bofe you' Pa an' Ma !

Thomas Nelson Page.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*


THE NATIONAL UPRISING.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE NATIONAL UPRISING.

THE guns of the Sumter bombardment awoke the country from the political nightmare which had so long tormented and paralyzed it. The lion of the North was fully roused. Betrayed, insulted, outraged, the free States arose as with a cry of pain and vengeance. War sermons from pulpits; war speeches in every assemblage; tenders of troops; offers of money; military proclamations and orders in every newspaper; every city radiant with bunting; every village-green a mustering-ground; war appropriations in every legislature and in every city or town council; war preparations in every public or private workshop; gun-casting in the great foundries; cartridge-making in the principal towns; camps and drills in the fields; parades, drums, flags, and bayonets in the streets; knitting, bandage-rolling, and lint-scraping in nearly every household. Before the lapse of forty-eight hours a Massachusetts regiment, armed and equipped, was on its way to Washington; within the space of a month the energy and intelligence of the country were almost completely turned from the industries of peace to the activities of war. The very children abandoned their old-time school-games, and played only at soldiering.

From every governor of every free State to whom the President's proclamation and the requisition of the Secretary of War were addressed, most gratifying and loyal answers were promptly returned. They not only promised to obey the call and furnish the regiments asked for, but in their replies reflected the unanimity with which their people rallied to the defense of the assaulted Union. "The governor's call was published on yesterday, and he has already received the tender of forty companies," † said Illinois. "Our citizens through-



JOHN A. ANDREW, GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS (1861-66).

out the State will respond with great enthusiasm to any call for sustaining the Government against the designs of the conspirators," ‡ said Vermont. "Ten days ago we had two parties in this State; to-day we have but one, and that one is for the Constitution and Union unconditionally," § said Iowa. The war spirit rose above all anticipation, and the offer of volunteers went far beyond the call. "We have 6000 men in camp here and will have 8000 men by to-morrow night. . . . I have also made a tender of six additional regiments to which I have received no answer. I shall put the six additional regiments in camp and under discipline, and hold them subject to the Government's order at least for a time." || Such was the greeting from Indiana. A no less inspiring report was made by her sister State. "I find

† Governor Yates and others to Lincoln, April 17, 1861. War Records.

‡ Governor Fairbanks to Cameron, April 18, 1861. War Records.

§ Governor Kirkwood to Cameron, April 18, 1861. War Records.

|| Governor Morton to Cameron, April 23, 1861. War Records.

that I have already accepted and have in camp, or ready to march instantly to it, a larger force than the thirteen regiments named as the contingent of Ohio under the late requisition of the President. Indeed, without seriously repressing the ardor of the people, I can hardly stop short of twenty regiments."* The telegrams and letters here quoted from are fair samples of the language and spirit, the promptness and devotion, with which the people of the North answered the President's official summons. Especial mention deserves to be made of the untiring zeal and labors of the various executives of the free States in organizing and equipping troops, which earned for them the popular and honorable title of the "war governors."

If we would catch a glimpse of the dramatic forms in which popular fervor manifested itself in the President's own State, we need but read how the town of Quincy, Illinois, sent away her first company :

Yesterday, Sunday, Captain Prentiss left with his command for Springfield. At 12 M. all the pastors of the city, with their congregations, met the gallant captain and his loyal company in Washington Square, to give them a parting benediction. Six or seven thousand persons were present. A banner was presented, a hymn was sung, prayer was made, and the soldiers addressed by one of the clergymen and myself. We then marched with them to the depot, where the "Star Spangled Banner" was sung, many thousands joining in the chorus. The scene altogether was the most solemn and impressive I have ever witnessed, and showed unmistakably how intensely the fires of patriotism are burning in the hearts of our people.†

In the Gulf States the revolutionary excitement rose to a similar height, but with contrary sentiment. All Union feeling and utterance instantly vanished; and, overawed by a terrorism which now found its culmination, no one dared breathe a thought or scarcely entertain a hope for the old flag. The so-called Government of the Confederate States, finally convinced that it must at length confront actual war, made such haste as it could to put an army in the field, manifesting meanwhile an outward gayety at the prospect which its members could hardly have felt at heart. Montgomery telegrams stated that the cabinet of the Confederate States read President Lincoln's proclamation "amid bursts of laughter."‡ Mr. A. H. Stephens was reported as saying in an Atlanta speech that it would require 75 times 75,000 men to intimidate the South. In addition to the 21,000 volunteers conditionally asked for on April 8, the rebel

Secretary of War notified the governors of the seven cotton-States that 32,000 more must be immediately got ready to take the field,§ and also asked that the forts and military posts in their limits be formally turned over to the control of the Montgomery authorities.|| Arkansas and Tennessee not yet being members of the Confederacy, permission was asked of their executives to plant batteries to blockade the Mississippi.¶ Spare guns from the captured Charleston forts were sent South, and extraordinary efforts were made to concentrate an army at Pensacola for the reduction of Fort Pickens.

It was at this time (April 17) that Jefferson Davis issued a proclamation, inviting applications for letters of marque and reprisal, under which privateers were offered the opportunity to roam the high seas and ravage the commerce of the United States "under the seal of these Confederate States." The final hope of the rebel leaders was in cotton and free trade; and they believed that privateering was the easy stepping-stone to European intervention. The reasoning was plausible, and the time not ill-chosen; but the proclamation found itself confronted by the prompt precautionary act of the United States Government. Two days later (April 19) President Lincoln issued a counter-proclamation, setting on foot a blockade of the rebel ports "in pursuance of the laws of the United States and of the laws of nations," and declaring that offenders under the pretended letters of marque would be held amenable to the laws against piracy.

Thus sixteen States in the North and seven States in the South stood opposed in the attitude and preparation of war. Between these two extremes of sentiment lay the debatable land of the border slave-States, the greater portion of their citizens tormented with anxiety, with doubt, with their affections evenly balanced between the Union on one hand and slavery on the other; with ties of consanguinity permeating alike the North and the South; with the horrible realization that in the impending conflict they were between the upper and the nether millstones. To a certain extent the governors of these States had hitherto professed to share the irresolution of their people. Openly they had still expostulated with the cotton-States against precipitate disunion, and urged instead that all the slave States should join in a convention and demand constitutional guarantees from the North. All this, however, was largely a mere pretext, because

* Governor Dennison to Cameron, April 22, 1861. War Records.

† Browning to Lincoln, April 22, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Press telegrams.


§ Walker to the governors, April 16, 1861. War Records.

|| Walker to Brown, April 17, 1861. War Records.


¶ Walker to Governor Rector, April 17, and Governor Harris, April 19, 1861. War Records.



WILLIAM SPRAGUE, RHODE ISLAND.



WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM, CONNECTICUT.



WILLIAM DENNISON, OHIO.



RICHARD YATES, ILLINOIS.



ALEXANDER W. RANDALL, WISCONSIN.



EDWIN D. MORGAN, NEW YORK.



OLIVER P. MORTON, INDIANA.



ANDREW D. CURTIN, PENNSYLVANIA.

SOME WAR GOVERNORS.

they very well knew that the extreme demands which they formulated would not be granted. Secretly, most of them were in the revolutionary plot; and when, by the assault on Sumter and President Lincoln's call for troops, they were compelled to take sides, all save two immediately gave their voice and help more or less actively in aid of rebellion.

This course they began by refusing the regiments called for under the President's proclamation. "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States," answered Governor Magoffin. "I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina." So ran the response from Governor Ellis. "The people of this commonwealth are freemen, not slaves, and will defend to the last extremity their honor, lives, and property against Northern mendacity and usurpation," was the reply from Governor Rector of Arkansas. "In such unholy crusade no gallant son of Tennessee will ever draw his sword," wrote Governor Harris. "Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with," said Governor Jackson of Missouri.

Chief among the plotting border-State executives was Governor Letcher of Virginia. A former chapter has set forth the drift of that State towards revolution under his leadership and inspiration. The apparent Union majority in the Virginia convention had somewhat restrained and baffled him and his coadjutors; but now they adroitly turned the fresh war excitement to their own advantage. The Virginia Unionists, like those of the other border States, had illogically aided secession by clamoring for the unconditional evacuation of Sumter and other forts. Now that the Government and the North resolved to repel force by force, the ground necessarily sank from under them. They were overwhelmed with arguments and reproaches. One or two vainly essayed to stem the tide. But when Anderson's flag went down even their measured and conditional patriotism withered in Richmond like Jonah's gourd. There was nothing more but brass-bands, meetings, war speeches, and torchlight processions. The Virginia commissioners reported Lincoln's answer to the convention without comment, and shrinking Unionists admitted that "if the President meant subjugation of the South, Virginia had

but one course to pursue." Governor Letcher did not need any stronger hint. With a dramatic affectation of incredulity and deliberation, to impress not only public opinion, but especially the wavering, dissolving majority, he waited a day before telegraphing his refusal to furnish troops — repeating the staple phrase about "subjugation." Then, in the face of his own avowed project to capture Fort Monroe, and with the assaulting guns of Beauregard still ringing in his ears, he replied to Cameron, "You have chosen to inaugurate civil war."*

Meanwhile, the fever heat of the populace communicated itself to the convention. An outside "States Rights" assemblage of prominent Virginia politicians, which thronged into Richmond at this juncture, added its not inconsiderable tribute of pressure to the sweeping tide of treason. Under such impulses the convention went into secret session on Wednesday, April 17, and by a vote of 88 to 55 passed an ordinance of secession — or, as they softly phrased it, "An ordinance to repeal the ratification of the Constitution of the United States." On the same day Governor Letcher signed a proclamation announcing the dissolution of the Union and the existence of the rebel Provisional Government, and calling on all the armed regiments and companies of volunteers in the State to hold themselves in readiness for orders. Nor did his zeal confine itself to paper edicts. Under his instructions, doubtless matured and prepared in advance, seizures of the custom-house and Government buildings in Richmond, of a private powder depot in Lynchburg, and of a number of steamers in the James River were hurriedly made, and military movements set on foot to capture the United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the United States navy yard at Norfolk.

Of the two remaining border slave-States, Delaware lay in such an isolated geographical position, and had withal so few slaves within her limits, that she was practically a part of the North, though still dominated in her local politics by pro-slavery influence.† Allied to the South rather by tradition than by present interest, her executive took refuge in a course of inaction. He replied by saying that the laws of Delaware gave him no authority to comply with the requisition of the Secretary of War, and that the organized volunteer companies of the State might at their option tender their services to the United States;‡ and to this effect he issued his official proclama-

* Letcher to Cameron, April 16, 1861. War Records.

† It would seem from the following that Delaware was not altogether free from the taint of rebellion:

"I sent to New Castle a regiment with which I de-

sign seizing the arms of four companies of secessionists now drilling in that place and Wilmington." — Paterson to Townsend, May 27, 1861. War Records.

‡ Burton to Cameron, April 25, 1861. War Records.

tion.* The people took him at his word, and by their own action bore a patriotic and honorable part in the dangers and achievements of the Union army.

Of more immediate and vital importance, however, than that of any other border slave-State, was the course of Maryland in this crisis. Between that State and Virginia lay the District of Columbia, originally ten miles square of Federal territory, containing the capital, the Government, and the public archives. In her chief city, Baltimore, centered three of the great railroad routes by which troops must approach Washington. It was a piece of exceptional good fortune that the governor of Maryland was a friend of the Union, though hardly of that unflinching fearlessness needed in revolutionary emergencies. Whatever of hesitancy or vacillation he sometimes gave way to resulted from a constitutional timidity rather than from a want of patriotism; and, with brief exceptions, to be more fully narrated, he was active and energetic in behalf of the Government. The population of the State was divided by a sharp antagonism, the Unionists having the larger numbers, the secessionists the greater persistence and daring. The city of Baltimore was so far corrupted by treasonable influences that Wigfall had established a successful recruiting office there for the rebel armies.† As yet, disunion was working secretly; but this for the present increased rather than diminished its effectiveness.

Like the other border-State executives, Governor Hicks had urged concession, compromise, peace, and joint border-State action to maintain the Union. In this, while his colleagues for the greater part merely used such talk to cover their meditated treachery, he was entirely sincere and patriotic. When Lincoln's call for troops reached him, he had no thought of refusing or resisting, but nevertheless hurried over to Washington to deprecate civil war, and to ask that Maryland soldiers should not be sent to subjugate the South.‡ Since the President had never entertained any purpose of "subjugation," he readily promised that the Maryland regiments should be employed to defend Maryland itself and the Federal district and capital. The governor thereupon wrote to the Secretary of War: "The condition of affairs in this State at this time requires that arms shall be placed in the hands of true men and loyal to the United States Government alone," and requested arms "for arming four regiments of militia for the service of the United States and the Fed-

eral Government."§ Other prominent Marylanders were already combining for demonstrative action to sustain the Government. A congressional election in the State was near at hand. On the day of the President's proclamation Henry Winter Davis announced himself, in a Baltimore evening paper, as a candidate for Congress "upon the basis of the unconditional maintenance of the Union." But the official announcements and the exciting rumors with which the newspapers were filled had also stirred the disunion elements of Maryland into unwonted activity, and the pressure of sentiment hostile to Federal authority was quickly brought to bear on Governor Hicks, and developed the timid and hesitating qualities of his character. He issued his proclamation April 18, containing, among many sage counsels in behalf of quiet and peace, two paragraphs doubtless meant by him for good, but which were well calculated to furnish the disunionists hope and encouragement:

I assure the people that no troops will be sent from Maryland, unless it may be for the defense of the national capital. . . . The people of the State will in a short time have the opportunity afforded them, in a special election for members of the Congress of the United States, to express their devotion to the Union, or their desire to see it broken up. ||

With this outline view of the political condition of the country at large, and especially of the border States of Virginia and Maryland, let us follow events at the Federal capital as recorded in the daily reports of General Scott to the President. On April 15, the day on which Lincoln issued his first call for 75,000 troops, the general says, in his report No. 13:

I have but little of special interest to report to-day, except that Colonel Smith, the commander of the Department of Washington, like myself, thinks our means of defense, with vigilance, are sufficient to hold this city till reinforcements arrive. I have telegraphed the commander at Harper's Ferry armory to say whether he can station, to advantage, for the defense of that establishment, additional recruits from Carlisle. The ground about the armory is very contracted and rocky.¶

General Scott's daily report, No. 14, April 16, then proceeds:

For the President. He has no doubt been informally made acquainted with the reply of the officer commanding at Harper's Ferry, yesterday, viz.: that he wants no reinforcement. Nevertheless, as soon as the capital, the railroad to the Delaware at Wilmington, and Fort Monroe are made secure, my next object of attention will be the security of Harper's Ferry — proposing, in the mean time, or rather suggesting that the spare marines from the navy yards of Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and Boston be promptly sent to

* Burton, April 26, 1861. "Rebellion Record."

† War Records.

‡ Hicks to Lincoln, April 17, 1861. War Records.

§ Hicks to Cameron, April 17, 1861. War Records.

|| Hicks, April 18, 1861. "Rebellion Record."

¶ Unpublished MS.

the Gosport navy yard. This relief may serve, by compelling the secessionists to enlarge their preparations, to give us time to send a regiment of volunteers to that important point, in advance of any formidable attack upon it. With the authority of the Secretary of War we are engaged in mustering into the service eight additional companies of District volunteers. These, I think, place the capital a little ahead of impending dangers, and we will maintain, at least, that advantage, till by the arrival (in a week) of regulars and abundant volunteers our relative advantage will, I trust, be more than doubled.*

General Scott's daily report, No. 15, April 17, 1861:

I repeat in writing some details which I had the honor to submit verbally to the President this forenoon. Three or four regiments from Massachusetts (believed to be the first ready under the recent call) may be expected (three of them) to arrive here, and (one of them) at Fort Monroe in two or three days. One of the three may, I think, be safely spared for Harper's Ferry, if the danger there (and I shall know to-morrow) shall seem imminent. Captain Kingsbury, a most capable officer of the Ordnance Department, goes up this afternoon for that purpose, and to act a few days as superintendent; that is, till a new appointment (of a civilian) can be made. Two of the Massachusetts regiments are needed here; one of them I shall endeavor to intercept at Baltimore and direct it to Harper's Ferry. As soon as one of the four reaches Fort Monroe, it perhaps may be safe to detach thence for the Gosport Navy Yard two or three companies of regulars to assist in the defense of that establishment. By to-morrow, or certainly the next day, we shall have Colonel Delafield here, an excellent engineer, to send to Gosport (with a letter from the Secretary of the Navy giving the necessary authority) to devise, in conjunction with the naval commander there, a plan of defense. Colonel Delafield will take instructions to call for the two or three companies of regulars as mentioned above. Excepting the reinforcement of marines suggested yesterday, and until the arrival of more volunteers, I know not what else can be done for the security of the Gosport Navy Yard. To-night all the important avenues leading into Washington shall be well guarded.*

General Scott's daily report, No. 16, April 18, 1861, shows how the undefined yet thickening dangers made themselves felt at headquarters:

For the President. I am (placed between many fires, Fort Monroe, Harper's Ferry, Gosport Navy Yard, etc., etc.) much embarrassed by the non-arrival of troops. Monday, the 15th instant, Senator Wilson had the quota of Massachusetts doubled, and on the ground of being entirely ready (as I understood) got permission that it should be at once pushed (farthest) to the South. Though equal to any volunteers in the world, the preference of being in the advance must have been given on that ground. In reply to Governor Andrew's telegram, I said (Tuesday night, the 16th) "Send first regiment which is ready by rail here. The second by rail or sea, as you prefer, to Fort Monroe." (I had but an hour before pointed out the route via Baltimore and the Chesapeake.) When I sent those telegrams (late in the night) I did not know that the War Department had already tele-

graphed the governor for one of his regiments to take a fast steamer to Fort Monroe and to send the other three here by rail.

Two and a half o'clock P. M. I have not heard anything further respecting the Massachusetts quota. At this instant the War Department has a telegram from Philadelphia saying that "The Massachusetts troops are here this afternoon. Leave to-morrow (Friday) morning early." Also another telegram to this effect: "Tell General Cameron [we] think that troops must go through from here to Washington, by day, in numbers of about 2000 at a time, so as to be ready to meet any emergency on the way." The Philadelphia [dispatch] does not say whether three or four regiments are there. I hope but three, and that the fourth will be to-night in Fort Monroe.

Last night I received a telegram from Major-General Sandford (of the city of New York) saying that "Under the orders of the governor, the 7th regiment (a crack corps) is ready to report to me. How shall it be sent?" I instantly replied, by rail, and added, "Telegraph me the hour of departure." I have as yet heard nothing further from Gen. S.

In respect to Harper's Ferry and the Gosport Navy Yard, both of which are in great peril, I can do nothing before the arrival of troops, beyond the instructions given this morning to send the third regiment that might arrive at Baltimore to Harper's Ferry—the first and second to continue on to Washington.

(Here a report reaches me that the railroad bridge over the Gunpowder, 28 miles beyond Baltimore, has been burned. †)

Colonel Delafield, whom I intended to send to Fort Monroe and the Gosport Navy Yard, has not arrived. If he comes to-night I shall send him to-morrow, hoping that he will find a Massachusetts regiment in position.

If land batteries should be planted on the Potomac to cut off our water communication, we must send an expedition and capture them.*

The current demoralization of politics in the country had infected the army and the navy; deadened the energy of Anderson, misdirected the zeal of Adams, caused the dishonor of Twiggs; had struck high and low—in New Orleans as in Charleston, in Texas as in Washington, carrying off now a paymaster or a lieutenant, now the quartermaster-general and the adjutant-general of the army. Among these victims of the States Rights heresy was yet another individual destined to a melancholy prominence in the rebellion, whom a pitiless fate called to the maintenance of a principle and a policy, not only of itself false and monstrous, but by him so recognized and acknowledged. This was Robert E. Lee, a West Point graduate, an accomplished and experienced soldier, frequently recognized and promoted, the captor of John Brown at Harper's Ferry, and recently (March 16, 1861) made colonel of the First Cavalry by the Lincoln administration; of fine presence, ripe judgment, and mature manhood, being then about two years older than President Lincoln. Lee was a favorite of Scott: under the call for troops the General-in-Chief at once selected him in his own mind as the most capable and promising officer in the service to

* Unpublished MS.

† This rumor proved incorrect. Such an occurrence, however, took place two days later, as we shall see.

become the principal commander in the field; and of this intention he spoke at the time to many without reserve, having no misgiving as to his loyalty.

Scott's confidence proved to be sadly misplaced. Repeated resignations and defections had very naturally engendered in the minds of President and Cabinet a distrust of every officer of Southern birth. Lincoln therefore requested F. P. Blair, senior, an intimate friend, to ascertain Lee's feelings and intentions. On the 18th of April, the third day after the President's call for troops, the day after Virginia's secret secession ordinance, and the day before the Baltimore riot, Mr. Blair invited Lee to an interview, informed him of the promotion and duties to which he was soon likely to be called, and thus unofficially offered him the command of the Union army. A flat contradiction exists as to the character of Lee's answer. Cameron, then Secretary of War, says he accepted the offer.* Montgomery Blair, then Postmaster-General, says he was undecided what he would do.† Both these gentlemen apparently derived their information from the elder Blair. On the other hand, Lee himself asserts that he declined the proposition, because, "though opposed to secession and deprecating war, I could take no part in an invasion of the Southern States."‡ He further explains his motive to have been an unwillingness to "take part against my native State," or to "raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home."§ But in his interview with Blair he also affirmed that secession was anarchy; that if he owned the whole four million slaves of the South he would sacrifice them all to the Union; and he appears to have substantially repeated the sentiment written to his son a few weeks before, as follows:

Secession is nothing but revolution. The framers of our Constitution never exhausted so much labor, wisdom, and forbearance in its formation, and sur-

* General Lee called on a gentleman who had my entire confidence, and intimated that he would like to have the command of the army. He assured that gentleman, who was a man in the confidence of the Administration, of his entire loyalty, and his devotion to the interests of the Administration and of the country. I consulted with General Scott, and General Scott approved of placing him at the head of the army. The place was offered to him unofficially with my approbation, and with the approbation of General Scott. It was accepted by him verbally, with the promise that he would go into Virginia and settle his business, and then come back to take command.—[Hon. Simon Cameron, debate in U. S. Senate, Feb. 19, 1868.]

† General Lee said to my father when he was sounded by him, at the request of President Lincoln, about taking command of our army against the rebellion, then hanging upon the decision of the Virginia convention, "Mr. Blair, I look upon secession as anarchy. If I owned four millions of slaves in the South, I would sacrifice them all to the Union; but how can I draw

rounded it with so many guards and securities, if it was intended to be broken by every member of the confederacy at will. It was intended for "Perpetual Union," so expressed in the preamble, and for the establishment of a government, not a compact, which can only be dissolved by revolution, or the consent of all the people in convention assembled. It is idle to talk of secession. Anarchy would have been established, and not a government, by Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, and the other patriots of the Revolution.¶

Under a liberal interpretation, Lee's personal denial must be accepted; but the times, the circumstances, his qualifying declarations, and the strong statements of Cameron and Blair clearly reveal his hesitation and indecision. After his interview with Blair, Lee sought an interview with Scott, where the topics which filled men's hearts and occupied men's lips — Union, secession, Virginia, subjugation, duty and honor, defection and treason — were once more, we may be quite sure, thoroughly discussed. It is morally certain that Scott, also a Virginian, gave Lee a lesson in patriotism; but he caught no generous emulation from the voice and example of his great chief. From Scott's presence Lee seems to have retired to his home and family at Arlington, to wrestle with the haunting shadows of duty. Pregnant news came to him, thick and fast. The secession of Virginia was verified in Washington that same evening. The next evening the Massachusetts 6th marched in mingled pride and sorrow to the Capitol, having an immortal record of service to their country. Here were new and important elements to influence his decision. Virginia seceded, Maryland in revolt, Washington threatened, Sumter lost, the border States defiant, the Confederate States arming, and uttering a half-official threat that the rebel flag should float over the Capitol by the 1st of May. If the walls of Arlington heard secret or open conferences with conspirators from Washington, or conspirators from Richmond,

my sword upon Virginia, my native State?" He could not determine then; said he would consult with his friend General Scott, and went on the same day to Richmond, probably to arbitrate difficulties; and we see the result.—[Hon. Montgomery Blair to Bryant, "National Intelligencer," August 9, 1866.]

‡ I never intimated to any one that I desired the command of the United States army, nor did I ever have a conversation but with one gentleman, Mr. Francis Preston Blair, on the subject, which was at his invitation, and, as I understood, at the instance of President Lincoln. After listening to his remarks, I declined the offer he made me, to take command of the army that was to be brought into the field, stating, as candidly and as courteously as I could, that, though opposed to secession and deprecating war, I could take no part in an invasion of the Southern States.—[Lee to Reverdy Johnson, Feb. 25, 1868. Jones, "Life of Lee," p. 141.]

§ Lee to his sister, April 20, 1861. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

¶ Lee to his son, Jan. 23, 1861. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

no record of them has come to light; but Saturday, April 20, Lee wrote to his old commander:

GENERAL: Since my interview with you on the 18th instant, I have felt that I ought not longer to retain my commission in the army. I therefore tender my resignation, which I request you will recommend for acceptance. It would have been presented at once, but for the struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a service to which I have devoted all the best years of my life and all the ability I possessed. . . . Save in defense of my native State, I never desire again to draw my sword.

Lee was at the time, in military phrase, "on leave of absence"; and without waiting to hear whether his resignation had been accepted, or even recommended for acceptance, as he himself had urged — without awaiting further orders, or permission, or discharge, or dismissal from service, on the 22d of April he was, by the governor and the convention of Virginia, appointed to, and on the 23d, in Richmond, publicly invested with, chief command of the Virginia Confederate forces under the secret secession ordinance and Letcher's revolutionary proclamation, with all his military obligations to the United States intact and uncanceled; thus rendering himself guilty of desertion and treason.* No danger whatever menaced his "native State" — the President had positively disclaimed all intention to invade it. In due course of events we find him not alone defending his native State, to which he owed nothing, but seeking to destroy the Union, which had done everything for him; opposing war by promoting "revolution," and redressing grievances by endeavoring to establish "anarchy."

In instructive contrast with the weakness and defects of Lee, we have the honorable conduct and example of General Scott. He, too, was a Virginian who loved his native State. He, too, was opposed to secession and deprecated war. He, too, as officer, commander, diplomatist, and statesman, had learned from books and from men the principles and practice of loyalty, and perhaps better than any American exemplar was competent to interpret a soldier's oath, a soldier's duty, a soldier's honor. His sympathies were at least as earnestly with the South as with the North.

* The Army Regulations of 1857, having the authority and force of law, contained the following provisions: "24. No officer will be considered out of service on the tender of his resignation, until it shall have been duly accepted by the proper authority.

"28. In time of war, or with an army in the field, resignations shall take effect within thirty days from the date of the order of acceptance."

For the offense thus defined by the Regulations of 1857, the Act of August 5, 1861, provided specific punishment, as follows:

"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any com-

To avoid bloodshed he had declared his individual willingness to say to the seceded States, "Wayward sisters, depart in peace." But underneath pride of home, affection of kindred, and horror of war, on the solid substratum of consistency and character, lay his recognition of the principle of government, his real, not simulated, veneration of the Constitution, his acceptance of the binding force of law, his unswerving fidelity to his oath, his undying devotion to his flag. The conspirators had long hoped for the assistance of his great name and authority. They filled the air with rumors of his disaffection. Since its abrupt secession ordinance, the Virginia convention had sat with closed doors; but through a responsible witness, we know that on the day on which Lee wrote his resignation (April 20) a committee of that convention called on General Scott to tempt him with the offer of the command of the Virginia forces. Senator Stephen A. Douglas, on his way home to arouse the great West in aid of Lincoln's proclamation, told the circumstance in graphic language to excited listeners:

I have been asked whether there is any truth in the rumor that General Scott was about to retire from the American army. It is almost profanity to ask that question. I saw him only last Saturday. He was at his desk, pen in hand, writing his orders for the defense and safety of the American capital. Walking down the street I met a distinguished gentleman, a member of the Virginia convention, whom I knew personally, and had a few minutes' conversation with him. He told me that he had just had an interview with Lieutenant-General Scott; that he was chairman of the committee appointed by the Virginia convention to wait upon General Scott and tender him the command of the forces of Virginia in this struggle. General Scott received him kindly, listened to him patiently, and then said to him, "I have served my country under the flag of the Union for more than fifty years, and as long as God permits me to live I will defend that flag with my sword, even if my own native State assails it."

Other eye-witnesses report that the rebuke contained an additional feature of unusual impressiveness. When the spokesman of the committee, a man of venerable years and presence, had vaguely and cautiously so far unfolded the glittering lure of wealth and honor which Virginia held out that the general could catch the drift of the humiliating

missioned officer of the army, navy, or marine corps, who, having tendered his resignation, shall, prior to due notice of acceptance of the same by the proper authority, and, without leave, quit his post or proper duties with the intent to remain permanently absent therefrom, shall be registered as a deserter, and punished as such."

If it be contended that Lee's offense was committed prior to this last statute, the answer is that his transgression was a much graver one, for he not only absented himself with intent to remain, but immediately entered into hostile service, an act punishable under the broad principles of general military law.

proposal, Scott held up his hand and said emphatically, "Friend Robertson, go no farther. It is best that we part here before you compel me to resent a mortal insult."* That same afternoon Scott also telegraphed to Senator Crittenden, in response to an anxious inquiry based on the false rumors set afloat about him, "I have not changed. I have not thought of changing. Always a Union man." And in that unshaken mood of sublime patriotism he lived and died, beloved of his country, and honored by the world.

The Virginia secession ordinance, though secretly adopted on the 17th, became quickly known to the people of Richmond. It was immediately announced to the States Rights convention in session in another hall, and Governor Letcher, Senator Mason, ex-President Tyler, and ex-Governor Wise, from the convention, soon appeared there and glorified the event with speeches—the latter lamenting the "blindness which had prevented Virginia from seizing Washington before the Republican hordes got possession of it." Nevertheless, an effort was still made to prevent the news from going North.† But that evening some of the unconditional Union delegates from West Virginia—then yet a part of the Old Dominion—deemed it prudent to shake the Richmond dust from their feet and secure their personal safety by prompt departure. Delegates Carlisle and Dent were in Washington on the 18th, and in all probability informed Mr. Seward and the President how irretrievably Virginia was committed to rebellion, even if Governor Letcher's reply and proclamation had left any doubt on that point. Ominous rumors came from Harper's Ferry, and also (as we have seen) a premature report of the burning of the railroad bridges beyond Baltimore. On that day, too, a detachment of 460 Pennsylvania volunteers, "almost entirely without arms," and a company of regulars from Minnesota had been hurriedly forwarded from Harrisburg to Washington.‡ The unruly elements of Baltimore were already in commotion, the cars containing these men being in their passage through that city cheered by the crowd at some points and hooted and stoned at others, though no casualties occurred.§ Noting all these rumors and acts of hostility, Secretary Cameron telegraphed to Governor Hicks that "the President is informed that threats are made and measures taken by unlawful combinations of misguided citizens of Maryland to prevent by force the transit of United States troops across Maryland on their way, pursuant to orders, for the defense of this capital"—and strongly intimated to

the governor that the loyal authorities of Maryland ought to put them down.||

The events of the week—the daily mustering of volunteers, the preparations for defense, the telegrams from the various State capitals—had thrown Washington into a military fever. All the social sympathies of the permanent population of Washington, and especially of its suburbs, Georgetown and Alexandria, were strongly Southern; but the personal interests of its inhabitants and property holders were necessarily bound up with the course and fate of the existing Government. The Union manifestations were for the moment dominant, and volunteers came forward readily, even somewhat enthusiastically, to fill up the District quota. The city was also yet full of office-seekers from various States north and west. Cassius M. Clay of Kentucky, and Senator-elect James H. Lane of Kansas, both men of mark and courage, after an evening or two of flaming speech-making, organized them into respectively the "Clay Battalion" and the "Frontier Guards." These companies, of from thirty to sixty men each, were what might be called irregular volunteers—recruits from East and West, of all ranks in the great army of politics, who came forward to shoulder a musket without enlistment, commission, paymaster, or commissariat. By this time the danger had become so threatening that every scrap and show of military force was welcome and really useful. The Government furnished them arms, and gave them in charge of Major (afterwards General) David Hunter, who, on the evening of the 18th, stationed Clay's company in Willard's Hall, with orders to patrol the streets, and took Lane's Frontier Guards to the post of honor at the Executive Mansion. At dusk they filed into the famous East Room, clad in citizens' dress, but carrying very new, untarnished muskets, and following Lane, brandishing a sword of irreproachable brightness. Here ammunition-boxes were opened and cartridges dealt out; and after spending the evening in an exceedingly rudimentary squad drill, under the light of the gorgeous gas chandeliers, they disposed themselves in picturesque bivouac on the brilliant-patterned velvet carpet—perhaps the most luxurious cantonment which American soldiers have ever enjoyed. Their motley composition, their too transparent motive, their anomalous surroundings, the extraordinary emergency, their mingled awkwardness and earnestness,

* Townsend, "Anecdotes of the Civil War," p. 5.

† Jones, "Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I., p. 23.

‡ J. D. C. to Cameron, April 18, 1861.

§ Scharf, "History of Maryland."

|| Cameron to Hicks, April 18, 1861. War Records.

rendered the scene a medley of bizarre contradictions,—a blending of masquerade and tragedy, of grim humor and realistic seriousness,—a combination of Don Quixote and Daniel Boone altogether impossible to describe. However, their special guardianship of the East Room lasted only for a night or two, until more suitable quarters could be extemporized; and for many days they lent an important moral influence in repressing and overawing the lurking treason still present in a considerable fraction among the Washington inhabitants.

The graphic pen of Bayard Taylor, who happened to be in Washington on this same afternoon of April 18, has left us a sharp and strong historical picture of the city at the time :

Everywhere around me the flag of the Union was waving; troops were patrolling the streets, and yonder the watchful Marshal Lamon was galloping on the second horse he had tired out since morning. Everybody seemed to be wide awake, alert, and active. On reaching Willard's Hotel, the scene changed. The passages were so crammed that I had some difficulty in reaching the office. To my surprise, half the faces were Southern — especially Virginian — and the conversation was carried on in whispers. Presently I was hailed by several Northern friends, and heard their loud, outspoken expressions of attachment to the Union. The whisperers near us became silent and listened attentively. I was earnestly questioned as to whether the delay of the mails was occasioned by rails being torn up or bridges destroyed. Every one seemed to suspect that a treasonable demonstration had taken place in or near Baltimore. The most exciting rumors were afloat. Harper's Ferry was taken — Virginia had secretly seceded — Wise was marching on Washington — always winding up with the impatient question, "Why don't the troops come on?"

From Willard's Bayard Taylor went to the State Department, and afterwards to make a call on Lincoln. He continues :

I need not describe the President's personal appearance, for nearly everybody has seen him. Honesty, firmness, and sound common sense were the characteristics with which personally he impressed me. I was very glad to notice the tough, enduring vitality of his temperament — he needs it all. He does not appear to be worn or ill, as I have heard, but, on the contrary, very fresh and vigorous. His demeanor was thoroughly calm and collected, and he spoke of the present crisis with that solemn, earnest composure which is the sign of a soul not easily perturbed. I came away from his presence cheered and encouraged.

BALTIMORE.

BALTIMORE, in 1861, was the great gateway of military approach from the Northern States to Washington. Lying at the head of the magnificent Chesapeake Bay, impossible to close by forts, it was also the common center and terminus of three principal railroad

routes — respectively, from the Ohio River and the west; from Harrisburg and the lake region northward; from Philadelphia, covering New York and New England. With the South in rebellion, Washington had but two established routes of transportation left her — the Potomac River, a fine water highway, but flowing through hostile territory, and liable to be quickly obstructed by land batteries at narrow points; and a single line of railway, a distance of forty miles to Baltimore, subject entirely to the will or caprice of that great city of over two hundred thousand inhabitants, somewhat notorious for disorderly tendencies. It is therefore no marvel that the authorities, both State and Federal, watched the temper of her people with anxious solicitude. Two days after the President's call, Cameron asked the president of the great Pennsylvania road to take charge of the military transportation,* who, going personally to Baltimore, reported the secession feeling very strong, and expressed fears lest the secession of Virginia might carry Maryland with her.†

The Massachusetts men were the first under arms. Governor Andrew of that State had quietly organized and equipped a few regiments of militia in view of possible emergencies. The President's proclamation was published in the Boston morning papers on Monday, April 15; on Tuesday forenoon the 6th Massachusetts began mustering on Boston Common; on Wednesday evening, April 17, the completed regiment, with new rifles and filled cartridge-boxes, with benedictions on the regimental flag and amid the silent blessings of the multitude, embarked in railroad cars. As they sped southward they witnessed the manifestation of the popular uprising in the New England towns, the literally packed streets and the demonstrations of honor in New York, and the crowning enthusiasm in Philadelphia, where they arrived on the evening of the 18th. Here Colonel Jones, commanding the regiment, found General Robert Patterson organizing the Pennsylvania militia, and received from the military and railroad officers warning of apprehended danger in Baltimore; but, in obedience to what he deemed imperative orders from his governor, he determined to go forward — only delaying his progress that his somewhat wearied men might bivouac until after midnight, which arrangement would also permit them to pass through Baltimore by day. Before daylight the men were roused, and the train started from Philadelphia. Reaching the Susquehanna River, it overtook a corps of Pennsylvania volunteers — Small's brigade, over a thousand men — which, by

* Cameron to Thomson, April 17, 1861. War Records.

† Thomson to Cameron, April 17, 1861. War Records.

some neglect or disobedience of orders, had started for Washington without uniforms or arms. This corps was also attached to the train, which thus numbered more than thirty cars. The railroad officials, to guard against accident or treachery, sent a pilot engine ahead, and had arranged an interchange of cipher messages with their Baltimore office, from which, at succeeding stations as the train safely approached the city, repeated assurances were received that all was quiet, and no trouble need be feared. Nevertheless, with due soldierly caution, Colonel Jones made deliberate preparation; his command loaded and capped their rifles, while he went personally through the cars and issued the following explicit order:

The regiment will march through Baltimore in column of sections, arms at will. You will undoubtedly be insulted, abused, and perhaps assaulted, to which you must pay no attention whatever, but march with your faces square to the front, and pay no attention to the mob, even if they throw stones, bricks, or other missiles; but if you are fired upon, and any one of you is hit, your officers will order you to fire. Do not fire into any promiscuous crowds; but select any man whom you may see aiming at you, and be sure you drop him.

This order clearly contemplated a march through the city by the regiment in a body, which by some misunderstanding or change of plan on the part of the railroad managers was not carried out.

The train arrived at the Philadelphia or President street station, and the troops were again to take cars for Washington at the

latter station. Accordingly, it was at this point that danger was apprehended, and protection of the police had been asked. The Baltimore authorities assert that, though they only received about half an hour's notice, they responded promptly, and the mayor, chief of police, and a considerable force were on hand and rendered effective service in protecting the transfer of the troops at the Washington station.

When, therefore, the train first halted at the Philadelphia or President street station on its arrival, Colonel Jones, instead of being notified to form his regiment for a march, as he expected, was astonished to find the first few cars drawn rapidly and separately through the streets by horses, which had been attached before he was well aware of what was going on. His own and seven or eight succeeding cars thus made the transit safely, and arriving at the Washington station the troops began to change cars. Here an immense crowd was gathered, and demonstrations of hostility immediately began. Says a newspaper account:

The scene, while the troops were changing cars, was indescribably fearful. Taunts clothed in the most outrageous language were hurled at them by the panting crowd, who, almost breathless with running, pressed up to the car windows, presenting knives and revolvers, and cursed up into the faces of the soldiers. The police were thrown in between the cars, and forming a barrier, the troops changed cars, many of them cocking their muskets as they stepped on the platform.*

The peaceful passage of the cars through the streets was not, however, of long duration. When the ninth† car, containing the seventh


company, issued from the Philadelphia depot, it was greeted with riotous insults by the crowd which had, during the unavoidable delay, rapidly gathered; and while passing over a portion of Pratt street, where certain street repairs were going on, the mob gathered up a pile of loose

paving-stones which they hurled at the car, smashing in the windows and blinds, and adding to this method of assault an occasional shot from a pistol or a gun. Says a trustworthy account:

The men were very anxious to fire on their assailants, but Major Watson forbade them. One or two soldiers

* "Baltimore Sun," April 20, 1861.

† There are discrepancies between the different accounts.



FROM THE PHILADELPHIA TO THE CAMDEN STATION.

Washington or Camden station. The two depots were perhaps a mile apart, the track connecting them running for the greater distance straight westward along Pratt street, excepting a short bend to the north at the beginning, and a corresponding short bend to the south near the end. It seems at the last moment to have been decided to follow the ordinary method of hauling the loaded cars from the Philadelphia depot to the Washington depot with horses, and to make the troops change cars at the

were wounded by paving-stones and bricks, and at length one man's thumb was shot, when, holding up the wounded hand to the major, he asked leave to fire in return. Orders were then given to lie on the bottom of the car and load, and rising to fire from the windows at will. These orders were promptly obeyed.*

Three times during the passage obstructions were laid on the track, requiring the car to be stopped till they could be removed. Under such repeated attacks this car reached the Washington depot. It had been a fight at long range, and in the shelter of the car no death had resulted to the troops. It is apparently at this juncture that the various authorities at the Washington depot became aware of the serious character of the riot. Colonel Jones was informed by the railroad superintendent that cars could no longer be hauled across the city, and he hurriedly wrote an order to the missing companies to join him by a forced march.*

Mayor Brown started immediately on foot for the scene of the disturbance. Marshal Kane, Chief of Police, devolved his command on a subordinate, and, collecting as many policemen as could be spared, also hastened eastward to join the mayor.

Exciting scenes were meanwhile enacted about the Philadelphia depot. The car of the seventh company having escaped their clutches as described, the rioters bethought themselves of permanently breaking communication between the two stations. Certain street repairs were at the time in progress along a portion of Pratt street. They seized the laborers' picks and shovels and tried to pry up the rails, but without success. Then they piled loose stones, and at another place a load of sand, on the track. Elsewhere they laid on the rails a number of heavy anchors dragged from a neighboring wharf. At still another place, they partly tore up a bridge. While the remaining four companies were waiting their turn to proceed, two of the railroad men informed them of the condition of affairs. Colonel Jones's order had failed to reach them; but the officers consulted together and, placing Captain Follansbee in command, resolved to go forward. The companies filed out of their cars, formed deliberately on the sidewalk, and, calling a policeman to lead the way, started on the perilous march. Almost at the very outset they encountered a hastily improvised procession, following a secession flag and marching directly towards them, which refused to yield the way. In an instant there were crowding, hustling, confusion, groans, hooting,

cries of "nigger thieves," and a struggle for the capture and possession of the rebel flag. The soldiers pushed doggedly ahead, and, thinking to pass the crowd, broke into a double-quick. This encouraged the rioters, who took it as a sign of fear. They redoubled their yells, called them cowards, and followed them with showers of clubs and stones. After two or three blocks of such progress the soldiers reached the torn-up bridge. "We had to play 'Scotch-hop' to get over it," says Captain Follansbee. "As soon as we had crossed the bridge, they commenced to fire upon us from the street and houses. I ordered the men to protect themselves, and then we returned their fire and laid a great many of them away." At this point Mayor Brown met the advancing column. He writes:

An attack on them had begun, and the noise and excitement were great. I ran at-once to the head of the column, some persons in the crowd shouting as I approached, "Here comes the mayor." I shook hands with the officer in command, saying, as I did so, "I am the mayor of Baltimore." I then placed myself at his side and marched with him as far as the head of Light street wharf, doing what I could by my presence and personal efforts to allay the tumult. The mob grew bolder and the attack became more violent. Various persons were killed and wounded on both sides. The troops had some time previously begun to fire in self-defense; and the firing, as the attack increased in violence, became more general. †

Captain Follansbee confirms this statement:

The mayor of the city met us almost half-way. He said there would be no trouble, and that we could get through, and kept with me for about a hundred yards; but the stones and balls whistled too near his head, and he left. . . . That was the last I saw of him.* ‡

The mayor's separation from the troops was probably caused by an important diversion which occurred at this point in their progress. Marshal Kane, hurrying to the rescue at the head of about fifty policemen, met the struggling and fighting column of soldiers, with Captain Follansbee and Mayor Brown at their head; and, taking in the situation and remedy at a glance, executed a movement which was evidently the turning-point in the affray. By his order the line of policemen opened their ranks, and, having allowed the column of troops to pass through, immediately closed again behind them, forming a firm line across the street. The marshal directed his men "to draw their revolvers and shoot down any man who dared to break their line." § This opposed an effectual barrier to the farther advance of this portion of the mob, which the police continued to hold in check, while the column of

I seized a musket and killed one of the rioters is entirely incorrect."

§ Report of Marshal Kane, May 3, 1861. "Congressional Globe," July 18, 1861.

* Hanson, "The Sixth Massachusetts Regiment."

† Mayor's message, July 11, 1861. War Records.

‡ In his volume, "Baltimore and the 19th of April, 1861," published in 1887, ex-Mayor Brown says (p. 51): "The statement in Colonel Jones's report that

troops pursued its way to the Washington depot with only one or two further attacks. Arrived there, the four companies were hurried into cars. The trouble, however, was not yet over. The immense crowd gathered here manifested a dangerous turbulence. Their savage temper had only grown during the delay, the receipt of news and rumors, and by the final arrival of the harried rear-guard. More threatening than all, the crowd repeatedly rushed ahead of the standing train and piled heavy stones, telegraph poles, and other objects on the track, which the police as often succeeded in removing. Colonel Jones and his officers had their men well under control; they kept them still, the blinds of the cars well drawn down, and thus prevented any unnecessary challenge or irritation to the mob. All being at length ready, the train moved slowly and cautiously away; but as it did so, a discharge of muskets blazed from a window of the rear car, and a prominent citizen of Baltimore fell dying to the ground. The bystanders declared the act was without provocation; the soldiers and their officers maintained that it was in response to a volley of stones or a shot. The total casualties of the day were never accurately ascertained or published. The soldiers lost 4 men killed and 36 wounded; the citizens perhaps two or three times that number. The single death which thus occurred as the train moved out, however, created more subsequent excitement in Baltimore than the scores who were slain and wounded in the *mêlée* on Pratt street.

Marshal Kane, having stopped the progress of the mob along Pratt street, had marched his policemen back to the Washington depot, where he learned that the train was gone; and, supposing that all danger was at last over, dismissed his force and was proceeding to his office when he was notified that there were yet other troops at the Philadelphia depot. These proved to be the regimental band of the Massachusetts men, and Small's Pennsylvania brigade, all unarmed. It is probable that the great length of the train had compelled the halting, at a considerable distance from the depot, of the cars in which they were, and that they had remained in ignorance of the occurrences described. When Marshal Kane arrived there, he found

* Report of Marshal Kane, May 3, 1861.

† In response to a request from Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, the mayor and authorities of Baltimore took immediate steps to care for the wounded and to pay respect to the dead of the Massachusetts regiment, a courtesy which was properly acknowledged. One year later the legislature of Maryland appropriated \$7000 for the families of Massachusetts soldiers killed or disabled by wounds in the riot.

‡ "Baltimore Sun," April 20, 1861. The "Baltimore American" gives a slightly different version of the

that the members of the band were already driven from their car and dispersed, and that the Pennsylvania men were just coming into the depot. "Some of these troops," he says, "commenced jumping from the train just as I got there, and were immediately set upon by an infuriated populace. I fought hard for their protection; at first almost alone, but soon had the assistance of a part of my force who hurried from the neighboring beats."* Meanwhile the railroad officials at Philadelphia were hastily consulted by telegraph, and orders soon came to have the remainder of the train and troops withdrawn from Baltimore without unloading, and carried back on the railroad towards Philadelphia as far as the Susquehanna River. The dispersed members of the band and other stragglers for the most part found sympathy, shelter, and concealment among humane Baltimoreans not engaged in the riot, until rescued and sent home by the police. †

All this rioting occurred in the forenoon between 10 and 12 o'clock. During the remainder of the day mob feeling, if not mob violence, controlled the city of Baltimore. The military companies were ordered out, and a mass meeting called to meet at 4 o'clock in Monument Square. At the appointed time a huge gathering assembled: the speakers, for the greater part, delivered strong anti-coercion speeches; instead of the national banner, a flag was displayed bearing the arms of Maryland. In substance, the occasion was a great secession meeting. Mayor Brown and Governor Hicks were called to the rostrum and made professions and promises in the prevailing tone, the governor declaring that he bowed in submission to the people. "I am a Marylander," said he, "and I love my State, and I love the Union; but I will suffer my right arm to be torn from my body before I will raise it to strike a sister State."‡ How completely the city was in revolt is told by Governor Hicks in a dispatch sent on the following day to Secretary Cameron:

Up to yesterday there appeared promise, but the outbreak came; the turbulent passions of the riotous element prevailed; fear for safety became reality; what they had endeavored to conceal, but what was known to us, was no longer concealed, but made manifest; the rebellious element had the control of things. We were arranging and organizing forces to protect the city and governor's remarks. It is probable that both reports are somewhat inaccurate:

The Union was now apparently broken, but he trusted that its reconstruction may yet be brought about [cries of "Never"]. Resuming, he said: "But if otherwise, I bow in submission to the mandate of the people. If submit we must, in God's name let us submit in peace; for I would rather this right arm should be separated from my body than raise it against a brother."— [Speech of Governor Hicks, April 19, 1861, as reported in the "Baltimore American" of April 20.]

preserve order, but want of organization and of arms prevented success. They had arms; they had the principal part of the organized military forces with them; and for us to have made the effort, under the circumstances, would have had the effect to aid the disorderly element. They took possession of the armories, have the arms and ammunition, and I therefore think it prudent to decline (for the present) responding affirmatively to the requisition made by President Lincoln for four regiments of infantry.*

This temporary bending before the storm of riot by the powerless authorities might have been pardoned under the emergency; but now they proceeded to stultify their courageous conduct of the forenoon by an act, if not of treason, at least of cowardice. At midnight Mayor Brown, Marshal Kane, and the Board of Police, and, as these assert, also Governor Hicks, consulted together, and deliberately ordered the destruction of the railroad bridges between Baltimore and both Harrisburg and Philadelphia.† Two strong parties of men were sent out, one of them headed by Marshal Kane, who before daylight burned the bridges at Melvale, Relay House, and Cockeysville on the Harrisburg road, and over the Bush and Gunpowder rivers and Harris Creek on the Philadelphia road. Governor Hicks soon after totally denied his consent to, or complicity in, the business, while the others insist that he was equally responsible with themselves.‡ The fact remained that the authorities had, by an act of war, completely cut off the national capital from railroad communication with the North.

The authors of this destruction attempt to justify their conduct by the excuse that they were informed of the approach of another large body of Northern troops, and they feared that under prevailing excitement the troops would wreak vengeance on the city for that day's attack on the Massachusetts 6th. They however cite nothing in the form of such a threat reaching them before their order, except a telegram from the railroad officer at Philadelphia, "that it was impossible to prevent these troops from going through Baltimore; the Union men must be aroused to resist the mob." Angry and ugly threats did soon come from the North; but not till after the burning, and largely excited by that act itself. It is impossible to resist the conviction that Mayor Brown and Marshal Kane were secessionists at heart; and while they were too sagacious to have prompted or encouraged the mob of April 19, they were quite ready to join in any sweeping popular move-

ment to precipitate Maryland into rebellion, even if they were not actually then in a secret conspiracy to that end. While on his way to burn the bridges, Marshal Kane sent a telegram to a kindred spirit, which leaves no doubt of his then treasonable intent:

Thank you for your offer. Bring your men in by the first train, and we will arrange with the railroad afterwards. Streets red with Maryland blood. Send expresses over the mountains and valleys of Maryland and Virginia for the riflemen to come without delay. Fresh hordes will be down on us to-morrow (the 20th). We will fight them, and whip them or die.§

General Scott's report and Cameron's dispatch of the 18th, quoted in the last chapter, show the already serious apprehensions of the Administration about the condition of Maryland, and particularly Baltimore. The rumors and news received on the 19th made the outlook still worse. It was definitely ascertained in the forenoon that Harper's Ferry had been so threatened by the Virginia rebels as to induce Lieutenant Jones to burn the arsenal and armory and retreat into Maryland with his little handful of soldiers. Other news convinced the authorities that there was no reasonable prospect of saving the Gosport navy yard at Norfolk, Virginia; and that night the war steamer *Pawnee* was started on her mission, with discretionary authority to destroy that immense establishment with its millions' worth of Government property. Shortly after noon there came, both by telegraph and messenger, the dreaded dispatch from Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown:

A collision between the citizens and the Northern troops has taken place in Baltimore, and the excitement is fearful. Send no more troops here. We will endeavor to prevent all bloodshed. A public meeting of citizens has been called, and the troops of the State and the city have been called out to preserve the peace. They will be enough.

Carefully scrutinized, this dispatch was found to be, like an ancient oracle, capable of a twofold meaning. The President and part of the Cabinet supposed Hicks meant to say he needed no troops to put down the riot. On the other hand, General Scott and Mr. Seward, usually so hopeful, thought they could read between the lines that it was desired no more troops should be passed through Baltimore. The arrival of the assaulted Massachusetts 6th about 5 o'clock added nothing to the current information except to demonstrate the seriousness of the day's occurrences. A crowd of five thousand people received the

* Hicks to Cameron, April 20, 1861. War Records.

† Mayor's message, Report of Marshal Kane, and Report Board of Police, May 3, 1861; War Records. Also Brown, "Baltimore and the 19th of April, 1861."

‡ Mayor Brown to the Maryland legislature, May 10, 1861. War Records.

§ Kane to Johnson, April 19, 1861. Marshal Kane, in his official report of May 3, 1861, admits the language of the dispatch, and offers no explanation of it but undue excitement.

regiment at the depot with enthusiastic cheers of welcome, and escorted its march to the rotunda of the Capitol, whence it went to quarters in the Senate Chamber. After tea that evening special messengers came from Governor Hicks to say that the Pikesville arsenal, eight miles from Baltimore, having been abandoned by the army officer in charge, the governor had caused it to be occupied and protected for the United States. The President showed them the dispatch; but they could give no explanation beyond reiterating the governor's and their own loyalty. The true interpretation soon came, though in a round-about way. The riot had thrown all the railroad companies into a panic. Hicks and Brown had advised, and the Board of Police ordered, all troops en route to be sent back towards Pennsylvania.* To its compliance with this advice and order the Baltimore and Ohio road added a refusal to undertake any further transportation; † and to this refusal the Philadelphia and Wilmington road had also given its assent. ‡ A few hours' reflection showed the Philadelphia railroad officials the suicidal nature of such refusal, not only to the Government, but especially to their own business, and they now telegraphed to Washington to know what was to be done — laying the blame rather more heavily than he deserved at the door of Governor Hicks. At Washington the question was pretty fully debated by the President, Cabinet, and General Scott, and a sharp dispatch in cipher sent back to Philadelphia:

Governor Hicks has neither right nor authority to stop troops coming to Washington. Send them on, prepared to fight their way through, if necessary. §

This decision having been reached, the President and various officials sought their rest for the night, not by any means assured of a tranquil sleep. The possible contingencies of the hour are briefly expressed in a memorandum made on the night of the Baltimore riot by an occupant of the Executive Mansion:

We are expecting more troops here by way of Baltimore, but are also fearful that the secessionists may at any hour cut the telegraph wires, tear up the railroad track, or burn the bridges, and thus prevent their reaching us and cut off all communication. We have rumors that 1500 men are under arms at Alexandria, seven miles below here, supposed to have hostile designs against this city; and an additional report that a vessel was late this evening seen landing men on the Maryland side of the river. All these things indicate that if we are to be attacked at all soon, it will happen to-night. On the other hand, we have some four to five thousand men under arms in the city, and a very vigilant watch out in all the probable directions

of approach. The public buildings are strongly guarded; the Secretary of War will remain all night in his Department, and General Scott is within convenient reach. I do not think any force could be brought against the city to-night which our men could not easily repel. ||

Soon after midnight a special train brought a committee of Baltimoreans. The authorities of that unhappy city were, first by the riot, and afterwards by the public meeting and the popular demonstrations in the streets, worked into a high state of excitement. About an hour before their determination and order to burn the bridges, Mayor Brown wrote a request to the President to stop the transit of troops, saying, "It is my solemn duty to inform you that it is not possible for more soldiers to pass through Baltimore, unless they fight their way at every step." ¶ Being by this time in one of his yielding moods, Governor Hicks concurred in the request by a written note.** It was too late to see the President when the committee bearing the letter arrived; they therefore applied to Cameron at the War Department, who refused flatly to entertain their request, turning over on his sofa for another nap. From the chief clerk they learned that no troops were then actually on the way, and with this bit of relief they contented themselves till daylight.

Next morning (April 20) the President had just finished his breakfast when General Scott's carriage stopped under the White House portico. The general was suffering from gout, which made it painful for him to mount to the Executive chamber; and to save him this exertion, Lincoln came down to exchange a word with him at the door. At the foot of the staircase the President encountered the Baltimore committee, read their brief letter, and took them at once to General Scott's carriage, where they rehearsed their errand, eloquently portraying the danger — nay, the impossibility — of bringing soldiers through Baltimore; whereupon the general, looking solely to the extreme urgency of getting troops to the capital, and perceiving no present advantage in fighting a battle in that city, suggested promptly, "March them around" — the change from the dispatch sent the previous evening to Philadelphia being purely one of expediency under an alleged state of facts. The committee returned with the President to his office, where he wrote them a reply to Governor Hicks's and Mayor Brown's letters:

For the future troops must be brought here, but I make no point of bringing them through Baltimore. Without any military knowledge myself, of course I

* "Rebellion Record."

† Hicks, Brown, and Howard to Garrett, April 19, 1861.

‡ Garrett, reply, April 19, 1861.

§ Felton to Hicks and Brown, April 19, 1861.

¶ Thomas to Felton, April 19, 1861. War Records.

|| J. G. N., personal memoranda. Unpublished MS.

¶ Brown to Lincoln, April 19, 1861. War Records.

** Hicks to Lincoln. War Records.


must leave details to General Scott. He hastily said this morning, in the presence of these gentlemen, "March them around Baltimore, and not through it." I sincerely hope the general, on fuller reflection, will consider this practical and proper, and that you will not object to it. By this a collision of the people of Baltimore with the troops will be avoided, unless they go out of the way to seek it.*

This arrangement was, on being communicated to the governor, duly accepted by him. He wrote:

I hoped they would send no more troops through Maryland; but as we have no right to demand that, I am glad no more are to be sent through Baltimore.†

"Give an inch, he'll take an ell." The proverb is especially applicable in times of revolution, when men act under impulse, and not on judgment. President Lincoln did not lose sight of this human weakness while dealing with the Baltimore committee. When about to write his letter for them, he said half playfully, "If I grant you this concession, that no troops shall pass through the city, you will be back here to-morrow demanding that none shall be marched around it."‡ They protested to the contrary; but the President's words were literally verified. When the committee returned to Baltimore, the alleged popular dread of invasion had already changed to extensive preparation for meditated but not yet avowed insurrection. So far from being thankful for their success in changing the march of Union troops, the incensed secessionists upbraided the committee for consenting to allow them to pollute the soil of Maryland. Two members of the legislature were sent back to the President§ to formulate new demands. This, with the governor's withdrawal of his offer to furnish the four regiments, already cited, and the scattering sensational telegrams received, induced Lincoln, on the afternoon of Saturday, April 20, to telegraph to Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown to come by special train, as he desired to consult them "relative to preserving the peace of Maryland." The governor had gone to Annapolis, and after the interchange of various messages, the mayor himself was asked to come.

So soon as the Baltimore route was closed by the riot of the 19th of April, the railroad authorities|| at Philadelphia had with commendable energy devised and prepared a new



MAP OF THE APPROACHES TO WASHINGTON.

route—by rail to Perryville on the Susquehanna; thence by water on Chesapeake Bay to Annapolis; thence by railroad, or, if that were destroyed, common wagon-roads to Washington. This they suggested to General Scott on the 20th, and he ordered it adopted the same day. That same forenoon Hon. David Wilmot, making his way northward from Washington as best he could, wrote back from Baltimore to the General-in-Chief, confirming the rumor that some of the bridges of the Philadelphia road had been destroyed, the telegraph interrupted, and rapid communication with the North cut off; and added, "Troops coming on your road [from Harrisburg to Baltimore] could leave it about three miles from Baltimore, and by a march of five miles reach the Washington road some two

* Lincoln to Hicks and Brown, April 20, 1861.

† Hicks to Brown, April 20, 1861. War Records.

‡ J. G. N., personal memoranda. Unpublished MS.

§ Scharf, "History of Maryland."

|| Great credit is due to Mr. S. M. Felton, then president of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad, the same who devised the precautions at the time of Mr. Lincoln's night journey through Baltimore. Mr. Felton, heartily seconded by J. Edgar Thomson, then president of the Pennsylvania

Railroad, by intimate knowledge and control of facilities, railroad cars, and steam vessels, was able at once to order such new combinations on an extensive scale as were rendered necessary by the Baltimore riot and the requirements of the large numbers of troops hurrying to the defense of Washington. For this patriotic service the Secretary of War sent his official acknowledgment to these gentlemen, including also Mr. E. S. Sanford, president of the American Telegraph Company.

and a half miles from the city.”* It was with some such idea that General Scott had first proposed the march around Baltimore; and strengthened by Wilmot's suggestion, he on the following day wrote to General Patterson, who held command in Philadelphia, that this Harrisburg and Baltimore route was perhaps the most important military avenue to Washington, closing with the injunction, “Give your attention in part to this line.”† The Washington authorities were, however, not long in finding that this assumption was a vital error. General Scott wrote:

In my letter to you yesterday, I intended that the railroad via Harrisburg and York towards Baltimore was more important, perhaps, for reënfencing Washington, than that from Philadelphia to Perryville, etc. That supposition was founded on the Secretary's belief that the distance from a certain point on the Harrisburg railroad to the Relay House, eight miles this side of Baltimore, was but some seven miles by a good wagon road, whereas there is no good common road between the two railroads of less than thirty miles. This fact renders the railroad from Harrisburg to Baltimore of no value to us here, without a force of perhaps ten thousand men to hold Baltimore, to protect the rails and bridges near it.‡

Bearing in mind this change of view, let us return to the affairs of Baltimore. Through various delays it happened that Mayor Brown did not reach Washington until Sunday morning, April 21, in obedience to Lincoln's request of the previous afternoon. The mayor brought with him two members of the first Baltimore committee, and besides these a prominent and active secessionist. Through all of Friday night and Saturday the secession feeling steadily rose in Baltimore; the city, to the full extent of its ability, made ready to resist the further passage of troops by force; and to a considerable degree the same excitement, and the same resolve and preparation, spread like wild-fire to the country villages of Maryland. Naturally, Mayor Brown and his committee-men, while they carefully kept secret their own official bridge-burning, did not undercolor their description of this insurrectionary mood of their people. The discussion was participated in by General Scott and the Cabinet, and took a wide range, lasting all Sunday forenoon (April 21). The President insisted that troops must come. General Scott explained that they could only come in one of three ways: First, through Baltimore; second, by the Harrisburg route and a march round Baltimore; and third, by the Annapolis route. The last two routes were therefore agreed upon.

General Scott said if the people would per-

mit them to go by either of these routes uninterrupted, the necessity of their passing through Baltimore would be avoided. If the people would not permit them a transit thus remote from the city, they must select their own best route, and, if need be, fight their way through Baltimore, a result which he earnestly deprecated. The President expressed his hearty concurrence in the desire to avoid a collision, and said that no more troops should be ordered through Baltimore if they were permitted to go uninterrupted by either of the other routes suggested. In this disposition the Secretary of War expressed his participation. Mayor Brown agreed to this arrangement, and promised on his part “that the city authorities would use all lawful means to prevent their citizens from leaving Baltimore to attack the troops in passing at a distance.§

With this agreement the committee took their leave, and the President proceeded to other pressing business, when, to his astonishment, Mayor Brown and his companions once more made their appearance, between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon. They brought a highly sensational telegram just received by them at the depot from Mr. Garrett, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which read:

Three thousand Northern troops are reported to be at Cockeysville; intense excitement prevails; churches have been dismissed, and the people are arming in mass. To prevent terrific bloodshed, the result of your interview and arrangement is awaited. ||

Cockeysville is on the Harrisburg route, fifteen miles from Baltimore; and because they had no previous notice of such approach, the committee now intimated that advantage had been taken of their presence in Washington to bring these forces within striking distance of Baltimore. The Cabinet and Scott were again summoned, and the whole discussion was opened up anew.

The President, at once, in the most decided way urged the recall of the troops, saying he had no idea they would be there to-day, and lest there should be the slightest suspicion of bad faith on his part in summoning the mayor to Washington, and allowing troops to march on the city during his absence, he desired that the troops should, if it were practicable, be sent back at once to York or Harrisburg.¶

Orders were accordingly issued to this effect, the President, however, notifying the committee that he should not again in any wise interfere with the military arrangements.

In this, as in his Sumter policy, Lincoln interposed his authority in pursuance of his constant exercise not alone of justice and firm-

* Wilmot to Scott, April 20, 1861. War Records.

† Scott to Patterson, April 21, 1861. War Records.

‡ Scott to Patterson, April 22, 1861. War Records.

§ Mayor Brown, Report, April 21, 1861. “Rebellion Record.”

|| Scharf, “Chronicles of Baltimore.”

ness, but of the very utmost liberality and forbearance. He did not expect to appease the Maryland rebels, but to make them clearly responsible for further bloodshed, should any occur, and thereby to hold the Maryland Unionists; and the result vindicated his judgment. These were sufficient motives; and underlying them he had yet another, still more conclusive. All this examination of maps and discussion had brought the conviction to his quick penetration, in advance of any of his councilors, that the Harrisburg route was, in the present state of affairs, entirely impracticable and useless, which fact General Scott so fully set forth on the following day in his already cited letter to General Patterson.

WASHINGTON IN DANGER.

THANKS to the preparations and promptness of Governor Andrew, the Massachusetts 8th was not far behind the 6th. It assembled on Boston Common on Thursday morning, and was in Philadelphia on Friday evening, April 19, just in time to hear the authentic reports as well as the multiplied and exaggerated rumors of that day's doings of the Baltimore mob, and the tragic fate of some of their comrades of the 6th. Massachusetts having agreed to double her quota, the four regiments thus to be received formed a brigadier-general's command, and for this command Governor Andrew designated Benjamin F. Butler, who already held that office and rank under the State militia laws. He was a lawyer by profession, but possessed in an eminent degree the peculiarly American quality of ability to adapt himself to any circumstance or duty, with a quick perception to discover and a ready courage to seize opportunities. It must be noted in passing that he was a radical Democrat in politics, and could boast that he had voted fifty times in the late Charleston convention to make Jefferson Davis the Democratic candidate for President. But with the same positive zeal he denounced secession, and helped to prepare the Massachusetts regiments to join in suppressing it by the authority and with the power of the Federal Government. Arrived with the Massachusetts 8th at Philadelphia, General Butler that night telegraphed further news of the day's disaster to Governor Andrew.

I have reason to believe that Colonel Jones has gone through to Washington. Two killed only of the Massachusetts men. We shall go through at once. The road is torn up through Baltimore. Will telegraph again.*

* Butler to Andrew, April 19, 1861.

† Lefferts to Cameron. April 20, 1861. War Records.

Later and more definite information caused him to modify his intention to press on: first, the Baltimore railroad refused to carry any more troops into that city; secondly, the burning of the bridges made it impossible for them to do so. In this dilemma, the Philadelphia railroad authorities had bethought them of a new route — that by Annapolis, previously described. This plan required not only much discussion, but great additional preparation; and Friday night and a part of Saturday passed before it was pronounced even probably feasible. By this time the 7th regiment of New York — the *corps d'élite* of the whole Union, which on Friday afternoon started its march down Broadway "through that tempest of cheers two miles long" — had also reached Philadelphia, where it too, like the Massachusetts 8th, was obliged seriously to study the further ways and means of getting to Washington. The various railroad and military officials of Philadelphia strongly advised the Annapolis route, and Colonel Lefferts, commanding the New York 7th, telegraphed to Cameron asking orders to go that way.† There was long delay in transmitting the dispatch and awaiting a reply; and before the requested permission came, Colonel Lefferts changed his purpose, chartered a steamship, placed his regiment on board, and started for Washington via the Delaware river and bay and the Potomac River — this decision being apparently not a little hastened by certain military rivalries and jealousies which instantly sprang up between Colonel Lefferts and Brigadier-General Butler, acting as yet under separate State authority, and being therefore independent of each other's control. Scott's reply to send troops by Havre de Grace and Annapolis,‡ as suggested, at length came through the somewhat deranged telegraph offices; and Lefferts being gone, the order was communicated to Butler.§ While the New York 7th, under Lefferts, was steaming down Delaware Bay on the transport *Boston*, the Massachusetts 8th, under Butler, proceeded by cars to Perryville (opposite Havre de Grace), and, embarking on the ferry-boat *Maryland*, steamed down Chesapeake Bay, and by midnight was anchored off Annapolis. As events turned out, this division of forces proved an advantage, since neither of the boats was capable of containing both regiments; and twenty-four hours later, as we shall see, the *Boston* joined the *Maryland* at Annapolis before either regiment had disembarked.

The small and antiquated town of Annapolis, the capital of Maryland and the seat of

‡ Thomas to Patterson, April 20, 1861. War Records.

§ Patterson to Thomas, April 21, 1861. War Records.

the United States Naval Academy, was for the moment in sympathy with secession. Governor Hicks had returned here from Baltimore, it being his official residence, to make ready for the coming special session of the Maryland legislature, which, in one of his moments of timidity, he had been prevailed upon to call together on the 26th. The governor and the mayor of Annapolis both strongly urged Butler not to land his men; to which he replied that he must land to get provisions, and in turn requested the governor's formal consent. Pending this diplomatic small-talk, he found a piece of work to do. The old frigate *Constitution*, of historic fame, was anchored off the grounds of the Naval Academy as a training-ship; a few boat-loads of Baltimore roughs might easily cut her out and convert her into a privateer. Commandant Blake, who, with the majority of his officers and cadets, remained loyal, asked Butler to help pull her farther out into the bay for better security against capture. In this enterprise the greater part of Sunday, the 21st of April, was spent.

The two Sunday interviews of the mayor of Baltimore with President Lincoln, and the resulting arrangement that troops should hereafter come by the Annapolis route, have been detailed. The telegraph, in the mean time, was still working, though with delays and interruptions. As an offset to the disagreeable necessity of ordering the Pennsylvania troops back from Cockeysville, the cheering news of Butler's arrival at Annapolis had come directly to hand. That same Sunday afternoon President Lincoln and his cabinet met at the Navy Department, where they might deliberate in greater seclusion, and the culminating dangers to the Government underwent scrutinizing inquiry and anxious comment. The events of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, as developed by the military reports and the conferences with the Baltimore committees, exhibited a degree of real peril such as had not menaced the capital since the British invasion in 1814. Virginia was in arms on one side, Maryland on the other; the railroad was broken; the Potomac was probably blockaded; a touch would sever the telegraph. Of this occasion the President afterwards said:

It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Government fall into ruin, or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the present age and for posterity.*

Surveying the emergency in its remote as well as merely present aspects, and assuming without hesitation the responsibilities which

existing laws did not authorize, but which the needs of the hour imperatively demanded, Lincoln made a series of orders designed to meet, as well as might be, the new crisis in public affairs. A convoy was ordered out to guard the California steamers bringing heavy shipments of gold; fifteen merchant steamers were ordered to be purchased or chartered, and armed at the navy yards of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia for coast protection and blockade service; two million dollars were placed in the hands of three eminent citizens of New York, John A. Dix, George Opdyke, and Richard M. Blatchford, to be in their judgment disbursed for the public defense; another commission of leading citizens of New York, George D. Morgan, William M. Evarts, Richard M. Blatchford, and Moses H. Grinnell, in connection with Governor Morgan, was empowered to exercise practically the full authority of the War and Navy Departments in organizing troops and forwarding supplies; two of the ablest naval officers were authorized each to arm two additional merchant vessels to cruise in the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay, together with sundry minor measures and precautions. Before these various orders could even be prepared for transmittal, the crowning embarrassment had already come upon the Government. On that Sunday night (April 21) the telegraph operator at Baltimore reported that the insurrectionary authorities had taken possession of his office; to which the Washington telegraph superintendent laconically added, "Of course this stops all."

So the prospect closed on Sunday night. Monday forenoon brought, not relief, but rather an exaggeration of the symptoms of danger. Governor Hicks, influenced by his secession surroundings at Annapolis, neither having consented to Butler's landing nor yet having dissuaded him from that purpose, now turned his appeals to the President. "I feel it my duty," he wrote, "most respectfully to advise you that no more troops be ordered or allowed to pass through Maryland, and that the troops now off Annapolis be sent elsewhere; and I most respectfully urge that a truce be offered by you, so that the effusion of blood may be prevented. I respectfully suggest that Lord Lyons be requested to act as mediator between the contending parties of our country."† The suggestion was not only absurd in itself, but it awakened painful apprehension lest his hitherto friendly disposition might suddenly change to active hostility. This was a result to be avoided by all possible means; for, even in his present neutral mood, he was still an effective breakwater against

* Lincoln, special message, May 27, 1862.

† Hicks to Lincoln, April 22, 1861. War Records.

those who were striving day and night to force Maryland into some official act of insurrection. Mr. Seward therefore wrote the governor a very kindly worded and yet dignified rebuke, reminding him of the days "when a general of the American Union with forces designed for the defense of its capital was not unwelcome anywhere in the State of Maryland, and certainly not at Annapolis"; and suggesting at its close "that no domestic contention that may arise among the parties of this republic ought in any case to be referred to any foreign arbitrament, least of all to the arbitrament of an European monarchy."*

Meanwhile, as an additional evidence of the yet growing discontent, another large Baltimore committee found its way to the President—this time from one of the religious bodies of that city, with a Baptist clergyman as its spokesman, who bluntly proposed that Mr. Lincoln should "recognize the independence of the Southern States." Though such audacity greatly taxed his patience, he kept his temper, and replied that neither the President nor Congress possessed the power or authority to do this; and to the further request that no more troops be sent through Maryland, he answered in substance:

You, gentlemen, come here to me and ask for peace on any terms, and yet have no word of condemnation for those who are making war on us. You express great horror of bloodshed, and yet would not lay a straw in the way of those who are organizing in Virginia and elsewhere to capture this city. The rebels attack Fort Sumter, and your citizens attack troops sent to the defense of the Government, and the lives and property in Washington, and yet you would have me break my oath and surrender the Government without a blow. There is no Washington in that—no Jackson in that—there is no manhood or honor in that. I have no desire to invade the South; but I must have troops to defend this capital. Geographically it lies surrounded by the soil of Maryland; and mathematically the necessity exists that they should come over her territory. Our men are not moles, and can't dig under the earth; they are not birds, and can't fly through the air. There is no way but to march across, and that they must do. But in doing this, there is no need of collision. Keep your rowdies in Baltimore, and there will be no bloodshed. Go home and tell your people that if they will not attack us, we will not attack them; but if they do attack us, we will return it, and that severely.

Washington now began to take on some of the aspects of a siege. The large stores of flour and grain at the Georgetown mills, and even that already loaded for shipment on schooners, were seized, and long trains of carts were engaged in removing it to safer storage in the public buildings. Prices

of provisions were rising. The little passenger steamers plying on the Potomac were taken possession of by the military officers to be used for guard and picket duty on the river. The doors, windows, and stairways of the public buildings were protected by barricades, and the approaches to them guarded by sentinels. All travel and nearly all business came to a standstill, and theaters and places of amusement were closed. With the first notice of the burning of the railroad bridges, the strangers, visitors, and transient sojourners in the city became possessed of an uncontrollable desire to get away. So long as the trains ran to Baltimore, they proceeded to that point; from there they sought to escape northward by whatever stray chances of transportation offered themselves. By some of these fugitives the Government had taken the precaution to send duplicates of important orders and dispatches to Northern cities. This *sauve qui peut* quickly denuded Washington of its redundant population. While the Unionist non-combatants were flying northward, the latent secessionists were making quite as hurried an escape to the South; for it was strongly rumored that the Government intended to impress the whole male population of Washington into military service for the defense of the city.

One incidental benefit grew out of the panic—the Government was quickly relieved of its treasonable servants. Some hundreds of clerks resigned out of the various departments on this Monday, April 22d, and the impending danger not only brought these to final decision, but also many officers of high grades and important functions. Commodore Buchanan, in charge of the Washington navy yard, together with nearly all the subordinate officers, suddenly discovered their unwillingness longer to keep their oaths and serve the United States; and that night this invaluable naval depot, with all its vast stores of material, its immense workshops and priceless machinery, was intrusted solely to the loyalty and watchfulness of Commander John A. Dahlgren and a little handful of marines, scarcely enough in numbers to have baffled half a dozen adroit incendiaries, or to ascertain the street gossip outside the walls of the establishment.† Among the scores of army and navy resignations reported the same day was that of Captain John B. Magruder, 1st Artillery, then in command of a light battery

* Seward to Hicks, April 22, 1861.

† Mem. for the War Department. The *Anacostia*, a small Potomac steamer, anchored off Gillsboro' Point, and after remaining a short time returned down the river. The *Harriet Lane*, supposed revenue cutter, is now off the Arsenal and has been there a short time.

I have not been able to communicate with her. I should wish to have a company of Massachusetts or United States troops in the yard at night if they can be spared.—John A. Dahlgren, Acting Commandant, 22d April. MS.

on which General Scott had placed special reliance for the defense of Washington. No single case of defection gave Lincoln such astonishment and pain as this one. "Only three days ago," said he, when the fact was made known to him, "Magruder came voluntarily to me in this room, and with his own lips and in my presence repeated over and over again his asseverations and protestations of loyalty and fidelity."* It was not merely the loss of an officer, valuable and necessary though he might be in the emergency, but the significance of this crowning act of perfidy which troubled the President, and to the suggestiveness of which he could not close his eyes. Was there not only no patriotism left, but was all sense of personal obligation, of every-day honesty, and of manliness of character gone also? Was everything crumbling at his touch? In whom should he place confidence? To whom should he give orders, if clerks, and captains, and commodores, and quartermaster-generals, and governors of States, and justices of the Supreme Court proved false in the moment of need? If men of the character and rank of the Magruders, the Buchanans, the McCauleys, the Lees, the Johnstons, the Coopers, the Campbells were giving way, where might he not fear treachery? There was certainly no danger that all the officers of the Government would thus prove recreant; but might not the failure of a single one bearing an important trust cause a vital and irreparable disaster?

The perplexities and uncertain prospects of the hour are set forth with frank brevity by General Scott, in the report which was sent to the President that night of Monday, April 22:

I have but little that is certain to report, viz.: (1) That there are three or four steamers off Annapolis, with volunteers for Washington; (2) that their landing will be opposed by the citizens, reënforced from Baltimore; (3) that the landing may be effected nevertheless by good management; and (4) that the rails on the Annapolis road (20 miles) have been taken up. Several efforts to communicate with those troops to-day have failed; but three other detached persons are repeating the attempt, and one or more of them will, I think, succeed. Once ashore, the regiments (if but two, and there are probably more) would have no difficulty in reaching Washington on foot, other than the want of wagons to transport camp equipage, etc. The quartermaster that I have sent there (I do not know that he has arrived) has orders to hire wagons if he can, and if not, to impress, etc. Of rumors, the following are probable, viz.: (1) That from 1500 to 2000 troops are at the White House (4 miles below Mount Vernon, a narrow point in the Potomac) engaged in erecting a battery; (2) that an equal force is collected or in progress of assemblage on the two sides of the river to attack Fort Washington; and (3) that extra cars went up yesterday to bring down from Harper's Ferry about 2000 other troops to join in a

general attack on this capital—that is, on many of its fronts at once. I feel confident that with our present forces we can defend the Capitol, the Arsenal, and all the executive buildings (seven) against ten thousand troops not better than our district volunteers.†

Tuesday morning came, but no news from Annapolis, no volunteers up the Potomac. It was Cabinet day; and about noon, after the President and his councilors were assembled, messengers announced the arrival of two steamers at the navy yard. There was a momentary hope that these might be the long-expected ships from New York; but inquiries proved them to be the *Pawnee* and a transport on their return from the expedition to Norfolk. The worst apprehensions concerning that important post were soon realized—it was irretrievably lost. The only bit of comfort to be derived from the affair was that the vessels brought back with them a number of marines and sailors, who would now add a little fraction of strength to the defense of the capital. The officers of the expedition were soon before the President and Cabinet, and related circumstantially the tale of disaster and destruction which the treachery of a few officers and the credulous duplicity of the commandant had rendered unavoidable.

The Gosport navy yard, at Norfolk, Virginia, was of such value and importance that its safety, from the very beginning of Mr. Lincoln's administration, had neither been neglected nor overlooked. But, like every other exposed or threatened point,—like Sumter, Pickens, Tortugas, Key West, Fort Monroe, Baltimore, Harper's Ferry, and Washington itself,—its fate was involved in the want of an army and navy of adequate strength. On the day that the President resolved on the Sumter expedition, two hundred and fifty seamen had been ordered from Brooklyn to Norfolk to render Gosport more safe. Instead of going there, it was immediately necessary to change their destination to Sumter and Pickens. And so, though the danger to Gosport was never lost sight of, the reënforcements to ward it off were never available. Officer after officer and letter after letter were sent by the department to enjoin vigilance, to prepare defenses, and to remove valuable ships. The officers of the navy yard professed loyalty; the commandant had grown gray in the service of his country, and enjoyed the full confidence of his equals and superiors. It was known that the secessionists had designs upon the post; but it was believed that the watchfulness which had been ordered and the measures of precaution which had been arranged under the special supervision of two

* J. H., Diary. Unpublished MS.

† Unpublished MS.

trusted officers of the Navy Department, who were carrying out the personal instructions of Secretary Welles, would meet the danger. At a critical moment, the hitherto correct judgment of Commandant McCauley committed a fatal mistake. The subordinate officers of the yard, professing loyalty, practiced treason, and lured him unwittingly into their designs.

Several valuable vessels lay at the navy yard. To secure them eventually for Virginia, Governor Letcher had, among his first acts of hostility, attempted to obstruct the channel from Norfolk to Fort Monroe by means of sunken vessels. But the effort failed; the passage still remained practicable. Ascertaining this, Commodore Alden and Chief Engineer Isherwood, specially sent for the task by Secretary Welles, had, with the help of the commandant of the yard, prepared the best ships — the *Merrimac*, the *Germantown*, the *Phymouth*, and the *Dolphin* — for quick removal to Fort Monroe. The engines of the *Merrimac* were put in order, the fires under her boilers were lighted, the moment of her departure had been announced, when suddenly a change came over the spirit of Commandant McCauley. Virginia passed her ordinance of secession; the traitorous officers of the navy yard were about to throw off their mask and desert their flag; and, as a parting stroke of intrigue, they persuaded the commandant that he must retain the *Merrimac* for the security of the yard. Yielding to this treacherous advice, he countermanded her permission to depart and ordered her fires to be put out. Thus baffled, Isherwood and Alden hastened back to Washington to obtain the superior orders of the Secretary over this most unexpected and astounding action of the commandant.

They reached Washington on this errand respectively on the 18th and 19th of April, just at the culminating point of insurrection and danger. Hasty consultations were held and energetic orders were issued. The *Pawnee*, just returned from her Sumter cruise, was again coaled, supplied, and fitted out — processes consuming precious hours, but which could not be omitted. On the evening of April 19 she steamed down the Potomac under command of Commodore Paulding, with discretionary orders to defend or to destroy. Next evening, April 20, having landed at Fort Monroe and taken on board three to five hundred men of the 3d Massachusetts, only that morning arrived from Boston, and who embarked without a single ration, the *Pawnee* proceeded to Norfolk, passing without difficulty through the seven sunken hulks in the Elizabeth River. But Commodore Paulding found that he had come too late to

save anything. The commandant, once more successfully plied with insidious advice, had yielded to the second suggestion of his juniors, and had scuttled the removable ships — ostensibly to prevent their being seized and used by the rebels. As they were slowly sinking, no effort to remove them could succeed, and no resource was left but to destroy everything so far as could be done. Accordingly, there being bright moonlight, the greater part of that Saturday night was devoted to this work of destruction. Several parties were detailed to fire the ships and the buildings and to lay a mine to blow up the dry-dock, and the sky was soon lighted up from an immense conflagration. Yet, with all this effort, the sacrifice was left incomplete. Not more than half the buildings were consumed. The workshops, with their valuable machinery, escaped. The 1500 to 2000 heavy cannon in the yard could neither be removed nor rendered unserviceable. Some unforeseen accident finally prevented the explosion of the dry-dock. Of the seven ships burned to the water's edge, the hull of the *Merrimac* was soon afterwards raised, and in the course of events changed by the rebels into the iron-clad *Merrimac*, or, as they named her, the *Virginia*. At 5 o'clock on Sunday morning the *Pawnee* considered her work finished, and steamed away from Gosport, followed by the sailing-ship *Cumberland*.

No point of peril had been so clearly foreseen, so carefully provided for, and apparently so securely counteracted as the loss of the three or four valuable ships at Norfolk; and yet, in spite of foresight and precaution, they had gone to worse than ruin through the same train of circumstances which had lost Sumter and permitted the organization of the Montgomery rebellion. The loss of ships and guns was, however, not all; behind these was the damaging moral effect upon the Union cause and feeling. For four consecutive days each day had brought a great disaster — Virginia's secession on the 17th; the burning of Harper's Ferry on the 18th; the Baltimore riot and destruction of railroad bridges on the 19th; the abandonment and destruction of this great navy yard and its ships on the night of the 20th. This began to look like an irresistible current of fate. No popular sentiment could long stem such a tide of misfortune. The rebels of Virginia, Maryland, and especially of Washington began to feel that Providence wrought in their behalf, and that their cherished conspiracy was already crowned with success. Evidently with such a feeling, on this same Tuesday, Associate Justice John A. Campbell, still a member of the Supreme Court and under oath to support the Constitution of the United States, again sent a

letter of aid and comfort to Jefferson Davis. He wrote:

Maryland is the object of chief anxiety with the North and the Administration. Their fondest hope will be to command the Chesapeake and relieve the capital. Their pride and their fanaticism would be sadly depressed by a contrary issue. This will be the great point of contest in all negotiations.

Incline to think that they are prepared to abandon the south of the Potomac. But not beyond. Maryland is weak. She has no military men of talents, and I did hear that Colonel Huger was offered command and declined it — however, his resignation had not been accepted. Huger is plainly not competent for such a purpose. Lee is in Virginia. Think of the condition of Baltimore and provide for it, for there is the place of danger. The events at Baltimore have placed a new aspect upon everything at the North. There is a perfect storm there. While it has to be met, no unnecessary addition should be made to increase it.*

Another night of feverish public unrest, another day of anxiety to the President — Wednesday, April 24. There was indeed no attack on the city; but, on the other hand, no arrival of troops to place its security beyond doubt. Repetition of routine duties; repetition of small, unsubstantial rumors; long faces in the streets; a holiday quiet over the city; closed shutters and locked doors of business houses; the occasional clatter of a squad of cavalry from point to point; sentinels about the departments; sentinels about the Executive Mansion; Willard's Hotel, which a week before was swarming with busy crowds, now deserted as if smitten by a plague — with only furtive servants to wake echoes along the vacant corridors, and in all its vast array of chambers and parlors but a single lady guest to recall the throng of fashion and beauty which had so lately made it a scene of unceasing festivity from midday to midnight. Ever since the telegraph stopped on Sunday night the Washington operators had been listening for the ticking of their instruments, and had occasionally caught fugitive dispatches passing between Maryland secessionists, which were for the greater part immediately known to be unreliable; for General Scott kept up a series of military scouts along the Baltimore railroad as far as Annapolis Junction, twenty miles from Washington, from which point a branch railroad ran at a right angle to the former, twenty miles to Annapolis, on Chesapeake Bay. The general dared not risk a detachment permanently to hold the junction; no considerable secession force had been encountered, and the railroad was yet safe. But it was known, or at least strongly probable, that the volunteers from the North had been at Annapolis since Sunday morning. Why did they not land? Why did they not advance? The Annapolis road was known

* Campbell to Davis, April 23, 1861. MS.

to be damaged; but could they not march twenty miles? The previous day (April 23) had, by some lucky chance, brought a New York mail three days old. The newspapers in it contained breezy premonitions of the Northern storm — Anderson's enthusiastic reception; the departure of the New York 7th regiment; the sailing of Governor Sprague with his Rhode Islanders; the monster meeting in Union Square, with the outpouring of half a million of people in processions and listening to speeches from half a dozen different stands; the energetic measures of the New York Common Council; the formation of the Union Defense Committee; whole columns of orders and proclamations; the flag-raising; the enlistments; the chartering and freighting of ships; and from all quarters news of the wild, jubilant uprising of the whole immense population of the Free States. All this was gratifying, pride-kindling, reassuring; and yet, read and re-read with avidity in Washington that day, it would always bring after it the galling reflection that all this magnificent outburst of patriotism was paralyzed by the obstacle of a twenty miles' march between Annapolis and the junction. Had the men of the North no legs?

Lincoln, by nature and habit so calm, so equable, so undemonstrative, nevertheless passed this period of interrupted communication and isolation from the North in a state of nervous tension which put all his great powers of mental and physical endurance to their severest trial. General Scott's reports, though invariably expressing his confidence in successful defense, frankly admitted the evident danger; and the President, with his acuteness of observation and his rapidity and correctness of inference, lost no single one of the external indications of doubt and apprehension. Day after day prediction failed and hope was deferred; troops did not come, ships did not arrive, railroads remained broken, messengers failed to reach their destination. That fact itself demonstrated that he was environed by the unknown — and that whether a Union or a Secession army would first reach the capital was at best an uncertainty. To a coarse or vulgar nature such a situation would have brought only one of two feelings — either overpowering personal fear, or overweening bravado. But Lincoln, almost a giant in physical stature and strength, combined in his intellectual nature a masculine courage and power of logic with a sentimental tenderness as delicate as a woman's, and an ideal sensitiveness of conscience. This presidential trust which he had assumed was to him not a mere regalia of rank and honor. Its terrible duties and responsibilities seemed rather a coat

of steel armor, not only heavy to bear, but cutting remorselessly into the quick flesh. That one of the successors of Washington should find himself even to this degree in the hands of his enemies was personally humiliating; but that the majesty of a great nation should be thus insulted and its visible symbols of authority be placed in jeopardy; above all, that the hitherto glorious example of the republic to other nations should stand in this peril of surprise and possible sudden collapse, the Constitution be scoffed and jeered, and human freedom become once more a by-word and reproach — this must have begot in him an anxiety approaching torture. In the eyes of his countrymen and of the world he was holding the scales of national destiny; he alone knew that for the moment the forces which made the beam vibrate with such uncertainty were beyond his control. In others' society he gave no sign of these inner emotions. But once, on the afternoon of the 23d, the business of the day being over, the Executive office deserted, after walking the floor alone in silent thought for nearly half an hour, he stopped and gazed long and wistfully out of the window down the Potomac in the direction of the expected ships; and, unconscious of any presence in the room, at length broke out with irrepressible anguish in the repeated exclamation, "Why don't they come! Why don't they come!"

One additional manifestation of this bitterness of soul occurred on the day following (April 24), though in a more subdued manner. The wounded soldiers of the Massachusetts 6th, including several officers, came to pay a visit to the President. They were a little shy when they entered the room — having the traditional New England awe of authorities and rulers. Lincoln received them with that sympathetic kindness and equality of bearing which put them at ease after the interchange of the first greetings. His words of sincere thanks for their patriotism and their suffering, his warm praise of their courage, his hearty recognition of their great service to the public, and his earnestly expressed confidence in their further devotion, quickly won their trust and respect. He spoke to them of the position and prospect of the city, contrasting their prompt arrival with the unexplained delay which seemed to have befallen the regiments from the various States supposed to be somewhere on the way. Pursuing this theme, he finally fell into a tone of irony to which only intense feeling ever drove him. "I begin to believe," said he, "that there is no North. The 7th regiment is a myth. Rhode Island is another. You are the only real thing."* There are

* J. H., Diary. Unpublished MS.

few parchment brevets as precious as such a compliment, at such a time, from such a man.

However much the tardiness of the Annapolis reinforcements justified the President's sarcasm, they were at last actually on the way. We left Butler engaged in assisting the school-ship *Constitution* to a more secure position. The aid proved effectual; but the day's work ended by the ferry-boat *Maryland* — the Massachusetts 8th being still on board — getting hard aground in the shoal water of Annapolis Harbor. In this helpless predicament, with only hard pilot-bread and raw salt pork furnished from the *Constitution* to eat, and no water to drink, the regiment passed the night of Sunday. Early next morning (Monday, April 22) brought the arrival of another ship, which proved to be the *Boston*, containing the New York 7th; and thus these two regiments, so lately parted at Philadelphia, were once more united. Colonel Lefferts had proceeded on his independent course to Fort Monroe; but receiving no intelligence concerning the Potomac route, concluded, after all, to adopt the more prudent plan of steaming up Chesapeake Bay to Annapolis.

The *Boston* at once set to work, but without eventual success, to pull the *Maryland* into deeper water. Meanwhile the officers of the two regiments were holding interviews and correspondence with Commandant Blake of the Naval School on the one hand, and with the Maryland authorities on the other. Governor Hicks, in punctilious assertion of the paramount State sovereignty of Maryland, protested, in writing, against landing the troops. The mayor of Annapolis joined in the protest; though privately both declared Maryland was loyal to the Union, and that they would make no military resistance. That afternoon both regiments were landed. There was still a certain friction of military jealousy and refusal to coöperate between Butler and Lefferts; both were eager to proceed to Washington, but differed in their plans; and the many and apparently authentic rumors of the opposing force that would meet them from Baltimore caused discussion and delay. They had no transportation, few rations, and little ammunition. Butler took the first practical measures, by ordering the railroad depot and buildings to be occupied. Here an old locomotive was found, the machinery of which had been carefully disarranged. The mechanical skill of the Yankee militiamen now asserted its value. Private Charles Homans, of the Massachusetts 8th, at once recognized the locomotive as having been built in "our shop"; and calling to his help several machinists like himself from among the Massachusetts boys, they had no great difficulty in putting it in running or-

der. Tuesday morning (April 23) showing still no warlike demonstrations from any quarter, the surroundings of the town were reconnoitered, and two companies of the Massachusetts 8th pushed out three and a half miles along the railroad. A beginning was also made towards repairing the track, which was found torn up and displaced here and there. In this work, and in testing the newly repaired locomotive and improvising a train, another day slipped by. In the evening, however, two of the eight messengers sent out from Washington to Annapolis succeeded in reaching there, the second one bringing the definite orders of General Scott that Butler should remain and hold the place, and that the advancing troops should repair the railroad. That night, also, came four or more steamships with as many additional regiments of volunteers.

Wednesday morning, April 24, being the fourth day at Annapolis for the Massachusetts 8th and the third for the New York 7th, they started on their twenty miles' march to the junction. A couple of extemporized platform cars on which the "7th" mounted their little brass howitzers, the patched-up locomotive, and two rickety passenger cars constituted their artillery-baggage-supply-ambulance-and-construction train all in one. Thus provided, the two regiments marched, scouted, laid track, and built bridges as occasion required; now fraternizing and cooperating with hearty good-will. It was slow and tedious work; they were not inured to nor provided for even such holiday campaigning as this. Luckily they had fine weather—a warm, sunny, spring day, succeeded by a clear night with a full moon to light it. So they clung pluckily to their duty, hungry and

sleepy though they were, all day and all night of Wednesday, and arrived at the junction about daybreak of Thursday. All the previous rumors had taught them that here they might expect a rebel force and a fight. The anticipation proved groundless; they learned, on the contrary, that a train from Washington had come to this place for them the day before. It soon again made its appearance; and quickly embarking on it, by noon the New York 7th was at its destination.

Those who were in the Federal capital on that Thursday, April 25, will never, during their lives, forget the event. An indescribable gloom and doubt had hung over Washington nearly a week, paralyzing its traffic and crushing out its very life. As soon as their coming was known, an immense crowd gathered at the depot to obtain ocular evidence that relief had at length reached the city. Promptly debarking and forming, the 7th marched from the Capitol up Pennsylvania Avenue to the White House. As they passed up the magnificent street, with their well-formed ranks, their exact military step, their soldierly bearing, their gayly floating flags, and the inspiring music of their splendid regimental band, they seemed to sweep all thought of danger and all taint of treason not only out of that great national thoroughfare, but out of every human heart in the Federal city. The presence of this single regiment seemed to turn the scales of fate. Cheer upon cheer greeted them, windows were thrown up, houses opened, the population came forth upon the streets as for a holiday. It was an epoch in American history. For the first time, the combined spirit and power of Liberty entered the nation's capital.

LOVE'S IMAGINING.

DEAR Love, I sometimes think how it would be
 If thou shouldst love me, if, on such a day,
 O day of wonder! thou shouldst come and say
 I love thee, or but let me guess thy plea—
 If once thine eyes should brighten suddenly,
 If once thy step should hasten or delay
 Because of me, if once thy hand should stay
 A needless instant in my own! Ah, me!
 From such imaginings I wake and start,
 And dull and worthless life's endeavors seem
 Before the tender beauty of my dream—
 And then I whisper my impatient heart,
 "Be still, be comforted, O heart of mine,
 Thou art not all bereft, the dream is thine."

Hopetill Goodwin.

LUCINA.

THINE are the buds within the woody spray
That reddens toward the spring and lengthening day;
Thine subtly, from the patient toiling root,
To draw sweet currents to the topmost shoot.—
 Smite thou with solar shaft,
 Rock on Æolian draft,
 Buffet with down-poured floods,—
Feed strong thy tenderlings, the unblown buds!

Thine are the germs that when the year died down
Hid them below the year's despoiled crown;
Thine to release to them the vital store
That garnered lies at the white frostless core.—
 Dislodge the cumbering mold,
 Shower them with Titan's gold
 In sylvan glades, in meads;
They are thy little wards, the striving seeds.

And thine the yet unplumed, unsinging hope
Of singing ones that by a sun-warm slope,
Or hollow where the brake is first unfurled,
Hover, and brood the center of a world.—
 Be their mute hope thy care,
 Soon on the dew-fresh air
 Faint hunger-cries be heard,—
Thou quickener of the nighted, shell-bound bird!

Thine, thine all life until the birth-hour fall,
And nascent being waken at thy call:
Then fleest thou, inconstant, having won
For each the world-embathing air and sun.
 Not stayed by gift or vow,—
 A soft half-memory thou,
 A waning aureole
From the bright mist that wrapped the stranger soul!

Thou—is it thou that to the early year
Lendest a glory fugitive and dear,
A passion to its chill, dim-colored flowers,
A restless vigil to its murmuring hours?
 O chary ministrant
 Of dreams revisitant
 When vernal winds arise
Breathing vague cheer from other earth and skies!

As the pent leaf and song-bird wait for thee
To dart the orient beam that sets them free,
We wait some tremulous forerunning glow,
Signal of life supreamer than we know.—
 In shining morn and spring,
 To fields Elysian bring
 And crown with being's whole,—
Thou daybreak of the worn night-traveling soul!


Edith M. Thomas.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE BORDER STATES.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

REBELLIOUS MARYLAND.



NO sooner had the secession ordinance been secretly passed by the convention of Virginia than Governor Letcher notified Jefferson Davis of the event, and (doubtless by preconcert) invited him to send a commissioner from Montgomery to Richmond to negotiate an alliance. The adhesion of Virginia was an affair of such magnitude and pressing need to the cotton-States, that Davis made the Vice-President of the new Confederacy, Alexander H. Stephens, his plenipotentiary, who accordingly arrived at Richmond on the 22d of April. Here he found everything as favorable to his mission as he could possibly wish. The convention was filled with a new-born zeal of insurrection; many lately stubborn Union members were willingly accepting offices in the extemporized army of the State; the governor had that day appointed Robert E. Lee commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces, which choice the convention immediately confirmed. Stephens was shrewd enough to perceive that his real negotiation lay neither with the governor nor the convention, but with this newly created military chieftain. That very evening he invited Lee to a conference, at which the late Federal colonel forgot the sentiment written by his own hand two days before, that he never again desired to draw his sword except in defense of his native State,† and now expressed great eagerness for the proposed alliance. Lee being willing, the remainder of the negotiation was easy; and two days afterward (April 24) Stephens and certain members of the convention signed a formal military league, making Virginia an immediate member of the "Confederate States," and placing her armies under the command of Jefferson Davis — thus treating with contempt the convention proviso that the secession ordinance should only take effect after ratification by the people, the vote on which had been set for the fourth Thursday of May. Lee and others endured this military usurpation, under which they became

beneficiaries, without protest. No excuse for it could be urged. Up to this time not the slightest sign of hostility to Virginia had been made by the Lincoln administration — no threats, no invasion, no blockade; the burning of Harper's Ferry and Gosport were induced by the hostile action of Virginia herself. On the contrary, even after these, Mr. Lincoln repeated in writing, in a letter to Reverdy Johnson which will be presently quoted, the declarations made to the Virginia commissioners on the 13th, that he intended no war, no invasion, no subjugation — nothing but defense of the Government.

At the time of the Baltimore riot the telegraph was still undisturbed; and by its help, as well as by personal information and private letters, that startling occurrence and the succeeding insurrectionary uprising were speedily made known throughout the entire South, where they excited the liveliest satisfaction and most sanguine hopes. All the Southern newspapers immediately became clamorous for an advance on Washington; some of the most pronounced Richmond conspirators had all along been favorable to such an enterprise; and extravagant estimates of possibilities were telegraphed to Montgomery. They set forth that Baltimore was in arms, Maryland rising, Lincoln in a trap, and not more than 1200 regulars and 3000 volunteers in Washington; that the rebels had 3000 men at Harper's Ferry; that Governor Letcher had seized three to five steamers on the James River; that the connecting Southern railroads could carry 5000 to 7000 men daily at the rate of 350 miles per day.

As a leader we want Davis. An hour now is worth years of common fighting. One dash, and Lincoln is taken, the country saved, and the leader who does it will be immortalized.‡

This, from a railroad superintendent supposed to have practical skill in transportation, looked plausible. The Montgomery cabinet caught the enthusiasm of the moment, and on April 22 Jefferson Davis telegraphed to Governor Letcher at Richmond:

In addition to the forces heretofore ordered, requisitions have been made for 13 regiments; 8 to rendezvous at Lynchburg, 4 at Richmond, and 1 at Harper's Ferry. Sustain Baltimore, if practicable. We reënforce you.

† Lee to General Scott, April 20, 1861.

‡ Bird to Walker, April 20, 1861. War Records.

This dispatch shows us what a farce even the Virginia military league was, since two days before its conclusion "foreign" rebel troops were already ordered to the "sacred soil" of the Old Dominion. Governor Letcher was doubtless willing enough to respond to the suggestion of Davis, but apparently had neither the necessary troops nor preparation. He had as yet been able to muster but a shadowy force on the line of the Potomac, notwithstanding his adjutant-general's pretentious report of the previous December. Nevertheless, hoping that events might ripen the opportunity into better conditions for success, he lost no time in sending such encouragement and help as were at his control. The rebel commander at Harper's Ferry had already communicated with the Baltimore authorities and effected a cordial understanding with them, and they promised to notify him of hostile menace or approach.* Mason, late senator, appears thereupon to have been dispatched to Baltimore.† He seems to have agreed to supply the Maryland rebels with such arms as Virginia could spare; and some 2000 muskets actually found their way to Baltimore from this source during the following week,‡ though an arrangement to send twenty cannon (32-pounders) to the same city from the Gosport navy yard§ apparently failed.

But it would appear that the project of a dash at Washington found an unexpected obstacle in the counsels of Virginia's new military chief, Robert E. Lee, who assumed command of the State forces April 23.¶ He instructed the officers at Alexandria and along the Potomac to act on the defensive, to establish camps of instruction, and collect men and provisions.¶ This course was little to the liking of some of the more ardent rebels. They telegraphed (in substance) that Davis's immediate presence at Richmond was essential; that his non-arrival was causing dissatisfaction; and that the troops had no confidence in Lee and were murmuring; that there were signs of temporizing, hopes of a settlement without collision, and consequent danger of demoralization; that Lee "dwelt on enthusiasm North and against aggression from us." Said another dispatch:

Have conversed with General Robert E. Lee. He wishes to repress enthusiasm of our people. His troops not ready, although pouring in every hour. They remain here. General Cocke has three hundred and no more. Corps of observation on Potomac near Alexandria. He considers Maryland helpless, needing encouragement and succor. Believes twenty thousand men in and near Washington.**

* Harper to Richardson, April 21, 1861. War Records.

† Blanchard to Howard, April 23, 1861. McPherson, "History of the Rebellion."

‡ Stuart to Police Board, May 2, 1861. *Ibid.*, p. 394.

In no State were the secession plottings more determined or continuous than in Maryland. From the first a small but able and unwearied knot of Baltimore conspirators sought to commit her people to rebellion by the empty form of a secession ordinance. They made speeches, held conventions, besieged the governor with committees; they joined the Washington conspirators in treasonable caucus; they sent recruits to Charleston; they incited the Baltimore riot; and there is no doubt that in these doings they reflected a strong minority sentiment in the State. With such a man as Pickens or Letcher in the executive chair they might have succeeded, but in Governor Hicks they found a constant stumbling-block and an irremovable obstacle. He gave Southern commissioners the cold shoulder. He refused at first to call the legislature. He declined to order a vote on holding a convention. He informed General Scott of the rebel plots of Maryland, and testified of the treasonable designs before the investigating committee of Congress. His enemies have accused him of treachery, and cite in proof a letter which they allege he wrote a few days after Lincoln's election in which he inquired whether a certain militia company would be "good men to send out to kill Lincoln and his men." If the letter be not a forgery, it was at most an ill-judged and awkward piece of badinage; for his repeated declarations and acts leave no doubt that from first to last his heart was true to the Union. He had the serious fault of timidity, and in several instances foolishly gave way to popular clamor; but in every case he soon recovered and resumed his hostility to secession.

The Baltimore riot, as we have seen, put a stop to the governor's arrangements to raise and arm four regiments of Maryland volunteers, of picked Union men, for United States service within the State or at Washington. Instead of this, he, in the flurry of the uprising, called out the existing militia companies, mainly disloyal in sentiment and officered by secessionists. The Baltimore authorities collected arms, bought munitions, and improvised companies to resist the passage of troops; they forbade the export of provisions, regulated the departure of vessels, controlled the telegraph. General Stewart, commanding the State militia, established posts and patrols, and in effect Maryland became hostile territory to the North and to the Government. The Union flag disappeared from her soil. For three or

§ Watts to Lee, April 27, 1861. MS.

¶ Lee, General Orders, April 23, 1861. War Records.

¶ Lee to Cocke, April 24, 1861. War Records.

** Duncan to Walker, April 26, 1861. MS.

four days treason was rampant; all Union men were intimidated; all Union expression or manifestation was suppressed by mob violence. The hitherto fearless Union newspapers, in order to save their offices and materials from destruction, were compelled to drift with the flood, and print editorials advising, in vague terms, that all must now unite in the defense of Maryland. It was in this storm and stress of insurrection that Governor Hicks protested against Butler's landing, and sent Lincoln his proposal of mediation;* and on the same day (April 22), and by the same influence, he was prevailed upon to notify the legislature to meet on the 26th. It so happened that the seats of the Baltimore members were vacant. A special election, dominated by the same passions, was held on the 24th. Only a "States Rights" ticket was voted for; and of the 30,000 electors in the city 9244, without opposition, elected the little knot of secession conspirators—the Union men not daring to nominate candidates or come to the polls.

For the moment the leading Unionists of Maryland deemed their true rôle one of patience and conciliation. In this spirit Reverdy Johnson, a lawyer and statesman of fame and influence both at home and abroad, came to Lincoln upon the stereotyped errand to obtain some assurance in writing that he meditated no invasion or subjugation of the South; to which the President confidentially replied:

I forebore to answer yours of the 22d because of my aversion (which I thought you understood) to getting on paper and furnishing new grounds for misunderstanding. I do say the sole purpose of bringing troops here is to defend this Capital. I do say I have no purpose to invade Virginia with them or any other troops, as I understand the word invasion. But suppose Virginia sends her troops, or admits others through her borders, to assail this Capital, am I not to repel them even to the crossing of the Potomac, if I can? Suppose Virginia erects, or permits to be erected, batteries on the opposite shore to bombard the city, are we to stand still and see it done? In a word, if Virginia strikes us, are we not to strike back, and as effectively as we can? Again, are we not to hold Fort Monroe (for instance), if we can? I have no objection to declare a thousand times that I have no purpose to invade Virginia or any other State, but I do not mean to let them invade us without striking back.†

Mr. Johnson replied, thanking the President for his frankness, and indorsing all his

* War Records.

† Lincoln to Johnson, April 24, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Johnson to Lincoln, April 24, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ Campbell to Davis, April 28, 1861. Unpublished MS.

|| As the legislature, at its last session, had unseated

policy. "In a word," said he, "all that your note suggests would be my purpose were I intrusted with your high office." He also promised that the President's note should "be held perfectly confidential."‡ But it appears that Mr. Johnson chose his confidants with very poor judgment; for within four days its substance was written from Washington direct to Jefferson Davis.§

By no means the least of the difficult problems before Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet was the question how to deal with the Maryland legislature, so unexpectedly called to assemble. The special election in Baltimore,|| held under secession terrorism, had resulted in the unopposed choice of ten delegates from the city, all believed to be disloyal, and several of them known to be conspicuous secessionists. With this fresh element of treason suddenly added to a legislative body so small in numbers, it seemed morally certain that its first act would be to arm the State, and pass something equivalent to a secession ordinance. Should this be permitted? How could it best be prevented? Ought the legislature to be arrested? Should it be dispersed by force? General Butler was at Annapolis, where it was expected that the session would be held, and signified his more than willingness to act in the matter. The plans were discussed in Cabinet with great contrariety of opinion. Some of the least belligerent of the President's councilors were by this time in hot blood over the repeated disasters and indignities which the Government had suffered, and began to indulge in the unreasoning temper and impatience of the irritated public opinion of the North, where one of the largest and most influential journals had already declared that the country needed a dictator. Mr. Bates filed a written opinion—in spirit a protest—declaring that the treasonable acts in Virginia and Maryland were encouraged by the fact that "we frighten nobody, we hurt nobody"; though he failed to suggest any other than merely vindictive remedies that were immediately feasible. Mr. Chase also partook of this frame of mind, and wrote the President a curt little note of querulous complaint, eminently prophetic of his future feelings towards and relations to Mr. Lincoln:

Let me beg you to remember that the disunionists have anticipated us in everything, and that as yet we

the delegates from Baltimore, a special election was held in that city on April 24. But one ticket was presented, and 9244 ballots were cast for Messrs. John C. Brune, Ross Winans, Henry M. Warfield, J. Hanson Thomas, T. Parkin Scott, H. M. Morfitt, S. Teackle Wallis, Charles H. Pitts, Wm. G. Harrison, and Lawrence Sangston, the States Rights candidates. —Scharf, "History of Maryland," Vol. III., p. 424.

have accomplished nothing but the destruction of our own property. Let me beg you to remember also that it has been a darling object with the disunionists to secure the passage of a secession ordinance by Maryland. The passage of that ordinance will be the signal for the entry of disunion forces into Maryland. It will give a color of law and regularity to rebellion and thereby triple its strength. The custom-house in Baltimore will be seized and Fort McHenry attacked—perhaps taken. What next? Do not, I pray you, let this new success of treason be inaugurated in the presence of American troops. Save us from this new humiliation. A word to the brave old commanding general will do the work of prevention. You alone can give the word.*

The bad taste and injustice of such language consisted in its assumption that the President was somehow culpable for what had already occurred, whereas Mr. Chase had in the beginning been more conciliatory towards the rebels than had Mr. Lincoln.

With a higher conception of the functions of the presidential office, Mr. Lincoln treated public clamor and the fretfulness of Cabinet ministers with the same quiet toleration. Again, as before, and as ever afterward, he listened attentively to such advice as his Cabinet had to give, but reserved the decision to himself. He looked over the Attorney-General's legal notes, weighed the points of political expediency, canvassed carefully the probabilities of military advantage, and embodied his final directions in a letter to General Scott:

MY DEAR SIR: The Maryland legislature assembles to-morrow at Annapolis, and not improbably will take action to arm the people of that State against the United States. The question has been submitted to and considered by me, whether it would not be justifiable, upon the ground of necessary defense, for you, as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, to arrest or disperse the members of that body. I think it would not be justifiable, nor efficient for the desired object. *First*, they have a clearly legal right to assemble; and we cannot know in advance that their action will not be lawful and peaceful. And if we wait until they shall have acted, their arrest or dispersion will not lessen the effect of their action.

Secondly, we cannot permanently prevent their action. If we arrest them, we cannot long hold them as prisoners; and, when liberated, they will immediately reassemble and take their action. And precisely the same if we simply disperse them. They will immediately reassemble in some other place.

I therefore conclude that it is only left to the commanding general to watch and await their action, which, if it shall be to arm their people against the United States, he is to adopt the most prompt and efficient means to counteract, even if necessary to the bombardment of their cities; and, in the extremest necessity, the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*.†

Thus directed, General Scott wrote to General Butler on the following day:

In the absence of the undersigned, the foregoing instructions are turned over to Brigadier-General B. F. Butler of the Massachusetts Volunteers, or other officer commanding at Annapolis, who will carry them out in a right spirit; that is, with moderation and firmness. In the case of arrested individuals notorious for their hostility to the United States, the prisoners will be safely kept and duly cared for, but not surrendered except on the order of the commander aforesaid. ‡

At the last moment, however, conscious of the offenses which some of their members were meditating against the Government, the Maryland legislature abandoned the idea of meeting at Annapolis, and induced the governor to convene their special session at the town of Frederick. Here Governor Hicks sent them his special message on the 27th, reciting the recent occurrences, transmitting his correspondence with the various Federal authorities, and expressing the conviction "that the only safety of Maryland lies in preserving a neutral position between our brethren of the North and of the South." At the same time he admitted the right of transit for Federal troops, and counseled "that we shall array ourselves for Union and peace."§ The lack of coherence and consistency in the message was atoned for by its underlying spirit of loyalty.

Meanwhile the plentiful arrival of volunteers enabled the Government to strengthen its hold upon Annapolis and the railroad.¶ The military "Department of Annapolis" was created, and General Butler assigned to its command. This embraced twenty miles on each side of the railroad from Annapolis to Washington;¶ and all of Maryland not included in these limits was left in General Patterson's "Department of Pennsylvania." Measures were taken to concentrate sufficient troops at Harrisburg and at Philadelphia to approach Baltimore in force from those quarters and permanently to occupy the city; and to give the military ample authority for every contingency, the President issued the following additional order to General Scott:

You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ.**

* Chase to Lincoln, April 24, 1861. Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase."

† Lincoln to Scott, April 25, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Scott to Butler, April 26, 1861. War Records.

§ Hicks, Special Message, April 27, 1861. "Rebellion Record."

¶ Butler to Scott, April 27, 1861. War Records.

¶ General Orders, No. 12, April 27, 1861. War Records.

** Lincoln to Scott, April 27, 1861. McPherson, "History of the Rebellion."

Having run its course about a week or ten days, the secession frenzy of Baltimore rapidly subsided. The railroad managers of that city once more tendered their services to the War Department; but Secretary Cameron, instead of giving them immediate encouragement, ordered that the Annapolis route be opened for public travel and traffic. Their isolation, first created by the bridge-burning, was thus continued and soon began to tell seriously upon their business interests, as well as upon the general industries and comfort of the city. On the 4th of May General Butler, under Scott's orders, moved forward and took post with two regiments at the Relay House, eight miles from Baltimore, where he could control the westward trains and cut off communication with Harper's Ferry. The significance of all these circumstances did not escape the popular observation and instinct. The Union newspapers took courage and once more printed bold leaders; the city government dismissed the rebel militia and permitted bridges and telegraphs to be repaired. Governor Hicks issued a proclamation for the election of members of Congress to attend the coming special session on the 4th of July; and also, by special message to the legislature and publication in the newspapers, repudiated the charge that he had consented to the bridge-burning. More than all, the Unionists of both city and State, gaining confidence with the strong evidences of reaction, began to hold meetings and conventions vigorously to denounce secession, and to demonstrate that they were in a decided majority.

Little by little loyalty and authority asserted themselves. About the 1st of May General Scott began preparing to reestablish the transit of troops through Baltimore, and on the 9th the first detachment since the riot of April 19 successfully made the journey. Some 1300 men in all, including Sherman's regular battery from Minnesota and 500 regulars from Texas, were brought in transports from Perryville and landed at Locust Point under the guns of the *Harriet Lane*, embarked in cars, and carried through South Baltimore. The city authorities, police, and a large concourse of people were present; and the precautions and arrangements were so thorough that not the slightest disturbance occurred. Four days after this (May 13) the railroad brought the first train from Philadelphia over its repaired track and restored bridges.


The Maryland legislature, finding its occupation gone, and yet nursing an obstinate secession sympathy, adjourned on May 14 to meet again on the 4th of June. About the same time the people of Baltimore underwent a surprise. Late on the evening of May 13,

under cover of an opportune thunder-storm, General Butler moved from the Relay House into the city with about a thousand men, the bulk of his force being the famous Massachusetts 6th, which had been mobbed there on the 19th of April. The movement was entirely unauthorized and called forth a severe rebuke from General Scott; but it met no opposition and was loudly applauded by the impatient public opinion of the North, which could ill comprehend the serious military risk it involved. The general carried his spirit of bravado still farther. He made his camp on Federal Hill, which he proceeded to fortify; and on the afternoon of the 14th sent a detachment of only thirty-five men to seize a lot of arms stored near the locality of the riot. The little squad of volunteers found the warehouse and were given possession of the arms,—2200 muskets sent from Virginia, and 4020 pikes of the John Brown pattern, made for the city by the Winans establishment during the riot week,—and loading them on thirty-five wagons and drays started for Fort McHenry over some of the identical streets where the Massachusetts men had been murdered by the mob. It was already late when this long procession got under way; large crowds collected, and riotous demonstrations of a threatening character were made at several points. Fortunately, the police gave efficient assistance, and what might easily have become an unnecessary sacrifice of life was by their vigilance averted.

Also coincident with this, the Union cause gained another signal advantage in Maryland. Governor Hicks's courage had risen with the ebb of disloyalty throughout the State; and as soon as the legislature was adjourned he issued his proclamation calling into the service of the United States the four regiments he originally promised under the President's call. These were rapidly formed, and became a part of the Union army under a new call. Amidst these fluctuations the more belligerent Maryland rebels also formed companies and went South—some to Richmond, some to the rebel camp at Harper's Ferry. But the fraction of military aid which Maryland finally gave to the rebellion rose to no special significance.

Out of these transactions, however, there arose a noteworthy judicial incident. A man named John Merryman, found recruiting as a lieutenant for one of these rebel companies, was arrested (May 25) and imprisoned in Fort McHenry. Chief-Justice Taney, then in Baltimore, being applied to, issued a writ of *habeas corpus* to bring the prisoner before him.* General Cadwalader, at this time in command, made a respectful reply to the writ, alleging

* Tyler, "Memoir R. B. Taney," pp. 640-642.



GOVERNOR T. H. HICKS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

Merryman's treason, and stating further that the President had authorized him to suspend the writ in such cases; and requested the Chief-Justice to postpone further action till the matter could be referred to the President.* This avowal aroused all the political ire of the Chief-Justice; he was struck with a judicial blindness which put disloyalty, conspiracy, treason, and rebellion utterly beyond his official contemplation. He saw not with the eye of a great judge the offended majesty of the law commanding the obedience of all citizens of the republic, but only, with a lawyer's microscopic acuteness, the disregard of certain technical forms and doubtful professional dicta. The personal restraint of one traitor in arms became of more concern to him than the endangered fate of representative government to the world.

The Chief-Justice immediately ordered an attachment to issue against General Cadwalader for contempt; upon which the marshal made return that he was unable to serve it, being denied entrance to Fort McHenry. Thereupon the Chief-Justice admitted the existence of a superior military force, but declared "that the President, under the Constitution of the United States, cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, nor authorize a military officer to do it," and

that Merryman ought therefore to be immediately discharged; and went on to say "that he should cause his opinion when filed, and all the proceedings, to be laid before the President, in order that he might perform his constitutional duty to enforce the laws by securing obedience to the process of the United States."

To this general purport the Chief-Justice filed his written opinion on the 1st of June,† and caused a copy to be transmitted to the President.

Of that opinion it will not be irrelevant to quote the criticism of one of the profoundest and most impartial jurists of that day:

Chief-Justice Taney's opinion in Merryman's case is not an authority. This, of course, is said in the judicial sense. But it is not even an argument, in the full sense. He does not argue the question from the language of the clause, nor from the history of the clause, nor from the principles of the Constitution, except by an elaborate depreciation of the President's office, even to the extent of making him, as Commander-in-Chief of the army, called from the States into the service of the United States, no more than an assistant to the marshal's posse — the deepest plunge of judicial rhetoric. The opinion, moreover, has a tone, not to say a ring, of disaffection to the President, and to the Northern and Western side of his house, which is not comfortable to suppose in the person who fills the central seat of impersonal justice.‡

To this estimate of the spirit of Chief-Justice Taney's view we may properly, by way of anticipation, here add President Lincoln's own official answer to its substance. No attention was of course paid to the transmitted papers; but the President at the time of their receipt was already engaged in preparing his message to the coming special session of Congress, and in that document he presented the justification of his act. The original draft of the message, in Lincoln's autograph manuscript, thus defines the executive authority with that force of statement and strength of phraseology of which he was so consummate a master:


Soon after the first call for militia, I felt it my duty to authorize the commanding general, in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* — or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. At my verbal request, as well as by the general's own inclination, this authority has been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned; and I have been reminded from a high quarter that one who is sworn to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" should not himself be one to violate them. Of course I gave some consideration to the questions of power and

* Tyler, "Memoir R. B. Taney," pp. 643, 644.

† Ibid., pp. 644-659.

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‡ Horace Binney, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," Part I., p. 36.



GOVERNOR CLAIBORNE F. JACKSON.

propriety before I acted in this matter. The whole of the laws which I have sworn to take care that they be faithfully executed were being resisted, and failing to be executed, in nearly one-third of the States. Must I have allowed them to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty, that practically it relieves more of the guilty than the innocent, should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case I should consider my official oath broken, if I should allow the Government to be overthrown, when I might think the disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it. But in this case I was not, in my own judgment, driven to this ground. In my opinion, I violated no law. The provision of the Constitution that "The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," is equivalent to a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. I decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, which I authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision plainly was made for a dangerous emergency, I cannot bring myself to believe that the framers of that instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case by the rebellion.*

The alterations and corrections from this first draft into the more impersonal form as finally sent to Congress and officially printed,

* Lincoln, Special Message, July 4, 1861. Autograph MS. of original draft.

but nowise changing its argument or substance, are also entirely in Lincoln's handwriting. That second and corrected form better befits the measured solemnity of a State paper. But in the language quoted above we seem brought into direct contact with the living workings of Lincoln's mind, and in this light the autograph original possesses a peculiar biographical interest and value.

MISSOURI.

THE governor of Missouri, Claiborne F. Jackson, was early engaged in the secession conspiracy, though, like other border-State executives, he successfully concealed his extreme designs from the public. There was an intolerant pro-slavery sentiment throughout the State; but, unlike other border States, it contained a positive and outspoken minority of equally strong antislavery citizens in a few localities, chiefly in the great commercial city of St. Louis, and made up mainly of its German residents and voters, numbering fully one-half the total population, which in 1860 was 160,000. This was the solitary exception to the general pro-slavery reaction in the whole South during the decade. Here, in 1856, a young, talented, courageous leader and skillful politician, Francis P. Blair, Jr., though himself a slaveholder, had dared to advocate the doctrine and policy of gradual emancipation, and on that issue secured an election to Congress. The same issue repeated in 1858 brought him sufficiently near an election to entitle him to contest his opponent's seat. In 1860 Blair and his followers, now fully acting with the Republican party, cast 17,028 votes for Lincoln, while the remaining votes in the State were divided as follows: Douglas, 58,801; Bell, 58,372; Breckinridge, 31,317. Blair was also again elected to Congress. The combined Lincoln, Douglas, and Bell vote showed an overwhelming Union majority; but the governor elected by the Douglas plurality almost immediately became a disunionist and secession conspirator.

With Blair as a leader, and such an organized minority at his call, the intrigues of Governor Jackson to force Missouri into secession met from the outset with many difficulties, notwithstanding the governor's official powers, influential following, and the prevalent pro-slavery opinion of the State. The legislature was sufficiently subservient; it contained a majority of radical secessionists, and only about fifteen unconditional Union members, who, however, were vigilant and active, and made the most of their minority influence. The same general expedients resorted to in other States by the conspirators were used in

Missouri—visits and speeches from Southern commissioners; messages and resolutions of "Southern" rights and sympathy and strong enunciation of the doctrine of non-coercion; military bills and measures to arm and control the State; finally, a "sovereign" State Convention. Here they overshot their mark. A strong majority of Union members was elected. The convention met at Jefferson City, the State capital, adjourned to the healthier atmosphere of St. Louis, and by an outspoken report and decided votes condemned secession and took a recess till December following.

The secession leaders, however, would not accept their popular defeat. In the interim Sumter fell, and Lincoln issued his call for troops. Governor Jackson, as we have seen, insultingly denounced the requisition as "illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, and diabolical," and again convened his rebel legislature in extra session to do the revolutionary work which the "sovereign" Missouri convention had so recently condemned.

It was an essential feature of Governor Jackson's programme to obtain possession of the St. Louis arsenal, and as early as January he had well-nigh completed his intrigue for its surrender to the State by a treacherous officer. But suspicion was aroused, the commandant changed, and the arsenal reënforced; by the middle of February the garrison had been increased to 488 regulars and recruits. In the mean time local intrigue was active. The secessionists organized bodies of "Minute men" to capture it, while the Union men with equal alertness formed a safety committee, and companies of Home Guards to join in its defense. These latter were largely drawn from the German part of the city, to which the arsenal lay contiguous, and their guardianship over it was therefore more direct and effective. Lincoln was inaugurated, and making Montgomery Blair his postmaster-general and Edward Bates his attorney-general, Missouri had virtually two representatives in the Cabinet. Francis P. Blair, Jr., brother of Montgomery, therefore found no great difficulty in having the command of the arsenal given to Captain Nathaniel Lyon, not only a devoted soldier, but a man of thorough anti-slavery convictions. Lyon was eager to forestall the secession conspiracy by extensive preparation and swift repression; but the depart-

ment commander, General Harney, and the ordnance officer, Major Hagner, whom Lyon had displaced, both of more slow and cautious temper, and reflecting the local political conservatism, thwarted and hampered Lyon and Blair, who from the beginning felt and acted in concert. No great difficulty grew out of this antagonism till the President's call for troops; then it created discussion, delay, want of coöperation. Blair could not get his volunteers mustered into service, and Governor Yates of Illinois could get no arms. The President finally grew impatient. Harney was relieved and called to Washington, and Lyon



MAJOR-GENERAL FRANCIS P. BLAIR, JR. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

directed to muster-in and arm the four Missouri regiments of volunteers with all expedition, and to send the extra arms to Springfield, Illinois, while three Illinois regiments were ordered to St. Louis to assist in guarding the arsenal.

These orders were issued in Washington on April 20. By this time St. Louis, like the whole Union, was seething with excitement, except that public opinion was more evenly divided than elsewhere. There were Union speeches and rebel speeches; cheers for Lin-

coln and cheers for Davis; Union flags and rebel flags: Union headquarters and rebel headquarters. With this also there was mingled a certain antipathy of nationality, all the Germans being determined Unionists. The antagonism quickly grew into armed organizations. The Unionists were mustered, armed, and drilled at the arsenal as United States volunteers. On the other hand Governor Jackson, having decided on revolution, formed at St. Louis a nominal camp of instruction under the State militia laws. The camp was established at Lindell's Grove, was christened "Camp Jackson," in honor of the governor, and was commanded by Brigadier-General D. M. Frost, a West Point graduate. Two regiments quickly assembled, and a third was in process of formation. The flag of the United States still floated over it and many Unionists were in the ranks of the old holiday parade militia companies, but the whole leadership and animating motive were in aid of rebellion: it was already literally one of Jefferson Davis's outposts. As soon as Governor Jackson had avowed his treason, he dispatched two confidential agents to Montgomery to solicit arms and aid, by whom Jefferson Davis wrote in reply:

After learning as well as I could from the gentlemen accredited to me what was most needful for the attack on the arsenal, I have directed that Captains Green and Duke should be furnished with two 12-pounder howitzers and two 32-pounder guns, with the proper ammunition for each. These from the commanding hills will be effective, both against the garrison and to breach the inclosing walls of the place. I concur with you as to the great importance of capturing the arsenal and securing its supplies, rendered doubly important by the means taken to obstruct your commerce and render you unarmed victims of a hostile invasion. We look anxiously and hopefully for the day when the star of Missouri shall be added to the constellation of the Confederate States of America.*

In reality he already regarded the "star" as in the "constellation." Three days later the rebel Secretary of War wrote to the governor:


Can you arm and equip one regiment of infantry for service in Virginia to rendezvous at Richmond? Transportation will be provided by this Government. The regiment to elect its own officers, and must enlist for not less than twelve months, unless sooner discharged.†

In face of the overwhelming Union sentiment of Missouri, so lately manifested by the

* Davis to Jackson, April 23, 1861. War Records.

† Walker to Jackson, April 26, 1861. War Records.

‡ Jackson to Walker, May 5, 1861. War Records.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL NATHANIEL LYON.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

action of the State convention, Governor Jackson was not prepared for so bold a proceeding, and therefore wrote in reply:

Yours of the 26th ultimo, *via* Louisville, is received. I have no legal authority to furnish the men you desire. Missouri, you know, is yet under the tyranny of Lincoln's government—so far, at least, as forms go. We are woefully deficient here in arms and cannot furnish them at present; but so far as men are concerned we have plenty of them ready, willing, and anxious to march at any moment to the defense of the South. Our legislature has just met, and I doubt not will give me all necessary authority over the matter. If you can arm the men they will go whenever wanted, and to any point where they may be most needed. I send this to Memphis by private hand, being afraid to trust our mails or telegraphs. Let me hear from you by the same means. Missouri can and will put one hundred thousand men in the field if required. We are using every means to arm our people, and until we are better prepared must move cautiously. I write this in confidence. With my prayers for your success, etc.‡

First to capture the arsenal and then to reënforce the armies of Jefferson Davis was doubtless the immediate object of Camp Jackson. It would be a convenient nucleus which at the given signal would draw to itself similar elements from different parts of the State. Already the arsenal at Liberty—the same one from which arms were stolen to overawe Kansas in 1855—had been seized on April 20 and its contents appropriated by secessionists in western Missouri. Jeff M. Thompson had been for some weeks drilling a rebel camp at St. Joseph, and threatening the neighboring arsenal at Leavenworth. The legislature was maturing a comprehensive military bill which would give the governor power to concentrate and use these scattered fractions of regiments. Until this was passed, Camp Jackson had a lawful existence under the old militia laws.

But the Union Safety Committee, and especially Mr. Blair and Captain Lyon, followed the governor's intrigue at every step, and reporting the growing danger to Washington received from President Lincoln extraordinary powers to overcome it. An order to Captain Lyon read as follows:

The President of the United States directs that you enroll in the military service of the United States the loyal citizens of St. Louis and vicinity, not exceeding, with those heretofore enlisted, ten thousand in number, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the United States for the protection of the peaceable inhabitants of Missouri; and you will, if deemed necessary for that purpose by yourself and by Messrs. Oliver T. Filley, John How, James O. Broadhead, Samuel T. Glover, J. Witzig, and Francis P. Blair, Jr., proclaim martial law in the city of St. Louis, etc.*

It was upon this order, with certain additional details, that General Scott made the indorsement, "It is revolutionary times, and therefore I do not object to the irregularity of this."

The Union Safety Committee soon had indisputable evidence of the insurrectionary purposes and preparations. On the night of May 8 cannon, ammunition, and several hundred muskets, sent by Jefferson Davis, were landed at the St. Louis levee from a New Orleans steamer, and at once transferred to Camp Jackson. They had been brought from the arsenal at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and were a part of the United States arms captured there in January by the governor of that State. The proceeding did not escape the vigilance of the Safety Committee, but the material of war was allowed to go unobstructed to the camp. The next day Captain Lyon visited Camp Jackson in disguise, and thus acquainting himself personally with its condition, strategical situation, and surroundings matured his plan for its immediate capture. All legal obstacles which had been urged

against such a summary proceeding were now removed by the actual presence in the camp of the hostile supplies brought from Baton Rouge.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon of May 10 a strong battalion of regulars with six pieces of artillery, four regiments of Missouri Volunteers, and two regiments of Home Guards, all under command of Captain Lyon, were rapidly marching through different streets to Camp Jackson. Arrived there, it was but a moment's work to gain the appointed positions surrounding the camp, and to plant the batteries, ready for action, on commanding elevations. General Frost heard of their coming, and undertook to avert the blow by sending Lyon a letter denying that he or his command, or "any other part of the State forces," meant any hostility to the United States—though it was himself who had endeavored to corrupt the commandant of the arsenal in January,† and who, in a letter to the governor,‡ had outlined and recommended these very military proceedings in Missouri, convening the legislature, obtaining heavy guns from Baton Rouge, seizing the Liberty arsenal, and establishing this camp of instruction, expressly to oppose President Lincoln.

So far from being deterred from his purpose, Lyon refused to receive Frost's letter; and, as soon as his regiments were posted, sent a written demand for the immediate surrender of Camp Jackson, "with no other condition than that all persons surrendering under this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated." The case presented no alternative; and seeing that he was dealing with a resolute man, Frost surrendered with the usual protest. Camp and property were taken in possession; arms were stacked, and preparation made to march the prisoners to the arsenal, where on the following day they were paroled and disbanded.

Up to this time everything had proceeded without casualty, or even turbulent disorder; but an immense assemblage of the street populace followed the march and crowded about the camp. Most of them were peaceful spectators whose idle curiosity rendered them forgetful of danger; but among the number was the usual proportion of lawless city rowdies, of combative instincts, whose very nature impelled them to become the foremost elements of disorder and revolution. Many of them had rushed to the scene of expected conflict with such weapons as they could seize; and now as the homeward march began they pressed defiantly upon the troops, with cheers for Jeff Davis and

* Cameron to Lyon, April 30, 1861. War Records.

† Frost to Jackson, January 24, 1861. Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," p. 43.

‡ Frost to Jackson, April 15, 1861. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

insults and bitter imprecations upon the soldiers. It seems a fatality that when a city mob in anger and soldiers with loaded guns are by any circumstances thrown into close contact it produces the same incidents and results. There are insult and retort, a rush and a repulse; then comes a shower of missiles, finally a pistol-shot, and after it a return volley from the troops, followed by an irregular fusillade from both sides. Who began it, or how it was done, can never be ascertained. It so happened on this occasion, both at the head and rear of the marching column and during a momentary halt; and, as usual, the guilty escaped, and innocent men, women, and children fell in their blood, while the crowd fled pell-mell in mortal terror. Two or three soldiers and some fifteen citizens were killed and many wounded.

As at Baltimore, the event threw St. Louis into the excitement of a general riot. Gun stores were broken into and newspaper offices threatened; but the police checked the outbreak, though public tranquillity and safety were not entirely restored for several days.

Aside from its otherwise deplorable results, the riot produced, or rather magnified, a military and political complication. On the day after the capture of Camp Jackson, General Harney returned from Washington, and once more assumed command. His journey also was eventful. Arrested by the rebels at Harper's Ferry, he had been sent to Richmond; there the authorities, anxious to win him over to secession by kindness, set him at liberty. Proof against their blandishments, however, he merely thanked them for their courtesy, and, loyal soldier as he was, proceeded to his superiors and his duty at Washington. This circumstance greatly aided his explanations and excuses before General Scott, President Lincoln, and the Cabinet, and secured his restoration as Department Commander.

But his return to St. Louis proved ill timed. His arrival there in the midst of the excitement over the capture of Camp Jackson and the riot emphasized and augmented the antagonism between the radical Unionists, led by Blair and Lyon, and the pro-slavery and conservative Unionists, who now made the general their rallying point. Paying too much attention to the complaints and relying too blindly upon the false representations and promises of secession conspirators like Frost, and greatly underrating the active elements of rebellion in Missouri, Harney looked coldly upon the volunteers and talked of disbanding the Home Guards. This brought him into conflict with the Union Safety Committee and President Lincoln's orders. Delegations of equally influential citizens representing both sides went to

Washington, in a stubborn mistrust of each other's motives. In their appeal to Lincoln, Lyon's friends found a ready advocate in Mr. Blair, Postmaster-General, and Harney's friends in Mr. Bates, the Attorney-General; and the Missouri discord was thus in a certain degree, and at a very early date, transplanted into the Cabinet itself. This local embitterment in St. Louis beginning here ran on for several years, and in its varying and shifting phases gave the President no end of trouble in his endeavor from first to last to be just to each faction.

Harney was strongly entrenched in the personal friendship of General Scott; besides, he was greatly superior in army rank, being a brigadier-general, while Lyon was only a captain. On the other hand, Lyon's capture of Camp Jackson had shown his energy, courage, and usefulness, and had given him great popular éclat. Immediately to supersede him seemed like a public censure. It was one of the many cases where unforeseen circumstances created a dilemma, involving irritated personal susceptibilities and delicate questions of public expediency.

President Lincoln took action promptly and firmly, though tempered with that forbearance by which he was so constantly enabled to extract the greatest advantage out of the most perplexing complications. The delegations from Missouri with their letters arrived on May 16, a week after the Camp Jackson affair. Having heard both sides, Lincoln decided that in any event Lyon must be sustained. He therefore ordered that Harney should be relieved, and that Lyon be made a brigadier-general of volunteers. In order, however, that this change might not fall too harshly, Lincoln did not make his decision public, but wrote confidentially to Frank Blair, under date of May 18:

MY DEAR SIR: We have a good deal of anxiety here about St. Louis. I understand an order has gone from the War Department to you, to be delivered or withheld in your discretion, relieving General Harney from his command. I was not quite satisfied with the order when it was made, though on the whole I thought it best to make it; but since then I have become more doubtful of its propriety. I do not write now to countermand it, but to say I wish you would withhold it, unless in your judgment the necessity to the contrary is very urgent. There are several reasons for this. We had better have him a friend than an enemy. It will dissatisfy a good many who otherwise would be quiet. More than all, we first relieve him, then restore him, and now if we relieve him again the public will ask, "Why all this vacillation?" Still, if in your judgment it is indispensable, let it be so.

Upon receipt of this letter both Blair and Lyon, with commendable prudence, determined to carry out the President's suggestion. Since Harney's return from Washington his words and acts had been more in conformity

with their own policy. He had published a proclamation defending and justifying the capture of Camp Jackson, and declaring that "Missouri must share the destiny of the Union," and that the whole power of the United States would be exerted to maintain her in it. Especially was the proclamation unsparing in its denunciation of the recent military bill of the rebel legislature.

This bill cannot be regarded in any other light than an indirect secession ordinance, ignoring even the forms resorted to by other States. Manifestly its most material provisions are in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States. To this extent it is a nullity, and cannot, and ought not to, be upheld. . . . Within the field and scope of my command and authority the supreme law of the land must and shall be maintained, and no subterfuges, whether in the form of legislative acts or otherwise, can be permitted to harass or oppress the good and law-abiding people of Missouri. I shall exert my authority to protect their persons and property from violations of every kind, and I shall deem it my duty to suppress all unlawful combinations of men, whether formed under pretext of military organizations, or otherwise.*

He also suggested to the War Department the enlistment of Home Guards and the need of additional troops in Missouri. So far as mere theory and intention could go, all this was without fault. There can be no question of Harney's entire loyalty, and of his skill and courage as a soldier dealing with open enemies. Unfortunately, he did not possess the adroitness and daring necessary to circumvent the secret machinations of traitors.

Governor Jackson, on the contrary, seems to have belonged by nature and instinct to the race of conspirators. He and his rebel legislature, convened in special session at Jefferson City, were panic-stricken by the news of the capture of Camp Jackson. On that night of May 10 the governor, still claiming and wielding the executive power of the State, sent out a train to destroy the telegraph and to burn the railroad bridge over the Osage River, in order to keep the bayonets of Lyon and Blair at a safe distance. At night the legislature met for business, the secession members belted with pistols and bowie-knives, with guns lying across their desks or leaning against chairs and walls, while sentinels and soldiers filled the corridors and approaches. The city was in an uproar; the young ladies of the female seminary and many families were moved across the river for security.† All night long the secession governor and his secession majority hurried their treasonable legislation through the mere machinery of parliamentary forms. It was under these conditions that the

famous military bill and kindred acts were passed. It appropriated three millions; authorized the issue of bonds; diverted the school fund; anticipated two years' taxes; made the governor a military dictator, and ignored the Federal Government. It was in truth, as Harney called it, "an indirect secession ordinance."

Armed with these revolutionary enactments, but still parading his State authority, Governor Jackson undertook cautiously to consolidate his military power. Ex-Governor Sterling Price was appointed Major-General commanding the Missouri State Guard; who, more conveniently to cloak the whole conspiracy, now sought an interview with Harney, and entered with him into a public agreement, vague and general in its terms, "of restoring peace and good order to the people of the State in subordination to the laws of the general and State governments."

General Price, having by commission full authority over the militia of the State of Missouri, undertakes, with the sanction of the governor of the State, already declared, to direct the whole power of the State officers to maintain order within the State among the people thereof, and General Harney publicly declares that, this object being thus assured, he can have no occasion, as he has no wish, to make military movements which might otherwise create excitements and jealousies, which he most earnestly desires to avoid.‡

Blinded and lulled by treacherous professions, Harney failed to see that this was evading the issue and committing the flock to the care of the wolf. Price's undertaking to "maintain order" was, in fact, nothing else than the organization of rebel companies at favorable points in the State, and immediately brought a shower of Union warnings and complaints to Harney. Within a week the information received caused him to notify Price of these complaints, and of his intention to organize Union Home Guards for protection.§ More serious still, reliable news came that an invasion was threatened from the Arkansas border. Price replied with his blandest assurances, denying everything. The aggressions, he said, were acts of irresponsible individuals. To organize Home Guards would produce neighborhood collision and civil war. He should carry out the agreement to the letter. Should troops enter Missouri from Arkansas or any other State he would "cause them to return instanter."||

Harney, taking such declarations at their surface value, and yielding himself to the suggestions and advice of the St. Louis conservatives who disliked Lyon and hated Blair, remained inactive, notwithstanding a sharp

* Harney, Proclamation, May 14, 1861. War Records.

† Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," pp. 168-178.

‡ Price, Harney Agreement, May 21, 1861. War Records.

§ Harney to Price, May 27, 1861. War Records.

|| Price to Harney, May 28 and May 29. War Records.

admonition from Washington. The Adjutant-General wrote :

The President observes with concern that notwithstanding the pledge of the State authorities to cooperate in preserving peace in Missouri, loyal citizens in great numbers continue to be driven from their homes. . . . The professions of loyalty to the Union by the State authorities of Missouri are not to be relied upon. They have already falsified their professions too often, and are too far committed to secession, to be entitled to your confidence, and you can only be sure of their desisting from their wicked purposes when it is out of their power to prosecute them. You will therefore be unceasingly watchful of their movements, and not permit the clamors of their partisans and opponents of the wise measures already taken to prevent you from checking every movement against the Government, however disguised, under the pretended State authority. The authority of the United States is paramount, and whenever it is apparent that a movement, whether by color of State authority or not, is hostile, you will not hesitate to put it down.*

Harney had announced this identical policy in his proclamation of May 14. The difficulty was that he failed to apply and enforce his own doctrines, or rather that he lacked penetration to discern the treachery of the State authorities. He replied to the War Department :

My confidence in the honor and integrity of General Price, in the purity of his motives, and in his loyalty to the Government remains unimpaired. His course as President of the State Convention that voted by a large majority against submitting an ordinance of secession, and his efforts since that time to calm the elements of discord, have served to confirm the high opinion of him I have for many years entertained.†

Lyon and Blair were much better informed, and the latter wrote to Lincoln :

. . . I have to-day delivered to General Harney the order of the 16th of May above mentioned relieving him, feeling that the progress of events and condition of affairs in this State make it incumbent upon me to assume the grave responsibility of this act, the discretionary power in the premises having been given me by the President.‡

The President and the Secretary of War duly sustained the act.

This change of command soon brought matters in Missouri to a crisis. The State authorities were quickly convinced that Lyon would tolerate no evasion, temporizing, or misunderstanding. They therefore asked an interview; and Lyon sent Governor Jackson

and General Price a safeguard to visit St. Louis. They on the one part, and Lyon and Blair on the other, with one or two witnesses, held an interview of four hours on June 11. The governor proposed that the State should remain neutral; that he would not attempt to organize the militia under the military bill, on condition that the Union Home Guards should be disarmed and no further Federal troops should be stationed in Missouri. Lyon rejected this proposal, insisting that the governor's rebel "State Guards" should be disarmed and the military bill abandoned, and that the Federal Government should enjoy its unrestricted right to move and station its troops throughout the State, to repel invasion or protect its citizens. This the governor refused.

So the discussion terminated. Jackson and Price hurried by a special train back to Jefferson City, burning bridges as they went. Arrived at the capital, the governor at once published a proclamation of war. He recited the interview and its result, called fifty thousand militia into the active service of the State, and closed his proclamation by coupling together the preposterous and irreconcilable announcements of loyalty to the United States and declaration of war against them — a very marvel of impudence, even among the numerous kindred curiosities of secession literature. §

This sudden announcement of active hostility did not take Lyon by surprise. Thoroughly informed of the conspirators' plans, he had made his own preparations for equally energetic action. Though Jackson had crippled the railroad, the Missouri River was an open military highway, and numerous swift steamboats lay at the St. Louis wharf. On the afternoon of June 13 he embarked one of his regular batteries and several battalions of his Missouri Volunteers, and steamed with all possible speed up the river to Jefferson City, the capital of the State, leading the movement in person. He arrived on the 15th of June, and, landing, took possession of the town without resistance, and raised the Union flag over the State-house. The governor and his adherents hurriedly fled, his Secretary of State carrying off the great seal with which to certify future pretended official acts.

But it is equally my duty to advise you that your first allegiance is due to your own State, and that you are under no obligation whatever to obey the *unconstitutional* edicts of the military despotism which has enthroned itself at Washington, nor to submit to the infamous and degrading sway of its wicked minions in this State. No brave and true-hearted Missourian will obey one or submit to the other. Rise, then, and drive out ignominiously the invaders who have dared to desecrate the soil which your labors have made fruitful, and which is consecrated by your homes. [Jackson, Proclamation, June 12, 1861. Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," p. 252.]

* Thomas to Harney, May 27, 1861. War Records.

† Harney to Thomas, June 5, 1861. War Records.

‡ F. P. Blair, Jr., to the President, May 30, 1861. Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," p. 223.

§ In issuing this proclamation I hold it to be my solemn duty to remind you that Missouri is still one of the United States; that the Executive Department of the State government does not arrogate to itself the power to disturb that relation; that that power has been wisely vested in a convention which will at the proper time express your sovereign will; and that meanwhile it is your duty to obey all *constitutional* requirements of the Federal Government.

There had been no time for the rebellion to gather any head at the capital; but at the town of Boonville, fifty miles farther up the river, General Price was collecting some fragments of military companies. This nucleus of opposition Lyon determined also to destroy. Leaving but a slight guard at the capital, he reëmbarked his force next day, and reaching Boonville on the 17th landed without difficulty, and put the half-formed rebel militia to flight after a spirited but short skirmish. General Price prudently kept away from the encounter; and Governor Jackson, who had come hither, and who witnessed the disaster from a hill two miles distant, once more betook himself to flight. Two on the Union and fifteen on the rebel side were killed.

This affair at Boonville was the outbreak of open warfare in Missouri, though secret military aggression against the United States Government had been for nearly six months carried on by the treasonable State officials, aided as far as possible by the conspiracy in the cotton-States.

The local State government of Missouri, thus broken by the hostility of Governor Jackson and subordinate officials, was soon regularly restored. It happened that the Missouri State convention, chosen, as already related, with the design of carrying the State into rebellion, but which, unexpectedly to the conspirators, remained true to the Union, had, on adjourning its sessions from March to December, wisely created an emergency committee with power to call it together upon any necessary occasion. This committee now issued its call, under which the convention assembled in Jefferson City on the 22d of July. Many of its members had joined the rebellion, but a full constitutional quorum remained, and took up the task of reconstituting the disorganized machinery of civil administration. By a series of ordinances it declared the State offices vacant, abrogated the military bill and other treasonable legislation, provided for new elections, and finally, on the 31st of July, inaugurated a provisional government, which thereafter made the city of St. Louis its official headquarters. Hamilton R. Gamble, a conservative, was made governor. He announced his unconditional adherence to the Union, and his authority was immediately recognized by the greater portion of the State. Missouri thus remained through the entire war, both in form and in substance, a State in the Union.

Nevertheless a considerable minority of its population, scattered in many parts, was strongly tinctured with sympathy for the rebellion. The conspiracy so long nursed by Governor Jackson and his adherents had taken

deep and pernicious root. An anomalous condition of affairs suddenly sprung up. Amidst a strongly dominant loyalty there smoldered the embers of rebellion, and during the whole civil war there blazed up fitfully, often where least expected, the flames of neighborhood strife and guerrilla warfare to an extent and with a fierceness not equaled in any other State. We shall have occasion to narrate how, under cover of this sentiment, the leaders of secession bands and armies made repeated and desolating incursions; and how, some months later, Governor Jackson with his perambulating State seal set up a pretended legislature and State government, and the Confederate authorities at Richmond enacted the farce of admitting Missouri to the Southern Confederacy. It was, however, from first to last, a palpable sham; the pretended Confederate officials in Missouri had no capital or archives, controlled no population, permanently held no territory, collected no taxes; and Governor Jackson was nothing more than a fugitive pretender, finding temporary refuge within Confederate camps.

KENTUCKY.

THE three States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, forming McClellan's department, were bounded south of the Ohio River by the single State of Kentucky, stretching from east to west, and occupying at least four-fifths of the entire Ohio line. Kentucky was a slave State. This domestic institution allied her naturally to the South, and created among her people a pervading sympathy with Southern complaints and demands. Her geographical position and her river commerce also connected her strongly with the South. On the other hand, the traditions of her local politics bound her indissolubly to the Union. The fame of her great statesman, Henry Clay, rested upon his lifelong efforts for its perpetuity. The compromise of 1850, which thwarted and for ten years postponed the Southern rebellion, was his crowning political triumph. But Henry Clay's teaching and example were being warped and perverted. A feeblèr generation of disciples, unable, as he would have done, to distinguish between honorable compromise and ruinous concession, undertook now to quell war by refusing to take up arms; desired an appeal from the battlefield to moral suasion; proposed to preserve the Government by leaving revolution unchecked.

The legislature, though appealing to the South to stay secession, and though firmly refusing to call a State convention, nevertheless protested against the use of force or

coercion by the General Government against the seceding States. John J. Crittenden took similar ground, counseling Kentucky to stand by the Union and correctly characterizing secession as simple revolution. Nevertheless he advised against the policy of coercion, and said of the seceded States, "Let them go on in peace with their experiment."* A public meeting of leading citizens at Louisville first denounced secession and then denounced the President for attempting to put down secession. They apostrophized the flag and vowed to maintain the Union, but were ready to fight Lincoln.† It makes one smile to read again the childish contradictions which eminent Kentucky statesmen uttered in all seriousness.

A people that have prospered beyond example in the records of time, free and self-governed, without oppression, without taxation to be felt, are now going to cut each other's throats; and why? Because Presidents Lincoln and Davis could not settle the etiquette upon which the troops were to be withdrawn from Fort Sumter. ‡

This was the analysis of one. Another was equally infelicitous:

Why this war? . . . Because Mr. Lincoln has been elected President of the country and Mr. Davis could not be, and therefore a Southern Confederacy was to be formed by Southern demagogues, and now they are attempting to drag you on with them. . . . Let us not fight the North or South, but, firm in our position, tell our sister border States that with them we will stand to maintain the Union, to preserve the peace, and uphold our honor and our flag, which they would trail in the dust. . . . If we must fight, let us fight Lincoln and not our Government.§

The resolutions of the meeting were quite as illogical. They declared that

the present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her present independent position, taking sides not with the Administration, nor with the seceding States, but with the Union against them both; declaring her soil to be sacred from the hostile tread of either; and, if necessary, to make the declaration good with her strong right arm.||

The preposterous assumption was also greatly strengthened in the popular mind by the simultaneous publication of an address of the same tenor in Tennessee, from John Bell and others. He had been one of the four candidates for President in the election of 1860—the one for whom both Kentucky and Tennessee cast their electoral votes; and as the standard-bearer of the "Constitutional Union" party had in many ways reiterated his and their devotion to "the Union, the

Constitution, and the enforcement of the laws." The address distinctly disapproved secession; it condemned the policy of the Administration; it unequivocally avowed the duty of Tennessee to resist by force of arms the subjugation of the South.¶ What shall be said when men of reputed wisdom and experience proclaim such inconsistencies? All these incidents are the ever-recurring signs of that dangerous demoralization of public sentiment, of that utter confusion of political principles, of that helpless bewilderment of public thought, into which portions of the country had unconsciously lapsed.

Governor Magoffin of Kentucky and his personal adherents seem to have been ready to rush into overt rebellion. His official message declared that Kentucky would resist the principles and policy of the Republican party "to the death, if necessary"; that the Union had practically ceased to exist; and that she would not stand by with folded arms while the seceded States were being "subjugated to an anti-slavery Government." With open contumacy he replied to President Lincoln's official call, "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."** He applied to Jefferson Davis for arms, and to the Louisville banks for money, but neither effort succeeded. The existing legislature contained too many Union members to give him unchecked control of the public credit of the State. He was therefore perforce driven to adhere to the policy of "neutrality," as the best help he could give the rebellion. Nevertheless, he was not without power for mischief. The militia of Kentucky had recently been reorganized under the personal influence and direction of S. B. Buckner, who, as inspector-general, was the legal and actual general-in-chief. Buckner, like the governor, ex-Vice-President Breckinridge, and others, was an avowed "neutral" but a predetermined rebel, who in the following September entered the military service of Jefferson Davis. For the present his occupation was rather that of political intrigue to forward the secession of Kentucky, which he carried on under pretense of his formal and assumed instructions from the governor to employ the "State Guard," or rather its shadow of authority, to prevent the violation of "State neutrality" by either the Southern or the Northern armies.

The public declarations and manifestations in Kentucky were not reassuring to the people

* Crittenden, speech before Kentucky legislature, March 26, 1861. New York "Tribune," March 30.

† "Rebellion Record."

‡ James Guthrie, speech at Louisville, Ky., April 18, 1861. Ibid.

§ Archibald Dixon, speech at Louisville, April 18, 1861. Ibid.

¶ "Rebellion Record."

¶ Ibid.

** Magoffin to Cameron, April 15, 1861. War Records.

north of the Ohio line. Governor Morton of Indiana wrote :

The country along the Ohio River bordering on Kentucky is in a state of intense alarm. The people entertain no doubt but that Kentucky will speedily go out of the Union. They are in daily fear that marauding parties from the other side of the river will plunder and burn their towns.*

Even after the lapse of some weeks this fear was not dissipated. General McClellan wrote :

The frontier of Indiana and Illinois is in a very excited and almost dangerous condition. In Ohio there is more calmness. I have been in more full communication with the people. A few arms have been supplied, and all means have been taken to quiet them along the frontier. Special messengers have reached me from the governors of Indiana and Illinois, demanding heavy guns and expressing great alarm. I sent Lieutenant Williams to confer with Governor Morton, to tell him that I have no heavy guns, and to explain to him the impropriety of placing them in position along the frontier just at the present time. I have promised Governor Yates some heavy guns at Cairo as soon as I can get them.

McClellan himself was not free from apprehension :

I am very anxious to learn the views of the General [Scott] in regard to western Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. At any moment it may become necessary to act in some one of these directions. From reliable information I am sure that the governor of Kentucky is a traitor. Buckner is under his influence, so it is necessary to watch them. I hear to-night that one thousand secessionists are concentrating at a point opposite Gallipolis. Cairo is threatened.†

He proposed, therefore, to reënforce and fortify Cairo, place several gunboats on the river, and in case of need to cross into Kentucky and occupy Covington Heights for the better defense of Cincinnati.

This condition of affairs brought another important question to final decision. The governor of Illinois had ordered the summary seizure of war material at Cairo, and President Lincoln formally approved it. Ordinary river commerce was more tenderly dealt with. Colonel Prentiss wrote :

No boats have been searched unless I had been previously and reliably informed that they had on board munitions of war destined to the enemies of the Government, and in all cases where we have searched we have found such munitions. My policy has been such that no act of my command could be construed as an insult, or cause to any State for secession.‡

But the threatening demonstrations from the South were beginning to show that this was a dangerous leniency. McClellan there-

fore asked explicitly whether provisions destined for the seceded States or for the Southern army should longer be permitted to be sent,§ to which an official order came on May 8: "Since the order of the 2d, the Secretary of War decides that provisions must be stopped at Cairo."||

In reality matters in Kentucky were not quite so bad as they appeared to the public eye. With sober second thought, the underlying loyalty of her people began to assert itself. Breckinridge and his extreme Southern doctrines had received only a little more than one-third the votes of the State.¶ Mr. Lincoln was a Kentuckian by birth, and had been a consistent Whig; their strong clanship could not quite give him up as hopelessly lost in abolitionism. Earnest Unionists also quickly perceived that "armed neutrality" must soon become a practical farce; many of them from the first used it as an artful contrivance to kill secession. The legislature indeed declared for "strict neutrality," and approved the governor's refusal to furnish troops to the President.** Superficially, this was placing the State in a contumacious and revolutionary attitude. But this official action was not a true exponent of the public feeling. The undercurrent of political movement is explained by a letter of John J. Crittenden, at that time the most influential single voice in the State. On the 17th of May he wrote to General Scott :

The position of Kentucky, and the relation she occupies toward the government of the Union, is not, I fear, understood at Washington. It ought to be well understood. Very important consequences may depend upon it and upon her proper treatment. Unfortunately for us, our governor does not sympathize with Kentucky in respect to the secession. His opinions and feelings incline him strongly to the side of the South. His answer to the requisition for troops was in its terms hasty and unbecoming, and does not correspond with usual and gentlemanly courtesy. But while she regretted the language of his answer, Kentucky acquiesced in his declining to furnish the troops called for, and she did so, not because she loved the Union the less, but she feared that if she had parted with those troops, and sent them to serve in your ranks, she would have been overwhelmed by the secessionists at home and severed from the Union; and it was to preserve, substantially and ultimately, our connection with the Union that induced us to acquiesce in the partial infraction of it by our governor's refusal of the troops required. This was the most prevailing and general motive. To this may be added the strong indisposition of our people to a civil war with the South, and the apprehended consequences of a civil war within our State and among our own people. I could elaborate and strengthen all this, but I will leave the subject to your own reflection: with this only remark, that I think Kentucky's excuse

* Morton to Cameron, April 28, 1861. War Records.
† McClellan to Townsend, May 10, 1861. War Records.

‡ Prentiss to Headquarters.

§ McClellan to Scott, May 7, 1861. War Records.

|| Townsend to McClellan, May 8, 1861. *Ibid.*

¶ The vote of Kentucky in 1860 was: Lincoln, 1364; Douglas, 25,651; Breckinridge, 53,143; Bell, 66,058. [“Tribune Almanac,” 1861.]

** Resolutions, May 16, 1861. Van Horne, “History Army of the Cumberland,” Vol. I., p. 7.

is a good one, and that, under all the circumstances of the complicated case, she is rendering better service in her present position than she could by becoming an active party in the contest.*

In truth, Kentucky was undergoing a severe political struggle. The governor was constantly stimulating the revolutionary sentiment. The legislature had once more met, on May 6, being a second time convened in special session by the governor's proclamation. The governor's special message now boldly accused the President of usurpation, and declared the Constitution violated, the Government subverted, the Union broken. He again urged that the State be armed and a convention be called. It was these more radical and dangerous measures which the Union members warded off with a legislative resolution of "neutrality." So also the military bill which was eventually passed was made to serve the Union instead of the secession cause. A Union Board of Commissioners was provided to control the governor's expenditures under it. A "Home Guard" was authorized, to check and offset Buckner's "State Guard" of rebellious proclivities. Privates and officers of both organizations were required to swear allegiance to both the State and the Union. Finally, it provided that the arms and munitions should be used neither against the United States nor against the Confederate States, unless to protect Kentucky against invasion. Such an attitude of qualified loyalty can only be defended by the plea of its compulsory adoption as a lesser evil. But it served to defeat the conspiracy to assemble a "sovereignty convention" to inaugurate secession; and the progress of the Kentucky legislature, from its "anticoercion" protest in January to its merely defensive "neutrality" resolutions and laws in May, was an immense gain.

From the beginning of the rebellion, Lincoln felt that Kentucky would be a turning weight in the scale of war. He believed he knew the temper and fidelity of his native State, and gave her his special care and confidence. Though Governor Magoffin refused him troops, there came to him from private sources the unmistakable assurance that many Kentuckians were ready to fight for the Union. His early and most intimate personal friend, Joshua F. Speed, was now an honored and influential citizen of Louisville. At Washington also he had taken into a cordial acquaintanceship a characteristic Kentuckian, William Nelson, a young, brave, and energetic lieutenant of the United States Navy. Nelson saw his usefulness, and perhaps also his opportunity, in an effort to redeem his State, rather than in active service on the quarter-deck. He possessed the social gifts, the free manners, the

impulsive temperament peculiar to the South. Mr. Lincoln gave him leave of absence, and sent him to Kentucky without instructions. At the same time the President brought another personal influence to bear. Major Anderson was the hero of the hour, and being a Kentuckian, that State rang with the praise of his prudence and valor in defending Sumter. On the 7th of May, Lincoln gave him a special commission, "To receive into the army of the United States as many regiments of volunteer troops from the State of Kentucky, and from the western part of the State of Virginia, as shall be willing to engage in the service of the United States,"† etc., and sent him to Cincinnati, convenient to both fields of labor. These three persons, Speed and Nelson at Louisville, and Anderson within easy consulting distance, formed a reliable rallying-point and medium of communication with the President. The Unionists, thus encouraged, began the formation of Union Clubs and Home Guards, while the Government gave them assurance of protection in case of need. Wrote General McClellan:

The Union men of Kentucky express a firm determination to fight it out. Yesterday Garrett Davis told me: "We will remain in the Union by voting if we can, by fighting if we must, and if we cannot hold our own, we will call on the General Government to aid us." He asked me what I would do if they called on me for assistance, and convinced me that the majority were in danger of being overpowered by a better-armed minority. I replied that if there were time I would refer to General Scott for orders. If there were not time, that I would cross the Ohio with 20,000 men. If that were not enough, with 30,000; and if necessary, with 40,000; but that I would not stand by and see the loyal Union men of Kentucky crushed. I have strong hopes that Kentucky will remain in the Union, and the most favorable feature of the whole matter is that the Union men are now ready to abandon the position of "armed neutrality," and to enter heart and soul into the contest by our side. ‡

In a short time Nelson quietly brought five thousand Government muskets to Louisville, under the auspices and control of a committee of leading citizens. Wrote Anderson to Lincoln:

I had the pleasure to receive yesterday your letter of the 14th [May] introducing Mr. Joshua F. Speed, and giving me instructions about issuing arms to our friends in Kentucky. I will carefully attend to the performance of that duty. Mr. Speed and other gentlemen for whom he will vouch, viz., Hon. James Guthrie, Garrett Davis, and Charles A. Marshall, advise that I should not, at present, have anything to do with the raising of troops in Kentucky. The committee charged with that matter will go on with the organization and arming of the Home Guard, which they will see is composed of reliable men.§

* Unpublished MS.

† War Records.

‡ McClellan to Townsend, May 17, 1861. War Records.

§ Anderson to Lincoln, May 19, 1861. Unpublished MS.

Under date of May 28 Lincoln received further report of these somewhat confidential measures to counteract the conspiracy in his native State:

The undersigned, a private committee to distribute the arms brought to the State of Kentucky by Lieutenant William Nelson, of the United States Navy, among true, reliable Union men, represent to the Executive Department of the United States Government that members of this Board have superintended the distribution of the whole quantity of five thousand muskets and bayonets. We have been reliably informed and believe that they have been put in the hands of true and devoted Union men, who are pledged to support the Constitution of the United States and the enforcement of the laws; and, if the occasion should arise, to use them to put down all attempts to take Kentucky, by violence or fraud, out of the Union.*

The committee added that this had greatly strengthened the cause, that twenty thousand more could be safely intrusted to the Union men, who were applying for them and eager to get them, and recommended that this system of arming Kentucky be resumed and widely extended.†

The struggle between treason and loyalty in the Kentucky legislature had consumed the month of May, ending, as we have seen, by decided advantages gained for the Union, and attended by the important understanding and combination between prominent Kentucky citizens and President Lincoln whereby the loyalists were furnished with arms and assured of decisive military support. The Kentucky legislature adjourned *sine die* on May 24, and the issue was thereupon transferred to the people of the State. The contest took a double form: first an appeal to the ballot in an election for members of Congress, which the President's call for a special session on the 4th of July made necessary. A political campaign ensued of universal and intense excitement. Whatever the Union sentiment of the State had hitherto lacked of decision and boldness was largely aroused or created by this contest. The Unionists achieved a brilliant and conclusive triumph. The election was held on the 20th of June, and nine out of the ten Congressmen chosen were outspoken loyalists.

The second phase of the contest was, that it evoked a partial show of military force on both sides of the question. The military bill passed on the last day of the May session provided for organizing "Home Guards" for local defense. Whether by accident or design, Buckner's old militia law to organize the "State Guards" had required an oath of allegiance from the officers only. The new law

required all the members to swear fidelity to both Kentucky and the United States, and a refusal terminated their membership.‡ This searching touchstone at once instituted a process of separating patriots from traitors. The organization of Home Guards and the reorganization of the State Guards went on simultaneously. It would perhaps be more correct to say disorganization of the State Guards; for many loyal members took advantage of the requirement to abandon the corps and to join the Home Guards, while disloyal ones seized the same chance to go to rebel camps in the South; and under the action of both public and private sentiment the State Guards languished and the Home Guards grew in numerical strength and moral influence.

Meanwhile, as a third military organization, Kentuckians were enlisting directly in the service of the United States. Even before the already mentioned commission to Anderson, Colonels Guthrie and Woodruff had established "Camp Clay," on the Ohio shore above Cincinnati, where a number of Kentuckians joined a yet larger proportion of Ohioans, and were mustered into the three-months' service as the 1st and 2d regiments Kentucky Volunteer Infantry.§ These regiments were afterward reorganized for the three-years' service; and this time, mainly filled with real Kentuckians, were on the 9th and 10th of June remustered under their old and now entirely appropriate designations. About this time also State Senator Rousseau, who had made a brilliant Union record in the legislature, obtained authority to raise a brigade. On consulting with the Union leaders, it was resolved still to humor the popular "neutrality" foible till after the congressional election; and to this end he established "Camp Joe Holt," on the Indiana shore, where he gathered his recruits.|| The same policy kept the headquarters of Anderson yet in Cincinnati.

With the favorable change of public sentiment, and the happy issue of the congressional election, the Union men grew bolder. Nelson had all this while been busy, and had secretly appointed the officers and enrolled the recruits for four regiments from central Kentucky. At the beginning of July he threw off further concealment, and suddenly assembled his men in "Camp Dick Robinson," which he established between Danville and Lexington. His regiments were only partly full and indifferently armed, and the transmission of proper arms to his camp was persist-

* The report was signed by C. A. Wickliffe, Garrett Davis, J. H. Garrard, J. Harlan, James Speed, and Thornton F. Marshall; and also indorsed by J. F. Robinson, W. B. Houston, J. K. Goodloe, J. B. Brunner, and J. F. Speed.

† Committee, Report, May 28, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Act of May 24, 1861. "Session Laws," p. 6.

§ Van Horne, "Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 14.

|| Van Horne, "Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 16.

ently opposed by rebel intrigue, threats, and forcible demonstrations. Nevertheless the camp held firm, and by equal alertness and courage secured its guns, and so far sustained and strengthened the loyal party that at the general election of the 5th of August a new legislature was chosen giving the Union members a majority of three-fourths in each branch.

Thus in a long and persistent contest, extending from January to August, the secession conspirators of Kentucky, starting with the advantage of the governor's coöperation, military control, and general acceptance of the "neutrality" delusion, were, nevertheless, outgeneraled and completely baffled. Meanwhile the customary usurpations had carried Tennessee into active rebellion; and now, despairing of success by argument and intrigue, and inspired by the rebel success at Bull Run, the local conspiracy arranged to call in the assistance of military force. On the 17th of August the conspirators assembled in caucus in Scott county,* and, it is alleged, arranged a three-fold programme: first, the governor should officially demand the removal of Union camps and troops from the State; secondly, under pretense of a popular "peace" agitation, a revolutionary rising in aid of secession should take place in central Kentucky; thirdly, a simultaneous invasion of rebel armies from Tennessee should crown and secure the work.

Whether or not the allegation was literally true, events developed themselves in at least an apparent conformity to the plan. Governor Magoffin wrote a letter to the President, under date of August 19, urging "the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within the State." In reply to this, President Lincoln, on August 24, wrote the governor a temperate but emphatic refusal:

I believe it is true that there is a military force in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United States, which force is not very large, and is not now being augmented. I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force by the United States. I also believe this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians, having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes, and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of Kentucky. In all I have done in the premises I have acted upon the urgent solicitation of many Kentuckians, and in accordance with what I believed, and still believe, to be the wish of a majority of all the Union-loving people of Kentucky. While I have conversed on this subject with many eminent men of Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of Congress, I do not remember that any one of them or any other person, except your Excellency and the bearer of your Excellency's letter, has urged me to remove the military force from Kentucky, or to disband it. One other very worthy citizen of Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the force suspended for a time. Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this

force shall be removed beyond her limits, and with this impression I must respectfully decline to so remove it. I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky. It is with regret I search and cannot find in your not very short letter any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union.

The other features of the general plot succeeded no better than Magoffin's application to Lincoln. Three public demonstrations were announced, in evident preparation and prompting of a popular rebel uprising in central Kentucky. Under pretense of an ovation to Vallandigham, an Ohio congressman and Democratic politician, who had already made himself notorious by speeches of a rebel tendency, a meeting was held in Owen county on September 5. On September 10 a large "peace" mass meeting was called at Frankfort, the capital, to overawe the newly assembled loyal legislature. Still a third gathering, of "States Rights" and "peace" men, was called at Lexington on September 20, to hold a camp drill of several days, under supervision of leading secessionists.†

The speeches and proceedings of these treacherous "peace" meetings sufficiently revealed their revolutionary object. They were officered and managed by men whose prior words and acts left no doubt of their sympathies and desires, and the most conspicuous of whom were soon after in important stations of command in the rebel armies. The resolutions were skillfully devised: though the phraseology was ambiguous, the arrangement and inference led to one inevitable conclusion. The substance and process were: Firstly, that peace should be maintained; secondly, to maintain peace we must preserve neutrality; thirdly, that it is incompatible with neutrality to tax the State "for a cause so hopeless as the military subjugation of the Confederate States"; fourthly, that a truce be called and commissioners appointed to treat for a permanent peace.

At the larger gatherings, where the proceedings were more critically scanned, prudence dictated that they should refrain from definite committal; but at some of the smaller preliminary meetings the full purpose was announced "that the recall of the invading armies, and the recognition of the separate independence of the Confederate States, is the true policy to restore peace and preserve the relations of fraternal love and amity between the States."

While these peace meetings were in course of development, the second branch of the plot was not neglected. In the county of Owen an

* "Danville Quarterly Review," June, 1862.

† "Danville Quarterly Review," June and September, 1862, pp. 245, 381, 385, and 388.

insurrectionary force was being organized by Humphrey Marshall. There was no concealment of his purpose to march upon Frankfort, where the legislature of the State had lately met, and by force of arms to scatter it and break up the session. Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky related the attendant circumstances in a speech in the United States Senate:

I reached there to attend a session of the Court of Appeals on the very evening that it was said Humphrey Marshall was to make his incursion into Franklin county, and to storm the capital. Some members, especially secession members of the legislature, and some citizens of the town of Frankfort, and one or two judges of our Court of Appeals, left Frankfort hurriedly in the expectation that it was to be sacked that night by Humphrey Marshall's insurgent hosts. I myself, with other gentlemen, provided ourselves with arms to take part in the defense of the legislature and the capital of the State. We sent to Lexington, where there were encamped three to five hundred Union troops, who had been enlisted in the Union service for the defense of the legislature and the capital of our State, and had them brought down at 3 o'clock in the morning.*

As events progressed, both these branches of the plot signally failed. The peace meetings did not result in a popular uprising; they served only to show the relative weakness of the secession conspiracy. Such manifestations excited the Union majority to greater vigilance and effort, and their preparation and boldness overawed the contemplated insurrectionary outbreak. A decisive turn of affairs had indeed come, but armed conflict was avoided. Instead of the Union legislature being driven from the capital and dispersed, Vice-President Breckinridge, General Buckner, William Preston, and other leaders of the conspiracy soon after hurriedly left Kentucky with their rebellious followers and joined the Confederate army, just beyond the Tennessee border, to take part in the third branch of the plot,—a simultaneous invasion of Kentucky at three different points.

THE CONFEDERATE MILITARY LEAGUE.

It was constantly assumed that secession was a movement of the entire South. The fallacy of this assumption becomes apparent when we remember the time required for the full organization and development of the rebellion. From the 12th of October, when Governor Gist issued his proclamation convening the South Carolina legislature to inaugurate secession, to January 26, when Louisiana passed her secession ordinance, is a period of three and a half months. In this first period, as it may be called, only the six cotton-States reached a positive attitude of insurrection; and they

as is believed, by less than a majority of their citizens. Texas, the seventh, did not finally join them till a week later. During all this time the eight remaining slave States, with certainly as good a claim to be considered the voice of the South, earnestly advised and protested against the precipitate and dangerous step. But secession had its active partisans in them. As in the cotton-States, their several capitals were the natural centers of disunion; and, with few exceptions, their State officials held radical opinions on the slavery question. With the gradual progress of insurrection therefore in the extreme South four of the interior slave States gravitated into secession. Their change was very gradual; perhaps principally because a majority of their people wished to remain in the Union, and it was necessary to wait until by slow degrees the public opinion could be overcome.

The anomalous condition and course of Virginia has already been described—its Union vote in January, the apparently overwhelming Union majority of its convention, its vacillating and contradictory votes during February and March, and its sudden plunge into a secession ordinance and a military league with Jefferson Davis immediately after the Sumter bombardment. The whole development of the change is explained when we remember that Richmond had been one of the chief centers of secession conspiracy since the Frémont and Buchanan campaign of 1856.

In the other interior slave States the secession movement underwent various forms, according to the greater obstacles which its advocates encountered. North Carolina, it will be remembered, gave a discouraging answer to the first proposal, and the earliest demonstrations of the conspiracy elicited no popular response. On the 9th and 10th of January an immature combination of State troops and citizens seized Forts Caswell and Johnston, but the governor immediately ordered their restoration to the Federal authorities. The governor excused the hostile act by alleging the popular apprehension that Federal garrisons were to be placed in them, and earnestly deprecated any show of coercion.† He received a conciliatory response from the War Department (January 15, 1861) that no occupation of them was intended unless they should be threatened.‡

Nevertheless conspiracy continued, and, as usual, under the guise of solicitude for peace; and in a constant clamor for additional guarantees, the revolutionary feeling was augmented little by little. There seems to have

* Garrett Davis, Senate speech, March 13, 1862. "Congressional Globe," p. 1214.

† Ellis to Buchanan, Jan. 12, 1861. War Records.
‡ Holt to Ellis, Jan. 15, 1861. Ibid.

been great fluctuation of public opinion. A convention was ordered by the legislature and subsequently voted down at the polls. Commissioners were sent to the peace convention at Washington, and also to the provisional rebel Congress at Montgomery, with instructions limiting their powers to an effort at mediation. At the same time the North Carolina House passed a unanimous resolution that if reconciliation failed, North Carolina must go with the slave States. Next a military bill was passed to reorganize the militia, and arm ten thousand volunteers.* In reality it seems to have been the same struggle which took place elsewhere; the State officials and radical politicians favoring secession, and the people clinging to the Union, but yielding finally to the arts and intrigues of their leaders. When Sumter was bombarded and President Lincoln called for troops, the governor threw his whole influence and authority into the insurrectionary movement. He sent an insulting refusal to Washington,† and the next day ordered his State troops to seize Forts Caswell and Johnston. A week later (April 22) he seized the Fayetteville arsenal, containing 37,000 stands of arms, 3000 kegs of powder, and an immense supply of shells and shot. We may also infer that he was in secret league with the Montgomery rebellion; for the rebel Secretary of War at once made a requisition upon him, and he placed his whole military preparation at the service of Jefferson Davis, sending troops and arms to Richmond and elsewhere. It was a bold usurpation of executive power. Neither legislature nor convention had ordered rebellion; but from that time on the State was arrayed in active hostility to the Union. It was not till the 1st of May that the legislature for the second time ordered a convention, which met and passed an ordinance of secession on the 20th of that month, also formally accepting the Confederate States Constitution.

In the State of Arkansas the approaches to secession were even slower and more difficult than in North Carolina. There seems to have been little disposition at first, among her own people or leaders, to embark in the disastrous undertaking. The movement appears to have been begun when, on December 20, 1860, a commissioner came from Alabama, and by an address to the legislature invited Arkansas to unite in the movement for separation. No direct success followed the request, and the delicate expedient of a convention to ascertain the will of the people was resorted to. All parties joined in this measure; the fire-eaters to promote secession, the Unionists to thwart it. An election for or against a convention took place February 18, 1861, resulting in

27,412 votes for and 15,826 votes against it; though as compared with the presidential election it was estimated that at least 10,815 voters did not go to the polls. At a later election for delegates the returns indicated a Union vote of 23,626 against a secession vote of 17,927. When the convention was organized, March 4, 1861, the delegates are reported to have chosen Union officers by a majority of six; ‡ many of the delegates must have already betrayed their constituents by a change of front. Revolutionary tricks had been employed, the United States arsenal at Little Rock had been seized (February 8), and the ordnance stores at Napoleon (February 12), while no doubt the insurrectionary influences from the neighboring cotton-States were indefinitely multiplied. With all this the progress of the conspirators was not rapid. A conditional secession ordinance was voted down by the convention, 39 to 35. This ought to have effectually killed the movement; but it shows the greater aggressiveness and persistence of the secession leaders, that, instead of yielding to their defeat, they kept alive their scheme, by the insidious proposal to take a new popular vote on the question in the following August. Meanwhile there were a continual loss of Union sentiment and growth of secession excitement; and, as in other States, when the Sumter catastrophe occurred, the governor and his satellites placed the State in an attitude of insurrection by the refusal to comply with Lincoln's call for troops, and by hostile military organization. Thereafter disunion had a free course. The convention was hastily called together April 20, and, meeting on the 6th of May, immediately passed the customary ordinance of secession.

In no other State did secession resort to such methods of usurpation as in Tennessee. The secession faction of the State was insignificant in numbers, but its audacity was perhaps not equaled in any other locality; and it may almost be said that Governor Harris carried the State into rebellion single handed. The whole range of his plottings cannot, of course, be known. He called a session of the legislature January 7, 1861, and sent them a highly inflammatory message. A convention bill was passed and approved January 19, 1861, which submitted the question of "convention" or "no convention," and which also provided that any ordinance of disunion should be ratified by popular vote before taking effect. At the election held on February 9 there appeared on the vote for delegates a Union majority of 64,114, and

* "Annual Cyclopaedia," 1861, p. 538.

† Ellis to Cameron, April 15, 1861. War Records.

‡ "Annual Cyclopaedia," 1861, p. 22.

against holding the convention a majority of 11,875. This overwhelming popular decision for a time silenced the conspirators. The fall of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's call for troops afforded the governor a new pretext to continue his efforts. He sent the President a defiant refusal, and responded to a requisition from Montgomery for troops, being no doubt in secret league with the rebellion. In the revolutionary excitement which immediately followed, the governor's official authority, and the industrious local conspiracy of which he was the head, carried all before them. Since it was evident that he could not obtain a convention to do his bidding, he resolved to employ the legislature, which he once more called together. In secret sessions he was able to manipulate it at his will. On the 1st of May the legislature passed a joint resolution directing the governor to appoint commissioners "to enter into a military league with the authorities of the Confederate States," placing the whole force of the State at the control of Jefferson Davis, and on the 7th of the month a formal military league or treaty to this effect was signed.* Even after this the governor had difficult work. Eastern Tennessee was pervaded by so strong a Union sentiment that it continued to labor and protest against being dragged into rebellion contrary to its will, but the opposition was of little direct avail. Military organization had its grasp on the whole State, and citizens not in arms had no choice but to submit to the orders issued from Montgomery and Nashville.

It will be seen from this recital that the secession movement divides itself into two distinct periods. The first group, the cotton-States, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas, took action mainly between the 12th of October, 1860, and February 4, 1861, a period of a little more than three and a half months. The second group, the interior slave States, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, was occupied by the struggle about three months longer, or a total of six months after Lincoln's election. So also these two periods exhibited separate characteristics in their formative processes. The first group, being more thoroughly permeated by the spirit of revolt, and acting with greater vigor and promptness, shows us the semblance at least of voluntary confederation, through its Provisional Congress at Montgomery. On the other hand, the action of the four interior slave States

* "Rebellion Record."

was, in each case, with more or less distinctness at first, merely that of joining the original nucleus in a military league, in which the excitement of military preparation and allurements of military glory, not the consideration of political expediency, turned the scale.

There remained still the third group, consisting of the border slave States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. The efforts of the conspirators to involve Maryland in secession have already been detailed, as well as the persistence they employed to gain control of Kentucky and Missouri. In these three States, however, the attempt failed because of the direct and indirect military support which the Government was able to give immediately to the Union sentiment and organizations. Had it been possible to extend the same encouragement and help to Arkansas and Tennessee, they also might have been saved. This becomes more apparent when we remember how quickly half of Virginia was reclaimed and held steadfastly loyal during the war. The remaining slave State, Delaware, was so slightly tainted with treason that her attitude can scarcely be said to have been in doubt; moreover, her geographical position threw her destiny inseparably with the free States.


The adhesion which we have described of the four interior slave States of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas to the Confederate States at once wholly changed the scope and resources of the rebellion. It extended its territorial area nearly one-third, and almost doubled its population and resources. It could now claim to be a compact nation of eleven States, with a territory more than double the size of any European nation except Russia, and with a population of five and a half millions of whites and three and a half millions of blacks. It had a long sea-coast, several fine harbors, and many navigable rivers. It contained a great variety of lands, important diversities of climate, and a wide range of agricultural products. Its country was as yet sparsely inhabited, and was known to include very considerable mineral wealth, while its manufacturing capabilities were almost wholly untouched. The exultation and enthusiastic prophecies of the rebel chiefs at the successful beginning of their daring project were perhaps not unnatural when we reflect that their mischievous design and reprehensible cause had secured the support of such fair and substantial elements of national greatness and power.

“FROM OUT ETERNAL SILENCE DO WE COME.”

FROM out eternal silence do we come,
 Into eternal silence do we go;
 For was there not a time, and swift or slow
 Must come again, when all this world's loud hum
 Was naught to us, and shall again grow dumb
 Through all eternity? — Between two low,
 Dark, stony portals, with much empty show
 Of tinkling brass and sounding fife and drum,
 The endless Caravan of Life moves on;
 Or whence or whither, to what destiny,
 But He who dwells beyond the farthest dawn
 Knows, yet reveals not, evermore even He
 In silence wrapt, for all the thunder's roll,
 Save for His deathless message to our soul!

Stuart Sterne.


THE PERSONALITY OF LEO XIII.



LEO XIII. is described by the Italian publicist Bonghi as “one of the most finely balanced and vigorous of characters.” Without the brilliancy or the geniality of Pius IX., which attracted even his enemies to him personally, he has qualities which many Catholics believe of greater usefulness in the present time. He is little of an orator, but much of an author. He uses the pen *urbi et orbi* (to the city and to the world). He teaches by encyclicals; his predecessor taught by allocutions. To the culture of Leo X. he unites the spirituality of Pius IX. He possesses all that is good in the spirit of the Renaissance without that mixture of paganism which almost put the classics above the Scriptures and valued a variation in a line of Horace as much as the Gospel of St. John. He never forgets the weight of his burden as the spiritual ruler in matters of faith and morals of the Catholic world. When he speaks in his encyclicals, which are models of classic Latinity, when he teaches *ex cathedra* on subjects of faith or of those principles which touch faith, being of Christian morality, the elegant graces of the past are forgotten and his words flow solemnly, gravely, with such force that even those who reject him as a teacher recognize his knowledge, broad and deep, of the Scriptures, and his ardent desire for the welfare of society.

Joachim Vincent Raphael Louis Pecci was born on March 2, 1810, at Carpineto,— Carpineto Romagna, to be accurate. His brother, Cardinal Pecci, calls it “an eagle's nest.” It is placed high in the Monte Lepini, in the Volscian range. Here, in this aerie-like town, much out of the course of the ordinary traveler, stands the country house of the Pecci family, its outlines softened by the boughs of well-grown trees. Carpineto is still, in appearance, a mediæval town, and even the lumbering stage-coach hurrying through its streets, ancient as that vehicle is, seems painfully modern. The Pecci are of Siennese origin. The mother of Leo XIII. was Anna Prosperi Buzi, a descendant of a famous Volscian family. Count Domenico, his father,— of a race which had been forced to flee from Sienna for having taken sides with the Medici,— fought for a time under Napoleon I. But while Napoleon held Pius IX. in his clutches, Count Domenico lived quietly in his home at Carpineto, little dreaming that his son was to be the successor of the imprisoned Pope.

Vincent Pecci, as he was called during his mother's life, spent a happy childhood in “the eagle's nest,” for he was the youngest of six children,— four boys and two girls,— and the memories of that peaceful time permeate his poetical work. Like most boys of his class, he was put in the care of the Jesuits. In their establishments at Viterbo and Rome he showed a marked taste for the classics. He resolved to be a priest. He did not allow himself, in



ENGRAVED BY T. JOHNSON.

FROM A PHOTOGRAPH OF PAINTING BY LENBACH, IN MUNICH.

Leo 17. 11. XIII.



POPE LEO XIII.

spite of his bad health, many hours of rest. His life was absorbed in those studies which his friend Pope Leo XII. had done so much to revive in Rome.

In the Divinity School of the Roman College, in the College of Nobles, in the University of the Sapienza, during the outbreak of cholera in 1837, he showed his courage, Christian charity, and executive ability in assisting Cardinal Sala in fighting the scourge. On December 31, of the same year, he was ordained priest. He was marked at once by the papal authorities as a man of mind and power.

Appointed Governor of Benevento, a hot-bed of smuggling and brigandage, connived at by treacherous nobles, he virtually purged the place. He was next made delegate of Umbria, of which his beloved Perugia is the capital. Umbria was in a worse condition than Benevento. His practical and prompt reforms there gave the then reigning Pope, Gregory XVI., the greatest satisfaction. He was consecrated Archbishop of Damietta and appointed Nuncio to Belgium. His influence on the progress of higher education in Belgium was felt at once. But Perugia needed an archbishop, and the Perugians would have no one but Mgr. Pecci, if they could help it. He was sent from Belgium to London and Paris; and then recalled to Rome, he was made Archbishop of Perugia. Pius IX. succeeded Gregory XVI. It was not long before Pecci was created cardinal. His model was St. Charles Borromeo,—of that famous family which produced the Cardinal Frederico of "I Promessi Sposi,"—and his teacher of teachers, St. Thomas Aquinas. He believed that priests should be learned as well as virtuous. He enforced his belief so well that Perugia became known as "admirable."

Pius IX. died. The conclave opened. Cardinal Pecci was elected Pope in the third ballot, by a vote of forty-four out of sixty-one. He assumed the name of Leo XIII. During his pontificate the Pope's one thought, iterated and reiterated, has been the salvation of society through Christian education.

He is now an old man. He has just celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of his ordination to the priesthood. This century was ten years

old when he entered it. He is not strong. He lives with the frugality and simplicity of a Spartan. This Pope, who in great functions wears the garments of a Roman patrician, a tiara more splendid than that of emperors, and moves, upborne by the arms of men, with more pomp than any potentate on earth, spends most of his time in a simple white robe, and engaged in active intellectual labor. He finds time to bless the little children that are brought to him; he is never hurried when an American Catholic, or non-Catholic, is introduced to him. The hardest work of his day is that done with the Cardinal Secretary of State. The problems which foreign governments offer him can only be solved by the keenest insight and the most consummate knowledge. Fortunately, he once ruled in Perugia with a firm hand, and he knows the difficulties of rulers. He also visited foreign courts, and he understands how to meet diplomacy with diplomacy. Sir Charles Dilke says that the diplomatic service of the Vatican is the most complete in Europe, and Sir Charles Dilke knows Europe very well. But Leo XIII., whose only recreation is a walk in the Vatican garden, a talk with an old friend, or the pleasure he finds in the Psalms of David, is the director of the policy of the Vatican in all matters. His days are happy when no diplomatic riddle vexes them. Secluded in his own palace, with no soldiers but an ornamental troop, helpless so far as physical force is concerned, he is an immense power in the world.

The poems of Leo XIII. are remarkable for their exquisite Latinity. They are the record of his feelings at various periods of his existence. In 1830 he wrote:

Scarce twenty years thou numberest, Joachim,
And fell diseases thy young life invade!
Yet pains, when charmed by verse, seem half allayed—
Record thy sorrows, then, in mournful hymn.

He anticipated death, but death has spared him longer than he spares most men. The elegance of the Pope's Latin and the sincerity of his sentiments—pure, warm, hearty, and in the cases of old scenes and old friends even homely—make his poems interesting. He writes lovingly of the past and hopefully of the future.

Maurice Francis Egan.



THE CHANCES OF BEING HIT IN BATTLE.

A STUDY OF REGIMENTAL LOSSES IN THE CIVIL WAR.



If a man enlist in time of war, what are the chances of his being killed? When a new regiment leaves for the front, how many of its men will probably lose their lives by violent deaths?

What are the battle losses of regiments in active service—not in wounded and captured, but in killed and died of wounds? A very good answer to these or similar inquiries is found in the records of the Northern troops in the war of 1861-65. It was a war so great, so long and desperate, it employed so many men, that these records furnish of themselves a fair reply.

A soldier of the late civil war is often questioned as to how many men his regiment lost. His answer is always something like this: "We left our barracks 1000 strong; when we returned there were only 85 left." Few people have the hardihood to dispute the old veteran, who testily fortifies all of his assertions by the argument that he was there and ought to know. So the story of the 1000 who went and the 85 who returned is accepted without reply. Now this peculiar form of statement as made by the old soldier is apt to be correct so far as it goes, but the inferences are invariably wrong. So few are aware of the many causes which deplete a regiment, that these missing men are generally thought of as dead. A better way for the veteran to answer the question would be to state that in round numbers his regiment lost 100 men killed; that 200 died of disease; that 400 were discharged for sickness or wounds; that 100 deserted; that 100 were absent in hospital or on furlough; and so only 100 remained as present at the muster-out. Of course, there are many regiments whose brilliant records would require a different statement, but as regards three-fourths of the troops in the late war it would fairly approximate the truth. Of the 2000 regiments or more in the Union army, there were 45* only in which the number of killed and mortally wounded exceeded 200 men. Such statements must not be regarded as derogatory nor belittling; for the simple facts are such as need no exaggeration, and the truth only need be told to furnish records unrivaled in military history.

As regards the number killed in regiments, the prevailing ideas are indefinite or incorrect, seldom approaching the truth. Nor are these errors confined to civilians alone; they are

prevalent among the officers and men who were there and would be supposed to know. All this is largely due to the reckless and careless statements too often made regarding such losses. The error is a somewhat excusable one, as neither officers nor men have the means of knowing the actual loss in every engagement. They remember, perhaps, some of the official reports of their colonel as rendered at the close of certain battles, but not all of them. These casualty reports, as given in, are divided into killed, wounded, and missing, the latter term generally including the captured. Many of these wounded and missing return; some of them during their absence die in hospitals or military prisons; nothing is definitely known about them at the time; so the tendency is to consider only the total of these casualties, and in time to think of them as all killed or lost.

There is fortunately, however, one reliable source of information as to the number of men in a regiment who were killed in action, and that is the regimental muster-out rolls. Every regiment before disbanding was required to hand in company rolls, made out in triplicate, bearing the names of all who had ever belonged to the company from first to last. Opposite each name were remarks showing what became of the man, such as: "killed," "died of wounds," "died of disease," "transferred," "discharged," "deserted," or "present at muster-out." So these rolls, when properly made out, form a reliable basis for ascertaining the number killed in a regiment. Many of the rolls, however, were defective, and some were lost. But the various States, through their respective military bureaus, have regained the desired information, and, with few exceptions, have completed their rolls, although this involved in some States years of clerical research and large appropriations of money. Some of these final rolls have been put in print, while the others are on file in the various offices of the States' adjutants general. In some of the States there are a few rolls missing, but the duplicates are on file in the War Department at Washington. The remark has been made concerning muster-out rolls that they are not always accurate. This was true to a certain extent at the close of the war, but for twenty years a clerical force has been busy in correcting and perfecting them. Certainly but few errors can remain as regards the killed, for the pension claims soon called attention to nearly all of such omissions. Hence these rolls, together with certain other sources

* Does not include heavy artillery organizations.

of information, furnish a reliable source for ascertaining the relative losses of every regiment and battery in the Northern army.

The maximum losses possess the greatest interest, and so invite attention first. The greatest loss in battle of any one regiment in the late war fell to the lot of the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery, in which 423 were killed, or died of wounds, out of 2202 men enrolled. Just here it is necessary to state that, while an infantry regiment consists of 1000 men with 30 line officers, the heavy artillery organization has 1800 men with 60 line officers, there being 12 companies of 150 each, with a captain and four lieutenants to each company. The 2202 men mentioned here as enrolled indicates that about 400 recruits were received during its term of service. The heavy artillery regiments saw no active service while on duty in that line. They left their fortifications near Washington and took the field in 1864, being armed with rifles, drilled and manœuvred the same as infantry, the only difference being in their larger organization. By carefully counting and classifying each name on the rolls of the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery the following abstract is obtained:

1ST MAINE HEAVY ARTILLERY.

Birney's Division,* Second Corps.

- (1) Colonel Daniel Chaplin (killed).
 (2) " Russell B. Shepherd, Bvt. Brigadier-General.

LOSSES.

	Officers.	En. Men.	Total.
Killed, or died of wounds.....	23	400	423
Died of diseases, accidents, etc.....	2	258	260
2202 enrolled; 423 killed = 19.2 per cent.			

Battles.	Killed.
Spotsylvania, Va.....	147
North Anna, Va.....	3
Totopotomoy, Va.....	3
Petersburg, Va., June 16, 17.....	12
Petersburg, Va., June 18.....	120
Jerusalem Road, Va.....	5
Siege of Petersburg, Va.....	10
Deep Bottom, Va.....	2
Weldon Railroad, Va., Oct. 2.....	5
Boynton Road, Va.....	10
Hatcher's Run, Va., March 25.....	6
Sailor's Creek, Va.....	5
Picket duty.....	2
Place unknown.....	3
Total of killed and died of wounds.....	423
Total of killed and wounded.....	1283

In their assault on Petersburg, June 18, 1864, they lost 604 † killed and wounded in less than twenty minutes, out of about 900 engaged. This regiment sustained not only the greatest numerical loss, but its percentage of killed as based upon its enrollment is also among the highest. This matter of percentage is an important factor in the subject of regimental loss, especially so as claims to gallant conduct are very apt to be based upon the size of the casualty list. In many regiments the losses are apparently small, when an examination of their enrollment shows that their loss

* The divisions mentioned, in connection with regiments, are the ones with which the regiments were the most prominently identified.

was really heavy in proportion to their numbers. The 1st Maine Heavy Artillery is remarkable for holding a high place in the list, whether tabulated as to loss by percentage or loss numerically. Although this organization enlisted in 1862, it saw no fighting until May, 1864, all of its losses in action occurring during a period of less than a year. This is noteworthy, as forming a proper basis for comparison with regimental losses in certain foreign wars — the late Franco-Prussian, for instance, in which the duration of the fighting was about the same. The total enrollment of this regiment was larger than the number just stated, but the excess was caused by accessions in June, 1865, after the war had ended, the additions consisting of men with unexpired terms of enlistment, transferred from disbanded regiments. The actual number belonging to the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery during the war was as given in the preceding figures.

The next largest number of killed is found in the 8th New York Heavy Artillery, whose muster-out rolls, on file in the Adjutant-General's office at Albany, show, upon a careful examination of each name, the casualties upon which the following summary is based:

8TH NEW YORK HEAVY ARTILLERY.

Gibbon's Division, Second Corps.

- (1) Colonel Peter A. Porter (killed).
 (2) " Willard W. Bates (killed).
 (3) " James M. Willett.
 (4) " Joel B. Baker.

LOSSES.

	Officers.	En. Men.	Total.
Killed, or died of wounds.....	19	342	361
Died of diseases, accidents, etc.....	4	298	302
2575 enrolled; 361 killed = 14 per cent.			

Battles.	Killed.
Spotsylvania, Va.....	10
North Anna, Va.....	2
Cold Harbor, Va.....	207
Petersburg (assault).....	42
Jerusalem Road, Va.....	34
Siege of Petersburg.....	16
Reams's Station, Va.....	26
Deep Bottom, Va.....	4
Boynton Road, Va.....	13
Hatcher's Run, Va.....	1
White Oak Road, Va.....	2
Picket, February 8, 1865.....	1
Confederate prison-guard.....	3

Total of killed and died of wounds..... 361
 Total of killed and wounded..... 1010
 The loss by disease includes 102 deaths in Confederate prisons.

There were only a few regiments in the heavy artillery service, and so the regiment which stands next in point of numerical loss is an infantry command. The infantry constituted the bulk of the army, more than four-fifths of the troops belonging to that arm of the service. After examining carefully the losses in each one of all the infantry regiments in the Northern army it appears that the one which sustained the greatest loss in battle was

† Maine Reports, 1866. The War Department's figures are 90 killed, 459 wounded (including mortally wounded), and 31 missing; total, 580.

the 5th New Hampshire, from whose muster-out rolls, after due correction of errors, the following summary is prepared:

5TH NEW HAMPSHIRE INFANTRY.
Barlow's Division, Second Corps.

- (1) Colonel Edward E. Cross (killed).
- (2) " Charles E. Hapgood.
- (3) " Welcome A. Crafts.

LOSSES.

	Officers.	En. Men.	Total.
Killed, or died of wounds.....	18	277	295
Died of diseases, accidents, etc.....	2	176	178
Original roll, 976; of whom 175 were killed = 17.9 per cent.			

Battles.

	Killed.
Fair Oaks, Va.....	33
Picket, June 10, 1862.....	1
Allen's Farm, Va.....	8
Glendale, Va.....	8
Malvern Hill, Va.....	2
Antietam, Md.....	13
Fredericksburg, Va.....	51
Chancellorsville, Va.....	5
Gettysburg, Pa.....	34
Cold Harbor, Va.....	69
Petersburg (assault).....	15
Petersburg (trenches).....	14
Jerusalem Road, Va.....	4
Deep Bottom, Va.....	5
Reams's Station, Va.....	5
Sailor's Creek, Va.....	6
Farmville, Va.....	2
Place unknown.....	20
Total of killed and died of wounds.....	295
Total of killed and wounded.....	1051

With the killed are included a few who are recorded as, "Wounded and missing in action"; — men who never returned, were never heard from, were not borne on any of the Confederate prison lists, and were undoubtedly killed. They fell in some retreat, unobserved by any comrade, and, like wounded animals, crawled into some thicket to die; or else while sinking fast under their death hurt were removed by the enemy, only to die in some field hospital, barn, or tent, without leaving word or sign as to whom they were. They are now resting in some of the many thousand nameless graves in the battle-field cemeteries — graves with headstones bearing no other inscription than that shortest, and to soldiers the saddest, of all epitaphs, the one word "Unknown."

The infantry regiment which stands second as to numerical loss is the 83d Pennsylvania. It went out with the usual ten companies of one thousand men which constituted an infantry command, but as its ranks became depleted it received recruits, until from first to last over eighteen hundred men were carried on its rolls. With these, however, were included the non-combatants, the sick, wounded, and absentees. The muster-out rolls of this gallant regiment furnish the names from which the following abstract is made:

83D PENNSYLVANIA INFANTRY.
Griffin's Division, Fifth Corps.

- (1) Colonel John W. McLane (killed).
- (2) " Strong Vincent (killed), Brigadier-General.
- (3) " O. S. Woodward, Bvt. Brigadier-General.
- (4) " Chauncey P. Rogers.

LOSSES.

	Officers.	En. Men.	Total.
Killed, or died of wounds.....	11	271	282
Died of diseases, accidents, etc.....	2	151	153
1868 enrolled; 282 killed = 15.5 per cent.			

Battles.

	Killed.
Hanover Court House, Va.....	1
Gaines's Mill, Va.....	61
Malvern Hill, Va.....	50
Manassas, Va.....	26
Chancellorsville, Va.....	1
Fredericksburg, Va.....	4
Gettysburg, Pa.....	18
Guerrillas, Va., Dec. 10, 1863.....	1
Wilderness, Va.....	20
Spotsylvania, Va., May 8.....	57
Spotsylvania, Va., May 10.....	2
North Anna, Va.....	2
Bethesda Church, Va.....	1
Siege of Petersburg, Va.....	15
Peebles's Farm, Va.....	10
Hatcher's Run, Va.....	5
White Oak Road, Va.....	1
Gravelly Run, Va.....	4
Total of killed and died of wounds.....	282
Total of killed and wounded.....	971

The 83d was present at several engagements in addition to those mentioned, sustaining at each a loss in wounded; but it does not appear from their rolls that any of the wounded died of their injuries. This applies also to the other regiments whose list of battles may be given here.

The following-named commands also sustained remarkable losses during their terms of service. They were all infantry organizations, and the loss mentioned represents those who were killed in action or died of wounds received there, the loss including both officers and men. This list embraces every regiment in the Northern army whose loss in killed was two hundred or more:

Regiment.	Corps.	Killed.*
5th New Hampshire.....	Second	295
83d Pennsylvania.....	Fifth	282
7th Wisconsin.....	First	281
5th Michigan.....	Third	263
20th Massachusetts.....	Second	260
69th New York.....	Second	259
28th Massachusetts.....	Second	250
16th Michigan.....	Fifth	247
105th Pennsylvania.....	Third	245
6th Wisconsin.....	First	244
15th Massachusetts.....	Second	241
15th New Jersey.....	Sixth	240
2d Wisconsin.....	First	238
40th New York.....	Third	238
61st Pennsylvania.....	Sixth	237
11th Pennsylvania.....	First	236
48th New York.....	Tenth	236
45th Pennsylvania.....	Ninth	227
121st New York.....	Sixth	226
27th Michigan.....	Ninth	225
2d Michigan.....	Ninth	225
100th Pennsylvania.....	Ninth	224
8th Michigan.....	Ninth	223
2d Vermont.....	Sixth	221
111th New York.....	Second	220
18th U. S. Infantry.....	Fourteenth	218
9th Illinois.....	Sixteenth	217
22d Massachusetts.....	Fifth	216
5th Vermont.....	Sixth	213
142th Pennsylvania.....	Second	210
9th Massachusetts.....	Fifth	209
81st Pennsylvania.....	Second	208
7th Michigan.....	Second	208
55th Pennsylvania.....	Tenth	208
17th Maine.....	Third	207

* Compiled from State records. The figures on file at Washington show: 7th Wisconsin, 280; 83d Pennsylvania, 278; 5th New Hampshire, 277; 5th Michigan, 262; 20th Massachusetts, 257; but these figures of the War Department do not include any of the missing.

Regiment.	Corps.	Killed.
3d Vermont	Sixth	206
145th Pennsylvania	Second	205
24th Connecticut	Second	205
36th Illinois	Fourth	204
6th Vermont	Sixth	203
49th Ohio	Fourth	202
51st New York	Ninth	202
20th Indiana	Third	201
57th Massachusetts	Ninth	201
53d Pennsylvania	Second	200

The following heavy artillery regiments also lost over two hundred killed in action or died of wounds during their term of service :

Regiment.	Corps.	Killed.
1st Maine	Second	423
1st Massachusetts	Second	241
2d Connecticut	Sixth	254
2d New York	Second	211
7th New York	Second	291
8th New York	Second	361
9th New York	Sixth	204
14th New York	Ninth	226
2d Pennsylvania	Ninth	240

It should be remembered that these heavy artillery commands were much larger organizations than the ordinary infantry regiment, and that their extended ranks rendered them liable to heavy loss. They all went into action for the first time in Grant's overland campaign. They entered that campaign with full ranks, the 1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery going into the fight at Spotsylvania with 1617 men.

In giving figures here on the number killed, those who died of wounds received in action are included, and unless otherwise stated, it will, in each case, be so understood. The figures, as stated in connection with these leading regiments, should give a fair idea of the maximum killed in American regiments during the civil war. All of these troops belonged to the infantry, or to heavy artillery serving as infantry, and were three-years' regiments, many of them reënlisting when their term expired, and so were in service during the whole war. Still, as the active campaigning did not begin, to any extent, until 1862, the duration of the fighting was three years or less. The three-years' regiments, for the most part, lost about one hundred men killed in action. Some, of course, lost many more, and some considerably less, the smaller losses being represented by the tabulated figures which run in close gradations down to such commands as were fortunate enough to sustain no loss whatsoever in action.

The total of killed during the whole war was, on the Union side, 110,070, out of about 2,200,000 men. To be exact, there were 2,778,304 enlistments; but, after deducting the reënlistments and reducing the short-term numbers to a three-years' basis, the round numbers would not be very much in excess of the figures stated. This would indicate that the number killed during the war was, on the Northern side, very close to five per cent. of those engaged, and which is, by the way, a greater percentage than that of the Crimean or Franco-Prussian wars.

Although the average loss of the whole army was five per cent., it must be borne in mind that the percentage was very unevenly divided among the various regiments, ranging from twenty per cent. down to nothing. In most of the commands, the percentage of killed would naturally be the same as that of the whole army, but there were some in which the rate was necessarily large to offset that of those whose ranks sustained little or no loss. This increased percentage fell heavily on the Army of the Potomac, and on certain divisions in that army.

This subject of percentage is an interesting one, creating heroic records which might otherwise be overlooked, and adding fresh laurels when many would think the whole story had been told. There is something pathetic in the story of the Pennsylvania Reserves, when one studies the figures and thinks how thin were the ranks that furnished so many dead Pennsylvanians. The percentage list also shows plainly that the brunt of battle fell much heavier on some regiments than on others, and requires that such ones be known, so that the credit so justly due them may be fully acknowledged.

First of all, in this respect, stands the 2d Wisconsin Infantry, it having lost the most men, in proportion to its numbers, of any regiment in the whole Union army. The mortality records of the State of Wisconsin furnish the information from which the following statement of their loss is made :

2D WISCONSIN INFANTRY.

Wadsworth's Division, First Corps.

- (1) Colonel S. Park Coon.
- (2) " Edgar O'Connor (killed).
- (3) " Lucius Fairchild, Brigadier-General.
- (4) " John Mansfield.

LOSSES.

	Officers.	En. Men.	Total.
Killed, or died of wounds	10	228	238
Died of diseases, accidents, etc.		77	77
1188 enrolled; 238 killed = 20 per cent.			

Battles.

	Killed
Blackburn's Ford, Va.	1
First Bull Run, Va.	29
Catlett's Station, Va.	1
Gainesville, Va.	81
Manassas, Va.	2
South Mountain, Md.	12
Fredericksburg, Va.	30
Gettysburg, Pa.	3
Wilderness, Va.	49
Spotsylvania, Va.	13
Petersburg, Va.	7
Weldon Railroad, Va.	2
Hatcher's Run, Va.	1
Gun-boat, <i>Monnd City</i> .	6

Total of killed and died of wounds 238
Killed and wounded, 753; missing and captured 132

Another extraordinary percentage of killed occurred in the 57th Massachusetts Infantry, where 201 were killed out of an enrollment of 1052, or 19.1 per cent. This case cannot well be classed with the others, because the 57th went into action within a few days after leaving Boston, going into the thick of the

Wilderness fight with full ranks, while most regiments went into their first fight with ranks depleted by eight months' previous campaigning. The 57th was recruited largely from veteran soldiers, being known also as the "Second Veteran," and had the honor of being commanded by Colonel William F. Bartlett.

The next largest percentage of killed is found in the 140th Pennsylvania Infantry, whose muster-out rolls tell the following story; and, as in the instances previously cited, the names of each one of the dead could be given, were it necessary, in verification of the loss.

140TH PENNSYLVANIA INFANTRY.

Caldwell's Division, Second Corps.

- (1) Colonel Richard P. Roberts (killed).
- (2) " John Fraser, Bvt. Brigadier-General.

LOSSES.

	Officers.	En. Men.	Total.
Killed, or died of wounds	10	188	198
Died of diseases, accidents, etc.	1	127	128
1132 enrolled; 198 killed = 17.4 per cent.			

Battles.

	Killed.
Chancellorsville, Va.	65
Gettysburg, Pa.	61
Mine Run, Va.	1
Bristoe Station, Va.	1
Wilderness, Va.	8
Corbin's Bridge, Va.	4
Po River, Va.	5
Spotsylvania, Va.	52
North Anna, Va.	3
Totopotomoy, Va.	11
Cold Harbor, Va.	7
Petersburg, Va.	14
Deep Bottom, Va.	5
Reams's Station, Va.	1
Hatcher's Run, Va.	1
Sailor's Creek, Va.	4
Farmville, Va.	5

Total of killed and wounded 732
 Total of killed and died of wounds 198
 Died of disease in Confederate prisons, 28 (included).

The following regiments were also remarkable for their percentage of killed in action; remarkable because the general average was five per cent. They were all infantry commands:

Regiment.*	Corps.	Enrolled.	Killed.	Per cent.
26th Wisconsin (Germans) . . .	Twentieth.	1089	188	17.2
11th Pa. Reserves	Fifth	1179	190	16.6
142d Pennsylvania	First	935	155	16.5
141st Pennsylvania	Third	1037	167	16.1
36th Wisconsin	Second	1014	157	15.4
5th Kentucky	Fourth	1020	157	15.3
27th Indiana	Twelfth	1101	169	15.3
24th Michigan	First	1238	189	15.2
1st Minnesota	Second	1242	187	15.0
93d Illinois	Seventeenth	1011	151	14.9
8th Pa. Reserves	Fifth	1062	158	14.8
126th New York	Second	1036	153	14.7
55th Illinois	Fifteenth	1099	161	14.6
63d Pennsylvania	Third	1308	186	14.2
4th Michigan	Fifth	1325	189	14.2
37th Wisconsin	Ninth	1110	156	14.0
1st Michigan	Fifth	1346	187	13.8
73d Ohio	Twentieth	1267	174	13.7
6th Iowa	Sixteenth	1102	152	13.7
14th Indiana	Second	1134	152	13.4
44th New York	Fifth	1365	182	13.3
32d Indiana	Fourth	1285	171	13.3
22d Illinois	Fourth	1123	147	13.0

* Each of the 45 regiments previously mentioned as having lost 200 or more in killed has a place in this table.

In these enrollments no account is taken of men transferred to a regiment after the war had closed.

But the above enrollments include the non-combatants and absentees. The maximum of effective strength was fully one-fifth less and the actual percentage of loss correspondingly greater. A new regiment may leave its barracks 1000 strong, and yet, within 30 days, go into action with less than 800 muskets. The process of depletion begins with the very first day of service. Men are detailed as cooks, teamsters, servants, and clerks; the sick-list then appears, and the thousand muskets are never seen together again. So the percentage of killed, as based on a total enrollment, does not render justice to the survivors. Still, it is the only definite basis for such figures, and is sufficient in estimating the comparative losses of the various commands. This point is better understood when the losses in certain actions are considered by themselves. There are many regiments which lost one-fourth of their men killed, or three-fourths, including the wounded, in some one engagement. The 69th Pennsylvania, of Gibbon's division, Second Corps, lost at Gettysburg 55 killed out of 258 present at morning roll-call. The 5th New York, Duryea Zouaves, of Fitz-John Porter's corps, at Manassas lost 117 killed out of 490 present for duty, and had 221 wounded besides. The 6th United States Colored Infantry at New Market Heights had 367 present at roll-call, of whom 6 officers and 55 enlisted men were killed, besides 8 officers and 134 men wounded. The 24th Michigan, of the Iron Brigade, went into the first day's fight at Gettysburg with 496 rank and file, losing 79 killed and 237 wounded, many of the latter mortally so. Among their killed were 8 officers and 4 color bearers.

On the field of Gettysburg there is a bronze tablet with this inscription:

FROM THE HILL BEHIND THIS MONUMENT
 ON THE MORNING OF
 JULY 3, 1863,
 THE SECOND MASSACHUSETTS INFANTRY
 MADE AN ASSAULT UPON THE
 CONFEDERATE TROOPS
 IN THE WORKS AT THE BASE OF CULP'S HILL,
 OPPOSITE.
 THE REGIMENT CARRIED TO THE CHARGE
 22 OFFICERS AND 294 ENLISTED MEN.
 IT LOST 4 OFFICERS
 AND
 41 ENLISTED MEN
 KILLED AND MORTALLY WOUNDED,
 AND
 6 OFFICERS AND 84 MEN WOUNDED.

This inscription has a historical value, on account of the precision with which the loss is stated, the records on some of the Gettysburg field stones being very loose in this respect.

But the most remarkable instance of all is

that of the 1st Minnesota Infantry, at Gettysburg. It was coming on the field alone, just at the time when General Hancock observed a Confederate column advancing through his line at a point where there were no Union troops to confront them. In order to delay the Confederate advance until some brigade could be brought up, Hancock ordered the 1st Minnesota alone to charge the enemy's line. This forlorn hope moved forward with only 252* officers and men, accomplished the purpose, forced back the Confederates, and captured their flag; but when it was over only 47 men clustered around their own colors, while 205 lay dead or wounded on the field. The muster-out rolls of this regiment bear the names of 75 men all marked as killed at Gettysburg, or died of wounds received there, a loss in killed of 29 per cent. of those engaged. Fifty-six of these men are buried in the Gettysburg cemetery; the others, dying of their wounds in hospitals at Philadelphia or York, were buried elsewhere.

The extent of these losses will be better understood if compared with some of the extraordinary cases cited in the histories of other wars. Take, for instance, the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava,—the charge of the Six Hundred. Lord Cardigan took 673 officers and men into that action; they lost † 113 killed and 134 wounded; total, 247, or 36.7 per cent. The heaviest loss in the late Franco-Prussian war occurred at Mars-la-Tour, ‡ in the 16th German Infantry (3d Westphalian), which lost 49 per cent. But the 141st Pennsylvania lost 76 per cent. at Gettysburg, while regimental losses of 60 per cent. were a frequent occurrence in both Union and Confederate armies. In the war for the Union there were scores of regiments, unknown or forgotten in history, whose percentage of killed and wounded in certain actions would far exceed that of the much praised Light Brigade; and nobody blundered either.

Company losses show still greater percentages in certain cases. In this same 1st Minnesota, one company lost, at Gettysburg, 13 killed and 17 wounded out of 35 engaged. The maximum of company losses, however, both numerically and by percentage, is reached in Company I of the 83d Pennsylvania Infantry. This company, during its term of service, carried 193 names on its rolls, including recruits, out of

which number 2 officers and 45 enlisted men were killed. With the killed bear in mind an additional number, of nearly three times as many more, who were wounded. As these 193 names embraced all the non-combatants, sick, and absentees, together with its many absent wounded, it will be seen that the percentage of loss in some of their battles must have been without an equal.

The following instances of excessive loss in particular actions may be of interest in connection with this topic. They represent the maximum of loss, and may be of interest to such historians as persist in telling of regiments that were all cut to pieces or completely annihilated.

Regiment.	Battle.	Present.	Killed and wounded*.	Per cent.
25th Massachusetts.....	Cold Harbor, Va.....	302	215	71
36th Wisconsin (4 co's)	Bethesda Church, Va.....	240	166	69
12th Massachusetts.....	Antietam, Md.....	334	224	67
81st Pennsylvania.....	Fredericksburg, Va.....	261	176	67
5th New Hampshire.....	Fredericksburg, Va.....	303	193	64
15th New Jersey.....	Spotsylvania, Va.....	432	272†	63
9th Illinois.....	Shiloh, Tenn.....	578	366	63
9th New York‡ (8 co's)	Antietam, Md.....	373	235	63
69th New York.....	Antietam, Md.....	317	196	61
121st New York.....	Salem Heights, Va.....	453	276	61
97th Pennsylvania.....	Bermuda Hundred, Va.....	311	188	60
2d Wisconsin.....	Cedarburg, Pa.....	302	181§	60
7th Ohio.....	Cedar Mountain, Va.....	307	182	59
63d New York.....	Antietam, Md.....	341	202	59
49th Pennsylvania.....	Spotsylvania, Va.....	478	274	57
37th Wisconsin.....	Petersburg Mine, Va.....	251	145	57
12th New Hampshire.....	Cold Harbor, Va.....	301	167	55
141st New York.....	Peach Tree Creek, Ga.....	142	80	56
111th New York.....	Spotsylvania, Pa.....	450	249	55
26th Pennsylvania.....	Gettysburg, Pa.....	382	213	55
8th Kansas.....	Chickamauga, Ga.....	406	220	54
14th Ohio.....	Chickamauga, Ga.....	449	245	54
10th Wisconsin.....	Chaplin Hills, Ky.....	276	150	54
22d Indiana.....	Chaplin Hills, Ky.....	303	159	52
32d Iowa.....	Pleasant Hill, La.....	420	210	50

* Includes a few missing ones; but they were, undoubtedly, killed or wounded.

† Includes 116 killed or mortally wounded.

‡ "Hawkins's Zouaves."

§ All killed or wounded; missing not included.

|| Includes 109 killed or mortally wounded.

The foregoing lists indicate fairly the limit of injury which a regiment will endure, and also the capacity of modern fire-arms for inflicting the same when used subject to the varying conditions of a battle-field.

Loss in action properly includes all of the wounded, and so where only the number of killed is stated, as in some instances here, there should be added a certain proportion of wounded, in order fully to comprehend what is implied in the statement. This proportion, after deducting from the wounded those fatally injured and adding their number to the killed, is something over two wounded to one killed and died of wounds. Before such deduction, the usual proportion is a fraction over four to one. The number of killed, as officially reported at the close

* Two of the companies were not engaged in this affair, having been detailed elsewhere on the field. The loss of the 1st Minnesota at Gettysburg for both days—July 2 and 3—was 50 killed, 173 wounded, and 1 missing; total, 224, or about 83 per cent. of the number engaged.

† Kinglake.

‡ Dr. Engel, Direktor der königlichen preussischen statistischen Bureau.

of a battle, is generally increased over fifty per cent. by those who die of their wounds. This statement is based upon an extended and careful comparison of official reports with final muster-out rolls. It will always be found correct as to an aggregate loss of any large number of regiments, although it may not always hold true as to some particular one.

The battle losses of a regiment are always unevenly distributed among the various engagements in which it participates. There is generally some one battle in which its losses are unusually severe, some one which the men always remember as their Waterloo. The following are the heaviest losses sustained by regiments in any one battle, and, together with the instances mentioned elsewhere in this article, embrace all where the loss in killed exceeds eighty. Do not grow impatient at these statistics. They are no ordinary figures. They are not a census of population and products, but statistics every unit of which stands for the pale, upturned face of a dead soldier.

at the close of the war, they made out their official statement of losses, and appended their signatures thereto.

The three-months' troops did not always have a safe pleasure excursion. For instance:

Regiment.	Battle.	Killed.	Wounded, including mortally.	Missing.
69th New York Infantry.	First Bull Run.	38	59	95
1st Missouri Infantry.	Wilson's Creek.	76	208	11
1st Kansas Infantry.	Wilson's Creek.	77	187	26

Their rolls bear the names of 101 men who are recorded as killed or died of wounds received at Wilson's Creek.

The Pennsylvania nine-months' troops, also, were in service long enough to do good work at Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. The sound of the good-byes had hardly died away in their farm-houses when hundreds of them fell in that terrible crackling of musketry on the Sharpsburg pike.

CONFEDERATE LOSSES.

BUT how fared the Confederate regiments amidst all this fighting?

The official casualty lists of the Confederate forces are not so trustworthy as those of the Union side because they have not had the same careful revision since the war closed, but the tables, now accessible, show that the Northern aim was equally true, and that the Northern nerve was equally steady. The 26th North Carolina—Pettigrew's Brigade, Heth's Division—lost at Gettysburg 86 killed and 502 * wounded; total, 588, not including the missing, of whom there were about 120. In one company, 84 strong, every man and officer was hit; and the orderly sergeant who made out the list did it with a bullet through each leg. This is by far the largest regimental loss on either side during the war. At Fair Oaks the 6th Alabama, John B. Gordon's regiment, sustained a loss of 91 killed, 277 wounded, and 5 missing; total, 373. One company in this regiment is officially reported as having lost 21 killed and 23 wounded out of 55 who were in action. The 1st South Carolina Rifles encountered the Duryea Zouaves at Gaines's Mill, and retired † with a loss of 81 killed and 225 wounded. The Zouaves, in turn, vacated their position at Manassas in favor of the 5th Texas, but not until they had dropped 261 of the Texans.

The following tabulation of remarkable losses

* Including mortally wounded. The official report states that the regiment "went in (July 1) with over 800 men."

† But not until they received a flank fire from disengaged regiments of the enemy.

Battle.	Regiment.	Corps.	Killed and mortally wounded.
Cold Harbor, Va.	2d Conn. H. A.	Sixth.	129
Spotsylvania, Va.	1st Mass. H. A.	Second.	120
Cold Harbor, Va.	7th N. Y. H. A.	Second.	116
Antietam, Md.	15th Mass. (11 co's)	Second.	108
Shiloh, Tenn.	9th Illinois	Sixteenth.	103
Stone's River, Tenn.	18th U. S. Infantry.	Fourteenth.	102
Fort Donelson, Tenn.	11th Illinois	Seventeenth.	102
Salem Heights, Va.	121st New York	Sixth.	97
Williamsburg, Va.	70th New York.	Third	97
Wilderness, Va.	57th Massachusetts.	Ninth.	94
Fair Oaks, Va.	61st Pennsylvania	Sixth.	91
Fredericksburg, Va.	145th Pa. (8 co's)	Second	61
Gettysburg, Pa.	111th New York.	Second	88
Chickamauga, Ga.	22d Michigan.	Fourth	88
Gaines's Mill, Va.	9th Massachusetts.	Fifth.	87
Olustee, Fla.	8th U. S. Colored.	Tenth.	87
Pleasant Hill, La.	32d Iowa.	Sixteenth.	86
Prairie Grove, Ark.	20th Wisconsin	Herron's Div.	86
Fort Wagner, S. C.	48th New York.	Tenth.	83
Pickett's Mills, Ga.	49th Ohio.	Fourth	83
Gaines's Mill, Va.	22d Massachusetts.	Fifth	84
Chaplin Hills, Ky.	15th Kentucky	Fourteenth.	82
Wilderness, Va.	4th Vermont	Sixth	82
Shiloh, Tenn.	55th Illinois	Fifteenth	82

* Includes one company Andrew Sharpshooters.

In the preceding figures none of the wounded are counted, except the mortally wounded, who, in each case, are included with the killed. If there be added the many wounded ones who survived,—the maimed and crippled,—the record becomes appalling, and unsurpassed in all the annals of military heroism.

There may be some officers who will dispute the accuracy of certain figures given here, and will claim even a greater loss. If so, they should bear in mind that if their regiments did lose more men killed, they themselves failed so to state the fact when, twenty-three years ago,

is compiled from the Confederate official reports of regimental commandants:

Regiment.	Battle.	Killed.	Wounded.*	Total.
4th North Carolina	Fair Oaks	77	286	363
14th Georgia	Mechanicsville	71	264	335
14th Alabama	Seven Days	71	253	324
8th Tennessee	Stone's River	41	265	306
20th North Carolina	Gaines's Mill	70	202	272
Palmetto Sharpshooters	Glendale	39	215	254
4th Texas	Gaines's Mill	44	208	252
4d Mississippi	Gettysburg	60	205	265
23d Mississippi	Stone's River	34	202	236
2d Mississippi	Gettysburg	49	183	232
57th North Carolina	Fredericksburg, 1862	32	192	224
45th North Carolina	Gettysburg	46	173	219
4th Tennessee	Shiloh	36	183	219
13th Georgia	Antietam	48	166	214
2d North Carolina	Chancellorsville	47	167	214
5th Alabama	Fair Oaks	20	181	210
23th Mississippi	Stone's River	63	146	209
13th Georgia	Gettysburg	42	162	204
17th Mississippi	Gettysburg	40	160	200
8th Georgia	First Bull Run	41	159	200
16th Tennessee	Chaplin Hills	41	151	192
2d Florida	Fair Oaks	37	152	189
3d Arkansas	Antietam	27	155	182
2d Louisiana	Malvern Hill	30	152	182

* Includes the mortally wounded. The missing are not included in these figures: there were but few of them, and in most of these instances there were none.

† This loss occurred at Gaines's Mill and Glendale.

There were other losses in the Confederate ranks which were equally severe if considered in connection with the number engaged, and the percentage of loss in their regiments appears to have been as large as that of their adversaries. In many instances the Confederate colonels in their official reports state, together with their loss, the number of men taken into action. In making a compilation from these reports, some heroic records are revealed. For instance:

Regiment.	Battle.	"Present in action."	Killed and wounded.	Per cent.
1st Texas	Antietam	226	186	82
21st Georgia	Manassas	242	184	76
8th Tennessee	Stone's River	444	306	69
17th South Carolina	Manassas	284	189	67
23d North Carolina	Manassas	225	149	66
44th Georgia	Mechanicsville	514	335	65
16th Mississippi	Antietam	228	144	63
15th Virginia	Antietam	128	75	58
15th Georgia	Antietam	176	101	57
10th Georgia	Antietam	147	83	56
12th Tennessee	Stone's River	292	164	56
16th Tennessee	Stone's River	377	207	55
3d Alabama	Malvern Hill	354	200	56
7th North Carolina	Seven Days	450	253	56
15th North Carolina	Seven Days	396	224	56
1st S. C. Rifles	Gaines's Mill	537	306	56
4th North Carolina	Fair Oaks	678	369	54
12th South Carolina	Manassas	279	140	54
4th Texas	Antietam	200	107	53
27th Tennessee	Chaplin Hills	210	112	53
1st South Carolina	Manassas	283	151	53
49th Virginia	Fair Oaks	424	224	52
12th Alabama	Fair Oaks	408	215	52
7th South Carolina	Antietam	268	140	52
7th Texas	Raymond	306	158	52
11th Alabama	Glendale	357	181	51

With these should be again mentioned the 26th North Carolina, whose official report shows a loss of over 85 per cent. at Gettysburg.

Many important instances are necessarily omitted from the preceding list, as the Confederates issued an order in May, 1863,* forbidding any further mention, in regimental battle-reports, "of the number of men taken into action," alleging as a reason "the impropriety of thus furnishing the enemy with the means of computing" their strength. The same order required "that in future the reports of the wounded shall only include those whose injuries, in the opinion of the medical officers, render them unfit for duty," and deprecated "the practice of including cases of slight injuries which do not incapacitate the recipient for duty."

The total number of killed in the Confederate armies, including deaths from wounds, will never be definitely known. From a careful examination of their official reports, or, in case of the absence of such reports, a consideration of the accepted facts, it appears that their mortuary loss by battle was not far from 94,000.

In 1866, General Fry, U. S. Provost Marshal General, ordered a compilation made from the Confederate muster-rolls, then in possession of the Government, from which it appears that they lost 2086 officers and 50,868 enlisted men, killed; 1246 officers and 20,324 enlisted men, died of wounds; total, 74,524.† Deaths from disease, 59,297. These rolls were incomplete; the rolls of two States were almost entirely missing; and none of them covered the entire period. Still they develop the fact that the number of killed could not have been less than the figures given above.

It does not follow that, because the Confederate armies were smaller, their losses were smaller. Their generals showed a remarkable ability in always having an equal number of men at the points of contact.

Upon tabulating the casualties of each battle, using official reports only,—and, in absence of such, allowing one loss to offset the other,—the aggregate casualties up to April, 1864, show that the Union loss in killed and wounded is about 11,500 in excess of the Confederate, a very small amount as compared with the totals. But this difference in favor of the Confederates would disappear if their official reports were subjected to a revision of the nominal lists, as has been done lately with the Union reports. For several years past the War Department has had a

* General Orders, No. 63, Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, May 14, 1863.

† Message and Documents, Part 3, 1865-66.

clerical force at work in comparing the official battle-reports of Union generals with the regimental nominal lists of casualties, and in each case the total of casualties, as reported by the general, is largely increased.

Up to 1864 the losses on each side were, in the aggregate, substantially the same, with a slight difference, if any, in favor of the Confederates. Then came a frightful discrepancy.

From May 5 to June 30, in their operations against Richmond, the armies of the Potomac and the James lost 77,452* men,—a greater number than were in Lee's army. Of this number the Army of the Potomac lost 54,925 in its return to the Peninsula by the overland "line."

Whatever excess there may be in killed on the Union side during the war is chargeable to the campaigns of 1864-65.

It would be difficult to name the Confederate regiments which sustained the greatest losses during the war, as their rolls are incomplete. The loss in some, however, has been ascertained,† notably those in Gregg's South Carolina Brigade, A. P. Hill's Division. Their total losses during the war, in killed and mortally wounded, were :

	Officers.	En. Men.	Total.
1st South Carolina	21	260	281
12th South Carolina	17	213	230
13th South Carolina	17	203	220
14th South Carolina	16	208	224
1st S. C. Rifles	19	305	324

In addition, there were 3735 wounded in this brigade.

The loss in a Confederate regiment during the whole war would be large, as the Confederacy did not organize any new regiments after 1862, but distributed their successive levies among the old regiments. With these accessions came a corresponding increase in the regimental casualty lists.

In the North additional troops were raised for the most part by organizing new regiments, while veteran commands were allowed to become reduced below an effective strength.

The question is often asked, Which corps did the most fighting in the war? So far as the casualty lists are an indication, the Second Corps is the one that can fairly claim that honor. Of the 100 Northern regiments which lost the most men killed in action during the war, 35 belonged to the Second Corps, while 17 is the highest number belonging to any other corps.

* 10,242 killed, 52,043 wounded, 15,167 missing; total, 77,452 (Adjutant-General's office, Washington, 1888). Three-fourths of the missing were killed or wounded.

† "History South Carolina Brigade," J. F. Caldwell.

It should be understood, however, that the Second was a very large corps, containing over 90 regiments, while, for instance, the Twelfth Corps (Slocum's) had only 28. Yet the Twelfth Corps (the Second Corps, Army of Virginia) rendered brilliant and effective service at Cedar Mountain, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and Lookout Mountain—also, later on, in the Atlanta campaign, where it was commanded by Hooker and was known as the Twentieth Corps, although it still retained its badge and for the most part its organization. This depriving the Twelfth Corps of the name under which it had fought so long and well was a needless act of injustice, similar to the one which wiped out the names of the First and Third corps. In the latter cases it was a blunder, as subsequent events proved, as well as a heartless blow at the corps pride of the officers and men. It is evident that such a thing as *esprit de corps* was but slightly appreciated by the gentlemen who sat in the War Office at Washington in those days. In the Western armies, the Fourth Corps (Gordon Granger's) is deservedly prominent. The regiments whose losses indicate that their fighting was the hardest and most frequent are found in that corps more than in any other, although some hard fighting was done by them before their organization under that name.

The heaviest losses by brigades are credited to the Iron Brigade of the First Corps and the Vermont Brigade of the Sixth Corps, both having a continuous unbroken organization as brigades, which was a rare thing in the war. Their long list of killed was but the natural result of the courage with which they faced the musketry on so many fields.

It may be noticed by some that the regimental losses in killed, as stated here, are greatly in excess of the figures as given in the "Official Records of the Rebellion," now in course of publication by the War Department. But it should be understood that those official figures are the ones which were reported at the close of each action, and show only the nature of the casualties at that particular hour. Such reports were made up under the headings of "Killed," "Wounded," and "Missing." The number of those who died of wounds is not shown, but is covered up in each case under the general return of the wounded, although many of them die the same day. Again, the "missing" is an indefinite quantity, embracing, as it does, all those who were captured, together with a certain class which always turn up again within a few days. Official reports of wounded also were often far from correct, as in some commands men were not allowed to be considered as

wounded unless the injury was a severe one, while in others orders were received to report every casualty, however slight. On account of this some are asking, How many of the regiment were actually killed, or died of their wounds? How many were buried as the result of the fight? They know that, however doubtful might be the classification of a slightly wounded or a missing man, there can be no question as to the definite allotment of one that is buried. The "Official Records" constitute a wonderful work, highly creditable to the officer in charge, and of a magnitude that will require many years before the last volumes can be printed. Its casualty lists so far as reached possess an intense interest and are tabulated in admirable form. Still, many will be interested in going farther, and noting the actual and largely increased number of killed as developed by the figures gleaned from the muster-out rolls.

The number of officers killed in battle was somewhat greater in proportion than that of the enlisted men, but often failed to bear any definite ratio to the loss of the regiment itself. In the 2d Vermont Infantry 223 were killed, of whom 6 were officers, while in the 12th Massachusetts (Colonel Fletcher Webster) 194 were killed, of whom 18 were officers. Again, the 19th Maine lost 192 killed, of whom 3 only were officers, while in the 22d Indiana, out of 153 killed, 14 were officers.

In the aggregate, the proportion of officers to enlisted men killed was 1 officer to 16 men, but certain regiments and certain States show a wide variation. The Connecticut and Delaware officers had either an excess of bravery or a lack of caution, as their proportionate loss in battle far exceeds the average.

The largest number of officers killed in any infantry regiment belongs to the 61st Pennsylvania of the Sixth Corps, it having lost 19 officers killed in battle. The 1st Maine Heavy Artillery lost 21 officers in action, but it had just twice as many line officers as an infantry command. The 8th New York Heavy Artillery lost 20 officers killed, but is also subject to the same remark when compared with the 61st Pennsylvania. It was seldom that an infantry regiment lost more than 6 officers killed in any one battle. The 7th New Hampshire, however, lost 11 officers killed in the assault on Fort Wagner, it being the greatest regimental loss of officers in any one engagement. The 22d New York lost 9 officers at Manassas; the 59th New York lost 9 at Antietam; and the 145th Pennsylvania lost 9 at Fredericksburg, the latter regiment taking only 8 companies into action there. Eight officers were killed in the 1st Michigan at Manassas; in the 14th New Hampshire at Opequon; in

the 87th Indiana at Chickamauga; and in the 43d Illinois at Shiloh. In some regiments the field and staff sustained severe losses during their term of service. The 95th Pennsylvania lost 2 colonels, 2 lieutenant-colonels, a major, and an adjutant killed in action. The 20th Massachusetts, "one of the very best regiments in the service,"* lost also 6 of its field and staff in battle, a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, adjutant, and a surgeon. But the most peculiar instance of loss in officers occurred in the 148th Pennsylvania, where, in one company (Company C) there were killed at different times 7 line officers. It must have required some nerve to accept a commission in that company.

The surgeons and chaplains, although regarded as non-combatants, were not exempt from the bloody casualties of the battle-field. The medical service sustained a loss of 40 surgeons killed in action or mortally wounded. There were 73 more who were wounded in action, and, as in the case of those killed, they were wounded while in the discharge of their duties on the field. Many of the chaplains were also killed or wounded in battle. Some of them were struck down while attending to their duties with the stretcher-bearers, while others, like Chaplain Fuller, fell dead in the front rank with a rifle in their hands.

Of the three principal arms of the service, the infantry loses the most men in action, the cavalry next, and the light artillery the least. The heaviest cavalry loss seems to have fallen on the 1st Maine Cavalry, it having lost 15 officers and 159 enlisted men killed. Next comes the 1st Michigan Cavalry, with 14 officers and 150 enlisted men killed. Of the 260 cavalry regiments in the Northern army, there were 15 others whose loss in killed exceeded 100. The percentages of killed are also less in this part of the service, the highest being found in the 5th Michigan Cavalry with its 8.9 per cent., and in the 6th Michigan Cavalry with 8.3 per cent.—both in Custer's brigade. Cavalrymen go into action oftener than infantrymen, and so their losses, being distributed among a larger number of engagements, do not appear remarkable as reported for any one affair. Still, in some of their fights the "dead cavalryman" could be seen in numbers that answered only too well the famous question of General Hooker.† At Reams's Station the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry lost 27 men killed, and at Todd's Tavern the 1st New York Dragoons lost 24 killed, not including the additional casualty lists of wounded. The number of cavalry officers killed in some

* General Humphreys, Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.

† "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?"

regiments was excessive, as in this arm of the service, more than in any other, the officers are expected to lead their men. Although the cavalry did not suffer in killed as badly as the infantry, still they participated in more engagements, were under fire much more frequently, and so were obliged to exhibit an equal display of courage. The 5th New York Cavalry lost 8 officers and 93 enlisted men killed in action, but it was present at over 100 engagements, and lost men, either killed or disabled, in 88 of them. The muster-out rolls of the various mounted commands show that there were 10,596 "dead cavalymen" who were killed in action during the war, of whom 671 were officers, the proportionate loss of officers being greater than in the infantry.

The casualties in the light artillery were less than in any other arm of the service, the engineers excepted. The light batteries, or horse artillery, which constituted the artillery proper for the field operations, were organized for the most part as independent batteries or commands. In some States twelve of them were connected by a regimental organization, but even then they operated as independent commands. A battery or company of light artillery consisted generally of 150 men, with 6 cannon and the necessary horses. There were some four-gun batteries, and towards the close of the war most of the old batteries were reorganized on that basis. The greatest numerical loss in any one of these organizations occurred in Cooper's battery of the Pennsylvania Reserves, in which 2 officers and 18 enlisted men, out of 332 names enrolled, were killed during its term of service. Weeden's Rhode Island battery also sustained a severe loss in its many engagements, 19 being killed out of 290 enrolled; while the Pennsylvania batteries of Ricketts, Easton, and Kerns were also prominent by reason of their frequent, effective, and courageous actions, with the consequent large loss in killed. The highest percentage of killed is found in Phillips's 5th Massachusetts battery, which lost 19 killed out of 194 members, or 9.7 per cent.; the enrollment taken being the one prior to the transfer of the 3d Battery near the close of the war.

The 11th Ohio Battery sustained the greatest loss in any one action. At the battle of Iuka it lost 16 killed and 39 wounded, the enemy capturing the battery, but the gunners, refusing to surrender, worked their pieces to the last and were shot down at the guns. The battery went into this action with 54 gunners, 46 of whom were killed or wounded, the remainder of the casualties occurring among the drivers or others.

A still more remarkable artillery fight was

that of Bigelow's battery, 9th Massachusetts, at Gettysburg; remarkable, not only for the exceptional loss, but also for the efficiency with which the guns were served and the valuable service rendered. When, on the afternoon of the second day, it was found that the Union batteries, on the cross-road near the Peach Orchard, could no longer hold their position, "it became necessary to sacrifice one of them" by leaving it there in action and working it to the last, so as to check the Confederate advance long enough to enable the other batteries to fall back to a better position. Major McGilvery selected Bigelow and his men for this duty, ordering him to fight with fixed prolonge, an arrangement which availed but little, for, although the canister from his light twelves kept his front clear for a long time and successfully detained the enemy, he could not check the swarm which finally came in on each flank and rear, some of whom, springing nimbly on his limber-chests, shot down his horses and then his men. Bigelow was wounded, and two of his lieutenants were killed; 9 of his gunners were killed, 14 were wounded, and 2 were missing. The battery then ceased firing, four of its guns being temporarily in the hands of the enemy. Lieutenant Milton, who brought the battery off the field, states in his official report that 45 horses were killed and 15 wounded in this affair; and that 5 more were killed in the action of the following day. This is the largest number of horses killed in any battery action of the war; at least, there are no official reports to the contrary.* A general once criticised a gallant but unnecessary charge which he happened to witness with the remark: "It is magnificent, but it is not war."† The fight of these Massachusetts cannoneers was not only magnificent, but it was war. There really was no sacrifice. There was a sad loss of life, considering how few there were of the battery men, but each man killed at those guns cost Kershaw and Barksdale a score. Doubleday quotes a statement of McLaws', that "one shell from this artillery killed and wounded thirty men." If the shrapnel was so effective, what must have been the slaughter when Bigelow's smooth-bore Napoleons threw canister so rapidly into Kershaw's masses; for the gunners in this battery were not allowed side-arms, but had been carefully instructed that their safety lay in the rapidity with which they could work their guns. This battery held Barksdale's advance in check for a half-hour, from 6 to 6.30 p. m., after which McGilvery's second line, consisting of Dow's, Phillips's, and

* There may have been a greater number killed in a battery at Stone's River; but, as the battery was captured, the exact loss cannot be satisfactorily ascertained.

† "C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre."

Thompson's guns, confronted him from 6.30 to 7.15 P. M., at which time Willard and Stannard, with their brigades, made the advance which drove him back and regained Bigelow's guns. This is not put forward as history so much as an illustration of the losses suffered and inflicted by the light artillery when at its best.

The light artillery service lost during the war 1817 men killed and mortally wounded, of whom 116 were officers. Their smaller losses only emphasize the fact that it is a valuable arm of the service in its capability of inflicting so much more loss than it receives.

And yet the artillery are largely responsible for the oft-quoted remark that "It takes a man's weight in lead to kill him." This old saw has always been considered as needing more or less latitude, but, on the contrary, it expresses an absolute truth devoid of exaggeration. As regards the battles of modern warfare, it is a very fair way of stating the relative weight of metal thrown and men killed. The figures pertaining to this subject are attainable and make the matter very plain. To be just, we will pass by such actions as Fort Sumter and certain other artillery affairs in which not a man was killed, and turn to the field engagements where the loss of life was greatest; where, according to the rhetorical historians, the fields were swept by the storm of iron sleet and leaden hail; where the ranks of the enemy — always the enemy — were mowed down like grain before the reaper; where the charging masses were "literally" blown from the mouths of the guns; where, according to a statement in a report of the New York Bureau of Military Statistics, "legs, arms, and large pieces of bodies filled the air."

As the truth of the adage referred to is purely a matter of figures, we will turn to them, and, for the present, to those of the battle of Stone's River, a general engagement and one in which some of the best fighting of the war was done on both sides. In this battle the artillery fired 20,307 rounds of ammunition, as officially stated by General Barnett, Chief of Artillery, in his report, which was an exhaustive one in its details, and gives the exact number of rounds fired by each battery. The weight of these 20,307 projectiles was fully 225,000 pounds. The infantry at the same time are officially reported as having fired over 2,000,000 rounds, and which consisted mostly of conical bullets from .55 to .69 of an inch in diameter, and may have included some buck-and-ball. The weight of this lead fired by the infantry exceeded 150,000 pounds. Hence the combined weight of the projectiles fired by the artillery and infantry at Stone's River was 375,000 pounds, and

fully equal to that of the 2319 Confederates killed or mortally wounded by the same.

General Rosecrans, in his official report of this battle, goes into this curious matter also but in a somewhat different direction, and states that "of 14,560 rebels struck by our missiles, it is estimated that 20,000 rounds of artillery hit 728 men; 2,000,000 rounds of musketry hit 13,832 men; averaging 27.4 cannon shots to hit one man, 145 musket shots to hit one man." But in this statement the term "hit," as applied, includes the wounded, while the old saying refers only to the killed. Again, General Rosecrans makes the killed and wounded of the enemy too great, putting it at 14,560, while General Bragg reported officially only 9000. Still, Rosecrans need not complain of this, as Bragg, in turn, generously overestimates Rosecrans' loss. Any such error, however, would not affect the proportion of wounds inflicted by the two arms of the service, according to the report quoted. It seems strange that 20,000 artillery missiles should kill or wound only 728 men, and that of the cannon pointed at the Confederate columns it should take 27 shots to hit, kill, wound, or scratch one man. The discussion of this latter point will have to be left to the gallant old general and such of his veterans as wore the red trimming on their jackets. In the mean while it is fair to infer that the proportion of bullet wounds to shell wounds has been carefully noted in the hospital returns, and that the medical staff may have furnished this remarkable statement, with the statistics to back it up. Lack of space prevents the mention here of other field engagements in support of this old maxim, but further and ample proof is found in a mere reference to the noisy clatter on the picket lines; the long-range artillery duels so popular at one time in the war; the favorite practice known as shelling the woods; and the noisy Chinese warfare indulged in at some bombardments, where the combatants, ensconced within their bomb-proofs or casemates, hurled at each other a month's product of several foundries with scarcely a casualty on either side.

Many of the colored regiments sustained severe losses in battle, although there seems to be a popular impression to the contrary, influenced no doubt by the old sneering joke about them so common at one time. The 79th United States Colored Infantry lost 5 officers and 174 enlisted men killed in action during the short time that the colored troops were in service, and the 13th United States Colored Infantry lost 221 men, killed and wounded, in one fight at Nashville. The 54th Massachusetts (colored) lost 5 officers and 124 enlisted men in various actions, all killed,

or missing men who, never returning from that fierce assault on Wagner, were probably thrown into that historic trench where the enemy buried "the colonel with his niggers." The black troops were largely engaged in guard or garrison duty, but still saw enough active service to contribute 2751 men killed in battle. This does not include their officers, who were whites, and of whom 143 were killed.

The number of officers killed in the regular regiments was in excess of their due proportion, and argues plainly better selected material. On the other hand, the number of enlisted men killed in the regular service was less in proportion to enrollment than in the volunteer. This may be due to the larger number of deserters which encumbered their rolls, or it may be that the regulars, being better officered, accomplished their work with a smaller loss, avoiding the useless sacrifice, which occurred too often, as the direct result of incompetency. In alluding to the regulars as being better officered, they are referred to as a whole, it being fully understood that in many State regiments commissions were held by those equally competent. In fact, it is doubtful if the regular army has a regiment which ever had at any time a line of officers which could equal those of the 2d Massachusetts Volunteers. The number killed in action in the regular service was 144 officers and 2139 enlisted men, the heaviest loss occurring in the 18th Infantry.

In connection with the subject of regimental losses there is the important one of loss by disease. In our army there were twice as many deaths from disease as from bullets. In the Confederate army the loss from disease was, for obvious reasons, much less, being smaller than their loss in battle. This loss by disease was, in our Northern regiments, very unevenly distributed, running as low as 30 in some and exceeding 500 in others, while in some of the colored regiments it was still greater. There seems to be an impression that the regiments which suffered most in battle lost also the most from disease. This is an error, the direct opposite being the truth. The Report of the War Department for 1866 says, regarding this subject, that "it is to be noted, that those States which show large mortality on the battle-field likewise show large mortality by disease." This may be true of the State totals, but is wholly incorrect as to the regiments themselves; for, with but few exceptions, the regiments which sustained the heaviest loss in battle show the smallest number of deaths from disease. As an illustration, take the following commands, all of which were crack fighting regiments, and note the mortality from the two causes:

Regiment.	Corps	Killed or mortally wounded in battle.	Died of diseases, accidents, in prisons, &c.
2d Massachusetts	Twelfth	191	98
12th Massachusetts	First	193	83
21st Massachusetts	Ninth	159	91
37th Massachusetts	Sixth	109	92
5th N. Y. (Duryea Zouaves)	Fifth	177	31
61st New York	Second	189	119
63d New York (Irish Brigade)	Second	161	88
70th N. Y. (Sickles's Brigade)	Third	190	64
82d N. Y. (2d N. Y. S. M.)	Second	176	78
84th N. Y. (14th Brooklyn)	First	162	69
124th N. Y. ("Orange Blossoms")	Third	151	89
12th New Jersey	Second	177	99
62d Pennsylvania	Fifth	169	89
72d Penn. (Baxter's Zouaves)	Second	193	71
95th Pennsylvania	Sixth	182	73
102d Pennsylvania	Sixth	181	82
5th Ohio	Twelfth	151	50
7th Ohio	Twelfth	184	89
19th Indiana	Third	179	117
32d Indiana (First German)	Fourth	171	97
26th Wisconsin (German Regiment)	Eleventh	188	77
37th Wisconsin	Ninth	156	89
1st Minnesota	Second	187	99

In addition to these, there are the forty-five leading regiments previously mentioned,—leading ones as regards greatest loss in action,—whose aggregate of killed is one-third greater than that of their loss by disease. Then there might be cited the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, an effective and hard fighting division, in which every regiment sustained a greater loss in battle than by disease, with the exception of the 7th Reserves, in whose case the excess from disease was caused by seventy-four deaths in Andersonville. The 1st Jersey Brigade, the 2d Jersey Brigade, and the Iron Brigade were all hard fighters, with the consequent heavy losses, and yet each regiment in those brigades lost less by disease than by battle.

Still, in the whole army the aggregate loss by disease was double the loss in action, and the question arises, Where, then, did it occur?

In reply, a long list could be offered, in which regiments with a comparatively small loss in action would show a startling mortality from sickness; also many commands which performed garrison or post duty, and which show a long death-roll without having been engaged in any battle. The troops in the Departments of the Gulf and the Mississippi were exposed to a fatal climate, but participated in few battles, the fighting there, aside from a few minor engagements, being over by August, 1863. Though but few battle names were inscribed upon their colors, it should be remembered that they went and came in obedience to orders; that the service they rendered was an important one; and that their comrades' lives were also lost while in the line of duty.

Still, the inference is a fair one that the fighting regiments owed their exemption from disease to that same pluck which made them famous, and which enabled them to withstand its encroachments without tamely giving up and lying down under its attack. It was a question of mental as well as bodily stamina, and hence there is found in certain black regiments a mortality from disease exceeding by far that of any white troops, a fact which cannot be accounted for by climatic reasons, because the particular regiments referred to were recruited from blacks who were born and raised along the Mississippi, where these troops were stationed, and where the loss occurred.

Throughout the whole army, the officers were far less apt to succumb to the fatalities of disease than were their men. While the proportionate loss of enlisted men in battle was 16 men to one officer, the loss by disease was 82 men, and in the colored troops 214 men — facts with ethnological features worth noting.

In addition to deaths from battle and disease there were other prolific sources of mortality, over 4000 being killed by accidents, resulting mostly from a careless use of fire-arms or from fractious horses, while 3000 more were drowned while bathing or boating. By the explosion of the steamer *Sultana*, loaded with exchanged prisoners, homeward bound after the war, 1400 Union soldiers were killed — a loss exceeded in only a few battles of the war.

A regiment's greatest loss did not always occur in its greatest battle. The heaviest blows were often received in some fight which history scarcely mentions — some reconnoissance, ambuscade, or wagon-guard affair, entirely disconnected with any general engagement. With many commands this has been a misfortune and a grievance; something akin to that of the oft-quoted aspirant for glory who was slain in battle, but whose name was mis-

spelled in the newspapers. The 107th New York went through Gettysburg with a trivial loss, only to have 170 men struck down at Pumpkin Vine Creek, Ga. This regiment erected a monument, on the pedestal of which is chiseled a long list of battle names, remarkable for their euphony as well as their historic grandeur. The hand of the stone-cutter paused at Pumpkin Vine Creek, and the committee substituted New Hope Church, the name by which the Confederates designate the same fight.

The word Gettysburg is not a musical combination, but many will thank fortune that the battle was fought there instead of at Pipe Creek, the place designated in the general's orders. As it is, the essayist and historian will delight in referring to the grand victory as one which preserved unbroken the map and boundaries of the nation, but they would hardly care to do so if they were obliged to add that all this took place at Pipe Creek.

Soldiers love to point to the battle names inscribed upon their colors, and glory in the luster that surrounds them. It is natural that they should prefer well-known names or pleasant-sounding ones. The old soldier is something of a romancer in his way, and is alive to the value of euphony as an adjunct to his oft-told tale. The Michigan cavalrymen find willing ears for the story of their fight at Falling Waters, while the Jersey troopers find it difficult to interest hearers in their affair at Hawes' Shop. The veterans of the West find it easier to talk of Atlanta and Champion's Hill than of the Yazoo or Buzzard's Roost. Through coming years our rhyming bards will tell of those who fought at the Wilderness, or Malvern Hill, but cadence and euphony will ignore the fallen heroes of Pea Ridge and Bermuda Hundred.

William F. Fox.

THE MASK.

WHY am I still unscarred when agony,
 Repeated oft, has burnt both heart and brain,
 Till all my being seems a quivering pain
 That custom but renews unceasingly?
 Abroad, I shrink, dreading lest misery
 Have so defaced my face that once again
 Men turn, and look, and shuddering be fain
 To say with Dante's Florentines, "There, see
 One who, though living, hath known death and hell."
 So, when thy glance has glorified my face,
 And joy, transfigured, all in life seems well,
 Methinks my mirror then will show no trace
 Of my old self, but one supremely fair.
 Insensate flesh! I find no beauty there!

Elyot Weld.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE ADVANCE.



SECESSION sophistry about oppression and subjugation was sufficiently answered by the practical logic of the Southern States in collecting armies and uniting in military leagues. Military necessity, not political expediency, was now the unavoidable rule of action. The Washington authorities had long foreseen that merely filling the National capital with Northern regiments would not by itself give security to the Government buildings and archives. The presidential mansion, the Capitol, and the various department offices all lay within easy reach of rebel batteries which might rise in a single night at commanding points on the southern bank of the Potomac, and from which hostile shot and shell could speedily reduce the whole city to ruins. As early, therefore, as the 3d of May, Scott instructed General Mansfield, the local commander, to seize and fortify Arlington Heights. Various causes produced a postponement of the design, urgent as was the necessity; but finally the needed reinforcements arrived. Under plans carefully matured, the Union forces commanded by Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell on the morning of May 24 made their advance across the Potomac River and entered Virginia. Here was begun that formidable system of earth-works, crowning every hill in an irregular line for perhaps ten miles, extending from the river-bend above Georgetown to the bay into which Hunting Creek flows, below Alexandria, which constituted such an immense military strength, and so important a moral support to the Army of the Potomac, and, indeed, to the Union sentiment of the whole country during the entire war.

Three other movements of troops were begun about the same time. General Butler was transferred from Baltimore to Fort Monroe to collect nine or ten regiments for aggressive purposes. General Robert Patterson, who was organizing the Pennsylvania militia, assembled the contingent of that State with a view to a movement against Harper's Ferry.

And General George B. McClellan, appointed to organize the contingent from the State of Ohio, had his earliest attention directed toward a movement into western Virginia.

Prompted by many different shades of feeling, there now arose throughout the North a demand for military action and military success. Assuming the undeniable preponderance of men and means in the free States, public opinion illogically also assumed that they could be made immediately victorious. Under bold head-lines a leading newspaper kept "The nation's war cry" standing in its columns: "Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond! The rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July. By that date the place must be held by the National army!"† Though this was but a single voice, it brought responsive echoes from all parts of the North.

Two months of the first three-months' enlistment of the militia called into service were already gone; it seemed desirable that the remaining third of their term should be utilized in an energetic movement. General Scott's original idea had been that this energetic movement should occur at Harper's Ferry; but Johnston's evacuation of that place, and Patterson's over-caution and defensive strategy, frustrated the design. Under the increasing political pressure, the most promising alternative was thought to be a direct advance from Washington against Manassas Junction, the strategical importance of which the Confederates had instinctively recognized, especially its relation to Harper's Ferry. Colonel Cocke had written to Lee, May 15:

These two columns, one at Manassas and one at Winchester, could readily cooperate and concentrate upon the one point or the other; either to make head against the enemy's columns advancing down the valley, should he force Harper's Ferry, or in case we repulse him at Harper's Ferry, the Winchester supporting column could throw itself on this side of the mountains to cooperate with the column at Manassas.

On the 29th of June President Lincoln called his Cabinet and principal military officers to a council of war at the Executive Mansion, to discuss a campaign against the rebels at Manassas. General Scott took occa-

† "New York Tribune," June 20, 1861.

sion to say that he was not in favor of such a movement. "He did not believe in a little war by piecemeal. But he believed in a war of large bodies." He adhered to the "anacanda" policy, and a decisive campaign down the Mississippi River in the autumn and winter. "We were to go down, fight all the battles that were necessary, take all the positions we could find and garrison them, fight a battle at New Orleans and win it, and thus end the war."* But being overruled by the President and Cabinet in favor of an immediate movement, the old soldier gracefully yielded his preference, and gave his best counsel and co-operation to the new enterprise. He caused to be read the plan matured by General McDowell and approved by himself.

McDowell's plan stated that the secession forces then at Manassas Junction, under command of General Beauregard, and its dependencies, were estimated at twenty-five thousand. When threatened they would call up all reinforcements within reach.

If General J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Major-General Patterson, and Major-General Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity, I think they will not be able to bring up more than ten thousand men. So we must calculate on having to do with about thirty-five thousand men. . . . Leaving small garrisons in the defensive works, I propose to move against Manassas with a force of 30,000 of all arms, organized into 3 columns, with a reserve of 10,000. . . . After uniting the columns this side of it, I propose to attack the main position by turning it, if possible, so as to cut off communications by rail with the South. †

Before, however, the preparation for this advance had even been completed, the first campaign of the war, though not an extensive one, was already finished with a decided success to the Union arms.

When the Richmond convention by the secret secession ordinance of the 17th of April, and a few days later by a military league with Jefferson Davis, literally kidnapped Virginia and transferred her, bound hand and foot, to the rebel government at Montgomery, the western half of the State rose with an almost unanimous protest against the rude violation of self-government, and resolved to secede from secession. A series of popular meetings was held, with such success that on the 13th of May delegates from twenty-five counties met for consultation at Wheeling, and agreed on such further action and co-operation as would enable them to counteract and escape the treason and alienation to which they had been committed without their consent. The leaders made their designs known to President Lincoln at Washington, and to General McClellan at Cincinnati, commanding the

* Committee on Conduct of the War.

Department of the Ohio, and were not only assured of earnest sympathy, but promised active help from the Ohio contingent of three-months' volunteers, whenever the decisive moment of need should arrive. In conformity with this understanding, an expedition under McClellan's orders moved against and dispersed a little nucleus of rebel troops at Philippi, in a secluded mountain valley about fifteen miles south of Grafton.

Under shelter and encouragement of this initial military success, the political scheme of forming a new State proceeded with accelerated ardor. As early as June 11 a delegate convention, representing about forty counties lying between the crest of the Alleghanies and the Ohio River, met and organized at Wheeling. On the 13th of June, after reciting the various treasonable usurpations of the Richmond convention and Governor Letcher, it adopted a formal declaration that all the acts of the convention and the executive were without authority and void, and declared vacated all executive, legislative, and judicial offices in the State held by those "who adhere to said convention and executive." On the 19th of June an ordinance was adopted creating a provisional State government, under which F. H. Peirpoint was appointed governor, to wield executive authority in conjunction with an executive council of five members. A legislature was constituted by calling together such members-elect as would take a prescribed oath of allegiance to the United States and to the restored government of Virginia, and providing for filling the vacancies of those who refused. A similar provision continued or substituted other State and county officers. After adding sundry other ordinances to this groundwork of restoration, the convention on the 25th took a recess till August. The newly constituted legislature soon met to enact laws for the provisional government; and on July 9 it elected two United States senators, who were admitted to seats four days later.

So far the work was simply a repudiation of secession and a restoration of the government of the whole State which had been usurped. But the main motive and purpose of the counter-revolution was not allowed to halt nor fail. In August the Wheeling convention reassembled, and on the 20th adopted an ordinance creating the new State of Kanawha (afterward West Virginia) and providing for a popular vote to be taken in the following October on the question of ratification.

The Richmond government had no thought of surrendering western Virginia to the Union without a struggle. Toward the end of June

† McDowell to Townsend, June, 1861. War Records.

they sent General Garnett to oppose the Federal forces. He took position in a mountain-pass at Laurel Hill with 3 or 4 regiments, and stationed Colonel Pegram in another pass at Rich Mountain, 17 miles south, with a regiment and 6 guns. Early in July, General McClellan, learning the weakness of the rebels, resolved to drive them from their positions. He sent General Morris with 5 or 6 regiments against Garnett, and himself moved with some 7 regiments upon Pegram's intrenched camp. General Rosecrans, commanding McClellan's advance, was fortunate enough to obtain a Union mountaineer, thoroughly familiar with the locality, who led a detachment of 1900 men to the rear of the rebel position, where they easily dispersed an outpost of 300 men with 2 guns stationed near the summit. This victory made Pegram's position untenable; and, hastily abandoning his intrenched camp and guns, he sought to join Garnett at Laurel Hill by a northward march along the mountain-top. Garnett, however, was already retreating; and Pegram, unable to escape, surrendered his command of between 500 and 600 to McClellan on the morning of the 13th of July.

A difficult route of retreat to the northward still lay open to Garnett, and he made diligent efforts to impede the pursuit, which was pushed with vigor. About noon of July 13 Captain Benham with three Union regiments came up with the rebel wagon train at Carrick's Ford, one of the crossings of Cheat River, twenty-six miles north-west of Laurel Hill. Here Garnett deployed his rear-guard of a regiment with three guns to protect his train; but by a sharp attack the Union forces drove the enemy, capturing one of the guns. In a desultory skirmish a little farther on Garnett himself was killed by a sharpshooter, and that incident terminated the pursuit. The Unionists secured the wagon train, and the remnant of rebels successfully continued their farther retreat.

Large political and military results followed this series of comparatively slight encounters. They terminated the campaign for the possession of western Virginia, and the movement for the establishment of a separate State thereafter went on unchecked. The most important result was upon the personal fortunes of General McClellan. These were the first decided Union

victories of the war, and they were hailed by the North with a feeling of triumph altogether disproportionate to their real magnitude. When on the following day McClellan summed up in a single laconic dispatch* the scattered and disconnected incidents of three different days, happening forty miles apart, the impression, without design on his part, was most naturally produced upon the authorities and the country that so sweeping and effective a campaign could only be the work of a military genius of the first order. McClellan was the unquestioned hero of the hour. The *éclat* of this achievement soon called him to Washington, and in a train of events which followed had no insignificant influence in securing his promotion, on the 1st of November following, without further victories, to the command of all the armies of the United States.

BULL RUN. †

IT had been arranged that McDowell's advance against the enemy at Manassas should begin on July 9: by dint of extraordinary exertions he was ready and issued his marching orders on July 16. ‡ But his organization was very imperfect and his preparations were far from complete. Many of his regiments reached him but two days before, and some only on the day he moved. He started with barely wagons enough for his ammunition and hospital supplies; tents, baggage, and rations were to follow.§ The utmost caution was enjoined to avoid another Vienna or Big Bethel disaster. Three things, his marching orders said, would be held unpardonable: *First*, to come upon a battery or a breastwork without knowledge of its position. *Second*, to be surprised. *Third*, to fall back. His army being a new, untried machine, his men unused to the fatigues and privations of a march, progress was slow. With a cumbersome movement it felt its way toward Fairfax Court House and Centreville, the outposts of the enemy having sufficient time to retire as it advanced. Tyler commanded his first division, of 4 brigades; Hunter the second division, of 2 brigades; Heintzelman the third division, of 3 brigades; and Miles the fifth division, of 2 brigades. The fourth division, under Runyon,

* HUNTSVILLE, VA., July 14, 1861.

COLONEL TOWNSEND: Garnett and forces routed; his baggage and one gun taken; his army demoralized; Garnett killed. We have annihilated the enemy in western Virginia, and have lost 13 killed and not more than 40 wounded. We have in all killed at least 100 of the enemy, and their prisoners will amount to at least 1000. Have taken seven guns in all. I still look for the capture of the remnant of Garnett's army by General Hill. The troops defeated are the crack regiments of eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Ten-

nesseans, and Carolinians. Our success is complete and secession is killed in this country.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

[War Records.]

† For a more detailed account of the battle of Bull Run, see Nicolay, "The Outbreak of Rebellion," pp. 169-197.

‡ War Records.

§ Committee on Conduct of the War.

was left behind to guard his communications. His total command embraced an aggregate of 34,320 men; his marching column proper consisted of a little less than 28,000 men, including artillery, a total of 49 guns, and a single battalion of cavalry.

When, on the morning of July 18, Tyler reached Centreville, he found that the enemy had everywhere retired behind the line of Bull Run, a winding, sluggish stream flowing south-easterly toward the Potomac, about thirty-two miles south-east of Washington. While it is fordable in many places, it generally has steep and sometimes precipitous and rocky banks with wooded heights on the west. Three miles beyond the stream lies Manassas Junction on a high, open plateau. Here the railroads, from Richmond on the south and the Shenandoah Valley on the west, come together. To protect this junction the rebels had some slight field-works, armed with 14 or 15 heavy guns, and garrisoned by about 2000 men. Beauregard, in command since the 1st of June, had gathered an army of nearly 22,000 men and 29 guns. The independent command of Holmes, called up from Aquia Creek, augmented his force to a little over 23,000 men and 35 guns. Instead of keeping this about the Manassas earth-works he had brought it close down to the banks of Bull Run and posted it along a line some eight miles in length, extending from the Manassas railroad to the stone bridge on the Warrenton turnpike, and guarding the five intermediate fords.

The enemy retired from Centreville as Tyler approached that place; and taking a light detachment to make a reconnaissance, he followed their main body toward the crossing of Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, near the center of Beauregard's extended line. Tyler was under express orders to observe well the roads, but not to bring on an engagement.* Apparently lured on, however, by the hitherto easy approach, his reconnaissance became a skirmish, and calling up support, the skirmish became a preliminary battle. Before he was well aware of it 60 men had fallen, 2 exposed field-pieces had been with difficulty extricated, 1 regiment had retreated in confusion, and 3 others were deployed in line of battle, to make a new charge. At this point Tyler remembered his instructions and called off his troops. This engagement at Blackburn's Ford, so apparently without necessity or advantage, greatly exasperated the men and officers engaged in it, and seriously chilled the fine spirit in which the army started on its march. The attacking detachment did not then know that the enemy had suffered equal loss and demoralization. †

McDowell began his campaign with the

purpose of turning the flank of the enemy on the south; but the examinations made on the 18th satisfied him that the narrow roads and rough country in that direction made such a movement impracticable. When, in addition, he heard Tyler's cannonade on the same day, he hurried forward his divisions to Centreville; and the report of that day's engagement also seemed to prove it inexpedient to make a direct attack. ‡ That night McDowell assembled his division commanders at Centreville and confidentially informed them that he had changed his original plan, and resolved to march northward and turn Beauregard's left flank. † All of Friday, the 19th, and Saturday, the 20th, were spent in an effort of the engineers to find an unfortified ford over Bull Run in that direction; and thus the main battle was postponed till Sunday, July 21. During those two days, while McDowell's army was refreshed by rest and supplied with rations, the strength of the enemy in his front was greatly increased.

McDowell's movement was based upon the understanding and promise that Patterson should hold Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley, and General Scott made every exertion to redeem this promise. On the 13th he directed Patterson to detain Johnston "in the valley of Winchester"; and as the critical time approached, and hearing no official report from him for three whole days, he sent him a sharp admonition: "Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front, whilst he reënforces the [Manassas] Junction with his main body." ‡ And still more emphatically on the 18th, while the engagement of Blackburn's Ford was being fought by McDowell's troops: "I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or at least had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and, I suppose, superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent reënforcements toward Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win victories." § Patterson was touched by the implied censure, and answered restively: "The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and by threats and reconnaissances in force have caused him to be reënforced." || But the facts did not bear out the assertion. He had been grossly outwitted, and the enemy was at that moment making the stolen march which Scott feared, and of which

* McDowell to Tyler, July 18, 1861. War Records.

† War Records.

‡ Scott to Patterson, July 17, 1861. War Records.

§ Scott to Patterson. War Records.

|| Patterson to Scott, July 18, 1861. War Records.

Patterson remained in profound ignorance till two days later.

Since the 9th of July his readiness to "offer battle," or to "strike" when the proper moment should arrive, had oozed away. He became clamorous for reënforcements, and profuse of complaints. Making no energetic reconnaissance to learn the truth, and crediting every exaggerated rumor, he became impressed that he was "in face of an enemy far superior in numbers." Understanding perfectly the nature and importance of his assigned task, and admitting in his dispatches that "this force is the key-stone of the combined movements"; ambitious to perform a brilliant act, and commanding abundant means to execute his plan, his courage failed in the trying moment. "To-morrow I advance to Bunker Hill," he reported on July 14, "preparatory to the other movement. If an opportunity offers, I shall attack."* Reaching Bunker Hill on the 15th, he was within nine miles of the enemy. His opportunity was at hand. Johnston had only 12,000 men all told; Patterson, from 18,000 to 22,000. All that and the following day he must have been torn by conflicting emotions. He was both seeking and avoiding a battle. He had his orders written out for an attack. But it would appear that his chief of staff, Fitz-John Porter, together with Colonels Abercrombie and Thomas, at the last moment persuaded him to change his mind. Making only a slight reconnaissance on the 16th, he late that night countermanded his orders, and on July 17 marched to Charlestown—nominally as a flank movement, but practically in retreat. Johnston, the Confederate commander, was at Winchester, in daily anticipation of Patterson's attack, when at midnight of July 17 he received orders to go at once to the help of Beauregard at Manassas. By 9 o'clock on the morning of the 18th his scouts brought him information that Patterson's army was at Charlestown. Relieved thus unexpectedly from a menace of danger which otherwise he could neither have resisted nor escaped, he lost no time. At noon of the same day he had his whole effective force of 9000 men on the march; by noon of Saturday, July 20, 6000 of them, with 20 guns, were in Beauregard's camp at Bull Run, ready to resist McDowell's attack.

The Union army lay encamped about Centreville; from there the Warrenton turnpike ran westward over a stone bridge, crossing Bull Run to Gainesville, several miles beyond. Unaware as yet that Johnston had joined Beauregard, McDowell desired to seize Gainesville, a station on the railroad, to pre-

vent such a junction. The stone bridge was thought to be defended in force, besides being mined, ready to be blown up. The engineers, however, late on Saturday, obtained information that Sudley Ford, two or three miles above, could be readily carried and crossed by an attacking column.

On Saturday night, therefore, McDowell called his officers together and announced his plan of battle for the following day. Tyler's division was ordered to advance on the Warrenton turnpike and threaten the stone bridge; while Hunter and Heintzelman, with their divisions, should make a circuitous and secret night march, seize and cross Sudley Ford, and descending on the enemy's side of Bull Run should carry the batteries at the stone bridge by a rear attack, whereby Tyler would be able to cross and join in the main battle.

Beauregard, on his part, also planned an aggressive movement for that same Sunday morning. No sooner had Johnston arrived than he proposed that the Confederates should sally from their intrenchments, cross the five fords of Bull Run they were guarding, march by the various converging roads to Centreville, and surprise and crush the Union army in its camps. The orders for such an advance and attack were duly written out, and Johnston, as ranking officer, signed his approval of them in the gray twilight of Sunday morning. But it proved wasted labor. At sunrise Tyler's signal guns announced the Union advance and attack. The original plan was thereupon abandoned, and Beauregard proposed a modification—to stand on the defensive with their left flank at the stone bridge, and attack with their right from the region of Blackburn's Ford. This suggestion again Johnston adopted and ordered to be carried out. There had been confusion and delay in the outset of McDowell's march, and the flanking route around by Sudley Ford proved unexpectedly long. Tyler's feigned attack at the stone bridge was so feeble and inefficient that it betrayed its object; the real attack by Hunter and Heintzelman, designed to begin at daylight, could not be made until near 11 o'clock. The first sharp encounter took place about a mile north of the Warrenton turnpike; some five regiments on each side being engaged. The rebels tenaciously held their line for an hour. But the Union column was constantly swelling with arriving batteries and regiments. Tyler's division found a ford, and crossing Bull Run a short distance above the stone bridge, three of its brigades joined Hunter and Heintzelman. About 12 o'clock the Confederate line, composed mainly of Johnston's troops, wavered and broke, and was swept back across and out of the valley of the Warrenton turnpike, and down the road

* Patterson to Townsend, July 14, 1861. War Records.

running southward from Sudley Ford to Manassas Junction.

The commanders and other officers on both sides were impressed with the conviction that this conflict of the forenoon had decided the fortunes of the day. Beauregard's plan to make a counter-attack from his right flank against Centreville had failed through a miscarriage of orders; and leaving Johnston at headquarters to watch the entire field, he hastened personally to endeavor to check the tide of defeat. Jackson, afterward known by the sobriquet of "Stonewall," had already formed his fresh brigade, also of Johnston's army, on the crest of a ridge half a mile south of the Warrenton turnpike. Other regiments and batteries were hurried up, until they constituted a semicircular line of 12 regiments, 22 guns, and 2 companies of cavalry, strongly posted and well hidden in the edge of a piece of woods behind the screen of a thick growth of young pines.

At half-past 2 o'clock in the afternoon, McDowell attacked this second position of the enemy with an immediately available force of about 14 regiments, 24 guns, and a single battalion of cavalry. Here the advantages of position were all strongly against him. The enemy was posted, concealed, and his artillery concentrated, while McDowell's brigades were at the foot of the hill; not only where the ascent must be made in open view, but where the nature of the ground rendered a united advance impossible. A series of successive and detached assaults followed. Two batteries were lost by mistaking a rebel for a Union regiment; and because of the lax organization and want of discipline in the raw volunteer regiments, the strength of McDowell's command melted away in a rapid demoralization and disintegration. The scales of victory, however, yet vibrated in uncertainty, when at 4 in the afternoon the remainder of Johnston's army arrived, and seven fresh rebel regiments were thrown against the extreme right and partly in rear of the Union line.

This heavy numerical overweight at a decisive time and place terminated the battle very suddenly. The abundant rumors that Johnston was coming to the help of Beauregard seemed verified; and the Union regiments, ignorant of the fact that they had been successfully fighting part of his force all day, were now seized with a panic, and began by a common impulse to move in retreat. The suddenness of their victory was as unexpected to the rebel as to the Union commanders. Jefferson Davis, who had come from Richmond, arriving at Manassas at 4 o'clock, was informed that the battle was lost, and was implored by his companions not to endanger his

personal safety by riding to the front. Nevertheless he persisted, and was overjoyed to find that the Union army had, by a sudden and unexplained impulse, half marched, half run from the field. The rebel detachments of cavalry hung about the line of retreat, and by sudden dashes picked up a large harvest of trophies in guns and supplies, but they dared not venture a serious attack; and so unconvinced were they as yet of the final result, that that night the rebel commanders set a strong and vigilant guard in all directions against the expected return, and offensive operations, by McDowell next morning. The precaution was needless, for the Union army was so much demoralized that the commanders deemed it unsafe to make a stand at Centreville, where the reserves were posted; and a rapid though orderly retreat was continued through the night, and until all organized regiments or fragments reached their old camps within the fortifications on the Potomac, and the scattered fugitives made their way across the river into the city of Washington.

McDowell's defeat was wholly due to Patterson's inefficiency. He was charged with the task of defeating or holding Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley; he had a double force with which to perform his task. Had he done so, McDowell, who in that case would have been superior in numbers to Beauregard, and whose plans were in the main judicious, could easily have conquered. It was Johnston's army, which Patterson had permitted to escape, that principally fought the battle of Bull Run and defeated McDowell.* Nor is there any good sense in that criticism which lays the blame upon General Scott and the Administration for not having first united the two Federal armies. The Administration furnished a superior force against Beauregard at Bull Run, and an overwhelming force against Johnston at Winchester, and assured victory in each locality by the only reliable condition—other things being equal—an excess of numbers. Had Patterson held his foe, as he might, and McDowell defeated Beauregard, as he would have done, the capture of Johnston's force between the two Federal armies was practically certain, as General Scott intended. †

* The following analysis of the forces engaged in the main and decisive phases of the actual fighting shows it conclusively:

	JOHNSTON'S ARMY.		BEAUREGARD'S ARMY.	
	Regs.	Guns.	Regs.	Guns.
Battle of the morning	4	4	1	2
Battle of the afternoon	9	16	3	6
Final flank attack which created the panic	3	4	4	..
	16	24	8	8

† Scott to McClellan, July 18, 1861. War Records.

Scott was aware of the danger which Patterson's negligence had created. "It is known that a strong reinforcement left Winchester on the afternoon of the 18th, which you will also have to beat," he telegraphed McDowell on the day of the battle, which it was then too late to countermand.* He also promised him immediate reinforcements. The confidence of the General-in-Chief remained unshaken, and he telegraphed McClellan: "McDowell is this forenoon forcing the passage of Bull Run. In two hours he will turn the Manassas Junction and storm it to-day with superior force."†

It may well be supposed that President Lincoln suffered great anxiety during that eventful Sunday; but General Scott talked confidently of success, and Lincoln bore his impatience without any visible sign, and quietly went to church at 11 o'clock. Soon after noon copies of telegrams began to come to him at the Executive Mansion from the War Department and from army headquarters. They brought, however, no certain information, as they came only from the nearest station to the battle-field, and simply gave what the operator saw and heard. Toward 3 o'clock they became more frequent, and reported considerable fluctuation in the apparent course and progress of the cannonade. The President went to the office of General Scott, where he found the general asleep, and woke him to talk over the news. Scott said such reports were worth nothing as indications either way — that the changes in the currents of wind and the variation of the echoes made it impossible for a distant listener to determine the course of a battle. He still expressed his confidence in a successful result, and composed himself for another nap when the President left.

Dispatches continued to come about every ten or fifteen minutes, still based on hearing and hearsay. But the rumors grew more cheering and definite. They reported that the battle had extended along nearly the whole line; that there had been considerable loss; but that the secession lines had been driven back two or three miles, some of the dispatches said, to the Junction. One of General Scott's aides now also came, bringing the telegram of an engineer, repeating that McDowell had driven the enemy before him, that he had ordered the reserves to cross Bull Run, and wanted reinforcements without delay.‡

The aide further stated substantially that the general was satisfied of the truth of this

report, and that McDowell would immediately attack and capture the Junction, perhaps to-night, but certainly by to-morrow noon. Deeming all doubt at an end, President Lincoln ordered his carriage, and went out to take his usual evening drive.

He had not yet returned when, at 6 o'clock, Secretary Seward came to the Executive Mansion, pale and haggard. "Where is the President?" he asked hoarsely of the private secretaries. "Gone to drive," they answered. "Have you any late news?" he continued. They read him the telegrams which announced victory. "Tell no one," said he. "That is not true. The battle is lost. The telegraph says that McDowell is in full retreat, and calls on General Scott to save the capital. Find the President and tell him to come immediately to General Scott's." Half an hour later the President returned from his drive, and his private secretaries gave him Seward's message — the first intimation he received of the trying news. He listened in silence, without the slightest change of feature or expression, and walked away to army headquarters. There he read the unwelcome report in a telegram from a captain of engineers: "General McDowell's army in full retreat through Centreville. The day is lost. Save Washington and the remnants of this army. . . . The routed troops will not re-form."§ This information was such an irreconcilable contradiction of the former telegram that General Scott utterly refused to believe it. That one officer should report the army beyond Bull Run, driving the enemy and ordering up reserves, and another immediately report it three miles this side of Bull Run, in hopeless retreat and demoralization, seemed an impossibility. Yet the impossible had indeed come to pass; and the apparent change of fortune had been nearly as sudden on the battle-field as in Washington.

The President and the Cabinet met at General Scott's office, and awaited further news in feverish suspense, until a telegram from McDowell confirmed the disaster.|| Discussion was now necessarily turned to preparation for the future. All available troops were hurried forward to McDowell's support; Baltimore was put on the alert; telegrams were sent to the recruiting stations of the nearest Northern States to lose no time in sending all their organized regiments to Washington; McClellan was ordered to "come down to the Shenandoah Valley with such troops as can be spared from western Virginia."¶ A great number of

* Scott, Testimony, Committee on Conduct of the War.

† Scott to McClellan, July 21, 1861. War Records.

‡ Wendell to Thomas, July 21, 1861, 4 P. M. War Records.

§ Alexander, July 21, 1861. War Records.

|| McDowell to Townsend, July 21, 1861. War Records.

¶ Scott to McClellan, July 21, 1861. War Records.

civilians, newspaper correspondents, and several senators and representatives had followed McDowell's army to Centreville; one of the latter, Mr. Ely of New York, went to the battle-field itself, and was captured and sent for a long sojourn to Libby Prison in Richmond. Such of these non-combatants as had been fortunate enough to keep their horses and vehicles were the first to reach Washington, arriving about midnight. President Lincoln had by this time returned to the Executive Mansion, and reclining on a lounge in the Cabinet room he heard from several of these eye-witnesses their excited and exaggerated narratives, in which the rush and terror and unseemly stampede of lookers-on and army teamsters were altogether disproportionate and almost exclusive features. The President did not go to his bed that night; morning found him still on his lounge in the Executive office, hearing a repetition of these recitals and making memoranda of his own comments and conclusions.

As the night elapsed, the news seemed to grow worse. McDowell's first dispatch stated that he would hold Centreville. His second, that "the larger part of the men are a confused mob, entirely demoralized"; but he said that he would attempt to make a stand at Fairfax Court House.* His third reported from that point that "many of the volunteers did not wait for authority to proceed to the Potomac, but left on their own decision. They are now pouring through this place in a state of utter disorganization. . . . I think now, as all of my commanders thought at Centreville, there is no alternative but to fall back to the Potomac."† Reports from other points generally confirmed the prevalence of confusion and disorganization. Monday morning the scattered fugitives reached the bridges over the Potomac, and began rushing across them into Washington. It was a gloomy and dismal day. A drizzling rain set in which lasted thirty-six hours. Many a panic-stricken volunteer remembered afterward with gratitude, that when he was wandering footsore, exhausted, and hungry through the streets of the capital, her loyal families opened their cheerful doors to give him food, rest, and encouragement.

One of the principal reasons which prevented McDowell's making a stand at Centreville or Fairfax Court House was the important fact that the term of service of the three-months' militia, organized under President Lincoln's first proclamation, was about to expire. "In

the next few days," says McDowell in his report, "day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army."‡ This vital consideration equally affected the armies at other points; and bearing it, as well as the local exigency, in mind, the President and the Cabinet determined on several changes of army leadership. McDowell was continued in command on the Virginia side of the Potomac, with fifteen regiments to defend and hold the forts. McClellan was called to Washington to take local command, and more especially to organize a new army out of the three-years' regiments which were just beginning to come in from the various States. Patterson was only a three-months' general, appointed by the governor of Pennsylvania; his time expired, and he was mustered out of service. Banks was sent to Harper's Ferry to succeed him. Dix was put in command at Baltimore, and Rosecrans in western Virginia.

By noon of Monday the worst aspects of the late defeat were known; and especially the reassuring fact that the enemy was making no pursuit; and so far as possible immediate dangers were provided against. The War Department was soon able to reply to anxious inquiries from New York:

Our loss is much less than was at first represented, and the troops have reached the forts in much better condition than we expected. We are making most vigorous efforts to concentrate a large and irresistible army at this point. Regiments are arriving. . . . Our works on the south bank of the Potomac are impregnable, being well manned with reinforcements. The capital is safe. §

On the following day Lincoln in person visited some of the forts and camps about Arlington Heights, and addressed the regiments with words of cheer and confidence.

Compared with the later battles of the civil war, the battle of Bull Run involved but a very moderate loss || in men and material. Its political and moral results, however, were widespread and enduring. The fact that the rebel army suffered about equal damage in numbers of killed and wounded, and that it was crippled so as to be unable for months to resume the offensive, could not be immediately known. The flushed hope of the South magnified the achievement as a demonstration of Southern invincibility. The event of a pitched battle won gave the rebellion and the Confederate government a standing and a sudden respect-

|| The official reports show a loss to the Union side in the battle of Bull Run of 25 guns (the Confederates claim 28), 481 men killed, 1011 men wounded, and 1460 (wounded and other Union soldiers) sent as prisoners to Richmond. On the Confederate side the loss was 387 killed, 1582 wounded, and a few prisoners taken.—War Records.

* McDowell to Townsend, July 21, 1861. War Records.

† McDowell to Townsend, July 22, 1861.

‡ McDowell, Report, August 4, 1861. War Records.

§ Cameron to Stetson, Grinell, and others, July 22, 1861. War Records.

ability before foreign powers it had hardly dared hope for. With the then personal government of France, and with the commercial classes whose influence always rules the government of England, it gained at once a scarcely disguised active sympathy.

Upon the irritated susceptibilities, the wounded loyalty, the sanguine confidence of the North, the Bull Run defeat fell with a cruel bitterness. The eager hopes built on the victories of western Virginia were dashed to the ground. Here was a fresher and deeper humiliation than Sumter or Baltimore. But though her nerves winced, her will never faltered. She was both chastened and strengthened in the fiery trial. For the moment, however, irritation and disappointment found vent in loud complaint and blind recrimination. One or two curious incidents in this ordeal of criticism may perhaps be cited. A few days after the battle, in a conversation at the White House with several Illinois members of Congress, in the presence of the President and the Secretary of War, General Scott himself was so far nettled by the universal chagrin and fault-finding that he lost his temper and sought an entirely uncalled-for self-justification. "Sir, I am the greatest coward in America," said he. "I will prove it. I have fought this battle, sir, against my judgment; I think the President of the United States ought to remove me to-day for doing it. As God is my judge, after my superiors had determined to fight it I did all in my power to make the army efficient. I deserve removal because I did not stand up, when my army was not in a condition for fighting, and resist it to the last." The President said, "Your conversation seems to imply that I forced you to fight this battle." General Scott then said, "I have never served a President who has been kinder to me than you have been." Richardson, who in a complaining speech in Congress related the scene, then drew the inference that Scott intended to pay a personal compliment to Mr. Lincoln, but that he did not mean to exonerate the Cabinet; and when pressed by questions, further explained: "Let us have no misunderstanding about this matter. My colleagues understood that I gave the language as near as I could. Whether I have been correctly reported or not I do not know. If I did not then make the correct statement, let me do it now. I did not understand General Scott, nor did I mean so to be understood, as implying that the President had forced him to fight that battle."* The incident illustrates how easily history may be perverted by hot-blooded criticism. Scott's petulance drove him to an inaccurate statement

of events; Richardson's partisanship warped Scott's error to a still more unjustifiable deduction, and both reasoned from a changed condition of things. Two weeks before, Scott was confident of victory, and Richardson chafing at military inaction. The exact facts have already been stated. Scott advised against an offensive campaign into Virginia, but consented — was not forced — to prepare and direct it. He made success as certain as it ever can be made in war; but the inefficiency of Patterson foiled his plan and preparation. Even then victory was yet possible and probable but for the panic, against which there is no safeguard, and which has been fatal to armies in all times and in all countries.

Historical judgment of war is subject to an inflexible law, either very imperfectly understood or very constantly lost sight of. Military writers love to fight over the battles of history exclusively by the rules of the professional chess-board, always subordinating, often totally ignoring, the element of politics. This is a radical error. Every war is begun, dominated, and ended by political considerations; without a nation, without a government, without money or credit, without popular enthusiasm which furnishes volunteers, or public support which endures conscription, there could be no army and no war — neither beginning nor end of methodical hostilities. War and politics, campaigns and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and interdependent; and to talk of military operations without the direction and interference of an Administration is as absurd as to plan a campaign without recruits, pay, or rations. Applied to the Bull Run campaign, this law of historical criticism analyzes and fixes the relative responsibilities of government and commanders with easy precision. When Lincoln, on June 29, assembled his council of war, the commanders, as military experts, correctly decided that the existing armies could win a victory at Manassas and a victory at Winchester. General Scott correctly objected that these victories, if won, would not be decisive; and that in a military point of view it would be wiser to defer any offensive campaign until the following autumn. Here the President and the Cabinet, as political experts, intervened, and on their part decided, correctly, that the public temper would not admit of such a delay. Thus the Administration was responsible for the forward movement, Scott for the combined strategy of the two armies, McDowell for the conduct of the Bull Run battle, Patterson for the escape of Johnston, and Fate for the panic; for the opposing forces were equally raw, equally undisciplined, and as a whole fought the battle with equal courage and gallantry.

* "Globe," July 24 and Aug. 1, 1861, pp. 246 and 357.

But such an analysis of causes and such an apportionment of responsibilities could not be made by the public, or even by the best-informed individuals beyond Cabinet circles, in the first fortnight succeeding the Bull Run disaster. All was confused rumor, blind inference, seething passion. That the public at large and the touch-and-go newspaper writers should indulge in harsh and hasty language is scarcely to be wondered at; but the unseemly and precipitate judgments and criticisms of those holding the rank of leadership in public affairs are less to be excused. Men were not yet tempered to the fiery ordeal of revolution, and still thought and spoke under the strong impulse of personal prejudice, and with that untamed and visionary extravagance which made politics such a chaos in the preceding winter. That feeling, momentarily quelled and repressed by the rebel guns at Sumter, was now in danger of breaking out afresh. In illustration we need only to cite the words of prominent leaders in the three parties of the North, namely: Stanton, late Buchanan's attorney-general, and destined soon to become famous as Lincoln's War Secretary; Richardson, who had been the trusted lieutenant of Douglas, and now, since Douglas was dead, the ostensible spokesman of the faction which had followed that leader; and thirdly, Horace Greeley, exercising so prominent an influence upon the public opinion of the country through the columns of "The Tribune."

The Buchanan cabinet was still writhing under the odium which fell upon the late Administration, and much more severely upon the Breckinridge Democracy. Mr. Buchanan and his Cabinet were eager to seize upon every shadow of self-justification, and naturally not slow to emphasize any apparent shortcoming of their successors. Stanton, with his impulsive nature, was especially severe on the new President and Administration. In his eyes the only hope of the country lay in the members of Buchanan's reconstructed Cabinet. Thus he wrote to his colleague Dix, on June 11, in language that resembled a stump speech of the presidential campaign:

No one can imagine the deplorable condition of this city and the hazard of the Government, who did not witness the weakness and panic of the Administration, and the painful imbecility of Lincoln. We looked to New York in that dark hour as our only deliverance under Providence, and, thank God, it came. . . . But when we witness venality and corruption growing in power every day, and controlling the millions of money that should be a patriotic sacrifice for national deliverance, and treating the treasure of the nation as a booty to be divided among thieves, hope dies away: deliverance from this danger also must come from New York. . . . Of military affairs I can form no judgment. Every day affords fresh proof of the

design to give the war a party direction. The army appointments appear (with two or three exceptions only) to be bestowed on persons whose only claim is their Republicanism—broken-down politicians without experience, ability, or any other merit. Democrats are rudely repulsed, or scowled upon with jealous and ill-concealed aversion. The Western Democracy are already becoming disgusted, and between the corruption of some of the Republican leaders and the self-seeking ambition of others some great disaster may soon befall the nation. How long will the Democracy of New York tolerate these things? . . . We hoped to see you here, especially after you had accepted the appointment of major-general. But now that the Administration has got over its panic, you are not the kind of man that would be welcome.*

This letter plainly enough shows Mr. Stanton's attitude toward the new Administration. His letter of the following day to ex-President Buchanan reveals the state of feeling entertained by Dix:

The recent appointments in the army are generally spoken of with great disapprobation. General Dix is very much chagrined with the treatment he has received from the War Department, and on Saturday I had a letter declaring his intention to resign immediately.†

Again, July 16:

General Dix is still here. He has been shamefully treated by the Administration. We are expecting a general battle to be commenced at Fairfax to-day, and conflicting opinions of the result are entertained.‡

And once more, on July 26:

The dreadful disaster of Sunday can scarcely be mentioned. The imbecility of this Administration culminated in that catastrophe: an irretrievable misfortune and national disgrace, never to be forgotten, are to be added to the ruin of all peaceful pursuits and national bankruptcy as the result of Lincoln's "running the machine" for five months. You perceive that Bennett is for a change of the Cabinet, and proposes for one of the new Cabinet Mr. Holt. . . . It is not unlikely that some change in the War and Navy Departments may take place, but none beyond these two departments until Jefferson Davis turns out the whole concern. The capture of Washington seems now to be inevitable: during the whole of Monday and Tuesday it might have been taken without any resistance. The rout, overthrow, and utter demoralization of the whole army is complete. Even now I doubt whether any serious opposition to the entrance of the Confederate forces could be offered. While Lincoln, Scott, and the Cabinet are disputing who is to blame, the city is unguarded and the enemy at hand. General McClellan reached here last evening. But if he had the ability of Cæsar, Alexander, or Napoleon, what can he accomplish? Will not Scott's jealousy, Cabinet intrigues, Republican interference, thwart him at every step? While hoping for the best, I cannot shut my eyes against the dangers that beset the Government, and especially this city. It is certain that Davis was in the field on Sunday, and the secessionists here assert that he headed in person the last victorious charge. General Dix is in Baltimore. After three weeks' neglect and insult he was sent there.‡

While Stanton and Dix were thus nursing their secret griefs on behalf of one of the late

* Dix, "Memoirs of John A. Dix."

† "North American Review," November, 1879.

political factions, Richardson, as the spokesman of the Douglas wing of the Democracy, was indulging in loud complaints for the other. Charging that the division of the Democratic party at Charleston had brought the present calamity upon the Union, he continued:

This organization of the Breckinridge party was for the purpose of destroying the Government. That was its purpose and its object. What do we see? Without the aid and coöperation of the men of the North that party was powerless. The men from the Northern States who aided and encouraged this organization which is in rebellion are at the head to-day of our army. Butler of Massachusetts, Dix of New York and Patterson of Pennsylvania, and Cadwalader—all of them in this movement to break down and disorganize the Democratic party and the country. Why is it? This Douglas party furnished you one-half of your entire army. Where is your general, where is your man in command to-day who belongs to that party? Why is this? Have you Republicans sympathized with this Breckinridge party? Are you sympathizing with them, and lending your aid to the men who lead our armies into misfortune and disgrace?*

Richardson was easily answered. A member correctly replied that these and other three-months' generals had been selected by the governors of various States, and not by the President; moreover, that Patterson had been specially recommended by General Scott, whom Richardson was eulogizing, and that there would be plenty of opportunity before the war was over for the Douglas men to win honors in the field. But all this did not soothe Richardson's temper, which was roused mainly by his revived factional jealousy.

Unjust fault-finding was to be expected from party opponents; but it is not too much to say that it was a genuine surprise to the President to receive from a party friend, and the editor of the most influential newspaper in the Union, the following letter, conveying an indirect accusation of criminal indifference, and proposing an immediate surrender to rebellion and consent to permanent disunion:

NEW YORK, Monday, July 29, 1861.
Midnight.

DEAR SIR: This is my seventh sleepless night—yours, too, doubtless—yet I think I shall not die, because I have no right to die. I must struggle to live, however bitterly. But to business. You are not considered a great man, and I am a hopelessly broken one. You are now undergoing a terrible ordeal, and God has thrown the gravest responsibilities upon you. Do not fear to meet them. Can the rebels be beaten after all that has occurred, and in view of the actual state of feeling caused by our late, awful disaster? If they can,—and it is your business to ascertain and decide,—write me that such is your judgment, so that I may know and do my duty. And if they *cannot* be beaten,—if our recent disaster is fatal,—do not fear to sacrifice yourself to your country. If the rebels are not to be beaten,—if that is your judgment in view of all the light you can get,—then every drop of blood henceforth shed in this quarrel will be wantonly, wickedly

shed, and the guilt will rest heavily on the soul of every promoter of the crime. I pray you to decide quickly and let me know my duty.

If the Union is irrevocably gone, an armistice for 30, 60, 90, 120 days—better still for a year—ought at once to be proposed, with a view to a peaceful adjustment. Then Congress should call a national convention, to meet at the earliest possible day. And there should be an immediate and mutual exchange or release of prisoners and a disbandment of forces. I do not consider myself at present a judge of anything but the public sentiment. That seems to me everywhere gathering and deepening against a prosecution of the war. The gloom in this city is funeral,—for our dead at Bull Run were many, and they lie unburied yet. On every brow sits sullen, scorching, black despair. It would be easy to have Mr. Crittenden move any proposition that ought to be adopted, or to have it come from any proper quarter. The first point is to ascertain what is best that can be done—which is the measure of our duty, and do that very thing at the earliest moment.

This letter is written in the strictest confidence, and is for your eye alone. But you are at liberty to say to members of your Cabinet that you *know* I will second any move you may see fit to make. But do nothing timidly nor by halves. Send me word what to do. I will live till I can hear it at all events. If it is best for the country and for mankind that we make peace with the rebels at once and on their own terms, do not shrink even from that. But bear in mind the greatest truth: "Whoso would lose his life for my sake shall save it." Do the thing that is the highest right, and tell me how I am to second you.

Yours, in the depths of bitterness,

HORACE GREELEY. †

These few citations are noteworthy, because of the high quarters whence they emanated and the subsequent relations some of their authors bore to the war. They give us penetrating glimpses of how the Bull Run disaster was agitating the public opinion of the North. But it must not be hastily inferred that such was the preponderant feeling. The great tides of patriotism settled quickly back to their usual level. The army, Congress, and the people took up, a shade less buoyantly, but with a deeper energy, the determined prosecution of the war, and soon continued their cheerful confidence in the President, Cabinet, and military authorities. The war governors tendered more troops and hurried forward their equipped regiments; the Administration pushed the organization of the long-term volunteers; and out of the scattered débris of the Bull Run forces there sprang up that magnificent Army of the Potomac, which in a long and fluctuating career won such historic renown.

Meanwhile, in this first shadow of defeat, President Lincoln maintained his wonted equipoise of manner and speech. A calm and resolute patience was his most constant mood; to follow with watchfulness the details of the

* Richardson, Speech in House of Representatives, July 24, 1861.

† Unpublished Autograph MS.

accumulation of a new army was his most eager occupation. He smiled at frettings like those of Scott, Dix, and Richardson; but letters like that of Greeley made him sigh at the strange weakness of human character. Such things gave him pain, but they bred no resentment, and elicited no reply. Already at this period he began the display of that rare ability in administration which enabled him to smooth mountains of obstacles and bridge rivers of difficulty in his control of men. From this time onward to the end of the war his touch was daily and hourly amidst the vast machinery of command and coordination in Cabinet, Congress, army, navy, and the hosts of national politics. To still the quarrels of factions, to allay the jealousies of statesmen, to compose the rivalries of generals, to soothe the vanity of officials, to prompt the laggard, to curb the ardent, to sustain the faltering, was a substratum of daily routine underlying the great events of campaigns, battles, and high questions of state.

On the night following the battle of Bull Run, while Lincoln lay awake on a sofa in the Executive office, waiting to gather what personal information he could from the many officers and prominent civilians who were arriving at Washington after their flight from the battle-field, he already began sketching a pencil memorandum of the policy and military programme most expedient to be adopted in the new condition of affairs. This memorandum sketch or outline he added to from time to time during the succeeding days. On the 27th of July he seems to have matured his reflections on the late disaster, and with his own hand he carefully copied his memorandum in this completed form:

JULY 23, 1861.

1. Let the plan for making the blockade effective be pushed forward with all possible dispatch.
2. Let the volunteer forces at Fort Monroe and vicinity, under General Butler, be constantly drilled, disciplined, and instructed without more for the present.
3. Let Baltimore be held as now, with a gentle but firm and certain hand.
4. Let the force now under Patterson or Banks be strengthened and made secure in its position.
5. Let the forces in western Virginia act till further orders according to instructions or orders from General McClellan.
6. General Frémont push forward his organization and operations in the West as rapidly as possible, giving rather special attention to Missouri.
7. Let the forces late before Manassas, except the three-months' men, be reorganized as rapidly as possible in their camps here and about Arlington.
8. Let the three-months' forces who decline to enter the longer service be discharged as rapidly as circumstances will permit.
9. Let the new volunteer forces be brought forward as fast as possible; and especially into the camps on the two sides of the river here.

JULY 27, 1861.

When the foregoing shall have been substantially attended to,

1. Let Manassas Junction (or some point on one or other of the railroads nearest it) and Strasburg be seized, and permanently held, with an open line from Washington to Manassas, and an open line from Harper's Ferry to Strasburg—the military men to find the way of doing these.

2. This done, a joint movement from Cairo on Memphis; and from Cincinnati on east Tennessee.*

FRÉMONT.

MISSOURI had been saved from organized rebellion, but the smell and blackness of insurrectionary fire were strong upon her. While Governor Jackson and General Price, flying from the battle of Boonville as fugitives, were momentarily helpless, they nevertheless had reasonable hope of quick support. Whatever of latent rebellion and secret military preparation existed were set in motion by the governor's proclamation of June 12 and his order dividing the State into nine military districts and issuing commissions to a skeleton army under the provisions of the military bill passed by his rebel legislature before their expulsion from the capital by Lyon. Thus every one inclined to take up arms against the Union had the plausible excuse of authority and the guidance of a designated commander and rendezvous, and a simultaneous movement toward organization long preconceived immediately began. Missouri is a large State. She had over 68,000 square miles of territory, and a population of over a million souls; a trifling percentage would yield a formidable force. The spirit and impulse of revolution were at fever heat, and all the fire of the Border-Ruffian days smoldered along the frontier. The governor's brigadier-generals designated camps, and the hot-blooded country lads flocked to them, finding a charm of adventure in the very privations they were compelled to undergo. For half a year disloyalty had gone unpunished; the recent reports of march and battle served rather to sharpen their zeal.

Three railroads radiated from St. Louis—one toward the west, with its terminus at Sedalia; one toward the south-west, with terminus at Rolla; one toward the south, with terminus at Ironton. The first of these reached only about three-fourths, the last two scarcely half-way, across the State. Western Missouri, therefore, seemed beyond any quick reach of a military expedition from St. Louis. General Price, proceeding westward from Boonville, found one of these camps at Lexington; the governor, proceeding southward, was attended by a little remnant of fugitives from the bat-

* Lincoln, Autograph MS.

tle of Boonville. With such following as each could gather both directed their course toward the Arkansas line, collecting adherents as they went. Their pathway was not entirely clear. Before leaving St. Louis, Lyon had sent an expedition numbering about twenty-five hundred, commanded by Sweeny, a captain of regulars, by rail to Rolla and thence by a week's march to Springfield, from which point he had advanced a part of his force under Sigel to Carthage, near the extreme south-western corner of the State. Jackson and Price, having previously united their forces, thus found Sigel directly in their path. As they greatly outnumbered him, by the battle of Carthage, July 5,—a sharp but indecisive engagement,—they drove him back upon Springfield, and effected a junction with the rebel force gathered in the north-western corner of Arkansas, which had already assisted them by demonstrations and by capturing one of Sigel's companies.

Delayed by the need of transportation, Lyon could not start from Boonville on his south-western march until the 3d of July. The improvised forces of Jackson and Price, moving rapidly, because made up largely of cavalry, or, rather, unorganized horsemen, were far in advance of him, and had overwhelmed Sigel before Lyon was well on his way. Nevertheless he pushed ahead with energy, having called to him a detachment of regulars from Fort Leavenworth, and volunteers from Kansas numbering about 2200. These increased his column to about 4600 men. By July 13 he was at Springfield, and with the forces he found there was at the head of an aggregate of between 7000 and 8000 men.

The Confederate authorities had ambitious plans for the West. They already possessed Arkansas; the Indian Territory was virtually in their grasp; Missouri they looked upon with somewhat confident eyes; even the ultimate conquest of Kansas seemed more than a remote possibility. Nor were such plans confined to mere speculation. Major-General Polk was stationed at Memphis early in July to command the Mississippi region. The neutrality policy in Kentucky for the moment left the Tennessee contingent idle. Being appealed to by Governor Jackson, Polk made immediate preparations for a campaign in Missouri. On July 23 he reported to the Confederate government his purpose to send two strong columns into that State—one under McCulloch, of about 25,000 men, against Lyon at Springfield; another, under Pillow and Hardee, to march upon Ironton in south-east Missouri, where he estimated they would collect a force of 18,000. He wrote:

They are directed to pass in behind Lyon's force by land, or to proceed to St. Louis, seize it, and, taking

possession of the boats at that point, to proceed up the river Missouri, raising the Missourians as they go; and at such point as may appear most suitable to detach a force to cut off Lyon's return from the west. . . . If, as I think, I can drive the enemy from Missouri with the force indicated, I will then enter Illinois and take Cairo in the rear on my return.*

He was obliged a few days later to curtail this extravagant programme. Governor Jackson, he learned, to his chagrin, had exaggerated the available forces fully one-half.† Although he had already sent Pillow to New Madrid, he now "paused" in the execution of his plan; and the rivalry of the various rebel commanders seems soon to have completely paralyzed it. The "neutrality" attitude of the governors of both Missouri and Kentucky greatly delayed the progress of the war in the West. The middle of June came before Lyon chased the rebels from Jefferson City, and in Kentucky open and positive military action was deferred till the first weeks of September. Meanwhile, however, it was felt that the beginning of serious hostilities was only a question of time. The Mississippi River was blockaded, commerce suspended, Cairo garrisoned and fortified, gun-boats were being built, regiments were being organized and sent hither and thither, mainly as yet to keep the neighborhood peace. In the East the several Virginia campaigns were in progress, and General Scott's "anaconda" plan was well understood in confidential circles.

This condition of affairs made the whole Mississippi Valley sensitive and restless. The governors of the North-west met, and, by memorial and delegation, urged the Administration to make the Ohio line secure by moving forward and occupying advanced posts in Kentucky and Tennessee. Especially did they urge the appointment of a competent commander who could combine the immense resources of the West, and make them effective in a grand campaign southward to open the Mississippi.

Almost universal public sentiment turned to John C. Frémont as the desired leader for this duty. He was about forty-eight years of age. As student, as explorer, as a prominent actor in making California a State of the Union, he had shown talent, displayed energy, and conquered success in situations of difficulty and peril. As senator for a brief term, his votes proved that the North could rely on his convictions and principles. As the presidential candidate of the Republican party in 1856, his name had broadened into national representative value. The post of honor then had brought him defeat. He might well claim the post of duty for a chance to win a victory.

* Polk to Walker, July 23, 1861. War Records.

† War Records.

The dash of romance in his career easily re-kindled popular enthusiasm; political sagacity indicated that he should be encouraged to change this popularity into armies, and lead them to military success in aid of the imperiled nation. The inclination of the Administration coincided with the sentiment of the people. Seward had proposed him for Secretary of War, and Lincoln mentioned him for the French mission; but in the recent distribution of offices no place at once suitable to his abilities and adequate to his claims had been found available. This new crisis seemed to have carved out the work for the man.

He had passed the previous winter in France, but upon the outbreak of rebellion at once returned to his country. On his arrival in the city of New York, about the 1st of July, President Lincoln appointed him a major-general in the regular army, and on the 3d created the Western department, consisting of the State of Illinois and all the States and Territories between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains, and placed it under his command, with headquarters at St. Louis.

For a man whose genius could have risen to the requirements of the occasion it was a magnificent opportunity, an imperial theater. Unfortunately, the country and the Administration had overrated Frémont's abilities. Instead of proceeding at once to his post of duty, he remained in New York, absorbed largely in his personal affairs. Two weeks passed before he sent his letter of acceptance and oath of office. "Please proceed to your command without coming here," telegraphed General Scott, two days later. Postmaster-General Blair testified:

As soon as he was appointed, I urged him to go to his department. . . . The President questioned me every day about his movements. I told him so often that Frémont was off, or was going next day, according to my information, that I felt mortified when allusion was made to it, and dreaded a reference to the subject. Finally, on the receipt of a dispatch from Lyon by my brother, describing the condition of his command, I felt justified in telegraphing General Frémont that he must go at once. But he remained till after Bull Run; and even then, when he should have known the inspiration that would give the rebels, he traveled leisurely to St. Louis.*

When, on July 25, he finally reached his headquarters, and formally assumed command, he did not find his new charge a bed of roses. The splendid military strength of the North-west was only beginning its development. Recruiting offices were full; but commanders of departments and governors of States quarreled over the dribblets of arms and equipments remaining in the arsenals, and which were needed in a dozen places at once.

* Committee on Conduct of the War.

The educated and experienced officers and subalterns of the old regular army, familiar with organization and routine, did not suffice to furnish the needed brigadier-generals and colonels, much less adjutants, commissaries, quartermasters, and drill-sergeants. Error, extravagance, delay, and waste ensued. Regiments were rushed off to the front without uniforms, arms, or rations; sometimes without being mustered into service. Yet the latent resources were abundant in quantity and excellent in quality, and especially in the qualities of mind, ambition, earnestness, and talent competent through practical service to rise to every requirement of duty and sacrifice—genius which could lead, and patriotic devotion ready to serve, suffer, and die. What magnificent capabilities in those early Western volunteers; what illustrious talent in those first regiments found by Frémont and coming at his call!—Lyon, Grant, Blair, McClelland, Pope, Logan, Schofield, Curtis, Sturgis, Palmer, Hurlbut, and a hundred others whose names shine on the records of the war, to say nothing of the thousands who, unheralded, went gloriously to manful duty and patriotic death.

The three weeks loitered away in New York already served to quadruple Frémont's immediate task. Lyon had taken the field, and Blair had gone to Washington to take his seat in the special session of Congress as representative. The whole service immediately felt the absence from headquarters of these two inspiring and guiding leaders. At three points in Frémont's new department matters wore a threatening aspect. The plentiful seeds of rebellion sown by Governor Jackson throughout Missouri were springing up in noxious rankness. Amidst dominant loyalty existed a reckless and daring secession minority, unwilling to submit to the control of superior sentiment and force. Following the battle of Boonville there broke out in many parts of the State a destructive guerrilla warfare, degenerating into neighborhood and family feuds, and bloody personal reprisal and revenge, which became known under the term of "bushwhacking." Houses and bridges were burned, farms were plundered, railroads were obstructed and broken, men were kidnapped and assassinated. During the whole period of the war few organized campaigns disturbed the large territory of the State; but disorder, lawlessness, crime, and almost anarchy were with difficulty repressed from beginning to end.

The local administration charged with the eradication of these evils was greatly embarrassed and often thwarted through the unfortunate jealousy and rivalry between the

factions of radicals and conservatives, both adherents of the Union. Equally loyal, equally sincere in their devotion to the Government, they paralyzed each other's efforts by a blind opposition and recrimination. As events progressed these factions increased in their animosity toward each other, and their antagonistic attitude was continued throughout the whole war period. This conflict of local sentiment—personal, political, and military—produced no end of complications requiring the repeated direct interference of President Lincoln, and taxed to the utmost his abounding forbearance. Neighborhood troubles were growing in northern Missouri before Frémont left New York; and Lyon's adjutant selected Brigadier-General Pope to take command there and restore order. Frémont gave the permission by telegraph; and when he reached St. Louis, General Pope had eight Illinois regiments employed in this duty.*

Frémont's second point of difficulty was the strong report of danger to Cairo. The rebel general Polk, at Memphis, was in the midst of his preparations for his Missouri campaign, already mentioned. About the time of Frémont's arrival Pillow had just moved six thousand Tennesseans to New Madrid, and reported his whole force "full of enthusiasm and eager for the 'Dutch hunt.'" News of this movement, and the brood of wild rumors which it engendered, made General Prentiss, the Union commander at Cairo, exceedingly uneasy, and he called urgently for assistance. Cairo, the strategic key of the whole Mississippi Valley, was too important to be for a moment neglected; and in a few days after his arrival Frémont gathered the nearest available reinforcements, about eight regiments in all, and, loading them on a fleet of steamboats, led them in person in a somewhat ostentatious expedition to Cairo; and the demonstration, greatly magnified by rumor, doubtless had much influence in checking the hopes of the rebel commanders for an early capture of Missouri and Illinois.

The reinforcement of Cairo was very proper as a measure of precaution. It turned out, however, that the need was much less urgent than Frémont's third point of trouble, namely,

* General Pope, under date of August 3, makes a graphic statement of the methods of the bushwhackers: "The only persons in arms, so far as I could learn, were a few reckless and violent men in parties of twenty or thirty, who were wandering about, committing depredations upon all whose sentiments were displeasing, and keeping this whole region in apprehension and uneasiness. . . . So soon as these marauders found that troops were approaching, which they easily did, from the very persons who ask for protection, they dispersed, each man going to his home, and, in many cases, that home in the very town occupied by the troops. . . . When troops were sent

the safety of Lyon at Springfield, in southwestern Missouri. When Lyon left St. Louis he had conceived this campaign to the southwest, not merely to control that part of the State and to protect it against invasion, but also with the ultimate hope of extending his march into Arkansas. For this he knew his force in hand was inadequate; but he believed that from the troops being rapidly organized in the contiguous free States he would receive the necessary help as soon as it was needed. We have seen that he reached Springfield with an aggregate of about 7000 or 8000 men. It was, for those early days, a substantial, compact little army, somewhat seasoned, well commanded, self-reliant, and enthusiastic. Unfortunately it also, like the armies at every other point, was under the strain and discouragement of partial dissolution. The term of enlistment of the three-months' militia regiments, raised under the President's first proclamation, was about to expire. In every detachment, army, and at every post, throughout the whole country, there occurred about the middle of July, 1861, the incident of quick succession of companies and regiments going out of the service. Many of these corps immediately reorganized under the three-years' call; many remained temporarily in the field to take part in some impending battle. But despite such instances of generous patriotism, there was at all points a shrinkage of numbers, an interval of disorganization, a paralysis of action and movement.

On the whole, therefore, Lyon found his new position at Springfield discouraging. He was 120 miles from a railroad; provisions and supplies had not arrived as expected; half his army would within a brief period be mustered out of service; McClellan† was in western Virginia, Frémont in New York, Blair in Washington. He scarcely knew who commanded, or where to turn. The rebels were in formidable force just beyond the Arkansas line. The dispatches at this juncture take on an almost despairing tone.

All idea of any farther advance movement, or of even maintaining our present position, must soon be abandoned, unless the Government furnish us promptly

out against these marauders, they found only men quietly working in the field or sitting in their offices, who, as soon as the backs of the Federal soldiers were turned, were again in arms and menacing the peace." [Pope to Sturgeon, August 3, 1861. War Records.]

† While McClellan was yet at Cincinnati, organizing the Ohio contingent of three-months' men, Missouri had been temporarily attached to his department. Beyond a few suggestions by telegraph, however, he did not give it any attention in detail, because his hands were already full of work. His Virginia campaign soon required his presence and entire time.

with large reinforcements and supplies. Our troops are badly clothed, poorly fed, and imperfectly supplied with tents. None of them have as yet been paid.*

Two days later Lyon wrote:

If it is the intention to give up the West, let it be so; it can only be the victim of imbecility or malice. Scott will cripple us if he can. Cannot you stir up this matter and secure us relief? See Frémont, if he has arrived. The want of supplies has crippled me so that I cannot move, and I do not know when I can. Everything seems to combine against me at this point. Stir up Blair. †

Lyon's innuendoes against the Administration and against General Scott were alike unjust. Both were eager to aid him, but there was here, as elsewhere, a limit to possibilities. It was Frémont who needed stirring up. Appointed by the President on July 1, he had not even sent his official acceptance till the 16th, the day before Lyon wrote this appeal; and, after final and emphatic urging by Postmaster-General Blair, it was the 25th before he entered on his duties at St. Louis. Three special messengers from Lyon awaited him on his arrival, and repeated the tale of need and of danger. But Fremont listened languidly and responded feebly. Urgent calls indeed came to him from other quarters. As already stated, Cairo was represented to be seriously threatened, and he had chosen first to insure its safety. He had the means, by a judicious rearrangement of his forces, to have aided effectually both these exposed points. Under the critical conditions fully pointed out to him, he could at least have recalled Lyon and assisted his safe withdrawal to his railroad base at Rolla. But he neither recalled him nor substantially reinforced him. Two regiments were set in motion toward him, but it proved the merest feint of help. No supplies and no troops reached Lyon in season to be of the slightest service. Lyon's danger lay in a junction of the various rebel leaders just beyond the Arkansas line. The Confederate government had sent Brigadier-General McCulloch to conciliate or conquer the Indian Territory as events might dictate, and had given him three regiments—one from Louisiana, one from Texas, and one from Arkansas—for the work. Finding it bad policy for the present to occupy the Indian Territory, he hovered about the border with permission to move into either Kansas or Missouri.

Even before Polk's ambitious programme was found to be impracticable, McCulloch made haste to organize a campaign on his own account. On July 30 he reported that he was on his way toward Springfield with his own

brigade of 3200 troops, the command of General Pearce, with 2500 Arkansas State troops, and the somewhat heterogeneous gathering of Missourians under Price, which he thought could furnish about 7000 effective men, generally well mounted, but badly commanded, and armed only with common rifles and shotguns. It was the approach of this large force which had given Lyon such uneasiness, and with good cause. Moving steadily upon him, they soon approached so near that his position became critical. His own command had dwindled to less than five thousand effective men; the combined enemy had nearly treble that number of effectives, and probably more than three to one, counting the whole mass. If he remained stationary, they would slowly envelop and capture him. If he attempted to retreat through the 120 miles of barren mountainous country which lay between him and Rolla, they would follow and harass him and turn his retreat into a rout. Counting to the last upon reinforcements which did not come, he had allowed events to place him in an untenable position.

As a final and desperate resource, and the only one to save his army, he resolved to attack and cripple the enemy. As at Bull Run, and as so often happens, both armies, on the evening of August 9, were under orders to advance that night and attack each other. Some showers of rain in the evening caused McCulloch temporarily to suspend his order; but Lyon's little army, moving at nightfall, marched ten miles south of Springfield to Wilson's Creek. At midnight they halted for a brief bivouac. Dividing into two columns they fell upon the enemy's camp at daylight, Sigel, with 1200 men and a battery, marching against their right flank, in an endeavor to get to the rear, while Lyon in person led the remaining 3700 men, with two batteries, to a front attack against their left center. The movement was a most daring one, and the conflict soon became desperate. Sigel's attack, successful at first, was checked, his detachment put to flight, and 5 of his 6 guns captured and turned against Lyon.

Lyon, on the contrary, by an impetuous advance, not only quickly drove the enemy out of their camp, but gained and occupied a strong natural position, which he held with brave determination. His mixed force of regulars and volunteers fought with admirable coöperation. McCulloch, confident in his overwhelming numbers, sent forward line after line of attack, which Lyon's well-posted regular batteries threw back. The forenoon was already well spent when a final unusually heavy assault from the enemy was thus repulsed, largely by help of the inspiring per-

* Schofield to Harding, July 15, 1861. War Records.

† Lyon to Harding, July 17, 1861. War Records.

sonal example of Lyon himself, who led some fragments of reserves in a bayonet charge. The charge ended the conflict; but it also caused the fall of the commander, who, pierced by a ball, almost immediately expired. It was his fourth wound received in the action. Though the battle was substantially won, Sturgis, upon whom the command devolved, deemed it too hazardous to attempt to hold the field, and a retreat to Springfield was agreed upon by a council of officers. An unmolested withdrawal was effected in the afternoon, and upon further consultation a definite retreat upon Rolla was begun the following day. As Lyon had anticipated, the enemy was too much crippled to follow. The Union forces had 223 killed, 721 wounded, and 291 missing. The Confederate loss was 265 killed, 800 wounded, and 30 missing.

The battle of Wilson's Creek, the death of Lyon, and the retreat of the army to Rolla turned public attention and criticism sharply upon Frémont's department and administration, and that commander was suddenly awakened to his work and responsibility. He now made haste to dispatch reënforcements to Rolla, and sent urgent telegrams for help to Washington and to the governors of the neighboring free States. His new energy partook a little too much of the character of a panic. He declared martial law in the city of St. Louis, and began an extensive system of fortifications; which, together with directions to fortify Rolla, Jefferson City, and several other places, pointed so much to inaction, and a defensive policy, as to increase rather than allay public murmur.

His personal manners and methods excited still further and even deeper dissatisfaction. A passion for display and an inordinate love of power appeared to be growing upon him. He had established his headquarters in an elegant mansion belonging to a wealthy secessionist; his personal staff consisted largely of foreigners, new to the country, and unfamiliar with its language and laws. Their fantastic titles and gay trappings seemed devised for show rather than substantial service. He organized a special body-guard. Sentinels and subordinates unpleasantly hedged the approach to his offices. Instead of bringing order into the chaotic condition of military business, he was prone to set method and routine at defiance, issuing commissions and directing the giving out of contracts in so irregular a way as to bring a protest from the proper accounting officers of the Government. Though specially requested by the President to cooperate with the provisional governor, he continued to ignore him. A storm of complaint soon arose from all except the little

knot of flatterers who abused his favor and the newspapers that were thriving on his patronage. The Unionists of Missouri became afraid that he was neglecting the present safety of the State for the future success of his intended Mississippi expedition, and wild rumors even floated in the air of a secret purpose to imitate the scheme of Aaron Burr and set up an independent dictatorship in the West.*

Reports came to President Lincoln from multiplied sources, bringing him a flood of embarrassment from the man to whom he had looked with such confidence for administrative aid and military success. It was his uniform habit, when he had once confided command and responsibility to an individual, to sustain him in the trust to the last possible degree. While he heard with pain the cumulating evidence of Frémont's unfitness, instead of immediately removing him from command, he sought rather to remedy the defect. In this spirit he wrote the following letter to General Hunter, which letter peculiarly illustrates his remarkable delicacy in managing the personal susceptibilities of men :

MY DEAR SIR: General Frémont needs assistance which it is difficult to give him. He is losing the confidence of men near him, whose support any man in his position must have to be successful. His cardinal mistake is that he isolates himself, and allows nobody to see him; and by which he does not know what is going on in the very matter he is dealing with. He needs to have by his side a man of large experience. Will you not, for me, take that place? Your rank is one grade too high to be ordered to it; but will you not serve the country and oblige me by taking it voluntarily? †

With this letter of the President, Postmaster-General Blair—hitherto Frémont's warm personal friend—and Meigs, the quartermaster-general of the army, went to St. Louis, to make a brief inspection and report of matters, and to give friendly advice and admonition to the commander of the Department of the West. While they were on their way, Mrs. Frémont was journeying toward Washington, bearing her husband's reply to a letter from the President sent him by special messenger about a week before.

Her mind was less occupied with the subject of the missive she bore than with the portent of a recent quarrel which the general had imprudently allowed to grow up between Colonel Frank Blair and himself. Blair had finally become convinced of Frémont's incapacity, and in public print sharply criticised his doings. Indeed, the quarrel soon progressed so far that Frémont placed him under arrest; then Blair preferred formal charges against the general for maladministration, and

* Meigs, Diary. MS.

† Lincoln to Hunter, Sept. 9, 1861. Unpublished MS.

the general in turn entered formal counter-charges against Blair.

Arrived at her destination Mrs. Frémont took the opportunity, in her interview with Mr. Lincoln, to justify General Frémont in all he had done, and to denounce his accusers with impetuous earnestness. She even asked for copies of confidential correspondence concerning her husband's personal embroilment. In these circumstances it was no light task for Mr. Lincoln to be at once patient, polite, and just; yet the following letter will testify that he accomplished even this difficult feat:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 12, 1861.

MRS. GENERAL FRÉMONT.

MY DEAR MADAM: Your two notes of to-day are before me. I answered the letter you bore me from General Frémont, on yesterday, and not hearing from you during the day, I sent the answer to him by mail. It is not exactly correct, as you say you were told by the elder Mr. Blair, to say that I sent Postmaster-General Blair to St. Louis to examine into that department and report. Postmaster-General Blair did go, with my approbation, to see and converse with General Frémont as a friend. I do not feel authorized to furnish you with copies of letters in my possession, without the consent of the writers. No impression has been made on my mind against the honor or integrity of General Frémont, and I now enter my protest against being understood as acting in any hostility towards him.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.*

It will be interesting to read in addition a graphic, verbal recapitulation of these incidents, made by President Lincoln in a confidential evening conversation with a few friends in the Executive office a little more than two years afterward, and which one of his secretaries recorded:

The Blairs have to an unusual degree the spirit of clan. Their family is a close corporation. Frank is their hope and pride. They have a way of going with a rush for anything they undertake; especially have Montgomery and the old gentleman. When this war first began they could think of nothing but Frémont; they expected everything from him, and upon their earnest solicitation he was made a general and sent to Missouri. I thought well of Frémont. Even now I think well of his impulses. I only think he is the prey of wicked and designing men, and I think he has absolutely no military capacity. He went to Missouri the pet and protégé of the Blairs. At first they corresponded with him and with Frank, who was with him, fully and confidentially, thinking his plans and his efforts would accomplish great things for the country. At last the tone of Frank's letters changed. It was a change from confidence to doubt and uncertainty. They were pervaded with a tone of sincere sorrow and of fear that Frémont would fail. Montgomery showed them to me, and we were both grieved at the prospect. Soon came the news that Frémont had issued his emancipation order, and had set up a bureau of abolition, giving free papers, and occupying his time apparently with little else. At last, at my suggestion, Montgomery Blair went to Missouri to look at and talk over matters. He went as the friend of Frémont. He passed, on the way, Mrs. Frémont, coming to see me. She sought an audience with me at midnight, and tasked me so violently with many things, that I had to exercise all the awkward tact I have to avoid quarrel-

ing with her. She surprised me by asking why their enemy, Montgomery Blair, had been sent to Missouri. She more than once intimated that if General Frémont should decide to try conclusions with me, he could set up for himself.†

MILITARY EMANCIPATION.

NOT only President Lincoln, but the country at large as well, was surprised to find, in the newspapers of August 30, a proclamation from the commander of the Department of the West of startling significance. The explanations of its necessity and purpose were altogether contradictory, and its mandatory orders so vaguely framed as to admit of dangerous variance in interpretation and enforcement. Reciting the disturbed condition of society, and defining the boundaries of army occupation, it contained the following important decrees:

Circumstances, in my judgment of sufficient urgency, render it necessary that the commanding general of this department should assume the administrative powers of the State. . . . In order, therefore, to suppress disorder, to maintain as far as now practicable the public peace, and to give security and protection to the persons and property of loyal citizens, I do hereby extend and declare established martial law throughout the State of Missouri. . . . All persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court-martial, and, if found guilty, will be shot. The property, real and personal of all persons in the State of Missouri directly proven to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field is declared to be confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared freemen. . . . The object of this declaration is to place in the hands of the military authorities the power to give instantaneous effect to existing laws, and to supply such deficiencies as the conditions of war demand. But this is not intended to suspend the ordinary tribunals of the country, where the law will be administered by the civil officers in the usual manner, and with their customary authority, while the same can be peaceably exercised.‡

Despite its verbiage and confusion of subjects, it was apparent that this extraordinary document was not a measure of military protection, but a political manœuvre. Since the first movement of the armies the slavery question had become a subject of new and vital contention, and the antislavery drift of public opinion throughout the North was unmistakably manifest. There was no room for doubt that General Frémont, apprehensive about his loss of prestige through the disaster to Lyon and the public clamors growing out of his mistakes and follies in administration, had made this appeal to the latent feeling in the public mind as a means of regaining his waning popularity. Full confirmation was afforded by his immediately convening under his

* Unpublished MS.

† Unpublished MS.

‡ Frémont, Proclamation. War Records.

proclamation a military commission to hear evidence, and beginning to issue personal deeds of manumission to slaves.* The proceeding strongly illustrates his want of practical sense: the delay and uncertainty of enforcement under this clumsy method would have rendered the theoretical boon of freedom held out to slaves rare and precarious, if not absolutely impracticable. As soon as an authentic text of the proclamation reached President Lincoln, he wrote and dispatched the following letter:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 2, 1861.

MAJOR-GENERAL FRÉMONT.

MY DEAR SIR: Two points in your proclamation of August 30 give me some anxiety:

First. Should you shoot a man, according to the proclamation, the Confederates would very certainly shoot our best men in their hands in retaliation; and so, man for man, indefinitely. It is, therefore, my order that you allow no man to be shot under the proclamation without first having my approbation or consent.

Second. I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberating slaves of traitorous owners, will alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us; perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for Kentucky. Allow me, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the first and fourth sections of the act of Congress entitled, "An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes," approved August 6, 1861, and a copy of which act I herewith send you.

This letter is written in a spirit of caution, and not of censure. I send it by special messenger, in order that it may certainly and speedily reach you.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.†

It was the reply to the above which the general sent to Washington by the hand of Mrs. Frémont, and which contained a very lame apology for the dictatorial and precipitate step he had taken. He wrote:

Trusting to have your confidence, I have been leaving it to events themselves to show you whether or not I was shaping affairs here according to your ideas. The shortest communication between Washington and St. Louis generally involves two days, and the employment of two days in time of war goes largely towards success or disaster. I therefore went along according to my own judgment, leaving the result of my movements to justify me with you. And so in regard to my proclamation of the 30th. Between the rebel armies, the Provisional Government, and home traitors, I felt the position bad and saw danger. In the night I decided upon the proclamation and the form of it. I wrote it the next morning and printed it the same day. I did it without consultation or advice with any one, acting solely with my best judgment to serve the country and yourself, and perfectly willing to receive the amount of censure which should be thought due if I had made a false movement. This is as much a movement in the war as a battle, and in going into these I shall have to act according to my judgment of the ground before me, as I did on this occasion. If, upon reflection, your better judgment still decides that I am wrong in the article respecting

the liberation of slaves, I have to ask that you will openly direct me to make the correction. The implied censure will be received as a soldier always should the reprimand of his chief. If I were to retract of my own accord, it would imply that I myself thought it wrong, and that I had acted without the reflection which the gravity of the point demanded. But I did not. I acted with full deliberation, and upon the certain conviction that it was a measure right and necessary, and I think so still. In regard to the other point of the proclamation to which you refer, I desire to say that I do not think the enemy can either misconstrue or urge anything against it, or undertake to make unusual retaliation. The shooting of men who shall rise in arms against an army in the military occupation of a country is merely a necessary measure of defense, and entirely according to the usages of civilized warfare. The article does not at all refer to prisoners of war, and certainly our enemies have no ground for requiring that we should waive in their benefit any of the ordinary advantages which the usages of war allow to us.‡

Frémont thus chose deliberately to assume a position of political hostility to the President. Nevertheless Mr. Lincoln, acting still in his unfailing spirit of dispassionate fairness and courtesy, answered as follows:

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11, 1861.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. FRÉMONT.

SIR: Yours of the 8th in answer to mine of the 2d instant is just received. Assuming that you, upon the ground, could better judge of the necessities of your position than I could at this distance, on seeing your proclamation of August 30 I perceived no general objection to it. The particular clause, however, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves appeared to me to be objectionable in its non-conformity to the act of Congress passed the 6th of last August upon the same subjects; and hence I wrote you, expressing my wish that that clause should be modified accordingly. Your answer, just received, expresses the preference on your part that I should make an open order for the modification, which I very cheerfully do. It is therefore ordered that the said clause of said proclamation be so modified, held, and construed as to conform to, and not to transcend, the provisions on the same subject contained in the act of Congress entitled, "An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes," approved August 6, 1861, and that said act be published at length, with this order.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.§

As might have been expected, Frémont's proclamation of military emancipation, and Lincoln's order revoking it, produced a fresh and acrimonious discussion of the slavery question. The incident made the name of Frémont a rallying cry for men holding extreme anti-slavery opinions, and to a certain extent raised him to the position of a new party leader. The vital relation of slavery to the rebellion was making itself felt to a degree which the great body of the people, so long trained to a legal tolerance of the evil, could not yet bring themselves to acknowledge. Men hitherto conservative and prudent were swept along by the relentless logic of the nation's calamity

* "Rebellion Record."

† War Records.

‡ Frémont to Lincoln, Sept. 8, 1861. War Records.

§ War Records.

to a point where they were ready at once to accept and defend measures of even the last necessity for the nation's preservation.

With admirable prudence Lincoln himself added nothing to the public discussion, but a confidential letter written to a conservative friend who approved and defended Frémont's action will be found of enduring interest.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22, 1861.

HON. O. H. BROWNING.

MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 17th is just received; and coming from you, I confess it astonishes me. That you should object to my adhering to a law, which you had assisted in making, and presenting to me, less than a month before, is odd enough. But this is a very small part. General Frémont's proclamation, as to confiscation of property, and the liberation of slaves, is *purely political*, and not within the range of *military law* or necessity. If a commanding general finds a necessity to seize the farm of a private owner, for a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, he has the right to do so, and to so hold it, as long as the necessity lasts; and this is within military law, because within military necessity. But to say the farm shall no longer belong to the owner, or his heirs forever, and this, as well when the farm is *not* needed for military purposes as when it is, is purely political, without the savor of military law about it. And the same is true of slaves. If the general needs them he can seize them and use them, but when the need is past, it is not for him to fix their permanent future condition. That must be settled according to laws made by lawmakers, and not by military proclamations. The proclamation in the point in question is simply "dictatorship." It assumes that the general may do *anything* he pleases — confiscate the lands and free the slaves of *loyal* people, as well as of disloyal ones. And going the whole figure, I have no doubt, would be more popular, with some thoughtless people, than that which has been done! But I cannot assume this reckless position, nor allow others to assume it on my responsibility.

You speak of it as being the only means of saving the Government. On the contrary, it is itself the surrender of the Government. Can it be pretended that it is any longer the Government of the United States — any government of constitution and laws — wherein a general or a president may make permanent rules of property by proclamation?

I do not say Congress might not, with propriety, pass a law on the point, just such as General Frémont proclaimed. I do not say I might not, as a member of Congress, vote for it. What I object to is, that I, as President, shall expressly or impliedly seize and exercise the permanent legislative functions of the Government.

So much as to principle. Now as to policy. No doubt the thing was popular in some quarters, and would have been more so if it had been a general declaration of emancipation. The Kentucky legislature would not budge till that proclamation was modified; and General Anderson telegraphed me that on the news of General Frémont having actually issued deeds of manumission, a whole company of our volunteers threw down their arms and disbanded. I was so assured as to think it probable that the very arms we had furnished Kentucky would be turned against us. I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of this capital. On the contrary, if you will give

up your restlessness for new positions, and back me manfully on the grounds upon which you and other kind friends gave me the election, and have approved in my public documents, we shall go through triumphantly.

You must not understand I took my course on the proclamation *because* of Kentucky. I took the same ground in a private letter to General Frémont before I heard from Kentucky.

You think I am inconsistent because I did not also forbid General Frémont to shoot men under the proclamation. I understand that part to be within military law, but I also think, and so privately wrote General Frémont, that it is impolitic in this, that our adversaries have the power, and will certainly exercise it, to shoot as many of our men as we shoot of theirs. I did not say this in the public letter, because it is a subject I prefer not to discuss in the hearing of our enemies.

There has been no thought of removing General Frémont on any ground connected with his proclamation, and if there has been any wish for his removal on any ground, our mutual friend Sam. Glover can probably tell you what it was. I hope no real necessity for it exists on any ground. . . .

Your friend, as ever,

A. LINCOLN.*

The reader will not fail to note that the argument of this letter seems diametrically opposed to the action of the President, when, exactly one year later, he issued his preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation, as well as to that of the final one, on the first day of January, 1863. Did Mr. Lincoln change his mind in the interim? The answer is two-fold. He did not change his mind as to the principle; he did change his mind as to the policy of the case.

Rightly to interpret Mr. Lincoln's language we must imagine ourselves in his position, and examine the question as it presented itself to his mind. Congress, by the act of August 6, 1861, had authorized him to cause property used or employed in aid of insurrection to be "seized, confiscated, and condemned"; providing, however, that such condemnation should be by judicial proceeding. He saw that Frémont by mere proclamation assumed to confiscate all property, both real and personal, of rebels in arms, whether such property had been put to insurrectionary use or not, and, going a step further, had annexed a rule of property, by decreeing that their slaves should become free. This assumption of authority Lincoln rightly defined as "simply dictatorship," and as being, if permitted, the end of constitutional government. The case is still stronger when we remember that Frémont's proclamation began by broadly assuming "the administrative powers of the State"; that its declared object was mere individual punishment, and the measure a local police regulation to suppress disorder and maintain the peace; also that it was to operate throughout Missouri, as well within as without the

*MS. Also printed in "Proceedings of Illinois Bar Association, 1882," pp. 40, 41.

portions of the State under his immediate military control. Military necessity, therefore, could not be urged in justification. The act was purely administrative and political.

The difference between these extra-military decrees of Frémont's proclamation and Lincoln's acts of emancipation is broad and essential. Frémont's act was one of civil administration, Lincoln's a step in an active military campaign; Frémont's was local and individual, Lincoln's national and general; Frémont's partly within military lines, Lincoln's altogether beyond military lines; Frémont's an act of punishment, Lincoln's a means of war; Frémont's acting upon property, Lincoln's acting upon persons. National law, civil and military, knew nothing of slavery, and did not protect it as an institution. It only tolerated State laws to that effect, and only dealt with fugitive slaves as "persons held to service." Lincoln did not, as dictator, decree the abrogation of these State laws; but in order to call persons from the military aid of the rebellion to the military aid of the Union, he, as Commander-in-Chief, armed by military necessity, proclaimed that persons held as slaves within rebel lines should on a certain day become free unless rebellion ceased.

Thus no real distinction of principle exists between his criticism of Frémont's proclamation and the issuing of his own. On the other hand, there is a marked and acknowledged change of policy between the date of the Browning letter and the date of his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. In September, 1861, he stood upon the position laid down in the Chicago platform; upon that expressed in the constitutional amendment and indorsed in his inaugural; upon that declared by Congress in July, in the Crittenden resolution, namely: that the General Government would not interfere directly or indirectly with the institution of slavery in the several States. This policy Lincoln undertook in good faith to carry out, and he adhered to it so long as it was consistent with the safety of the Government. His Browning letter is but a reaffirmation of that purpose. At the time he wrote it military necessity was clearly against military emancipation, either local or general. The revocation of Frémont's decree saved Kentucky to the Union, and placed forty thousand Kentucky soldiers in the Federal army. But one year after the date of the Browning letter, the situation was entirely reversed. The Richmond campaign had utterly failed; Washington was menaced; the country was despondent; and military necessity now justified the policy of general military emancipation.

Whatever temporary popularity Frémont

gained with antislavery people by his proclamation was quickly neutralized by the occurrence of a new military disaster in his department. The battle of Wilson's Creek and the retreat of the Union army to Rolla left the Confederate forces master of south-west Missouri. The junction of rebel leaders, however, which had served to gain that advantage was of short duration. Their loosely organized and badly supplied army was not only too much crippled to follow the Union retreat, but in no condition to remain together. Price, as major-general of Missouri State forces, had only temporarily waived his rank and consented to serve under McCulloch, holding but a brigadier-general's commission from Jefferson Davis. Both the disagreement of the leaders and the necessities of the troops almost immediately compelled a separation of the rebel army. General Pearce with his Arkansas State forces returned home, and General McCulloch with his three Confederate regiments also marched back into Arkansas, taking up again his primary task of watching the Indian Territory. General Price held his numerous but heterogeneous Missouri followers together, and, busying himself for a time in gathering supplies, started back in a leisurely march northward from Springfield toward the Missouri River. The strong secession feeling of south-western Missouri rapidly increased his force, liberally furnished him supplies, and kept him fully informed of the numbers and location of the various Union detachments. There were none in his line of march till he neared the town of Lexington, on the Missouri River. The rebel governor, Jackson, had recently convened the rebel members of his legislature here, but a small Union detachment sent from Jefferson City occupied the place, dispersing them and capturing their records, and the great seal of the State, brought by the governor in his flight from the capital. About the 1st of September the Union commander at Jefferson City heard of the advance of Price, and sent forward the Chicago Irish Brigade under Colonel Mulligan to reënforce Lexington, with directions to fortify and hold it. Mulligan reached Lexington by forced marches, where he was soon joined by the Union detachment from Warrensburg retreating before Price. The united Federal force now numbered 2800 men, with 8 guns. Price pushed forward his cavalry, and made a slight attack on the 12th, but was easily repulsed and retired to await the arrival of his main body, swelled by continual accessions to some 20,000 with 13 guns; and on the 18th he again approached and formally laid siege to Lexington.

Mulligan made good use of this interim,

gathering provisions and forage, casting shot, making ammunition for his guns, and inclosing the college building and the hill on which it stood, an area of some fifteen acres, with a strong line of breastworks. Price began his attack on the 18th, but for two days made little headway. Slowly, however, he gained favorable positions; his sharp-shooters, skilled riflemen of the frontier, drove the Federals into their principal redan, cut off their water supply by gaining and occupying the river shore, and finally adopted the novel and effective expedient of using movable breastworks, by gradually rolling forward bales of wet hemp. On September 20, after fifty-two hours of gallant defense, Mulligan's position became untenable. The reinforcements he had a right to expect did not come, his water cisterns were exhausted, the stench from dead animals burdened the air about his fort. Some one at length, without authority, displayed a white flag, and Price sent a note which asked, "Colonel, what has caused the cessation of the fight?" Mulligan's Irish wit was equal to the occasion, and he wrote on the back of it, "General, I hardly know, unless you have surrendered." The pleasantry led to a formal parley; and Mulligan, with the advice of his officers, surrendered.*

The uncertainty which for several days hung over the fate of Lexington, and the dramatic incidents of the fight, excited the liveliest interest throughout the West. Newspaper discussion soon made it evident that this new Union loss might have been avoided by reasonable prudence and energy on the part of Frémont, as there were plenty of disposable troops at various points, which, during the slow approach and long-deferred attack of Price, could have been hurried to Mulligan's support. There were universal outcry and pressure that at least the disaster should be retrieved by a prompt movement to intercept and capture Price on his retreat. Frémont himself seems to have felt the sting of the disgrace, for, reporting the surrender, he added:

"I am taking the field myself, and hope to destroy the enemy, either before or after the junction of forces under McCulloch. Please notify the President immediately."

"Your dispatch of this day is received," responded General Scott. "The President is glad you are hastening to the scene of action; his words are, 'he expects you to repair the disaster at Lexington without loss of time.'"

This hope was not destined to reach a fulfillment. Price almost immediately retreated southward from Lexington with his captured booty, among which the pretentious great seal

* "Rebellion Record."

of the State figures as a conspicuous item in his report. On September 24 Frémont published his order, organizing his army of five divisions, under Pope at Boonville, McKinstry at Syracuse, Hunter at Versailles, Sigel at Georgetown, Asboth at Tipton. On paper it formed a respectable show of force, figuring as an aggregate of nearly 39,000; in reality it was at the moment well-nigh powerless, being scattered and totally unprepared for the field. Frémont's chronic inattention to details, and his entire lack of methodical administration, now fully revealed themselves. Even under the imperative orders of the general, nearly a month elapsed before the various divisions could be concentrated at Springfield; and they were generally in miserable plight as to transportation, supplies, and ammunition. Amidst a succession of sanguine newspaper reports setting forth the incidents and great expectations of Frémont's campaign, the convincing evidence could not be disguised that the whole movement would finally prove worthless and barren.

Meanwhile, acting on his growing solicitude, President Lincoln directed special inquiry, and about the 13th of October the Secretary of War, accompanied by the Adjutant-General of the Army, reached Frémont's camp at Tipton. His immediate report to the President confirmed his apprehension. Secretary Cameron wrote:

I returned to this place last night from the headquarters of General Frémont at Tipton. I found there and in the immediate neighborhood some 40,000 troops, with 1 brigade (General McKinstry's) in good condition for the field and well provided; others not exhibiting good care, and but poorly supplied with munitions, arms, and clothing. I had an interview with General Frémont, and in conversation with him showed him an order for his removal. He was very much mortified, pained, and, I thought, humiliated. He made an earnest appeal to me, saying that he had come to Missouri, at the request of the Government, to assume a very responsible command, and that when he reached this State he found himself without troops and without any preparation for an army; that he had exerted himself, as he believed, with great energy, and had now around him a fine army, with everything to make success certain; that he was now in pursuit of the enemy, whom he believed were now within his reach; and that to recall him at this moment would not only destroy him, but render his whole expenditure useless. In reply to this appeal, I told him that I would withhold the order until my return to Washington, giving him the interim to prove the reality of his hopes as to reaching and capturing the enemy, giving him to understand that, should he fail, he must give place to some other officer. He assured me that, should he fail, he would resign at once.

It is proper that I should state that after this conversation I met General Hunter, who, in very distinct terms, told me that his division of the army, although then under orders to march, and a part of his command actually on the road, could not be put in proper condition for marching for a number of days. To a question I put to him, "whether he believed General Frémont fit for the command," he replied that he did not think

that he was; and informed me that though second in command, he knew nothing whatever of the purposes or plans of his chief.*

The opinion of another division commander, General Pope, was freely expressed in a letter of the previous day, which Hunter also exhibited to the Secretary:

I received at 1 o'clock last night the extraordinary order of General Frémont for a forward movement of his whole force. The wonderful manner in which the actual facts and condition of things here are ignored stupefies me. One would suppose from this order that divisions and brigades are organized, and are under immediate command of their officers; that transportation is in possession of all; that every arrangement of supply trains to follow the army has been made; in fact, that we are in a perfect state of preparation for a move.

You know, as well as I do, that the exact reverse is the fact; that neither brigades nor divisions have been brought together, and that if they were there is not transportation enough to move this army one hundred yards; that, in truth, not one solitary preparation of any kind has been made to enable this advance movement to be executed. I have never seen my division, nor do I suppose you have seen yours. I have no cavalry even for a personal escort, and yet this order requires me to send forward companies of pioneers protected by cavalry. Is it intended that this order be obeyed, or rather, that we try to obey it, or is the order only designed for Washington and the papers? I went to Jefferson City, the last time I saw you, for the express purpose of getting transportation for my division, and explained to General Frémont precisely what I have said above. How in the face of the fact that he knew no transportation was furnished, and that Kelton has none, he should coolly order such a movement, and expect it to be made, I cannot understand on any reasonable or common-sense hypothesis.

Another letter to the President from a more cautious and conservative officer, General Curtis, exercising a local command in St. Louis, gave an equally discouraging view of the situation:

Your Excellency's letter of the 7th inst., desiring me to express my views in regard to General Frémont frankly and confidentially to the Secretary of War, was presented by him yesterday, and I have complied with your Excellency's request. . . . Matters have gone from bad to worse, and I am greatly obliged to your Excellency's letter, which breaks the restraint of military law, and enables me to relieve myself of a painful silence. In my judgment General Frémont lacks the intelligence, the experience, and the sagacity necessary to his command. I have reluctantly and gradually been forced to this conclusion. His reserve evinces vanity or embarrassment, which I never could so far overcome as to fully penetrate his capacity. He would talk of plans, which, being explained, only related to some move of a general or some dash at a shadow, and I am now convinced he has no general plan. Forces are scattered and generally isolated without being in supporting distance or relation to each other, and when I have expressed apprehension as to some, I have seen no particular exertion to repel or relieve, till it was too late. I know the demand made on him for force everywhere is oppressive; but remote posts have improperly stood out, and some still stand, inviting assault, without power to retreat, fortify, or rein-

force. Our forces should be concentrated, with the rivers as a base of operation; and these rivers and railroads afford means for sudden and salutary assaults on the enemy. . . . The question you propound, "Ought General Frémont to be relieved from or retained in his present command?" seems easily answered. It is only a question of manner and time. Public opinion is an element of war which must not be neglected. . . . It is not necessary to be precipitate. A few days are not of vast moment, but the pendency of the question and discussion must not be prolonged. Controversies in an army are almost as pernicious as a defeat.†

Thus the opinions of three trained and experienced army officers, who had every means of judging from actual personal observation, coincided with the general drift of evidence which had come to the President from civilian officials and citizens, high and low. Frémont had frittered away his opportunity for usefulness and fame; such an opportunity, indeed, as rarely comes to men. He had taken his command three months before with the universal good-will of almost every individual, every subordinate, every official, every community in his immense department. In his brief incumbency he not only lost the general public confidence, but incurred the special displeasure or direct enmity of those most prominent in influence or command next to him, and without whose friendship and hearty coöperation success was practically impossible.

Waiting and hoping till the last moment, President Lincoln at length felt himself forced to intervene. On the 24th of October, just three months after Frémont had assumed command, he directed an order to be made that Frémont should be relieved and General Hunter be called temporarily to take his command. This order he dispatched by the hand of a personal friend to General Curtis at St. Louis, with the following letter:

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24, 1861.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. R. CURTIS.

DEAR SIR: On receipt of this, with the accompanying inclosures, you will take safe, certain, and suitable measures to have the inclosure addressed to Major-General Frémont delivered to him with all reasonable dispatch, subject to these conditions only, that if, when General Frémont shall be reached by the messenger,—yourself or any one sent by you,—he shall then have, in personal command, fought and won a battle, or shall then be actually in a battle, or shall then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of a battle, it is not to be delivered, but held for further orders. After, and not till after, the delivery to General Frémont, let the inclosure addressed to General Hunter be delivered to him.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.‡

It will be seen that the conditions attending the delivery of this order were somewhat peculiar. If General Frémont had just won a battle, or were on the eve of fighting one,

* Cameron to Lincoln, Oct. 14, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Curtis to Lincoln, Oct. 12, 1861. MS.

‡ War Records.

then both justice to himself, and more especially the risk or gain to the Union cause, rendered it inexpedient to make a sudden change in command. But the question also had another and possibly serious aspect. Amid all his loss of prestige and public confidence, Frémont had retained the clamorous adhesion and noisy demonstrative support of three distinct elements. First, a large number of officers to whom he had given irregular commissions, issued by himself, "subject to the approval of the President." These commissions for the moment gave their holders rank, pay, and power; and to some of them he had assigned extraordinary duties and trusts under special instructions, regardless of proper military usage and method. The second class was the large and respectable German population of St. Louis, and other portions of Missouri, forming the nucleus of the radical faction whose cause he had especially espoused. The third class comprised the men of strong antislavery convictions throughout the Union who hailed his act of military emancipation with unbounded approval. The first class composed about his person a clique of active sycophants, wielding power and dispensing patronage in his name; the other two supplied a convenient public echo. Out of such surroundings and conditions there began to come a cry of persecution and a vague hum of insubordination, coupled with adulations of the general. Some of his favorites talked imprudently of defiance and resistance to authority; * occasional acts of Frémont himself gave a color of plausibility to these mutterings. He had neglected to discontinue the expensive fortifications and barracks when directed to do so by the Secretary of War. Even since the President ordered him to modify his proclamation, he had on one occasion personally directed the original document to be printed and distributed. Several of his special appointees were stationed about the city of St. Louis, "so they should control every fort, arsenal, and communication, without regard to commanding officers or quartermasters." † Suspicions naturally arose, and were publicly expressed, that he would not freely yield up his command; or, if not actually resisting superior authority, that he might at least, upon some pretext, temporarily prolong his power.

There was, of course, no danger that he could successfully defy the orders of the President. The bulk of his army, officers and sol-

diers, would have spurned such a proposition. But the example of delay or doubt, any shadow of insubordination, would have had an extremely pernicious effect upon public opinion. General Curtis therefore sent a trusted bearer of dispatches, who, by an easy stratagem, entered Frémont's camp, gained a personal audience, and delivered the official order of removal. Duplicates of the President's letters were at the same time, and with equal care, dispatched to the camp of General Hunter, at a considerable distance, and he traveled all night to assume his new duties. When he reached Frémont's camp, on the following day, he learned that ostensible preparations had been made and orders issued for a battle, on the assumption that the enemy was at Wilson's Creek advancing to an attack. Taking command, Hunter sent a reconnaissance to Wilson's Creek, and obtained reliable evidence that no enemy whatever was there or expected there. Frémont had been duped by his own scouts; for it is hardly possible to conceive that he deliberately arranged this final bit of theatrical effect.

The actual fact was that while Price, retreating southward, by "slow and easy marches," ‡ kept well beyond any successful pursuit, his army of twenty thousand which had captured Lexington dwindled away as rapidly as it had grown. His movement partook more of the nature of a frontier foray than an organized campaign: the squirrel-hunters of western Missouri, whose accurate sharp-shooting drove Mulligan into his intrenchments to starvation or surrender, returned to their farms or their forest haunts to await the occasion of some new and exciting expedition; the whole present effort of General Price, now at the head of only 10,000 or 12,000 men, being to reach an easy junction with McCulloch on the Arkansas border, so that their united force might make a successful stand, or at least insure a safe retreat from the Union army.

President Lincoln, however, did not intend that the campaign to the south-west should be continued. Other plans were being discussed and matured. With the order to supersede Frémont he also sent the following letters, explaining his well-considered views and conveying his express directions:

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24, 1861.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. R. CURTIS.

MY DEAR SIR: Herewith is a document — half letter, half order — which, wishing you to see, but not

the moral aid of the Government, is treason to the people. I cannot find smoother phrases, for it is the death struggle of our nationality, and no time for fair words. [Mrs. Frémont to Lamon, St. Louis, Oct. 20, 1861. Unpublished MS.]

† Curtis to Lincoln, Nov. 1, 1861. MS.

‡ Price, Official Report. War Records.

* To remove Mr. Frémont will be a great wrong, as the necessary investigation following it will prove. It will make immense confusion, and require all his control over his friends and the army to get them to do as he will,—accept it as an act of authority, not of justice,—but in time of war it is treason to question authority. To leave him here without money, without

to make public, I send unsealed. Please read it, and then inclose it to the officer who may be in command of the Department of the West at the time it reaches him. I cannot now know whether Frémont or Hunter will then be in command.

Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.*

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24, 1861.

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST.

SIR: The command of the Department of the West having devolved upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions. Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander in the field to specific lines and operations, as so much always depends on a knowledge of localities and passing events, it is intended, therefore, to leave a considerable margin for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.

The main rebel army (Price's) west of the Mississippi is believed to have passed Dade County in full retreat from north-western Arkansas, leaving Missouri almost freed from the enemy, excepting in the south-east of the State. Assuming this basis of fact, it seems desirable, as you are not likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making too long a line from your own base of supplies and reinforcements, that you should give up the pursuit, halt your main army, divide it into two corps of observation, one occupying Sedalia and the other Rolla, the present termini of railroad; then recruit the condition of both corps by reestablishing and improving their discipline and instructions, perfecting their clothing and equipments, and providing less uncomfortable quarters. Of course both railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously employing just so much force as is necessary for this. From these two points, Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in judicious coöperation with Lane on the Kansas border, it would be so easy to concentrate and repel any army of the enemy returning on Missouri from the south-west that it is not probable any such attempt to return will be made before or during the approaching cold weather. Before spring the people of Missouri will probably be in no favorable mood to renew for next year the troubles which have so much afflicted

and impoverished them during this. If you adopt this line of policy, and if, as I anticipate, you will see no enemy in great force approaching, you will have a surplus of force, which you can withdraw from these points and direct to others, as may be needed, the railroads furnishing ready means of reinforcing their main points, if occasion requires. Doubtless local uprisings will for a time continue to occur, but these can be met by detachments and local forces of our own, and will ere long tire out of themselves. While, as stated in the beginning of the letter, a large discretion must be and is left with yourself, I feel sure that an indefinite pursuit of Price, or an attempt by this long and circuitous route to reach Memphis, will be exhaustive beyond endurance, and will end in the loss of the whole force engaged in it.

Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.*

The change of command occasioned neither trouble nor danger. Frémont himself acted with perfect propriety. He took leave of his army in a brief and temperate address, and returned to St. Louis, where he was welcomed by his admirers with a public meeting and eulogistic speeches. The demonstration was harmless and unimportant, though care had been taken to send authority to General Curtis to repress disorder, and specially to look to the safety of the city and the arsenal.†

In accordance with the policy outlined by the President, General Hunter soon drew back the Federal army from Springfield to Rolla, and the greater part of it was transferred to another field of operations. Hearing of this retrograde movement, McCulloch rapidly advanced, and for a season occupied Springfield. One of the distressing effects of these successive movements of contending forces is described in a sentence of his report, "The Union men have nearly all fled with the Federal troops, leaving this place almost deserted."‡

* War Records.

† Townsend to Curtis, Nov. 6, 1861. War Records.

‡ McCulloch to Cooper, Nov. 19, 1861. War Records.



THE CRUMBLING COTTAGE.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

Union War Songs and Confederate Officers.

THE reading of Mr. Brander Matthews's "Songs of the War," in the August number of *THE CENTURY*, vividly recalls to mind an incident of my own experience which seems to me so apt an illustration of the effect of army songs upon men that I venture to send it to you, as I remember it, after twenty-two years.

A day or two after Lee's surrender in April, 1865, I left our ship at "Dutch Gap," in the James River, for a run up to Richmond, where I was joined by the ship's surgeon, the paymaster, and one of the junior officers. After "doing" Richmond pretty thoroughly we went in the evening to my rooms for dinner. Dinner being over and the events of the day recounted, the doctor, who was a fine player, opened the piano, saying: "Boys, we've got our old quartette here; let's have a sing." As the house opposite was occupied by paroled Confederate officers, no patriotic songs were sung. Soon the lady of the house handed me this note: "Compliments of General——and Staff. Will the gentlemen kindly allow us to come over and hear them sing?" Of course we consented, and they came. As the general entered the room, I recognized instantly the face and figure of one who stood second only to Lee or Jackson, in the whole Confederacy. After introductions and the usual interchange of civilities, we sang for them glees and college songs, until at last the general said: "Excuse me, gentlemen, you sing delightfully, but what *we* want to hear is your army songs." Then we gave them the army songs with uncton, the "Battle Hymn of the Republic," "John Brown's Body," "We're Coming, Father Abraham," "Tramp, Tramp, Tramp, the Boys are Marching," through the whole catalogue, to the "Star-spangled Banner,"—to which many a foot beat time as if it had never stepped to any but the "music of the Union,"—and closed our concert with "Rally Round the Flag, Boys." When the applause had subsided, a tall, fine-looking fellow in a major's uniform exclaimed, "Gentlemen, if we'd had your songs we'd have licked you out of your boots! Who could n't have marched or fought with such songs? While we had nothing, absolutely nothing, except a bastard 'Marseillaise,' the 'Bonny Blue Flag,' and 'Dixie,' which were nothing but jigs. 'Maryland, my Maryland' was a splendid song, but the true, old 'Lauriger Horatius' was about as inspiring as the 'Dead March in Saul,' while every one of these Yankee songs is full of marching and fighting spirit." Then turning to the general he said: "I shall never forget the first time I heard 'Rally Round the Flag.' 'T was a nasty night during the 'Seven Days' Fight,' and if I remember rightly it was raining. I was on picket, when, just before 'taps,' some fellow on the other side struck up that song and others joined in the chorus until it seemed to me the whole Yankee army was singing. Tom B——, who was with me, sung out, 'Good heavens, Cap, what are those fellows made of, anyway? Here we've licked

'em six days running and now, on the eve of the seventh, they're singing "Rally Round the Flag." I am not naturally superstitious, but I tell you that song sounded to me like the 'knell of doom,' and my heart went down into my boots; and though I've tried to do my duty, it has been an up-hill fight with me ever since that night."

The little company of Union singers and Confederate auditors, after a pleasant and interesting interchange of stories of army experiences, then separated, and as the general shook hands at parting, he said to me: "Well, the time *may* come when we can *all* sing the 'Star-spangled Banner' again." I have not seen him since.

Richard Wentworth Browne.

General Edwards's Brigade at Spotsylvania.

IN the interesting article in the June *CENTURY*, entitled "Hand-to-Hand Fighting at Spotsylvania," the author, while generally accurate and graphic, unaccountably omits any reference to that brigade of the Sixth Corps which was first engaged there, which was holding the key to the position when his own (Upton's) brigade came upon the field, and which, without egotism, can claim to have fought longer and more effectively than any other brigade of the Sixth Corps engaged. This honorable claim is made for the Fourth Brigade, Second Division, commanded by Colonel Oliver Edwards, which on that day had present for duty three small regiments, the 10th and 37th Massachusetts and the 2d Rhode Island. This claim is based upon the following facts:

When the two divisions of the Sixth Corps, which had been massed the previous evening, were summoned to the support of General Hancock, whose Second Corps had penetrated the Confederate lines, General Wright, who had just assumed command of the Sixth Corps, directed that the first brigade under arms and ready to move should lead the way. Edwards's brigade was first in line and led the march of the corps. It moved to the vicinity of the Landrum House, passing the Confederate generals and some of the prisoners who had been captured by Hancock, and, reaching the edge of woods facing the scene of action, came into line of battle facing by the rear rank, and advanced toward the captured works with the 10th Massachusetts on the right, the 2d Rhode Island in the center, and the 37th Massachusetts on the left.

The situation at this time was simply this,—the force of the Second Corps' attack had of itself broken up the organization of that command; the mass of men had been withdrawn to the outer face of the Confederate works and re-formed as well as possible under the circumstances. By the time this was accomplished the Confederates were prepared to undertake the recapture of the works they had lost. Then it was that Edwards's brigade moved forward and occupied the outer face of the intrenchments, relieving some troops already there

and connecting with the Excelsior Brigade. As the command came into position, it covered the nose or apex of the angle with the Rhode Island regiment, the 10th Massachusetts extending along the right face.

The brigade was scarcely in position when the Confederates advanced to the attack, the ground being extremely favorable for their purpose. On their side of the works it was wooded, and, in addition, scarcely forty yards to the rear of the fortifications was a hollow or a ravine which formed a natural siege approach. In that ravine, almost within pistol-shot of the Union lines, they were enabled to form columns of assault entirely screened from view, and the resulting attack had the appearance of lines of battle suddenly springing from the bosom of the earth. Three times in rapid succession their columns formed and rushed upon the angle held by Edwards and his nine hundred men, and as often did the deliberate fire of the Fourth Brigade repel the attack with terrible slaughter. To the right of Edwards's position, however, the defense was not so successful; the Union troops were driven back from the intrenchments, a force of Confederates crossing the works and taking position in a piece of woods, which gave them an enfilading fire on Edwards's right, so severe and well directed that it threw his 10th Regiment into confusion. It was at this time that Upton's brigade came upon the field and, in the words of that officer himself, encountered so severe a fire that he was unable to occupy the intrenchments, but resting his left upon them, near Edwards's right, his brigade lay down and opened fire.

Thus three assaults had been repulsed by Edwards's brigade before any other troops of the Sixth Corps came upon the field. As soon as the development of the Union line to the right relieved the flank fire somewhat, the 10th Regiment was returned to its place in the works, and throughout the remainder of that memorable day the brigade held its position with a fire so deadly and well directed that no hostile lines of battle could live to cross the few yards between the works and the ravine spoken of. Once, indeed, by the use of a white flag the Confederates came near accomplishing by stratagem what they had failed to do by force of arms. This emblem of peace being displayed in front of the Fourth Brigade, an officer ranking Edwards, but himself ranked by General Eustis, who was present, unjustifiably ordered the Fourth Brigade to cease firing. Instantly the purpose of the movement was shown by the dash of the Confederate line of battle for the coveted works. Fortunately, however, Edwards and his command were on the alert, and repulsed the attack, but not until the hostile colors were for a moment planted on the works,—the only instance during the day in which anything like a line of battle was enabled to advance so far at that point.

Near night the brigade was relieved, but the 37th Regiment was almost immediately ordered back to hold the works which had been unceremoniously vacated by a regiment of the Second Corps out of ammunition. The guns of the 37th also were empty, but the brave fellows pushed their bayonets under the head log, and thus held the works until a fresh supply of ammunition could be procured, when the firing was resumed and continued until 3 o'clock on the morning of the 13th.

This regiment was thus in action continually for more

than twenty hours, during which time it fired over four hundred rounds per man. At one time its guns became so foul that they could no longer be used, many of them bursting in the hands of the men. As it was impossible to relieve the line, a regiment from the Second Corps exchanged guns with the 37th, enabling the latter to continue their fire without interruption. It was in front of the right wing of this regiment and almost directly in the rear of the apex that the oak-tree, twenty-one inches in diameter, was cut down by bullets and fell within the Confederate lines.* I believe every regiment that fought anywhere in that part of the field claims to have shot down this particular tree; but in truth no single organization is entitled to all the credit. Certainly the Fourth Brigade, and especially its 37th Regiment, may claim the lion's share. Not only was this command engaged longer than any other, but all day the fire of the entire brigade was delivered under the head log, deliberately and well directed, and from the position of the troops a large portion of their fire concentrated at this point. Another fact, which would seem to settle the matter, was that the tree fell during the night, near midnight in fact, and hours after the firing had practically ceased on all parts of the line save at this vital point.

James L. Bowen.

SPRINGFIELD, MASS.

The Lost War Maps of the Confederates

IN several published articles, and in several books by Confederate generals and civilians, there have been severe criticisms (some just and some unjust) in regard to the want of suitable maps for the guidance of our commanders. General D. H. Hill in *THE CENTURY*, and General Dick Taylor and Mr. Jefferson Davis in their books, have made special mention of this want, and General Long in his recent "Memoirs of Robert E. Lee" comes to the defense of that distinguished general from this implied blame, and remarks that "the want of maps should be placed where it properly belongs,—with the war-directing authority at Richmond," and he further states that "the blunders complained of were more the result of inattention to orders and want of proper energy on the part of a few subordinate commanders than any lack of knowledge of the country." These remarks of General Long are substantially true. The writer has the best of reasons from personal knowledge and observation, and from an interview with General Lee a little after daybreak on Sunday morning, June 29th, 1862, for confirming the truth of the latter remarks as to "inattention to orders and want of proper energy," in this particular campaign up to that date. The escape of McClellan's army from White Oak Swamp was undoubtedly due to these short-comings, and I am persuaded that General Long and others have proved conclusively that the same cause prevented the concentration of Lee's army at the proper time before Gettysburg and occasioned its defeat there. It is one of the many failings of humanity to shift blame from one shoulder to another, as it is also to claim the merit of success where it is not due. Any simpleton can now untie a Gordian knot, knowing how Alexander did it.

* Several trees were cut down.—See foot-note, page 306, of *THE CENTURY* magazine for June, 1887.—EDITOR.

It is true that there were no maps of any account in existence at the time when General Lee assumed the command, that were of use to the Army of Northern Virginia, June 1st, 1862. Incomplete tracings or fragments of the old "Nine-Sheet" map of Virginia were probably all that our commanders had for guidance. General Long has, therefore, seemingly made an error in asserting in his note at the close of chapter ten of his book that the map accompanying that chapter was "used by General Lee during this campaign," as will be seen by reference to the indorsements on the map itself. The "Seven Days' Fight" occurred in June-July, 1862. This map was approved by me April 3d, and was "sent from the Engineer Bureau with letter of April 4th, 1863." It may, as alleged in the note, have been filed subsequent to these dates, but it was not in existence at the time stated by General Long, as will be seen further on.

Up to this period the blame, if any is due, must lie with the "war-directing power at Richmond." It is probable that weightier matters filled the minds of the higher authorities at this time, and that too much reliance was placed by commanders in the field in the efficiency of local guides and the insane and ridiculous notion that was affected that one Southern man could lick three Yankees under any and all circumstances; and besides, our armies as yet had not had sufficient battlings and unnecessary losses of men, to develop the indispensable necessity of a more intimate knowledge of topographical details of regions over which troops must be manœuvred. The march up the peninsula from Yorktown, the battle of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, Jackson's collision with Hill's line of march from Mechanicsville to Gaines's Mill, and the whole seven days' campaign brought out this fact in strong colors, bloody colors, at Beaver Dam Creek.

One of the first things that engaged General Lee's attention on taking command of the army was the organization of some plan for procuring accurate maps for his own use and that of his commanders. A few days after this event, on the 3d or 4th of June, the writer was sought by Major Walter H. Stevens, Chief Engineer of the army at that time, and Major Jasper S. Whiting, his associate, and was informed that they had been sent from headquarters by General Lee to find a suitable person to take charge of a topographical organization which he was desirous of having formed as soon as possible, and proceed to the field, as he found no maps of consequence on taking command of the army; and as maps were indispensable, no means must be spared to procure them. I was asked if I would undertake the duty and on what terms. They were informed that I had an application for the appointment to a captaincy in the Engineer Corps, favorably indorsed by the President, which for several months had been conveniently pigeon-holed in the Engineer Bureau, and that if they would procure that appointment I would accept it and proceed immediately to work. It was done by order of General Lee on recommendation of those officers, and my commission was dated and received on June 6th. Two or three surveying parties furnished with the necessary instruments were immediately organized and started from Richmond as a center, to radiate thence to the picket-lines of the army, from Meadow Bridge around to James River, each party taking an allotted sector of that circumscribed

space. This work had not sufficiently far advanced to be of any use in June, for no part of the region beyond our lines was accessible to survey until June 30th, when orders were given to follow in the wake of our army and extend the surveys as fast and as far as possible. The field work was mapped as fast as practicable, but as the army soon changed its location, more immediate attention was given to other localities. Therefore, this map in question was dated 1862-3: it was not available a complete until the spring of 1863. Other parties, soon after these first ones were started, were sent into Hanover and Spotsylvania counties, and as fast as possible other parties, amounting in all to about thirteen, were formed and sent into other counties of northern and north-eastern portions of Virginia, until in the course of time detailed surveys were made and at the close of the contest nearly all the work was mapped, from the western part of Fauquier and Rappahannock counties to Wilmington, North Carolina; from the strategic lines on the eastward to the Piedmont region of Virginia; and down the valley of Virginia as far as the Potomac River in Jefferson and Berkeley counties; and into south-western Virginia as far as Smyth county; and nearly all the counties south of James River east of Lynchburg unoccupied by the Federal forces. The surveys in North Carolina embraced a considerable belt on each side of the Weldon and Wilmington R. R. The exact limits of these extensive surveys can not now be recalled, for these maps have all been lost.

The general plan of operations was adopted of placing full parties in each county, and maps of each county thus successively surveyed in detail were constructed on a comparatively large scale, giving full credit to heads of field corps in the titles; and also general maps, one north and one south of James River, were prepared on a smaller scale, preserving all the details. So great was the demand for maps occasioned by frequent changes in the situation of the armies, that it became impossible by the usual method of tracings to supply them. I conceived the plan of doing this work by photography, though expert photographers pronounced it impracticable, in fact impossible. To me it was an original idea, though I believe not a new one, but not in practical use. Traced copies were prepared on common tracing-paper in very black India ink, and from these sharp negatives by sun-printing were obtained, and from these negatives copies were multiplied by exposure to the sun in frames made for the purpose. The several sections, properly toned, were pasted together in their order, and formed the general map, or such portions of it as were desired; it being the policy, as a matter of prudence against capture, to furnish no one but the commanding general and corps commanders with the entire map of a given region.

From this statement it will be seen that to General Lee is due the credit of promptly originating methodical means for procuring accurate maps to supply the want that has been, by implication mainly, so unfavorably commented on. Many maps that grace various memoirs, and personal recollections, and descriptions of campaigns and battle-fields in Virginia have their basis in the maps made as above described, though accredited to others. "I could a tale unfold" in regard to some of these stolen maps, but *cui bono? Nil proprium ducas quod mutari potest.*



From the Collection of the New York Historical Society.



THE OLD BULL DOG ON THE RIGHT TRACK.


From the Collection of the New York Historical Society.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.



ON the day after the battle of Bull Run, General McClellan was ordered to Washington. He arrived there on the 26th of July, and the next day assumed command of the division of the Potomac, comprising the troops in and around Washington on both banks of the river. In his report he says:

There were about 50,000 infantry, less than 1000 cavalry, and 650 artillerymen, with 9 imperfect field-batteries of 30 pieces. . . . There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance. Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets of Washington were crowded with straggling officers and men, absent from their stations without authority, whose behavior indicated the general want of discipline and organization.†

This picture is naturally drawn in the darkest colors, but the outlines are substantially accurate. There was great need of everything which goes to the efficiency of an army. There was need of soldiers, of organization, of drill, of a young and vigorous commander to give impulse and direction to the course of affairs.

All these wants were speedily supplied. The energy of the Government and the patriotism of the North poured into the capital a constant stream of recruits. These were taken in hand by an energetic and intelligent staff, assigned to brigades and divisions, equipped and drilled, with the greatest order and celerity. The infantry levies, on their first arrival, were sent to the various camps in the suburbs, and being there formed into provisional brigades were thoroughly exercised and instructed before being transferred to the forces on the other side of the river. These provisional brigades were successively commanded by Generals Fitz John Porter, Ambrose E. Burnside, and Silas Casey. The cavalry and the artillery, as they arrived, reported respectively to Generals George Stoneman and William F. Barry, chiefs of those arms. Colonel Andrew Porter was made Provost-Marshal of Washington, and

soon reduced the place to perfect order, which was never again disturbed during the war. Deserters were arrested, stragglers sent back to their regiments, and the streets rendered more quiet and secure than those of most cities in profound peace.

A great army was speedily formed. The 50,000 that General McClellan found in Washington were reinforced by the stalwart men of the North as fast as steam could bring them by water or land. Nothing like it had ever before been seen on the continent. The grand total of officers and men of the regular army before the war consisted of 17,000 souls. On the 27th of October, exactly three months after General McClellan assumed command, he reported an aggregate of strength for the army under him of 168,218, of which there were, he said, present for duty 147,695; ‡ and he reported several other bodies of troops *en route* to him. The Adjutant-General's report, three days later, shows present for duty with the Army of the Potomac, inclusive of troops in the Shenandoah, on the Potomac, and at Washington, 162,737, with an aggregate present and absent of 198,238. This vast army was of the best material the country could afford. The three-months' regiments—which were, as a rule, imperfectly organized and badly officered, their officers being, to a great extent, the product of politics and personal influence—had been succeeded by the volunteer army of three-years' men, which contained all the best elements of the militia, with very desirable additions. Only the most able of the militia generals, those whom the President had recognized as worthy of permanent employment, returned to the field after the expiration of their three-months' service. The militia organization of brigades and divisions had of course disappeared. The governors of the States organized the regiments, and appointed regimental and company officers only. The higher organization rested with the President, who also had the appointing of general and staff officers. A most valuable element of the new army was the old regular organization, largely increased and improved by the addition of eleven regiments, constituting two divisions of two brigades each. This

McClellan, Report, p. 9.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

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created a great many additional vacancies, which were filled partly from the old army and partly from civil life, giving to the service a large number of valuable officers. Two classes of cadets were that year graduated from the military academy at West Point, many of whom became useful and distinguished in the regular and the volunteer service.

In brief, for three months the Government placed at the disposal of the young general more than a regiment a day of excellent troops. The best equipments, the best arms, the best artillery, the most distinguished of the old officers, the most promising of the young, were given him. The armies in every other part of the country were stinted to supply this most important of all the departments; and at first it was with universal popular assent that this bountiful provision was made for him. He had gained for the country the only victory it had yet to its credit. He enjoyed a high character for military learning and science, founded upon the report of his friends. He was capable of great and long-continued industry in executive affairs. He was surrounded by an able and brilliant staff, all heartily devoted to him, and inclined to give him the greater share of the credit for their own work. His alert and gallant bearing, as he rode from camp to camp about Washington, surrounded by a company of aides in uniforms as yet untarnished by campaign life, impressed the imagination of tourists and newspaper correspondents, who at once gave him, on this insufficient evidence, the sobriquet of "the young Napoleon." In addition to these advantages, he was a man of extraordinary personal attractiveness; strangers instinctively liked him, and those who were thrown much in his company grew very fond of him. In every one, from the President of the United States to the humblest orderly who waited at his door, he inspired a remarkable affection and regard, a part of which sprang, it is true, from the intense desire prevalent at the time for success to our arms, which naturally included an impulse of good-will to our foremost military leaders; but this impulse, in the case of General McClellan, was given

a peculiar warmth by his unusually winning personal characteristics. In consequence he was courted and caressed as few men in our history have been. His charm of manner, enhanced by his rising fame, made him the idol of the Washington drawing-rooms; and his high official position, his certainty of speedy promotion to supreme command, and the probability of great political influence to follow, made him the target of all the interests and ambitions that center in a capital in time of war.*

He can hardly be blamed if this sudden and dazzling elevation produced some effect upon his character and temper. Suddenly, as by a spell of enchantment, he had been put in command of one of the greatest armies of modern times; he had become one of the most conspicuous figures of the world; his portrait had grown as familiar as those of our great historic worthies; every word and act of his were taken up and spread broadcast by the thousand tongues of publicity. He saw himself treated with the utmost deference, his prejudices flattered, and his favor courted by statesmen and soldiers twice his age. We repeat that he can hardly be blamed if his temper and character suffered in the ordeal.

He has left in his memoirs and letters unquestionable evidence of a sudden and fatal degeneration of mind during the months he passed in Washington in the latter half of 1861.† At first everything was novel and delightful. On the 27th of July he wrote: "I find myself in a new and strange position here; President, Cabinet, General Scott, and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land." Three days later he wrote: "They give me my way in everything, full swing and unbounded confidence. . . . Who would have thought when we were married that I should so soon be called upon to save my country?" A few days afterward: "I shall carry this thing on *en grand* and crush the rebels in one campaign." By the 9th of August his estimate of his own importance had taken such a morbid development that he was able to say: "I would cheerfully take

* General W. T. Sherman writes in his "Memoirs": "General McClellan arrived. . . . Instead of coming over the river, as we expected, he took a house in Washington, and only came over from time to time to have a review or inspection. . . . August was passing and troops were pouring in from all quarters; General McClellan told me he intended to organize an army of 100,000 men, with 100 field batteries, and I still hoped he would come on our side of the Potomac, pitch his tent, and prepare for real hard work, but his headquarters still remained in a house in Washington City." Vol. I., pp. 191, 192.

† To show how differently another sort of general comprehended the duties before him at this time, we

give another sentence from Sherman's "Memoirs": "I organized a system of drills, embracing the evolutions of the line, all of which was new to me, and I had to learn the tactics from books; but I was convinced that we had a long, hard war before us, and made up my mind to begin at the very beginning to prepare for it."

† "McClellan's Own Story," p. 82. We should hesitate to print these pathetic evidences of McClellan's weakness of character, contained as they are in private letters to his family, if they had not been published by Mr. W. C. Prime, with a singular misconception of their true bearing, as a basis for attacking the administration of Mr. Lincoln.

the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved"; yet he added in the same letter,* "I am not spoiled by my unexpected new position." This pleasing delirium lasted only a few weeks, and was succeeded by a strange and permanent hallucination upon two points: one was that the enemy, whose numbers were about one-third his own, vastly exceeded his army in strength; and the other, that the Government — which was doing everything in its power to support him — was hostile to him and desired his destruction. On the 16th of August he wrote: "I am here in a terrible place; the enemy have from three to four times my force; the President, the old general, can not or will not see the true state of affairs." He was in terror for fear he should be attacked, in doubt whether his army would stand. "If my men will only fight I think I can thrash him, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers. . . . I am weary of all this." Later on the same day he wrote with exultation that "a heavy rain is swelling the Potomac; if it can be made impassable for a week, we are saved." All through the month he expected battle "in a week." By the end of August his panic passed away; he said he was "ready for Beauregard," and a week later began to talk of attacking him.

By this time he had become, to use his own language, "disgusted with the Administration — perfectly sick of it."† His intimate friends and associates were among the political opponents of the men at the head of affairs, and their daily flatteries had easily convinced him that in him was the only hope of saving the country, in spite of its incapable rulers. He says in one place, with singular *naïveté*, that Mr. Stanton gained his confidence by professing friendship for himself while loading the President with abuse and ridicule.‡ He professed especial contempt for the President; partly because Mr. Lincoln showed him "too much deference."§ In October he wrote: "There are some of the greatest geese in the Cabinet I have ever seen — enough to tax the patience of Job." In November his disgust at the Government had become almost intolerable: "It is sickening in the extreme, and makes me feel heavy at heart, when I see the weakness and unfitness of the poor beings who control the destinies of this great country." The affair of Mason and Slidell, with which he had no concern, and upon which his advice was not asked, agitated him at this time. He feels that his wisdom alone must save the country in this crisis; he writes that he must

spend the day in trying to get the Government to do its duty. He does not quite know what its duty is — but must first "go to Stanton's to ascertain what the law of nations" has to say on the matter, Stanton being at this time his friend, and, as he thinks, Lincoln's opponent. He had begun already to rank the President as among his enemies. He was in the habit of hiding at Stanton's when he had serious work to do, "to dodge," as he said, "all enemies in the shape of 'browsing' Presidents," etc. "I am thwarted and deceived by these incapables at every turn."||

He soon began to call and to consider the Army of the Potomac as his own. He assumed the habit, which he never relinquished, of asking that all desirable troops and stores be sent to him. Indeed, it may be observed that even before he came to Washington this tendency was discernible. While he remained in the West he was continually asking for men and money. But when he came to the Potomac he recognized no such need on the part of his successor, and telegraphed to Governor Dennison to "pay no attention to Rosecrans's demand" for reinforcements.¶ In the plan of campaign which he laid before the President on the 4th of August, 1861, which was, in general objects and intentions, very much the same plan already adopted by General Scott and the Government, he assigned the scantiest detachments to the great work of conquering the Mississippi Valley; 20,000, he thought, would be enough, with what could be raised in Kentucky and Tennessee, "to secure the latter region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville" — while he demanded for himself the enormous aggregate of 273,000 men.** He wanted especially all the regular troops; the success of operations elsewhere, he said, was relatively unimportant compared with those in Virginia. These views of his were naturally adopted by his immediate associates, who carried them to an extent probably not contemplated by the general. They seemed to regard him as a kind of tribune, armed by the people with powers independent of and superior to the civil authorities. On the 20th of August his father-in-law, Colonel R. B. Marcy, being in New York, and not satisfied with what he saw in the way of recruitment, sent General McClellan a telegram urging him "to make a positive and unconditional demand for an immediate draft of the additional troops you require." "The people," he says, "will applaud such a course, rely upon it." The general, seeing

* "McClellan's Own Story," p. 85.

† *Ibid.*, p. 168.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¶ McClellan to Dennison, Aug. 12, 1861. War Records.

** McClellan to Lincoln. War Records.

nothing out of the way in this explosive communication of his staff-officer, sent it to the Secretary of War with this indorsement: "Colonel Marcy knows what he says, and is of the coolest judgment"; and recommended that his suggestion be carried into effect. All this time every avenue of transportation was filled with soldiers on their way to Washington.

In connection with his delusion as to the number of the enemy in front of him, it grew a fixed idea in his mind that all the best troops and all the officers of ability in the army should be placed under his orders. On the 8th of September he wrote a remarkable letter to the Secretary of War embodying these demands. He begins, in the manner which at an early day became habitual with him and continued to the end of his military career, by enormously exaggerating the strength of the enemy opposed to him. He reports his own force, in the immediate vicinity of Washington, at 85,000, and that of the enemy at 130,000, which he says is a low estimate, and draws the inevitable conclusion that "this army should be reënforced at once by all the disposable troops that the East and West and North can furnish. . . . I urgently recommend," he says, "that the whole of the regular army, old and new, be at once ordered to report here," with some trifling exceptions. He also demands that the choicest officers be assigned to him, especially that none of those recommended by him be sent anywhere else.* Most of these requests were granted, and General McClellan seems to have assumed a sort of proprietary right over every regiment that had once come under his command. When General T. W. Sherman's expedition was about sailing for the South, he made an earnest request to the Government for the 79th New York Highlanders. The matter being referred to General McClellan, he wrote in the most peremptory tone to the War Department, forbidding the detachment of those troops. "I will not consent," he says roundly, "to one other man being detached from this army for that expedition. I need far more than I now have, to save this country. . . . It is the task of the Army of the Potomac to decide the question at issue."† The President accepted this rebuke, and telegraphed to General Sherman that he had promised General McClellan "not to break his army here without his consent."‡

Such an attitude towards the military and civil authorities is rarely assumed by a gen-

eral so young and so inexperienced, and to sustain it requires a degree of popular strength and confidence which is only gained by rapid and brilliant successes. In the case of General McClellan the faith of his friends and of the Government had no nourishment for a long time except his own promises, and several incidents during the late summer and autumn made heavy drafts upon the general confidence which was accorded him.

From the beginning of hostilities the blockade of the Potomac River below Washington was recognized on both sides as a great advantage to be gained by the Confederates, and a great danger to be guarded against by the national Government. For a while the navy had been able to keep the waters of the river clear by the employment of a few powerful light-draft steamers; but it soon became evident that this would not permanently be a sufficient protection, and even before the battle of Bull Run the Navy Department suggested a combined occupation, by the army and the navy, of Mathias Point, a bold and commanding promontory on the Virginia side, where the Potomac, after a horse-shoe bend to the east, flows southward again with its width greatly increased. On the 20th of August the Navy Department renewed its importunities to the War Department to coöperate in the seizure of this most important point, which was "absolutely essential to the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac."§ Eleven days later these suggestions were still more pressingly presented, without effect. In October, however, when rebel batteries were already appearing at different points on the river, and when it was in contemplation to send to Port Royal the steamers which had been policing the Potomac, an arrangement was entered into between the army and the navy to occupy Mathias Point. Orders were sent to Captain Craven to collect at that place the necessary boats for landing a force of 4000 men. He waited all night and no troops appeared. Captain Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who had taken a great deal of interest in the expedition, went in deep chagrin to the President, who at once accompanied him to General McClellan's quarters to ask some explanation of this failure. The general informed him that he had become convinced it would not be practicable to land the troops, and that he had therefore not sent them. Captain Fox assured him that the navy would be responsible for that; and, after some discussion, it was concluded that the troops should go the next

* McClellan to Cameron. War Records.

† McClellan to Thomas A. Scott, Oct. 17, 1861. War Records.

‡ Lincoln to Sherman, October 18, 1861. War Records.

§ Welles to Cameron. War Records.

night. Captain Craven was again ordered to be in readiness; the troops did not go. Craven came to Washington in great agitation, threw up his command, and applied for sea-service, on the ground that his reputation as an officer would be ruined by the closing of the river while he was in command of the flotilla.* The vessels went out one by one; the rebels put up their batteries at their leisure, and the blockade of the river was complete. When General McClellan was examined as to this occurrence by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he did not remember the specific incidents as recited by Captain Fox, and as reported above, but said he never regarded the obstruction of the Potomac as of vital importance; its importance was more moral than physical.†

General McClellan was perhaps inclined to underrate moral effects. The affair at Ball's Bluff, which occurred on the 21st of October, produced an impression on the public mind and affected his relations with the leading spirits in Congress to an extent entirely out of proportion to its intrinsic importance. He had hitherto enjoyed unbounded popularity. The country saw the army rapidly growing in numbers and improving in equipment and discipline, and was content to allow the authorities their own time for accomplishing their purposes. The general looked forward to no such delays as afterward seemed to him necessary. He even assumed that the differences between himself and Scott arose from Scott's preference "for inaction and the defensive."‡ On the 10th of October he said to the President: "I think we shall have our arrangements made for a strong reconnaissance about Monday to feel the strength of the enemy. I intend to be careful and do as well as possible. Don't let them hurry me, is all I ask." The President, pleased with the prospect of action, replied: "You shall have your own way in the matter, I assure you."§ On the 12th he sent a dispatch to Mr. Lincoln from the front, saying that the enemy was before him in force, and would probably attack in the morning. "If they attack," he added, "I shall beat them."|| Nothing came of this. On the 16th the President was, as usual, at headquarters for a moment's conversation with General McClellan, who informed him that the enemy was massing at Manassas, and said that he was "not such a fool as to buck against that place in the spot designated by the rebels." But he seemed continually to be waiting merely for some slight additional

increment of his force, and never intending any long postponement of the offensive; while he was apparently always ready, and even desirous, for the enemy to leave their works and attack him, being confident of defeating them.

In this condition of affairs, with all his force well in hand, he ordered, on the 19th of October, that General McCall should march from his camp at Langley to Dranesville, to cover a somewhat extensive series of reconnaissances for the purpose of learning the position of the enemy, and of protecting the operations of the topographical engineers in making maps of that region. The next day he received a dispatch from General Banks's adjutant-general, indicating that the enemy had moved away from Leesburg. This information turned out to be erroneous; but upon receiving it General McClellan sent a telegram to General Stone at Poolesville informing him that General McCall had occupied Dranesville the day before and was still there, that heavy reconnaissances would be sent out the same day in all directions from that point, and directing General Stone to keep a good lookout upon Leesburg, to see if that movement had the effect to drive them away. "Perhaps," he adds, "a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them."¶ General McClellan insists that this order contemplated nothing more than that General Stone should make some display of an intention to cross, and should watch the enemy more closely than usual. But General Stone gave it a much wider range, and at once reported to General McClellan that he had made a feint of crossing at Poolesville, and at the same time started a reconnoitering party towards Leesburg from Harrison's Island, and that the enemy's pickets had retired to their intrenchments. Although General McClellan virtually holds that this was in effect a disobedience of his orders, he did not direct General Stone to retire his troops—on the contrary, he congratulated him upon the movement; but thinking that McCall would not be needed to cooperate with him, he ordered the former to fall back from Dranesville to his camp near Prospect Hill, which order, though contradicted by later instructions which did not reach him until his return to Langley, was executed during the morning of the 21st. But while McCall, having completed his reconnaissance, was marching at his leisure back to his camp, the little detachment which General Stone had sent across the river had blundered into battle.

A careful reading of all the accounts in the

* Report Committee on Conduct of the War. G. V. Fox, Testimony.

† Report Committee on Conduct of the War. McClellan, Testimony.

‡ "McClellan's Own Story," p. 170.

§ I. H., Diary.

¶ Ibid.

¶¶ McClellan, Report, p. 32.

archives of the War Department relating to this affair affords the best possible illustration of the lack of discipline and intelligent organization prevailing at that time in both armies. The reports of the different commanders seem hardly to refer to the same engagement; each side enormously exaggerates the strength of the enemy, and the descriptions of the carnage at critical moments of the fight read absurdly enough when compared with the meager official lists of killed and wounded. We will briefly state what really took place.

On the evening of the 20th General Gorman made a demonstration of crossing at Edwards Ferry, and a scouting party of the 20th Massachusetts crossed from Harrison's Island and went to within about a mile of Leesburg, returning with the report that they had found a small camp of the enemy in the woods. General Stone then ordered Colonel Charles Devens, commanding the 20th Massachusetts, to take four companies of his regiment over in the night to destroy this camp at day-break. Colonel Devens proceeding to execute this order found that the report of the scouting party was erroneous, and reporting this fact waited in the woods for further orders. General Stone sent over a small additional detachment which he afterward reinforced by a larger body, the whole being in command of Colonel E. D. Baker of the California regiment—a Senator from Oregon, an officer of the highest personal and political distinction, and, as we have already related, not without experience in the Mexican war. General Stone had now evidently resolved upon a reconnaissance in force, and in case an engagement should result he confidently expected Colonel Baker to drive the enemy from his front, at which juncture General Stone expected to come in upon their right with Gorman's troops, which he was pushing over at Edwards Ferry, and capture or rout the entire command. He gave Colonel Baker discretionary authority to advance or to retire after crossing the river, as circumstances might seem to dictate.

Colonel Baker entered upon the work assigned to him with the greatest enthusiasm and intrepidity. The means of transportation were lamentably inadequate; but working energetically, though without system, the greater part of the troops assigned for the service were at last got over, and Baker took command on the field a little after 2 o'clock. The battle was already lost, though the brave and high-spirited orator did not suspect it, any more than did General Stone, who, at Edwards Ferry, was waiting for the moment to arrive when he should attack the enemy's right and convert his defeat into rout. Colonel Devens,

who had been skirmishing briskly with continually increasing numbers of the Confederates all the morning, had by this time fallen back in line with Baker's, Lee's, and Cogswell's regiments, and a new disposition was made of all the troops on the ground to resist the advancing enemy. The disposition was as bad as it could well be made; both flanks were exposed, and the reserves were placed in an unprotected position immediately in rear of the center, where they were shot down without resistance, and were only dangerous to their comrades in front of them. Colonel Baker, whose bravery marked him for destruction, was killed about 4 o'clock, being struck at the same moment by several bullets while striving to encourage his men, and after a brief and ineffectual effort by Colonel Cogswell to move to the left, the National troops retreated to the river bank. They were closely followed by the Confederates; the wretched boats into which many of them rushed were swamped; some strong swimmers reached the Maryland shore, some were shot in the water, a large number threw their arms into the stream and, dispersing in the bushes, escaped in the twilight; but a great proportion of the entire command was captured. The losses on the Union side were 10 officers and 39 enlisted men killed, 15 officers and 143 enlisted men wounded, 26 officers and 688 enlisted men missing.* The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was almost as great—36 killed and 117 wounded.*

As soon as the news of the disaster began to reach General Stone, he hurried to the right, where the fugitives from the fight were arriving, did what he could to reestablish order there, and sent instructions to Gorman to intrench himself at Edwards Ferry and act on the defensive. General Banks arrived with reinforcements at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 22d and assumed command. The Confederates made an attack upon Gorman the same day and were easily repulsed; but General McClellan, thinking "that the enemy were strengthening themselves at Leesburg, and that our means of crossing and recrossing were very insufficient," withdrew all the troops to the Maryland side.† It seems from the Confederate reports that he was mistaken in concluding that the enemy were strengthening themselves; they were also getting out of harm's way as rapidly as possible. General Evans, their commander, says:

Finding my brigade very much exhausted, I left Colonel Barksdale with his regiment, with 2 pieces

* War Records.

† McClellan to Secretary of War. War Records.

of artillery and a cavalry force, as a grand guard, and I ordered the other 3 regiments to fall back towards Carter's Mills to rest and to be collected in order.*

The utter inadequacy of means for crossing was of course a sufficient reason to justify the cessation of active operations at that time and place.

Insignificant as was this engagement in itself, it was of very considerable importance in immediate effect and ultimate results. It was the occasion of enormous encouragement to the South. The reports of the Confederate officers engaged exaggerated their own prowess, and the numbers and losses of the National troops tenfold. General Beauregard, in his congratulatory order of the day, claimed that the result of this action proved that no disparity of numbers could avail anything as against Southern valor assisted by the "manifest aid of the God of battles."† It will probably never be possible to convince Confederate soldiers that here, as at Bull Run, the numbers engaged and the aggregate killed and wounded were about equal on both sides — a fact clearly shown by the respective official records. At the North the gloom and affliction occasioned by the defeat were equally out of proportion to the event. Among the killed and wounded were several young men of brilliant promise and distinguished social connections in New England, and the useless sacrifice of their lives made a deep impression upon wide circles of friends and kindred. The death of Colonel Baker greatly affected the public mind. He had been little known in the East when he came as Senator from Oregon, but from the moment that he began to appear in public his fluent and impassioned oratory, his graceful and dignified bearing, a certain youthful energy and fire which contrasted pleasantly with his silver hair, had made him extremely popular with all classes. He was one of Mr. Lincoln's dearest friends; he was especially liked in the Senate; he was one of the most desirable and effective speakers at all great mass-meetings. A cry of passionate anger went up from every part of the country over this precious blood wasted, this dishonor inflicted upon the National flag.

The first and most evident scape-goat was, naturally enough, General Stone. He cannot be acquitted of all blame, even in the calmest review of the facts; there was a lack of preparation for the fight, a lack of thorough supervision after it had begun. But these were the least of the charges made against him. The suspicions which civil war always breeds, and the calumnies resulting from them, were let loose upon

him. They grew to such proportions by constant repetition, during the autumn and winter following, that many people actually thought he was one of a band of conspirators in the Union army working in the interest of rebellion. This impression seized upon the minds of some of the most active and energetic men in Congress, friends and associates of Colonel Baker. They succeeded in convincing the Secretary of War that General Stone was dangerous to the public welfare, and on the 28th of January an order was issued from the War Department to General McClellan directing him to arrest General Stone. He kept it for several days without executing it; but at last, being apparently impressed by the evidence of a refugee from Leesburg that there was some foundation for the charges made by the committee of Congress, he ordered the arrest of General Stone, saying at the same time to the Secretary of War that the case was too indefinite to warrant the framing of charges.‡ The arrest was made without consulting the President. When Mr. Stanton announced it to him the President said: "I suppose you have good reasons for it; and having good reasons, I am glad I knew nothing of it until it was done." General Stone was taken to Fort Lafayette, where he remained in confinement six months; he was then released and afterward restored to duty, but never received any satisfaction to his repeated demands for reparation or trial.

For the moment, at least, there seemed no disposition to censure General McClellan for this misfortune. Indeed, it was only a few days after the battle of Ball's Bluff that he gained his final promotion to the chief command of the armies of the United States. A brief review of his relations to his predecessor may be necessary to a proper understanding of the circumstances under which he succeeded to the supreme command.

Their intercourse, at first marked by great friendship, had soon become clouded by misunderstandings. The veteran had always had a high regard for his junior, had sent him his hearty congratulations upon his appointment to command the Ohio volunteers, and although he had felt compelled on one occasion to rebuke him for interference with matters beyond his jurisdiction,§ their relations remained perfectly friendly, and the old general warmly welcomed the young one to Washington. But once there, General McClellan began to treat the General-in-Chief with a neglect which, though probably unintentional, was none the less galling. On the 8th of August, General McClellan sent to

* Evans to Jordan, Oct. 3, 1861. War Records.

† Beauregard, Orders, Oct. 23, 1861. War Records.

‡ McClellan to Stone, Dec. 5, 1862. War Records.

§ War Records.

General Scott a letter* to the effect that he believed the capital "not only insecure," but "in imminent danger." As General McClellan had never personally communicated these views to his chief, but had, as Scott says, "propagated them in high quarters," so that they had come indirectly to the old general's ears, his temper, which was never one of the meekest, quite gave way, and declining to answer General McClellan's letter, he addressed an angry note to the Secretary of War, scouting the idea of Washington being in danger, calling attention to "the stream of new regiments pouring in upon us," complaining bitterly of the reticence and neglect with which his junior treated him, and begging the President, as soon as possible, to retire him from the active command of the army, for which his age, his wounds, and his infirmities had unfitted him.

Mr. Lincoln was greatly distressed by this altercation between the two officers. He prevailed upon General McClellan to write him a conciliatory note, withdrawing the letter of the 8th; and armed with this, he endeavored to soothe the irritation of Scott, and to induce him to withdraw his angry rejoinder of the 9th. But youth, sure of itself and the future, forgives more easily than age; and Scott refused, respectfully but firmly, to comply with the President's request. He waited two days and wrote again to the Secretary of War, giving his reasons for this refusal. He believed General McClellan had deliberately, and with the advice of certain members of the Cabinet, offended him by the letter in question, and

* This letter deserves a careful reading. It is extremely characteristic, as showing, in the first place, how early McClellan began to exaggerate the number of the enemy in front of him, and how large were his ideas as to the force necessary for the protection of Washington so long as the duty of protecting the capital devolved upon him.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE POTOMAC,
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8, 1861.

LIEUT.-GEN. WINFIELD SCOTT,
Commanding U. S. Army.

GENERAL: Information from various sources reaching me to-day, through spies, letters, and telegrams, confirms my impressions, derived from previous advices, that the enemy intend attacking our positions on the other side of the river, as well as to cross the Potomac north of us. I have also received a telegram from a reliable agent just from Knoxville, Tenn., that large reinforcements are still passing through there to Richmond. I am induced to believe that the enemy has at least 100,000 men in front of us. Were I in Beauregard's place with that force at my disposal, I would attack the positions on the other side of the Potomac, and at the same time cross the river above this city in force. I feel confident that our present army in this vicinity is entirely insufficient for the emergency, and it is deficient in all the arms of the service — infantry, artillery, and cavalry. I therefore respectfully and most earnestly urge that the garrisons of all places in our rear be reduced at once to the minimum absolutely necessary to hold them, and that all the

troops thus made available be forthwith forwarded to this city; that every company of regular artillery within reach be immediately ordered here to be mounted; that every possible means be used to expedite the forwarding of new regiments of volunteers to this capital without one hour's delay. I urge that nothing be left undone to bring up our force for the defense of this city to 100,000 men, before attending to any other point. I advise that at least eight or ten good Ohio and Indiana regiments may be telegraphed for from western Virginia, their places to be filled at once by the new troops from the same States, who will be at least reliable to fight behind the intrenchments which have been constructed there. The vital importance of rendering Washington at once perfectly secure, and its imminent danger, impel me to urge these requests with the utmost earnestness, and that not an hour be lost in carrying them into execution. A sense of duty which I cannot resist compels me to state that in my opinion military necessity demands that the departments of North-eastern Virginia, Washington, the Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, including Baltimore, and the one including Fort Monroe, should be merged into one department, under the immediate control of the commander of the main army of operations, and which should be known and designated as such.

The two generals never became reconciled. The bickerings between them continued for two months, marked with a painful and growing bitterness on the part of Scott, and on the part of McClellan by a neglect akin to contempt. The elder officer, galled by his subordinate's persistent disrespect, published a general order on the 16th of September, which he says was intended "to suppress an irregularity more conspicuous in Major-General McClellan than in any other officer," forbidding junior officers on duty from corresponding with their superiors except through intermediate commanders; the same rule applying to correspondence with the President and the Secretary of War, unless by the President's request. General McClellan showed how little he cared for such an order by writing two important letters to the Secretary of War within three days after it was issued. On the same day a special order was given General

troops thus made available be forthwith forwarded to this city; that every company of regular artillery within reach be immediately ordered here to be mounted; that every possible means be used to expedite the forwarding of new regiments of volunteers to this capital without one hour's delay. I urge that nothing be left undone to bring up our force for the defense of this city to 100,000 men, before attending to any other point. I advise that at least eight or ten good Ohio and Indiana regiments may be telegraphed for from western Virginia, their places to be filled at once by the new troops from the same States, who will be at least reliable to fight behind the intrenchments which have been constructed there. The vital importance of rendering Washington at once perfectly secure, and its imminent danger, impel me to urge these requests with the utmost earnestness, and that not an hour be lost in carrying them into execution. A sense of duty which I cannot resist compels me to state that in my opinion military necessity demands that the departments of North-eastern Virginia, Washington, the Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, including Baltimore, and the one including Fort Monroe, should be merged into one department, under the immediate control of the commander of the main army of operations, and which should be known and designated as such.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

[War Records.]

† Scott to the President, Aug. 12, 1861.

McClellan to report to army headquarters the number and position of troops under his command, to which order he paid no attention whatever. General Scott felt himself helpless in the face of this mute and persistent disobedience, but he was not able to bear it in silence. On the 4th of October he addressed another passionate remonstrance to the Secretary of War, setting forth these facts, asking whether there were no remedy for such offenses, advertising once more to his physical infirmities, and at last divulging the true reason why he had borne so long the contumely of his junior—that he was only awaiting the arrival of General Halleck, whose presence would give him increased confidence in the preservation of the Union, and thus permit him to retire.* On the 31st of October he took his final resolution, and addressed the following letter to the Secretary of War:

For more than three years I have been unable, from a hurt, to mount a horse or to walk more than a few paces at a time, and that with much pain. Other and new infirmities — dropsy and vertigo — admonish me that repose of mind and body, with the appliances of surgery and medicine, are necessary to add a little more to a life already protracted much beyond the usual span of man. It is under such circumstances, made doubly painful by the unnatural and unjust rebellion now raging in the Southern States of our so late prosperous and happy Union, that I am compelled to request that my name be placed on the list of army officers retired from active service. As this request is founded on an absolute right granted by a recent act of Congress, I am entirely at liberty to say it is with deep regret that I withdraw myself, in these momentous times, from the orders of a President who has treated me with distinguished kindness and courtesy, whom I know among much personal intercourse to be patriotic, without sectional partialities or prejudices, to be highly conscientious in the performance of every duty, and of unrivaled activity and perseverance. And to you, Mr. Secretary, whom I now officially address for the last time, I beg to acknowledge my many obligations for the uniform high consideration I have received at your hands.*

His request was granted, with the usual compliments and ceremonies, the President and Cabinet waiting upon him in person at his residence. General McClellan succeeded him in command of the armies of the United States, and in his order of the 1st of November he praised in swelling periods the war-worn veteran† whose latest days of service he had so annoyed and embittered. When we consider the relative positions of the two officers — the years, the infirmities, the well-earned glory of Scott, his former friendship and kindness towards his junior; and, on the other hand, the youth, the strength, the marvelous good fortune of McClellan, his great promotion, his certainty of almost immediate succession to supreme command — it cannot be said that his demeanor towards his chief was magnanimous. Although General Scott's unfitness for com-

mand had become obvious, although his disposition, which in his youth had been arrogant and haughty, had been modified but not improved by age into irascibility, it would certainly not have been out of place for his heir presumptive to dissemble an impatience which was not unnatural, and preserve some appearance at least of a respect he did not feel. Standing in the full sunshine, there was something due from him to an old and illustrious soldier stepping reluctant into hopeless shadow.

The change was well received in all parts of the country. At Washington there was an immediate feeling of relief. The President called at General McClellan's headquarters on the night of the 1st of November and gave him warm congratulations. "I should feel perfectly satisfied," he said, "if I thought that this vast increase of responsibility would not embarrass you." "It is a great relief, sir," McClellan answered. "I feel as if several tons were taken from my shoulders to-day. I am now in contact with you and the Secretary. I am not embarrassed by intervention." "Very well," said the President; "draw on me for all the sense and information I have. In addition to your present command the supreme command of the army will entail an enormous labor upon you." "I can do it all," McClellan quickly answered.‡ Ten days later Blenker's brigade organized a torchlight procession, a sort of Fackel-tanz, in honor of the event. The President, after the show was over, went as usual to General McClellan's, and referring to the Port Royal expedition thought this "a good time to feel the enemy." "I have not been unmindful of that," McClellan answered; "we shall feel them tomorrow."§ Up to this time there was no importunity on the part of the President for an advance of the army, although for several weeks some of the leading men in Congress had been urging it. As early as the 26th of October, Senators Trumbull, Chandler, and Wade called upon the President and earnestly represented to him the importance of immediate action. Two days later they had another conference with the President and Mr. Seward, at the house of the latter. They spoke with some vehemence of the absolute necessity for energetic measures to drive the enemy from in front of Washington. The President and the Secretary of State both defended the general in his deliberate purpose not to move until he was ready. The zealous senators did not confine their visits to the civil authorities. They called upon General McClellan also,

* Scott to Cameron. War Records.

† McClellan, Order, Nov. 1, 1861. War Records.

‡ J. H., Diary, Nov. 1, 1861.

§ *Ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1861.

and in the course of an animated conversation Mr. Wade said an unsuccessful battle was preferable to delay; a defeat would be easily repaired by the swarming recruits—a thrust which McClellan neatly parried by saying he would rather have a few recruits before a victory than a good many after a defeat.* There was as yet no apparent hostility to McClellan, even among “these wretched politicians,” as he calls them. On the contrary, this conference of the 26th was not inharmonious; McClellan represented General Scott as the obstacle to immediate action, and skillfully diverted the zeal of the senators against the General-in-Chief. He wrote that night:

For the last three hours I have been at Montgomery Blair's, talking with Senators Wade, Trumbull, and Chandler about war matters. They will make a desperate effort to-morrow to have General Scott retired at once; until this is accomplished, I can effect but little good. He is ever in my way, and I am sure does not desire effective action.†

The President, while defending the generals from the strictures of the senators, did not conceal from McClellan the fact of their urgency. He told him it was a reality not to be left out of the account; at the same time he was not to fight till he was ready. “I have everything at stake,” the general replied. “If I fail, I will never see you again.” At this period there was no question of more than a few days' delay.

The friendly visits of the President to army headquarters were continued almost every night until the 13th of November, when an incident occurred which virtually put an end to them.‡ On that evening Mr. Lincoln walked across the street as usual, accompanied by one of his household, to the residence of the Secretary of State, and after a short visit there both of them went to General McClellan's house, in H street. They were there told that the general had gone to the wedding of an officer and would soon return. They waited nearly an hour in the drawing-room, when the general returned, and, without paying any special attention to the orderly who told him the President was waiting to see him, went upstairs. The President, thinking his name had not been announced to the general, again sent a servant to his room and received the answer that he had gone to bed. Mr. Lincoln attached no special importance to this incident, and, so far as we know, never asked nor received any explanation of it. But it was not unnatural that he should conclude his frequent visits had become irksome to the general, and that he should discontinue them. There was no cessation of their friendly relations, though

after this most of their conferences were held at the Executive Mansion.

On the 20th of November a grand review of the Army of the Potomac took place at Upton's Hill. There were about 50,000 men in line, drawn up on a wide, undulating plain, which displayed them to the best advantage, and a finer army has rarely been seen. The President, accompanied by Generals McClellan and McDowell, and followed by a brilliant cavalcade of a hundred general and staff officers, rode up and down the entire extent of the embattled host. Mr. Lincoln was a good horseman, and was received with hearty cheers by the troops, thousands of whom saw him that day for the first and last time. The reviewing officers then took their stand upon a gentle acclivity in the center of the plain, and the troops filed past in review through the autumnal afternoon until twilight. It had certainly all the appearance of a great army ready for battle, and there was little doubt that they would speedily be led into action. But after the review drilling was resumed; recruits continued to pour in, to be assigned and equipped and instructed. The general continued his organizing work; many hours of every day he passed in the saddle, riding from camp to camp with tireless industry, until at last he fell seriously ill, and for several weeks the army rested almost with folded hands awaiting his recovery.

EUROPEAN NEUTRALITY.

ONE of the gravest problems which beset the Lincoln administration on its advent to power was how foreign nations would deal with the fact of secession and rebellion in the United States; and the people of the North endured a grievous disappointment when they found that England and France were by active sympathy favorable to the South. This result does not seem strange when we consider by what insensible steps the news from America had shaped their opinion.

Europeans were at first prepared to accept the disunion threats of Southern leaders as mere transient party bravado. The non-coercion message of President Buchanan, however, was in their eyes an indication of serious import. Old World statesmanship had no faith in unsupported public sentiment as a lasting bond of nationality. The experience of a thousand years teaches them that, under their monarchical system, governments and laws by “divine right” are of accepted and permanent force only when competent physical power stands behind them to compel obedience. Mr. Buchanan's dogma that the Federal Government had no authority to keep a State in the Union was to them, in

* J. H., Diary, Oct. 26, 27, 1861. † J. H., Diary.

‡ “McClellan's Own Story,” p. 171.

theory at least, the end of the Government of the United States. When, further, they saw that this theory was being translated into practice by acquiescence in South Carolina's revolt; by the failure to reënforce Sumter; by the President's quasi-diplomacy with the South Carolina commissioners as foreign agents; and finally by his practical abdication of executive functions, in the message of January 8,* "referring the whole subject to Congress," and throwing upon it all "the responsibility,"—they naturally concluded that the only remaining question for them was one of new relations with the divided States. From the election of Lincoln until three days preceding his inauguration, a period of nearly four months, embracing the whole drama of public secession and the organization of the Montgomery confederacy, not a word of information, explanation, or protest on these momentous proceedings was sent by the Buchanan cabinet to foreign powers. They were left to draw their inferences exclusively from newspapers, the debates of Congress, and the President's messages till the last day of February, 1861, when Secretary Black, in a diplomatic circular, instructed our ministers at foreign courts "that this Government has not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction within the territory of those seceded States and does not desire to do so," and that a recognition of their independence must be opposed. France and England replied courteously that they would not act in haste, but quite emphatically that they could give no further binding promise.

Mr. Seward, on assuming the duties of Secretary of State, immediately transmitted a circular, repeating the injunction of his predecessor and stating the confidence of the President in the speedy restoration of the harmony and unity of the Government. Considerable delay occurred in settling upon the various foreign appointments. The new minister to France, Mr. Dayton, and the new minister to Great Britain, Mr. Adams, did not sail for Europe till about the 1st of May. Before either of them arrived at his post, both governments had violated in spirit their promise to act in no haste. On the day Mr. Adams sailed from Boston, his predecessor, Mr. Dallas, yet in London, was sent for by Lord John Russell, her Britannic Majesty's Minister of Foreign Affairs. "He told me," wrote Mr. Dallas, "that the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy were here; that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so, *unofficially*; that there existed an understanding between this Government and that of France which would

* "Globe," Jan. 9, 1861, p. 294.

lead both to take the same course as to recognition, whatever that course might be." The step here foreshadowed was soon taken. Three days later Lord Russell did receive the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy; and while he told them he could not communicate with them "officially," his language indicated that when the South could maintain its position England would not be unwilling to hear what terms they had to propose. When Mr. Adams landed in England he found, evidently to forestall his arrival, that the Ministry had published the Queen's proclamation of neutrality, raising the Confederate States at once to the position and privilege of a belligerent power; and France soon followed the example.

In taking this precipitate action, both powers probably thought it merely a preliminary step: the British ministers believed disunion to be complete and irrevocable, and were eager to take advantage of it to secure free trade and cheap cotton; while Napoleon III., Emperor of the French, already harboring far-reaching colonial designs, expected not only to recognize the South, but to assist her at no distant day by an armed intervention. For the present, of course, all such meditations were veiled under the bland phraseology of diplomatic regret at our misfortune. The object of these pages is, however, not so much to discuss international relations as to show what part President Lincoln personally took in framing the dispatch which announced the answering policy of the United States.

When the communication which Lord Russell made to Mr. Dallas was received at the State Department, the unfriendly act of the English Government, and more especially the half-insulting manner of its promulgation, filled Mr. Seward with indignation. In this mood he wrote a dispatch to Mr. Adams, which, if transmitted and delivered in its original form, could hardly have failed to endanger the peaceful relations of the two countries. The general tone and spirit of the paper were admirable; but portions of it were phrased with an exasperating bluntness, and certain directions were lacking in diplomatic prudence. This can be accounted for only by the irritation under which he wrote. It was Mr. Seward's ordinary habit personally to read his dispatches to the President before sending them. Mr. Lincoln, detecting the defects of the paper, retained it, and after careful scrutiny made such material corrections and alterations with his own hand as took from it all offensive crudeness without in the least lowering its tone, but, on the contrary, greatly increasing its dignity.

SEWARD'S ORIGINAL DISPATCH, SHOWING MR. LINCOLN'S CORRECTIONS.

[All words by Lincoln in margin or in text are in italics. All matter between brackets was marked out.]

No. 10.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, May 21st, 1861.

SIR:

Mr. Dallas in a brief dispatch of May 2d (No. 333) tells us that Lord John Russell recently requested an interview with him on account of the solicitude which His Lordship felt concerning the effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the President. In that conversation the British Secretary told Mr. Dallas that the three Representatives of the Southern Confederacy were then in London, that Lord John Russell had not yet seen them, but that he was not unwilling to see them unofficially. He farther informed Mr. Dallas that an understanding exists between the British and French Governments which would lead both to take one and the same course as to recognition. His Lordship then referred to the rumor of a meditated blockade by us of Southern ports, and a discontinuance of them as ports of entry. Mr. Dallas answered that he knew nothing on those topics and therefore could say nothing. He added that you were expected to arrive in two weeks. Upon this statement Lord John Russell acquiesced in the expediency of waiting for the full knowledge you were expected to bring.

Mr. Dallas transmitted to us some newspaper reports of Ministerial explanations made in Parliament.

You will base no proceedings on parliamentary debates farther than to seek explanations when necessary and communicate them to this Department. [We intend to have a clear and simple record of whatever issue may arise between us and Great Britain.]

Leave out.

Leave out, because it does not appear that such explanations were demanded.

The President [is surprised and grieved] *regrets* that Mr. Dallas did not protest against the proposed unofficial intercourse between the British Government and the missionaries of the insurgents, [as well as against the demand for explanations made by the British Government]. It is due however to Mr. Dallas to say that our instructions had been given only to you and not to him, and that his loyalty and fidelity, too rare in these times [among our late representatives abroad are confessed and] *are* appreciated.

Leave out.

Intercourse of any kind with the so-called Commissioners is liable to be construed as a recognition of the authority which appointed them. Such intercourse would be none the less [wrongful] *hurtful* to us, for being called unofficial, and it might be even more injurious, because we should have no means of knowing what points might be resolved by it. Moreover, unofficial intercourse is useless and meaningless, if it is not expected to ripen into official intercourse and direct recognition. It is left doubtful here whether the proposed unofficial intercourse has yet actually begun. Your own [present] antecedent instructions are deemed explicit enough, and it is hoped that you have not misunderstood them. You will in any event desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficial as well as official with the British Government, so long as it shall continue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of this country, [confining yourself simply to a delivery of a copy of this paper to the Secretary of State. After doing this]* you will communicate with this Department and receive farther directions.

Leave out.

* *When intercourse shall have been arrested for this cause,*

Lord John Russell has informed us of an understanding between the British and French Governments that they will act together in regard to our affairs. This communication however loses something of its value from the circumstance that the communication was withheld until after knowledge of the fact had been acquired by us from other sources. We know also another fact that has not yet been officially communicated to us, namely that other European States are apprized by France and England of their agreement and are expected to concur with or follow them in whatever measures they adopt on the subject of recognition. The United States have been impartial and just in all their conduct towards the several

nations of Europe. They will not complain however of the combination now announced by the two leading powers, although they think they had a right to expect a more independent if not a more friendly course from each of them. You will take no notice of that or any other alliance. Whenever the European governments shall see fit to communicate directly with us we shall be as heretofore frank and explicit in our reply.

As to the blockade, you will say that by [the] *our own* laws [of nature] and *the laws* of nature and the laws of nations this government has a clear right to suppress insurrection. An exclusion of commerce from national ports which have been seized by the insurgents, in the equitable form of blockade, is a proper means to that end. You will [admit] not insist that our blockade is [not] to be respected if it be not maintained by a competent force—but passing by that question as not now a practical or at least an urgent one you will add that [it] the blockade is now and it will continue to be so maintained, and therefore we expect it to be respected by Great Britain. You will add that we have already revoked the exequatur of a Russian Consul who had enlisted in the Military service of the insurgents, and we shall dismiss or demand the recall of every foreign agent, Consular or Diplomatic, who shall either disobey the Federal laws or disown the Federal authority.

As to the recognition of the so-called Southern Confederacy it is not to be made a subject of technical definition. It is of course [*quasi*] direct recognition to publish an acknowledgment of the sovereignty and independence of a new power. It is [*quasi*] direct recognition to receive its ambassadors, Ministers, agents, or commissioners officially. A concession of belligerent rights is liable to be construed as a recognition of them. No one of these proceedings will [be borne] *pass* [*unnoticed*] unquestioned by the United States in this case.

Hitherto recognition has been moved only on the assumption that the so-called Confederate States are de facto a self-sustaining power. Now after long forbearance, designed to soothe discontent and avert the need of civil war, the land and naval forces of the United States have been put in motion to repress the insurrection. The true character of the pretended new State is at once revealed. It is seen to be a Power existing in pronunciamiento only. It has never won a field. It has obtained no forts that were not virtually betrayed into its hands or seized in breach of trust. It commands not a single port on the coast nor any highway out from its pretended Capital by land. Under these circumstances Great Britain is called upon to intervene and give it body and independence by resisting our measures of suppression. British recognition would be British intervention to create within our own territory a hostile state by overthrowing this Republic itself. [When this act of intervention is distinctly performed, we from that hour shall cease to be friends and become once more, as we have twice before been forced to be enemies of Great Britain.]

[Leave out.]

As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent service, you will say that this is a question exclusively our own. We treat them as pirates. They are our own citizens, or persons employed by our citizens, preying on the commerce of our country. If Great Britain shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents, and give them shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the laws of nations afford an adequate and proper remedy, [and we shall avail ourselves of it. *And while you need not to say this in advance, be sure that you say nothing inconsistent with it.*]

Happily, however, Her Britannic Majesty's Government can avoid all these difficulties. It invited us in 1856 to accede to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, of which body Great Britain was herself a member, abolishing privateering everywhere in all cases and for ever. You *already* have our authority to propose to her our accession to that declaration. If she refuse to receive it, it can only be because she is willing to become the patron of privateering when aimed at our devastation.

These positions are not elaborately defended now, because to vindicate them would imply a possibility of our waiving them.

[Drop all from this line to the end, and in lieu of it write

“ This paper is for your own guidance only, and not [sic] to be read or shown to anyone.]

We are not insensible of the grave importance of this occasion. We see how, upon the result of the debate in which we are engaged, a war may ensue between the United States, and one, two, or even more European nations. War in any case is as exceptionable from the habits as it is revolting from the sentiments of the American people. But if it come it will be fully seen that it results from the action of Great Britain, not our own, that Great Britain will have decided to fraternize with our domestic enemy, either without waiting to hear from you our remonstrances, and our warnings, or after having heard them. War in defense of national life is not immoral, and war in defense of independence is an inevitable part of the discipline of nations.

The dispute will be between the European and the American branches of the British race. All who belong to that race will especially deprecate it, as they ought. It may well be believed that men of every race and kindred will deplore it. A war not unlike it between the same parties occurred at the close of the last century. Europe atoned by forty years of suffering for the error that Great Britain committed in provoking that contest. If that nation shall now repeat the same great error the social convulsions which will follow may not be so long but they will be more general. When they shall have ceased, it will, we think, be seen, whatever may have been the fortunes of other nations, that it is not the United States that will have come out of them with its precious Constitution altered or its honestly obtained dominion in any degree abridged. Great Britain has but to wait a few months and all her present inconveniences will cease with all our own troubles. If she take a different course she will calculate for herself the ultimate as well as the immediate consequences, and will consider what position she will hold when she shall have forever lost the sympathies and the affections of the only nation on whose sympathies and affections she has a natural claim. In making that calculation she will do well to remember that in the controversy she proposes to open we shall be actuated by neither pride, nor passion, nor cupidity, nor ambition; but we shall stand simply on the principle of self-preservation, and that our cause will involve the independence of nations, and the rights of human nature.

I am Sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, ESQ., etc., etc., etc.

W. H. S.

[It is quite impossible to reproduce in type the exact form of the manuscript of the dispatch with all its interlineations and corrections; but the foregoing shows those made by Mr. Lincoln with sufficient accuracy. Such additional verbal alterations of Mr. Seward's as merely corrected ordinary slips of the pen or errors of the copyist are not noted. When the President returned the manuscript to his hands, Mr. Seward somewhat changed the form of the dispatch by prefixing to it two short introductory paragraphs in which he embodied, in his own phraseology, the President's direction that the paper was to be merely a confidential instruction not to be read or shown to any one, and that he should not in advance say anything inconsistent with its spirit. This also rendered unnecessary the President's direction to omit the last two paragraphs, and accordingly they remained in the dispatch as finally sent.]

THE mere perusal of this document shows how ill-advised was Mr. Seward's original di-

rection to deliver a copy of it to the British foreign office without further explanation, or without requesting a reply in a limited time. Such a course would have left the American minister in a position of uncertainty whether he was still in diplomatic relations or not, and whether the point had been reached which would justify him in breaking off intercourse; nor would he have had any further pretext upon which to ascertain the disposition or intention of the British Government. It would have been wiser to close the legation at once and return to America. Happily, Mr. Lincoln saw the weak point of the instruction, and by his changes not only kept it within the range of personal and diplomatic courtesy, but left Mr. Adams free to choose for himself the best way of managing the delicate situation.

The main point in question, namely, that the United States would not suffer Great Britain to carry on a double diplomacy with Washington and with Montgomery at the same time — that if she became the active friend of the re-

bellion she must become the enemy of the United States, was partly disposed of before the arrival of the amended dispatch at London. Several days before it was written Mr. Adams had his first official interview (May 18) with Lord John Russell, and in the usual formal phraseology, but with emphatic distinctness, told him that if there existed on the part of Great Britain "an intention more or less marked to extend the struggle" by encouragement in any form to the rebels, "I was bound to acknowledge in all frankness that in that contingency I had nothing further left to do in Great Britain." The British minister denied any intention to aid the rebellion, and explained that the Queen's proclamation was issued merely to define their own attitude of strict neutrality, so that British naval officers and other officials might understand how to regulate their conduct.*

When the dispatch finally reached Mr. Adams, he obtained another interview with Lord John Russell, to ascertain definitely the status of the rebel commissioners in London. He told him that a continuance of their apparent relation with the British Government "could scarcely fail to be viewed by us as hostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding action accordingly." Lord John Russell replied that he had only seen the rebel commissioners twice, and "had no expectation of seeing them any more."†

So early as the year 1854, when the shadow of the Crimean war was darkening over Europe, the Government of the United States submitted to the principal maritime nations the propositions, first, that free ships should make free goods, and second, that neutral property on board an enemy's vessel should not be subject to confiscation unless contraband of war. These propositions were not immediately accepted, but when the powers assembled in congress at Paris in 1856, for the purpose of making peace, Great Britain and the other nations which took part in the congress gave them their assent, adding to them, as principles of international law, the abolition of privateering and the obligation that blockades, to be respected, must be effective. The adhesion of the United States having been invited to these four propositions, the Government of that day answered that they would accede to them if the other powers would accept a fifth principle — that the goods of private persons, non-combatants, should be exempt from confiscation in maritime war. This proposition was rejected by the British Government, and the negotiations were then suspended until after Mr. Lincoln became President. A few weeks after his inauguration

the suspended negotiations were taken up by Mr. Seward, who directed Mr. Adams to signify to the British Government that the United States were now ready to accept without reserve the four propositions adopted at the Congress of Paris.‡ After some delay, Lord John Russell remarked to Mr. Adams that in case of the adhesion of the United States to the Declaration of Paris, the engagement on the part of Great Britain would be prospective and would not invalidate anything done. This singular reserve Mr. Adams reported to his Government, and was directed by Mr. Seward to ask some further elucidation of its meaning. But before this dispatch was received, the strange attitude of the British Government was explained by Lord Russell's§ submitting to Mr. Adams a draft of a supplementary declaration on the part of England that her Majesty did not intend, by the projected convention for the accession of the United States to the articles of the Congress of Paris, "to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States." The President, having been informed of this proposed declaration, at once instructed Mr. Adams|| that it was inadmissible, as the Government of the United States could not accede to this great international act except upon the same equal footing upon which all the other parties stood. It afterward transpired that the British Government had, at the same time that these important negotiations were going on with the Government of the United States, approached the new Confederate Government upon the same subject, sending communications in a clandestine manner through the British Legation in Washington to Mr. Bunch, the English consul at Charleston, through whom they were in the same furtive and unofficial manner laid before the authorities at Richmond. The French Government joined in this proceeding, at the invitation of England. Mr. Davis at once recognized the great importance of such quasi-recognition of his Government, and he himself drafted resolutions declaring the purpose of the Confederates to observe the principles towards neutrals embodied in the second and third rules of the Declaration of Paris — that blockades to be binding must be effectual, but

* Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.

† Adams to Seward, June 14, 1861.

‡ See Mr. Seward's dispatch to Mr. Adams, April 24, 1861; Seward to Adams, May 17, 1861; and papers relating to Treaty of Washington, Vol. I., p. 33, et seq.

§ Lord John Russell was raised to the peerage, under the title of Earl Russell, July 30, 1861.

|| Seward to Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.

that they "maintained the right of privateering."* These resolutions were passed in the Confederate Congress, and Mr. Bunch, conveying the news of this result to Lord Lyons, said:

The wishes of her Majesty's Government would seem to have been fully complied with, for as no proposal was made that the Confederate Government should abolish privateering, it could not be expected that they should do so of their own accord, particularly as it is the arm upon which they most rely for the injury of the extended commerce of their enemy.

The American Government held itself justly aggrieved, therefore, that its accession to the Declaration of Paris was impeded by conditions which it could not, consistently with its dignity, accept; that the British Government was secretly negotiating at the same time with the insurgents upon the same subject; that while the United States were invited to accede to all four of the articles of Paris the Confederate Government was given its choice by the British Cabinet to accept only three. The Government of the United States said afterward in its case at Geneva that

The practical effect of this diplomacy, had it been successful, would have been the destruction of the commerce of the United States or its transfer to the British flag, and the loss of the principal resource of the United States upon the ocean should a continuation of this course of insincere neutrality unhappily force the United States into a war. Great Britain was thus to gain the benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second and third articles, the rebel privateers and cruisers were to be protected and their devastation legalized, while the United States were to be deprived of a dangerous weapon of assault upon Great Britain.

The action of Mr. Bunch in this matter was properly regarded by the President as a violation of the laws of the United States to which he was accredited, and his exequatur was revoked. A long discussion followed, in which neither side succeeded in convincing the other of its wrong; and the next year, pending an attack upon Charleston, a British man-of-war entered that port and took Mr. Bunch away.

THE "TRENT" AFFAIR.


THE public mind would probably have dwelt with more impatience and dissatisfaction upon the present and prospective inaction of the armies but for an event which turned all thoughts with deep solicitude into an entirely different channel. This was what is known as the *Trent* affair, which seriously threatened to embroil the nation in a war with Great Britain. The Confederate Gov-

ernment had appointed two new envoys to proceed to Europe and renew its application for recognition, which its former diplomatic agents had so far failed to obtain. For this duty ex-Senator Mason of Virginia and ex-Senator Slidell of Louisiana were selected, on account of their political prominence, as well as their recognized abilities. On the blockade runner *Theodora*, they, with their secretaries and families, succeeded in eluding the Union cruisers around Charleston, and in reaching Havana, Cuba. Deeming themselves beyond danger of capture, they made no concealment of their presence or mission, but endeavored rather to "magnify their office." The British consul showed them marked attention, and they sought to be presented officially to the Captain-General of Cuba; but that wary functionary explained that he received them only as "distinguished gentlemen." They took passage on board the British mail steamer *Trent* for St. Thomas, intending there to take the regular packet to England.

Captain Wilkes, commanding the United States war steamer *San Jacinto*, just returned from an African cruise, heard of the circumstance, and, going to Havana, fully informed himself of the details of their intended route. The *Trent*, he learned, was to leave Havana on November 7. That day found him stationed in the old Bahama channel, near the northern coast of Cuba, where he had reason to believe she would pass. At about noon of the 8th the lookout announced the approach of the *Trent*, and when she was sufficiently near, the *San Jacinto* fired a round-shot across her course, and displayed the American colors. The British steamer did not seem disposed to accept the warning and failed to slacken her speed, whereupon Captain Wilkes ordered a shell to be fired across her bows, which at once brought her to. Lieutenant Fairfax, with two officers and a guard of marines, left the *San Jacinto* and rowed to the mail steamer; the lieutenant mounted to the deck alone, leaving his officers and men in the boat. He was shown to the quarter-deck, where he met Captain Moir of the *Trent*, and, informing him who he was, asked to see his passenger-list. Captain Moir declined to show it. Lieutenant Fairfax then told him of his information that the rebel commissioners were on board and that he must satisfy himself on that point before allowing the steamer to proceed. The envoys and their secretaries came up, and, hearing their names mentioned, asked if they were wanted. Lieutenant Fairfax now made known in full the purport of his orders and the object of his visit.

The altercation and commotion called a

* Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington, Vol. I., p. 36.



CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY MAYALL, LENT BY THEODORE F. DWIGHT, ESQ.)

considerable number of passengers around the group. All of them manifested open secession sympathy, and some indulged in abusive language so loud and demonstrative that the lieutenant's two officers, and six or eight armed men from the boat, without being called, mounted to the lieutenant's assistance. In these unfriendly demonstrations the mail agent of the *Trent*, one Captain Williams, a retired British naval officer, made himself especially conspicuous with the declaration that he was the "Queen's representative," and with various threats of the consequences of the affair. The captain of the *Trent* firmly but quietly opposed all compliance or search, and the envoys and their secretaries protested

against arrest, whereupon Lieutenant Fairfax sent one of his officers back to the *San Jacinto* for additional force. In perhaps half an hour the second boat returned from the *San Jacinto* with some twenty-four additional men. Lieutenant Fairfax now proceeded to execute his orders without actual violence, and with all the politeness possible under the circumstances. Mason and Slidell, and their secretaries, foreseeing the inevitable, had retired to their state-rooms to pack their luggage; thither it was necessary to follow them, and there the presence of the families of Slidell and Eustis created some slight confusion, and a few armed marines entered the cabin, but were sent back. The final act of capture and

removal was then carried out with formal stage solemnity.*

Captain Wilkes's first instruction to Lieutenant Fairfax was to seize the *Trent* as a prize, but, as he afterward explained:

I forbore to seize her, however, in consequence of my being so reduced in officers and crew, and the derangement it would cause innocent persons, there being a large number of passengers, who would have been put to great loss and inconvenience as well as disappointment from the interruption it would have caused them in not being able to join the steamer from St. Thomas for Europe.†

The *Trent* was allowed to proceed on her voyage, while the *San Jacinto* steamed away for Boston, where she arrived on the 24th of



REAR-ADMIRAL CHARLES WILKES, U. S. N.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY ANTHONY.)

November, and transferred her prisoners to Fort Warren.

The whole country rang with exultation

"When the marines and some armed men had been formed," reports Lieutenant Fairfax, "just outside of the main deck cabin, where these four gentlemen had gone to pack up their baggage, I renewed my efforts to induce them to accompany me on board, they still refusing to accompany me unless force was applied. I called in to my assistance four or five officers, and first taking hold of Mr. Mason's shoulder, with another officer on the opposite side, I went as far as the gang-way of the steamer, and delivered him over to Lieutenant Greer, to be placed in the boat. I then returned for Mr. Slidell, who insisted that I must apply considerable force to get him to go with me. Calling in at last three officers, he also was taken in charge and handed over to Mr. Greer. Mr. McFarland and Mr. Eustis, after protesting, went quietly into the boat." "There was a great deal of excitement on board at this time," says another report, "and the officers and passengers

over the exploit. The feeling was greatly heightened by the general public indignation at the unfriendliness England had so far manifested to the Union cause; but perhaps more especially because the two persons seized had been among the most bitter and active of the secession conspirators. The public press lauded Captain Wilkes, Boston gave him a banquet, and the Secretary of the Navy wrote him a letter of emphatic approval. He congratulated him "on the great public service" he had rendered in the capture, and expressed only the reservation that his conduct in omitting to capture the vessel must not be allowed to constitute a precedent.‡ When Congress met on the 2d of December following, the House of Representatives immediately passed a resolution, without a dissenting voice, thanking Captain Wilkes for his "brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct"; while by other resolutions the President was requested to order the prisoners into close confinement, in retaliation for similar treatment by the rebels of certain prisoners of war. The whole strong current of public feeling approved the act without qualification, and manifested an instant and united readiness to defend it.

President Lincoln's usual cool judgment at once recognized the dangers and complications that might grow out of the occurrence. A well-known writer has recorded what he said in a confidential interview on the day the news was received:

I fear the traitors will prove to be white elephants. We must stick to American principles concerning the rights of neutrals. We fought Great Britain for insisting, by theory and practice, on the right to do precisely what Captain Wilkes has done. If Great Britain shall now protest against the act, and demand their release, we must give them up, apologize for the act as a violation of our doctrines, and thus forever bind her over to keep the peace in relation to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for sixty years.§||

The Cabinet generally coincided in expressing gratification and approval. The international questions involved came upon them so suddenly that they were not ready with de-

of the steamer were addressing us by numerous opprobrious epithets, such as calling us pirates, villains, traitors, etc." (Report Secretary of the Navy, Dec. 2, 1861.) The families of Slidell and Eustis had meanwhile been tendered the use of the cabin of the *San Jacinto*, if they preferred to accompany the prisoners; but they declined, and proceeded in the *Trent*.

† Report Secretary of the Navy, Dec. 2, 1861.

‡ Welles, in "The Galaxy," May, 1873, pp. 647-649.

§ Lossing, "Civil War in the United States," Vol. II., p. 156.

|| Secretary of the Navy Welles corroborated the statement in "The Galaxy" for May, 1873, p. 647: "The President, with whom I had an interview immediately on receiving information that the emissaries were captured and on board the *San Jacinto*, before consultation with any other member of the Cabinet discussed with me some of the difficult points presented. His chief

cided opinions concerning the law and policy of the case; besides, the true course obviously was to await the action of Great Britain.


The passengers on board the *Trent*, as well as the reports of her officers, carried the news of the capture directly to England, where the incident raised a storm of public opinion even more violent than that in the United States, and very naturally on the opposite side. The Government of England relied for its information mainly upon the official report of the mail agent, Captain Williams, who had made himself so officious as the "Queen's representative," and who, true to the secession sympathies manifested by him on shipboard, gave his report a strong coloring of the same character. English public feeling, popular and official, smarted under the idea that the United States had perpetrated a gross outrage, and the clamor for instant redress left no room for any calm consideration of the far-reaching questions of international law involved. There seemed little possibility that a war could be avoided, and England began immediate preparations for such an emergency. Some eight thousand troops were dispatched to Canada, ships were ordered to join the English squadrons in American waters, and the usual proclamation issued prohibiting the export of arms and certain war supplies.

Two days after the receipt of the news Lord Palmerston, in a note to the Queen, formulated the substance of a demand to be sent to the United States. He wrote:

The general outline and tenor which appeared to meet the opinions of the Cabinet would be, that the Washington Government should be told that what has been done is a violation of international law and of the rights of Great Britain, and that your Majesty's Government trusts that the act will be disavowed, and the prisoners set free and restored to British protection; and that Lord Lyons should be instructed that, if this demand is refused, he should retire from the United States.*

On the following day the formal draft of the proposed dispatch to Lord Lyons was laid before the Queen, who, together with Prince Albert, examined it with unusual care. The critical character of the communication, and the imminent danger—the almost certainty

anxiety—for his attention had never been turned to admiralty law and naval captures—was as to the disposition of the prisoners, who, to use his own expression, would be elephants on our hands, that we could not easily dispose of. Public indignation was so over-




JOHN SLIDELL.

—of a rupture and war with America which it revealed, made a profound impression upon both. Prince Albert was already suffering from the illness which terminated his life two weeks afterward. This new and grave political question gave him a sleepless night. "He could eat no breakfast," is the entry in her Majesty's diary, "and looked very wretched. But still he was well enough on getting up to make a draft for me to write to Lord Russell, in correction of his draft to Lord Lyons, sent me yesterday, which Albert did not approve."

The Queen returns these important drafts, which upon the whole she approves; but she cannot help feeling that the main draft—that for communication to the American Government—is somewhat meager. She should have liked to have seen the expression of a hope that the American captain did not act under instructions, or, if he did, that he misapprehended them—that the United States Government must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow its flag to be insulted, and the security of her mail communications to be placed in jeopardy; and her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that the United States Government intended wantonly to put an insult upon this country, and to add to their many distressing

whelming against the chief conspirators that he feared it would be difficult to prevent severe and exemplary punishment, which he always deprecated."

* Martin, "Life of the Prince Consort," Vol. V., p. 420.



J. M. MASON.

complications by forcing a question of dispute upon us; and that we are therefore glad to believe that upon a full consideration of the circumstances of the undoubted breach of international law committed, they would spontaneously offer such redress as alone could satisfy this country, viz., the restoration of the unfortunate passengers and a suitable apology.*

It proved to be the last political memorandum he ever wrote. The exact language of his correction, had it been sent, would not have been well calculated to soothe the irritated susceptibilities of Americans. To the charge of "violating international law," to which Palmerston's cold note confined itself, he added the accusation of "wanton insult," though disclaiming a belief that it was intended. But a kind and pacific spirit shines through his memorandum as a whole, and it is evident that both the Queen and himself, gratefully remembering the welcome America had lately accorded the Prince of Wales, shrank from the prospect of an angry war. In this the Queen unconsciously responded to the impulse of amity and goodwill which had induced the President to modify so materially his foreign secretary's dispatch of the 21st of May, the unpremeditated thought of the ruler, in each case, being at once wiser and more humane than the first intention of the diplomatists. It was from the intention rather than the words of the Prince that the

Queen's ministers took their cue and modified the phraseology into more temperate shape. Earl Russell wrote:

Her Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the friendly relations which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United States, are willing to believe that the United States' naval officer who committed this aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his Government, or that if he conceived himself to be so authorized, he greatly misunderstood the instructions he had received. For the Government of the United States must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow such an affront to the national honor to pass without full reparation, and her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the Government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion between the two Governments a question of so grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that Government will of its own accord offer to the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been

committed. Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them, to him. †

In the private note accompanying this formal dispatch further instruction was given, that if the demand were not substantially complied with in seven days, Lord Lyons should break off diplomatic relations and return with his whole legation to London. Yet at the last moment Lord Russell himself seems to have become impressed with the brow-beating precipitancy of the whole proceeding, for he added another private note, better calculated than even the Queen's modification to soften the disagreeable announcement to the American Government. He wrote to Lord Lyons:

My wish would be, that at your first interview with Mr. Seward you should not take my dispatch with you, but should prepare him for it and ask him to settle it with the President and the Cabinet what course they will propose. The next time you should bring my dispatch and read it to him fully. If he asks what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance, I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the President quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain from anything like menace. ‡

* Martin, "Life of the Prince Consort," Vol. V., p. 422.

† Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, Nov. 30, 1861. British "Blue Book."

‡ Inclosure in No. 49. British "Blue Book."

This last diplomatic touch reveals that the Ministry, like the Queen, shrank from war, but that it desired to reap all the advantages of a public menace, even while privately disclaiming one.

The British demand reached Washington on the 19th of December. It happened, fortunately, that Lord Lyons and Mr. Seward were on excellent terms of personal friendship, and the British envoy was therefore able to present the affair with all the delicacy which had been suggested by Lord Russell. The Government at Washington had carefully abstained from any action other than that already mentioned. Lord Lyons wrote:

Mr. Seward received my communication seriously and with dignity, but without any manifestation of dissatisfaction. Some further conversation ensued in consequence of questions put by him with a view to ascertain the exact character of the dispatch. At the conclusion he asked me to give him to-morrow to consider the question, and to communicate with the President.*

Another dispatch from Lord Lyons shows that Mr. Seward asked a further delay, and that Lord Russell's communication was not formally read to him till Monday, the 23d of December.†

If we may credit the statement of Secretary Welles, Mr. Seward had not expected so serious a view of the affair by the British Government; and his own language implies as much when, in a private letter some months afterward, he mentions Lord Lyons's communication as "our first knowledge that the British Government proposed to make it a question of offense or insult, and so of war," adding: "If I had been as tame as you think would have been wise in my treatment of affairs with that country, I should have no standing in my own."‡ But while Mr. Seward, like most other Americans, was doubtless elated by the first news that the rebel envoys were captured, he readily discerned that the incident was one of great diplomatic gravity and likely to be fruitful of prolonged diplomatic contention. Evidently in this spirit, and for the purpose of reserving to the United States every advantage in the serious discussion which was unavoidable, he prudently wrote in a confidential dispatch to Mr. Adams, on November 27:

I forbear from speaking of the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. The act was done by Commodore Wilkes without instructions, and even without the knowledge of the Government. Lord Lyons has judiciously refrained from all communication with me on

* Lyons to Russell, Dec. 19, 1861.

† Lyons to Russell, Dec. 23, 1861. British "Blue Book."

‡ Seward to Weed, March 2, 1862. "The Galaxy," August, 1870.

the subject, and I thought it equally wise to reserve ourselves until we hear what the British Government may have to say on the subject.

Of the confidential first interviews between the Secretary of State and the President on this important topic there is no record. From what remains we may easily infer that the President clearly saw the inevitable necessities surrounding the question, and was anxiously searching some method of preserving to the United States whatever of indirect advantage might accrue from compliance with the British demand, and of making that compliance as palatable as might be to American public opinion. In this spirit we may presume he wrote the following experimental draft of a dispatch, preserved in his autograph manuscript. Its chief proposal is to arbitrate the difficulty, or in the alternative seriously to examine the question in all its aspects, and out of them to formulate a binding rule for both nations to govern similar cases. It was an honest and practical suggestion to turn an accidental quarrel into a great and durable transaction for the betterment of international law.

The dispatch of her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, dated the 30th of November, 1861, and of which your Lordship kindly furnished me a copy, has been carefully considered by the President; and he directs me to say that if there existed no fact or facts pertinent to the case, beyond those stated in said dispatch, the reparation sought by Great Britain from the United States would be justly due, and should be promptly made. The President is unwilling to believe that her Majesty's Government will press for a categorical answer upon what appears to him to be only a partial record, in the making up of which he has been allowed no part. He is reluctant to volunteer his view of the case, with no assurance that her Majesty's Government will consent to hear him; yet this much he directs me to say, that this Government has intended no affront to the British flag, or to the British nation; nor has it intended to force into discussion an embarrassing question, all which is evident by the fact hereby asserted, that the act complained of was done by the officer without orders from, or expectation of, the Government. But being done, it was no longer left to us to consider whether we might not, to avoid a controversy, waive an unimportant though a strict right; because we too, as well as Great Britain, have a people justly jealous of their rights, and in whose presence our Government could undo the act complained of only upon a fair showing that it was wrong, or at least very questionable. The United States Government and people are still willing to make reparation upon such showing.

Accordingly I am instructed by the President to inquire whether her Majesty's Government will hear the United States upon the matter in question. The President desires, among other things, to bring into view, and have considered, the existing rebellion in the United States; the position Great Britain has assumed, including her Majesty's proclamation in relation thereto; the relation the persons whose seizure is the subject of complaint bore to the United States, and the object of their voyage at the time they were seized; the knowledge which the master of the *Trent* had of their relation to the United States, and of the object of their voyage, at the time he received them on board for the

voyage: the place of the seizure; and the precedents and respective positions assumed, in analogous cases, between Great Britain and the United States.

Upon a submission, containing the foregoing facts, with those set forth in the before-mentioned dispatch to your Lordship, together with all other facts which either party may deem material, I am instructed to say, the Government of the United States will, if agreed to by her Majesty's Government, go to such friendly arbitration as is usual among nations, and will abide the award.

Or, in the alternative, her Majesty's Government may, upon the same record, determine whether any, and if any, what, reparation is due from the United States; provided no such reparation shall be different in character from, nor transcend, that proposed by your Lordship, as instructed in and by the dispatch aforesaid; and provided further, that the determination thus made shall be the law for all future analogous cases between Great Britain and the United States.*

We may suppose that upon consultation with Mr. Seward, Mr. Lincoln decided that, desirable as this proceeding might be, it was precluded by the impatient, inflexible terms of the British demand. Only three days of the seven-days' grace remained; if they should not by the coming Thursday agree to deliver Mason and Slidell, the British legation would close its doors, and the consternation of a double war would fill the air. It is probable, therefore, that even while writing this draft, Lincoln had intimated to his Secretary of State the need of finding good diplomatic reasons for surrendering the prisoners.

A note of Mr. Seward shows us that the Cabinet meeting to consider finally the *Trent* question was appointed for Tuesday morning, December 24; but the Secretary says that, availing himself of the President's permission, he had postponed it to Wednesday morning at 10 A. M., adding, "I shall then be ready." It is probably true, as he afterward wrote, † that the whole framing of his dispatch was left to his own ingenuity and judgment, and that neither the President nor any member of the Cabinet had arrived at any final determination. The private diary of Attorney-General Bates supplies us some additional details:

Cabinet council at 10 A. M., December 25, to consider the relations with England on Lord Lyons's demand of the surrender of Mason and Slidell; a long and interesting session, lasting till 2 P. M. The instructions of the British Minister to Lord Lyons were read. . . . There was read a draft of answer by the Secretary of State.

The President's experimental draft quoted above was not read; there is no mention of

* Lincoln, unpublished MS.

† The consideration of the *Trent* case was crowded out by pressing domestic affairs until Christmas Day. It was considered on my presentation of it on the 25th and 26th of December. The Government, when it took the subject up, had no idea of the grounds upon which it would explain its action, nor did it believe it would

either the reading or the points it raised. The whole discussion appears to have been confined to Seward's paper. There was some desultory talk, a general comparing of rumors and outside information, a reading of the few letters which had been received from Europe. Mr. Sumner, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was invited in, and read letters he had received from John Bright and Richard Cobden, liberal members of the British Parliament and devoted friends of the Union. During the session also there was handed in and read the dispatch just received from his Government by M. Mercier, the French minister, and which, in substance, took the English view of the matter. The diary continues:

Mr. Seward's draft of letter to Lord Lyons was submitted by him, and examined and criticised by us with apparently perfect candor and frankness. All of us were impressed with the magnitude of the subject, and believed that upon our decision depended the dearest interest, probably the existence, of the nation. I, waiving the question of legal right,—upon which all Europe is against us, and also many of our own best jurists,—urged the necessity of the case; that to go to war with England now is to abandon all hope of suppressing the rebellion, as we have not the possession of the land, nor any support of the people of the South. The maritime superiority of Britain would sweep us from all the Southern waters. Our trade would be utterly ruined, and our treasury bankrupt; in short, that we must not have war with England.

There was great reluctance on the part of some of the members of the Cabinet — and even the President himself — to acknowledge these obvious truths; but all yielded to, and unanimously concurred in, Mr. Seward's letter to Lord Lyons, after some verbal and formal amendments. The main fear, I believe, was the displeasure of our own people — lest they should accuse us of timidly truckling to the power of England. ‡

The published extracts from the diary of Secretary Chase give somewhat fully his opinion on the occasion:

Mr. Chase thought it certainly was not too much to expect of a friendly nation, and especially of a nation of the same blood, religion, and characteristic civilization as our own, that in consideration of the great rights she would overlook the little wrong; nor could he then persuade himself that, were all the circumstances known to the English Government as to ours, the surrender of the rebel commissioners would be insisted upon. The Secretary asserted that the technical right was undoubtedly with England. . . . Were the circumstances reversed, our Government would, Mr. Chase thought, accept the explanation, and let England keep her rebels; and he could not divest himself of the belief that, were the case fairly understood, the British Government would do likewise. "But," continued Secretary Chase, "we cannot afford delays. While

concede the case. Yet it was heartily unanimous in the actual result after two days' examination, and in favor of the release. Remember that in a council like ours there are some strong wills to be reconciled. [Seward to Weed, Jan. 22, 1862. Weed, "Autobiography," Vol. II., p. 409.]

‡ Bates, Diary. Unpublished MS.

the matter hangs in uncertainty the public mind will remain disquieted, our commerce will suffer serious harm, our action against the rebels must be greatly hindered, and the restoration of our prosperity — largely identified with that of all nations — must be delayed. Better, then, to make now the sacrifice of feeling involved in the surrender of these rebels, than even avoid it by the delays which explanations must occasion. I give my adhesion, therefore, to the conclusion at which the Secretary of State has arrived. It is gall and wormwood to me. Rather than consent to the liberation of these men, I would sacrifice everything I possess. But I am consoled by the reflection that while nothing but severest retribution is due to them, the surrender under existing circumstances is but simply doing right — simply proving faithful to our own ideas and traditions under strong temptations to violate them; simply giving to England and the world the most signal proof that the American nation will not under any circumstances, for the sake of inflicting just punishment on rebels, commit even a technical wrong against neutrals.”*

In these two recorded opinions are reflected the substantial tone and temper of the Cabinet discussion, which ended, as both Mr. Bates and Mr. Seward have stated, in a unanimous concurrence in the letter of reply as drawn up by the Secretary of State. That long and remarkably able document must be read in full, both to understand the wide range of the subject which he treated and the clearness and force of his language and argument. It constitutes one of his chief literary triumphs. There is room here only to indicate the conclusions arrived at in his examination. First, he held that the four persons seized and their dispatches were contraband of war; secondly, that Captain Wilkes had a right by the law of nations to detain and search the *Trent*; thirdly, that he exercised the right in a lawful and proper manner; fourthly, that he had a right to capture the contraband found. The real issue of the case centered in the fifth question: “Did Captain Wilkes exercise the right of capturing the contraband in conformity with the law of nations?” Reciting the deficiency of recognized rules on this point, Mr. Seward held that only by taking the vessel before a prize court could the existence of contraband be lawfully established; and that Captain Wilkes having released the vessel from capture, the necessary judicial examination was prevented, and the capture left unfinished or abandoned.

Mr. Seward’s dispatch continued:

I trust that I have shown to the satisfaction of the British Government, by a very simple and natural statement of the facts and analysis of the law applicable to them, that this Government has neither meditated, nor practiced, nor approved any deliberate wrong

in the transaction to which they have called its attention, and, on the contrary, that what has happened has been simply an inadvertency, consisting in a departure by the naval officer, free from any wrongful motive, from a rule uncertainly established, and probably by the several parties concerned either imperfectly understood or entirely unknown. For this error the British Government has a right to expect the same reparation that we, as an independent State, should expect from Great Britain or from any other friendly nation in a similar case. . . . If I decide this case in favor of my own Government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. . . . The four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort Warren, in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated.†

With the formal delivery of Mason and Slidell and their secretaries to the custody of the British minister, the diplomatic incident was completed on the part of the United States. Lord Russell, on his part, while announcing that her Majesty’s Government differed from Mr. Seward in some of the conclusions‡ at which he had arrived, nevertheless acknowledged that the action of the American Government constituted “the reparation which her Majesty and the British nation had a right to expect.”§ It is not too much to say that not merely the rulers and Cabinets of both nations, but also those of all the great European powers, were relieved from an oppressive apprehension by this termination of the affair.

If from one point of view the United States suffered a certain diplomatic defeat and humiliation, it became, in another light, a real international victory. The turn of affairs placed not only England, but France and other nations as well, distinctly on their good behavior. In the face of this American example of moderation they could no longer so openly brave the liberal sentiment of their own people by the countenance they had hitherto given the rebellion. So far from improving or enhancing the hostile mission of Mason and Slidell, the adventure they had undergone served to diminish their importance and circumscribe their influence. The very act of their liberation compelled the British authorities sharply to define the hollow pretense under which they were sent. In his instructions to the British Government vessel which received them at Provincetown and conveyed them to England, Lord Lyons wrote:

It is hardly necessary that I should remind you that these gentlemen have no official character. It will be

* Warden, “Life of Chase,” pp. 393, 394.

† Seward to Lyons, Dec. 26, 1861.

‡ In a dispatch to Lord Lyons of Jan. 23, 1862, in which he discusses the questions at some length, Lord Russell held: first, that Mason and Slidell and their supposed dispatches, under the circumstances of their

seizure, were not contraband; secondly, that the bringing of the *Trent* before a prize court, though it would alter the character would not diminish the offense against the law of nations.

§ Russell to Lyons, Jan. 10, 1862.

right for you to receive them with all courtesy and respect as private gentlemen of distinction; but it would be very improper to pay to them any of those honors which are paid to official persons.*

The same result in a larger degree awaited their advent in Europe. Under the intense publicity of which they had been the subject, officials of all degrees were in a measure com-


pelled to avoid them as political "suspects." Mason was received in England with cold and studied neglect; while Slidell in France, though privately encouraged by the Emperor Napoleon III., finally found himself a victim instead of a beneficiary of his selfishness.

* Lyons to Commander Hewett, Dec. 30, 1861. British "Blue Book."



BIRD MUSIC: SPARROWS.

THE SONG SPARROW.

THE sparrow family is a large one. There may be twenty species, half of which, at least, spend their summer in New England. The song sparrows are the most numerous, sing the most, and exhibit the greatest variety of melody. Standing near a small pond recently, I heard a song sparrow sing four distinct songs within twenty minutes, repeating each several times.



I have more than twenty songs of this sparrow, and have heard him in many other forms. He generally gives a fine trill at the beginning or end of his song. Sometimes, however, it is introduced in the middle, and occasionally is omitted, especially in the latter part of the season. There is a marked difference in the quality and volume of the voices of different individuals. During the season of 1885 I listened almost daily to the strongest and best sparrow voice that I have ever heard. There was a fullness and richness, particularly in the trills, that reminded one of the bewitching tones of the wood-thrush. These are some of his songs:



That the singers of any species sing exactly alike, with the same voice and style, and in the same key always, is a great mistake.

There is a wide difference between the singing of old and young birds. This is especially true of the oriole, the tanager, and the bobolink. The voice of a bird four years old is very much fuller and better than that of a yearling; just as his plumage is deeper and richer in color.

The song sparrow comes soon after the bluebird and the robin, and sings from the time of his coming till the close of summer. Unlike his cousin, the field sparrow, he seems to seek the companionship of man. Sitting near an open window one day last summer, as was my habit, my attention was attracted by the singing of a song sparrow perched upon a twig not far away. Fancying that he addressed himself to me individually, I responded with an occasional whistle.

He listened with evident interest, his head on one side and his eye rolled up. For many days in succession he came at about the same hour in the afternoon, and perching in the same place sung his cheery and varied songs, listening in turn to my whistles.

THE FIELD SPARROW.

THIS sparrow, less common than the song or the chipping sparrow, resembles these in appearance and habits. He is not so social, preferring the fields and pastures and bushy lots. When Wilson wrote, "None of our birds have been more imperfectly described than the family of the finch tribe usually called sparrows," he wrote well; but when he wrote of this one, "It has no song," he brought himself under his own criticism. And when Dr. Coues, on the contrary, describes him as "very melodious, with an extensive and varied

score to sing from," and further, as possessing "unusual compass of vocal powers," he much better describes the song sparrow. The field sparrow is surely a fine singer, and he may have several songs. I have heard him in one only; but that one, though short, it would be hard to equal. As a scientific composition it stands nearly if not quite alone. Dr. Coues quotes Mr. Minot on the singing of this bird. "They open with a few exquisitely modulated whistles, each higher and a little louder than the preceding, and close with a sweet trill." The song does begin with two or three well-separated tones — or "whistles," if you please; but I discover no modulation, nor is each higher than the preceding, the opening tones being on the same pitch. However, the song, both in power and rapidity, increases from beginning to end. It by no means requires "unusual compass"; simply the interval of a minor third.

When we consider the genius displayed in combining so beautifully the essence of the three grand principles of sound, length, pitch, and power, its brevity and limited compass make it all the more wonderful. Scarcely anything in rhythmic and dynamics is more difficult than to give a perfect *accelerando* and *crescendo*; and the use of the chromatic scale by which the field sparrow rises in his lyric flight involves the very pith of melodic ability. This little musician has explored the whole realm of sound, and condensed its beauties in perfection into one short song.



Simeon Pease Cheney.

MATTHEW ARNOLD.

"Such, poets, is your bride, the Muse! . . .
 . . . a hidden ground
 Of thought and of austerity within."

MATTHEW ARNOLD, *Austerity of Poetry.*

AUSTERIE, sedate, the chisel in his hand,
 He carved his statue from a flawless stone,
 That faultless verse, whose earnest undertone
 Echoes the music of his Grecian land.
 Like Sophocles on that Ægean strand
 He walked by night, and watched life's sea alone,
 Amid a temperate, not the tropic zone,
 Girt round by cool waves and a crystal sand.
 And yet the world's heart in his pulses stirred;
 He looked abroad across life's wind-swept plain,
 And many a wandering mariner has heard
 His warning hail, and as the blasts increase,
 Has listened, till he passed the reefs again,
 And floated safely in his port of Peace.

William P. Andrews.

WAITING FOR THE BUGLE.

WE wait for the bugle ; the night-dews are cold,
The limbs of the soldiers feel jaded and old,
The field of our bivouac is windy and bare,
There is lead in our joints, there is frost in our hair,
The future is veiled and its fortunes unknown
As we lie with hushed breath till the bugle is blown.

At the sound of that bugle each comrade shall spring
Like an arrow released from the strain of the string:
The courage, the impulse of youth shall come back
To banish the chill of the drear bivouac,
And sorrows and losses and cares fade away
When that life-giving signal proclaims the new day.

Though the bivouac of age may put ice in our veins,
And no fiber of steel in our sinew remains ;
Though the comrades of yesterday's march are not here,
And the sunlight seems pale and the branches are sear,—
Though the sound of our cheering dies down to a moan,
We shall find our lost youth when the bugle is blown.

Thomas Wentworth Higginson.

THE HIGH TIDE AT GETTYSBURG.

BY AN EX-CONFEDERATE SOLDIER.

A CLOUD possessed the hollow field,
The gathering battle's smoky shield.
Athwart the gloom the lightning flashed,
And through the cloud some horsemen dashed,
And from the heights the thunder pealed.

Then at the brief command of Lee
Moved out that matchless infantry,
With Pickett leading grandly down,
To rush against the roaring crown
Of those dread heights of destiny.

Far heard above the angry guns
A cry across the tumult runs,—
The voice that rang through Shiloh's woods
And Chickamauga's solitudes,
The fierce South cheering on her sons !

Ah, how the withering tempest blew
Against the front of Pettigrew !
A Kamsin wind that scorched and singed
Like that infernal flame that fringed
The British squares at Waterloo !

A thousand fell where Kemper led ;
A thousand died where Garnett bled :
In blinding flame and strangling smoke
The remnant through the batteries broke
And crossed the works with Armistead.

“Once more in Glory’s van with me!”
 Virginia cried to Tennessee:
 “We two together, come what may,
 Shall stand upon these works to-day!”
 (The reddest day in history.)

Brave Tennessee! In reckless way
 Virginia heard her comrade say:
 “Close round this rent and riddled rag!”
 What time she set her battle-flag
 Amid the guns of Doubleday.

But who shall break the guards that wait
 Before the awful face of Fate?
 The tattered standards of the South
 Were shriveled at the cannon’s mouth,
 And all her hopes were desolate.

In vain the Tennesseean set
 His breast against the bayonet!
 In vain Virginia charged and raged,
 A tigress in her wrath uncaged,
 Till all the hill was red and wet!

Above the bayonets, mixed and crossed,
 Men saw a gray, gigantic ghost
 Receding through the battle-cloud,
 And heard across the tempest loud
 The death-cry of a nation lost!

The brave went down! Without disgrace
 They leaped to Ruin’s red embrace.
 They only heard Fame’s thunders wake,
 And saw the dazzling sun-burst break
 In smiles on Glory’s bloody face!

They fell, who lifted up a hand
 And bade the sun in heaven to stand!
 They smote and fell, who set the bars
 Against the progress of the stars,
 And stayed the march of Motherland!

They stood, who saw the future come
 On through the fight’s delirium!
 They smote and stood, who held the hope
 Of nations on that slippery slope
 Amid the cheers of Christendom!

God lives! He forged the iron will
 That clutched and held that trembling hill.
 God lives and reigns! He built and lent
 The heights for Freedom’s battlement
 Where floats her flag in triumph still!

Fold up the banners! Smelt the guns!
 Love rules. Her gentler purpose runs.
 A mighty mother turns in tears
 The pages of her battle years,
 Lamenting all her fallen sons!

THE CAREER OF THE CONFEDERATE RAM "ALBEMARLE."

I. HER CONSTRUCTION AND SERVICE.

BY HER BUILDER.



PART OF THE SMOKE-STACK OF THE "ALBEMARLE."


DURING the spring of 1863, having been previously engaged in unsuccessful efforts to construct war vessels, of one sort or another, for the Confederate Government, at different points in eastern North Carolina and Virginia, I undertook a contract with the Navy Department to build an iron-clad gun-boat, intended, if ever completed, to operate on the waters of Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds. A point on the Roanoke River, in Halifax County, North Carolina, about thirty miles below the town of Weldon, was fixed upon as the most suitable for the purpose. The river rises and falls, as is well known, and it was necessary to locate the yard on ground sufficiently free from overflow to admit of uninterrupted work for at least twelve months. No vessel was ever constructed under more adverse circumstances. The shipyard was established in a corn-field, where the ground had already been marked out and planted for the coming crop, but the owner of the land was in hearty sympathy with the enterprise, and aided me then and afterwards, in a thousand ways, to accomplish the end I had in view. It was next to impossible to obtain machinery suitable for the work in

hand. Here and there, scattered about the surrounding country, a portable saw-mill, blacksmith's forge, or other apparatus was found, however, and the citizens of the neighborhoods on both sides of the river were not slow to render me assistance, but coöperated, cordially, in the completion of the iron-clad, and at the end of about one year from the laying of the keel, during which innumerable difficulties were overcome by constant application, determined effort, and incessant labor, day and night, success crowned the efforts of those engaged in the undertaking.

Seizing an opportunity offered by comparatively high water, the boat was launched, though not without misgivings as to the result, for the yard being on a bluff she had to take a jump, and as a matter of fact was "hogged" in the attempt, but to our great gratification did not thereby spring a leak.

The plans and specifications were prepared by John L. Porter, Chief Constructor of the Confederate Navy, who availed himself of the advantage gained by his experience in converting the frigate *Merrimac* into the iron-clad *Virginia* at the Gosport Navy Yard.

The *Albemarle* was 152 feet long between perpendiculars; her extreme width was 45 feet; her depth from the gun-deck to the keel was 9 feet, and when launched she drew $6\frac{1}{2}$ feet of water, but after being ironed and completed her draught was about 8 feet. The




PLAN OF THE "ALBEMARLE."

keel was laid, and construction was commenced by bolting down, across the center, a piece of frame timber, which was of yellow pine, eight by ten inches. Another frame of the same size was then dovetailed into this, extending outwardly at an angle of 45 degrees, forming the side, and at the outer end of this the frame for the shield was also dovetailed, the angle

Oak knees were bolted in, to act as braces and supports for the shield.

The armament consisted of two rifled "Brooke" guns mounted on pivot-carriages, each gun working through three port-holes, as occasion required, there being one port-hole at each end of the shield and two on each side. These were protected by iron



THE "ALBEMARLE" GOING DOWN THE ROANOKE.

being 35 degrees, and then the top deck was added, and so on around to the other end of the bottom beam. Other beams were then bolted down to the keel, and to the one first fastened, and so on, working fore and aft, the main-deck beams being interposed from stem to stern. The shield was 60 feet in length and octagonal in form. When this part of the work was completed she was a solid boat, built of pine frames, and if calked would have floated in that condition, but she was afterwards covered with 4-inch planking, laid on longitudinally, as ships are usually planked, and this was properly calked and pitched, cotton being used for calking instead of oakum, the latter being very scarce and the former almost the only article to be had in abundance. Much of the timber was hauled long distances. Three portable saw-mills were obtained, one of which was located at the yard, the others being moved about from time to time to such growing timber as could be procured.

The iron plating consisted of two courses, 7 inches wide and 2 inches thick, mostly rolled at the Tredegar Iron Works, Richmond. The first course was laid lengthwise, over a wooden backing, 16 inches in thickness, a 2-inch space, filled in with wood, being left between each two layers to afford space for bolting the outer course through the whole shield, and the outer course was laid flush, forming a smooth surface, similar to that of the *Virginia*. The inner part of the shield was covered with a thin course of planking, nicely dressed, mainly with a view to protection from splinters.

covers lowered and raised by a contrivance worked on the gun-deck. She had two propellers driven by two engines of 200-horse power each, with 20-inch cylinders, steam being supplied by two flue boilers, and the shafting was geared together.

The sides were covered from the knuckle, four feet below the deck, with iron plates two inches thick.

The prow was built of oak, running 18 feet back, on center keelson, and solidly bolted, and it was covered on the outside with iron plating, 2 inches thick and, tapering off to a 4-inch edge, formed the ram.

The work of putting on the armor was prosecuted for some time under the most disheartening circumstances, on account of the difficulty of drilling holes in the iron intended for her armor. But one small engine and drill could be had, and it required, at the best, twenty minutes to drill an inch and a quarter hole through the plates, and it looked as if we would never accomplish the task. But "necessity is the mother of invention," and one of my associates in the enterprise, Peter E. Smith, of Scotland Neck, North Carolina, invented and made a twist-drill with which the work of drilling a hole could be done in four minutes, the drill cutting out the iron in shavings instead of fine powder.

For many reasons it was thought judicious to remove the boat to the town of Halifax, about twenty miles up the river, and the work of completion, putting in her machinery, armament, etc., was done at that point, although



CAPTAIN J. W. COOKE, C. S. N.

the actual finishing touches were not given until a few days before going into action at Plymouth.

Forges were erected on her decks, and blacksmiths and carpenters were kept hard at work as she floated down the river to her destination.


Captain James W. Cooke, of the Confederate Navy, was detailed by the department to watch the construction of the vessel and to take command when she went into commission. He made every effort to hasten the completion of the boat. He was a bold and gallant officer, and in the battles in which he subsequently engaged he proved himself a hero. Of him it was said that "he would fight a powder magazine with a coal of fire," and if such a necessity could by any possibility have existed he would, doubtless, have been equal to the occasion.

In the spring of 1864 it had been decided at headquarters that an attempt should be made to recapture the town of Plymouth. General Hoke was placed in command of the land forces, and Captain Cooke received orders to cooperate. Accordingly Hoke's division proceeded to the vicinity of Plymouth and surrounded the town from the river above to the river below, and preparation was made to storm the forts and breastworks as soon as the *Albemarle* could clear the river front of the Federal war vessels protecting the place with their guns.

On the morning of April 18, 1864, the *Albemarle* left the town of Hamilton and proceeded down the river towards Plymouth, going stern foremost, with chains dragging from the bow, the rapidity of the current making it impracticable to steer with her head

down-stream. She came to anchor about three miles above Plymouth, and a mile or so above the battery on the bluff at Warren's Neck, near Thoroughfare Gap, where torpedoes, sunken vessels, piles, and other obstructions had been placed. An exploring expedition was sent out, under command of one of the lieutenants, which returned in about two hours, with the report that it was considered impossible to pass the obstructions. Thereupon the fires were banked, and the officers and crew not on duty retired to rest.

Having accompanied Captain Cooke as a volunteer aide, and feeling intensely dissatisfied with the apparent intention of lying at anchor all that night, and believing that it was "then or never" with the ram if she was to accomplish anything, and that it would be foolhardy to attempt the passage of the obstructions and batteries in the day-time, I requested permission to make a personal investigation. Captain Cooke cordially assenting, and Pilot John Luck and two of the few experienced seamen on board volunteering their services, we set forth in a small lifeboat, taking with us a long pole, and arriving at the obstructions proceeded to take soundings. To our great joy it was ascertained that there was ten feet of water over and above the obstructions. This was due to the remarkable freshet then prevailing; the proverbial "oldest inhabitant" said, afterwards, that such high water had never before been seen in Roanoke River. Pushing on down the stream to Plymouth, and taking



COMMANDER C. W. FLUSSLER, U. S. N.



THE SINKING OF THE "SOUTHFIELD."

advantage of the shadow of the trees on the north side of the river, opposite the town, we watched the Federal transports taking on board the women and children who were being sent away for safety, on account of the approaching bombardment. With muffled oars, and almost afraid to breathe, we made our way back up the river, hugging close to the northern bank, and reached the ram about 1 o'clock, reporting to Captain Cooke that it was practicable to pass the obstructions provided the boat was kept in the middle of the stream. The indomitable commander instantly aroused his men, gave the order to get up steam, slipped the cables in his impatience to be off, and started down the river. The obstructions were soon reached and safely passed, under a fire from the fort at Warren's Neck which was not returned. Protected by the iron-clad shield, to those on board the noise made by the shot and shell as they struck the boat sounded no louder than pebbles thrown against an empty barrel. At Boyle's Mill, lower down, there was another fort upon which was mounted a very heavy gun. This was also safely passed, and we then discovered two steamers coming up the river. They proved to be the *Miami* and the *Southfield*.*


The two ships were lashed together with long spars, and with chains festooned between them. The plan of Captain Flusser, who commanded, was to run his vessels so as to get the *Albemarle* between the two, which would have placed the ram at a great disadvantage, if not altogether at his mercy; but Pilot John Luck, acting under orders from Captain Cooke, ran the ram close to the southern shore; and then suddenly turning toward the middle of the stream, and going with the current, the throttles, in obedience to his bell, being wide open, he dashed the prow of the *Albemarle* into the side of the *Southfield*, making an opening large enough to carry her to the bottom in much less time than it takes to tell the story. Part of her crew went down with her.†

The chain-plates on the forward deck of the *Albemarle* became entangled in the frame of the sinking vessel, and her bow was carried down to such a depth that water poured into her port-holes in great volume, and she would soon have shared the fate of the *Southfield*, had not the latter vessel reached the bottom, and then, turning over on her side, released the ram, thus allowing her to come up on an even keel. The *Miami*, right alongside, had opened fire with her heavy guns, and so close were the vessels together that a shell with a ten-second

* The *Miami* carried 6 9-inch guns, 1 100-pounder Parrott rifle, and 1 24-pounder S. B. howitzer, and the ferry-boat *Southfield* 5 9-inch, 1 100-pounder Parrott, and 1 12-pounder howitzer.—EDITOR.

† Of the officers and men of the *Southfield*, seven of

the former, including Acting Volunteer Lieutenant C. A. French, her commander, and forty-two of her men were rescued by the *Miami* and the other Union vessels; the remainder were either drowned or captured.—EDITOR.



THE "SASSACUS" RAMMING THE "ALBEMARLE."

fuse, fired by Captain Flusser, after striking the *Albemarle* rebounded and exploded, killing the gallant man who pulled the lanyard, tearing him almost to pieces. Notwithstanding the death of Flusser, an attempt was made to board the ram, which was heroically resisted by as many of the crew as could be crowded on the top deck, who were supplied with loaded muskets passed up by their comrades below. The *Miami*, a powerful and very fast side-wheeler, succeeded in eluding the *Albemarle* without receiving a blow from her ram, and retired below Plymouth, into Albemarle Sound.*

Captain Cooke having successfully carried out his part of the programme, General Hoke attacked the fortifications the next morning and carried them; not, however, without heavy loss, Ransom's brigade alone leaving 500 dead and wounded on the field, in their most heroic charge upon the breastworks protecting the eastern front of the town. General Wessells, commanding the Federal forces, made a gallant resistance, and surrendered only when further effort would have been worse than useless. During the attack the *Albemarle* held the river front, according to contract, and all day long poured shot and shell into the resisting forts with her two guns.

On May 5, 1864, Captain Cooke left the Roanoke River with the *Albemarle* and two

tenders, the *Bombshell* and *Cotton Plant*, and entered the Sound with the intention of recovering, if possible, the control of the two Sounds, and ultimately of Hatteras Inlet. He proceeded about sixteen miles on an east-northeasterly course, when the Federal squadron, consisting of seven well-armed gun-boats, the *Mattabesett*, *Sassacus*, *Wyalusing*, *Whitehead*, *Miami*, *Commodore Hull*, and *Ceres*, all under the command of Captain Melancton Smith, hove in sight, and at 2 o'clock that afternoon approached in double line of battle, the *Mattabesett* being in advance. They proceeded to surround the *Albemarle*, and hurled at her their heaviest shot,† at distances averaging less than one hundred yards. The *Albemarle* responded effectively, but her boats were soon shot away, her smoke-stack was riddled, many iron plates in her shield were injured and broken, and the after-gun was broken off eighteen inches from the muzzle, and rendered useless. This terrible fire continued, without intermission, until about 5 P. M., when the commander of the double-ender *Sassacus* selected his opportunity, and with all steam on struck the *Albemarle* squarely just abaft her starboard beam, causing every timber in the vicinity of the blow to groan, though none gave way. The pressure from the revolving wheel of the *Sassacus* was so great that it forced the after deck of the ram several feet below the

* The following admirably clear and succinct account of the fight is given by Acting Master William N. Wells, of the *Miami*, in his report of April 23 to Admiral Lee:

"The siege commenced Sabbath afternoon, April 17, by an artillery fire upon Fort Gray. Early in the morning of April 18, between the hours of 3 and 5, the enemy tried to carry by storm Fort Gray, but were repulsed. In the afternoon of the 18th heavy artillery opened fire upon the town and breastworks. Then the fight became general. Up to this time the gun-boats *Southfield* and *Miami* were chained together in preparation to encounter the ram. They were then separated. The *Southfield*, moving up the river, opened fire over the town. The *Miami*, moving down the river, opened a cross-fire upon the enemy, who were charging upon Fort Williams. The firing, being very exact, caused the enemy to fall back. After three attempts to storm the fort, at 9 o'clock the firing ceased from the enemy, they having withdrawn from range. Commander Flusser dispatched a messenger to General Wessells to learn the result of the day's fight. The messenger returned at 10 P. M., having delivered the message, and bearing one from General Wessells to Commander Flusser, stating that the fire from the naval vessels was very satisfactory and effective — so much so that the advancing columns of the enemy broke and retreated; also desired that the *Miami* might be kept below the town to prevent a flank movement by the enemy. At 10:30 P. M., steamer *Southfield* came down and anchored near. At 12:20 A. M., April 19, the *Southfield* came alongside to rechain the two steamers as speedily as possible; the ram having been seen by Captain Barrett, of the *Whitehead*, and reported by him as coming down the river. At 3:45 A. M. the gun-boat *Ceres* came down, passing near, giving

the alarm that the ram was close upon her. I immediately hastened to acquaint Commander Flusser of the information. He immediately came on deck, and ordered both vessels to steam ahead as far as possible and run the ram down. No sooner than given was the order obeyed. Our starboard chain was slipped and bells rung to go ahead fast. In obedience to the order, the steamers were in one minute moving up the river, the ram making for us. In less than two minutes from the time she was reported, she struck us upon our port bow near the water-line, gouging two planks nearly through for ten feet; at the same time striking the *Southfield* with her prow upon the starboard bow, causing the *Southfield* to sink rapidly. As soon as the battery could be brought to bear upon the ram, both steamers, the *Southfield* and *Miami*, commenced firing solid shot from the 100-pound Parrott rifles and 11-inch Dahlgren guns; they making no perceptible indentations in her armor. Commander Flusser fired the first three shots personally from the *Miami*, the third being a ten-second Dahlgren shell, 11-inch. It was directly after that fire that he was killed by pieces of shell; several of the gun's crew were wounded at the same time. Our bow hawser being stranded, the *Miami* swung round to starboard, giving the ram a chance to pierce us. Necessity required the engine to be reversed in motion to straighten the vessel in the river, to prevent going upon the bank of the river, and to bring the rifle gun to bear upon the ram. During the time of straightening the steamer the ram had also straightened, and was making for us. From the fatal effects of her prow upon the *Southfield* and of our sustaining injury, I deemed it useless to sacrifice the *Miami* in the same way."

† The Union fleet had 32 guns and 23 howitzers, a total of 55.—EDITOR.

surface of the water, and created an impression on board that she was about to sink. Some of the crew became demoralized, but the calm voice of the undismayed captain checked the incipient disorder, with the command, "Stand to your guns, and if we must sink let us go down like brave men."

The *Albemarle* soon recovered, and sent a shot at her assailant which passed through one of the latter's boilers, the hissing steam disabling a number of the crew. Yet the discipline on the *Sassacus* was such that, notwithstanding the natural consternation under these appalling circumstances, two of her guns continued to fire on the *Albemarle* until she drifted out of the arena of battle. Two of the fleet attempted to foul the propellers of the ram with a large fishing-seine which they had previously procured for the purpose, but the line parted in paying it out. Then they tried to blow her up with a torpedo, but failed. No

equal conflict continued until night. Some of the Federal vessels were more or less disabled, and both sides were doubtless well content to draw off. Captain Cooke had on board a supply of bacon and lard, and this sort of fuel being available to burn without draught from a smoke-stack, he was able to make sufficient steam to get the boat back to Plymouth, where she tied up to her wharf covered with wounds and with glory.

The *Albemarle* in her different engagements was struck a great many times by shot and shell,* and yet but one man lost his life, and that was caused by a pistol-shot from the *Miami*, the imprudent sailor having put his head out of one of the port-holes to see what was going on outside.

Captain Cooke was at once promoted and placed in command of all the Confederate naval forces in eastern North Carolina. The *Albemarle* remained tied to her wharf at Plym-



INSIDE THE "ALBEMARLE" CASEMATE.

better success attended an effort to throw a keg of gunpowder down her smoke-stack, or what was left of it, for it was riddled with holes from shot and shell. This smoke-stack had lost its capacity for drawing, and the boat lay a helpless mass on the water. While in this condition every effort was made by her numerous enemies to destroy her. The un-

outh until the night of October 27, 1864, when Lieutenant William B. Cushing, of the United States Navy, performed the daring feat of destroying her with a torpedo. Having procured a torpedo-boat so constructed as to be very fast, for a short distance, and with the

* The upper section alone of the smoke-stack has 114 holes made by shot and shell.—G. E.

exhaust steam so arranged as to be noiseless, he proceeded, with a crew of fourteen men, up the Roanoke River. Guards had been stationed by the Confederate military commander on the wreck of the *Southfield*, whose top deck was then above water, but they failed to see the boat. A boom of logs had been arranged around the *Albemarle*, distant about thirty feet from her side. Captain Cooke had planned and superintended the construction of this arrangement before giving up the command of the vessel to Captain A. F. Warley. Cushing ran his boat up to these logs, and there, under a hot fire, lowered and exploded the torpedo under the *Albemarle's* bottom, causing her to settle down and finally to sink at the wharf. The torpedo-boat and crew were captured; but Cushing refusing to surrender, though twice called upon so to do, sprang into the river, dived to the bottom, and swam across to a swamp opposite the town, thus making his escape; and on the next night, after having experienced great suffering, wandering through the swamp, he succeeded in obtaining a small canoe, and made his way back to the fleet.

The river front being no longer protected, and no appliances for raising the sunken vessel



CAPTAIN ALEXANDER F. WARLEY, C. S. N.

being available, on October 31 the Federal forces attacked and captured the town of Plymouth.*

Gilbert Elliott.

II. THE "ALBEMARLE" AND THE "SASSACUS."

AN ATTEMPT TO RUN DOWN AN IRON-CLAD WITH A WOODEN SHIP.

THE United States steamer *Sassacus* was one of several wooden side-wheel ships, known as "double-enders," built for speed, light draught, and ease of manœuvre in battle, as they could go ahead or back with equal facility. She carried four 9-inch Dahlgren guns and two 100-pounder Parrott rifles. On the 5th of May, 1864, this ship, while engaged, together with the *Mattabesett*, *Wyalusing*, and several smaller vessels, with the Confederate iron-clad *Albemarle* in Albemarle Sound, was, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander F. A. Roe, and with all the speed attainable, driven down upon the ram, striking full and square at the junction of its armored roof and deck. It was the first attempt of the kind and deserves a place in history. This sketch is an endeavor to recall only the part taken in the engagement by the *Sassacus* in her attempt to run down the ram.

One can obtain a fair idea of the magnitude of such an undertaking by remembering that on a ship in battle you are on a floating target, through which the enemy's shell may bring not only the carnage of explosion but

an equally unpleasant visitor — the sea. To hurl this egg-shell target against a rock would be dangerous, but to hurl it against an iron-clad bristling with guns, or to plant it upon the muzzles of 100-pounder Brooke or Parrott rifles, with all the chances of a sheering off of the iron-clad, and a subsequent ramming process about which no two opinions ever existed, is more than dangerous.

On the 17th of April, 1864, Plymouth, N. C., was attacked by the Confederates by land and river. On the 20th it was captured, the ram *Albemarle* having sunk the *Southfield* and driven off the other Union vessels.

On the 5th of May the *Albemarle*, with the captured steamer *Bombshell*, and the steamer *Cotton Plant*, laden with troops, came down the river. The double-enders *Mattabesett*, *Sassacus*, *Wyalusing*, and *Miami*, together with the smaller vessels, *Whitehead*, *Ceres*, and *Commodore Hull*, steamed up to give battle.

The Union plan of attack was for the large vessels to pass as close as possible to the ram without endangering their wheels, deliver their fire, and then round to for a second discharge.

* The *Albemarle* was subsequently raised and towed to the Norfolk Navy Yard, and after being stripped

of her armament, machinery, etc., she was sold, Oct. 15, 1867, to J. N. Leonard & Co., for \$3200.— EDITOR.

The smaller vessels were to take care of thirty armed launches, which were expected to accompany the iron-clad. The *Miami* carried a torpedo to be exploded under the enemy, and a strong net or seine to foul her propeller.

All eyes were fixed on this second *Merrimac* as, like a floating fortress, she came down the bay. A puff of smoke from her bow port opened the ball, followed quickly by another, the shells aimed skillfully at the pivot-rifle of the leading ship, *Mattabesett*, cutting away



REAR-ADMIRAL F. A. ROE, U. S. N.

rail and spars, and wounding six men at the gun. The enemy then headed straight for her, in imitation of the *Merrimac*, but by a skillful management of the helm the *Mattabesett* rounded her bow,* closely followed by our own ship, the *Sassacus*, which at close quarters gave her a broadside of solid 9-inch shot. The guns might as well have fired blank cartridges, for the shot skimmed off into the air, and even the 100-pound solid shot from the pivot-rifle glanced from the sloping roof into space with no apparent effect. The feeling of helplessness that comes from the failure of heavy guns to make any mark on an advancing foe can never be described. One is like a man with a bodkin before a Gorgon or a Dragon, a man with straws before the wheels of Juggernaut.

To add to the feeling in this instance, the

rapid firing from the different ships, the clouds of smoke, the changes of position to avoid being run down, the watchfulness to get a shot into the ports of the ram, as they quickly opened to deliver their well-directed fire, kept alive the constant danger of our ships firing into or entangling each other. The crash of bulwarks and rending of exploding shells which were fired by the ram, but which it was utterly useless to fire from our own guns, gave confused sensations of a general and promiscuous mêlée, rather than a well-ordered attack; nevertheless the plan designed was being carried out, hopeless as it seemed. As our own ship delivered her broadside, and fired the pivot-rifle with great rapidity at roof, and port, and hull, and smoke-stack, trying to find a weak spot, the ram headed for us and narrowly passed our stern. She was foiled in this attempt, as we were under full headway, and swiftly rounding her with a hard-port helm, we delivered a broadside at her consort, the *Bombshell*, each shot hulling her. We now headed for the latter ship, going within hail.

Thus far in the action our pivot-rifle astern had had but small chance to fire, and the captain of the gun, a broad-shouldered, brawny fellow, was now wrought up to a pitch of desperation at holding his giant gun in leash, and as we came up to the *Bombshell* he mounted the rail, and, naked to the waist, he brandished a huge boarding-pistol and shouted, "Haul down your flag and surrender, or we'll blow you out of the water!" The flag came down, and the *Bombshell* was ordered to drop out of action and anchor, which she did. Of this surrender I shall have more to say farther on.

Now came the decisive moment, for by this action, which was in reality a manœuvre of our commander, we had acquired a distance from the ram of about four hundred yards, and the latter, to evade the *Mattabesett*, had sheered off a little and lay broadside to us. The Union ships were now on both sides of the ram with engines stopped. Commander Roe saw the opportunity, which an instant's delay would forfeit, and boldly met the crisis of the engagement. To the engineer he cried, "Crowd waste and oil in the fires and back slowly! Give her all the steam she can carry!" To Acting-Master Boutelle he said, "Lay her course for the junction of the casemate and the hull!" Then came four bells, and with full steam and open throttle the ship sprang forward like a living thing. It was a moment

* If the *Mattabesett* rounded the bow of the *Albemarle*, the latter must have been heading up the sound at the time; in other words, she must have turned previous to the advance of the Union fleet. Upon this point the reports of the captains of the double-enders give conflicting testimony. Commander Febiger rep-

resents the ram as retreating towards the Roanoke, while Lieutenant-Commander Roe describes her as in such a position that she would necessarily have been heading towards the advancing squadron. The conflict of opinion was doubtless due to the similarity in the two ends of the ram.—EDITOR.

ing it over and tearing away our own bows, ripping and straining our timbers at the water-line. The enemy's lights were put out, and his men hurled from their feet, and, as we learned afterward, it was thought for a moment that it was all over with them. Our ship quivered for an instant, but held fast, and the swift splash of the paddles showed that the engines were uninjured. My own station was in the bow, on the main-deck, on a line with the



ACTING MASTER CHARLES A. BOUTELLE, U. S. N.

enemy's guns. Through the starboard shutter, which had been partly jarred off by the concussion, I saw the port of the rain not ten feet away. It opened; and like a flash of lightning I saw the grim muzzle of a cannon, the straining gun's-crew naked to the waist and blackened with powder; then a blaze, a roar and rush of the shell as it crashed through, whirling me round and dashing me to the deck.

Both ships were under headway, and as the ram advanced, our shattered bows clinging to the iron casemate were twisted round, and a second shot from a Brooke gun almost touching our side crashed through, followed immediately by a cloud of steam and boiling water that filled the forward decks as our overcharged boilers, pierced by the shot, emptied their contents with a shrill scream that drowned for an instant the roar of the guns. The shouts of command and the cries of scalded, wounded, and blinded men mingled with the rattle of small-arms that told of a hand-to-hand conflict above. The ship surged heavily to port as the great weight of water in the boilers was expended, and over the cry, "The ship is sinking!" came the shout, "All hands repel boarders on starboard bow!"

The men below, wild with the boiling steam, sprang to the ladder with pistol and cutlass, and gained the bulwarks; but men in the rigging with muskets and hand grenades, and the well-directed fire from the crews of the guns, soon baffled the attempt of the Confederates to gain our decks. To send our crew on the grated top of the iron-clad would have been madness.

The horrid tumult, always characteristic of battle, was intensified by the cries of agony from the scalded and frantic men. Wounds may rend, and blood flow, and grim heroism keep the teeth set firm in silence; but to be boiled alive — to have the flesh drop from the face and hands, to strip off in sodden mass from the body as the clothing is torn away in savage eagerness for relief, will bring screams from the stoutest lips. In the midst of all this, when every man had left the engine room, our chief engineer, Mr. Hobby, although badly scalded, stood with heroism at his post; nor did he leave it till after the action, when he was brought up, blinded and helpless, to the deck. I had often before been in battle; had stepped over the decks of a steamer in the *Merrimac* fight when a shell had exploded, covering the deck with fragments of human bodies, literally tearing to pieces the men on the small vessel as she lay alongside the *Minnesota*, but never before had I experienced such a sickening sensation of horror as on this occasion, when the bow of the *Sassacus* lay for thirteen minutes on the roof of the *Albemarle*. An officer of the *Wyalusing* says that when the dense smoke and steam enveloped us they thought we had sunk, till the flash of our guns burst through the clouds, followed by flash after flash in quick succession as our men recovered from the shock of the explosion.

In Commander Febiger's report the time of our contact was said to be "some few minutes." To us, at least, there seemed time enough for the other ships to close in on the ram and sink her, or sink beside her, and it was thirteen minutes as timed by an officer, who told me; but the other ships were silent, and with stopped engines looked on as the clouds closed over us in the grim and final struggle.

Captain French of the *Miami*, who had bravely fought his ship at close quarters, and often at the ship's length, vainly tried to get bows on, to come to our assistance and use his torpedo; but his ship steered badly, and he was unable to reach us before we dropped away. In the mean time the *Wyalusing* signaled that she was sinking—a mistake, but one that affected materially the outcome of the battle. We struck exactly at the spot for which we had aimed; and, contrary to the diagram given in the naval report for that year, the headway of



"ALL HANDS LIE DOWN!"

both ships twisted our bows, and brought us broadside to broadside — our bows at the enemy's stern and our starboard paddle-wheel on the forward starboard angle of his casemate. Against the report mentioned, I not only place my own observation, but I have in my possession the written statement of the navigator, Boutelle, now a member of Congress from Maine.

At length we drifted off the ram, and our pivot-gun, which had been fired incessantly by Ensign Mayer, almost muzzle to muzzle with the enemy's guns, was kept at work till we were out of range.

The official report says that the other ships were then got in line and fired at the enemy, also attempting to lay the seine to foul his propeller — a task that proved, alas, as impracticable as that of injuring him by the fire of the guns. While we were alongside, and had drifted broadside to broadside, our 9-inch Dahlgren guns had been depressed till the shot would strike at right angles, and the solid iron would bound from the roof into the air like marbles, and with as little impression. Fragments even of our 100-pound rifle-shots, at close range, came back on our own decks.


At dusk the ram steamed into the Roanoke River. Had assistance been rendered during the long thirteen minutes that the *Sassacus* lay over the ports of the *Albemarle*, the heroism of Commander Roe would have electrified the public and made his name, as it should be, imperishable in the annals of naval warfare. There was no lack of courage on the

other ships, and the previous loss of the *Southfield*, the signal from the *Wyalusing* that she was sinking, the apparent loss of our ship, and the loss of the sounds of North Carolina if more were disabled, dictated the prudent course they adopted.

Of the official reports, which gave no prominence to the achievement of Commander Roe and have placed an erroneous record on the page of history, I speak only with regret. He was asked to correct his report as to the speed of our ship. He had said we were going at a speed of ten knots, and the naval report says, "He was not disposed to make the original correction." I should think not! — when the speed could only be estimated by his own officers, and the navigator says clearly in his report *eleven* knots. We had perhaps the swiftest ship in the navy. We had backed slowly to increase the distance; with furious fires and a gagged engine working at the full stroke of the pistons, — a run of over four hundred yards, with eager and excited men counting the revolutions of our paddles; who should give the more correct statement?

The ship first in the line claimed the capture of the *Bombshell*. The captain of that vessel, afterward a prisoner on our ship, said he surrendered to the *second* ship in the line, viz., the *Sassacus*; that the flag was not hauled down till he was ordered to do so by Commander Roe; and that no surrender had been intended till the order came from the second vessel in the line.

Another part of the official report states that



THE "SASSACUS" DISABLED AFTER RAMMING.

the bows of the double-enders were all frail, and had they been armed would have been insufficient to have sunk the ram. If this were so, then was the heroism of the trial the greater. Our bow, however, was shod with a *bronze beak*, weighing fully three tons, well secured to prow and keel; and this was twisted and almost entirely torn away in the collision.

But what avails it to a soldier to dash over the parapet and seize the colors of the enemy if his regiment halts outside the *chevaux-de-*

frise? We have always felt that a similar blow on the other side, or a close environment of the heavy guns of the other ships, would have captured or sunk the ram. As it was, she retired, never again to emerge for battle from the Roanoke River, and the object of her coming on the day of our engagement, viz., to aid the Confederates in an attack on New Berne, was defeated; but her ultimate destruction was reserved for the gallant Lieutenant Cushing, of glorious memory.

Edgar Holden, M. D., late U. S. N.

NOTE. The Navy Department was not satisfied with the first official reports, and new and special reports were called for. As a result of investigation, promotions of many of the officers were made.—EDITOR.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "ALBEMARLE."

UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT BY THE LATE W. B. CUSHING, COMMANDER, U. S. N.

IN September, 1864, the Government was laboring under much anxiety in regard to the condition of affairs in the sounds of North Carolina. Some months previous (April 19th) a rebel iron-clad had made her appearance, attacking Plymouth, beating our fleet, sinking the *Southfield*, and killing the gallant Captain Flusser, who commanded the flotilla. General Wessells's brigade had been forced to surrender, and all that section of country and the line of Roanoke River had fallen again into rebel hands. Little Washington and the Tar River were thus outflanked and lost to us. Some time after (May 5th), this iron-clad, the *Albemarle*, had steamed out into the open sound and engaged seven of our steamers, doing much dam-

age and suffering little. The *Sassacus* had attempted to run her down, but had failed, and had had her boiler exploded by one of the 100-pound shells fired from the Confederate.

The Government had no iron-clad that could cross Hatteras bar and enter the sounds,* and it seemed likely that our wooden ships would be defeated, leaving New Berne, Roanoke Island, and other points endangered. At all events, it was impossible for any number of our vessels to injure her at Plymouth, and the expense of our squadron kept to watch her was very great.

At this stage of affairs Admiral S. P. Lee

* Several light-draught monitors were in course of construction at this time, but were not yet completed.—ED.

spoke to me of the case, when I proposed a plan for her capture or destruction. I submitted in writing two plans, either of which I was willing to undertake.

The first was based upon the fact that through a thick swamp the iron-clad might be approached to within a few hundred yards, whence India-rubber boats, to be inflated, and carried upon men's backs, might transport a boarding-party of a hundred men; in the second plan the offensive force was to be conveyed in two low-pressure and very small steamers, each armed with a torpedo and howitzer.

In this last named plan (which had my preference), I intended that one boat should dash in, while the other stood by to throw canister and renew the attempt if the first should fail. It would also be useful to pick up our men if the attacking boat were disabled. Admiral Lee believed that the plan was a good one, and ordered me to Washington to submit it to the Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, doubted the merit of the project, but concluded to order me to New York to "purchase suitable vessels."

Finding some boats building for picket duty, I selected two, and proceeded to fit them out. They were open launches, about thirty feet in length, with small engines, and propelled by a screw. A 12-pounder howitzer was fitted to the bow of each, and a boom was rigged out, some fourteen feet in length, swinging by a goose-neck hinge to the bluff of the bow. A topping lift, carried to a stanchion inboard, raised or lowered it, and the torpedo was fitted into an iron slide at the end. This was intended to be detached from the boom by means of a heel-jigger leading inboard, and to be exploded by another line, connecting with a pin, which held a grape-shot over a nipple and cap. The torpedo was the invention of Engineer Lay of the navy, and was introduced by Chief-Engineer Wood.

Everything being completed, we started to the southward, taking the boats through the canals to Chesapeake Bay, and losing one in going down to Norfolk. This was a great misfortune, and I have never understood how it occurred. I forget the name of the volunteer ensign to whose care it was intrusted; he was taken prisoner with his crew.

My best boat being thus lost, I proceeded with one alone to make my way through the Chesapeake and Albemarle canals into the sounds.

Half-way through, the canal was filled up, but finding a small creek that emptied into it below the obstruction, I endeavored to feel

my way through. Encountering a mill-dam, we waited for high water, and ran the launch over it; below she grounded, but I got a flat-boat, and, taking out gun and coal, succeeded in two days in getting her through. Passing with but seven men through the canal, where for thirty miles there was no guard or Union inhabitant, I reached the sound, and ran before a gale of wind to Roanoke Island. Here I pretended that we were going to Beaufort, and engaged to take two passengers along. This deception became necessary, in consequence of the close proximity of the rebel forces. If any person had known our destination, the news would have reached Plymouth long before we arrived to confirm it.

So, in the middle of the night, I steamed off into the darkness, and in the morning was out of sight. Fifty miles up the sound, I found the fleet anchored off the mouth of the river, and awaiting the ram's appearance. Here, for the first time, I disclosed to my officers and



COMMANDER W. B. CUSHING, U. S. N.

men our object, and told them that they were at liberty to go or not, as they pleased. These, seven in number, all volunteered. One of them, Mr. Howarth of the *Monticello*, had been with me repeatedly in expeditions of peril. Eight were added to my original force, among whom was Assistant Paymaster Francis H. Swan, who came to me as we were about to start and urged that he might go, as he had never been in a fight. Disregarding my remark that "it was a bad time for initiation," he still made the request, and joined us. He found an event-

ful night of it, being wounded, and spending his next four months in Libby Prison.

The Roanoke River is a stream averaging 150 yards in width, and quite deep. Eight miles from the mouth was the town of Plymouth, where the ram was moored. Several thousand soldiers occupied town and forts, and held both banks of the stream. A mile below the ram was the wreck of the *Southfield*, with hurricane deck above water, and on this a guard was stationed, to give notice

her alive," having in the two boats twenty men well armed with revolvers, cutlasses, and hand-grenades. To be sure, there were ten times our number on the ship and thousands near by; but a surprise is everything, and I thought if her fasts were cut at the instant of boarding, we might overcome those on board, take her




FIG. 1. CUSHING'S LAUNCH AND TORPEDO—SHOWING METHOD OF WORKING.

A long spar A (Fig. 1) was pivoted by means of a universal joint on its inboard end into the bracket B, the bracket being securely fastened to the outside of the boat. The spar was raised or lowered by means of a haliard e, which passed through a block at the head of the stanchion C, and thence down to the drum of a small windlass D, situated in the bottom of the boat, directly abaft the stanchion. On the outboard end of the spar was a socket, or head, which carried the shell. The shell was held in place only by a small pin g, which passed through a lug h, protruding from the lower side of the shell, and thence through an inclined plane z, which was attached to the socket. The lug and pin are clearly shown in Fig. 2. To detach the shell the pin g was pulled, which forced the shell gently out of the socket. This was accomplished by a haliard j, which led from the boat to the head of the socket, passing back of the head of the shell through the lugs aa, so that when the haliard was tightened it would force the shell out. A smaller haliard l, leading to the pin g, was spliced to the haliard j in such a manner that when the haliard j was pulled, first the pin and then the shell would come out.




FIG. 2. CUSHING'S TORPEDO—SECTIONAL VIEW.

The shell (Fig. 2) contained an air chamber X and a powder chamber Z. The result of this arrangement was that when the shell was detached it assumed a vertical position, with the air chamber uppermost, and, being lighter than its volume of water, it floated gradually towards the surface. At the top of its central shaft or tube was a grape-shot, held in place by a pin p, to which was attached the haliard j. The pin was a trigger, and the haliard was known as the trigger-line. Upon pulling the haliard the pin came out, the shot fell by its own weight upon the nipple z, which was covered by a percussion cap and connected directly with the powder chamber, and the torpedo exploded.

When the spar was not in use it was swung around by means of a stern line, bringing the head of the spar to the stern of the boat. To use the apparatus, the shell was put in place and the spar was swung around head forward; it was then lowered by means of the haliard e to the required depth; the haliard j was pulled, withdrawing the pin g, and forcing out the shell; finally, when the floating shell had risen to its place, the trigger-line s was pulled and the torpedo fired.

of anything suspicious, and to send up fire-rockets in case of an attack. Thus it seemed impossible to surprise them, or to attack, with hope of success.

Impossibilities are for the timid: we determined to overcome all obstacles. On the night of the 27th of October* we entered the river, taking in tow a small cutter with a few men, the duty of whom was to dash aboard the [wreck of the] *Southfield* at the first hail, and prevent any rocket from being ignited.


Fortune was with our little boat, and we actually passed within thirty feet of the pickets without discovery and neared the wharf, where the rebels lay all unconscious. I now thought that it might be better to board her, and "take

into the stream, and use her iron sides to protect us afterward from the forts. Knowing the town, I concluded to land at the lower wharf, creep around and suddenly dash aboard from the bank; but just as I was sheering in close to the wharf, a hail came, sharp and quick, from the iron-clad, and in an instant was repeated. I at once directed the cutter to cast off, and go down to capture the guard left in our rear, and ordering all steam went at the dark mountain of iron in front of us. A heavy fire was at once opened upon us, not only from the ship, but from men stationed on the shore. This did not disable us, and we neared them rapidly. A large fire now blazed upon the bank, and by its light I discovered the unfortunate fact that there was a circle of logs around the *Albemarle*, boomed well out from her side, with the very intention of preventing the action of torpedoes. To examine them more closely,

* The first attempt was made on the previous night, but after proceeding a short distance the launch grounded, and the time lost in getting her off made it too late to carry out the purpose of the expedition.—EDITOR.

I ran alongside until amidships, received the enemy's fire, and sheered off for the purpose of turning, a hundred yards away, and going at

against the iron ribs and into the mass of men standing by the fire upon the shore. In another instant we had struck the logs and were



THE BLOWING-UP OF THE "ALBEMARLE."

the booms squarely, at right angles, trusting to their having been long enough in the water to have become slimy—in which case my boat, under full headway, would bump up against them and slip over into the pen with the ram. This was my only chance of success, and once over the obstruction my boat would never get out again; but I was there to accomplish an important object, and to die, if needs be, was but a duty. As I turned, the whole back of my coat was torn out by buck-shot, and the sole of my shoe was carried away. The fire was very severe.

In a lull of the firing, the captain hailed us, again demanding what boat it was. All my men gave some comical answers, and mine was a dose of canister, which I sent among them from the howitzer, buzzing and singing

over, with headway nearly gone, slowly forging up under the enemy's quarter-port. Ten feet from us the muzzle of a rifle gun looked into our faces, and every word of command on board was distinctly heard.

My clothing was perforated with bullets as I stood in the bow, the heel-jigger in my right hand and the exploding-line in the left. We were near enough then, and I ordered the boom lowered until the forward motion of the launch carried the torpedo under the ram's overhang. A strong pull of the detaching-line, a moment's waiting for the torpedo to rise under the hull, and I hauled in the left hand, just cut by a bullet.*

The explosion took place at the same instant that 100 pounds of grape, at 10 feet range, crashed in our midst, and the dense

* In considering the merits of Cushing's success with this exceedingly complicated instrument, it must be remembered that nothing short of the utmost care in

preparation could keep its mechanism in working-order; that in making ready to use it, it was necessary to keep the end of the spar elevated until the boat had

mass of water thrown out by the torpedo came down with choking weight upon us.

Twice refusing to surrender, I commanded the men to save themselves; and throwing off sword, revolver, shoes, and coat, struck out from my disabled and sinking boat into the river. It was cold, long after the frosts, and the water chilled the blood, while the whole surface of the stream was plowed up by grape and musketry, and my nearest friends, the fleet, were twelve miles away, but anything was better than to fall into rebel hands. Death was better than surrender. I swam for the opposite shore, but as I neared it a man,* one of my crew, gave a great gurgling yell and went down.

The rebels were out in boats, picking up my men; and one of these, attracted by the sound, pulled in my direction. I heard my own name mentioned, but was not seen. I now "struck out" down the stream, and was soon far enough away to again attempt landing. This time, as I struggled to reach the bank, I heard a groan in the river behind me, and, although very much exhausted, concluded to turn and give all the aid in my power to the officer or seaman who had bravely shared the danger with me and in whose peril I might in turn partake.

Swimming in the night, with eye at the level of the water, one can have no idea of distance, and labors, as I did, under the discouraging thought that no headway is made. But if I were to drown that night, I had at least an opportunity of dying while struggling to aid another. Nearing the swimmer, it proved to be Acting Master's Mate Woodman, who said that he could swim no longer. Knocking his cap from his head, I used my right arm to sustain him, and ordered him to strike out. For ten minutes at least, I think, he managed to keep afloat, when, his presence of mind and physical force being completely gone, he gave a yell and sunk like a stone, fortunately not seizing upon me as he went down.


Again alone upon the water, I directed my

surmounted the boom of logs, and to judge accurately the distance in order to stop the boat's headway at the right point; that the spar must then be lowered with the same precision of judgment; that the detaching laniard must then be pulled firmly, but without a jerk; that, finally, the position of the torpedo under the knuckle of the ram must be calculated to a nicety, and that by a very gentle strain on a line some twenty-five or thirty feet long the trigger-pin must be withdrawn. When it is reflected that Cushing had attached to his person four separate lines, viz., the detaching laniard, the trigger-line, and two lines to direct the movements of the boat, one of which was fastened to the wrist and the other to the ankle of the engineer; that he was also directing the adjustment of the spar

course towards the town side of the river, not making much headway, as my strokes were now very feeble, my clothes being soaked and heavy, and little chop-seas splashing with a choking persistence into my mouth every time that I gasped for breath. Still, there was a determination not to sink, a will not to give up; and I kept up a sort of mechanical motion long after my bodily force was in fact expended.

At last, and not a moment too soon, I touched the soft mud, and in the excitement of the first shock I half raised my body and made one step forward; then fell, and remained half in the mud and half in the water until daylight, unable even to crawl on hands and knees, nearly frozen, with brain in a whirl, but with one thing strong in me—the fixed determination to escape. The prospect of drowning, starvation, death in the swamps—all seemed lesser evils than that of surrender.

As day dawned, I found myself in a point of swamp that enters the suburbs of Plymouth, and not forty yards from one of the forts. The sun came out bright and warm, proving a



THE WRECK OF THE "ALBEMARLE."

most cheering visitant, and giving me back a good portion of the strength of which I had been deprived before. Its light showed me the town swarming with soldiers and sailors, who moved about excitedly, as if angry at some sudden shock. It was a source of satisfaction to me to know that I had pulled the

by the halliard; that the management of all these lines, requiring as much exactness and delicacy of touch as a surgical operation, where a single error in their employment, even a pull too much or too little, would render the whole expedition abortive, was carried out under a fire of musketry so hot that several bullets passed through his clothing and directly in front of the muzzle of a 100-pounder rifle, and carried out with perfect success, it is safe to say that the naval history of the world affords no other example of such marvellous coolness and professional skill as that shown by Cushing in the destruction of the *Albemarle*.—J. R. SOLEY.

* Samuel Higgins, fireman.

wire that set all these figures moving (in a manner quite as interesting as the best of theatricals), but as I had no desire of being discovered by any of the rebs who were so plentiful around me, I did not long remain a spectator. My first object was to get into a dry fringe of rushes that edged the swamp; but to do this required me to pass over thirty or forty feet of open ground, right under the eye of the sentinel who walked the parapet.

Watching until he turned for a moment, I made a dash to cross the space, but was only half-way over when he turned, and forced me to drop down right between two paths, and almost entirely unshielded. Perhaps I was unobserved because of the mud that covered me, and made me blend in with the earth; at all events the soldier continued his tramp for some time, while I, flat on my back, awaited another chance for action. Soon a party of four men came down the path at my right, two of them being officers, and passed so close to me as almost to tread upon my arm. They were conversing upon the events of the previous night, and were wondering "how it was done," entirely unconscious of the presence of one who could give them the information. This proved to me the necessity of regaining the swamp, which I did by sinking my heels and elbows into the earth and forcing my body, inch by inch, towards it. For five hours then, with bare feet, head, and hands, I made my way where I venture to say none ever did before, until I came at last to a clear place, where I might rest upon solid ground. The cypress swamp was a network of thorns and briars, that cut into the flesh at every step like knives, and frequently, when the soft mire would not bear my weight, I was forced to throw my body upon it at length, and haul it along by the arms. Hands and feet were raw when I reached the clearing, and yet my difficulties were but commenced. A working-party of soldiers was in the opening, engaged in sinking some schooners in the river to obstruct the channel. I passed twenty yards in their rear through a corn furrow, and gained some woods below. Here I encountered a negro, and after serving out to him twenty dollars in greenbacks and some texts of Scripture (two powerful arguments with an old darky), I had confidence enough in his fidelity to send him into town for news of the ram.

When he returned, and there was no longer doubt that she had gone down, I went on again, and plunged into a swamp so thick that I had only the sun for a guide and could not see ten feet in advance. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon I came out from the dense mass of reeds upon the bank of one of the deep,

narrow streams that abound there, and right opposite to the only road in the vicinity. It seemed providential that I should come just there, for, thirty yards above or below, I never should have seen the road, and might have struggled on until worn out and starved—found a never-to-be-discovered grave. As it was, my fortune had led me to where a picket party of seven soldiers were posted, having a little flat-bottomed, square-ended skiff toggled to the root of a cypress-tree that squirmed like a snake into the inky water. Watching them until they went back a few yards to eat, I crept into the stream and swam over, keeping the big tree between myself and them, and making for the skiff.

Gaining the bank, I quietly cast loose the boat and floated behind it some thirty yards around the first bend, where I got in and paddled away as only a man could where liberty was at stake.

Hour after hour I paddled, never ceasing for a moment, first on one side, then on the other, while sunshine passed into twilight and that was swallowed up in thick darkness, only relieved by the few faint star rays that penetrated the heavy swamp curtain on either side. At last I reached the mouth of the Roanoke, and found the open sound before me.

My frail boat could not have lived a moment in the ordinary sea there, but it chanced to be very calm, leaving only a slight swell, which was, however, sufficient to influence my boat, so that I was forced to paddle all upon one side to keep her on the intended course.

After steering by a star for perhaps two hours for where I thought the fleet might be, I at length discovered one of the vessels, and after a long time got within hail. My "Ship ahoy!" was given with the last of my strength, and I fell powerless, with a splash, into the water in the bottom of my boat, and awaited results. I had paddled every minute for ten successive hours, and for four my body had been "asleep," with the exception of my two arms and brain. The picket vessel, *Valley City*,—for it was she,—upon hearing the hail at once slipped her cable and got under way, at the same time lowering boats and taking precaution against torpedoes.

It was some time before they would pick me up, being convinced that I was the rebel conductor of an infernal machine, and that Lieutenant Cushing had died the night before.

At last I was on board, had imbibed a little brandy and water, and was on my way to the flag-ship, commanded by Commander Macomb.

As soon as it became known that I had returned, rockets were thrown up and all hands

called to cheer ship; and when I announced success, all the commanding officers were summoned on board to deliberate upon a plan of attack.

In the morning I was again well in every way, with the exception of hands and feet, and had the pleasure of exchanging shots with the batteries that I had inspected on the day previous.

I was sent in the *Valley City* to report to Admiral Porter at Hampton Roads, and soon after Plymouth and the whole district of the Albemarle, deprived of the iron-clad's protection, fell an easy prey to Commander Macomb and our fleet.*

I again received the congratulations of the Navy Department, and the thanks of Congress, and was also promoted to the grade of Lieutenant-Commander.

Engineer-in-Chief William W. Wood, of the United States Navy, in describing the construction and fitting out of the launch with which Captain Cushing blew up the *Albemarle*, says:

When I was on duty in New York in connection with the construction of the iron-clad fleet and other vessels, I was also engaged in devising means to destroy the Confederate iron-clads, and to remove the harbor obstructions improvised by the Southerners to prevent

* Lieutenant Cushing reached the *Valley City* about midnight on the night of October 28-29, and announced the destruction of the *Albemarle*. On the next day, the 29th, at 11.15 A. M., Commander Macomb got under way, and his fleet proceeded up the Roanoke River in the following order: *Commodore Hull*, *Shamrock* (flag-ship), *Chicopee*, *Ossego*, *Wyalusing*, and *Tacony*; the *Valley City* being sent at the same time up Middle River, which joined the Roanoke above Plymouth, to intercept any vessels coming out with stores. Upon the arrival of the fleet at the wreck of the *Southfield*, after exchanging shots with the lower batteries, it was found that the enemy had effectually obstructed the channel by sinking schooners alongside of the wreck, and the expedition was therefore compelled to return. The *Valley City*, hearing the firing cease, concluded that Plymouth had been captured, and continuing her course up Middle River reached the Roanoke; but on approaching the enemy's works, and learning her mistake, she withdrew as she had come. It was upon her course up Middle River, shortly after noon, that the *Valley City* picked up Houghton, the only member of the crew of the picket-boat, beside Cushing, who escaped death or capture. He had swum across the river, and had remained hidden for thirty-six hours in the swamp that separates the two streams.

On the next day, Commander Macomb, having ascertained from the experience of the *Valley City* that Middle River offered a clear passage, determined to approach Plymouth by that route. The fleet was preceded by the tug *Basley*, with Pilot Alfred Everett, of the *Wyalusing*, on board. Following the *Basley* were the *Shamrock*, *Ossego*, *Wyalusing*, *Tacony*, and *Commodore Hull*. The *Valley City* had been detailed to take Lieutenant Cushing to Hampton Roads, and the *Chicopee* had gone to New Bern for repairs. The expedition threaded successfully the channel, shelling Plymouth across the woods on the intervening neck of

access of our vessels to the harbors and approaches in Southern waters.

About this time experiment had developed the feasibility of using torpedoes from the bows of ordinary steam-launches, and there had been already two such launches constructed, which were then lying at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, N. Y., having torpedoes fitted to them.

While sitting at my desk at the iron-clad office in Canal street, New York (the office of Rear-Admiral F. H. Gregory, the general superintendent), a young man (a mere youth) came in and made himself known as Lieutenant W. B. Cushing, United States Navy.

He stated to me, in strict confidence, that he was North on a secret mission, under the sanction of the Honorable Secretary of the Navy, the object being to cut out or destroy the rebel iron-clad ram *Albemarle*, then lying at Plymouth, N. C., and he had been looking for small and swift low-pressure tug-boats for the purpose of throwing a force on board, capturing, and cutting her out, and that, should he fail in this object, to destroy her; that so far he had been unable to find just such vessels as he required; and, further, he had been at the Navy Yard and there saw a steam-launch being fitted with a torpedo, and had called on me to make inquiry as to what was designed to be accomplished by its use, etc.

I gave him all the particulars and urged him to avail himself of the opportunity presented, which he without hesitation did. He sat down at my desk and wrote to the Secretary, stating that he had found what he desired for his purpose, and requested an order from the Department to be furnished with two of the torpedo boats or launches; and in going out said: "I will visit my mother at Fredonia, N. Y., and when they are ready inform me, and I will come down and learn how to use this thing."

land on its way up, until it reached the head of Middle River and passed into the Roanoke, where it lay all night.

At 9.30 on the morning of the 31st of October the line was formed, the *Commodore Hull* being placed in advance, as her ferry-boat construction enabled her to fire ahead. The *Whitehead*, which had arrived with stores just before the attack, was lashed to the *Tacony*, and the tugs *Basley* and *Belle* to the *Shamrock* and *Ossego*, to afford motive power in case of accident to the machinery. Signal was made to "Go ahead fast," and soon after 11 the fleet was hotly engaged with the batteries on shore, which were supported by musketry from rifle-pits and houses. After a spirited action of an hour at short range, receiving and returning a sharp fire of shell, grape, and canister, the *Shamrock* planted a shell in the enemy's magazine, which blew up, and the Confederates hastily abandoned their works. A landing-party was at once sent ashore and occupied the batteries, capturing the last of the retreating garrison. In a short time Plymouth was entirely in possession of the Union forces. Twenty-two cannon were captured, with a large quantity of small-arms, stores, and ammunition. The casualties on the Union side were six killed and nine wounded.

The vessels engaged were as follows: DOUBLE-ENDERS: *Shamrock*, Commander W. H. Macomb, commanding division, Lieutenant Rufus K. Duer, executive officer; *Ossego*, Lieutenant-Commander H. N. T. Arnold; *Wyalusing*, Lieutenant-Commander Earl English; *Tacony*, Lieutenant-Commander W. T. Truxtun. FERRY-BOAT: *Commodore Hull*, Acting-Master Francis Josselyn. GUN-BOAT: *Whitehead*, Acting-Master G. W. Barrett. TUGS: *Belle*, Acting-Master James G. Green; *Basley*, Acting-Master Mark D. Ames. The *Chicopee*, Commander A. D. Harrell, and *Valley City*, Acting-Master J. A. J. Brooks, as already stated, were not present at the second and final demonstration.—J. R. SOLEY.

I did so. Lieutenant Cushing came to New York, the launch was taken out into the North River, and one or more torpedo shells exploded by Lieutenant Cushing himself.

We stopped at the same hotel (the old United States, corner of Pearl and Fulton streets) until his departure, where I became well acquainted with this gallant and brave officer, and discussed frequently the resources of the torpedo steam-launches.

I was not disappointed when, a short time afterwards, Barry, the clerk of the hotel, told me one morning on my making my appearance that "Cushing had done the work," and handed me the morning paper containing Cushing's report to the Honorable Secretary of the Navy.

The dimensions of these two launches were as follows: 45 to 47 feet long; 9 feet 6 inches beam, and carried a howitzer forward. Draught of water, about 40 to 42 inches.*

Cushing's visit to his mother, referred to by Engineer-in-Chief Wood, is thus described by Mrs. Cushing:

NOTE ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "ALBEMARLE."

BY HER CAPTAIN, A. F. WARLEY, C. S. N.

WHEN I took command of the Confederate States iron-clad *Albemarle*, I found her made fast to the river bank nearly abreast of the town of Plymouth. She was surrounded by a cordon of single cypress logs chained together, about ten feet from her side.

I soon found why the very able officer whom I succeeded (Captain J. N. Maffitt) was willing to give up the command. There was no reason why the place might not be recaptured any day: the guns commanding the river were in no condition for use, and the troops in charge of them were worn down by ague, and were undrilled and worthless.

On the other side of the river, at pistol range, was a low island heavily timbered, and said to be almost impenetrable. As it fully commanded our position, I sent an active officer with a few hardy men to "explore it."

*The two "picket-boats," as they were officially designated, were delivered completely fitted to Lieutenant Cushing, in New York, on the 20th of September, by Admiral F. H. Gregory, Superintendent of Construction, with orders to send them directly to Hampton Roads by way of the canals. Cushing, not having any desire to make a canal voyage in an open launch, had obtained permission to proceed by land. Picket-boat No. 1 was under the command of Acting Ensign William L. Howarth, and No. 2 under Acting Ensign Andrew Stockholm. The two boats left New York on the 22d. Both of them struck on the rocks near Bergen Point, N. J., and remained there sunk for some hours. They arrived on the 25th, badly damaged, at New Brunswick, where they were repaired. No. 2 sank again in the canal, and was again repaired in Philadelphia, where the boats arrived on the 28th. Leaving Philadelphia, they reached Baltimore in safety; and after having been inspected by Cushing, they resumed their voyage on the 4th of October down Chesapeake Bay.

Soon after leaving Baltimore, No. 1's engine broke down, and she was towed into Annapolis by No. 2 on the 5th. Leaving Annapolis the next day in a heavy sea, the boats worked over first to one shore and then to the other. Presently the machinery of No. 2 was disabled, and she put into Great Wicomico Bay for repairs. Howarth's anxiety to reach Fort Monroe led him to press on, leaving his consort to follow as soon as possible. On the 8th, however, when the repairs had been completed, and just as Stockholm was

Well do I remember that dreary day in the fall of 1864 when Will, home on a brief visit, invited me to ride with him over the Arkwright hills; the only time I was there, but in memory forever associated with the destruction of the *Albemarle*. It was a dark, cloudy day, and looked lonely; but where no one could hear or see us Will said to me, "Mother, I have undertaken a great project, and no soul must know until it is accomplished. I *must* tell you, for I need your prayers." He then informed me that the Navy Department had commissioned him to destroy the rebel ram *Albemarle*. How, when, and where, he told me all particulars, while I tried to still the beatings of my heart and listen in silence. At last I said, "My son, I believe you will accomplish it, but you *cannot* come out alive. Why did they call upon you to do this?" I felt that it was asking too much. "Mother, it shall be done or you will have no son Will. If I die, it will be in a good cause." After that I spoke only words of encouragement, but, oh! those days of suspense, shared by no one, every hour an age of agony, until from my son Howard came the glad telegram, "William is safe and successful."

His report on his return showed that we were under constant espionage. Acting on this information the same officer (Mr. Long), with ten men, ambuscaded and captured a Federal man-of-war boat, and for the time being put a stop to the spy system.

When I had been about a month at Plymouth the troops were relieved by a new set. On the day of their arrival I heard of a steam-launch having been seen in the river, and I informed the officer in command of the fact, and at the same time told him that the safety of the place depended on the *Albemarle*, and the safety of the *Albemarle* depended on the watchfulness of his pickets.

The crew of the *Albemarle* numbered but sixty, too small a force to allow me to keep an armed watch on deck at night and to do outside picketing besides. Moreover, to break the monotony of the life and keep

about to get away, he was attacked by guerrillas. In trying to get out into the open water the boat unfortunately grounded; and Stockholm, after using up his ammunition, set her on fire and surrendered. The prisoners were sent to Richmond, but were soon after paroled, and Stockholm on his return was dismissed. No. 1 arrived safely at her destination, and was used by Cushing in the expedition against the *Albemarle*. The list of officers and men on board Picket-boat No. 1, on the expedition of October 27, 1864, with the vessels to which they were officially attached, was as follows: Lieutenant William B. Cushing, commanding, *Monticello*; Acting Assistant Paymaster Francis H. Swan, *Ossego*; Acting Ensign William L. Howarth, *Monticello*; Acting Master's Mate John Woodman, *Commodore Hull*; Acting Master's Mate Thomas S. Gay, *Ossego*; Acting Third Assistant Engineer William Stotesbury, Picket-boat; Acting Third Assistant Engineer Charles L. Steever, *Ossego*; Samuel Higgins, first-class fireman, Picket-boat; Richard Hamilton, coal-heaver, *Shamrock*; William Smith, ordinary seaman, *Chicopee*; Bernard Harley, ordinary seaman, *Chicopee*; Edward J. Houghton, ordinary seaman, *Chicopee*; Lorenzo Deming, landsman, Picket-boat; Henry Wilkes, landsman, Picket-boat; Robert H. King, landsman, Picket-boat. Cushing and Howarth, together with those designated as attached to the "Picket-boat," were the original seven who brought the boat down from New York. Cushing and Houghton escaped, Woodman and Higgins were drowned, and the remaining eleven were captured.

down ague, I had always out an expedition of ten men, who were uniformly successful in doing a fair amount of damage to the enemy. All were anxious to be on these expeditions and to keep out of the hospital.

The officer in command of the troops was inclined to give me all assistance, and sent a picket of twenty-five men under a lieutenant; they were furnished with rockets and had a field-piece. This picket was stationed on board of a schooner about gun-shot below the *Albemarle*, where an attempt was being made to raise a vessel (the *Southfield*) sunk at the time of Commander Cooke's dash down the river. Yet on the night of the 27th of October Cushing's steam-launch ran quietly alongside of the schooner unobserved by the picket, without a sound or signal, and then steamed up to the *Albemarle*.

It was about 3 A. M. The night was dark and slightly rainy, and the launch was close to us when we hailed and the alarm was given — so close that the gun could not be depressed enough to reach her; so the crew were sent in the shield with muskets, and kept up a heavy fire on the launch as she slowly forced her way over the chain of logs and ranged by us within a few feet. As she reached the bow of the *Albemarle* I heard a report as of an unshotted gun, and a piece of wood fell at my feet. Calling the carpenter, I told him a torpedo had been exploded, and ordered him to examine and report to me, saying nothing to any one else. He soon reported "a hole in her bottom big enough to drive a wagon in."

By this time I heard voices from the launch — "We surrender," etc., etc., etc. I stopped our fire and sent out Mr. Long, who brought back all those who had been in the launch except the gallant cap-

tain and three of her crew, all of whom took to the water.

Having seen to their safety, I turned my attention to the *Albemarle* and found her resting on the bottom in eight feet of water, her upper works above water. The very men who had destroyed her had no idea of their success, for I heard one say to another, "We did our best, but there the d——d old thing is yet."

That is the way the *Albemarle* was destroyed, and a more gallant thing was not done during the war. After her destruction, failing to convince the officer in command of the troops that he could not hold the place, I did my best to help defend it. Half of my crew went down and obstructed the river by sinking the schooner at the wreck, and with the other half I had two 8-inch guns commanding the upper river put in serviceable order, relaid platforms, fished out tackles from the *Albemarle*, got a few shells, etc., and waited. I did not have to wait long. The fleet steamed up to the obstructions, fired a few shells over the town, steamed down again, and early next morning rounding the island were in the river and opened fire.

The two 8-inch guns worked by Mr. Long and Mr. Shelley did their duty, and I think did all that was done in the defense of Plymouth. The fire of the fleet was concentrated on us, and one at least of the steamers was so near that I could hear the orders given to elevate or depress the guns. When I felt that by hanging on I could only sacrifice my men and achieve nothing, I ordered our guns spiked and the men sent round to the road by a ravine.

The crew left me by Captain Maffitt were good and true men, and stuck by me to the last. If any failed in his duty, I never heard of it; and if any of them still live, I send them a hearty "God bless you!"

A NOTE OF PEACE.

REUNIONS OF "THE BLUE AND THE GRAY."



ALTHOUGH the horrors of war are the more conspicuous where the conflict is between brothers and the struggle is a long and desperate one, the evidences are numerous that, underneath the passion and bitterness of our civil war, there were counter currents of kindly feeling, a spirit of genuine friendliness pervading the opposing camps. This friendliness was something deeper than the expression of mere human instinct; the combatants felt that they were indeed brothers. Acts of kindness to wounded enemies began to be noted at Bull Run, while in every campaign useless picket firing was almost uniformly discountenanced, and the men shook hands at the outposts and talked confidently of their private affairs and their trials and hardships in the army. This feeling, confined, perhaps, to men on the very front line, culminated at Appomattox, where the victors shared rations with their late antagonists and

generously offered them help in repairing the wastes of battle. When the Union veteran returned to the North he did not disguise his faith in the good intentions of the Southern fighting man, and for a number of years after peace was made, the process of fraternization went quietly forward. The business relations of the sections and the interchange of settlers brought into close communication the rank and file of both armies, and the spirit of goodwill that had been manifested in a manner so unique at the front was found to be a hearty and general sentiment.

Out of this state of things was developed, naturally, a series of formal meetings of veterans of the Blue and the Gray. The earliest reunions of which I find record were held in 1881 (the year of the Yorktown Centennial and of Garfield's death). The first was a meeting of Captain Colwell Post, Grand Army of the Republic, of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the ex-Confederates of Luray Valley, Virginia. The Southern veterans appointed special committees to welcome the comrades of the Carlisle

post to the soil of Virginia, and received them accordingly on the 21st of July. In September following, the post, in turn, invited the Southerners to visit Carlisle, and greeted them with a public reception. The meeting was held on the Fair Ground, in the presence of a large assemblage, and Governor Henry M. Hoyt welcomed the Virginians; General James A. Beaver and Grand Army Posts 58 and 116, of Harrisburg, took part in the reunion.

In October of that year, the members of Aaron Wilkes Post, of Trenton, New Jersey, on their journey to the Yorktown Centennial celebration, visited Richmond, and were entertained in a fraternal manner by the Veteran Association of the Old 1st Virginia regiment and by other ex-Confederates. In each case, at Luray and at Richmond, the meeting was brought about by overtures on the part of the Northern veterans. Lee Camp, Confederate Veterans, at Richmond, was formed soon after this visit of Aaron Wilkes Post. The list of the more prominent formal reunions includes the following:

- 1881.— July 21, Luray, Virginia. Participants: Captain Colwell Post, G. A. R., of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and ex-Confederates of the Valley of Virginia.
- 1881.— September 28, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The same organizations participating.
- 1881.— October 17 and 18, Richmond. Aaron Wilkes Post, G. A. R., of Trenton, New Jersey, and the Veteran Association of the Old 1st Virginia Infantry, Otey Battery, and Richmond Howitzers, of Richmond.
- 1882.— April 12 and 13, Trenton. Return visit of the Richmond ex-Confederates.
- 1882.— October, Gettysburg. Officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac and of the Army of Northern Virginia. The exercises extended over three days, and among the participants were Generals Sickles, Crawford, and Stannard, of the Union side, and Generals Forney, Trimble, and others, of the Confederate Army.
- 1883.— October 15-18, Richmond. Lincoln Post, G. A. R., of Newark, New Jersey, Phil Kearny Post, G. A. R., of Richmond, and Lee Camp, Confederate Veterans.
- 1884.— May 30, Fredericksburg, Virginia. Union Veteran Corps, Washington Continentals, and George G. Meade Post, G. A. R., of Washington, D. C., and Lee Camp, C. V., of Richmond, and Maury Camp, C. V., of Fredericksburg. Among the participants were Generals Rosecrans, Slocum, Newton, Doubleday, and Roy Stone, and Colonel H. W. Jackson of the Union side, and General Longstreet, Colonels W. C. Oates, and Hilary A. Herbert, and Captain Robert E. Lee of the Confederates.
- 1884.— June 17, Newark, New Jersey. Return visit of Phil Kearny Post and Lee Camp, of Richmond, to Lincoln Post, of Newark.
- 1885.— May 7 and 8, Baltimore. Society of the Army of the Potomac, and Lee Camp, of Richmond.
- 1885.— May 20, Richmond. Aaron Wilkes Post, of

Trenton, and Lee Camp. Dedication of the Richmond Home for ex-Confederates, and Memorial Exercises at Hollywood Cemetery.

- 1885.— May 30, Annapolis, Maryland. Meade Post, G. A. R., and other Union veterans, and the ex-Confederates of Annapolis. Memorial Day reunion.
- 1885.— July 4, Auburn, New York. Seward Post, G. A. R., of Auburn, and Lee Camp.
- 1885.— October 19, Richmond. The same.
- 1885.— October 22, 23, and 24, Owensboro, Kentucky. "Ex-Federal and Ex-Confederate" Soldiers' Association, of Davis County, Kentucky, and Union veterans and ex-Confederates of the West.
- 1886.— July 3, Gettysburg. Cavalry Reunion on the field of the battle of July 3, 1863, between Stuart and Gregg. Generals D. McM. Gregg, Wade Hampton, J. B. McIntosh were present, also Major H. B. McClellan, of Stuart's staff.
- 1886.— October 12, 13, and 14, Richmond. Lee Camp, and John A. Andrew Post, G. A. R., of Boston.
- 1887.— June 9, Staunton, Virginia. Confederate Memorial Exercises conducted jointly by the Blue and the Gray; Generals W. W. Averell, Fitzhugh Lee, and John D. Imboden took part in the ceremonies.
- 1887.— June 16, 17, 18, and 19, Boston, Massachusetts. John A. Andrew Post, of Boston, and Lee Camp. The Southern veterans took part in the ceremonies at the Bunker Hill anniversary on the 17th, and in the evening attended a banquet at Faneuil Hall, where the State shield of Virginia was displayed beside that of Massachusetts. Among those present were Governor Oliver Ames, Senator George F. Hoar, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Colonel Henry O. Kent, of Massachusetts, and John Goode, George D. Wise, and Major N. B. Randolph, of Virginia.
- 1887.— June 18, Lynn, Massachusetts. General Lander Post, G. A. R., of Lynn, John A. Andrew Post, and Lee Camp.
- 1887.— July 3, Gettysburg. Pickett's Division Association and the Philadelphia Brigade. A large number of veterans of both armies accompanied these organizations and took part in the memorial meeting.
- 1887.— September 14, Mexico, Missouri. Reunion of ex-Confederates of Missouri, participated in by Union veterans and local posts of the Grand Army.
- 1887.— September 15, 16, and 17, Antietam Battlefield, Maryland. Antietam Post, G. A. R., of Sharpsburg, Maryland, U. S. Grant Post, of Harper's Ferry, the Veteran Association of the 50th New York Volunteers, and Confederate veterans of Maryland and Virginia.
- 1887.— September 27, Evansville, Indiana. Veterans of both armies under a general invitation from a national committee, headed by General James M. Shackelford. Letters of indorsement breathing the spirit of fraternity were sent by Generals John B. Gordon, James Longstreet, and Basil W. Duke.
- 1887.— October 11, Kenesaw Mountain Battlefield, Georgia. Excursion and reunion of Confederate and Union veterans.

The meetings here enumerated, with two or three exceptions, were devoted mainly to the interchange of social courtesies. On other noteworthy occasions the Southerners have extended less formal attentions to Northern

veterans while visiting the old battle-fields, particularly at Pea Ridge, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Petersburg, Antietam, Ball's Bluff, and the region around Richmond. One of the practical results of the personal acquaintanceship that sprung up at these reunions was the cooperation of the Grand Army of the Republic with the Confederate Veterans in raising funds to erect a home for disabled Southern soldiers at Richmond. The movement to establish the home originated with Lee Camp, and was promptly indorsed by the Grand Army posts of Virginia.

In March, 1884, J. F. Berry, of Phil Kearny Post, and A. A. Spitzer, of Lee Camp, Richmond, visited New York to confer with members of the Grand Army, and a meeting was held on the 19th at the St. James Hotel, resulting in the creation of a joint committee with General John B. Gordon, of Georgia, as chairman, and General James R. O'Beirne, of Farragut Post, G. A. R., of New York, as vice-chairman. Acting on the suggestion of the ex-Confederate members, the committee published a call for a mass meeting to be held at Cooper Institute, April 9, the anniversary of Lee's surrender, and General Grant was called upon to preside. His response to the invitation was as follows:

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1884.

GENERAL J. B. GORDON, *Chairman Central Committee, New York:*

Your letter of March 31, informing me that I had been chosen to preside at a meeting of the different posts of the G. A. R. and ex-Confederates in the city of New York, is received.

The object of the meeting is to inaugurate, under the auspices of soldiers of both armies, a movement in behalf of a fund to build a home for disabled ex-Confederate soldiers.

I am in hearty sympathy with the movement, and would be glad to accept the position of presiding officer, if I were able to do so. You may rely on me, however, for rendering all aid I can in carrying out the designs of the meeting.

I am here under treatment for the injury I received on Christmas Eve last, and will not be able to leave here until later than the 9th, and cannot tell now how soon or when I shall be able to go.

I have received this morning your dispatch of last evening urging that I must be there to preside, but I have to respond to that, that it will be impossible for me to be there on the 9th, and I cannot now fix a day when I could certainly be present.

Hoping that your meeting will insure success, and promising my support financially and otherwise to the movement,

I am, very truly yours,
U. S. GRANT.

Following this mass meeting a fund of several thousand dollars was raised by local committees of the G. A. R. posts of New York,

* What will doubtless prove to be the greatest demonstration (up to this date) of the fraternal feelings existing among veterans, is the meeting of the survivors of the Army of the Potomac with the survivors of the Army of Northern Virginia, at Gettysburg, July

Brooklyn, Boston, and elsewhere. Literary and dramatic entertainments were given in aid of the fund. The first of these took place on the 30th of April, at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York. At that date General Grant had returned to his home in Sixty-sixth street, though he was still suffering from the injuries referred to in his letter to General Gordon. He wrote to the committee of Grand Army veterans that he was physically unable to attend the entertainment, inclosed a check for \$50, and indorsed their action.

The record here presented is not the whole story of the work that has been done since the war closed. The spirit that moved Lincoln to say in his last inaugural, "With malice toward none," has continued its holy influence. That which must appear to the world at large a startling anomaly, is in truth the simple principle of good-will unfolding itself under favorable conditions. The war, that is, the actual encounter on the field, taught the participants the dignity of American character. On the occasion of the reception of Lee Camp by the Society of the Army of the Potomac at Baltimore, in 1885, General H. W. Slocum said to the assembled veterans: "This incident that occurred here to-day proves the truth of the old saying that there is nothing so makes men respect one another as standing up in the ranks and firing at one another." In closing his remarks the same speaker gave the key-note to this whole matter of the fraternization of former foes, from the point of view of a Unionist. The words were these: "The men of those armies [Union and Confederate] respected one another, and when General Grant said to General Lee, 'when your men go home they can take their horses to work their little farms,' he spoke the sentiments of every man in the army." The propriety of such declarations can hardly be questioned, and the Northern promoters of reunions of "The Blue and the Gray" are pursuing the course marked out by Grant, and they may, in sincerity, point to him as their leader and exemplar.* On the other hand, the sympathy of the ex-Confederates with the sufferings of General Grant, at the close of his life, and their notable action at the time of his death, may be cited as evidence for the Southerners of the lasting sentiments of good-will they hold toward their former opponents.

George L. Kilmer,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN POST, G. A. R.,
NEW YORK, 1888.

2d, 3d and 4th. This gathering originated in a proposal made by the Third Corps Society, at their reunion in May, 1887, and the matter was taken in charge by the Society of the Army of the Potomac at their reunion in the June following.—G. L. K.

when one o' that same seck of people name to me the very subjects I be'n a-thinkin' and a actuil' a-dreamin' about, ef it did n't 'pears like to me the good Lord sent him a-purpose."

With hand yet trembling, she took from her bosom a marriage-license, and, handing it to Mr. Hooks, said:

"There 's a paper for you, Mr. Hooks, which people is now ready and a-waitin' for you to 'tend to it."

Turning her face towards the dining-room, she called aloud:

"Mimy, you may come in, and the balance of 'em."

The door opened, Mimy and the other negroes, having on every item of Sunday clothes that that plantation had on hand, filed in and took position near the walls. After a decent

moment, a-tiptoe, his arm already curved to receive that of his bride, stepped forth Mr. Abner Hines.

"And I do believe, on my soul," Mr. Hooks said some time afterwards, "that arter I have jinded them two together, hard and fast, a'cordin' to law *and* gospul, that it were in me to make prob'ble the biggest, everlastin'est speech I ever spread myself before a augence; but the fact were, everybody got to laughin' and cryin' so they drownded my woices. Ah, well! it were a ruther eggitin' time all thoo. But everything have swaged down peaceable. The breth'en they forgive me for dancin', when Susan Ann give in the pooty expeunce she told, and it were give' out I would n't do so no more."

R. M. Johnston.

THE KNIGHT IN SILVER MAIL.

SHE left the needle in the rose
And put her broidery by,
And leaning from her casement tall
She heard the owlets cry.
The purple sky was thick with stars,
And in the moonlight pale
She saw come riding from the wood
A knight in silver mail.

His plume was like the snowy foam
That wreathes the roaring tide,
The glory of his golden locks
His helmet could not hide.
She took the lily from her breast
(Like hers, its beauty frail),
And dropped it as he rode beneath —
The knight in silver mail.

About her gown of crimson silk
She drew a mantle dark.
She saw the stately castle-towers
Uprising from the park,
And on the lake the mated swans,
Asleep in shadow, sail,
But left it all to follow him,
The knight in silver mail.

At dawn her father's men-at-arms
Went searching everywhere,
And found her with the churchyard dews
A-sparkle in her hair.
And lo! a sight to make the best
And bravest of them quail,
Beside her in the tangled grass,
A skeleton in mail.

"Oh, I would see thy face, my love,
Oh, I would see thy face!
Why dost thou keep thy visor down?
It is a lonely place."
His voice was like the hollow reeds
That rustle in the gale:
"T'is lonelier in my castle," said
The knight in silver mail.

He let his steed go riderless,
He took her by the hand
And led her over brake and brier
Into a lonesome land.
"Oh, are thy headstones all a-row
That glimmer in the vale?"
"My castle-walls are white," replied
The knight in silver mail.

"So close unto thy castle-doores
Why buryest thou the dead?"
"For ten long years I've slept with them:
Ah, welcome home!" he said.
He clasped her dainty waist around,
And in the moonlight pale
Upraised his visor, and she saw
The knight in silver mail.

Minna Irving.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

TENNESSEE AND KENTUCKY.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

HALLECK.



IN sending General Hunter to relieve Frémont, the President did not intend that he should remain in charge of the Department of the West. Out of its vast extent the Department of Kansas was created a few days afterward, embracing the State of Kansas, the Indian Territory, and the Territories of Nebraska, Colorado, and Dakota, with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, and Hunter was transferred to its command. General Halleck was assigned to the Department of the Missouri, embracing the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and that portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River.

Henry Wager Halleck was born in Oneida County, New York, January 15, 1815. Educated at Union College, he entered the military academy at West Point, where he graduated third in a class of thirty-one, and was made second lieutenant of engineers July 1, 1839. While yet a cadet he was employed at the academy as assistant professor of engineering. From the first he devoted himself with constant industry to the more serious studies of his profession. He had attained a first lieutenancy when the Mexican war broke out, and was sent to the Pacific coast. Valuable services in the military and naval operations prosecuted there secured him the brevet of captain from May 1, 1847. On the conquest of California by the United States forces, he took part in the political organization of the new State, first as Secretary of State under the military governors, and afterward as leading member of the convention which framed the constitution under which California was admitted to the Union.

He remained in the army and in charge of various engineering duties on the Pacific coast until August 1, 1854, having been meanwhile promoted captain of engineers. At that date he resigned his commission to engage in civil pursuits. He became a member of a law firm, and was also interested in mines and railroads,

when the outbreak of the rebellion called him again into the military service of the Government. He was not only practically accomplished in his profession as a soldier, but also distinguished as a writer on military art and science. Halleck's high qualifications were well understood and appreciated by General Scott, at whose suggestion he was appointed a major-general in the regular army to date from August 19, 1861, with orders to report himself at army headquarters in Washington. A phrase in one of Scott's letters, setting forth McClellan's disregard for his authority, creates the inference that the old general intended that Halleck should succeed him in chief command. But when the latter reached Washington, the confusion and disasters in the Department of the West were at their culmination, and urgent necessity required him to be sent thither to succeed Frémont.

General Halleck arrived at St. Louis on November 18, 1861, and assumed command on the 19th. His written instructions stated forcibly the reforms he was expected to bring about, and his earlier reports indicate that his difficulties had not been overstated—irregularities in contracts, great confusion in organization, everywhere a want of arms and supplies, absence of routine and discipline. Added to this was reported danger from the enemy. He telegraphs under date of November 29:

I am satisfied that the enemy is operating in and against this State with a much larger force than was supposed when I left Washington, and also that a general insurrection is organizing in the counties near the Missouri River, between Boonville and Saint Joseph. A desperate effort will be made to supply and winter their troops in this State, so as to spare their own resources for a summer campaign.

An invasion was indeed in contemplation, but rumor had magnified its available strength. General Price had, since the battle of Lexington, lingered in south-western Missouri, and was once more preparing for a northward march. His method of campaigning was peculiar, and needed only the minimum of organization and preparation. His troops were made up mainly of young, reckless, hardy Missourians, to whom a campaign was

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an adventure of pastime and excitement, and who brought, each man, his own horse, gun, and indispensable equipments and clothing. The usual burdens of an army commissariat and transportation were of little moment to these partisans, who started up as if by magic from every farm and thicket, and gathered their supplies wherever they went. To quote the language of one of the Missouri rebel leaders: "Our forces, to combat or cut them off, would require only a haversack to where the enemy would require a wagon." The evil of the system was, that such forces vanished quite as rapidly as they appeared. The enthusiastic squads with which Price had won his victory at Lexington were scattered among their homes and haunts. The first step of a campaign, therefore, involved the gathering of a new army, and this proved not so easy in the opening storms of winter as it had in the fine midsummer weather. On the 26th of November, 1861, Price issued a call for 50,000 men. The language of his proclamation, however, breathed more of despair than of confidence. He reminded his adherents that only one in forty had answered to the former call, and that "Boys and small property-holders have in main fought the battles for the protection of your property." He repeated many times, with emphasis, "I must have 50,000 men."* His prospects were far from encouraging. McCulloch, in a mood of stubborn disagreement, was withdrawing his army to Arkansas, where he went into winter quarters. Later on, when Price formally requested his coöperation, McCulloch as formally refused. For the moment the Confederate cause in south-western Missouri was languishing. Governor Jackson made a show of keeping it alive by calling the fugitive remnant of his rebel legislature together at Neosho, and with the help of his sole official relic—the purloined State seal—enacting the well-worn farce of passing a secession ordinance, and making a military league with the Confederate States.

The Confederate Congress at Richmond responded to the sham with an act to admit Missouri to the Confederacy. An act of more promise at least, appropriating a million dollars to aid the Confederate cause in that State, had been passed in the preceding August. Such small installment of this fund, however, as was transmitted failed even to pay the soldiers, who for their long service had not as yet received a penny. In return the Richmond authorities asked the transfer of Missouri troops to the Confederate service; but with this request the rebel Missouri leaders

were unable immediately to comply. When, under date of December 30, 1861, Governor Jackson complained of neglect and once more urged that Price be made commander in Missouri, Jefferson Davis responded sarcastically that not a regiment had been tendered, and that he could not appoint a general before he had troops for him.† From all these causes Price's projected winter campaign failed, and he attributed the failure to McCulloch's refusal to help him.‡

The second part of the rebel programme in Missouri, that of raising an insurrection north of the Missouri River, proved more effective. Halleck was scarcely in command when the stir and agitation of depredations and the burning of bridges, by small squads of secessionists in disguise, were reported from various counties of northern Missouri. Federal detachments went promptly in pursuit, and the perpetrators as usual disappeared, only however to break out with fresh outrages when quiet and safety had apparently been restored. It was soon evident that this was not merely a manifestation of neighborhood disloyalty, but that it was part of a deliberate system instigated by the principal rebel leaders. "Do you intend to regard men," wrote Price to Halleck, January 12, 1862, "whom I have specially dispatched to destroy roads, burn bridges, tear up culverts, etc., as amenable to an enemy's court-martial, or will you have them to be tried as usual, by the proper authorities, according to the statutes of the State?" § Halleck, who had placed the State under martial law, to enable him to deal more effectually with this class of offenders, stated his authority and his determination, with distinct emphasis, in his reply of January 22, 1862:

You must be aware, general, that no orders of yours can save from punishment spies, marauders, robbers, incendiaries, guerrilla bands, etc., who violate the laws of war. You cannot give immunity to crime. But let us fully understand each other on this point. If you send armed forces, wearing the garb of soldiers and duly organized and enrolled as legitimate belligerents, to destroy railroads, bridges, etc., as a military act, we shall kill them, if possible, in open warfare; or, if we capture them, we shall treat them as prisoners of war. But it is well understood that you have sent numbers of your adherents, in the garb of peaceful citizens and under false pretenses, through our lines into northern Missouri, to rob and destroy the property of Union men and to burn and destroy railroad bridges, thus endangering the lives of thousands, and this, too, without any military necessity or possible military advantage. Moreover, peaceful citizens of Missouri, quietly working on their farms, have been instigated by your emissaries to take up arms as insurgents, and to rob and plunder, and to commit arson and murder. They do not even act under the garb of soldiers, but under false pretenses and in the

* War Records.

† Davis to Jackson, Jan. 8, 1862. *Ibid.*

‡ Price to Polk, Dec. 23, 1861. *Ibid.*

§ Price to Halleck. *Ibid.*

guise of peaceful citizens. You certainly will not pretend that men guilty of such crimes, although "specially appointed and instructed by you," are entitled to the rights and immunities of ordinary prisoners of war.

One important effect which Price hoped to produce by the guerrilla rising he was instigating was to fill his army with recruits. "The most populous and truest counties of the State," he wrote, "lie upon or north of the Missouri River. . . . I sent a detachment of 1100 men to Lexington, which after remaining only a part of one day gathered together about 2500 recruits, and escorted them in safety to me at Osceola." His statement was partly correct, but other causes contributed both to this partial success and the partial defeat that immediately followed. Just at the time this expedition went to Lexington, the various Federal detachments north of the Missouri River were engaged in driving a number of secession guerrilla bands southward across that stream. Halleck was directing the joint movements of the Union troops, and had stationed detachments of Pope's forces south of the Missouri River, with the design of intercepting and capturing the fugitive bands. A slight failure of some of the reports to reach him disconcerted and partly frustrated his design. The earliest guerrilla parties which crossed at and near Lexington escaped and made their way to Price, but the later ones were intercepted and captured as Halleck had planned. Pope reports, September 19:

Colonel Davis came upon the enemy near Milford late this afternoon, and having driven in his pickets assaulted him in force. A brisk skirmish ensued, when the enemy, finding himself surrounded and cut off, surrendered at discretion. One thousand three hundred prisoners, including 3 colonels and 17 captains, 1000 stand of arms, 1000 horses, 65 wagons, tents, baggage, and supplies have fallen into our hands. Our loss is 2 killed and 8 wounded.*

On the next day he found his capture was still larger, as he telegraphs: "Just arrived here. Troops much embarrassed with nearly 2000 prisoners and great quantity of captured property."

In anticipation of the capture or dispersion of these north-western detachments of rebels, Halleck had directed the collection of an army at and about Rolla, with the view to move in force against Price. General Samuel R. Curtis was, on December 25, assigned to the command of the Union troops to operate in the south-western district of Missouri. Some 10,000 men were gathered to form his column; and had he known Price's actual condition, the possibility of a short and successful campaign was before him. But the situation

was also one of difficulty. The railroad ended at Rolla; Springfield, the supposed location of Price's camp, was a hundred and twenty miles to the south-west, with bad roads, through a mountainous country. Rebel sentiment and sympathy were strong throughout the whole region, and the favoring surroundings enabled Price to conceal his designs and magnify his numbers. Rumors came that he intended to fight at Springfield, and the estimates of his strength varied from 20,000 to 40,000. The greatest obstacle to a pursuit was the severity of the winter weather; nevertheless the Union soldiers bore their privations with admirable patience and fortitude, and Halleck urged a continuance of the movement through every hindrance and discouragement. He writes to McClellan, January 14, 1862:

I have ordered General Curtis to move forward, with all his infantry and artillery. His force will not be less than 12,000. The enemy is reported to have between 35 and 40 guns. General Curtis has only 24; but I send him 6 pieces to-morrow, and will send 6 more in a few days. I also propose placing a strong reserve at Rolla, which can be sent forward if necessary. The weather is intensely cold, and the troops, supplied as they are with very inferior clothing, blankets, and tents, must suffer greatly in a winter campaign, and yet I see no way of avoiding it. Unless Price is driven from the State, insurrections will continually occur in all the central and northern counties, so as to prevent the withdrawal of our troops.

A few days later (January 18) Halleck wrote to Curtis that he was about to reënforce him with an entire division from Pope's army, increasing his strength to fifteen thousand; that he would send him mittens for his soldiers:

Get as many hand-mills as you can for grinding corn. . . . Take the bull by the horns. I will back you in such forced requisitions when they become necessary for supplying the forces. We must have no failure in this movement against Price. It must be the last.

And once more, on January 27, he repeated his urgent admonition:

There is a strong pressure on us for troops, and all that are not absolutely necessary here must go elsewhere. Pope's command is entirely broken up; 4000 in Davis's reserve and 6000 ordered to Cairo. Push on as rapidly as possible and end the matter with Price.

This trying winter campaign led by General Curtis, though successful in the end, did not terminate so quickly as General Halleck had hoped. Leaving the heroic Western soldiers camping and scouting in the snows and cutting winds of the bleak Missouri hills and prairies, attention must be called to other incidents in the Department of the Missouri. While Halleck was gratifying the Government and the Northern public with the ability and

* Pope to Halleck. War Records.

vigor of his measures, one point of his administration had excited a wide-spread dissatisfaction and vehement criticism. His military instincts and methods were so thorough that they caused him to treat too lightly the political aspects of the great conflict in which he was directing so large a share. Frémont's treatment of the slavery question had been too radical; Halleck's now became too conservative. It is not probable that this grew out of his mere wish to avoid the error of his predecessor, but out of his own personal conviction that the issue must be entirely eliminated from the military problem. He had noted the difficulties and discussions growing out of the dealings of the army with fugitive slaves, and hoping to rid himself of a perpetual dilemma, one of his first acts after assuming command was to issue his famous General Order No. 3 (November 20, 1861), the first paragraph of which ran as follows:

It has been represented that important information respecting the numbers and condition of our forces is conveyed to the enemy by means of fugitive slaves who are admitted within our lines. In order to remedy this evil, it is directed that no such persons be hereafter permitted to enter the lines of any camp or of any forces on the march, and that any now within such lines be immediately excluded therefrom.*

This language brought upon him the indignant protest of the combined antislavery sentiment of the North. He was berated in newspapers and denounced in Congress, and the violence of public condemnation threatened seriously to impair his military usefulness. He had indeed gone too far. The country felt, and the army knew, that so far from being generally true that negroes carried valuable information to the enemy, the very reverse was the rule, and that the "contrabands" in reality constituted one of the most important and reliable sources of knowledge to the Union commanders in the various fields, which later in the war came to be jocosely designated as the "grape-vine telegraph." Halleck soon found himself put on the defensive, and wrote an explanatory letter to the newspapers. A little later he took occasion officially to define his intention:

The object of these orders is to prevent any person in the army from acting in the capacity of negro-catcher or negro-stealer. The relation between the slave and his master, or pretended master, is not a matter to be determined by military officers, except in the single case provided for by Congress. This matter in all other cases must be decided by the civil authorities. One object in keeping fugitive slaves out of our camp is to keep clear of all such questions. . . . Orders No. 3 do not apply to the authorized private servants of officers nor the negroes employed by proper author-

ity in the camps. It applies only to fugitive slaves. The prohibition to admit them within our lines does not prevent the exercise of all proper offices of humanity in giving them food and clothing outside where such offices are necessary to prevent suffering.†

It will be remembered that the Missouri State Convention in the month of July appointed and inaugurated a provisional State government. This action was merely designed to supply a temporary executive authority until the people could elect new loyal State officers, which election was ordered to be held on the first Monday in November. The convention also, when it finished the work of its summer session, adjourned to meet on the third Monday in December, 1861, but political and military affairs remained in so unsettled a condition during the whole autumn that anything like effective popular action was impracticable. The convention was therefore called together in a third session at an earlier date (October 11, 1861), when it wisely adopted an ordinance postponing the State election for the period of one year, and for continuing the provisional government in office until their successors should be duly appointed.

With his tenure of power thus prolonged, Governor Gamble, also by direction of the convention, proposed to the President to raise a special force of Missouri State militia for service within the State during the war there, but to act with the United States troops in military operations within the State or when necessary to its defense. President Lincoln accepted the plan upon the condition that whatever United States officer might be in command of the Department of the West should also be commissioned by the governor to command the Missouri State militia; and that if the President changed the former, the governor should make the corresponding change, in order that any conflict of authority or of military plans might be avoided. This agreement was entered into between President Lincoln and Governor Gamble on November 6, and on November 27 General Schofield received orders from Halleck to raise, organize, and command this special militia corps. The plan was attended with reasonable success, and by the 15th of April, 1862, General Schofield reports, "an active efficient force of 13,800 men was placed in the field," nearly all of cavalry.


The raising and organizing of this force, during the winter and spring of 1861-62, produced a certain degree of local military activity just at the season when the partisan and guerrilla operations of rebel sympathizers were necessarily impeded or wholly suspended by severe weather; and this, joined with the vigorous administration of General Hal-

* War Records.

† Halleck to Asboth, Dec. 26, 1861. *Ibid.*

leck, and the fact that Curtis was chasing the army of Price out of south-western Missouri, gave a delusive appearance of quiet and order throughout the State. We shall see how this security was rudely disturbed during the summer of 1862 by local efforts and uprisings, though the rebels were not able to bring about any formidable campaign of invasion, and Mis-

sion became, in the public estimation, rather a sign of suspicion than an assurance of honesty and good faith. It grew into one of the standing jests of the camps that when a Union soldier found a rattlesnake, his comrades would instantly propose with mock gravity, "Administer the oath to him, boys, and let him go."



souri as a whole remained immovable in her military and political adherence to the Union.

With the view still further to facilitate the restoration of public peace, the State convention at the same October (1861) session, extended amnesty to repentant rebels in an ordinance which provided that any person who would make and file a written oath to support the Federal and State governments, declaring that he would not take up arms against the United States, or the provisional government of Missouri, nor give aid and comfort to their enemies during the present civil war, should be exempt from arrest and punishment for previous rebellion.

Many persons doubtless took this oath and kept it with sincere faith. But it seems no less certain that many others who also took it so persistently violated both its spirit and letter as to render it practically of no service as an external test of allegiance to the Union. In the years of local hatred and strife which ensued, oaths were so recklessly taken and so willfully violated that the ceremony of adjura-

THE TENNESSEE LINE.

In the State of Kentucky the long game of political intrigue came to an end as the autumn of 1861 approached. By a change almost as sudden as a stage transformation-scene, the beginning of September brought a general military activity and a state of qualified civil war. This change grew naturally out of the military condition, which was no longer compatible with the uncertain and expectant attitude the State had hitherto maintained. The notes of preparation for Frémont's campaign down the Mississippi could not be ignored. Cairo had become a great military post, giving the Federal forces who held it a strategical advantage both for defense and offense against which the Confederates had no corresponding foothold on the great river. The first defensive work was Fort Pillow, 215 miles below, armed with only twelve 32-pounders. To oppose a more formidable resistance to Frémont's descent was of vital importance, which General

Polk's West Point education enabled him to realize.

But the Mississippi, with its generally level banks, afforded relatively few points capable of effective defense. The one most favorable to the Confederate needs was at Columbus, in the State of Kentucky, eighteen miles below Cairo, on a high bluff commanding the river for about five miles. Both the Union and Confederate commanders coveted this situation, for its natural advantages were such that when fully fortified it became familiarly known as the "Gibraltar of the West." So far, through the neutrality policy of Kentucky, it had remained unappropriated by either side. On the first day of September, the rebel General Polk, commanding at Memphis, sent a messenger to Governor Magoffin to obtain confidential information about the "future plans and policy of the Southern party in Kentucky," explaining his desire to "be ahead of the enemy in occupying Columbus and Paducah." Buckner at the same time was in Richmond, proposing to the Confederate authorities certain military movements in Kentucky, "in advance of the action of her governor." On September 3 they promised him, as definitely as they could, countenance and assistance in his scheme; and a week after, he accepted a brigadier-general's commission from Jefferson Davis. While Buckner was negotiating, General Polk initiated the rebel invasion of Kentucky. Whether upon information from Governor Magoffin or elsewhere, he ordered Pillow with his detachment of six thousand men to cross the river from New Madrid and occupy the town of Columbus.

The Confederate movement created a general flurry in neutrality circles. Numerous protests went to both Polk and the Richmond authorities, and Governor Harris hastened to assure Governor Magoffin that he was in entire ignorance of it, and had appealed to Jefferson Davis to order the troops withdrawn. Even the rebel Secretary of War was mystified by the report, and directed Polk to order the troops withdrawn from Kentucky. Jefferson Davis however, either with prior knowledge or with truer instinct, telegraphed to Polk: "The necessity justifies the action."* In his letter to Davis, the general strongly argued the propriety of his course: "I believe, if we could have found a respectable pretext, it would have been better to have seized this place some months ago, as I am convinced we had more friends than in Kentucky than we have had since, and every hour's delay made against us. Kentucky was fast

melting away under the influence of the Lincoln Government." He had little need to urge this view. Jefferson Davis had already written him, "We cannot permit the indeterminate quantities, the political elements, to control our action in cases of military necessity"; † and to Governor Harris, "Security to Tennessee and other parts of the Confederacy is the primary object. To this all else must give way." ‡

To strengthen further and consolidate the important military enterprises thus begun, Jefferson Davis now adopted a recommendation of Polk that

They should be combined from west to east across the Mississippi Valley, and placed under the direction of one head, and that head should have large discretionary powers. Such a position is one of very great responsibility, involving and requiring large experience and extensive military knowledge, and I know of no one so well equal to that task as our friend General Albert S. Johnston.

Johnston, with the rank of general, was duly assigned, on September 10, to the command of Department No. 2, covering in general the States of Tennessee, Arkansas, part of Mississippi, Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian Territory. Proceeding at once to Nashville and conferring with the local authorities, he wrote back to Richmond, under date of September 16:

So far from yielding to the demand for the withdrawal of our troops, I have determined to occupy Bowling Green at once. . . . I design to-morrow (which is the earliest practicable moment) to take possession of Bowling Green with five thousand troops, and prepare to support the movement with such force as circumstances may indicate and the means at my command may allow.

The movement was promptly carried out. Buckner was put in command of the expedition; and seizing several railroad trains, he moved forward to Bowling Green on the morning of the 18th, having sent ahead five hundred men to occupy Munfordville, and issuing the usual proclamation, that his invasion was a measure of defense. Meanwhile the third column of invaders entered eastern Kentucky through Cumberland Gap. Brigadier-General Zollicoffer had eight or ten thousand men under his command in eastern Tennessee, but, as elsewhere, much scattered, and badly armed and supplied. Under his active supervision, during the month of August he somewhat improved the organization of his forces and acquainted himself with the intricate topography of the mountain region he was in. Prompted probably from Kentucky, he was ready early in September to join in the combined movement into that State. About the 10th he advanced with six regiments through

* Davis to Polk, Sept. 4, 1861. War Records.

† Davis to Polk, Sept. 15, 1861. *Ibid.*

‡ Davis to Harris, Sept. 13, 1861. *Ibid.*

Cumberland Gap to Cumberland Ford, and began planning further aggressive movements against the small Union force, principally Home Guards, which had been collected and organized at Camp Dick Robinson.

The strong Union legislature which Kentucky elected in August met in Frankfort, the capital, on the 2d of September. Polk, having securely established himself at Columbus, notified the governor of his presence, and offered as his only excuse the alleged intention of the Federal troops to occupy it. The legislature, not deeming the excuse sufficient, passed a joint resolution instructing the governor "to inform those concerned that Kentucky expects the Confederate or Tennessee troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally."* The governor vetoed the resolution, on the ground that it did not also embrace the Union troops; the legislature passed it over his veto. Governor Magoffin now issued his proclamation, as directed. Polk and Jefferson Davis replied that the Confederate army would withdraw if the Union army would do the same. To this the legislature responded with another joint resolution, that the conditions prescribed were an insult to the dignity of the State, "to which Kentucky cannot listen without dishonor," and "that the invaders must be expelled." The resolution further required General Robert Anderson to take instant command, with authority to call out a volunteer force, in all of which the governor was required to lend his aid. Kentucky was thus officially taken out of her false attitude of neutrality, and placed in active coöperation with the Federal Government to maintain the Union. Every day increased the strength and zeal of her assistance. A little later in the session a law was enacted declaring enlistments under the Confederate flag a misdemeanor and the invasion of Kentucky by Confederate soldiers a felony, and prescribing heavy penalties for both. Finally, the legislature authorized the enlistment of forty thousand volunteers to "repel invasion," providing also that they should be mustered into the service of the United States and coöperate with the armies of the Union. This was a complete revolution from the anti-coercion resolutions that the previous legislature had passed in January.

Hitherto there were no Federal forces in Kentucky except the brigade which Lieutenant Nelson had organized at Camp Dick Robinson; the Home Guards in various counties, though supplied with arms by the Federal Government, were acting under State militia laws. General Robert Anderson, commanding the military department which embraced Kentucky, still kept his headquarters

* War Records.

at Cincinnati, and Rousseau, a prominent Kentuckian, engaged in organizing a brigade of Kentuckians, had purposely made his camp on the Indiana side of the Ohio River. Nevertheless President Lincoln, the governors of Ohio and Indiana, and the various military commanders had for months been ready to go to the assistance of the Kentucky Unionists whenever the emergency should arise. Even if the neutral attitude of Kentucky had not been brought to an end by the advance of the Confederate forces, it would have been by that of the Federals. A point had been reached where further inaction was impossible. Three days before General Pillow occupied Hickman, Frémont sent General Grant to south-eastern Missouri, to concentrate the several Federal detachments, drive out the enemy, and destroy a rumored rebel battery at Belmont. His order says finally, "It is intended, in connection with all these movements, to occupy Columbus, Kentucky, as soon as possible." It was in executing a part of this order that the gun-boats sent to Belmont extended their reconnaissance down the river, and discovered the advance of the Confederates on the Kentucky shore. An unexpected delay in the movement of one of Grant's detachments occurred at the same time; and that commander, with the military intuition which afterward rendered him famous, postponed the continuance of the local operations in Missouri, and instead immediately prepared an expedition into Kentucky, which became the initial step of his brilliant and fruitful campaign in that direction a few months later. He saw that Columbus, his primary objective point, was lost for the present; but he also perceived that another, of perhaps equal strategical value, yet lay within his grasp, though clearly there was no time to be wasted in seizing it. The gun-boat reconnaissance on the Mississippi River, which revealed the rebel occupation of Kentucky, was begun on September 4. On the following day General Grant, having telegraphed the information to Frémont and to the Kentucky legislature, hurriedly organized an expedition of 2 gun-boats, 1800 men, 16 cannon for batteries, and a supply of provisions and ammunition on transports. Taking personal command, he started with the expedition from Cairo at midnight of the 5th, and proceeded up the Ohio River to the town of Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, where he arrived on the morning of the 6th. A contraband trade with the rebels, by means of small steamboats plying on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, had called special attention to the easy communication between this point and central Tennessee. He landed without opposition and took possession, making

arrangements to fortify and permanently hold the place; having done which, he himself returned to Cairo the same afternoon, to report his advance and forward reinforcements. The importance of the seizure was appreciated by the rebels, for, on the 13th of September, Buckner wrote to Richmond, "Our possession of Columbus is already neutralized by that of Paducah."

The culmination of affairs in Kentucky had been carefully watched by the authorities in Washington. From a conference with President Lincoln, Anderson returned to Cincinnati on September 1, taking with him two subordinates of exceptional ability, Brigadier-Generals Sherman and Thomas. A delegation of prominent Kentuckians met him, to set forth the critical condition of their State. He dispatched Sherman to solicit help from Frémont and the governors of Indiana and Illinois, and a week later moved his headquarters to Louisville, also sending Thomas to Camp Dick Robinson, to take direction of affairs in that quarter. By the time that Sherman returned from his mission the crisis had already developed itself. The appearance of Polk's forces at Columbus, the action of the legislature, the occupation of Paducah by Grant, and the threatening rumors from Buckner's camp, created a high degree of excitement and apprehension. On September 16 Anderson reported Zollicoffer's invasion through Cumberland Gap, upon which the President telegraphed him to assume active command in Kentucky at once. Added to this, there came to Louisville on the 18th the positive news of Buckner's advance to Bowling Green. This information set all central Kentucky in a military ferment; for the widely published announcement that the State Guards, Buckner's secession militia, would meet at Lexington on September 20, to have a camp drill under supervision of Breckinridge, Humphrey Marshall, and other leaders, seemed too plainly coincident with the triple invasion to be designed for a mere holiday. A rising at Lexington and a junction with Zollicoffer might end in a march upon Frankfort, the capital, to disperse the legislature; a simultaneous advance by Buckner in force and capture of Louisville would, in a brief campaign, complete the subjugation of Kentucky to the rebellion. There remains no record to show whether or not such a plan was among the movements, "in advance of the governor's action," which Buckner discussed with Jefferson Davis on September 3 at Richmond. The bare possibility roused the Unionists of Kentucky to vigorous action. With an evident distrust of Governor Magoffin, a caucus of the Union members of the legislature as-

sumed quasi-executive authority, and through the speakers of the two Houses requested General Thomas, at Camp Dick Robinson, to send a regiment, "fully prepared for fight," to Lexington in advance of the advertised "camp drill" of the State Guards; also promising that the Home Guards should rally in force to support him. Thomas ordered the movement, and, in spite of numerous obstacles, Colonel Bramlette brought his regiment to the Lexington fair ground on the night of the 19th of September. His advent was so sudden that he came near making important arrests. Breckinridge, Humphrey Marshall, Morgan, and other leaders were present, but, being warned, fled in different directions, and the "camp drill," shorn of its guiding spirits, proved powerless for the mischievous ends which had evidently been intended.

At Louisville, General Anderson lost no time in the effort to meet Buckner's advance. There were no organized troops in the city, but the brigade Rousseau had been collecting on the Indiana shore was hastily called across the river and joined to the Louisville Home Guards, making in all some 2500 men, who were sent out by the railroad towards Nashville, under the personal command of Sherman. An expedition of the enemy had already burned the important railroad bridges, apparently, however, with the simple object of creating delay. Nevertheless, Sherman went on and occupied Muldraugh's Hill, where he was soon reinforced; for the utmost efforts had been used by the governors of Ohio and Indiana to send to the help of Kentucky every available regiment. If Buckner meditated the capture of Louisville, this show of force caused him to pause; but he remained firm at Bowling Green, also increasing his army, and ready to take part in whatever movement events might render feasible.

No serious or decisive conflicts immediately followed these various moves on the military chess-board. For the present they served merely to define the hostile frontier. With Polk at Columbus, Buckner at Bowling Green, and Zollicoffer in front of Cumberland Gap, the Confederate frontier was practically along the northern Tennessee line. The Union line ran irregularly through the center of Kentucky. One direct result was rapidly to eliminate the armed secessionists. Humphrey Marshall, Breckinridge, and others who had set up rebel camps hastened with their followers within the protection of the Confederate line. Before further operations occurred, a change of Union commanders took place. The excitement, labors, and responsibilities proved too great for the physical strength of General Anderson. Relieved at his own re-

quest, on October 8, he relinquished the command to General Sherman, who was designated by General Scott to succeed him. The new and heavy duties which fell upon him were by no means to Sherman's liking. "I am forced into the command of this Department against my will," he wrote. Looking at his field with a purely professional eye, the disproportion between the magnitude of his task and the immediate means for its accomplishment oppressed him like a nightmare. There were no troops in Kentucky when he came. The recruits sent from other States were gradually growing into an army, but as yet without drill, equipments, or organization. Kentucky herself was in a curious transition. By vote of her people and her legislature, she had decided to adhere to the Union; but as a practical incident of war, many of her energetic and adventurous young men drifted to Southern camps, while the Union property-holders and heads of families were unfit or unwilling immediately to enlist in active service to sustain the cause they had espoused. The Home Guards, called into service for ten days, generally refused to extend their term. The arms furnished them became easily scattered, and, even if not seized or stolen by young secession recruits and carried to the enemy, were with difficulty recovered for use. Now that the General Government had assumed command and the State had ordered an army, many neighborhoods felt privileged to call for protection rather than furnish a quota for offense. Even where they were ready to serve, the enlistment of the State volunteers, recently authorized by the legislature, had yet scarcely begun.

About the middle of October, Mr. Cameron, Secretary of War, returning from a visit to Frémont, passed through Louisville and held a military consultation with Sherman. General Sherman writes:

I remember taking a large map of the United States, and assuming the people of the whole South to be in rebellion, that our task was to subdue them, showed that McClellan was on the left, having a frontage of less than 100 miles, and Frémont the right, about the same; whereas I, the center, had from the Big Sandy to Paducah, over 300 miles of frontier; that McClellan had 100,000 men, Frémont 60,000, whereas to me had only been allotted about 18,000. I argued that for the purpose of defense we should have 60,000 men at once, and for offense would need 200,000 before we were done. Mr. Cameron, who still lay on the bed, threw up his hands and exclaimed, "Great God! where are they to come from?" I asserted that there were plenty of men at the North, ready and willing to come if he would only accept their services; for it was notorious that regiments had been formed in all the North-western States whose services had been refused by the War Department, on the ground that they would not be needed. We discussed all these matters fully,

in the most friendly spirit, and I thought I had aroused Mr. Cameron to a realization of the great war that was before us, and was in fact upon us.*

While recognizing many of the needs which Sherman pointed out, the Secretary could not immediately promise him any great augmentation of his force.

Complaints and requests of this character were constantly coming to the Administration from all the commanders and governors, and a letter of President Lincoln, written in reply to a similar strain of fault-finding from Indiana, plainly indicates why such requirements in all quarters could not be immediately supplied:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 29, 1861.

HIS EXCELLENCY GOV. O. P. MORTON: Your letter by the hand of Mr. Prunk was received yesterday. I write this letter because I wish you to believe of us (as we certainly believe of you) that we are doing the very best we can. You do not receive arms from us as fast as you need them; but it is because we have not near enough to meet all the pressing demands, and we are obliged to share around what we have, sending the larger share to the points which appear to need them most. We have great hope that our own supply will be ample before long, so that you and all others can have as many as you need. I see an article in an Indianapolis newspaper denouncing me for not answering your letter sent by special messenger two or three weeks ago. I did make what I thought the best answer I could to that letter. As I remember, it asked for ten heavy guns to be distributed with some troops at Lawrenceburgh, Madison, New Albany, and Evansville; and I ordered the guns and directed you to send the troops if you had them. As to Kentucky, you do not estimate that State as more important than I do; but I am compelled to watch all points. While I write this I am if not in *range* at least in *hearing* of cannon shot, from an army of enemies more than a hundred thousand strong. I do not expect them to capture this city; but I know they would if I were to send the men and arms from here to defend Louisville, of which there is not a single hostile armed soldier within forty miles, nor any force known to be moving upon it from any distance. It is true the army in our front may make a half-circle around southward and move on Louisville; but when they do, we will make a half-circle around northward and meet them; and in the mean time we will get up what forces we can from other sources to also meet them.

I hope Zollicoffer has left Cumberland Gap (though I fear he has not), because, if he has, I rather infer he did it because of his dread of Camp Dick Robinson, reinforced from Cincinnati, moving on him, than because of his intention to move on Louisville. But if he does go round and reinforce Buckner, let Dick Robinson come round and reinforce Sherman, and the thing is substantially as it was when Zollicoffer left Cumberland Gap. I state this as an illustration; for in fact I think if the Gap is left open to us Dick Robinson should take it and hold it; while Indiana, and the vicinity of Louisville in Kentucky, can reinforce Sherman faster than Zollicoffer can Buckner. . . .

Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN.†

The conjectures of the President proved substantially correct. Great as was the need of arms for Union regiments, the scarcity among the rebels was much greater. Of the 30,000

* Sherman, "Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 203.

† Unpublished MS.

stands which Johnston asked for when he assumed command, the rebel War Department could only send him 1000. Ammunition and supplies were equally wanting. He called out 50,000 volunteers from Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas, but reënforcements from this and other sources were slow. His greatest immediate help came by transferring Hardee with his division from Missouri to Bowling Green. If, as Sherman surmised, a concentration of his detachments would have enabled him to make a successful march on Louisville, he was unwilling to take the risk. The contingency upon which the rebel invasion was probably based, the expected rising in Kentucky, had completely failed. Johnston wrote to Richmond:

We have received but little accession to our ranks since the Confederate forces crossed the line; in fact, no such enthusiastic demonstration as to justify any movements not warranted by our ability to maintain our own communications.*

One of his recruiting brigadiers wrote:

The Kentuckians still come in small squads; I have induced the most of them to go in for the war. This requires about three speeches a day. When thus stirred up they go, almost to a man. Since I have found that I can't be a general, I have turned recruiting agent and sensation speaker for the brief period that I shall remain.†

For the present Johnston's policy was purely defensive; he directed Cumberland Gap to be fortified, and completed the works at Columbus, "to meet the probable flotilla from the North, supposed to carry two hundred heavy guns," while Buckner was vigorously admonished to "Hold on to Bowling Green." He made this order when Buckner had six thousand men; but even when that number was doubled, after the arrival of Hardee, Johnston was occupied with calculations for defense and asking for further reënforcements.‡

LINCOLN DIRECTS COÖPERATION.

At the beginning of December, 1861, the President was forced to turn his serious personal attention to army matters. Except to organize, drill, and review the Army of the Potomac, to make an unfruitful reconnaissance and to suffer the lamentable Ball's Bluff disaster, McClellan had nothing to show for his six months of local and two months of chief command. The splendid autumn weather, the wholesome air and dry roads, had come and gone. Rain, snow, and mud, crippling clogs to military movements in all lands and

epochs, were to be expected for a quarter if not for half of the coming year. Worse than all, McClellan had fallen seriously ill. With most urgent need of early action, every prospect of securing it seemed to be thus cut off. In this dilemma Lincoln turned to the Western commanders. "General McClellan is sick," he telegraphed to Halleck on the last day of the year. "Are General Buell and yourself in concert?" The following day, being New Year's, he repeated his inquiry, or rather his prompting suggestion, that, McClellan being incapable of work, Buell and Halleck should at once establish a vigorous and hearty co-operation. Their replies were not specially promising. "There is no arrangement between General Halleck and myself," responded Buell, adding that he depended on McClellan for instructions to this end; while Halleck said, "I have never received a word from General Buell. I am not ready to coöperate with him"; adding, in his turn, that he had written to McClellan, and that too much haste would ruin everything. Plainly, therefore, the military machine, both East and West, was not only at a complete standstill, but was without a programme.

Of what avail, then, were McClellan's office and function of General-in-Chief, if such a contingency revealed either his incapacity or his neglect? The force of this question is immensely increased when we see how in the same episode McClellan's acts followed Lincoln's suggestions. However silent and confiding in the skill and energy of his generals, the President had studied the military situation with unremitting diligence. In his telegram of December 31 to Halleck, he started a pregnant inquiry. "When he [Buell] moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reënforced from Columbus?" And he asked the same question at the same time of Buell. Halleck seems to have had no answer to make; Buell sent the only reply that was possible: "There is nothing to prevent Bowling Green being reënforced from Columbus if a military force is not brought to bear on the latter place."

Lincoln was not content to permit this know-nothing and do-nothing policy to continue. "I have just been with General McClellan, and he is much better," he wrote the day after New Year's; and in this interview the necessity for action and the telegrams from the Western commanders were fully discussed, as becomes evident from the fact that the following day McClellan wrote a letter to Halleck containing an earnest suggestion to remedy the neglect and need pointed out by Lincoln's dispatch of December 31. In this letter McClellan advised an expedition up the Cumberland River, a dem-

* War Records.

† Alcorn to Buckner, Oct. 21, 1861. *Ibid.*

‡ Johnston to Cooper, Oct. 17, 1861. *Ibid.*

onstration on Columbus, and a feint on the Tennessee River, all for the purpose of preventing reënforcements from joining Buckner and Johnston at Bowling Green, whom Buell was preparing to attack.

Meanwhile Lincoln's dispatch of inquiry had renewed the attention, and perhaps aroused the ambition, of Buell. He and Halleck had, after Lincoln's prompting, interchanged dispatches about concerted action. Halleck reported a withdrawal of troops from Missouri "almost impossible"; to which Buell replied that "the great power of the rebellion in the West is arrayed" on a line from Columbus to Bowling Green, and that two gun-boat expeditions with a support of 20,000 men should attack its center by way of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and that "whatever is done should be done speedily, within a few days." Halleck, however, did not favorably entertain the proposition. His reply discussed an altogether different question. He said it would be madness for him with his forces to attempt any serious operation against Camp Beauregard or Columbus; and that if Buell's Bowling Green movement required his help it ought to be delayed a few weeks, when he could probably furnish some troops. Leaving altogether unanswered Buell's suggestion for the movement up the Cumberland and the Tennessee, Halleck stated his strong disapproval of the Bowling Green movement, and on the same day he repeated these views a little more fully in a letter to the President. Premising that he could not at the present time withdraw any troops from Missouri, "without risking the loss of this State," he said:

I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations, never having received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign. If it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while another moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run. To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central position will fail, as it always has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. It is condemned by every military authority I have ever read. General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.

Lincoln, finding in these replies but a continuation of not only the system of delay, but also the want of plans, and especially of energetic joint action, which had thus far in a majority of cases marked the operations of the various commanders, was not disposed further to allow matters to remain in such unfruitful conditions. Under his prompting McClellan, on this same 6th of January, wrote to

Buell, "Halleck, from his own account, will not soon be in a condition to support properly a movement up the Cumberland. Why not make the movement independently of and without waiting for that?" And on the next day Lincoln followed this inquiry with a still more energetic monition: "Please name as early a day as you safely can, on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Major-General Halleck. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have something definite. I send a like dispatch to Major-General Halleck." This somewhat peremptory order seems to have brought nothing except a reply from Halleck: "I have asked General Buell to designate a day for a demonstration to assist him. It is all I can do till I get arms." Three days later, Halleck's already quoted letter of the 6th reached Washington by mail, and after its perusal the President indorsed upon it, with a heart-sickness easily discernible in the words, "The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done."

Nevertheless, something was being done: very little at the moment, it is true, but enough to form the beginning of momentous results. On the same day on which Halleck had written the discouraging letter commented upon above by the President, he had also transmitted to Grant at Cairo the direction, "I wish you to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray." The object was, as he further explained, to prevent reënforcements being sent to Buckner at Bowling Green. He was to threaten Camp Beauregard and Murray, to create the impression that not only was Dover (Fort Donelson) to be attacked, but that a great army to be gathered in the West was to sweep down towards Nashville, his own column being merely an advance guard. Flag-Officer Foote was to assist by a gun-boat demonstration. "Be very careful, however," added Halleck, "to avoid a battle; we are not ready for that; but cut off detached parties and give your men a little experience in skirmishing."

If Halleck's order for a demonstration against Mayfield and Murray, creating an indirect menace to Columbus and Dover, had gone to an unwilling or negligent officer, he could have found in his surrounding conditions abundant excuses for evasion or non-compliance. There existed at Cairo, as at every other army post, large or small, lack of officers, of organization, of arms, of equipments, of transportation, of that multitude of things considered necessary to the efficiency of moving troops. But in the West the sudden increase of armies brought to command,

and to direction and management, a large proportion of civilians, lacking methodical instruction and experience, which was without question a serious defect, but which left them free to invent and to adopt whatever expedients circumstances might suggest, or which rendered them satisfied, and willing to enter upon undertakings amidst a want of preparation and means that better information might have deemed indispensable.

The detailed reports and orders of the expedition we are describing clearly indicate these latter characteristics. We learn from them that the weather was bad, the roads heavy, the quartermaster's department and transportation deficient, and the gun-boats without adequate crews. Yet nowhere does it appear that these things were treated as impediments. Halleck's instructions dated January 6 were received by Grant on the morning of the 8th, and his answer was that immediate preparations were being made for carrying them out, and that Flag-Officer Foote would cooperate with three gun-boats. "The continuous rains for the last week or more," says Grant, "have rendered the roads extremely bad, and will necessarily make our movement slow. This however will operate worse upon the enemy, if he should come out to meet us, than upon us." The movement began on the evening of January 9, and its main delay occurred through Halleck's orders. It was fully resumed on the 12th. Brigadier-General McClelland, with five thousand men, marched southward, generally parallel to the Mississippi River, to Mayfield, midway between Fort Henry and Columbus, and pushed a reconnaissance closely up to the latter place. Brigadier-General Smith, starting from Paducah, marched a strong column southward, generally parallel to the Tennessee River, to Calloway, near Fort Henry. Foote and Grant, with three gun-boats, two of them new iron-clads, ascended the Tennessee to Fort Henry, drew the fire of the fort, and threw several shells into the works. It is needless to describe the routes, the precautions, the marching and counter-marching to mystify the enemy. While the rebels were yet expecting a further advance, the several detachments were already well on their return. "The expedition," says Grant, "if it had no other effect, served as a fine reconnaissance." But it had more positive results. Fort Henry and Columbus were thoroughly alarmed and drew in their outposts, while the Union forces learned from inspection that the route offered a feasible line of march to attack and invest Columbus, and demonstrated the inherent weakness and vulnerability of Fort Henry. This, be it remembered, was done with raw forces and

without preparation, but with officers and men responding alike promptly to every order and executing their task more than cheerfully, even eagerly, with such means as were at hand when the order came. "The reconnaissance thus made," reports McClelland, "completed a march of 140 miles by the cavalry, and 75 miles by the infantry, over icy or miry roads, during a most inclement season." He further reports that the circumstances of the case "prevented me from taking, on leaving Cairo, the five-days' supply of rations and forage directed by the commanding officer of this district; hence the necessity of an early resort to other sources of supply. None other presented but to quarter upon the enemy or to purchase from loyal citizens. I accordingly resorted to both expedients as I had opportunity."

Lincoln's prompting did not end with merely having produced this reconnaissance. The President's patience was well-nigh exhausted; and while his uneasiness drove him to no act of rashness, it caused him to repeat his admonitions and suggestions. In addition to his telegrams and letters to the Western commanders between December 31 and January 6, he once more wrote to both, on January 13, to point out how advantage might be taken of the military condition as it then existed. Halleck had emphasized the danger of moving on "exterior lines," and insisted that it was merely repeating the error committed at Bull Run and would as inevitably produce disaster. Lincoln in his letter shows that the defeat at Bull Run did not result from movement on exterior lines, but from failure to use exterior lines with judgment and concert; and he further illustrated how the Western armies might now, by judicious cooperation, secure important military results.

MY DEAR SIR: * Your dispatch of yesterday is received, in which you say, "I have received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote all my efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares I have not seen nor asked to see General McClellan's letter to you. For my own views, I have not offered, and do not now offer, them as orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do. With this preliminary, I state my general idea of this war to be, that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no

* This letter was addressed to Buell, but a copy of it was also sent to Halleck. [War Records.]

change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much. To illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ran away to reënforce Manassas, we had forborne to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. I mention this to illustrate, not to criticize. I did not lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than some others seem to. In application of the general rule I am suggesting, every particular case will have its modifying circumstances, among which the most constantly present and most difficult to meet will be the want of perfect knowledge of the enemy's movements. This had its part in the Bull Run case; but worse in that case was the expiration of the terms of the three-months' men. Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus and "down river" generally, while you menace Bowling Green and east Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either; but seize Columbus and east Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and one which I am sure you will not overlook, that the east Tennessee line is so long and over so bad a road.

Buell made no reply to this letter of Lincoln's; but Halleck sent an indirect answer a week later, in a long letter to General McClellan, under date of January 20. The communication is by no means a model of correspondence when we remember that it emanates from a trained writer upon military science. It is long and somewhat rambling; it finds fault with politics and politicians in war, in evident ignorance of both politics and politicians. It charges that past want of success "is attributable to the politicians rather than to the generals," in plain contradiction of the actual facts. It condemns "pepper-box strategy," and recommends detached operations in the same breath. The more noticeable point of the letter is that, while reiterating that the General-in-Chief had furnished no general plan, and while the principal commanders had neither unity of views nor concert of action, it ventures, though somewhat feebly, to recommend a combined system of operations for the West. Says Halleck, in this letter:

The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam is, in my opinion, impracticable, or at least premature. It is not a proper line of operations, at least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the first objective point. This would turn Columbus and force the abandonment of Bowling Green. . . . This line of the Cumberland or Tennessee is the great central line of the western theater of war, with the Ohio below the mouth of Green River as the base, and two good navigable rivers extending far into the interior of the theater of operations. But the plan should not be attempted without a large force—not less than 60,000 effective men.

The idea was by no means new. Buell had tentatively suggested it to McClellan as early as November 27; McClellan had asked further details about it December 5; Buell had

again specifically elaborated it, "as the most important strategical point in the whole field of operations," to McClellan on December 29, and as the "center" of the rebellion front in the West, to Halleck on January 3. Yet, recognizing this line as the enemy's chief weakness, McClellan at Washington, Buell at Louisville, and Halleck at St. Louis, holding the President's unlimited trust and authority, had allowed nearly two months to elapse, directing the Government power to other objects, to the neglect, not alone of military success, but of plans of coöperation, of counsel, of intention to use this great and recognized military advantage, until the country was fast losing confidence and even hope. Even now Halleck did not propose immediately to put his theory into practice. Like Buell, he was calling for more troops for the "politicians" to supply. It is impossible to guess when he might have been ready to move on his great strategic line, if subordinate officers, more watchful and enterprising, had not in a measure forced the necessity upon his attention.

GRANT AND THOMAS IN KENTUCKY.

IN the early stage of military organization in the West, when so many volunteer colonels were called to immediate active duty in the field, the West Point education of Grant and his practical campaign training in the Mexican war made themselves immediately felt and appreciated at the department headquarters. His usefulness and superiority were at once evident by the clearness and brevity of his correspondence, the correctness of routine reports and promptness of their transmission, the pertinence and practical quality of his suggestions, the readiness and fertility of expedient with which he executed orders. Any one reading over his letters of this first period of his military service is struck by the fact that through him something was always accomplished. There was absence of excuse, complaint, or delay; always the report of a task performed. If his means or supplies were imperfect, he found or improvised the best available substitute; if he could not execute the full requirement, he performed so much of it as was possible. He always had an opinion, and that opinion was positive, intelligible, practical. We find therefore that his allotted tasks from the very first rose continually in importance. He gained in authority and usefulness, not by solicitation or intrigue, but by services rendered. He was sent to more and more difficult duties, to larger supervision, to heavier responsibilities. From guarding a station at Mexico on the North

Missouri railroad, to protecting a railroad terminus at Ironton in south-east Missouri; from there to brief inspection duty at Jefferson City, then to the command of the military district of south-east Missouri; finally to the command of the great military depot and rendezvous at Cairo, Illinois, with its several outlying posts and districts, and the supervision of its complicated details about troops, arms, and supplies to be collected and forwarded in all directions,—clearly it was not chance which brought him to such duties, but his fitness to perform them. It was from the vantage ground of this enlarged command that he had checkmated the rebel occupation of Columbus, by immediately seizing Paducah and Smithland. And from Cairo also he organized and led his first experiment in field fighting, at what is known as the battle of Belmont.

Just before Frémont was relieved, and while he was in the field in nominal pursuit of Price, he had ordered Grant to clear south-eastern Missouri of guerrillas, with the double view of restoring local authority and preventing reinforcements to Price. Movements were in progress to this end when it became apparent that the rebel stronghold at Columbus was preparing to send out a column.

Grant organized an expedition to counteract this design, and on the evening of November 6 left Cairo with about 3000 men on transports, under convoy of 2 gun-boats, and steamed down the river. Upon information gained while on his route, he determined to break up a rebel camp at Belmont Landing, on the Missouri shore opposite Columbus, as the best means of making his expedition effective. On the morning of the 7th he had landed his troops at Hunter's Point, three miles above Belmont, and marched to a favorable place for attack back of the rebel encampment, which was situated in a large open field and was protected on the land side by a line of abatis. By the time Grant reached his position the rebel camp, originally consisting of a single regiment, had been reinforced by four regiments under General Pillow, from Columbus. A deliberate battle, with about equal forces, ensued. Though the Confederate line courageously contested the ground, the Union line, steadily advancing, swept the rebels back, penetrating the abatis and gaining the camp of the enemy, who took shelter in disorder under the steep river-bank. Grant's troops had gained a complete and substantial victory, but they now frittered it away by a disorderly exultation, and a greedy plunder of the camp they had stormed. The record does not show who was responsible for the unmilitary conduct, but it quickly brought its

retribution. Before the Unionists were aware of it, General Polk had brought an additional reinforcement of several regiments across the river and hurriedly marched them to cut off the Federal retreat, which, instead of an orderly march from the battle-field, became a hasty scramble to get out of danger. Grant himself, unaware that the few companies left as a guard near the landing had already embarked, remained on shore to find them, and encountered instead the advancing rebel line. Discovering his mistake, he rode back to the landing, where "his horse slid down the river-bank on its haunches and trotted on board a transport over a plank thrust out for him."* Belmont was a drawn battle; or, rather, it was first a victory for the Federals and then a victory for the Confederates. The courage and the loss were nearly equal: 79 killed and 289 wounded on the Union side; 105 killed and 419 wounded on the Confederate side.

Brigadier-General McClelland, second in command in the battle of Belmont, was a fellow-townsmen of the President, and to him Lincoln wrote the following letter of thanks and encouragement to the troops engaged:

This is not an official but a social letter. You have had a battle, and without being able to judge as to the precise measure of its value, I think it is safe to say that you, and all with you, have done honor to yourselves and the flag, and service to the country. Most gratefully do I thank you and them. In my present position, I must care for the whole nation; but I hope it will be no injustice to any other State for me to indulge a little home pride, that Illinois does not disappoint us. I have just closed a long interview with Mr. Washburne, in which he has detailed the many difficulties you and those with you labor under. Be assured, we do not forget or neglect you. Much, very much, goes undone; but it is because we have not the power to do it faster than we do. Some of your forces are without arms; but the same is true here, and at every other place where we have considerable bodies of troops. The plain matter-of-fact is, our good people have rushed to the rescue of the Government faster than the Government can find arms to put into their hands. It would be agreeable to each division of the army to know its own precise destination; but the Government cannot immediately, nor inflexibly at any time, determine as to all; nor, if determined, can it tell its friends without at the same time telling its enemies. We know you do all as wisely and well as you can; and you will not be deceived if you conclude the same is true of us. Please give my respects and thanks to all.†

Belmont having been a mere episode, it drew after it no further movement in that direction. Grant and his command resumed their routine work of neighborhood police and observation. Buell and Halleck, both coming to their departments as new commanders shortly afterward, were absorbed with difficulties at other points. Secession was not yet

* Force, "From Fort Henry to Corinth," p. 23.

† Lincoln to McClelland, Nov. 10, 1861. Unpublished MS.

quieted in Kentucky. The Union troops at Cairo, Paducah, Smithland, and other river towns yet stood on the defensive, fearing rebel attack rather than preparing to attack rebels. Columbus and Bowling Green were the principal Confederate camps, and attracted and received the main attention from the Union commanders.

The first noteworthy occurrence following Belmont, as well as the beginning of the succession of brilliant Union victories which distinguished the early months of the year 1862, was the battle of Mill Springs, in eastern Kentucky. It had been the earnest desire of President Lincoln that a Union column should be sent to seize and hold east Tennessee, and General McClellan had urged such movement upon General Buell in several dispatches almost preemptory in their tone. At first Buell seemed to entertain the idea and promised compliance; but as his army increased in strength and discipline his plans and hopes centered themselves in an advance against Bowling Green, with the design to capture Nashville. General Thomas remained posted in eastern Kentucky, hoping that he might be called upon to form his column and lead it through the Cumberland Gap to Knoxville; but the weeks passed by, and the orders which he received only tended to scatter his few regiments for local defense and observation. With the hesitation of the Union army at this point, the Confederates became bolder. Zollicoffer established himself in a fortified camp on the north bank of the Cumberland River, where he could at the same time defend Cumberland Gap and incite eastern Kentucky to rebellion. Here he became so troublesome that Buell found it necessary to dislodge him, and late in December sent General Thomas orders to that effect. Thomas was weak in numbers, but strong in vigilance and courage. He made a difficult march during the early weeks of January, 1862, and halted at Logan's Cross Roads, within ten miles of the rebel camp, to await the junction of his few regiments. The enemy, under Zollicoffer and his district commander, Crittenden, resolved to advance and crush him before he could bring his force together. Thomas prepared for and accepted battle. The enemy had made a fatiguing night march of nine miles, through a cold rain and over muddy roads. On the morning of January 19 the battle, begun with spirit, soon had a dramatic incident. The rebel commander, Zollicoffer, mistaking a Union regiment, rode forward and told its commanding officer, Colonel Speed S. Fry, that he was firing upon friends. Fry, not aware that Zollicoffer was an enemy, turned away to order his men to stop firing. At this moment one of

Zollicoffer's aides rode up, and seeing the true state of affairs drew his revolver and began firing at Fry, wounding his horse. Fry, wheeling in turn, drew his revolver and returned the fire, shooting Zollicoffer through the heart.* The fall of the rebel commander served to hasten and complete the defeat of the Confederates. They retreated in disorder to their fortified camp at Mill Springs. Thomas ordered immediate pursuit, and the same night invested their camp and made preparations to storm their intrenchments the following morning. When day came, however, it was found that the rebels had precipitately crossed the Cumberland River during the night, abandoning their wounded, twelve pieces of artillery, many small-arms, and extensive supplies, and had fled in utter dispersion to the mountains. It was one of the most remarkable Union victories of the war. General Thomas's forces consisted of a little over six regiments, those of Crittenden and Zollicoffer something over ten regiments.† It was more than a defeat for the Confederates. Their army was annihilated, and Cumberland Gap once more stood exposed, so that Buell might have sent a Union column and taken possession of eastern Tennessee with but feeble opposition. It is possible that the brilliant opportunity would at last have tempted him to comply with the urgent wishes of the President and the express orders of the General-in-Chief, had not unexpected events in another quarter diverted his attention and interest.

There was everywhere, about the months of December, 1861, and January, 1862, a perceptible increase of the Union armies by fresh regiments from the Northern States, a better supply of arms through recent importations, an increase of funds from new loans, and the delivery for use of various war material, the product of the summer's manufacture. Of prime importance to the military operations which centered at Cairo was the completion and equipment of the new gun-boats. A word of retrospect concerning this arm of the military service is here necessary. Commander John Rodgers was sent West in the month of May, 1861, to begin the construction of war vessels for Western rivers. Without definite plans he had purchased, and hastily converted, and armed as best he might, three river steamers. These were put into service in September. They were provided with cannon, but had no iron plating. They were the *Tyler*,‡ of 7 guns; the *Lexington*, of 6 guns; and the *Con-*

* Cist, "Army of the Cumberland," pp. 17, 18.

† Van Horne, "History of the Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 57.

‡ This vessel seems to have been named the *Tyler* at one time and the *Taylor* at another.

estoga, of 3 guns. Making Cairo their central station, they served admirably in the lighter duties of river police, in guarding transports, and in making hasty trips of reconnaissance. For the great expedition down the Mississippi, projected during the summer and fall of 1861, a more powerful class of vessels was provided.* The distinguished civil engineer James B. Eads designed and was authorized to build 7 new gun-boats, to carry 13 guns each, and to be protected about the bows with iron plating capable of resisting the fire of heavy artillery. They were named the *Cairo*, *Carondelet*, *Cincinnati*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Pittsburg*, and *St. Louis*. Two additional gun-boats of the same type of construction, but of larger size,—the *Beuton*, of 16 guns, and the *Essex*, of 5 guns,—were converted from other vessels about the same time. At the time Flag-Officer Foote finally accepted the first seven (January 15, 1862), it had been found impossible to supply them with crews of Eastern seamen. Resort was had to Western steamboatmen, and also to volunteers from infantry recruits. The joint reconnaissance of Grant and Foote to Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, January 14, has been related. A second examination was made by General Smith, who on January 22 reports that he had been within two miles and a half of the fort; that the river had risen fourteen feet since the last visit, giving a better opportunity to reconnoiter; more important, that the high water had drowned out a troublesome advance battery, and that, in his opinion, two iron-clad gun-boats could make short work of it. It is evident that, possessed of this additional information, Grant and Foote immediately resolved upon vigorous measures. Grant had already asked permission to visit Halleck at St. Louis. This was given; but Halleck refused to entertain his project. So firmly convinced was Grant, however, that his plan was good, that, though unsuccessful at first, he quickly renewed the request.† “Commanding-General Grant and myself,” telegraphed Foote to Halleck (January 28, 1862), “are of opinion that Fort Henry on the Tennessee River can be carried with four iron-clad gun-boats and troops to permanently occupy. Have we your authority to move for that purpose when ready?” To this Grant on the same day added the direct proposal, “With permission, I will take Fort Henry on the Ten-

nessee, and establish and hold a large camp there.” It would appear that no immediate answer was returned, for on the following day Grant renews his proposition with more emphasis.‡

It is easy to perceive what produced the sudden change in Halleck's mind. Grant's persistent urging was evidently the main influence, but two other events contributed essentially to the result. The first was the important victory gained by Thomas at Mill Springs in eastern Kentucky on January 19, the certain news of which was probably just reaching him; the second was a telegram from Washington, informing him that General Beauregard, with fifteen regiments from the Confederate army in Virginia, was being sent to Kentucky to be added to Johnston's army.§ “I was not ready to move,” explains Halleck afterward, “but deemed best to anticipate the arrival of Beauregard's forces.” It is well also to remember in this connection that two days before, President Lincoln's War Order No. 1 had been published, ordering a general movement of all the armies of the Union on the coming 22d of February. Whatever induced it, the permission now given was full and hearty. “Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry,” Halleck telegraphed to Grant on the 30th of January. “I will send you written instructions by mail.”

Grant and Foote had probably already begun their preparation. Receiving Halleck's instructions on February 1, Grant on the following day started his expedition of 15,000 men on transports, and Foote accompanied him with 7 gun-boats for convoy and attack. Their plan contemplated a bombardment by the fleet from the river, and assault on the land side by the troops. For this purpose General McClelland, with a division, was landed four miles below the fort on February 4. They made a reconnaissance on the 5th, and being joined by another division, under General Smith, were ordered forward to invest the fort on the 6th. This required a circuitous march of eight miles, during which the gun-boats of Flag-Officer Foote, having less than half the distance to go by the river, moved on and began the bombardment. The capture proved easier than was anticipated. General Tilghman, the Confederate commander of the

* To show the unremitting interest of the President in these preparations, and how his encouragement and prompting followed even their minor details, we quote from his autograph manuscript a note to the Secretary of War:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Jan. 24, 1862.

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

MY DEAR SIR: On reflection I think you better make a peremptory order on the ordnance officer at

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Pittsburg to ship the ten mortars and two beds to Cairo instantly, and all others as fast as finished, till ordered to stop, reporting each shipment to the Department here.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

† Grant, “Memoirs,” Vol. I., p. 287.

‡ Ibid.

§ McClelland to Halleck and Buell, January 29, 1862. War Records.

fort, had, early that morning, sent away his 3000 infantry to Fort Donelson, being convinced that he was beset by an overpowering force. He kept only one company of artillerymen to work the eleven river guns of the fort; with these he defended the work about two hours, but without avail. Foote's 4 iron-plated gun-boats steamed boldly within 600 yards. The bombardment, though short, was well sustained on both sides, and not without its fluctuating chances. Two of the heaviest guns in the fort were soon silenced, one by bursting, the other being rendered useless by an accident with the priming wire. At this point a rebel shot passed through the casemate and the boiler of the gun-boat *Essex*, and she drifted helplessly out of the fight. But the remaining gun-boats continued their close and fierce attack, and five more of the rebel guns being speedily disabled, General Tilghman hauled down his flag and came on board to surrender the fort. McClelland's troops, from the land side, soon after entered the work and took formal possession. On the same day Grant telegraphed to Halleck, "Fort Henry is ours"; and his dispatch bore yet another significant announcement eminently characteristic of the man, "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th."

FORT DONELSON.

THE news of the capture of Fort Henry created a sudden consternation among the Confederate commanders in Tennessee. It seemed as if the key-stone had unexpectedly fallen out of their arch of well-planned defenses. Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Hardee immediately met in a council of war at Bowling Green, and after full discussion united in a memorandum acknowledging the disaster and resolving on the measures which in their judgment it rendered necessary. They foresaw that Fort Donelson would probably also fall; that Johnston's army must retreat to Nashville to avoid capture; that since Columbus was now separated from Bowling Green, the main army at Columbus must retreat to Humboldt, or possibly to Grand Junction, leaving only a sufficient garrison to make a desperate defense of the works and the river;* and immediate orders were issued to prepare for these movements. Nevertheless, Johnston, to use his own language, resolved "to fight for Nashville at Donelson." For this purpose he divided the army at Bowling Green, starting 8000 of his men under Generals Buckner and Floyd, together with 4000 more under

Pillow from other points, on a rapid march to reinforce the threatened fort,† while General Hardee led his remaining 14,000 men on their retreat to Nashville.‡ This retreat was not alone a choice of evils. Even if Fort Henry had not fallen and Donelson been so seriously menaced, the overwhelming force of Buell would have compelled a retrograde movement. Had Buell been a commander of enterprise he would have seized this chance of inflicting great damage upon the diminished enemy in retreat. His advance guard, indeed, followed; but Johnston's remnant, marching night and day, succeeded in reaching the Cumberland River opposite Nashville, where, after preparations to cross in haste, the rebel commander awaited with intense eagerness to hear the fate of Donelson.

Of the two commanders in the West, the idea of the movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers was more favorably thought of by Halleck than by Buell. Buell pointed out its value, but began no movement that looked to its execution. Halleck, on the contrary, not only realized its importance, but immediately entertained the design of ultimately availing himself of it; thus he wrote at the time he ordered the reconnaissance which demonstrated its practicability: "The demonstration which General Grant is now making I have no doubt will keep them [the enemy] in check till preparations can be made for operations on the Tennessee or Cumberland."§ His conception of the necessary preparations was, however, almost equivalent to the rejection of the plan. He thought that it would require a force of 60,000 men; and to delay it till that number and their requisite material of war could be gathered or detached under prevailing ideas would amount to indefinite postponement.

When at last, through Grant's importunity, the movement was actually begun by the advance to capture Fort Henry, a curious interest in the expedition and its capabilities developed itself among the commanders. Grant's original proposition was simply to capture Fort Henry and establish a large camp. Nothing further was proposed, and Halleck's instructions went only to the same extent, with one addition. As the reported arrival of Beauregard with reinforcements had been the turning influence in Halleck's consent, so he proposed that the capture of Fort Henry should be immediately followed by a dash at the railroad bridges across the Tennessee and their destruction, to prevent those reinforcements from reaching Johnston. But

* Beauregard, Memorandum, Feb. 7, 1862. War Records.

† Johnston to ———, March 17, 1862. War Records.

‡ Johnston to Benjamin, Feb. 8, 1862. War Records.

§ Halleck to McClellan, Jan. 14, 1862. War Records.

with the progress of Grant's movement the chances of success brightened, and the plan began correspondingly to expand. On the 2d of February, when Grant's troops were preparing to invest Fort Henry, Halleck's estimate of coming possibilities had risen a little. He wrote to Buell:

At present it is only proposed to take and occupy Fort Henry and Dover [Donelson], and, if possible, cut the railroad from Columbus to Bowling Green.

Here we have Donelson added to Henry in the intention of the department commander. That the same intention existed in Grant's mind is evident, for, as already related, on the fall of Henry on the 6th, he immediately telegraphed to Halleck: "Fort Henry is ours. . . . I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry." It is to be noted, however, that in proposing to destroy Fort Donelson, he still limits himself to his original proposition of an entrenched camp at Fort Henry.

At the critical moment Halleck's confidence in success at Fort Henry wavered, and he called upon Buell with importunity for sufficient help to make sure work of it. Buell's confidence also seems to have been very weak; for, commanding 72,502 men,—46,150 of them "in the field,"—he could only bring himself to send a single brigade* to aid in a work which he had described as of such momentous consequence. Afterward, indeed, he sent eight regiments more; but these were not from his 70,000 in the field. They were raw troops from Ohio and Indiana, which McClellan, with curious misconception of their usefulness, had ordered to Buell, who did not need them, instead of to Halleck, who was trying to make every man do double duty.

Out of this uncertainty about the final result at Fort Henry, the indecision of Buell's character becomes deplorably manifest. McClellan, satisfied that Buell could not advance against Johnston's force at Bowling Green over the difficult winter roads, and having not yet heard of the surrender of Fort Henry, suggested to both Buell and Halleck the temporary suspension of operations on other lines in order to make a quick combined movement up the Tennessee and the Cumberland. This was on February 6. Buell's fancy at first caught at the proposal, for he replied that evening:

This whole move, right in its strategical bearing, but commenced by General Halleck without appreciation, preparative or concert, has now become of vast magnitude. I was myself thinking of a change of the line to support it when I received your dispatch. It will have to be made in the face of 50,000, if not 60,000 men, and is hazardous. I will answer definitely in the morning.†

Halleck was more positive in his convictions. He telegraphed to McClellan on the same day:

If you can give me, in addition to what I have in this department, 10,000 men, I will take Fort Henry, cut the enemy's line, and paralyze Columbus. Give me 25,000, and I will threaten Nashville and cut off railroad communication, so as to force the enemy to abandon Bowling Green without a battle.

News of the fall of Fort Henry having been received at Washington, McClellan twenty-four hours later telegraphed to Halleck: "Either Buell or yourself should soon go to the scene of operations. Why not have Buell take the line of [the] Tennessee and operate on Nashville, while your troops turn Columbus? These two points gained, a combined movement on Memphis will be next in order." The dispatch was in substance repeated to Buell, who by this time thought he had made up his mind, for two hours later he answered: "I cannot, on reflection, think a change of my line would be advisable. . . . I hope General Grant will not require further reinforcements. I will go if necessary." Thus on the night of the 7th, with the single drilled brigade from Green River and the eight raw regiments from Ohio and Indiana, he proposed to leave the important central line on which Grant had started to its chances.

A night's reflection made him doubt the correctness of his decision, for he telegraphed on the morning of the 8th, "I am concentrating and preparing, but will not decide definitely yet." Halleck's views were less changeable: at noon on the 8th, he again urged that Buell should transfer the bulk of his forces to the Cumberland River, to move by water on Nashville. To secure this cooperation, he further proposed a modification of department lines to give Buell command on the Cumberland and Hitchcock or Sherman on the Tennessee, with superior command for himself over both.

No immediate response came from Washington, and three days elapsed when Halleck asked Buell specifically: "Can't you come with all your available forces and command the column up the Cumberland? I shall go to the Tennessee this week."‡ Buell's desire, vibrating like a pendulum between the two brilliant opportunities before him, now swings towards Halleck's proposal, but with provoking indefiniteness and fatal slowness. He answers that he will go either to the Cumberland or to the Tennessee, but that it will require ten days to transfer his troops.§ In this emergency,

* Buell to McClellan, Feb. 5, 1862. War Records.

† Buell to McClellan, Feb. 6, 1862. War Records.

‡ Halleck to Buell, Feb. 11, 1862. War Records.

§ Buell to Halleck, Feb. 12, 1862. War Records.

when hours counted as weeks. Buell showed himself almost as helpless and useless as a dismantled ship, rolling uneasily and idly in the trough of the sea. With, by this time, nearly 100,000 men* in the field, and with certainly a larger proportion of drilled and instructed regiments than could be found either in the camp of Grant or in the camps of the enemy, he could not make himself felt in any direction; he would neither attack the enemy in front nor send decisive help to Grant. He gives forth the everlasting cry of preparation, of delay, of danger.

During his painful hesitation, events forced him to a new conclusion. News came that the rebels had evacuated Bowling Green, and he telegraphed:

The evacuation of Bowling Green, leaving the way open to Nashville, makes it proper to resume my original plan. I shall advance on Nashville with all the speed I can.

From this last determination, Halleck appealed beseechingly to the General-in-Chief. He announced that Grant had formally invested Fort Donelson and that the bombardment was progressing favorably, but he further explained that since the evacuation of Bowling Green, the enemy were concentrating against Grant. He claimed that it was bad strategy for Buell to advance on Nashville over broken bridges and bad roads, and this point he reiterated with emphasis. He telegraphed on February 16:

I am still decidedly of the opinion that Buell should not advance on Nashville, but come to the Cumberland with his available forces. United to Grant we can take and hold Fort Donelson and Clarksville, and by another central movement cut off both Columbus and Nashville. . . . Unless we can take Fort Donelson very soon we shall have the whole force of the enemy on us. Fort Donelson is the turning-point of the war, and we must take it, at whatever sacrifice.

But his appeal was unavailing. McClellan took sides with Buell, insisting that to occupy Nashville would be most decisive. Buell had, indeed, ordered Nelson's division to go to the help of Grant; but in the conflict of his own doubts and intentions the orders had been so tardy that Nelson's embarkation was only beginning on the day when Donelson surrendered. McClellan's further condition in order to Buell, to help Grant if it were necessary, of-

fered a yet more distant prospect of succor. If the siege of Donelson had been prolonged, assistance from these directions would of course have been found useful. In the actual state of facts, however, they show both Buell and McClellan incapable, even under continued pressure, of seizing and utilizing the fleeting chances of war which so often turn the scale of success, and which so distinctly call out the higher quality of military leadership.

Amidst the sluggish counsels of commanders of departments, the energy of Grant and the courage and intrepidity of his raw Western soldiers had already decided one of the great crises of the war. Grant had announced to Halleck that he would storm Fort Donelson on the 8th of February, but he failed to count one of the chances of delay. "I contemplated taking Fort Donelson to-day with infantry and cavalry alone," reported he, "but all my troops may be kept busily engaged in saving what we now have from the rapidly rising waters."† This detention served to change the whole character of the undertaking. If he could have marched and attacked on the 8th, he would have found but 6000 men in the fort, which his own troops largely outnumbered; as it turned out, the half of Johnston's army sent from Bowling Green and other points, conducted by Generals Pillow, Floyd, and Buckner, arrived before the fort was invested, increasing the garrison to an aggregate of 17,000 and greatly extending the lines of rifle-pits and other defenses.‡ This presented an altogether different and more serious problem. The enemy before Grant was now, if not superior, at least equal in numbers, and had besides the protection of a large and well-constructed earth-work, armed with seventeen heavy and forty-eight field-guns. It is probable that this changed aspect of affairs was not immediately known to him; if it was, he depended on the reinforcements which Halleck had promised, and which soon began to arrive. Early on the morning of the 12th he started on his march, with the divisions of McClernand and Smith, numbering 15,000. At noon they were within two miles of Donelson. That afternoon and all the following day, February 13, were occupied in driving in the rebel pickets, finding the approaches, and drawing the lines of investment around the

* The following is the force in the whole of the late Department of the Ohio, as nearly as can be ascertained at present: 92 regiments infantry, 60,882 for duty; 79,334 aggregate, present and absent. 11 regiments, 1 battalion, and 7 detached companies cavalry, 9222 for duty; 11,496 aggregate, present and absent. 28 field and 2 siege batteries, 3368 for duty; 3953 aggregate, present and absent. [Buell to Thomas, February 14, 1862. War Records.]

† Grant to Cullum, February 8, 1862. War Records.

‡ General Grant's estimate of the Confederate forces is 21,000. He says he marched against the fort with but 15,000, but that he received reinforcements before the attack, and their continued arrival had, at the time of the surrender, increased his army to about 27,000. Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. I., pp. 299 and 315.

fort. A gallant storming assault by four Illinois regiments upon one of the rebel batteries was an exciting incident of the afternoon's advance, but was unsuccessful.

To understand the full merit of the final achievement, the conditions under which the siege of Donelson was thus begun must be briefly mentioned. The principal fort, or earth-work which bore the military name, lay on the west bank of the Cumberland River, half a mile north of the little town of Dover. The fort occupied the terminal knoll of a high ridge ending in the angle between the river and the mouth of Hickman Creek. This main work consisted of two batteries of heavy guns, primarily designed to control the river navigation. But when General Johnston resolved to defend Nashville at Donelson and gathered an army of 17,000 men for the purpose, the original fort and the town of Dover, and all the intervening space, were inclosed by a long, irregular line of rifle-pits connecting more substantial breastworks and embankments on the favorable elevations, in which field-batteries were planted; the whole chain of intrenchments, extending from Hickman Creek on the north till it inclosed the town of Dover on the south, having a total length of about two and a half miles. Outside the rifle-pits were the usual obstructions of felled trees and abatis, forming an interlacing barrier difficult to penetrate.

The Union troops had had no fighting at Fort Henry; at that place the gun-boats had done the whole work. The debarkation on the Tennessee, the reconnaissance, the march towards Donelson, the picket skirmishing during the 12th and 13th, had only been such as to give them zest and exhilaration. When, on the morning of the 12th, the march began, the weather was mild and agreeable; but on the afternoon of the 13th, while the army was stretching itself cautiously around the rebel intrenchments, the thermometer suddenly went down, a winter storm set in with rain, snow, sleet, ice, and a piercing north-west wind, that made the men lament the imprudence they had committed in leaving overcoats and blankets behind. Grant's army was composed entirely of Western regiments; fifteen from the single State of Illinois, and a further aggregate of seventeen from the States of Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Missouri, and Iowa. Some of these regiments had seen guerrilla fighting in Missouri, some had been through the battle of Belmont, but many were new to the privations and dangers of an active campaign. Nearly all the officers came from civil life; but a common thought, energy, and will animated the whole mass. It was neither discipline nor mere military ambition; it was

patriot work in its noblest and purest form. They had left their homes and varied peaceful occupations to defend the Government and put down rebellion. They were in the flush and exaltation of a common heroic impulse: in such a mood, the rawest recruit was as brave as the oldest veteran; and in this spirit they endured hunger and cold, faced snow and ice, held tenaciously the lines of the siege, climbed without flinching through the tangled abatis, and advanced into the deadly fire from the rifle-pits with a purpose and a devotion never excelled by soldiers of any nation or epoch.

Flag-Officer Foote, with six gun-boats, arrived the evening of the 13th; also six regiments sent by water. Fort Henry had been reduced by the gun-boats alone, and it was resolved first to try the effect of these new and powerful fighting machines upon the works of Donelson. Accordingly on Friday, February 14, the assault was begun by an attack from the six gun-boats. As before, the situation of the fort enabled the four iron-clads to advance up-stream towards the batteries, the engines holding them steadily against the swift current, presenting their heavily plated bows as a target for the enemy. The attack had lasted an hour and a half. The iron-clads were within 400 yards of the rebel embankments, the heavy armor was successfully resisting the shot and shell from the fort, the fire of the enemy was slackening, indicating that the water-batteries were becoming untenable, when two of the gun-boats were suddenly disabled and drifted out of the fight, one having her wheel carried away, and the other her tiller-ropes damaged.

These accidents, due to the weakness and exposure of the pilot-houses, compelled a cessation of the river attack and a withdrawal of the gun-boats for repairs, and gave the beleaguered garrison corresponding exultation and confidence. Flag-Officer Foote had been wounded in the attack, and deeming it necessary to take his disabled vessels temporarily back to Cairo, he requested Grant to visit him for consultation. Grant therefore went on board one of the gun-boats before dawn on the morning of the 15th, and it was arranged between the commanders that he should perfect his lines and hold the fort in siege until Foote could return from Cairo to assist in renewing the attack.

During all this time there had been a fluctuation of fear and hope in the garrison — from the repulse of McClelland's assault on the 13th, the prompt investment of the fort, the gun-boat attack and its repulse. There was want of harmony between Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, the three commanders within the fort.

Prior to the gun-boat attack a bold sortie was resolved upon, which project was, however, abandoned through the orders or non-compliance of Pillow. That night the second council of war determined to make a serious effort to extricate the garrison. At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 15th the divisions of Pillow and Buckner moved out to attack McClernand's division, and if possible open an avenue of retreat by the road running southward from Dover to Charlotte. The Confederates made their attack not only with spirit but with superior numbers. Driving back McClernand's right, they were by 11 o'clock in the forenoon in complete possession of the coveted Charlotte road. Buckner, who simultaneously attacked McClernand's left, did not fare so well. He was repulsed, and compelled to retire to the intrenchments from which he had issued. At this critical point Grant returned from his visit to Foote. What he found and what he did is stated with brevity in the message he hastily sent back :

If all the gun-boats that can will immediately make their appearance to the enemy it may secure us a victory. Otherwise all may be defeated. A terrible conflict ensued in my absence, which has demoralized a portion of my command, and I think the enemy is much more so. If the gun-boats do not show themselves, it will reassure the enemy and still further demoralize our troops. I must order a charge, to save appearances. I do not expect the gun-boats to go into action, but to make appearance and throw a few shells at long range.*

In execution of the design here announced, Grant sent an order to General C. F. Smith, commanding the second division, who held the extreme left of the investing line, to storm the intrenchments in front of him. His men had as yet had no severe fighting, and now went forward enthusiastically to their allotted task, carrying an important outwork with impetuous gallantry. Learning of his success, Grant in turn ordered forward the entire remainder of his force under Wallace and McClernand. This order was also executed during the afternoon, and by nightfall the whole of the ground lost by the enemy's morning attack was fully regained. There is a conflict of testimony about the object of the attack of the enemy. Buckner says it was to effect the immediate escape of the garrison; Pillow says he had no such understanding, and that neither he nor any one else made preparation for departure. The opportunity, therefore, which his division had during the forenoon to retire by the open road to Charlotte was not improved. By evening the chance was gone, for the Federals had once more closed that avenue of escape.

* Grant to Foote, Feb. 15, 1862. War Records.

During the night of the 15th, the Confederate commanders met in council to decide what they should do. Buckner, the junior, very emphatically gave the others to understand that the situation of the garrison was desperate, and that it would require but an hour or two of assault on the next morning to capture his portion of the defenses. Such a contingency left them no practical alternative. Floyd and Pillow, however, had exaggerated ideas of the personal danger they would be in from the Government if they permitted themselves to become prisoners, and made known their great solicitude to get away. An agreement was therefore reached through which Floyd, the senior general, first turned over his command to Pillow; then Pillow, the second in command, in the same way relinquished his authority to Buckner, the junior general. This formality completed, Floyd and Pillow made hasty preparations, and taking advantage of the arrival of a rebel steamer boarded it, with their personal followers, during the night, and abandoned the fort and its garrison.

As usual, the active correspondents of Western newspapers were with the expedition, and through their telegrams something of the varying fortunes of the Kentucky campaign and the Donelson siege had become known to the country, while President Lincoln at Washington gleaned still further details from the scattering official reports which came to the War Department through army channels. His urgent admonitions to Buell and Halleck in the previous month to bring about efficient coöperation have already been related. The new and exciting events again aroused his most intense solicitude, and prompted him to send the following suggestion by telegraph to Halleck :

You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from outside, to prevent which latter will, I think, require all the vigilance, energy, and skill of yourself and Buell, acting in full coöperation. Columbus will not get at Grant, but the force from Bowling Green will. They hold the railroad from Bowling Green to within a few miles of Fort Donelson, with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed. It is unsafe to rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buell. A small part of their force can retire slowly towards Nashville, breaking up the railroad as they go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Meantime Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces from all South and perhaps from here at Manassas. Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on the Upper Cumberland dash across, almost unresisted, and cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tennessee? In the midst of a bombardment at Fort Donelson, why could not a gun-boat run up and destroy the bridge at Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important, and I beg you to put your soul in the effort. I send a copy of this to Buell.

Before this telegram reached its destination, the siege of Donelson was terminated.

On Sunday morning, the 16th of February, when the troops composing the Federal line of investment were preparing for a final assault, a note came from Buckner to Grant, proposing an armistice to arrange terms of capitulation. The language of Grant's reply served to crown the fame of his achievement:

Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.

His resolute phrase gained him a prouder title than was ever bestowed by knightly accolade. Thereafter, the army and the country, with a fanciful play upon the initials of his name, spoke of him as "Unconditional Surrender Grant." Buckner had no other balm for the sting of his defeat than to say that Grant's terms were ungenerous and unchivalric, but the necessity compelled him to accept them. That day Grant was enabled to telegraph to Halleck:

We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, including Generals Buckner and Bushrod R. Johnson; also about 20,000 stand of

arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2000 to 4000 horses, and large quantities of commissary stores.

By this brilliant and important victory Grant's fame sprang suddenly into full and universal recognition. Congress was in session at Washington; his personal friend and representative, Hon. Elihu B. Washburne, member from the Galena district of Illinois, lost no time in proposing a resolution of thanks to Grant and his army, which was voted without delay and with generous gratitude. With even more heartiness, President Lincoln nominated him major-general of volunteers, and the Senate at once confirmed the appointment. The whole military service felt the inspiring event. Many of the colonels in Grant's army were made brigadier-generals; and promotion ran, like a quickening leaven, through the whole organization. Halleck also reminded the Government of his desire for larger power. "Make Buell, Grant, and Pope major-generals of volunteers," he telegraphed the day after the surrender, "and give me command in the West. I ask this in return for Forts Henry and Donelson."

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

General Lee's Views on Enlisting the Negroes.

[THE subjoined letters, which contain their own explanation, are sent to us through the Hon. W. L. Wilson, M. C., by the Hon. Andrew Hunter, of Charleston, West Virginia, who assures us that they have not before appeared in print.—EDITOR.]

RICHMOND, January 7, 1865.

TO GENERAL R. E. LEE.

DEAR GENERAL: I regret that in the succession of stirring events since the commencement of the present war I have had so little opportunity to renew our former, to me at least, exceedingly agreeable acquaintance, and particularly that I have so rarely, if ever, met with a suitable occasion to interchange views with you upon the important public questions which have been and are still pressing on us with such intense interest.

It would have demanded, indeed, in view of the scarcely less than awful weight of care and responsibility Providence and your country have thrown upon you, and which you will pardon me for saying has been grandly met, no ordinarily favorable opportunity to have induced me to intrude upon your overburdened time and attention for such a purpose; and in approaching you now, in this form, upon a subject which I deem of vital importance, I offer no other apology than the momentous character of the issue fixed upon the hearts and minds of every Southern patriot.

I refer to the great question now stirring the public mind as to the expediency and propriety of bringing to bear against our relentless enemy the element of military strength supposed to be found in our negro population; in other words, and more precisely, the wisdom and sound policy, under existing circumstances, of converting such portions of this popula-

tion as may be required into soldiers, to aid in maintaining our great struggle for independence and national existence.

The subject is one which recent events have forced upon our attention with intense interest, and in my judgment we ought not longer to defer its solution; and although the President in his late annual message has brought it to the attention of Congress, it is manifestly a subject in which the several States of the Confederacy must and ought to act the most prominent part, both in giving the question its proper solution and in carrying out any plans that he may devise on the subject. As a member of the Virginia Senate, having to act upon the subject, I have given it much earnest and anxious reflection, and I do not hesitate to say here, in advance of the full discussion which it will doubtless undergo, that the general objections to the proposition itself, as well as the practical difficulties in the way of carrying it out, have been greatly lessened as I have more thoroughly examined them. But it is not to be disguised that public sentiment is greatly divided on the subject; and besides many real objections, a mountain of prejudice growing out of our ancient modes of regarding the institution of Southern slavery will have to be met and overcome, before we can attain to anything like that degree of unanimity so extremely desirable in this and all else connected with our great struggle. In our former contest for liberty and independence, he who was then at the head of our armies, and who became the Father of his Country, did not hesitate to give his advice on all great subjects involving the success of that contest and the safety and welfare of his country, and in so doing perhaps rendered more essential service than he did in the field; nor do I perceive why, upon such a subject and in such a crisis as the present, we should not have the benefit

of your sound judgment and matured wisdom. Pardon me therefore for asking, to be used not only for my own guidance, but publicly as the occasion may require: Do you think that by a wisely devised plan and judicious selection negro soldiers can be made effective and reliable in maintaining this war in behalf of the Southern States? Do you think that the calling into service of such numbers of this population as the exigency may demand would affect injuriously, to any material extent, the institution of Southern slavery? Would not the introduction of this element of strength into our military operations justify in some degree a more liberal scale of exemptions or details, and by thus relieving from active service in the field a portion of the intelligent and directing labor of the country (as seems to be needed) have a beneficial bearing upon the question of subsistence and other supplies?

Would not, in your judgment, the introduction of such a policy increase, in other regards, our power of defense against the relentless warfare the enemy is now waging against us?

These are but some of the leading inquiries which suggest themselves. But I beg, General, if from a sense of duty and the promptings of your elevated patriotism, overriding unwise and ill-timed delicacy, you consent to reply to these inquiries, for the purpose before frankly indicated, that you will give me your views, as fully as your engagements will allow, upon every other question that may occur to you as likely to conduce to a wise decision of this grave and, as deemed by many, vitally important subject. With highest esteem,

Your obedient servant,

Andrew Hunter.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTH VIRGINIA,
11th January, 1865.

HON. ANDREW HUNTER, RICHMOND, VA.

DEAR SIR: I have received your letter of the 7th inst., and, without confining myself to the order of your interrogatories, will endeavor to answer them by a statement of my views on the subject. I shall be most happy if I can contribute to the solution of a question in which I feel an interest commensurate with my desire for the welfare and happiness of our people. Considering the relation of master and slave, controlled by humane laws and influenced by Christianity and an enlightened public sentiment, as the best that can exist between the white and black races while intermingled as at present in this country, I would deprecate any sudden disturbance of that relation, unless it be necessary to avert a greater calamity to both. I should therefore prefer to rely upon our white population to preserve the ratio between our forces and those of the enemy which experience has shown to be safe. But in view of the preparations of our enemies it is our duty to provide for continued war, and not for a battle or campaign, and I fear that we cannot accomplish this without overtaxing the capacity of our white population. Should the war continue, under existing circumstances, the enemy may in course of time penetrate our country and get access to a large part of our negro population. It is his avowed policy to convert the able-bodied men into soldiers, and to emancipate all.

The success of the Federal arms in the South was followed by a proclamation of President Lincoln for two hundred and eighty thousand men, the effect of

which will be to stimulate the Northern States to procure as substitutes for their own people the negroes thus brought within their reach. Many have already been obtained in Virginia, and should the fortune of war expose more of her territory, the enemy would gain a large accession to his strength.

His progress will thus add to his numbers and at the same time destroy slavery in a manner most pernicious to the welfare of our people. Their negroes will be used to hold them in subjection, leaving the remaining force of the enemy free to extend his conquest. Whatever may be the effect of our employing negro troops, it cannot be as mischievous as this. If it end in subverting slavery, it will be accomplished by ourselves, and we can devise the means of alleviating the evil consequences to both races. I think, therefore, we must decide whether slavery shall be extinguished by our enemies and the slaves be used against us, or use them ourselves at the risk of the effects which may be produced upon our social institutions. I believe that with proper regulations they can be made efficient soldiers. They possess the physical qualifications in an eminent degree. Long habits of obedience and subordination, coupled with the moral influence which in our country the white man possesses over the black, furnish an excellent foundation for that discipline which is the best guarantee of military efficiency. Our chief aim should be to secure their fidelity.

There have been formidable armies composed of men having no interest in the cause for which they fought beyond their pay or hope of plunder. But it is certain that the surest foundation upon which the fidelity of an army can rest, especially in a service which imposes peculiar hardships and privations, is the personal interest of the soldier in the issue of the contest. Such an interest we can give our negroes by giving immediate freedom to all who enlist, and freedom at the end of the war to the families of those who discharge their duties faithfully (whether they survive or not), together with the privilege of residing at the South. To this might be added a bounty for faithful service.

We should not expect slaves to fight for prospective freedom when they can secure it by going to the enemy, in whose service they will incur no greater risk than in ours. The reasons that induce me to recommend the employment of negro troops at all render the effects of the measures I have suggested upon slavery immaterial, and in my opinion the best means of securing the efficiency and fidelity of this auxiliary force would be to accompany the measure with a well-digested plan of gradual and general emancipation. As that will be the result of the continuance of the war, and will certainly occur if the enemy succeed, it seems to me advisable to adopt it at once, and thereby secure all the benefits that will accrue to our cause.

The employment of negro troops under regulations similar in principle to those above indicated would, in my opinion, greatly increase our military strength, and enable us to relieve our white population to some extent. I think we could dispense with our reserve forces except in cases of necessity.

It would disappoint the hopes which our enemies base upon our exhaustion, deprive them in a great measure of the aid they now derive from black troops, and thus throw the burden of the war upon their own

people. In addition to the great political advantages that would result to our cause from the adoption of a system of emancipation, it would exercise a salutary influence upon our whole negro population, by rendering more secure the fidelity of those who become soldiers and diminishing the inducements to the rest to abscond.

I can only say, in conclusion, that whatever measures are to be adopted should be adopted at once. Every day's delay increases the difficulty. Much time will be required to organize and discipline the men, and action may be deferred until it is too late.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. Lee, General.

Some Errors in General Sherman's "Grand Strategy."

IN the February CENTURY is a paper from General Sherman on "The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion." Near the outset of this paper the distinguished author makes a statement as to "the two great antagonist forces" of which the following is the gist:

First. That the belligerent populations, leaving out Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, were in round numbers nineteen and nine millions respectively.

Second. That while the entire Federal army averaged (from January, '62—May, '65) from 500,000 to 800,000 "present," the Confederate army averaged about 569,000 men — this last number being determined by taking one-sixteenth of the nine millions which is assumed as the total population of the Confederacy.

Third. That the three States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri furnished to each belligerent a "fair quota," and may be left out of the count.

First. To get a population of nine millions in the Confederate States, General Sherman has included the entire slave population of these States in 1860. By the Census of that year, the 11 Confederate States had in round numbers 5,450,000 whites and 3,650,000 blacks. Now the slave population of these States not only furnished no soldiers to the South,—it supplied much the larger part of the 178,975 colored troops which were enrolled during the war on the side of the North. Nay more — the records of the War Department show that besides some 22,000 white Union troops obtained from scattered points throughout the South, the State of Virginia (West Virginia) furnished 31,872, and that of Tennessee 31,092 men to the Federal army. Hence, in setting down the belligerent populations, not only is it misleading to include the slaves on the Confederate side, but large sections of West Virginia and East Tennessee should be transferred from the Southern to the Northern side. Considering population with reference to the men contributed to the two armies, is it not evident that (omitting Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland) the two belligerents drew from populations which were in the neighborhood of *twenty* millions and *five* millions, instead of *nineteen* millions and *nine* millions? It is not intended here to ignore the fact that the slave population of the South was in many ways a source of strength to that section, and that its presence enabled the South to send to the field a larger percentage of white men than could otherwise have

been spared. But it is absurd to estimate, as General Sherman does, that the slaves approached, in the value of their contributions to the struggle, an equal number of white people.

Second. The total number of men furnished to the Federal armies was 2,778,304 (or about 2,300,000 when reduced to a three-year standard); and of these, as General Sherman states, there was an average after January 1, '62 of from 500,000 to 800,000 present in the field. No report of the total number of Confederates enrolled exists, but General Sherman would have us believe that the Confederate Government was able to keep an average of 569,000 men actually in the field. Its limited resources in the way of armament and supplies would have made this impossible—but look at it simply as a question of population. It appears from Phisterer's figures that the average strength of the Federal armies present in the field was about one-fourth of the total number of troops furnished. If the Confederates showed the same proportion between enrolled men and those "present," there must have been over 2,000,000 Confederate troops enrolled during the war out of a total white population of about *five millions!*

This result might have given the author pause. But while the Confederate records are defective, there was no necessity for such wild statements as General Sherman makes. Many returns of the Confederate armies exist, and from these an approximate estimate of the total Confederate strength can be obtained. There never was a time, for instance, when the Army of Northern Virginia numbered 100,000 men present. It rarely even approached it; and yet this army generally exceeded in strength the main western Confederate army. It is doubtful whether there was at any date, throughout the Confederacy, more than half the men "present" that General Sherman assumes as the average strength of the Southern armies, and it is very certain that their real average strength was less than half of the numbers he gives. The total number of Confederates enrolled during the war was probably between 600,000 and 700,000 men. The former estimate was given by a Northern writer upon a careful examination of the records twenty years ago, and the best estimates at the War Records office to-day do not vary greatly from that number.

Third. It is certain that Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland furnished far more troops to the Northern than to the Southern side, which, considering the fact that these States were occupied almost entirely by Union troops, is not surprising. Phisterer credits

Maryland	with	46,638	Union	troops.
Missouri	"	109,111	"	"
Kentucky	"	75,760	"	"

If General Sherman means by "fair quota" that these States contributed forces to the two armies in the same proportion as that existing between the total Northern and Southern armies, he may be near the truth. But if he means, as seems probable, that they contributed equal or nearly equal numbers to the two sides, he is as wide of the mark as he is in the points above noted.

W. Allan.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE MISSISSIPPI AND SHILOH.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE MISSISSIPPI.



As a powerful supplement to the Union victories in Tennessee, the military operations west of the Mississippi River next demand our attention. Under the vigorous promptings of Halleck we left the army of General Curtis engaged in his trying midwinter campaign in south-western Missouri. He made ready with all haste to comply with the order to "push on as rapidly as possible and end the matter with Price." His army obeyed every order with cheerful endurance. "They contend with mud, water, and snow and ice manfully," wrote Curtis under date of February 1, 1862, "and I trust they will not falter in the face of a more active foe." In the same spirit he encouraged his officers:

The roads are indeed very bad, but they are worse for the enemy than for us if he attempts to retreat. . . . The men should help the teams out of difficulty when necessary, and all must understand that the elements are to be considered serious obstacles, which we have to encounter and overcome in this campaign. . . . Constant bad roads will be the rule, and a change for the better a rare exception.

As already remarked, Price had kept his situation and numbers well concealed. He was known to be at Springfield; but rumor exaggerated his force to 30,000, and it was uncertain whether he intended to retreat or advance. Reports also came that Van Dorn was marching to his support with 10,000 men. Curtis kept the offensive, however, pushing forward his outposts. By the 13th of February Price found his position untenable and ordered a retreat from Springfield. Since McCulloch would not come to Missouri to furnish Price assistance, Price was perforce compelled to go to Arkansas, where McCulloch might furnish him protection. Curtis pursued with vigor. "We continually take cattle, prisoners, wagons, and arms, which they leave in their flight," he wrote. Near the Arkansas line Price endeavored to make a stand with his rear-guard, but without success. On February 18, in a special order announcing the recent Union victories elsewhere, Curtis was able to congratulate his own troops as follows:

You have moved in the most inclement weather, over the worst of roads, making extraordinary long marches, subsisting mainly on meat without salt, and for the past six days you have been under the fire of the fleeing enemy. You have driven him out of Missouri, restored the Union flag to the virgin soil of Arkansas, and triumphed in two contests.

The rebels were in no condition to withstand him, and he moved forward to Cross Hollow, where the enemy had hastily abandoned a large cantonment with extensive buildings, only a portion of which they stopped to burn. It was time for Curtis to pause. He was 240 miles from his railroad base at Rolla, where he had begun his laborious march. Orders soon came from Halleck not to penetrate farther into Arkansas, but to hold his position and keep the enemy south of the Boston Mountains. "Hold your position," wrote Halleck, March 7, "till I can turn the enemy." At that date Halleck expected to make a land march along what he had decided to be the central strategic line southward from Fort Donelson, turn the enemy at Memphis, and compel the Confederate forces to evacuate the whole Mississippi Valley down to that point.

There was, however, serious work yet in store for Curtis. To obviate the jealousies and bickerings among Trans-Mississippi Confederate commanders the Richmond authorities had combined the Indian Territory with portions of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri in the Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. II., and had sent Major-General Earl Van Dorn to command the whole. His letters show that he went full of enthusiasm and brilliant anticipations. He did not dream of being kept on the defensive. He called for troops from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, and ordered the armies of McCulloch and McIntosh, and Pike with his Indian regiments, to join him. From these various sources he hoped to collect a force of from 30,000 to 40,000 men at Pocahontas, Arkansas. Unaware that Price was then retreating from Springfield, he wrote to that commander, under date of February 14, proposing a quick and secret march against St. Louis, which he hoped to capture by assault. Holding that city would soon secure Missouri and relieve Johnston, seriously pressed in Tennessee. He

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would not wait to prepare, but would adopt the style of frontier equipment and supply:

Flour, salt, and a little bacon in our wagons, and beef cattle driven with us, should be our commissariat. Grain-bags to contain two days' rations of corn, to be carried on our troopers' saddles, and money our paymaster's department, and sufficient ammunition our ordnance department.

But he did not have time enough to extemporize even this haversack campaign: he found his base of supplies menaced from the north-east, and information soon followed that Price was flying in confusion from the north-west. Ten days later we find him writing to Johnston:

Price and McCulloch are concentrated at Cross Hollow. . . . Whole force of enemy [Union] from 35,000 to 40,000; ours about 20,000. Should Pike be able to join, our forces will be about 26,000. I leave this evening to go to the army, and will give battle, of course, if it does not take place before I arrive. I have no doubt of the result. If I succeed, I shall push on.

Van Dorn found the Confederate forces united in the Boston Mountains, fifty-five miles south of Sugar Creek, to which point Curtis had retired for better security. He immediately advanced with his whole force, attacking the Union position on the 6th of March. On the 7th was fought the principal contest, known as the battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern. As usual, rumor exaggerated the forces on both sides. By the official reports it appears that Van Dorn's available command numbered 16,000. The Union troops under Curtis numbered only about 10,500; but they had the advantage of a defensive attitude and gained a complete victory, to which the vigilance and able strategy of the Union commander effectively contributed. Generals McCulloch, McIntosh, and other prominent rebel officers were killed early in the action, and Van Dorn's right wing was shattered.

The diminished and scattered forces of Van Dorn, retreating by different routes from the battle of Pea Ridge, were not again wholly united. Pike was ordered to conduct his Indian regiments back to the Indian Territory for local duty. The main remnant of the Confederate army followed Van Dorn to the eastward in the direction of Pochahontas, where he proposed to reorganize it, to resume the offensive. Halleck, cautioning Curtis to hold his position and keep well on his guard, speaks of Van Dorn as a "vigilant and energetic officer"; and Van Dorn's language certainly indicates activity, whatever may be thought of the discretion it betrays. He had hardly shaken from his feet the dust of his rout at Pea Ridge when he again began writing that he contemplated relieving the stress of

Confederate disaster in Tennessee by attempting to capture the city of St. Louis, a will-o'-the-wisp project that had by turns dazzled the eyes of all the Confederate commanders in the Mississippi Valley; or, as another scheme, perhaps a mere prelude to this, he would march eastward against Pope and raise the siege of New Madrid, on the Mississippi River. This brings us to a narrative of events at that point.

With the fall of Fort Donelson the rebel stronghold at Columbus had become useless. Its evacuation soon followed (March 2, 1862), and the Confederates immediately turned their attention to holding the next barrier on the Mississippi River. This was at a point less than one hundred miles below Cairo, where the Father of Waters makes two large bends, which, joined together, lie like a reversed letter S placed horizontally. At the foot of this first bend lay Island No. 10;* from there the river flows northward to the town of New Madrid, Missouri, passing which it resumes its southward flow. The country is not only flat, as the bend indicates, but it is encompassed in almost all directions by nearly impassable swamps and bayous. Island No. 10, therefore, and its immediate neighborhood, seemed to offer unusual advantages to bar the Mississippi with warlike obstructions. As soon as the evacuation of Columbus was determined upon, all available rebel resources and skill were concentrated here. The island, the Tennessee shore of the river, and the town of New Madrid were all strongly fortified and occupied with considerable garrisons—about 3000 men at the former and some 5000 at the latter place.

General Halleck, studying the strategical conditions of the whole Mississippi Valley with tenfold interest since the victories of Grant, also had his eye on this position, and was now as eager to capture it as the rebels were to defend it. One of the quickest movements of the whole war ensued. General Pope was selected to lead the expedition, and the choice was not misplaced. On the 22d of February, six days after the surrender of Fort Donelson, Pope landed at the town of Commerce, Missouri, on the Mississippi River, with 140 men. On the 28th he was on the march at the head of 10,000, who had been sent him in the interim from St. Louis and Cairo. On the 3d of March, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, he appeared before the town of New Madrid with his whole force, to which further reinforcements were soon added, raising his army to about 20,000. It would have required but a few hours to cap-

* See communication from John Banvard in "Open Letters" of this number of THE CENTURY.—EDITOR.

ture the place by assault; but the loss of life would have been great and the sacrifice virtually useless. It was the season of the early spring floods; the whole country was submerged, and the great river was at a very high stage between its levees. In addition to its earth-works and its garrison, New Madrid was guarded by a fleet of eight rebel gun-boats under command of Commodore George N. Hollins. The high water floated these vessels at such an elevation that their guns commanded every part of the town, and made its occupation by hostile troops impossible. Had Pope entered with his army, Hollins would have destroyed both town and troops at his leisure.

Pope therefore surrounded the place by siege-works in which he could protect his men; and sending a detachment to Point Pleasant on the river, nine miles below, secured a lodgment for batteries that closed the river to rebel transports and cut off the enemy's reinforcements and supplies. The movement proved effectual. Ten days later (March 13, 1862) the rebels evacuated New Madrid, leaving everything behind.

The Confederates now held Island No. 10 and the Tennessee shore; but their retreat was cut off by the swamps beyond and Pope's batteries below. The rebel gun-boat flotilla had retired down the river. Pope's forces held New Madrid and the Missouri shore, but they had neither transports nor gun-boats, and without these could not cross to the attack. In this dilemma Pope once more called upon Flag-Officer Foote to bring the Union fleet of gun-boats down the river, attack and silence the batteries of Island No. 10, and assist in capturing the rebel army, which his strategy had shut in a trap.

Foote, although commanding a fleet of nine Union gun-boats, objected that the difficulty and risk were too great. With all their formidable strength the gun-boats had two serious defects. Only their bows were protected by the heavier iron plating so as to be shot-proof; and their engines were not strong enough to back easily against the powerful current of the Mississippi. In their attacks on Forts Henry and Donelson they had fought up-stream; when disabled, the mere current carried them out of the enemy's reach. On the Mississippi this was reversed. Compelled to fight down-stream, they would, if disabled, be carried irresistibly directly to the enemy. A bombardment at long range from both gun and mortar boats had proved inef-

fectual to silence the rebel batteries. Pope's expedition seemed destined to prove fruitless, when a new expedient was the occasion of success.

The project of a canal to turn Island No. 10 was again revived. The floods of the Mississippi, pouring through breaks in the levees, inundated the surrounding country. Colonel Bissell of the engineer regiment, returning in a canoe with a guide from his unsuccessful visit to secure Foote's coöperation, learned that a bayou, from two and a half to three miles west of the Mississippi, ran irregularly to the south-west from the neighborhood of Island No. 8, the station of the Union gun-boat flotilla, to its junction with the river at New Madrid, a distance of twelve miles. An open corn-field and an opening in the woods, which marked the course of an old road, suggested to him the possibility of connecting the river with the bayou; but between the end of the road and the bayou lay a belt of heavy timber two miles in width.* How could he get a fleet of vessels over the ground thickly covered by trees of every size, from a sapling to a forest veteran three feet in diameter, whose roots stood six or seven feet under water? Modern mechanical appliances are not easily baffled by natural obstacles. Six hundred skillful mechanics working with the aid of steam and machinery, and directed by American inventive ingenuity, brought the wonder to pass. In a few days Colonel Bissell had a line of four light-draught steamboats and six coal-barges† crossing the corn-field and entering the open road. Great saws, bent in the form of an arc and fastened to frames swinging on pivots, severed the tree-trunks four and a half feet under water; ropes, pulleys, and capstans hauled the encumbering débris out of the path. In eight days the amphibious fleet was in the bayou. Here were new difficulties—to clean away the dams of accumulated and entangled drift-wood. In a few days more Bissell's boats and barges were ready to emerge into the Mississippi at New Madrid, but yet kept prudently concealed. Two gun-boats were needed to protect the transports in crossing troops. The sagacious judgment of Foote and the heroism of his subordinates supplied these at the opportune moment. Captain Walke of the *Carondelet* volunteered to run the batteries at Island No. 10; and now that the risk was justified, the flag-officer consented. On the night of the 4th of April, after the moon had gone down, the gun-boat *Carondelet*, moving with as little noise as

* J. W. Bissell, " Battles and Leaders of the Civil War."

† The barges used were coal-barges, about eighty feet long and twenty wide, scow-shaped, with both

ends alike. The sides were six inches thick, and of solid timber. [J. W. Bissell, " Battles and Leaders of the Civil War."]

possible, swung into the stream from her moorings and started on her perilous voyage. It must have seemed an omen of success that a sudden thunder-storm with its additional gloom and noise came up to aid the attempt. The movement was unsuspected by the enemy till, by one of frequent flashes of lightning, the rebel sentries on the earth-works of Island No. 10 and the shore batteries opposite saw the huge turtle-shaped river craft stand out in vivid outline, to be in a second hidden again by the dense obscurity. Alarm cries rang out, musketry rattled, great guns resounded; the ship almost touched the shore in the drift of the crooked channel. But the Confederate guns could not be aimed amidst the swift succession of brilliant flash and total darkness. The rebel missiles flew wild, and a little after midnight the *Carondelet* lay unharmed at the New Madrid landing. Captain Walke had made the first successful experiment in a feat of daring and skill that was many times repeated after he had demonstrated its possibility.

The gun-boat *Pittsburgh*, also running past the rebel batteries at night, joined the *Carondelet* at New Madrid on the morning of April 7, and the problem of Pope's difficulties was solved. When he crossed his troops over the river by help of his gun-boats and transports, formidable attack was no longer necessary. Island No. 10 had surrendered to Flag-Officer Foote that morning, and the several rebel garrisons were using their utmost endeavors to effect a retreat southward. Pope easily intercepted their movement: on that and the following day he received the surrender of three general officers and six or seven thousand Confederate troops.

As General Pope's victory had been gained without loss or demoralization, he prepared immediately to push his operations farther south. "If transportation arrives to-morrow or next day," telegraphed Assistant-Secretary Scott, who was with him at New Madrid, "we shall have Memphis within ten days." Halleck responded with the promise of ten large steamers to carry troops, and other suggestions indicating his approval of the movement "down the river." In the same dispatch Halleck gave news of the Union victory at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River, and announced his intention to proceed thither, and asked Assistant-Secretary Scott to meet him at Cairo for consultation. The meeting took place on the 10th of April, by which time Halleck had become more impressed with the severity and the perils of the late battle on the Tennessee; for Scott asks the Washington authorities whether a reënforcement of 20,000 or 30,000 men cannot be sent from the East to make good the loss. This conference proba-

bly originated the idea that soon interrupted the successful river operations, by withdrawing the army under Pope. Reënforcements could not be spared from the East, and Pope's army became the next resource. For the present, however, there was a continuation of the first plan. Pope's preliminary orders for embarkation were issued on the 10th, and on the 14th the combined land and naval forces which had reduced Island No. 10 reached Fort Pillow. Its works were found to be strong and extensive. The overflow of the whole country rendered land operations difficult; it was estimated that it would require two weeks to turn the position and reduce the works. Meanwhile information was obtained that Van Dorn's rebel army from Arkansas was about to reënforce Beauregard at Corinth. In view of all this, Assistant-Secretary Scott asked the question: "If General Pope finds, after careful examination, that he cannot capture Fort Pillow within ten days, had he not better reënforce General Halleck immediately, and let Commodore Foote continue to blockade below until forces can be returned and the position be turned by General Halleck beating Beauregard and marching upon Memphis from Corinth?" Before an answer came from the War Department at Washington, Halleck, who had for several days been with the army on the Tennessee River, decided the question for himself and telegraphed to Pope (April 15), "Move with your army to this place, leaving troops enough with Commodore Foote to land and hold Fort Pillow, should the enemy's forces withdraw." At the same time he sent the following suggestion to Flag-Officer Foote:

I have ordered General Pope's army to this place, but I think you had best continue the bombardment of Fort Pillow; and if the enemy should abandon it, take possession or go down the river, as you may deem best. General Pope will leave forces enough to occupy any fortifications that may be taken.

The plan was forthwith carried into effect. The transports, instead of disembarking Pope's troops to invest Fort Pillow, were turned northward, and steaming up the Mississippi to Cairo, thence to Paducah, and from Paducah up the Tennessee River, landed the whole of Pope's army, except two regiments, at Pittsburg Landing on the 22d of April.

The flotilla under Foote and the two regiments left behind continued in front of Fort Pillow, keeping up a show of attack, by a bombardment from one of the mortar-boats and such reconnaissances as the little handful of troops could venture, to discover, if possible, some weak point in the enemy's defenses. On the other hand, the Confederates, watching what they thought a favorable opportunity,

brought up eight of their gun-boats and made a spirited attack on the Union vessels on the morning of May 10. In a short combat two of the Union gun-boats, which bore the brunt of the onset, were seriously disabled, though not until they had inflicted such damage on three Confederate vessels that they drifted helplessly out of the fight; after which the remainder of the rebel flotilla retired from the encounter. For nearly a month after this preliminary gun-boat battle the river operations, though full of exciting daily incident, were marked by no important historical event. Mention, however, needs to be here made of a change in the control of the Union fleet. Commodore Foote had been wounded in the ankle during his attack on Fort Donelson, and his injury now caused him so much suffering and exhaustion of strength that he was compelled to relinquish his command. He took leave of his flotilla on the 9th of May, and was succeeded by Commodore Charles H. Davis, who from that time onward had charge of the gun-boat operations on the upper Mississippi.

THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN.

THE fall of Fort Donelson hastened, almost to a panic, the retreat of the Confederates from other points. By that surrender about one-third of their fighting force in Tennessee vanished from the campaign, while their whole web of strategy was instantly dissolved. The full possession of the Tennessee River by the Union gun-boats for the moment hopelessly divided the Confederate commands, and like a flushed covey of birds the rebel generals started on their several lines of retreat without concert or rallying point. Albert Sidney Johnston, the department commander, moved south-east towards Chattanooga, abandoning Nashville to its fate; while Beauregard, left to his own discretion and resources, took measures to effect the evacuation of Columbus so as to save its armament and supplies, and then proceeded to the railroad crossings of northern Mississippi to collect and organize a new army.

It is now evident that if the Union forces could have been promptly moved forward in harmonious combination, with the facility which the opening of the Tennessee River afforded them, such an advance might have been made, and such strategic points gained and held, as would have saved at least an entire year of campaign and battle in the West. Unfortunately this great advantage was not seized, and in the condition of affairs could not be; and a delay of a fortnight or more enabled the insurgents to renew the confidence and gather the forces to establish another line

farther to the south, and again to interpose a formidable resistance. One cause of this inefficiency and delay of the Union commanders may be easily gleaned from the dispatches interchanged by them within a few days succeeding the fall of Fort Donelson, and which, aside from their military bearings, form an interesting study of human nature.

General Buell, from his comfortable headquarters at Louisville, writes (February 17, 1862) that since the reinforcements (Nelson's division) started by him to assist at Fort Donelson are no longer needed, he has ordered them back. "The object of both our forces," he continues, "is, directly or indirectly, to strike at the power of the rebellion in its most vital point within our field. Nashville appears clearly, I think, to be that point." He thought further that heavy reinforcements would soon be thrown into it by the rebels. The leisurely manner in which he expected to strike at this heart of the rebellion appears from these words, in the same letter:

To depend on wagons at this season for a large force seems out of the question, and I fear it may be two weeks before I can get a bridge over the Barren River, so as to use the railroad beyond. I shall endeavor, however, to make an advance in less or much force before that time. . . . Let me hear your views.

Halleck, at St. Louis, was agitated by more rapid emotions. Watching the distant and dangerous campaign under Curtis in south-western Missouri, beginning another of mingled hazard and brilliant promise under Pope on the Mississippi, beset by perplexities of local administration, flushed to fever heat by the unexpected success of Grant, his mind ran forward eagerly to new prospects. "I am not satisfied with present success," he telegraphed Sherman. "We must now prepare for a still more important movement. You will not be forgotten in this." But this preparation seems, in his mind, to have involved something more than orders from himself.

Before he received the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson he became seriously alarmed lest the rebels, using their river transportation, might rapidly concentrate, attack Grant in the rear, crush him before succor could reach him, and, returning quickly, be as ready as before to confront and oppose Buell. Even after the surrender Halleck manifests a continuing fear that some indefinite concentration will take place, and a quick reprisal be executed by a formidable expedition against Paducah or Cairo. His overstrained appeals to Buell for help do not seem justified in the full light of history. An undertone of suggestion and demand indicates that this urgency, ostensibly based on his patriotic eagerness for success, was not wholly free from personal ambition.

We have seen how when he heard of Grant's victory he generously asked that Buell, Grant, and Pope be made major-generals of volunteers, and with equal generosity to himself broadly added, "and give me command in the West." He could not agree with Buell that Nashville was the most vital point of the rebellion in the West, and that heavy rebel reinforcements would be thrown into it from all quarters east and south. Halleck develops his idea with great earnestness in replying to that suggestion from Buell. He says:

To remove all questions as to rank, I have asked the President to make you a major-general. Come down to the Cumberland and take command. The battle of the West is to be fought in that vicinity. You should be in it as the ranking general in immediate command. Don't hesitate. Come to Clarksville as rapidly as possible. Say that you will come, and I will have everything there for you. Beauregard threatens to attack either Cairo or Paducah; I must be ready for him. Don't stop any troops ordered down the Ohio. We want them all. You shall have them back in a few days. Assistant-Secretary of War Scott left here this afternoon to confer with you. He knows my plans and necessities. I am terribly hard pushed. Help me, and I will help you. Hunter has acted nobly, generously, bravely. Without his aid I should have failed before Fort Donelson. Honor to him. We came within an ace of being defeated. If the fragments which I sent down had not reached there on Saturday we should have gone in. A retreat at one time seemed almost inevitable. All right now. Help me to carry it out. Talk freely with Scott. It is evident to me that you and McClellan did not at last accounts appreciate the strait I have been in. I am certain you will when you understand it all. Help me, I beg of you. Throw all your troops in the direction of the Cumberland. Don't stop any one ordered here. You will not regret it. There will be no battle at Nashville.

In answer to an inquiry from Assistant-Secretary Scott, he explains further:

I mean that Buell should move on Clarksville with his present column; there unite his Kentucky army and move up the Cumberland, while I act on the Tennessee. We should then be able to cooperate.

This proposal was entirely judicious; but in Halleck's mind it was subordinated to another consideration, namely: that he should exercise superior command in the West. Again he telegraphed to McClellan (February 19), "Give it [the Western division] to me, and I will split secession in twain in one month." The same confidence is also expressed to Buell, in a simultaneous dispatch to Assistant-Secretary Scott, who was with Buell. "If General Buell will come down and help me with all possible haste we can end the war in the West in less than a month." A day later Halleck becomes almost peremptory in a dispatch to McClellan: "I must have command of the armies in the West. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity. Lay this before the President and Secretary of War. May I assume the command? Answer quickly."

To this direct interrogatory McClellan replied in the negative. The request, to say the least of it, was somewhat presumptuous, and hardly of proper tone to find ready acquiescence from a military superior. In this case, however, it was also calculated to rouse a twofold instinct of jealousy. Buell was a warm personal friend of McClellan, and the latter could not be expected to diminish the opportunities or endanger the chances of his favorite. But more important yet was the question how this sudden success in Halleck's department, and the extension of command and power so boldly demanded, might affect McClellan's own standing and authority. He was yet General-in-Chief, but the Administration was dissatisfied at his inaction, and the President had already indicated, in the general war order requiring all the armies of the United States to move on the 22d of February, that his patience had a limit. McClellan did not believe that the army under his own immediate care and command would be ready to fulfill the President's order. Should he permit a rival to arise in the West and grasp a great victory before he could move?

An hour after midnight McClellan answered Halleck as follows:

Buell at Bowling Green knows more of the state of affairs than you at St. Louis. Until I hear from him I cannot see necessity of giving you entire command. I expect to hear from Buell in a few minutes. I do not yet see that Buell cannot control his own line. I shall not lay your request before the Secretary until I hear definitely from Buell.

Halleck did not feel wholly baffled by the unfavorable response. That day he received a dispatch from Stanton, who said:

Your plan of organization has been transmitted to me by Mr. Scott and strikes me very favorably, but on account of the domestic affliction of the President I have not yet been able to submit it to him. The brilliant result of the energetic action in the West fills the nation with joy.

Encouraged by this friendly tone from the Secretary of War, Halleck ventured a final appeal:

One whole week has been lost already by hesitation and delay. There was, and I think there still is, a golden opportunity to strike a fatal blow, but I can't do it unless I can control Buell's army. I am perfectly willing to act as General McClellan dictates or to take any amount of responsibility. To succeed we must be prompt. I have explained everything to General McClellan and Assistant-Secretary Scott. There is not a moment to be lost. Give me authority and I will be responsible for results.

Doubtless Halleck felt that the fates were against him, for the reply chilled his lingering hopes:

Your telegram of yesterday, together with Mr. Scott's reports, have this morning been submitted to the Pres-

ident, who, after full consideration of the subject, does not think any change in the organization of the army or the military departments at present advisable. He desires and expects you and General Buell to cooperate fully and zealously with each other, and would be glad to know whether there has been any failure of cooperation in any particular.

Mr. Lincoln had been watching by the bedside of his dying son, and in his overwhelming grief probably felt disinclined to touch this new vexation of military selfishness—a class of questions from which he always shrank with the utmost distaste; besides, we shall see in due time how the President's momentary decision turned upon much more comprehensive changes already in contemplation.

Before McClellan's refusal to enlarge Halleck's command, he had indicated that his judgment and feelings were both with Buell. Thus he telegraphed the latter on February 20:

Halleck says Columbus reënforced from New Orleans, and steam up on their boats ready for move—probably on Cairo. Wishes to withdraw some troops from Donelson. I tell him improbable that rebels are reënforced from New Orleans or attack Cairo. Think [they] will abandon Columbus. . . . How soon can you be in front of Nashville, and in what force? What news of the rebels? If the force in West can take Nashville, or even hold its own for the present, I hope to have Richmond and Norfolk in from three to four weeks.

He sent a similar dispatch to Halleck, in which he pointed out Nashville as the pressing objective:

Buell has gone to Bowling Green. I will be in communication with him in a few minutes, and we will then arrange. The fall of Clarksville confirms my views. I think Cairo is not in danger, and we must now direct our efforts on Nashville. The rebels hold firm at Manassas. In less than two weeks I shall move the army of the Potomac, and hope to be in Richmond soon after you are in Nashville. I think Columbus will be abandoned within a week. We will have a desperate battle on this line.

While the three generals were discussing high strategy and grand campaigns by telegraph, and probably deliberating with more anxiety the possibilities of personal fame, the simple soldiering of Grant and Foote was solving some of the problems that confused scientific hypothesis. They quietly occupied Clarksville, which the enemy abandoned; and even while preparing to do so, Grant suggested in his dispatch of February 19, "If it is the desire of the general commanding department, I can have Nashville on Saturday week." Foote repeated the suggestion in a dispatch of February 21, but the coveted permission did not come in time.

Meanwhile Buell, having gone to Bowling Green to push forward his railroad bridge, and hearing of the fall of Clarksville and the prob-

able abandonment of Nashville, moved on by forced marches with a single division, reaching the Cumberland opposite the city on the 25th. The enemy had burned the bridge and he could not cross; but almost simultaneously he witnessed the arrival of steamboats bringing General Nelson's division, which immediately landed and occupied the place. This officer and his troops, after several varying orders, were finally sent up the Cumberland to Grant, and ordered forward by him to occupy Nashville and join Buell. It was a curious illustration of dramatic justice that the struggle of the generals over the capture of the place should end in the possession of Nashville by the troops of Buell under the orders of Grant, whose name had not once been mentioned by the contending commanders.

For a few days succeeding the occupation of Nashville news and rumors of what the rebels were doing were very conflicting, and none of the Union commanders suggested any definite campaign. On February 26 Halleck ordered preparations for a movement up either the Tennessee or the Cumberland, as events might require; but for two days he could not determine which. Finally, on the 1st of March, he sent distinct orders to Grant to command an expedition up the Tennessee River, to destroy the railroad and cut the telegraph at Eastport, Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. This was to be, not a permanent army advance, but a temporary raid by gun-boats and troops on transports; all of which, after effecting what local destruction they could, were to return—the whole movement being merely auxiliary to the operations then in progress against New Madrid and Island No. 10, designed to hasten the fall of Columbus. It turned out that the preparations could not be made as quickly as Halleck had hoped; the delay arising, not from the fault or neglect of any officer, but mainly from the prevailing and constantly increasing floods in the Western waters, and especially from damage to telegraph lines that seriously hindered the prompt transmission of communications and orders. Out of this latter condition there also grew the episode of a serious misunderstanding between Halleck and Grant, which threatened to obscure the new and brilliant fame which the latter was earning.

Only a moment of vexation and ill temper can account for the harsh accusation Halleck sent to Washington, that Grant had left his post without leave, that he had failed to make reports, that he and his army were demoralized by the Donelson victory. Reply came back that generals must observe discipline as well as privates. "Do not hesitate to arrest him [Grant] at once," added McClellan, "if

the good of the service requires it, and place C. F. Smith in command." Halleck immediately acted on the suggestion, ordered Grant to remain at Fort Henry, and gave the proposed Tennessee expedition to Smith. Grant obeyed, and at first explained, with an admirable control of temper, that he had not been in fault. Later on, however, feeling himself wronged, he several times asked to be relieved from duty. By this time Halleck was convinced that he had unjustly accused Grant and as peremptorily declined to relieve him, and ordered him to resume his former general command. "Instead of relieving you," he added, "I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume the immediate command and lead it on to new victories." In truth, while neither general had been unjust by intention, both had been blamable in conduct. Grant violated technical discipline in leaving his command without permission; Halleck, with undue haste, preferred an accusation which further information proved to be groundless. It is to the credit of both that they dismissed the incipient quarrel and with new zeal and generous confidence immediately joined in hearty public service.

While the Grant-Halleck controversy and preparations for the Tennessee River expedition were both still in progress, the military situation was day by day slowly defining itself, though as yet without very specific action or conclusion. Buell, becoming satisfied that the enemy had no immediate intention to return and attack him at Nashville, inquired on March 3 of Halleck: "What can I do to aid your operations against Columbus?" To this Halleck replied on the 4th with the information that Columbus had been evacuated, and asked, "Why not come to the Tennessee and operate with me to cut Johnston's line with Memphis, Randolph, and New Madrid?" Without committing himself definitely, Buell answered on the 6th, merely proposing that they should meet at Louisville to discuss details. Halleck, however, unable to spare the time, held tenaciously to his proposition, informing Assistant-Secretary Scott, at Cairo, of the situation in these words:

I telegraphed to General Buell to reinforce me as strongly as possible at or near Savannah [Tennessee]. Their line of defense is now an oblique one, extending from Island No. 10 to Decatur or Chattanooga. Having destroyed the railroad and bridges in his rear, Johnston cannot return to Nashville. We must again pierce his center at Savannah or Florence. Buell should move immediately, and not come in too late, as he did at Donelson.

Feeling instinctively that he could get no effective voluntary help from Buell, Halleck turned again to McClellan, informing him of

his intended expedition up the Tennessee River, that he had directed a landing to be made at Savannah, that he had sent reinforcing tools, and would push forward reinforcements as rapidly as possible. On the following day, however, reporting the strength of Grant's forces, he said: "You will perceive from this that without Buell's aid I am too weak for operations on the Tennessee." The information received by him during the next twenty-four hours that Curtis had won a splendid victory at the battle of Pea Ridge in Arkansas made a favorable change in his resources, and he explains his views and intentions to McClellan with more confidence:

Reserves intended to support General Curtis will now be drawn in as rapidly as possible and sent to the Tennessee. I propose going there in a few days. That is now the great strategic line of the Western campaign, and I am surprised that General Buell should hesitate to reinforce me. He was too late at Fort Donelson, as Hunter has been in Arkansas. I am obliged to make my calculations independent of both. Believe me, general, you make a serious mistake in having three independent commands in the West. There never will and never can be any coöperation at the critical moment; all military history proves it. You will regret your decision against me on this point. Your friendship for individuals has influenced your judgment. Be it so. I shall soon fight a great battle on the Tennessee unsupported, as it seems; but if successful, it will settle the campaign in the West.

We may also conclude that another element of the confidence that prompted his language was the intimation lately received from the Secretary of War, who three days before had asked him to state "the limits of a military department that would place all the Western operations you deem expedient under your command." In fact, events in the East as well as in the West were culminating that rather suddenly ended existing military conditions. The naval battle between the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*, and the almost simultaneous evacuation of Manassas Junction by the rebel forces in Virginia, broke the long inactivity of the Army of the Potomac.

We cannot better illustrate how intently Mr. Lincoln was watching army operations, both in the East and the West, than by quoting his dispatch of March 10 to Buell:

The evidence is very strong that the enemy in front of us here is breaking up and moving off. General McClellan is after him. Some part of the force may be destined to meet you. Look out, and be prepared. I telegraphed Halleck, asking him to assist you if needed.

McClellan's aimless march to capture a few scarecrow sentinels and quaker guns in the deserted rebel field-works, which had been his nightmare for half a year, afforded the opportunity for a redistribution of military leader-

ships, which the winter's experience plainly dictated. Slow and cautious in maturing his decisions, President Lincoln was prompt to announce them when they were once reached. On the 11th of March he issued his War Order No. 3, one of his most far-reaching acts of military authority. It relieved McClellan from the duties of General-in-Chief of all the armies, and sent him to the field charged with the single object of conducting the campaign against Richmond. This made possible a new combination for the West, and the same order united the three Western departments (as far east as Knoxville, Tennessee) under the command of Halleck. Under this arrangement was fought the great battle on the Tennessee that Halleck predicted, giving the Union arms a victory the decisive influence of which was felt throughout the remainder of the war; a success, however, due mainly to the gallantry of the troops, and not to any genius or brilliant generalship of Halleck or his subordinate commanders.

The Tennessee River expedition under Smith, which started on March 10, made good its landing at Savannah, and on the 14th Smith sent Sherman with a division on nineteen steamboats, preceded by gun-boats, to ascend the river towards Eastport and begin the work of destroying railroad communications, which had been the original object of the whole movement. Sherman made a landing to carry out his orders; but this was the season of spring freshets. A storm of rain and snow changed every ravine and rivulet to a torrent; the Tennessee River rose fifteen feet in twenty-four hours, covering most steamboat landings with deep water; and the intended raid by land and water was reduced to a mere river reconnaissance, which proved the enemy to be in considerable force about Iuka and Corinth, covering and guarding the important railroad crossings and communications. Sherman felt himself compelled to return to Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee, nine miles above Savannah, which was on the east bank. The place was already well known to both armies, for a skirmish had occurred there on the 1st of March between Union gun-boats and a rebel regiment.

It would seem that General Smith had fixed upon Pittsburg Landing as an available point from which to operate more at leisure upon the enemy's railroad communications, and hence had already sent Hurlbut's division thither, which Sherman found there on his return. The place was not selected as a battle-field, nor as a base of operations for a campaign, but merely to afford a temporary lodgment for raids upon the railroads. By a silent and gradual change of conditions, however,

the intention and essential features of the whole Tennessee River movement underwent a complete transformation. What was begun as a provisional expedition became a strategic central campaign; and what was chosen for an outpost of detachments was almost imperceptibly turned into a principal point of concentration, and became, by the unexpected assault of the enemy, one of the hardest-fought battle-fields of the whole war.

Halleck assumed command of his combined departments by general orders dated March 13, and after explaining once more to Buell that all his available force not required to defend Nashville should be sent up the Tennessee, he telegraphed him on the 16th of March:

Move your forces by land to the Tennessee as rapidly as possible. . . . Grant's army is concentrating at Savannah. You must direct your march on that point so that the enemy cannot get between us.

The combined campaign thus set in motion was wise in conception, but its preliminary execution proved lamentably weak; and the blame is justly attributable, in about equal measure, to Halleck, Buell, and Grant. For a few days Halleck's orders were decided and firm; then there followed a slackening of opinion and a variance of direction that came near making a disastrous wreck of the whole enterprise. His positive orders to Buell to move as rapidly as possible and to concentrate at Savannah were twice repeated on the 17th; but on the 26th he directed him to concentrate at Savannah or Eastport, and on the 29th to concentrate at Savannah or Pittsburg, while on April 5 he pointedly consented to a concentration at Waynesborough. This was inexcusable uncertainty in the combinations of a great strategist, who complained that "hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity." These were the timid steps of a blind man feeling his way, and not the firm strides of a leader who promised to "split secession in twain in one month."

It can hardly be claimed that Buell's march fulfilled the injunction to move "as rapidly as possible." When his advanced division reached Duck River at Columbia on the 18th it found that stream swollen and the bridge destroyed, and set itself to the task of building a new frame bridge with a deliberateness better befitting the leisure of peace than the pressing hurry of war. Buell arrived in person at Columbia on the 26th.* He manifested his own dissatisfaction with the delay by ordering the construction of another bridge, this time of pontoons, which was completed simultaneously with the first on March 30.

* Buell in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. I., p. 491.

Still further delay was projected by a proposition to halt for concentration at Waynesborough. It must be said in justice to Buell, that Halleck did not complain of the slow bridge-building at Columbia, and that he consented to the concentration at Waynesborough. Had it taken place, Buell's army would again have been "too late" for a great battle. The excuse offered, that Buell supposed the Union army to be safe on the east bank of the Tennessee at Savannah, can scarcely be admitted; for on the 23d Buell received a letter from Grant which said:

I am massing troops at Pittsburg, Tennessee. There is every reason to suppose that the rebels have a large force at Corinth, Mississippi, and many at other points on the road towards Decatur.

This information, which Buell considered of no importance, appears to have excited the serious attention of General William Nelson, one of Buell's division commanders, who, already impatient at the tardy bridge-building, read the signs of danger in the conditions about him with a truer military instinct. Nelson finally obtained permission to ford the now falling waters of Duck River, crossed his division on the 29th and 30th, and began the march over the ninety miles remaining to be traversed with an enthusiasm and impetuosity that swept the whole army past the proposed halting-place at Waynesborough, bringing his own division to Savannah on the 5th, and others on the 6th, of April.

It reflects no credit on General Halleck or General Grant that during the interim of Buell's march the advanced post of Pittsburg Landing had been left in serious peril. Halleck was busy at St. Louis collecting reinforcements to send to Grant, with the announced intention to proceed to the field and take personal command on the Tennessee River. This implied a delay demanding either the concentration of the whole army at Savannah, as originally ordered by him, behind the safe barrier of the Tennessee, or strong fortifications for the exposed position of Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank. On the other hand, Grant, resuming his general command in person on March 17, and finding his five divisions separated, three at Savannah and two at Pittsburg Landing,—nine miles apart, with a river between them,—properly took alarm and immediately united them; but in doing this he committed the evident fault of defying danger by choosing the advanced position and of neglecting to raise the slightest intrenchments to protect his troops—which were without means of rapid retreat—against a possible assault from an enemy only twenty miles distant, and according to his own reports at all times his equal if not his superior in numbers. But

one cause can be assigned for this palpable imprudence. Well instructed in the duties of an officer under orders, he was just beginning his higher education as a leader of armies, and he was about to receive the most impressive lesson of his very strange career.

It has been already stated that after the fall of Fort Donelson the rebel commanders fled southward in confusion and dismay. We have the high authority and calm judgment of General Grant, in the mature experience and reflection of after years, that "if one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the Alleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis, and Vicksburg with the troops we then had";* but the Secessionists of the South-west were still in the fervor of their early enthusiasm, and recovered rapidly from the stupefaction of unexpected disaster. In the delay of four or five weeks that the divided ambition and over-cautious hesitation of the Union generals afforded them, they had renewed their courage, and united and reënforced their scattered armies. The separation of the armies of Johnston from those of Beauregard, which seemed irreparable when the Tennessee River was opened, had not been maintained by the prompt advance that everybody pointed out but which nobody executed. By the 23d of March the two Confederate generals had once more, without opposition, effected a junction of their forces at and about Corinth, and thus reversed the pending military problem. In the last weeks of February it could have been the united Unionists pursuing the divided Confederates. In the last weeks of March it was the united Confederates preparing to attack the divided armies of Halleck and Buell. The whole situation and plan is summed up in the dispatch of General Albert Sidney Johnston to Jefferson Davis, dated April 3, 1862:

General Buell is in motion, 30,000 strong, rapidly from Columbia by Clifton to Savannah; Mitchell behind him with 10,000. Confederate forces, 40,000, ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg. Division from Bethel, main body from Corinth, reserve from Burnsville converge to-morrow near Monterey on Pittsburg. Beauregard second in command; Polk, left; Hardee, center; Bragg, right wing; Breckinridge, reserve. Hope engagement before Buell can form junction.

The Confederate march took place as projected, and on the evening of April 5 their joint forces went into bivouac two miles from the Union camps. That evening also the Confederate commanders held an informal conference. Beauregard became impressed with impending defeat; their march had been slow, the rations they carried were exhausted, and

* Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 317.

their extra rations and ammunition were not yet at hand. They could no longer hope to effect the complete surprise that was an essential feature of their plan. Beauregard advised a change of programme—to abandon the projected attack and convert the movement into a “reconnaissance in force.” General Johnston listened, but refused his assent, and orders were given to begin the battle next morning. No suspicion of such a march or attack entered the mind of any Union officer; and that same day Grant reported to Halleck, “The main force of the enemy is at Corinth.”

The natural position occupied by the Union forces is admitted to have been unusually strong. The Tennessee River here runs nearly north. North of the camps, Snake Creek with an affluent, Owl Creek, formed a barrier stretching from the river bank in general direction towards the south-west. South of the camps, Lick Creek and river sloughs also formed an impassable obstruction for a considerable distance next to the Tennessee. The river on the east, and Snake and Owl creeks on the west, thus inclosed a high triangular plateau with sides three or four miles in length, crossed and intersected to some extent by smaller streams and ravines, though generally open towards the south. The roads from Pittsburg Landing towards Corinth followed the main ridge, also towards the south-west. A network of other roads, very irregular in direction, ran from the Corinth roads to various points in the neighborhood. Alternate patches of timber, thick undergrowth, and open fields covered the locality. Two miles from Pittsburg Landing, on one of the Corinth roads, stood a log meeting-house, called Shiloh Church, which was destined to become the center of the battle-field and to give its name to the conflict.

Three of Grant's divisions were camped in an irregular line from Lick Creek to Owl Creek, closing the open side of the triangular plateau—Sherman's division in the center, near Shiloh Church; Prentiss to his left, towards the Tennessee River and somewhat in advance; McClelland to the right, towards Owl Creek and somewhat in rear. Half-way back from Shiloh Church to Pittsburg Landing were camped the divisions of Hurlbut and of Smith, the latter now commanded—owing to Smith's illness—by W. H. L. Wallace. Another division, under General Lew. Wallace, had been left at Crump's Landing, six miles to the north, as a guard against rebel raids, which threatened to gain possession of the banks of the Tennessee at that point to destroy the river communications. Grant had apprehensions of a raid of this character and cautioned his officers against it, an admoni-

tion that was the basis of such alertness and vigilance as had existed for several days.

Most of the particulars of the battle that followed will probably always form a subject of dispute. There were no combined or dramatic movements of masses that can be analyzed and located. The Union army had no prepared line of defense; three lines in which the rebel army had been arranged for the attack became quickly broken and mingled with one another. On the Union side the irregular alignment of the camps and the precipitancy of the attack compelled the formation of whatever line of battle could be most hurriedly improvised. General Force says:

A combat made up of numberless separate encounters of detached portions of broken lines, continually shifting position and changing direction in the forest and across ravines, filling an entire day, is almost incapable of a connected narrative.

At 5 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, April 6, 1862, the rebel lines moved forward to the attack. The time required to pass the intervening two miles, and the preliminary skirmishes with Union pickets and a reconnoitering Union regiment that began the fight, gradually put the whole Union front on the alert; and when the main lines closed with each other, the divisions of Prentiss, Sherman, and McClelland were sufficiently in position to offer a stubborn resistance. The Confederates found themselves foiled in the easy surprise and confusion that they had counted upon. It would be a tedious waste of time to attempt to follow the details of the fight, which, thus begun before sunrise, continued till near sunset.

Along the labyrinth of the local roads, over the mixed patchwork of woods, open fields, and almost impenetrable thickets, across stretches of level, broken by miry hollows and abrupt ravines, the swinging lines of conflict moved intermittently throughout the entire day. There was onset and repulse, yell of assault and cheer of defiance, screeching of shells and sputtering of volleys, advance and retreat. But steadily through the fluctuating changes the general progress was northward, the rebels gaining and pushing their advance, the Unionists stubbornly resisting, but little losing their ground. It was like the flux and reflux of ocean breakers, dashing themselves with tireless repetition against a yielding, crumbling shore. Beauregard, to whom the Confederate commander had committed the general direction of the battle, several times during the day advanced his headquarters from point to point, following the steady progress of his lines. The time consumed and the lists of dead and wounded are sufficient evidence of the brave conduct of officers and

the gallant courage of men on both sides. On the Union side the divisions of Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace had early been brought forward to sustain those of Prentiss, Sherman, and McClermand. It was, to a degree seldom witnessed in a battle, the slow and sustained struggle, through an entire day, of one whole army against another whole army. The five Union divisions engaged in the battle of Sunday numbered 33,000.* The total force of the Confederates attacking them was 40,000.

It was in the latter half of the afternoon that the more noteworthy incidents of the contest took place. The first of these was the death of the Confederate commander, General Albert Sidney Johnston, who fell personally leading the charge of a brigade.† The knowledge of the loss was carefully kept from the Confederate army, and the management on their side of the conflict was not thereby impaired, because Beauregard had been mainly intrusted with it from the beginning. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon a serious loss fell upon the Unionists. General Prentiss, commanding the Sixth Division, and General W. H. L. Wallace, commanding the Third Division, whose united lines had held one of the key-points of the Federal left since 9 o'clock in the forenoon against numerous and well-concentrated assaults of the enemy, found that the withdrawal of troops both on the right and the left produced gaps that offered an opening to the enemy. Prentiss had been instructed by General Grant to hold his position at all hazards, and consulting with Wallace they determined to obey the order notwithstanding the now dangerous exposure. But the enemy seized the advantage; they quickly found themselves enveloped and surrounded; only portions of their command succeeded in cutting their way out; Wallace was mortally wounded, and Prentiss and fragments of the two divisions, numbering 2200 men, were taken prisoners.

This wholesale capture left a wide opening in the left of the Federal lines, and probably would have given the victory to the rebels but for another circumstance which somewhat compensated for so abrupt a diminution of the Union forces. The Union lines had now been swept back more than a mile and a half, and the rebel attack was approaching the main

Corinth road, running from Pittsburg Landing along the principal ridge, which here lay nearly at a right angle to the river. Colonel Webster of General Grant's staff, noting the steady retreat of the Union lines and foreseeing that the advancing attack of the enemy would eventually reach this ridge, busied himself to post a line of artillery—from thirty-five to fifty guns—along the crest, gathering whatever was available, among which were several heavy pieces. To man and support this extemporized battery he organized and posted, in conjunction with Hurlbut's division, such fragments of troops as had become useless at the front. To reach the crest of this ridge and this line of hastily planted cannon the enemy was obliged to cross a deep, broad hollow, extending to the river and partly filled with back-water. The topography of the place was such that the gun-boats *Tyler* and *Lexington* were also stationed in the Tennessee, abreast the valley and sheet of back-water, and their guns were thus enabled to assist the line of cannon on the ridge by a cross-fire of shells.

General Grant had passed the previous night at Savannah, where he had become aware of the arrival of the advance brigades of Nelson's division of Buell's army on the same day (April 5). He started by boat to Pittsburg Landing early Sunday morning, having heard the firing but not regarding it as an attack in force. Arrived there he became a witness of the serious nature of the attack, and remained on the battle-field, visiting the various division commanders and giving such orders as the broken and fluctuating course of the conflict suggested. But the defense, begun in uncertainty and haste before his arrival, could not thereafter be reduced to any order or system; it necessarily, all day long, merely followed the changes and the violence of the rebel attack. The blind and intricate battle-field offered little chance for careful planning; the haste and tumult of combat left no time for tactics. On neither side was the guidance of general command of much service; it was the division, brigade, and regimental commanders who fought the battle. About noon of Sunday General Grant began to have misgivings of the result, and dispatched a letter for help to Buell's forces at Savannah, saying, "If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the

* Throughout the history of the War of the Rebellion there is a marked disagreement in the estimate of numbers engaged in battles, as stated by the Unionists on one side and the Confederates on the other. This variance comes from a different manner of reporting those "present for duty" in the two armies, out of which arises a systematic diminution of Confederates and increase of Federals in the statements of Confederate writers. General Force, in his admirable little book "From Fort Henry to Corinth," analyzes these

methods of computation as applied to the battle of Shiloh, and arrives at the conclusion that the actual number of "combatants engaged in the battle" of Sunday was fully 40,000 Confederates and between 32,000 and 33,000 Unionists.

The reinforcements of Monday numbered, of Buell's army, about 20,000; Lew. Wallace's, 6500; and other regiments, about 1400.

† W. P. Johnston in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. I., p. 504.

river, it will be more to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us." He also sent an order to General Lew. Wallace, at Crump's Landing, to hasten his division to the right of the army.

So far as the Confederates had any distinct plan of battle, it was merely the simple one of forcing the Federals away from the river to gain possession of Pittsburg Landing, cut off their means of retreat by seizing or destroying the transports, and compel Grant to capitulate. But the execution of this leading design was completely frustrated by the difficult nature of the ground and by the gallant resistance made by Prentiss and Wallace, who held their line on the Union left, unshaken and unmoved, from 9 o'clock in the forenoon until 5 o'clock in the evening. The principal advance made by the rebels was not next to the river, where they desired it, but on the Union right next to Owl Creek, where it was of least value. Even after they had captured the whole residue of Prentiss's and Wallace's divisions, and had cleared out that terrible center of the Union fire which they had ineffectually assaulted a dozen times, and which by bitter experience they themselves learned to know and designate as the "Hornets' Nest," and near which their Commander-in-Chief had fallen in death, they were not yet within reach of the coveted banks of Pittsburg Landing. Before them still yawned the broad valley, the back-water, the mire, the steep hills across which screeched the shells from the gunboats and from the long death-threatening line of Webster's reserve artillery, and behind which the bayonets of Hurlbut's division, yet solid in organization and strong in numbers, glinted in the evening sun. From Hurlbut's right the shattered but courageous remnants of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman stretched away in an unbroken line towards Owl Creek. Ground had been lost and ground had been won; the line of fire had moved a mile and a half to the north; the lines of combatants had been shortened from three miles in the morning to one mile in the evening; but now, after the day's conflict, when the sun approached his setting, the relations and the prospects of the bloody fight were but little changed. The Confederates held the field of battle, but the Unionists held their central position, their supplies, and their communications. The front of attack had become as weak as the front of defense. On each side from eight to ten thousand men had been lost, by death, wounds, and capture. From ten to fifteen thousand panic-stricken Union stragglers covered under the shelter of the high river bank at Pittsburg Landing. From ten to fifteen thousand Confederate stragglers, some

equally panic-stricken, others demoralized by the irresistible temptations of camp-pillage, encumbered the rear of Beauregard's army. The day was nearly gone and the battle was undecided.

A controversy has recently arisen as to the personal impressions and intentions of General Grant at this crisis. His "Memoirs" declare in substance that he was still so confident of victory that he gave orders that evening for a renewal of the fight on the following morning by a general attack. General Buell, on the other hand, makes a strong argument that the evidence is against this assumption.* It is possible, as in so many other cases, that the truth lies midway between the two statements. A famous newspaper correspondent who was on the battle-field made the following record of the affair long before this controversy arose:

The tremendous roar to the left, momentarily nearer and nearer, told of an effort to cut him off from the river and from retreat. Grant sat his horse, quiet, thoughtful, almost stolid. Said one to him, "Does not the prospect begin to look gloomy?" "Not at all," was the quiet reply. "They can't force our lines around these batteries to-night—it is too late. Delay counts everything with us. To-morrow we shall attack them with fresh troops and drive them, of course."

The correspondent adds, in a note: "I was myself a listener to this conversation, and from it I date, in my own case at least, the beginning of any belief in Grant's greatness."†

As this writer was one of Grant's most candid critics, his testimony on this point is all the more valuable.

The turning-point was at length reached. Whatever may have been the much-disputed intentions and hopes of commanders at that critical juncture that were not expressed and recorded, or what might have been the possibilities and consequence of acts that were not attempted, it is worse than useless to discuss upon hypothesis. Each reader for himself must interpret the significance of the three closing incidents of that momentous Sunday, which occurred almost simultaneously.

Some of the rebel division commanders, believing that victory would be insured by one more desperate assault against the Union left to gain possession of Pittsburg Landing, made arrangements and gave orders for that object. It seems uncertain, however, whether the force could have been gathered and the movement made in any event. Only a single brigade made the attempt, and it was driven back in confusion. The officer of another

* Buell in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. I., p. 523, *et seq.*

† Whitelaw Reid, "Ohio in the Civil War."

detachment refused the desperate service. Still others were overtaken in their preparation by orders from General Beauregard to withdraw the whole Confederate army from the fight, and to go into bivouac until the following day. Eager as was that commander for victory, the conclusion had been forced on his mind, that, for that day at least, it was not within the power of his army to complete their undertaking; and accordingly he directed that the fight should cease. He reached this determination not knowing that Buell had arrived, and still hoping that he would not arrive, even on the morrow.

In this hope Beauregard was disappointed. While yet his orders to retire from the combat were being executed, and before the last desperate charge of the rebels towards Webster's reserve artillery was beaten back, the vanguard of Nelson's division, which had marched from Savannah and had been ferried across the river by transports, was mounting the bank at Pittsburg Landing and deploying in line of battle under the enemy's fire, Ammen's fresh brigade first coming to the support of the line of Union guns. A few men out of the brigade fell by the rebel bullets, and then came twilight, and soon after the darkness of night. The tide of victory was effectually turned. Whatever the single army of Grant might or might not have accomplished on the following day against the army of Beauregard is only speculation. Beauregard's attack had been ordered discontinued before the actual presence of Buell's troops on the battle-field. Had the attack been continued, however, that opportune arrival would have rendered its success impossible.

After sunset of Sunday all chances of a rebel victory vanished. The remainder of Nelson's division immediately crossed the river and followed Ammen's brigade to the field. Crittenden's division was next placed in position during the night. Finally McCook's division reached Pittsburg Landing early Monday morning and promptly advanced to the front. General Buell, who had come before the vanguard on Sunday evening, in person directed the placing and preparation of these three superb divisions of his army — a total of about twenty thousand fresh, well-equipped, and well-drilled troops — to renew an offensive conflict along the left of the Federal line. On the Federal right was stationed the fresh division of General Lew. Wallace, numbering 6500, which had arrived from Crump's Landing a little after nightfall, and which took position soon after midnight of Sunday. Along the Federal right center, Grant's reduced divisions which had fought the battle of Sunday were gathered and reorganized, McClernand and

Sherman in front, Hurlbut and the escaped remnants of W. H. L. Wallace's division, with some new detachments, in reserve. Grant and Buell met on Sunday evening and agreed to take the offensive jointly on Monday morning; Buell to command his three divisions on the left, Grant to direct his own forces on the right. No special plan was adopted other than simultaneously to drive the enemy from the field. The plan was carried out in harmony and with entire success. With only temporary checks, brought about by the too great impetuosity of the newly arrived reinforcements, the two wings of the Union army advanced steadily, and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon were in possession of all the ground from which they had been driven on the previous day; while the rebel army was in full retreat upon Corinth — foiled of its victory, dejected in spirit, and in a broken and almost hopeless state of disorganization. A little more genius and daring on the part of the Union commanders would have enabled them by vigorous pursuit to demolish or capture it; but they chose the more prudent alternative, and remained satisfied with only sufficient advance to assure themselves that the enemy had disappeared.

HALLECK'S CORINTH CAMPAIGN.

ON Wednesday, April 9, two days after the battle of Shiloh, General Grant gave evidence that he had fully learned the severe lesson of that terrible encounter. Reporting to Halleck his information that the enemy was again concentrating all his forces at Corinth, he added:

I do not like to suggest, but it appears to me that it would be demoralizing upon our troops here to be forced to retire upon the opposite bank of the river, and unsafe to remain on this many weeks without large reinforcements.

If his mind had reached a conviction of this character two or three weeks earlier, the results of the battle of Shiloh would have given better testimony to his military efficiency.

Halleck's opinion probably coincided with that of Grant, and the fortunes of war enabled him immediately to fulfill his promise to come to his relief. The day which saw the conclusion of the fight at Shiloh (April 7, 1862) witnessed the surrender of the rebel works at Island No. 10, on the Mississippi River, and the quick capture of nearly their entire garrison of six or seven thousand men. This finished the task which General Pope had been sent to do and enabled Halleck to transfer him and his army, by water, from the Mississippi River to the Tennessee. Halleck's order was made on April 15, and on the 22d Pope landed at

Hamburg, four miles above the battle-field of Shiloh, with his compact force of twenty thousand men fully organized and equipped, and flushed with a signal victory.

Halleck had arrived before him. Reaching Pittsburg Landing on the 11th of April, he began with industry to cure the disorders produced by the recent battle. Critics who still accuse the Lincoln administration of ignorant meddling with military affairs are invited to remember the language of the Secretary of War to Halleck on this occasion: "I have no instructions to give you. Go ahead, and success attend you."

The arrival of Pope was utilized by Halleck to give his united command an easy and immediate organization into army corps. His special field orders of April 28 named the Army of the Tennessee the First Army Corps, commanded by Grant, and constituting his right wing; the Army of the Ohio the Second Army Corps, commanded by Buell, and constituting the center; and the newly arrived Army of the Mississippi the Third Army Corps, commanded by Pope, and forming the left wing. Two days later (April 30) another order gave command of the right wing to General Thomas, whose division of the Army of the Ohio was added to it; it also organized a reserve corps under General McClelland, and had this provision:

Major-General Grant will retain the general command of the district of West Tennessee, including the Army Corps of the Tennessee, and reports will be made to him as heretofore; but in the present movements he will act as second in command under the major-general commanding the department.

The exact intent of this assignment remains to this day a matter of doubt. Nominally, it advanced Grant in rank and authority; practically, it deprived him of active and important duty. Halleck being on the field in person issued his orders directly to the corps commanders and received reports from them, and for about two months Grant found himself without serious occupation. The position became so irksome that he several times asked to be relieved, but Halleck refused; though he finally allowed him to go for a season into a species of honorable retirement, by removing his headquarters from the camp of the main army.

Coming to the front so soon after the great battle, Halleck seems to have been impressed with the seriousness of that conflict, for all his preparations to assume the offensive were made with the most deliberate caution. It was manifest that the enemy intended to defend Corinth, and necessarily that place became his first objective. With all the efforts that the Confederate Government could make, however, Beauregard succeeded in bringing

together only about fifty thousand effective troops. Halleck's combined armies contained more than double that number; but such was his fear of another disaster, that his advance upon Corinth was not like an invading march, but like the investment of a fortress. An army carrying a hundred thousand bayonets, in the picturesque language of General Sherman, moved upon Corinth "with pick and shovel." Intrenching, bridge-building, road-making, were the order of the day. Former carelessness and temerity were succeeded by a fettering over-caution.

The Administration expected more energetic campaigning from a commander of Halleck's reputed skill and the brilliant results realized since his advent. The country seemed at the culmination of great events. Since the beginning of the year success had smiled almost continuously upon the Union cause. As the crowning inspiration, in the midst of his march there had come the joyful news of Farragut's triumph and the capture of New Orleans. "Troops cannot be detached from here on the eve of a great battle," telegraphed Halleck to Stanton. "We are now at the enemy's throat." To such encouraging assurances the Administration responded with every possible exertion of reinforcement and supply. But days succeeded days, and the President's hope remained deferred. Nearly a month later, when reports came that Halleck was awaiting the arrival of a fourth Union army,—that of Curtis from Arkansas,—and these reports were supplemented by intimations that he would like to be joined by a fifth army from somewhere else, Mr. Lincoln sent him a letter of so kindly an explanation, that, in the actual condition of things, every word was a stinging rebuke:

Several dispatches from Assistant-Secretary Scott and one from Governor Morton, asking reinforcements for you, have been received. I beg you to be assured we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame when I tell you each of our commanders along our line from Richmond to Corinth supposes himself to be confronted by numbers superior to his own. Under this pressure we thinned the line on the Upper Potomac, until yesterday it was broken at heavy loss to us and General Banks put in great peril, out of which he is not yet extricated and may be actually captured. We need men to repair this breach, and have them not at hand. My dear general, I feel justified to rely very much on you. I believe you and the brave officers and men with you can and will get the victory at Corinth.

In reply Halleck resorted to the usual expedient of reading the Secretary of War a military lecture. May 26 he wrote:

Permit me to remark that we are operating upon too many points. Richmond and Corinth are now the great strategical points of war, and our success at these points should be insured at all hazards.

His herculean effort expended itself without corresponding result, when, a week later, he marched into the empty intrenchments of Corinth, only to find that the fifty thousand men composing Beauregard's army — the vital strength of rebellion in the West — were retreating at leisure to Baldwin and Okalona, railroad towns some fifty miles to the south. It had required but two days for the rebel army to go from Corinth to the Shiloh battle-field. Halleck consumed thirty-seven days to pass over the same distance and the same ground, with an army twice as strong as that of his adversary. Pope had reached him April 22, and it was the 29th of May when the Union army was within assaulting distance of the rebel intrenchments. The campaign had advanced with scientific precision, and attained one object for which it was conducted: it gained the fortifications of Corinth. In the end, however, it proved to be but the shell of the expected victory. Beauregard had not only skillfully disputed the advance and deceived his antagonist, but at the critical moment had successfully withdrawn the rebel forces to wage more equal conflict on other fields. The enemy evacuated Corinth on the night of the 29th, and beyond the usual demoralization which attends such a retrograde movement suffered little, for Halleck ordered only pursuit enough to drive him to a convenient distance. The achievement was the triumph of a strategist, not the success of a general. Instead of seizing his opportunity to win a great battle or to capture an army by siege, he had simply manœuvred the enemy out of position.

In reporting his success to Washington, Halleck of course magnified its value to the utmost,* and for the moment the Administration, not having that full information which afterward so seriously diminished the estimate, accepted the report in good faith as a grand Union triumph. It was indeed a considerable measure of success. Besides its valuable moral effect in strengthening the patriotism and the confidence of the North, and the secondary military advantage that the combined Western armies gained in the two months' strict camp discipline and active practical in-

struction in the art of field fortification, there was the positive possession of an important railroad center, and the apparent security of western and central Tennessee from rebel occupation.

In addition to these it had one yet more immediate and valuable military result. The remaining rebel strongholds on the upper Mississippi were now so completely turned that they were no longer tenable. Forts Pillow and Randolph were hastily evacuated by the enemy, and the Union flotilla took possession of their deserted works on June 5. Halleck had been looking somewhat anxiously for help on the river, and had complained of the unwillingness of the gun-boats to run past the Fort Pillow batteries and destroy the river fleet of the rebels. Flag-Officer Davis had considered the risk too great and had remained above Fort Pillow, occupying his time in harassing the works by a continuous bombardment. Now that the way was opened he immediately advanced in force, and at night of June 5 came to anchor two miles above the city of Memphis. His flotilla had lately received a notable reinforcement. One of the many energetic impulses which Stanton gave to military operations in the first few months after he became Secretary of War was his employment of an engineer of genius and daring, Charles Ellet, Jr., to extemporize a fleet of steam rams for service on the Western rivers.

The single blow by which the iron prow of the *Merrimac* sunk the frigate *Congress* in Hampton Roads, during the famous sea-fight between the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*, had demonstrated the effectiveness of this novelty in marine warfare. Ellet's proposal to the Secretary of the Navy, to try it on the Western rivers, was not favorably entertained; probably because the Navy Department already had its officers and its appropriations engaged in other more methodical and permanent naval constructions. But the eager and impatient Secretary of War listened to Ellet's plans with interest, and commissioned him to collect such suitable river craft as he could find on the Ohio, and to convert them post-haste into steam rams, "the honorable Secretary," reports Ellet, "expressing the hope that not

* Pope, condensing into one dispatches from Rosecrans, Hamilton, and Granger, telegraphed to Halleck: "The two divisions in the advance under Rosecrans are slowly and cautiously advancing on Baldwin this morning, with the cavalry on both flanks. Hamilton with two divisions is at Rienzi and between there and Boonville, ready to move forward should they be needed. One brigade from the reserve occupies Danville. Rosecrans reports this morning that the enemy has retreated from Baldwin, but he is advancing cautiously. The woods, for miles, are full of stragglers from the enemy, who are coming in in squads. Not less than ten thousand men

are thus scattered about, who will come in within a day or two." General Halleck dispatched to the War Department: "General Pope, with 40,000 men, is 30 miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners and deserters from the enemy, and 15,000 stand of arms captured." This dispatch of General Halleck's made a great sensation. The expectation that the stragglers would come into the national camp was disappointed; the prisoners taken were few, and Pope was censured for making a statement of fact which he neither made nor authorized. [Force, "From Fort Henry to Corinth."]

more than twenty days would be consumed in getting them ready for service." Ellet received his orders March 27.* On May 26 he joined the flotilla of Davis with a fleet of six vessels, formerly swift and strong river tugs and steamers, but now strengthened and converted for their new and peculiar service, and these accompanied the gun-boats in the advance against Memphis. On the morning of June 6 the rebel flotilla of eight gun-boats was discovered in front of the city preparing for fight, and there occurred another of the many dramatic naval combats of the war.

The eight rebel gun-boats ranged themselves in two lines abreast the city. The hills of Memphis were covered with thousands of spectators. With the dawn five of the Union gun-boats began backing down the Mississippi, holding their heads against the strong current to insure easier control and management of the vessel. The steam rams were yet tied up to the river bank. Soon the rebel flotilla opened fire on the Union gun-boats, to which the latter replied with spirit. Four of Ellet's rams, hearing the guns, cast loose to take part in the conflict. One of them disabled her rudder, and another, mistaking her orders, remained out of fighting distance. But the *Queen of the West* and the *Monarch*, passing swiftly between the gun-boats, dashed into the rebel line. The gun-boats, now turning their heads down the stream, hastily followed. There was a short and quick mêlée of these uncouth-looking river monsters, ram crashing into ram and gun-boat firing into gun-boat in a confusion of attack and destruction. In twenty minutes four rebel vessels and one Union ram were sunk or disabled. At this the other four rebel vessels turned and fled down-stream, and in a running pursuit of an hour, extending some ten miles, three additional vessels of the enemy were captured or destroyed. The Confederate fleet was almost annihilated; only one of their gun-boats escaped. The two disabled Union ships were soon raised and repaired, but the ram fleet had suffered an irreparable loss. Its commander, Ellet, was wounded by a pistol-shot, from the effect of which he died two weeks later. The combat was witnessed by Jeff. Thompson, commanding the city with a small detachment of rebel troops. In his report of the affair he mentions that "we were hurried in our retirement from Memphis," and that afternoon the Union flag floated over the city.

The naval victory of Memphis supplemented and completed the great Tennessee campaigns begun by Grant's reconnaissance of January 9. A division of Buell's army under General Mitchell had in the meanwhile occupied and held the line of the Tennessee River between Tuscumbia and Stevenson; and thus the frontier of rebellion had been pushed down from middle Kentucky below the southern boundary of the State of Tennessee.

But the invading movement following the line of the Tennessee River had expended its advantage; the initial point of a new campaign had been reached. We are left in doubt under what conviction Halleck formed his next plans, for he determined to dissolve and scatter the magnificent army of more than one hundred thousand men under his hand and eye; apparently in violation of the very military theory he had formulated two weeks before, when he said, "We are operating on too many points." In a dispatch to the Secretary of War on the 9th of June he announced his purpose to do three distinct things: First, to hold the Memphis and Charleston railroad; secondly, to send relief to Curtis in Arkansas; thirdly, to send troops to east Tennessee. To these three he added a fourth purpose in a dispatch of June 12:

If the combined fleet of Farragut and Davis fail to take Vicksburg, I will send an expedition for that purpose as soon as I can reënforce General Curtis.

Up to this point the country's estimate of General Halleck's military ability had steadily risen, but several serious errors of judgment now arrested his success. The greatest of these errors, perhaps, was the minor importance he seems to have attached to a continuation of the operations on the Mississippi River.

We have mentioned the victory of Farragut, and we need now to follow the upward course of his fleet. After receiving the surrender of New Orleans in the last days of April, he promptly pushed on an advance section of his ships up the Mississippi, which successively, and without serious opposition, received the surrender of all the important cities below Vicksburg, where Farragut himself arrived on the 20th of May. Vicksburg proved to be the most defensible position on the Mississippi, by reason of the high bluffs at and about the city. The Confederates had placed such faith in their defenses of the upper river, at Columbus, Island No. 10, and Fort Pillow, that no

* In response to that order I selected three of the strongest and swiftest stern-wheel coal tow-boats at Pittsburg, of which the average dimensions are about 170 feet length, 30 feet beam, and over 5 feet hold. At Cincinnati I selected two side-wheel boats, of which the largest is 180 feet long, 37½ feet beam in the wid-

est part, and 8 feet hold. At New Albany I secured a boat of about the same length but rather less beam, and subsequently I selected another at Cincinnati, of about the same class as the last, and sent her to Madison to be fitted out. [Ellet to McGunnigle, April 27, 1862. War Records.]

early steps were taken to fortify Vicksburg; but when Farragut passed and captured the lower forts and the upper defenses fell, the rebels made what haste they could to create a formidable barrier to navigation at Vicksburg. Beauregard sent plans for fortifications while he was yet disputing Halleck's advance from Shiloh to Corinth; and Lovell at New Orleans, retreating before Farragut's invasion, shipped the heavy guns he could no longer keep, and sent five regiments of Confederate troops, which he could no longer use, to erect the works. These reached their destination on May 12, and continuing the labors and preparations already begun, he had six batteries ready for service on Farragut's arrival. Remembering these dates and numbers, we can realize the unfortunate results of Halleck's dilatory Corinth campaign. He had then been in command, for a whole month, of forces double those of his antagonist. If, instead of digging his way from Shiloh to Corinth "with pick and shovel," he had forced such a prompt march and battle as his overwhelming numbers gave him power to do, the inevitable defeat or retreat of his enemy would have enabled him to meet the advance of Farragut with an army detachment sufficient to effect the reduction of Vicksburg with only slight resistance and delay. Such a movement ought to have followed by all the rules of military and political logic. The opening of the Mississippi outranked every other Western military enterprise in importance and urgency. It would effectually sever four great States from the rebel Confederacy; it would silence doubt at home and extinguish smoldering intervention abroad; it would starve the rebel armies and feed the cotton operatives of Europe. There would have been ample time; for he was advised as early as the 27th of April that New Orleans had been captured and that Farragut had "orders to push up to Memphis immediately," and he ought to have prepared to meet him.

No such coöperation, however, greeted Farragut. Reaching Vicksburg, his demand for the surrender of the place was refused. The batteries were at such a height that his guns could have no effect against them. Only two regiments of land forces accompanied the fleet. There was nothing to be done but to return to New Orleans, which he reached about the 1st of June. Here he met orders from Washington communicating the great desire of the Administration to have the river opened, and directing further efforts on his part to that end. Farragut took immediate measures to comply with this requirement. His task had already become more difficult. The enemy quickly comprehended the advantage which

the few high bluffs of the Mississippi afforded them, if not to obstruct, at least to harass and damage the operations of a fleet unsupported by land forces. The places which had been surrendered were, on the retirement of the ships, again occupied, and batteries were soon raised, which, though unable to cope with larger vessels, became troublesome and dangerous to transports, and were intermittently used or abandoned as the advantage or necessity of the enemy dictated.

Farragut again reached Vicksburg about June 25, accompanied this time by Porter with sixteen of his mortar-boats, and by General Williams at the head of three thousand Union troops. The mortar-sloops were placed in position and bombarded the rebel works on the 27th. On the morning of June 28, before daylight, Farragut's ships, with the aid of the continued bombardment, made an attack on the Vicksburg batteries, and most of them succeeded in passing up the river with comparatively small loss. Here he found Ellet — brother of him who was wounded at Memphis — with some vessels of the ram fleet, who carried the news to the gun-boat flotilla under Davis yet at Memphis. This flotilla now also descended the river and joined Farragut on the 1st of July.

We have seen, by the dispatch heretofore quoted, that Halleck expected the combined naval and gun-boat forces to reduce the Vicksburg defenses, but also that, in the event of their failure, he would send an army to help them. The lapse of two weeks served to modify this intention. The Secretary of War, who had probably received news of Farragut's first failure to pass the Vicksburg batteries, telegraphed him (on June 23) to examine the project of a canal to cut off Vicksburg, suggested by General Butler and others. Halleck replied (on June 28), "It is impossible to send forces to Vicksburg at present, but I will give the matter very full attention as soon as circumstances will permit." That same day Farragut passed above the batteries, and of this result Halleck was informed by Grant, who was at Memphis. Grant's dispatch added an erroneous item of news concerning the number of troops with Farragut, but more trustworthy information soon reached Halleck in the form of a direct application from Farragut for help. To this appeal Halleck again felt himself obliged to reply in the negative, July 3, 1862:

The scattered and weakened condition of my forces renders it impossible for me, at the present, to detach any troops to coöperate with you on Vicksburg. Probably I shall be able to do so as soon as I can get my troops more concentrated. This may delay the clearing of the river, but its accomplishment will be certain in a few weeks.

The hopeful promise with which the telegram closed dwindled away during the eleven days that followed. On the 14th of July Stanton asked him the direct question:

The Secretary of the Navy desires to know whether you have, or intend to have, any land force to cooperate in the operations at Vicksburg. Please inform me immediately, inasmuch as orders he intends to give will depend on your answer.

The answer this time was short and conclusive. "I cannot at present give Commodore Farragut any aid against Vicksburg."

A cooperative land force of from 12,000 to 15,000 men, Farragut estimated in his report of June 28, would have been sufficient to take the works. If we compare the great end to be attained with the smallness of the detachment thought necessary, there remains no reasonable explanation why Halleck should not have promptly sent it. But the chance had been lost. The waters of the Mississippi were falling so rapidly that Farragut dared not tarry in the river; and in accordance with orders received from the Department on July 20, he again ran past the Vicksburg batteries and returned to New Orleans.

If Halleck's refusal to help Farragut take Vicksburg seems inexplicable, it is yet more difficult to understand the apparently sudden cessation of all his former military activity, and his proposal, just at the point when his army had gathered its greatest strength and efficiency, abruptly to terminate his main campaign, and, in effect, go into summer quarters. He no longer talked of splitting secession in twain in one month, or of being at the enemy's throat. He no longer pointed out the waste of precious time, and uttered no further complaint about his inability to control Buell's army. His desires had been gratified. He commanded half of the military area within the Union; he had three armies under his own eye; the enemy was in flight before him; he could throw double numbers of men at any given point. At least two campaigns of overshadowing importance invited his resistless march. But in the midst of his success, in the plenitude of his power, with fortune thrusting opportunity upon him, he came to a sudden halt, folded his contented arms, and imitated the conduct that he wrongfully imputed to Grant after Donelson—"Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without regard to the future." In a long letter to the Secretary of War, dated June 25, after reviewing the sanitary condition of the army and

pronouncing it very good, he asks, apparently as the main question, "Can we carry on any summer campaign without having a large portion of our men on the sick-list?" This idea seems to dominate his thought and to decide his action. Buell had been ordered eastward on a leisurely march towards Chattanooga. Halleck proposed to plant the armies of Grant and of Pope on the healthy uplands of northern Mississippi and Alabama as mere corps of observation. Having personally wrested Corinth from the enemy, he exaggerated its strategical value. As a terminal point in the southward campaign, along the line of the Tennessee River, its chief use was to aid in opening the Mississippi River by turning the Confederate fortifications from Columbus to Memphis. Those strongholds once in Federal possession, Corinth inevitably fell into a secondary rôle, especially since the summer droughts rendered the Tennessee River useless as a military highway.

Carrying out this policy of Halleck, a large portion of the Western armies of the Union wasted time and strength guarding a great area of rebel territory unimportant for military uses, and which could have been better protected by an active forward movement. The security and the supply of Corinth appears to have been the central purpose. Buell was delayed in his march thoroughly to repair the railroad from Corinth eastward towards Chattanooga. Other detachments of the army were employed to repair the railroads westward from Corinth to Memphis, and northward from Corinth to Columbus. For several months all the energies of the combined armies were diverted from their more legitimate duty of offensive war to tedious labor on these local railroads,* much of the repairs being destroyed, almost as rapidly as performed, by daring guerrilla hostilities, engendered and screened amidst the surrounding sentiment of disloyalty.

It is impossible to guess what Halleck's personal supervision in these tasks might have produced, for at this juncture came a culmination of events that transferred him to another field of duty; but the legacy of policy, plans, and orders that he left behind contributed to render the whole Western campaign sterile throughout the second half of 1862.

The infatuation of Halleck in thus tying up the Western forces in mere defensive inaction comes out in still stronger light in the incident that follows, but it especially serves to show once more how, in the West as well as in the

* I inclose herewith a copy of a report of Brigadier-General McPherson, superintendent of railroads, from which it will be seen that we have opened 367 miles of road in less than one month, besides repairing a number of locomotives and cars which were captured

from the enemy greatly injured. Indeed, the wood-work of most of the cars has been entirely rebuilt, and all this work has been done by details from the army. [Halleck to Stanton, July 7, 1862. War Records.]

East, President Lincoln treated his military commanders, not with ignorant interference, as has been so often alleged, but with the most fatherly indulgence. Future chapters will describe the complete failure in the East of the campaign undertaken by McClellan against Richmond, and which, on the 30th of June, brought to Halleck an order from the Secretary of War, dated the 28th, immediately to detach and send 25,000 men to assist that imperiled enterprise. The necessity was declared "imperative." "But in detaching your force," explained the order, "the President directs that it be done in such a way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against Chattanooga and east Tennessee." Halleck took instant measures to obey the order, but said in reply that it would jeopardize the ground gained in Tennessee and involve the necessity of abandoning Buell's east Tennessee expedition. This result the President had in advance declared inadmissible. He now telegraphed emphatically on June 30:

Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry — no artillery or cavalry; but please do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important to hold, or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the expedition against Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, in east Tennessee, I think equally as important as the taking and holding of Richmond.*

This request, but accompanied by the same caution and condition, was repeated by the President on July 2; and again, under the prompting of extreme need, Lincoln on July 3 sent a diminished request, still, however, insisting that no risk be incurred in the West:

You do not know how much you would oblige us, without abandoning any of your positions or plans, if you could promptly send us even ten thousand infantry. Can you not? Some part of the Corinth army is certainly fighting McClellan in front of Richmond. Prisoners are in our hands from the late Corinth army.

In Halleck's response on the following day it is important to notice the difference in the opinions entertained by the two men upon this point. Lincoln wished to gain east Tennessee, Halleck desired to hold west Tennessee. The distinction is essential, for we shall see that while Halleck's policy prevailed, it tended largely, if not principally, to thwart the realization of Lincoln's earnest wish. Halleck telegraphed:

For the last week there has been great uneasiness among Union men in Tennessee on account of the secret organizations of insurgents to cooperate in any attack of an enemy on our lines. Every commanding officer from Nashville to Memphis has asked for reinforcements. Under these circumstances I submitted the question of sending troops to Richmond to the principal officers of my command. They are unanimous in opinion that

* War Records.

if this army is seriously diminished the Chattanooga expedition must be revoked or the hope of holding south-west Tennessee abandoned. I must earnestly protest against surrendering what has cost so much blood and treasure, and which in a military point of view is worth more than Richmond.

He had already, in a previous telegram (July 1), acknowledged and exercised the discretion which Lincoln gave him, replying, "Your telegram, just received, saves western Tennessee."

It was found by the Washington authorities that the early reports of McClellan's reverses had been unduly exaggerated, and that by straining resources in the East, the Western armies might be left undiminished. But with this conviction President Lincoln also reached the decision that the failure of the Richmond campaign must be remedied by radical measures. To devise new plans, to elaborate and initiate new movements, he needed the help of the highest attainable professional skill. None seemed at the moment so available as that of Halleck. Under his administration order had come out of chaos in Missouri, and under his guiding control, however feeble in the particular cases that we have pointed out, the Western armies had won the victories of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Island No. 10, and Corinth. It was a record of steady success, which justified the belief that a general had been found who might be intrusted with the direction of the war in its larger combinations. The weakness of his present plans had not yet been developed. Accordingly on the 11th of July this order was made by the President:

That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States as General-in-Chief, and that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department under his charge.

It seemed at the moment the best that could be done. In his short Corinth campaign Halleck had substantially demonstrated his unfitness for the leadership of an army in the field. He had made a grievous mistake in coming away from his department headquarters at St. Louis. He was a thinker and not a worker; his proper place was in the military study and not in the camp. No other soldier in active service equaled him in the technical and theoretical acquirements of his profession. The act of the President in bringing him to Washington restored him to his more natural duty.

In following the future career of Halleck, one of the incidents attending this transfer needs to be borne in mind. The first intimation of the change came in the President's dispatch of the 2d of July which asked: "Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit

for consultation without endangering the service in your department?" A few days later one of the President's friends went from Washington to Corinth bearing a letter of introduction to Halleck, explaining among other things:

I know the object of his visit to you. He has my cheerful consent to go, but not my direction. He wishes to get you and part of your force, one or both, to come here. You already know I should be exceedingly glad of this if in your judgment it could be done without endangering positions and operations in the Southwest.

To this Halleck replied on July 10:

Governor Sprague is here. If I were to go to Washington I could advise but one thing — to place all the forces in North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington under one head and hold that head responsible for the result.

It is doubtful if Halleck measured fully the import of his language; or whether he realized the danger and burden of the responsibility which, if he did not invite, he at least thus voluntarily assumed. Nominally he became General-in-Chief, but in actual practice his genius fell short of the high requirements of that great station. While he rendered memorable service to the Union, his judgment and courage sometimes quailed before the momentous requirements of his office, and thrust back upon the President the critical acts which overawed him. In reality, therefore, he was from the first only what he afterward became by technical orders — the President's chief-of-staff.

Before Halleck's transfer to Washington he had ordered Buell to move into east Tennessee, but that commander never seemed to appreciate the great military and political importance of such a movement. He considered the defense of west Tennessee a more essential object; and while his mind was engaged in that direction, Bragg planned and carried into effect a campaign into Kentucky that threatened at one time the most disastrous consequences to the Union cause in that region. He moved northward early in September, 1862, Kirby Smith preceding him with a strong detachment by way of Cumberland Gap, which marched without successful opposition almost to the Ohio River. Buell, believing that Bragg's real object was Nashville, made such dispositions that Bragg got a long start before him in the race to Louisville. He would, in fact, have had that city at his mercy if he had not left the direct road and turned to the right to join Kirby Smith at Frankfort to assist in the melancholy farce of inaugurating a Confederate governor for

Kentucky. Buell thus reached Louisville and immediately marched south in pursuit of Bragg. He overtook his army at Perryville and fought, on the 8th of October, a severe but indecisive battle; Buell kept the field and Bragg retired in the night, and hurried out of Kentucky at a pace that soon distanced his antagonist. The President renewed his earnest solicitations to Buell to occupy east Tennessee; Buell thought this impracticable, and was relieved of command on the 24th of October, and General Rosecrans was appointed to succeed him.

Rosecrans paid little attention as Buell had done to the orders of the President for the occupation of east Tennessee. He established his headquarters at Nashville, completed and strengthened his communications, and in the latter part of December moved upon General Bragg, who had gone into winter quarters at Murfreesboro'. The two armies came within sight of each other on the night of the 30th of December, 1862, and the next morning at daybreak each general moved to the fight, in pursuance of plans that were the exact counterpart of each other — Rosecrans having ordered his left wing to strike Bragg's right, double it up and take the position at Murfreesboro' in reverse, while Bragg proposed to crush the right wing of Rosecrans, and swinging the Confederate army around pivoting on its right to cut the Union force off from Nashville. Bragg struck the first blow with so much vigor that Rosecrans was obliged to give up his movement on the Confederate right and devote all his energies to the defense of his own position; and in spite of his utmost efforts, and the distinguished bravery with which he was supported by Thomas, Sheridan, and others, he lost ground all day, and at night the lines of the two armies were almost perpendicular to those that they had occupied in the morning. But Bragg had lost so severely in this day's fighting that he was unable to pursue his advantage on the 1st of January 1863; and on the 2d Rosecrans resumed the offensive on his left with such success that Bragg found himself forced to abandon the field in the night. The losses on both sides were appalling, and the result of the fight was so damaging to Bragg that he was unable to resume active operations during the winter of spring, and was, in fact, so weakened, that when, in the summer of 1863, Rosecrans at last marched against him, he gave up his positions one after another, until the Union army occupied, in September, without striking a blow the coveted and important mountain fortresses of Chattanooga.

HARD TIMES IN THE CONFEDERACY.



WITH emotions of mingled pain and pleasure, akin to those that come at hearing once again a familiar air, the echo of whose last cadence vanished years ago, so the reminiscences of the many makeshifts and expedients for maintaining life and a degree of comfort recur to the minds of those who, in the Southern Confederacy, struggled through the period embraced within the years 1861 and 1865. The blood-stained battle-fields where the hosts of contending armies met in deadly conflict witnessed no finer examples of courage and self-abnegation than did the chimneys and roof-trees of those times, where the ragged rebels had left wives and mothers and children and slaves to keep the household gods together, to raise the stint of corn and wine and oil, and to tend the flocks whereby they all might be clothed and fed.

It savors more of the ludicrous, perhaps, than of the desperately serious to be told in these latter days of how great an amount of money it took then to buy even the scant supplies of food and clothes which served to ward off cold and subdue hunger. If the State militia officer of the present who arrays his figure in the prescribed uniform of his command, at the moderate cost of some fifty or sixty dollars, had worn the Confederate "army forms" on his sleeve some twenty odd years back, he then could not have disported himself in such an outfit of trousers, coat, and vest for a less sum than twelve or fifteen hundred dollars of the currency at that time in vogue south of Mason and Dixon's line. Or had he been then as now, perchance, a *beau sabreur*, as some of that day were, with a love for the pomp and circumstance of war, though possessing withal the fine spirit of the *gants glacés* of De Preslin at Rethel, in the war of the Fronde, he doubtless would have affected the popular fashion of a soft slouch hat with a black plume waving from it and the brim upheld by a glittering star; and this gay headgear would have cost him a cool two hundred dollars of Confederate currency. But they were few in number who could wear fine uniforms even in the earlier days of the conflict; and in the latter years the prices of all commodities rose on a steady scale—save only that of one, which remained for the most part steadfast

and immovable from first to last, and that one was military service.

The privilege of fighting, bleeding, and even dying for one's unhappy country was in those days an inestimable boon which outweighed every sordid consideration of Confederate promises to pay—at least in the opinion of the higher authorities; and when a pound of tea from Nassau brought five hundred dollars, and a pair of cavalry boots six hundred dollars in that ridiculous medium of exchange, the pay of the private soldier of the Army of Northern Virginia was about eight dollars a month! Though there be something ludicrous in it all, the humor of it touches so nearly the outer edge of the heroic as to seem strangely like pathos.

Even where the money was to be had, the materials for handsome uniforms were not; and it is said that the insignia of rank on the sleeves and collar of a distinguished Confederate general were made by his wife from pieces of yellow flannel which before the war had been one of his children's petticoats.

Style and material were, after all, mere matters of individual gratification; for the army cared little what manner of raiment officers or comrades wore, save to make "b'iled" shirts, and a superfluity of finery wherever visible, subjects of infinite jest. The soldiers were as ready to cheer the dingy little forage cap of the puritan Stonewall Jackson when he trotted down the lines as to salute with applause the plumed chapeau of the dashing cavalier Stuart.

The traditional rebel soldier in the persimmon tree, who told his captain that he was eating the green persimmons in order to fit his mouth to the size of his rations, epitomized in his epigrammatic speech the history of the economic conditions of the Southern States, both in the field and at home, during the war of the Rebellion. After the seaports of the South had once become thoroughly blockaded, it was a continuous, and in the end unavailing, struggle on the part of the people of the Confederacy to accommodate the status of supply to that of demand.

After the war ended, a monthly magazine dedicated to perpetuating the records of the war from a Southern standpoint, and soon perishing in the vain endeavor, published a rude wood-cut, which, with its concomitant inscription, expressed with great pith and point

the extremities to which soldiers and homelike alike were reduced in the latter days of the contest. It represented two lank, lean, lantern-jawed Confederates in a blackberry patch. One of them, on his knees, the more readily to reach the palatable fruit, is looking upward at his comrade with a grim smile, and saying:

"They can't starve us, nohow, as long as blackberries last."

The vein of his self-gratulation and assurance is readily acquiesced in and reinforced by the other, who responds in a spirit of apt commendation, and with an even larger and more catholic faith:

"Naw, sir! And not as long as thar's huckleberries, nuther. And when they're gone, come 'simmons!"

To the uninitiated stranger who saw and read, the rude cut and its underwritten legend, if considered at all, doubtless were held coarse and witless; but to him who knew the bitter meaning thereof, through his own harsh experience, they spoke with the emphasis of a stern and powerful significance.

We read with a shudder of the dire straits to which the denizens of beleaguered cities are often subjected, when unclean animals and unwholesome refuse become the sole means of subsistence, and rejoice to think that such vicissitudes are few and far between. But it is no exaggeration to say, that, while only in exceptional instances were the Southern people reduced to such a pass, yet, from the day when the Federal fleet blockaded the harbors and forts of the Confederacy, their wants often left them not very many degrees removed from the condition of besieged people in the latter stages of beleaguement.

While the ratio of cold and hunger experienced was in an inverse order to that of comparative physical comfort the country was full of suffering, and thousands of people who had been reared and had lived in the extremes of ease and affluence were for months and years without what are believed, from the standpoint of the present, to be the commonest necessities of daily life.

The blockade-runners made at intervals perilous trips from Wilmington and Charleston to Nassau and back, carrying out cargoes of cotton and bringing in supplies. But these scanty imports were only a drop in the great empty bucket of want; and the South was forced to rely upon its own products, its own industry, and its own ingenuity to meet the demands of physical and social existence. The sudden realization of this duty of the hour was a greater shock to the inert and indolent South of that time than even that of arms; yet the deductive philosopher, speculating upon the origin and progress of the great

material growth and prosperity attained within the last two decades by the States once in rebellion, may well be led to attribute to this growth and prosperity the initial leaven of a highly wrought self-reliance and courage born of the sacrifices and struggles of that period. The women of the Confederacy learned the moral of the chapter even between the hard lines of its beginning; and it is by the memory of these mothers that the new South has been enabled to rise from the ashes of the old.

Forcing its producing capacity to the utmost limit that the crippled condition of labor would allow, and straining its ingenuity until that ingenuity threatened to give way, food and clothing at last failed the people of the South. The want of these things was the indomitable engineer who cleared the way for Sherman's march to the sea, the unanswerable herald who summoned Lee to Grant's presence at Appomattox Court House. It is no reflection upon the great generals of the Union to say, as the historian must, that the Federal navy, bringing the blockade, brought the hard times to the Confederacy, and that the hard times hastened its fall.

With the markets of Europe left open to its cotton, and with powerful friends at the courts of England and of France, whose friendship perhaps would have assumed more substantial form but for the envying Federal fleet, who can prophesy what might not have been the fate of the young Government? But with its most important staple thrown almost valueless upon its hands, the moral no less than the physical effect of the blockade upon its fortunes was tremendous. The land that had laughed aloud with plenty under the bounteous and beneficent rule of King Cotton saw the scepter of that sway depart from it, and was sad. The free-trade carried on without let or hindrance, wherever any trade was possible among the seceded States, which lay for the most part in a common latitude, and the variety of whose products was very slight, constituted a profoundly insignificant item when weighed in the balance against the no-trade of a vast outside world, producing all things that the wants of man might require. Of manufacture the South of that time knew absolutely nothing. She had no fisheries—or, having them, the blockade would have ended them. The mineral wealth that lay beneath the surface in many of her States was enveloped in a density of ignorance that was only accentuated by the scattered charcoal iron-furnaces set at wide intervals here and there in the Virginia or Georgia or east Tennessee hills, like faintly glimmering stars on the border of the great dark.

And yet during the hard times rude manufactures of various kinds were initiated, and the charcoal furnaces were multiplied. The cotton which could not be sold to Europe was made into cloth at home, and from the iron that ran molten from the scattered furnaces were wrought the death-dealing cannon of an historic army.

The currency of the new Government was from the beginning weighted down with a collateral condition which, though it had small effect on patriotism, caused no slight anxiety in the breast of far-seeing and circumspect men. This weighty condition was the promise to pay the stipulated amount of each note to the bearer of the imprinted piece of paper only at the expiration of a specified period of time "after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States of America." In the final issue the anxiety and doubt of caution were fully justified, for no treaty of peace was ever concluded between the Governments named in the elusive bond. Neither blood nor flesh might redeem the ill-starred paper from the Shylock of defeat.

This element of uncertainty made the value of the currency as shifting and mutable as the fortunes of the armies of its Government; but a cause of depreciation much more potent and far reaching was the diminution and final cessation of the cotton traffic by reason of the blockade.

The continental currency of the Revolution, floated on the tentative credit of a feeble and undeveloped country, did not lose its value any more rapidly than did this money of a confederation of some of the wealthiest and most prosperous States on the North American continent.

The dollar and ten cents of Confederate money which in September, 1861, would buy as much as a gold dollar of the United States, was worth in September, 1864, only about one-twenty-seventh of a gold dollar, and would buy scarcely anything, because it had no circula-

tion anywhere except in the Confederacy, and at that time there was hardly anything in the Confederacy for sale.* The very color in which the calamitous currency was printed seemed ominous; and with its systematic and rapid decline the fortunes of the embryo Government which it represented took on a cerulean and unpropitious hue. Finally it became so valueless for all purposes of trade that many, looking for an early and untoward ending of the struggle, refused to accept it at all. It was in vain that in many sections indignation meetings were held by the more patriotic in which those who declined it were denounced; for numbers of tradesmen and professional men alike advertised in the current newspapers that they would none of it, and that their dealings would be "by way of barter and exchange alone."

At an earlier period the theory had seemed to prevail that it was impossible for too much money to be afloat; and though the Government presses groaned beneath their steady output of Confederate treasury-notes, and the Register and the Treasurer of the Confederate States were reduced to the extremity of hiring men to sign the almost innumerable bills for them, State treasury-notes were circulated in profusion, while "wild-cat" bank-notes of all sorts, shapes, and sizes vied with the "shin-plaster" utterances of municipalities, private corporations, firms, and individuals in supplying the popular demand.

Counterfeiting must have been an easy task; but if counterfeits were circulated, they were received without question when every man who could hire a printing-press and write his name had the power to make as much money as he would.

This overflowing deluge of fiat money alarmed and dissipated the old-fashioned gold and silver coins of our progenitors, which fled incontinently, as they will do under such circumstances, to the coffers of the cautious and the stockings of the saving. Supplies of food and clothing, with a sturdy contempt

* The following is a table of values of Confederate money adopted by the courts of Virginia after the war for convenience in settlements of transactions in that currency:

	1861	1862	1863	1864	1865
January					
February		\$1.25	\$3.00	\$20.00 to 20.50	\$45.00 to 60.00
March		1.25	4.05	22.50 to 25.00	45.00 to 65.00
April		1.30	5.00	23.00 to 24.50	60.00 to 70.00
May		1.40	5.50	22.00 to 23.00	60.00
June	\$1.10	1.50	5.50	18.00 to 21.00	
July	1.10	1.50	7.00 to 8.00	17.00 to 19.00	
August	1.10	1.50	9.00	20.00 to 23.00	
September	1.10	1.50	12.00 to 13.00	22.50 to 25.00	
October	1.15	2.50	12.00 to 13.00	22.50 to 27.50	
November	1.15	2.50	14.00	26.00 to 27.00	
December	1.20	3.00	15.00 to 17.00	27.50 to 33.50	
			18.00 to 20.00	34.00 to 49.00	

for such an absurd financial theory, stoutly declined to lend it any countenance, and became monthly less purchasable than before.

Such a staple and necessary article of food as salt advanced within two months during the first year of the war from ten to eighteen dollars per sack, and from this time on continued to show a steady increase in price to the end, in spite of the fact that the salt springs and "licks" of Virginia, east Tennessee, and the Indian Territory were furnishing constantly large quantities of it.

Every article of food increased in price in a similar ratio; and the market reports of produce and supplies in contemporaneous Confederate journals present a strange contrast from month to month and year to year. Perhaps the most striking instance of the advance in prices of food supplies occurs in the case of flour, which in March, 1863, sold for \$25 per barrel; in January, 1864, for \$95 per barrel; and in January, 1865, for \$1000 per barrel. The spectral army in the Confederate rear, led by General Hard Times, was closing up its ranks, touching elbows, and moving at a double-quick in those days of January, 1865. There was death at the cannon's mouth in front of the hungry, foot-sore, shivering rebel, and starvation in the rear.

Even so early as February, 1863, the money value of a day's rations for 100 soldiers, which had in the first year of the war been about \$9, was at market prices \$123. In the corresponding month of the following year a day's rations had no estimated market value. From the soldier who possessed them money could not buy them, and he who was without them was unable to procure them at any price.

Side by side with the reports of battles and the records of peace commissions, congresses, and legislatures, the blurred columns of the Confederate press were wont to teem with domestic recipes for cheap dishes, directions for raising and utilizing various vegetable products, instructions for making much of little in matters pertaining to every phase of household life. Hard by a list of dead and wounded would stand a recipe for tanning dog-skins for gloves; while the paragraphs just succeeding the closing column of the description of a naval engagement off Hampton Roads were directions for the use of boneset as a substitute for quinine.

The journals of that day were printed usually upon the poorest paper, made of straw and cotton rags, and so brittle that the slightest touch mutilated it. The ink, like the paper, was of the cheapest and commonest, and left its impression, not only on the face of the

sheet, but on the hands no less than on the mind of the reader. Few fonts of new type found their way into the Confederacy during the war, and at the end of four years the facilities for printing had come to a low ebb. It was no uncommon thing for publishers to issue half-sheets in lieu of a complete paper, with scarcely an apology to subscribers for the curtailment of their literary and news rations. It was generally understood that this happened only through stern necessity, and not from any disposition on the part of the newspaper men to give less than an equivalent for the subscription price. Sometimes the journal which on yesterday appeared in all the glory of a six-column page was to-day cut down to a four-column half-sheet; or publication was suspended with the announcement that the stock of materials had been exhausted, and that as soon as the office could be replenished publication would be resumed. Eagerly as the rough sheets were looked for and closely as they were read, a diminution of matter in them, or a failure to appear, caused only passing comment or dissatisfaction. Men's minds were so filled with the thousand things that each day brought forth about them, there were so many rumors in the air, and news flew so rapidly even without newspaper aid, as to cause them not too greatly to miss that which to-day has come to be one of the veriest necessities of American life—a daily journal full of all the doings of all the world.

Sometimes even the coarse straw-paper failed the publishing fraternity when an edition was absolutely imperative; yet in such emergency the inventive talent never deserted them. It was considered a wonderful journalistic feat on the part of its publishers for the Vicksburg "Citizen," during the siege of that city, to make its appearance, when all other resources had failed, upon wall-paper.

Publishers of books and sheet music occupied a scarcely less helpless condition than the newspaper people. Their sole grounds of superiority consisted in the fact that the demands upon them were not so urgent. The girl who sang to her soldier lover the popular songs of that time, "Lorena," "When this Cruel War is Over," "The Standard-bearer," or "Harp of the South,"—which were all duly advertised "at the retail price of one dollar per sheet; the trade supplied, however, at half off, with an additional discount where one hundred of one piece are ordered,"—did not experience that immediate and insistent need of the song and its music which men and women alike felt for the newspaper that would tell them where the last battle had been fought, which army had been victorious, who had been promoted, and who had fallen. The

fateful column might contain evil or good report of some dear one, and its coming was full of interest and apprehension. Yet the sheet music, printed, like the newspapers, in the roughest style, upon the commonest paper, with now and then a caricatured lithographic likeness of some Confederate general on the title-page, continued to be sold and sung, even though its price ran from one to two dollars per sheet.

War songs and war music were the order of the day; and the soldiers in the camps and the small boys in ragged jackets shouted, with an equal zest,

“The despot’s heel is on thy shore!”

or

“Farewell forever to the Star-spangled Banner!”

from diminutive paper-covered books of martial ballads. The little song-books cost anywhere from two and a half to five Confederate dollars; and their contents, with a few notable exceptions, were as mediocre as the paper on which they were printed. The sentiment was there, nevertheless; and this was cared for by the singers more than the music or the lyrical or literary excellence of the songs.

The missionary and religious publishing houses never ceased their praiseworthy labor of printing tracts and pamphlets for distribution among the soldiers; but publications of a more ambitious or secular standard were very few. Now and then some adventurous firm in Richmond or Charleston or New Orleans would issue a badly printed edition of a new novel, reproduced from a copy smuggled in “through the lines” or brought by the blockade-runners from Nassau. Still, even “John Halifax, Gentleman,” and “Les Misérables,” which first appeared in the South in this way and this dress, lost much of their attractiveness in their Confederate garb of inferior ink, bad type, and worse paper.

Reminiscence of books and papers of the period recalls the dire and unfiled want of every species of stationery in each household, and the rough devices which were resorted to for supplying such deficiencies. It was a time when any individual who wished to use an envelope might be compelled first to make it, after the theory of “first catch your hare,” etc. The manner of their making was to cut them out of paper by a tin or pasteboard pattern, and fasten the flaps either with glue manufactured from the gum of the cherry-tree, or with ordinary flour-paste. Old desks and secretaries were ransacked, and frequently not unsuccessfully, for the red wafers or the sealing wax of an earlier date. Even the most stylish

and fashionable note paper for correspondence had an extremely unstylish texture, to say nothing of its hue, that ill comported with the red wax stamped with a crested coat of arms. The juice of poke-berries, compounded with vinegar, or the distillation of a vegetable product known as “ink balls,” usurped the place of ink, and faded from its original purple or crimson color with great rapidity to one of ugly rust. Steel pens were scarcely to be had for love or Confederate money; and the forgotten accomplishment of trimming a gray goose-quill to a good nib came to be once more an accomplishment with an ascertained value. The mucilage on the backs of the ill-engraved blue ten-cent stamps, adorned with the head of Jefferson Davis, often failed of its purpose; and the fingers, which were not infrequently tired enough after cutting out and making the envelope, trimming the pen, and writing the letter, must need still go through the labor of separating the stamps from each other with a pair of scissors or a penknife, and applying flour-paste to the back of the recalcitrant stamp, to insure the safe carriage of the missive of affection to the far-away soldier whose eyes might never read it.

The boys of that day, bereft of pencils, made them for themselves by melting bullets and pouring the molten lead into the cavity of small reeds from the cane brakes. Trimmed to a point, the home-made pencil, though its mark was faint, sufficed to serve the purposes of the young scribes and mathematicians.

It seems almost a figment of the fancy to recall in detail the array of makeshifts and devices which the hunger and thirst of the hard times compelled. We read with curious interest the item of news in the Virginia newspapers of January, 1865, that

Thompson Taylor, Esq., who had charge of the cooking of the New Year’s dinner for the soldiers of General Lee’s army, sold the surplus grease from the meats cooked to one of the railroad companies for seven dollars per pound.

If we might shut out the memories of the depreciation in value of Confederate money, and of the hardships and want prevalent in the Southern Confederacy at the time, we should doubtless wonder what strange army was this the remnants of whose magnificent viands could fetch so marvelous a sum; and haply recollections of the luxury and effeminacy of that innumerable array which the great king led into ancient Hellas would flit across our bewildered minds. Yet how different the reality; and how sharply the little item accentuates the story of privation and suffering! Provisions, which were plentiful enough in the days when the Yankees were to be “whipped

with corn-stalks," grew constantly scarcer and higher priced. The necessaries of the life of to-day were the luxuries of that storm-and-stress time. With "seed-tick" coffee and ordinary brown sugar costing fabulous sums and almost impossible to be obtained, it is small matter of wonder that the unsatisfied appetite of the rebel sharpshooter at his post far to the front often impelled him, though at the risk of detection and death, to call a parley with the Yankee across the line, his nearest neighbor, and persuade him to a barter of the unwonted delicacies for a twist of Virginia home-spun tobacco. Perhaps it never affected the mind of either with a sense of incongruity in their friendly dealings to reflect that the duty and the purpose of each was to shoot the other at the earliest opportunity after the cessation of the temporary truce and the return of each to his post.

Lovers of the fragrant after-dinner Mocha were forced to put up with a decoction of sweet potatoes that first had been cut into minute bits and dried on a scaffold in the sun as country housewives dry fruit, and then roasted and ground in a worn-out coffee-mill, or brayed in a mortar with a pestle. In yet more northern latitudes parched rye furnished even a poorer substitute for the Eastern berry; while coupled with the use of this last makeshift was the vulgar superstition that it produced blindness.

The old women and Dr. Johnsons of the Confederacy who could not exist without their fixed number of cups of tea a day drowned their happy memories of hyson in a solution of raspberry leaves, or the more medicinal preparation of the root of the sassafras bush. It was a gruesome time, and there were those who survived bullet and blade to surrender at last to indigestion and acute dyspepsia.

The number and character of intoxicating drinks were many and varied. Corn and rye whisky abounded; while in some latitudes pine tags and even potato peelings went into the impromptu still to come out pure "mountain dew." No internal revenue system aroused the ire of the untrammled distillers, and alcoholic liquors were cheaper in proportion than most other commodities; yet the amount of drunkenness was not what might have been expected. A favorite small beer in those sections where the persimmon-trees flourished best was made of the fruit of that tree, and was called in the vernacular of at least one part of the Confederacy "'possum toddy."

Housekeepers and cooks racked memory and imagination to make dishes that combined the absolutely essential conditions of being at once cheap and nutritious. Housekeeping, even in old Virginia, famous for its cookery,

hung a dejected head; and the whole South was less in want of the army of cooks, which Horace Greeley said it so much needed when he visited it after the war's end, than of something for the army to cook. A rare and famous dish of those days was "Confederate duck" — a dish which would have done no discredit to the piping period of peace, and which grew rarer and more famous as the hard times came nearer home to the Confederacy. This peculiarly named fowl was no fowl at all, but a tender and juicy beefsteak rolled and pinioned around a stuffing of stale bread crumbs, buttered and dully seasoned, and roasted before a roaring fire with spit and drip-pan.

At home and abroad sorghum came to take the place of the vanished sugar. The children at home ate it in their ginger cakes, and the soldiers in camp drank it in their rye-coffee. The molasses and sugar of Louisiana were procurable in degree till the fall of Vicksburg; but the spirit of independence was rife, and each State desired and determined to rely as much as possible on its own products. The theory of State sovereignty was extended even to sorghum; and its introduction was hailed everywhere as one of the greatest boons of a beneficent Providence. The juice of the cane, extracted in a primitive fashion by crushing the stalks between wooden rollers revolving upon wooden cogs and impelled by horse-and-little-darkey power, was caught in an ordinary trough, boiled down into proper consistency in preserving kettles, kitchen pots, or whatever might be utilized for the purpose, and barreled for use as sorghum molasses. The syrup thus produced was quite a palatable one, with a slightly acidulous and not disagreeable flavor, but with an unpleasant tendency to make the mouth sore. It was known as "long-sweetening," in contradistinction to its predecessor, "short-sweetening," the sugar that was scarce.

From its use in the place of sugar sorghum soon leaped into high repute as an almost universal food staple. It was warranted to cure any case of hunger in man or beast. Writers in the suggestive daily press undertook in elaborate and exhaustive essays to show that sorghum syrup was nearly as nutritious as meat and an exceedingly good substitute for it, while the seed of the sorghum cane was capable of being ground into a meal that made a most excellent and wholesome brown bread. They claimed that the problem of blockaded existence had been solved in the discovery of a plant which produced in itself meat and bread for the human family and provender for cattle. Yet the average denizen of the Confederacy, whether at home or in the army, while rendering due credit to the inge-

nity and skill with which the cause of the "food staple" was advocated by its champions, appealed to the higher arbitrament of his own digestion; and though willing to accord sorghum its real merit as serviceable and useful in the place of something better, he was always ready to exchange it for the more certain and familiar nutriment of bacon and "corn pone." To see it fulfill the functions of sugar in the latest recipe for Confederate coffee and tea was well enough; but quietly to submit to its usurpation of the high places of pork and corn was more than the appetite of hungry rebellion would endure.

There was a secondary use to which sorghum was put, in which it met with decided favor from a select few. This was its use in the manufacture of blacking. The manuscript recipe books of that day say that "wonderful shoe blacking, as good as Mason's best," can be made of sorghum molasses, pinewood soot, neat's-foot oil, and vinegar.

Yet, on the theory of the survival of the fittest, the average Confederate must have been right and the theoretic writers in the newspapers wrong about the value of sorghum; for bacon and corn bread have long since regained their wonted ascendancy in the South, and sorghum has vanished entirely from the fields where it once flourished, save, perhaps, where here and there some man and brother cultivates it yet in his little "truck patch," making "long-sweetening" for the consumption of his family in as primitive a method as that in which he helped his quondam owner to make it "endurin' o' the wah."

In the hardest times of the war period, when provisions were the scarcest, the larch to the larder of every Southern housekeeper hung out to each Southern soldier, no matter how ragged or humble. For him the best viands about the place were always prepared; and his was the high prerogative of receiving the last cup of real coffee, sweetened with the solitary remnant of sugar. With compassionate pity the women recognized the hardships in the army life of the Confederate soldier, and were always ungrudgingly ready to mitigate its severities in every possible manner.

"Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy" was a maxim of necessity in the hard times; for there was no raiment the subject of barter or sale which was inexpensive. Sporadic instances taken at random prove the general rule. In August, 1864, a private citizen's coat and vest, made of five yards of coarse homespun cloth, cost two hundred and thirty dollars exclusive of the price paid for the making. The trimmings consisted of old cravats; and for the cutting and putting together, a

country tailor charged fifty dollars. It is safe to say that the private citizen looked a veritable guy in his new suit, in spite of its heavy drain upon his pocket-book.

In January, 1865, the material for a lady's dress which before the war would have cost ten dollars could not be bought for less than five hundred. The masculine mind is unequal to the task of guessing how great a sum might have been had for bonnets "brought through the lines"; for in spite of patient self-sacrifice and unflinching devotion at the bedside of the wounded in the hospital, or in ministering to the needs of relatives and dependents at home, the Southern women of those days are credited with as keen an interest in the fashions as women everywhere in civilized lands are apt to be in times of peace. It was natural that they should be so interested, even though that interest could in the main not reach beyond theory. Without it they often would have had a charm the less and a pang the more. Any feminine garment in the shape of cloak or bonnet or dress which chanced to come from the North was readily awarded its meed of praise, and reproduced by sharp-eyed observers, so far as the scarcity of materials would admit.

But fashion's rules were necessarily much relaxed in the Southern Confederacy so far as practice went when even such articles as pins brought through the blockade sold for twelve dollars a paper, and needles for ten, with not enough of either.

The superstition expressed in the couplet,

See a pin, and pick it up,
All the day you 'll have good luck,

gained its converts by the score; more, however, as can be readily imagined, for the sake of the pin itself, which it was a stroke of happy fortune to find and seize, than of any other good luck that was to accompany the finding. The broken needle of Confederate times did not go into the fire or out of the window, but was carefully laid aside until the red sealing wax of the ransacked desks and secretaries lent it a head wherewith to appear as a handsome and useful pin. To obtain the bare materials out of which to fashion garments for the family and for the servants soon became a serious question. The house-carpenter and the blacksmith were called into service to this end, and cotton once more became king, though of a greatly diminished sovereignty. Carding-combs of a rough pattern were constructed for the purpose of converting the raw cotton into batting, and thence into rolls of uniform length and size for spinning. The hum of the spindle and the clank of the loom-treadle were the

martial music with which the women at home met the fierce attacks of the legions of cold and nakedness.

Spinning-wheels, reels, bobbins, looms, and all the appurtenances for the weaving of cloth were made and used at home; and the toilers in the cotton-fields and the spinners in the loom-shed worked on contentedly, with a seemingly sublime indifference to the mighty struggle that was convulsing a continent for their sakes.

Of this dusky people it may here be said that, no matter what philanthropists, politicians, or philosophers have said of them in the past or shall prophesy of them in the future, they were true to every trust reposed in them; and with a most tremendous power for direct evil in their possession, the negroes of the South in the days of the civil war did naught but good. If the "colored troops" of the Union army "fought nobly," the slaves of the Southern plantation so bore themselves in those stirring times as to merit no smaller meed of praise.

Cotton and woolen fabrics of firm and substantial texture were woven, cut, and fashioned into garments for whites and blacks. Plentiful crops of flax reënforced the array of wool and cotton; and many a little flax-wheel which in the days of peace has since moved North to adorn in its newly gilded and beribboned state the boudoir of some æsthetic girl might tell pathetic tales of its former place of residence if the tongue of its tiny spindle had but speech.

The dyes of the forest wood-barks, of the sumac, of the Carolina indigo, and of the coperas from the numerous copperas wells were utilized to color the cloth thus woven. We read in the current newspapers that "a handsome brown dye" is made by a combination of red oak-bark and blue stone in boiling water; and that "a brilliant yellow" may be obtained by pouring boiling water upon other component parts of "sassafras, swamp bay, and butterfly root." The same authorities tell us that "vivid purples, reds, and greens" were produced from a composition of coal-oil and sorghum, tinted with the appropriate tree-bark; though of coal-oil for other purposes there was all too little. If a great similarity of quality and texture existed in the homespun cloth, the enumeration of the foregoing means of dyeing clearly demonstrates that there was at least opportunity for as great diversity of color as distinguished the famous coat of Joseph; though the reader of to-day is apt to look with some suspicion on the conspicuous forwardness of the adjectives "vivid," "brilliant," and "splendid," which always accompanied these talismanic recipes.

Strong thread for sewing was evolved from the little flax-wheels. For any unusually handsome work, if by any odd chance such work should happen to be demanded, sewing silk was procured in an emergency by raveling the fringes of old silk shawls or picking to pieces silk scraps which had survived time's touch, and carding, combing, and twisting them into fine threads. These little silken "hanks" were sometimes so prettily colored by means of the dyes that have been described, as to become in the eyes of the womankind of that generation almost as beautiful as the many shaded, dainty *filoselles* of the present are to the women of to-day.

In the old Greek philosophy the limitations of desire were the boundaries of happiness. Stern necessity inculcated in the minds of the people of the South the folly of desiring much, and they learned the lesson fully; but its knowledge disproved in their case the truth of the old pagan doctrine. There were so many cares and anxieties and apprehensions treading close upon each other's pinched and starving steps that happiness could not always sit, a tranquil guest, at the poverty-smitten fireside.

For hats and caps many were the quaint devices contrived. Men's silk hats were seldom seen, save in some battered and forsaken shape and style that bespoke the halcyon days "before the war." When in occasional instances they appeared trim and new with the nap lying smoothly one way, they were generally recognized to have come from Nassau with a blockade-runner, and known to have cost much money. Their wearers, however, were not objects of envy to those who saw them run the gauntlet of the soldiers' gibes, who with rough wit and often rougher words scoffed at the wearers at Rome of apparel that self-respecting Romans had long since ceased to wear. Even the conventional slouch hat of the South, which had divided the affections of its *jeunesse dorée* with the voluminously skirted broadcloth coat before Fort Sumter fell, and whose popularity was easily renewed after Appomattox, and still holds perennial sway, passed away in large measure with the later months of the Confederacy.

With the growth of "substitutes" in the matter of things inanimate to eat or to wear, "substitutes" decreased in the acceptance of the term as descriptive of those who for pecuniary consideration were willing to take others' places in the ranks. The military draft, which enrolled old men and boys, took also many of the hatters of military age who had been left scattered through the Southern States, and then winter headgear got down to the bed-rock of coon and rabbit skins.

For making summer hats the Carolina palmetto leaf was in the greatest repute. Next in availability came wheat or rye straws, carefully selected with a view to size and quality, and bleached in the sun. The palmetto strips or the straws were first steeped in water to render them more pliable, and then plaited together by hand and sewed into proper shape. What constituted proper shape was usually a question to be solved only by the maker, and varied from the eminently picturesque to the decidedly grotesque or uncouth. If the hat of palmetto or straw was intended to adorn some feminine head, perchance a faded ribbon, redyed, or a gray partridge wing, lent it additional grace and beauty. In winter, home-woven hats, or knitted caps of the Tam o' Shanter type, were frequently seen. In spite of fashion's adverse though half-hearted decrees, young faces of those days seemed as sweet and winning under wide-brimmed "sundowns" or old time "pokes" as ever did those that have laughed beneath a "love of a bonnet" of a more *de rigueur* mode.

With the adjuncts of the female toilet the blockade made sad havoc. Silken stockings became undreamed-of luxuries; and their accompanying articles of apparel, which when first donned by a bride must always be composed of

Something old and something new,
Something borrowed and something blue,

fell far short of easy silk elastic, being made of knit yarn or cotton. Stockings of wool or cotton were the best that the most luxurious might aspire to. Shoe-strings were made in quantities by the children on little bobbins, or by plaiting or twisting threads together. Ladies' button boots were things almost unknown. Shoes were sometimes made of the pliant leather found in the flaps of disused cartridge-boxes and of the discarded belts of the soldiers. Oftener they were fashioned of cloth cut on the pattern of old shoes and sewed to leathern soles. Crinoline and corsets were constructed of hickory splints in lieu of whalebone and steel springs; and the prepared bark of certain kinds of trees or certain plants furnished the ladies with a supply of braids and switches. Then as now, however, the style of arranging the tresses of the female head frequently changed under the dictates of a fashion feebly endeavoring to assert itself wherever possible; and at one time even a small amount of natural hair easily served the purpose of covering the crescent shaped pillows on which it was put up, the startling names of which were "rats" and "mice."

Buttons, pins, buckles, hooks and eyes dis-

appeared by degrees from the face of the Southern Confederacy. Some wooden buttons were turned upon lathes from maple and similar wood, and there were horn buttons here and there; but both species were for the most part clumsy and ill-shapen. The whites of the Confederacy were content with them, while the slaves skewered their "galluses" to their trousers with wooden pins or the thorns of the locust.

Combs were made of horn or wood; and bristle tooth-brushes were replaced with twigs of the dog-wood, the black-gum, the sweet-gum, and the althea. The latter was especially valued as serving the double purpose of brush and dentifrice at once.

Turkey-wing fans and fans of peacock feathers supplanted those of a more or less artistic and elaborate design and finish; and many other articles of use or ornament, dear to the feminine heart and not easily attainable, were ingeniously simulated.

In February, 1864, it was officially announced that two hundred soldiers of the Stonewall Brigade were entirely without shoes. The statement indicates the great stress of poverty in respect to leather. The slave population in the farther South went barefoot in the summer and wore "wooden bottoms" in the winter. Men of the easiest circumstances, as easy circumstances then went, were forced to be content with shoes of the coarsest. To shoe the Army of Northern Virginia had made a dearth of leather in the South, and every method of economy was practiced to avoid further trouble on this score. The "wooden bottoms" of the slaves resembled in some respects the wooden shoes of the French peasantry. The upper-leather was that of the ordinary shoe, and was fastened by means of small wrought-iron nails to a sole and heel cut carefully to fit the bottom of the foot from a solid block of cypress wood. Their novelty, when first introduced among the negroes, made captive the fancy of the children of both races; and juvenile wooden bottoms were the rage for a long time.

As the years went by and the war went on, household furniture perished in the using and had to be replaced. Worn-out carpets saw themselves renewed in pretty colors and patterns, as bright and serviceable though not so handsome as Wilton. They came from the busy loom rooms with restored capacity to keep out the cold and deaden the clatter of the little wooden bottom shoes. Cozy rugs were made of the most unexpected materials, such as old shawls, flannel petticoats, stockings the heels and toes of which had forsaken them, and the like. Curtains of quaint stripes and figures, woven of stuffs from similar sources,

shut out the winds of winter, and gave comfort and beauty to the rooms. Broken chairs and decrepit sofas were replaced with others constructed of homespun cloth and cotton stuffing upon frames of wood roughly put together, or fashioned entirely of broom straw from the old fields, bound together in ornamental shapes with hickory withes. Sometimes interlaced grapevines made a pretty and not uncomfortable chair or sofa; and the common wooden frames, bottomed with twisted shucks or oak splints, abounded everywhere.

Many persons had their glass and china ware destroyed during the war; and it was almost impossible to replace it, even at ruinous prices. Such articles were always eagerly sought for at auction sales, and he who came determined to purchase must needs have a plethoric purse. Porcelain and earthenware of a coarse kind were manufactured from kaolin found in the Valley of Virginia and at other points in the South.

In their many exigencies and narrow straits the people of the Confederacy were nowhere put to a more crucial test than in the matter of lights. In the cities, gas, the fumes of which were as offensive to the olfactories as its radiating power to the eye, afforded a wretched pretense of illumination. In the country, where even the miserable gas was not to be had, the makeshifts to supply light were many. There was but little coal-oil in the South, and as little sperm-oil; and the tallow of the country went in large measure to the armies for military purposes.

A favorite lamp, and one easily fitted up, was a saucer of lard with a dry sycamore ball floating in the midst of it. A blaze applied to the sycamore ball readily ignited it; and it burned with a feeble, sickly glare until its sea of lard disappeared and left it no longer a fiery island. In the recipes printed in the current newspapers setting forth the proper manner of preparing the sycamore balls for use as candles, special insistence is made that they are to be "gathered from the tree and dried in the sun." If allowed to become over-ripe and fall to the ground before use, their fibrous covering would lose its hold upon the core, and drop away into the lard.

In the slave-quarters, "fat" pine knots blazed upon the hearth through winter and summer nights alike; while the night scenes of the negroes' merry-makings in the open air were illuminated by means either of the same material, or of crude tar piled upon the bowls of broken plantation shovels, set high in the midst on tripods made of three-limbed saplings. The juba-dance and the corn-shucking were equally invested with elements of the unreal and the grotesque, where the flickering

and shifting lights of the unconventional lanterns touched the dusky faces and forms and the smoke of their strange altars rose over them.

Another light in great vogue was the "Confederate," or "endless," candle. It was constructed by dipping a wick in melted wax and resin and wrapping it around a stick, one end of the wick being passed through a wire loop fastened to the end of the stick. The wick burned freely when lighted, but the illumination was very feeble; and unless the candle was watched, and the wick drawn through the loop and trimmed every few minutes, the whole affair was soon aflame. A great advantage of the Confederate candle was the length of time which it would last, its duration, when properly attended, being commensurate with the length of its wick and stick.

By the light of the sycamore ball or of the endless candle thousands throughout the South pored over the news columns of the papers at night to learn how went the battle, or scanned the lists of the wounded and the dead with eyes that ached with their hearts.

At no season of the year did the hard times draw so bitterly near the hearts of the adults as when the little homespun stockings hung about the chimney-place at Christmas, to await the coming of Santa Claus "through the lines." If he did not always bring bounteous profusion of gifts, the innocent fiction of his having been robbed by the armies on his way from the country of sleds and reindeers found many ready little believers, who, taking it for truth, yet did not really know how much of truth there was in it. To the younger children, who had no personal knowledge of the existence of many of the things that made the Christmas times so attractive to their elder brothers and sisters, the season was not so forlorn and pathetic as it often seemed to those who would have done so much for them and yet could do so little. Nor did they comprehend, if perchance they ever saw, the tears that oftentimes crept into unwilling eyes at the severe leanness of the little Christmas stocking, and the poverty that constituted its chief ingredient. Peanuts, known in the vernacular as "goobers," both raw and parched, pop-corn in balls and pop-corn in the ear, Florida oranges, apples, molasses cakes and molasses candy made up the list of confectionery dainties for the young people at that season. There were few of the many thousands of children living in the South when the war ended who had ever seen, even in a store window, a lump of white sugar or a striped stick of peppermint candy. The sorghum cakes of the hard times took the shapes of soldiers with im-

possible legs and arms, waving equally impossible banners; there were also guns, swords, pistols, horses with wonderful riders, and a multitude of curious animals not to be found described in any natural history then or now extant. So the molasses candy of the period was fashioned into baskets, hats, dolls, and manifold kinds of figures. Jumping-jacks, or "supple sawneys," were made of pasteboard, and worked their arms and legs through the medium of a cotton string. Rag doll-babies with eyes, noses, and mouths of ink were in great favor in the absence of those of wax or china; while here and there was the ever-welcome Noah's Ark with its menagerie of animals and its crew of men and women, all curiously carved out of pine-bark. Indestructible linen books for the little ones were made of pieces of cotton-cloth stitched together, on which were pasted pictures cut from old illustrated papers and magazines. Knitted gloves, suspenders, comforters, wristlets, and the like filled up the measure of the Christmas gifts.

Yet none the less gayly for the privation and distress standing so near at hand did the girls of that era trip it in the dances of the Christmas-tide with their brave soldier partners whenever opportunity offered; and none the less beautifully for the hard times did the red holly-berries of the season show from their waxen green, or the mistletoe hang overhead, in the light of the endless candles. For the

young women of the South, full of vim and life and spirit, the period of the war was in many respects a happy one. The girls and their lovers danced, as the soldiers fought, with all their might, and enjoyed it while it lasted. But with them, as with their elders, sorrows crowded on each other's heels, and the bride of yesterday was often the widow of to-day. They affected military dress, and wore brass buttons and epaulets whenever attainable. The demands of society upon them made sad havoc with many relics of earlier days which had been religiously preserved up to that time. The chests of every garret were ransacked; and morocco shoes and satin slippers of a by-gone generation, that had never tripped a livelier measure than a minuet, were held a veritable treasure-trove, and were dragged forth and danced in merrily. Many a lassie at the military "hops" showed her white arms and shoulders above the moth-eaten velvets and time-stained silks that had been worn by her young-lady grandmother.

Out of sight and hearing the hard times in the Confederacy have vanished. The recollection of them is attuned to melancholy; there is many a touch of bitter sorrow and of sharp regret in the strain; but the lapse of years has softened the once familiar air until the minor notes of joy are eloquent amidst the chords of grief.

A. C. Gordon.

"Aunt Martha" Grayson.

It seems to me fitting to the story of "The Graysons" to publish a little incident connected with "Aunt Martha" that came under my personal observation.

The incident of which I speak occurred when Lincoln and Douglas were making their famous tour of Illinois, and were to speak at Havana, Mason County, Illinois.

About 6 o'clock on the day previous there came to the house of the friend with whom I was stopping an old lady who had walked I do not know how many miles to see "dear Old Abe." She wore a calico sun-bonnet and a clean dark calico dress of rather scant proportions and was toil-worn and withered, but withal had such a kindly face that one forgot her homely attire and backwoods manners.

She talked incessantly of Mr. Lincoln, always calling him "Old Abe," and was so eager and trembling in her desire to see him that I could not help wondering what possible interest she could have in him, or he in her. I learned that Lincoln, years before, had saved the life of her son, who was accused of murder, and no scrap of evidence seemed possible to save him from the gallows. Here, then, was the mother of the young man whose story I had so often heard.

The next morning the old lady was up long before the rest of us, nervously roaming about, and scarcely able to control her agitation. "I am going to be the first to greet 'Old Abe' when he leaves the boat," she said over and over again; "and I want to tell him how glad I am that he has become so great."

She did not wait for the steam-whistle to herald his coming. With trembling fingers she tied the strings of her sun-bonnet under her chin, lighted her pipe,—I'm sure I'm not mistaken in this,—and hurried nervously away, saying as she left, "I must be the first to take him by the hand." And sure enough she was. The whistle blew, the crowd surged down to the landing, but the old lady was already there. No sooner was the plank thrown out than "Aunt Martha" stepped upon it, and was indeed the first to meet and greet "Old Abe."

She came back to the house shortly after, her face radiant with joy, the tears still coursing down her withered cheeks, and cried out between intervals of hysterical sobs: "I've seen him—he was not ashamed of me—he took my old hand and wrung it with a will, saying, 'Howdy, Aunt Martha? How are all the folks? I'm right glad to see you.'"

Mrs. H. L. Tobien.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

PLANS OF CAMPAIGN.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.



ABOUT the 1st of December, 1861, Mr. Lincoln, who saw more clearly than McClellan, then General-in-Chief, the urgent necessity for some movement of the army, suggested to him a plan of campaign which, afterward much debated and discussed and finally rejected, is now seen to have been eminently wise and sagacious. He made a brief autograph memorandum of his plan, which he handed to McClellan, who kept it for ten days and returned it to Mr. Lincoln, with a hurried memorandum in pencil, showing that it made little impression on his mind. The memorandum and answer are so illustrative of the two men that we give them here in full, copied from the original manuscript:

If it were determined to make a forward movement of the Army of the Potomac, without waiting further increase of numbers, or better drill and discipline, how long would it require to actually get in motion? [Answer, in pencil: If bridge-trains ready by December 15th — probably 25th.]

After leaving all that would be necessary, how many troops could join the movement from south-west of the river? [In pencil, 71,000.]

How many from north-east of it? [In pencil, 33,000.]

Suppose then that of those south-west of the river [in pencil, 50,000] move forward and menace the enemy at Centreville? The remainder of the movable force on that side move rapidly to the crossing of the Occoquan by the road from Alexandria towards Richmond; there to be joined by the whole movable force from north-east of the river, having landed from the Potomac just below the mouth of the Occoquan, move by land up the south side of that stream, to the crossing-point named; then the whole move together, by the road thence to Brentville, and beyond, to the railroad just south of its crossing of Broad Run, a strong detachment of cavalry having gone rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad bridges south and north of the point.

If the crossing of the Occoquan by those from above be resisted, those landing from the Potomac below to take the resisting force of the enemy in rear; or, if the landing from the Potomac be resisted, those crossing the Occoquan from above to take that resisting force in rear. Both points will probably not be successfully resisted at the same time. The force in front of Centreville, if pressed too hardly, should fight back slowly into the intrenchments behind them. Armed vessels and transports should remain at the Potomac landing to cover a possible retreat.†

General McClellan returned the memorandum with this reply:

I inclose the paper you left with me, filled as you requested. In arriving at the numbers given, I have left the minimum number in garrison and observation.

Information received recently leads me to believe that the enemy could meet us in front with equal forces nearly, and I have now my mind actively turned towards another plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy, nor by many of our own people.‡

The general's information was, as usual, erroneous. Johnston reports his "effective total" at this time as about 47,000 men — less than one-third what McClellan imagined it. Lincoln, however, did not insist upon knowing what the general's "other plan" was; nor did he press further upon his attention the suggestion that had been so scantily considered and so curtly dismissed. But as the weeks went by in inaction, his thoughts naturally dwelt upon the opportunities afforded by an attack on the enemy's right, and the project took more and more definite shape in his mind.

Congress convened on the 2d of December, and one of its earliest subjects of discussion was the battle of Ball's Bluff. Roscoe Conkling in the House of Representatives, and Zachariah Chandler in the Senate, brought forward resolutions for the appointment of committees to investigate and determine the responsibility for that disaster; but on motion of Grimes the Senate chose to order a permanent joint committee of three senators and four representatives to inquire into the conduct of the war. This action was unanimously agreed to by the House, and the committee was appointed, consisting of senators Wade, Chandler, and Johnson, and of representatives Gooch, Covode, Julian, and Odell. This committee, known as the Committee on the Conduct of the War, was for four years one of the most important agencies in the country. It assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of both the army and the government; it called soldiers and

† Lincoln to McClellan, autograph MS.

‡ McClellan to Lincoln, Dec. 10, 1861. Autograph MS.

statesmen before it and questioned them like refractory school-boys. It claimed to speak for the loyal people of the United States, and this claim generally met with the sympathy and support of a majority of the people's representatives in Congress assembled. It was often hasty and unjust in its judgment, but always earnest, patriotic, and honest; it was assailed with furious denunciation and defended with headlong and indiscriminating eulogy; and on the whole it must be said to have merited more praise than blame.

Even before this committee was appointed, as we have seen, senators Chandler and Wade, representing the more ardent and eager spirits in Congress, had repeatedly pressed upon the Government the necessity of employing the Army of the Potomac in active operations; and now that they felt themselves formally intrusted with a mandate from the people to that effect, were still more urgent and persistent. General McClellan and his immediate following treated the committee with something like contempt. But the President, with his larger comprehension of popular forces, knew that he must take into account an agency of such importance; and though he steadily defended General McClellan, and his deliberateness of preparation, before the committee, he constantly assured him in private that not a moment ought to be lost in getting himself in readiness for a forward movement. A free people, accustomed to considering public affairs as their own, can stand reverses and disappointments; they are capable of making great exertions and great sacrifices; the one thing that they cannot endure is inaction on the part of their rulers; the one thing that they insist upon is to see some result of their exertions and sacrifices. December was the fifth month that General McClellan had been in command of the greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was impossible to convince the country that a longer period of preparation was necessary before this army could be led against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in discipline or equipment. As a matter of fact, the country did not believe the rebel army to be equal to the army of the Union in any of these particulars. It did not share the strange delusion of General McClellan and his staff in regard to the numbers of his adversary, and the common sense of the people was nearer right in its judgment than the computations of the general and his inefficient secret service. McClellan reported to the Secretary of War that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered 150,000, and that he would therefore require, to make an advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of

240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective total of 41,000 men! It was useless to try to convince General McClellan of the impossibility of such a concentration of troops in front of him; he simply added together the aggregates furnished by the guesses of his spies and implicitly believed the monstrous sum. It is worthy of notice that the Confederate general rarely fell into the corresponding error. At the time that McClellan was quadrupling, in his imagination, the rebel force, Johnston was estimating the army under McClellan at exactly its real strength.

Aware that his army was less than one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the time in drilling and disciplining his troops, which, according to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military operations, he says, were practicable until the end of December; but he was never molested.

Our military exercises had never been interrupted. No demonstrations were made by the troops of that army, except the occasional driving in of a Confederate cavalry picket by a large mixed force. The Federal cavalry rarely ventured beyond the protection of infantry, and the ground between the two armies had been less free to it than to that of the Confederate army.

There was at no time any serious thought of attacking the Union forces in front of Washington. In the latter part of September, General Johnston had thought it possible for the Richmond government to give him such additional troops as to enable him to take the offensive, and Jefferson Davis had come to headquarters at Fairfax Court House to confer with the principals on that subject. At this conference, held on the 1st of October, it was taken for granted that no attack could be made, with any chances of success, upon the Union army in its position before Washington; but it was thought that, if enough force could be concentrated for the purpose, the Potomac might be crossed at the nearer ford, Maryland brought into rebellion, and a battle delivered in rear of Washington, where McClellan would fight at a disadvantage. Mr. Davis asked the three generals present, Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith, beginning with the last, how many troops would be required for such a movement. Smith answered "fifty thousand"; Johnston and Beauregard both said "sixty thousand"; and all agreed that they would require a large increase of ammunition and means of transportation. Mr. Davis said it was impossible to reinforce them to that extent, and the plan was dropped. It is hard to believe that during this same month of October, General McClellan, in a careful letter to

the War Department, with an army, according to his own account, of "147,695 present for duty," should have bewailed his numerical inferiority to the enemy, and begged that all other departments should be stripped of their troops and stores to enable him to make a forward movement, which he professed himself anxious to make "not later than the 25th of November," if the Government would give him men enough to meet the enemy on equal terms. This singular infatuation, difficult to understand in a man of high intelligence and physically brave, as McClellan undoubtedly was, must not be lost sight of. It furnishes the sole explanation of many things otherwise inexplicable. He rarely estimated the force immediately opposed to him at less than double its actual strength, and in his correspondence with the Government he persistently minimized his own force. This rule he applied only to the enemy in his immediate vicinity. He had no sympathy with commanders at a distance who asked for reinforcements. When Rosecrans succeeded him in western Virginia, and wanted additional troops, General McClellan was shocked at the unreasonable request. When William Tecumseh Sherman telegraphed that 75,000 men were needed to defend the Ohio line, and to make a forward movement into Kentucky, he handed the dispatch to Mr. Lincoln, who was sitting in his headquarters at the moment, with the remark, "The man is crazy." Every man sent to any other department he regarded as a sort of robbery of the Army of the Potomac.

All his demands were complied with to the full extent of the power of the Government. Not only in a material, but in a moral sense as well, the President gave him everything that he could. In addition to that mighty army, he gave him his fullest confidence and support. All through the autumn he stood by him, urging him in private to lose no time, but defending him in public against the popular impatience; and when winter came on, and the voice of Congress, nearly unanimous in demanding active operations, added its authoritative tones to the clamor of the country, the President endangered his own popularity by insisting that the general should be allowed to take his own time for an advance. In the latter part of December, McClellan, as already stated, fell seriously ill, and the enforced paralysis of the army that resulted from this illness and lasted several weeks added a keener edge to the public anxiety. The President painfully appreciated how much of justice there was in the general criticism, which he was doing all that he could to allay. He gave himself, night and day, to the study of the military situation. He read a large num-

ber of strategical works. He pored over the reports from the various departments and districts of the field of war. He held long conferences with eminent generals and admirals, and astonished them by the extent of his special knowledge and the keen intelligence of his questions. He at last convinced himself that there was no necessity for any further delay; that the army of the Potomac was as nearly ready as it ever would be to take the field against the enemy; and, feeling that he could not wait any longer, on the 10th of January, after calling at General McClellan's house and learning that the general was unable to see him, he sent for Generals McDowell and Franklin, wishing to take counsel with them in regard to the possibility of beginning active operations with the army before Washington. General McDowell has preserved an accurate report of this conference. The President said that he was in great distress; to use his own expression:

If something were not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not want to use the army he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it might be made to do something.

In answer to a direct question, put by the President to General McDowell, that accomplished soldier gave a frank and straightforward expression of his conviction that by an energetic movement upon both flanks of the enemy—a movement rendered entirely practicable by the superior numbers of the Union army—he could be forced from his works and compelled to accept battle on terms favorable to us. General Franklin rather favored an attack upon Richmond, by way of York River. A question arising as to the possibility of obtaining the necessary transportation, the President directed both generals to return the next evening, and in the mean time to inform themselves thoroughly as to the matter in question. They spent the following day in this duty and went the next evening to the Executive Mansion with what information they had been able to procure, and submitted a paper in which they both agreed that, in view of the time and means required to take the army to a distant base, operations could now best be undertaken from the present base substantially as proposed by McDowell. The Secretaries of State and of the Treasury, who were present, coincided in this view, and the Postmaster-General, Mr. Blair, alone opposed it. They separated to meet the next day at 3 o'clock. General Meigs, having been called into conference, concurred in the opinion that a movement from the present base was preferable; but no definite resolution was taken, as General McClellan was reported as fully

recovered from his illness, and another meeting was arranged for Monday, the 13th, at the White House, where the three members of the Cabinet already mentioned, with McDowell, Franklin, Meigs, and General McClellan himself, were present. At the request of the President, McDowell made a statement of what he and Franklin had done under Mr. Lincoln's orders, and gave his reasons for advising a movement to the front. He spoke with great courtesy and deference towards his superior officer, and made an apology for the position in which he stood. McClellan was not inclined to relieve the situation of any awkwardness there might be in it. He merely said, "coldly, if not curtly," to McDowell, "You are entitled to have any opinion you please," and made no further remark or comment. The President spoke somewhat at length on the matter, and General McClellan said very briefly "that the case was so clear a blind man could see it" and went off instinctively upon the inadequacy of his forces. The Secretary of the Treasury, whose sympathies were with that section of his party which had already lost all confidence in General McClellan, asked him point blank what he intended to do with the army, and when he intended doing it. A long silence ensued. Even if the question had been a proper one, it is doubtful whether General McClellan would have answered it; as it was, it must have required some self-control for him to have contented himself with merely evading it. He said that Buell in Kentucky must move first; and then refused to answer the question unless ordered to do so. The President asked him if he counted upon any particular time, not asking what the time was — but had he in his own mind any particular time fixed when a movement could be begun? This question was evidently put as affording a means of closing a conference which was becoming disagreeable if not dangerous. McClellan promptly answered in the affirmative, and the President rejoined, "Then I will adjourn this meeting."

It is a remarkable fact that although the plan recommended by these generals was exactly the plan suggested six weeks before by the President to McClellan, neither of them made the slightest reference to that incident. That Mr. Lincoln did not refer to a matter so close to his heart is a striking instance of his reticence and his magnanimity; that General McClellan never mentioned it would seem to show that he thought so little of the matter as to have forgotten it. He seemed also to have thought little of this conference; he makes no reference to it in his report. He says, referring to this period:

About the middle of January, upon recovering from a severe illness, I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the Administration.

The last words of the phrase refer not only to the President, but to Mr. Stanton, the new Secretary of War, who began as soon as he took charge of his department to ply the commander of the army with continual incitements to activity. All suggestions of this sort, whether coming from the Government, Congress, or the press, General McClellan received with surprise and displeasure, and the resentment and vexation of his immediate friends and associates found vent in expressions of contempt for unmilitary critics, which, being reported, only increased the evil that provoked them. He at last laid before the President his plan for attacking Richmond by the lower Chesapeake, which the President disapproved, having previously convinced himself of the superior merit of the plan for a direct movement agreed upon by Generals McDowell, Franklin, and Meigs, who were ignorant of the fact that it was his. Further delay ensued, the President not being willing to accept a plan condemned by his own judgment and by the best professional opinions that he could obtain, and General McClellan being equally reluctant to adopt a plan that was not his own. The President at last, at the end of his patience, convinced that nothing would be done unless he intervened by a positive command, issued on the 27th of January his "General War Order, No. 1." He wrote it without consultation with any one, and read it to the Cabinet, not for their sanction, but for their information. The order directed

that the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces; that especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of western Virginia, the army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day; that all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given; that the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

Four days later, as a necessary result of this general summons to action, a special instruction, called "President's Special War Order, No. 1," was issued to General McClellan, commanding

that all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the im-

mediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south-westward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the General-in-Chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

This is the President's suggestion of December 1, put at last in the form of a command.

It would not have been characteristic of General McClellan to accept such an order as final, nor of Mr. Lincoln to refuse to listen to his objections and to a full statement of his own views. The President even went so far as to give him, in the following note, dated February 3, a schedule of points on which he might base his objections and develop his views.

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock, to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroads south-west of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

First. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

Yours truly,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

This elicited from General McClellan a long letter, dated the same day, in which he dwelt with great emphasis on all the possible objections that could lie against a direct movement from Washington, and insisted with equal energy upon the advantages of a campaign by the lower Chesapeake. He rejects without argument the suggestion of an attack on both flanks of the enemy, on the ground of insufficient force, a ground that we have seen to be visionary. He says that an attack on the left flank of the enemy is impracticable on account of the length of the line, and confines his statement to a detail of the dangers and difficulties of an attack on the Confederate right by the line of the Occoquan. He insists that he will be met at every point by a determined resistance. To use his own words, he

brings out, in bold relief, the great advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies, with roads diverging in every direction, and a strong line of defense enabling him to remain on the defensive, with a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action.

Even if he succeeded in such a movement, he thought little of its results; they would be merely "the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Poto-

mac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory."

They would not end the war, the result he seemed to propose to himself in the one decisive battle he expected to fight somewhere. Turning to his own plan, he hopes by moving from his new base on the lower Chesapeake to accomplish this enormous and final success — to force the enemy either "to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine forks." The point which he thought promised the most brilliant results was Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock; "but one march from West Point, — on the York River, at the junction of the Pamunkey and the Mattaponi, — the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond." He enjoys the prospect of brilliant and rapid movements by which the rebel armies shall be cut off in detail, Richmond taken, and the rebellion brought to a close. He says finally:

My judgment as a general is clearly in favor of this project. . . . So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer the move from Fortress Monroe as a base — as a certain though less brilliant movement than that from Urbana, to an attack upon Manassas.

Most of the assumptions upon which this letter was based have since proved erroneous. The enormous force which McClellan ascribed to Johnston existed only in his imagination and in the wild stories of his spies. His force was about three times that of Johnston, and was therefore not insufficient for an attack upon one flank of the enemy while the other was held in check. It is now clearly known that the determined resistance that he counted upon, if he should attack by the line of the Occoquan, would not have been made. General Johnston says that about the middle of February he was sent for in great haste to Richmond, and on arriving there was told by Jefferson Davis that the Government thought of withdrawing the army to "a less exposed position." Johnston replied that the withdrawal of the army from Centreville would be necessary before McClellan's invasion, — which was to be looked for as soon as the roads were practicable, — but thought that it might be postponed for the present. He left Richmond, however, with the understanding on his part that the army was to fall back as soon as practicable, and the moment he returned to his camp he began his preparations to retire at once from a position which both he and the Richmond government considered absolutely untenable. On the 22d of February he says: "Orders were given to the chiefs of the quartermaster's and subsistence departments to remove the military property in the

depots at Manassas Junction and its dependencies to Gordonsville as quickly as possible." The railroads were urged to work to their utmost capacity. The line of the Occoquan, against which McClellan was arguing so strenuously to the President, was substantially the route by which Johnston expected him, believing, like the thorough soldier that he was, that it would be taken, because "invasion by that route would be the most difficult to meet"; and knowing that he could not cope with the Federal army north of the Rappahannock, he was ready to retire behind that stream at the first news of McClellan's advance. Everything now indicates that if McClellan had chosen to obey the President's order and to move upon the enemy in his front in the latter part of February* or the first days of March, one of the cheapest victories ever gained by a fortunate general awaited him. He would have struck an enemy greatly inferior in strength, equipment, and discipline, in the midst of a difficult retreat already begun, encumbered by a vast accumulation of provisions and stores,† which would have become the prize of the victor. He would not have won the battle that was to end the war. That sole battle was a dream of youth and ambition; the war was not of a size to be finished by one fight. But he would have gained, at slight cost, what would have been in reality a substantial success, and would have appeared, in its effect upon public opinion and the morale of the army, an achievement of great importance. The enemy, instead of quietly retiring at his own time, would have seemed to be driven beyond the Rapidan. The clearing the Potomac of hostile camps and batteries above and below Washington, and the capture of millions of pounds of stores, would have afforded a relief to the anxious public mind that the National cause sorely needed at that time, and which General McClellan needed most of all. ‡

These facts, that are now so clear to every one, were not so evident then; and although the President and the leading men in the Gov-

* The following extract shows that General McClellan himself had some vague thought of moving at that time: "February came and on the 13th General McClellan said to me, 'In ten days I shall be in Richmond.' A little surprised at the near approach of a consummation so devoutly to be wished, I asked, 'What is your plan, General?' 'Oh,' said he, 'I mean to cross the river, attack and carry their batteries, and push on after the enemy.' 'Have you any gun-boats to aid in the attack on the batteries?' 'No, they are not needed; all I want is transportation and canal-boats, of which I have plenty that will answer.' I did not think it worth while to reply; but made a note of the date and waited. The ten days passed away; no movement, and no preparation for a movement, had been made." [From a memorandum written by Hon. S. P. Chase. Schucker's "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 446.]

ernment and in Congress were strongly of the opinion that the plan favored by Mr. Lincoln and approved by McDowell, Meigs, and Franklin was the right one, it was a question of the utmost gravity whether he should force the General-in-Chief to adopt it against his obstinate protest. It would be too much to ask that any government should assume such a responsibility and risk. On the other hand, the removal of the general from the command of the Army of the Potomac would have been a measure not less serious. There was no successor ready at all his equal in accomplishments, in executive efficiency, or in popularity among the soldiers. Besides this, and in spite of his exasperating slowness, the President still entertained for him a strong feeling of personal regard. He therefore, after much deliberation and deep distress of mind, yielded his convictions, gave up his plan and adopted that of General McClellan for a movement by the lower Chesapeake. He never took a resolution which cost him more in his own feelings, and in the estimation of his supporters in Congress and in the country at large. He made no explanation of the reasons that induced this resolution; he thought it better to suffer any misrepresentation rather than to communicate his own grave misgivings to the country. The Committee on the Conduct of the War, who were profoundly grieved and displeased by this decision, made only this grim reference to it:

Your committee have no evidence, either oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued, or of the arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the President, that led him to relinquish his own line of operations and consent to the one proposed by General McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in February, 1862.

This council, which, the committee say, was the first ever called by McClellan, and then only at the direction of the President, was composed of twelve general officers — McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Barnard, Keyes, Fitz-John Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, and Naglee

† The subsistence department had collected at Manassas Junction more than three million pounds of provisions. They had also two million pounds of meat at Thoroughfare Gap, besides large herds of cattle and hogs. This accumulation was against the wish and to the great embarrassment of General Johnston. ["Johnston's Narrative," pp. 98 and 99.]

‡ Mr. William Swinton, who habitually takes sides with McClellan against the President where it is possible, says on this point: "Had Johnston stood, a battle with good prospect of success might have been delivered. But had he, as there was great likelihood he would do, and as it is now certain he would have done, fallen back from Manassas to the line of the Rapidan, his compulsory retirement would have been esteemed a positive victory to the Union arms." [Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 73.]

(from Hooker's division). The first four voted against the Urbana plan; Keyes only favored it on condition that the Potomac batteries should first be reduced. The rest voted for it without conditions. This was the council afterward referred to by Stanton when he said, "We saw ten generals afraid to fight."*

This plan of campaign having been definitely adopted, Mr. Lincoln urged it forward as eagerly as if it had been his own. John Tucker, one of the Assistant Secretaries of War, was charged by the President and Mr. Stanton with the entire task of transporting the Army of the Potomac to its new base, and the utmost diligence was enjoined upon him. Quartermasters Ingalls and Hodges were assigned to assist him. We shall see that he performed the prodigious task intrusted to him in a manner not excelled by any similar feat in the annals of the world.

But in the mean while there were two things that the President was anxious to have done, and General McClellan undertook them with apparent good-will. One was to reopen the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the other to clear out the rebel batteries that still obstructed the navigation of the Potomac. For the first, extensive preparations were made: a large body of troops was collected at Harper's Ferry; canal-boats were brought there in sufficient quantity to make a permanent bridge. General McClellan went to the place and, finding everything satisfactory for the operation, telegraphed for a large additional force of cavalry, artillery, and a division of infantry to rendezvous at once at Harper's Ferry, to cross as soon as the bridge was completed, which would be only the work of a day, and then to push on to Winchester and Strasburg. It was only on the morning of the next day, when the attempt was made to pass the canal-boats through the lift-lock, that it was discovered they were some six inches too wide to go through. The general thus discovered that his permanent bridge, so long planned, and from which so much had been expected, was impossible.† He countermanded his order for the troops; contented himself with a reconnaissance to Charleston and Martinsburg; and returned to Washington, as he says, "well satisfied with what had been accomplished." He was much surprised at finding that his satisfaction was not shared by the President. Mr. Lincoln's slow anger was thoroughly roused at this ridiculous outcome of an important enterprise, and he received the general on his return in a manner that somewhat disturbed his complacency.

McClellan went on in his leisurely way,

* J. H., Diary.

† Chase in his Diary said the expedition died of lockjaw.

preparing for a movement upon the batteries near the Occoquan, undisturbed by the increasing signs of electric perturbation at the Executive Mansion and the Capitol, which answered but faintly to the growing excitement in the North. The accumulating hostility and distrust of General McClellan,—totally unjust as it affected his loyalty and honor and his ardent desire to serve his country in the way that he thought best,—though almost entirely unknown to him, was poured upon the President, the Government, and the leading members of Congress in letters, and conversations, and newspaper leaders. Mr. Lincoln felt the injustice of much of this criticism, but he also felt powerless to meet it, unless some measures were adopted to force the general into an activity which was as necessary to his own reputation as to the national cause. The 22d of February came and passed, and the President's order to move on that day was not obeyed. McClellan's inertia prevailed over the President's anxious eagerness. On the 8th of March, Mr. Lincoln issued two more important General Orders. The first directed General McClellan to divide the Army of the Potomac into four army corps, to be commanded respectively by Generals Irvin McDowell, E. V. Sumner, S. P. Heintzelman, and E. D. Keyes; the forces to be left in front of Washington were to be placed in command of General Wadsworth. The Fifth Corps was to be formed, to be commanded by General N. P. Banks. For months this measure had been pressed upon General McClellan by the Government. An army of 150,000 men, it was admitted, could not be adequately commanded by the machinery of divisions and brigades alone. But though McClellan accepted this view in principle, he could not be brought to put it into practice. He said that he would prefer to command the army personally on its first campaign, and then select the corps commanders for their behavior in the field. The Government thought better to make the organization at once, giving the command of corps to the ranking division commanders. The fact that of the four generals chosen three had been in favor of an immediate movement against the enemy in front of Washington will of course be considered as possessing a certain significance. It is usually regarded as a grievance by the partisans of General McClellan.

The other order is of such importance that we give it entire:

PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER, No. 3.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 8, 1862.

Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without

leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure.

That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission. That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March instant, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day.

Ordered, That the Army and Navy coöperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and Chesapeake Bay.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General*.

This order has always been subject to the severest criticism from General McClellan's partisans; but if we admit that it was proper for the President to issue any order at all, there can be no valid objection made to the substance of this one. It was indispensable that Washington should be left secure; it would have been madness to allow General McClellan to take *all* the troops to the Peninsula, leaving the Potomac obstructed by the enemy's batteries, so near the capital; and the fixing of a date beyond which the beginning of the movement should not be postponed had been shown to be necessary by the exasperating experience of the past eight months. The criticism so often made, that a general who required to have such orders as these given him should have been dismissed the service, is the most difficult of all to meet. Nobody felt so deeply as Mr. Lincoln the terrible embarrassment of having a general in command of that magnificent army who was absolutely without initiative, who answered every suggestion of advance with demands for reënforcements, who met entreaties and reproaches with unending arguments to show the superiority of the enemy and the insufficiency of his own resources, and who yet possessed in an eminent degree the enthusiastic devotion of his friends and the general confidence of the rank and file. There was so much of executive efficiency and ability about him that the President kept on, hoping to the last that if he could once "get him started" he would then handle the army well and do great things with it.

MANASSAS EVACUATED.

SUNDAY, the 9th of March, was a day of swiftly succeeding emotions at the Executive Mansion. The news of the havoc wrought by

the *Merrimac* in Hampton Roads the day before arrived in the morning, and was received with profound chagrin by the calmest spirits and with something like consternation by the more excitable. But in the afternoon astonishing tidings came to reverse the morning's depression. The first was of the timely arrival of the *Monitor*, followed shortly, on the completion of the telegraph to Fort Monroe, by the news of her battle and victory. The exultation of the Government over this providential success was changed to amazement by the receipt of intelligence that the rebel batteries on the Potomac were already abandoned, and the tale of surprises was completed by the news which came in the evening that the Confederate army had abandoned their works at Manassas, retreating southward. General McClellan was with the President and the Secretary of War when this message arrived, and he received it, as might have been expected, with incredulity, which at last gave way to stupefaction. He started at once across the river, ostensibly to verify the intelligence, and in his bewilderment and confusion issued an order that night for an immediate advance of the army upon Centreville and Manassas. In the elaborate report by which he strove, a year after the fact, to shift from himself to others the responsibility of all his errors, occurs this remarkable sentence:

The retirement of the enemy towards Richmond had been expected as the natural consequence of the movement to the Peninsula, but their adoption of this course immediately on ascertaining that such a movement was intended, while it relieved me from the results of the undue anxiety of my superiors and attested the character of the design, was unfortunate in that the then almost impassable roads between our positions and theirs deprived us of the opportunity for inflicting damage usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the face of a powerful adversary.

This was the theory immediately adopted by himself, propagated among his staff, communicated to the Prince de Joinville, who published it in France on his return there, and to the Comte de Paris, who after twenty years incorporated it in his history — that the enemy, having heard of his scheme for going to the Peninsula, through the indiscretion of the Government, had suddenly taken flight from Manassas. General McClellan asserts this in his report a dozen times; he reiterates it as if he felt that his reputation depended upon it. If it is not true, then in the long contest with the President in regard to a direct attack from Washington the President was right and McClellan was wrong.

The straightforward narrative of General Johnston, and the official orders and correspondence of the Confederate officers, show

that there is not the slightest foundation for this theory of General McClellan's. They show, on the contrary, that the rebel government, nearly a month before this, had concluded that Johnston's position was untenable; that Johnston had shared in the belief, and had begun his preparations to retire on the 22d of February; that instead of "ascertaining McClellan's intention to move to the lower Chesapeake," he had been of the opinion that McClellan would advance upon the line designated by Mr. Lincoln, because it was the best line for attack and the most difficult for the rebels to defend; that he knew McClellan's enormous superiority in numbers and did not purpose to risk everything in resisting him there; that on the 5th of March, having received information of unusual activity in our army in the direction of Dumfries, he gave his final orders, and on the 7th began to move. He proceeded with the greatest deliberation, writing to one of his generals on the 15th, "McClellan seems not to value time especially." His subordinates were equally convinced that the Confederate right was the object of the Union advance; Holmes wrote in that sense to Lee on the 14th of March. Lee, who was then directing military operations in Richmond, answered him on the 16th, concurring in this view, recognizing the "advantages" of such a plan, and saying, "That he will advance upon our line as soon as he can, I have no doubt." Until the 18th of March Johnston did not suspect that McClellan was not advancing to strike his right flank; he then fell back behind the Rapidan, to guard against other contingencies. Even while our vast army was passing down the Potomac he could not make out where it was going. So late as the early days of April, Jefferson Davis was in doubt as to McClellan's destination, and Johnston only heard of the advance upon Yorktown about the 5th of that month.

By the very test, therefore, to which General McClellan appeals in the paragraph quoted above, his conduct during the autumn and winter stands finally condemned. By their contemporaneous letters and orders, by their military movements in an important crisis, by their well-considered historical narratives, the Confederate government and generals have established these facts beyond all possibility of future refutation: that the plan for a direct attack suggested by Lincoln, and contemptu-

ously rejected by McClellan, was a sound and practicable one; it was the plan they expected and dreaded to see adopted, because it was the one easiest to accomplish and hardest to resist. When they fancied that they saw the Army of the Potomac preparing to move, it was this plan alone of which they thought; and they immediately gave up their position, which McClellan thought impregnable, as they had been for weeks preparing to do at the first intimation of a forward movement. The long delay of five months, during three of which the roads were in unusually fine condition,* during all of which the Union forces were as three to one of the enemy, remains absolutely without excuse. It can only be explained by that strange idiosyncrasy of General McClellan which led him always to double or treble the number of an enemy and the obstacles in his immediate vicinity.

It is little blame to Confederate generals that they could not divine what General McClellan was doing with the grand army of the Union during the week that followed the evacuation of Manassas. No soldier could have been expected to guess the meaning of that mysterious promenade of a vast army to Centreville and Manassas, and back to Alexandria. In spite of the "impassable roads," they made the journey with ease and celerity. The question why the whole army was taken has never been satisfactorily answered. General McClellan started away in too much confusion of mind to know precisely what he intended; his explanation afterward was that he wanted the troops to have a little experience of marching and to "get rid of their *impedimenta*." He claims in his report to have found on this excursion a full justification of his extravagant estimate of the enemy's force, and speaks with indignation of the calumnious stories of "quaker guns" which were rife in the press at the time. Every one now knows how fatally false the estimate was; and as to the "quaker guns," this is what General Johnston says about them:

As we had not artillery enough for their works and for the army fighting elsewhere at the same time, rough wooden imitations of guns were made, and kept near the embasures, in readiness for exhibition in them. To conceal the absence of carriages, the embasures were covered with sheds made of bushes. These were the quaker guns afterwards noticed in Northern papers.

Without further discussing where the fault mac, entitled "The Peninsula," we quote a sentence on this subject: "During all the time Johnston's army lay at Centreville insolently menacing Washington . . . it never presented an effective strength of over 50,000 men. With more than twice that number, McClellan remained inactive for many precious weeks, under the delusion that he was confronted by a force nearly equal his own."

* Pollard's History, Vol. I., p. 184, says: "A long, lingering Indian summer, with roads more hard and skies more beautiful than Virginia had seen for many a year, invited the enemy to advance." "Johnston's Narrative" says that the roads were practicable until the last of December.

From the admirable monograph of Major-General A. S. Webb, Chief-of-Staff of the Army of the Poto-

lay, the fact is beyond dispute that when the evacuation of Manassas was known throughout the country, the military reputation of General McClellan received serious damage. No explanation made at the time, and, we may add, none made since then, could account satisfactorily for such a mistake as to the condition of the enemy, such utter ignorance as to his movements. The first result of it was the removal of General McClellan from the command of the armies of the United States. This resolution was taken by the President himself, on the 11th of March. On that day he prepared the order known as "President's War Order, No. 3," and in the evening called together Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Stanton, and read it to them. It was in these words:

PRESIDENT'S WAR ORDER, No. 3.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 11, 1862.

Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac.

Ordered further, That the departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tenn., be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that, until otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck have command of said department.

Ordered also, That the country west of the Department of the Potomac and east of the Department of the Mississippi be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Major-General Frémont. That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt of this order by them respectively, report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

All the members of the Cabinet present heartily approved the order. The President gave his reason for issuing it while General McClellan was absent from Washington — a reason indeed apparent in the opening words, which were intended to take from the act any appearance of disfavor. The general's intimate biographers have agreed that it was because the President was afraid to do it while the general was in Washington! The manner of the order, which was meant as a kindness, was taken as a grievance. Mr. Seward advised that the order be issued in the name of the Secretary of War, but this proposition met with a decided protest from Mr. Stanton. He said there was some friction already between himself and the general's friends, and he feared that the act, if signed by him, would be attributed to personal feeling. The President decided to take the responsibility.* In a manly

* J. H., Diary.

and courteous letter the next day, McClellan accepted the disposition thus made of him.

On the 13th of March, at Fairfax Court House, General McClellan called together the four corps commanders who were with him and submitted to them for discussion the President's order of the 8th. The results of the council cannot be more briefly stated than in the following memorandum, drawn up by the generals who took part in it:

A council of the generals commanding army corps at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were of the opinion:

I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers, provided —

First. That the enemy's vessel *Merrimac* can be neutralized;

Second. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and

Third. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York River.

Fourth. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.)

II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and Aquia and Richmond railroads. (Unanimous.)

N. B. — That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)

These conclusions of the council were conveyed to Washington, and the President on the same day sent back to General McClellan his approval, and his peremptory orders for the instant execution of the plan proposed, in these words, signed by the Secretary of War:

The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution: First, leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. Second, leave Washington entirely secure. Third, move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

No commander could ask an order more unrestricted, more unhampered, than this. Choose your own route, your own course, only go; seek the enemy and fight him.

Under the orders of Mr. John Tucker, of

the War Department, a fleet of transports had been preparing since the 27th of February. It is one of the many grievances mentioned by General McClellan in his report, that this work was taken entirely out of his hands and committed to those of Mr. Tucker; he thus estops himself from claiming any credit for one of the most brilliant feats of logistics ever recorded. On the 27th of February, Mr. Tucker received his orders; on the 17th of March, the troops began their embarkation; on the 5th of April, Mr. Tucker made his final report, announcing that he had transported to Fort Monroe, from Washington, Perryville, and Alexandria, "121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, etc., required for an army of such magnitude. The only loss," he adds, "of which I have heard is eight mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore in a gale within a few miles of Fort Monroe, the cargoes being saved." He is certainly justified in closing his story with these words: "I respectfully but confidently submit that, for economy and celerity of movement, this expedition is without a parallel on record."*

The first corps to embark was Heintzelman's; he took with him from General McClellan the most stringent orders to do nothing more than to select camping-grounds, send out reconnaissances, engage guides and spies, "but to make no important move in advance." The other forces embarked in turn, McDowell's corps being left to the last; and before it was ready to sail, General McClellan himself started on the 1st of April, with the headquarters on the steamer *Commodore*, leaving behind him a state of things that made it necessary to delay the departure of McDowell's troops still further.

In all the orders of the President it had been clearly stated that, as an absolute condition precedent to the army being taken away to a new base, enough troops should be left at Washington to make that city absolutely safe, not only from capture, but from serious menace. The partisans of General McClellan then, and ever since then, have contended that, as Washington could not be seriously attacked without exposing Richmond to capture, undue importance was attached to it in these orders. It would be a waste of words to argue with people who place the political and strategic value of these two cities on a level. The

*The means by which this work was done were as follows:

113 steamers at an average price per day\$215.10
128 schooners at an average price per day 24.45
88 barges at an average price per day 14.27

capture of Richmond, without the previous virtual destruction of the rebel armies, would have been, it is true, an important achievement, but the seizure of Washington by the rebels would have been a fatal blow to the Union cause. General McClellan was in the habit of saying that if the rebel army should take Washington while he was at Richmond they could never get back; but it might be said that the general who would permit Washington to be taken could not be relied on to prevent the enemy from doing what they liked afterward. Mr. Lincoln was unquestionably right in insisting that Washington must not only be rendered safe from capture, but must also be without the possibility of serious danger. This view was adopted by the council of corps commanders, who met on the 13th of March at Fairfax Court House. They agreed unanimously upon this principle, and then, so as to leave no doubt as to details, three of the four gave the opinion that after the forts on the Virginia side were fully garrisoned, and those on the Maryland side occupied, a covering force of 25,000 men would be required.

The morning after General McClellan had sailed for Fort Monroe, the Secretary of War was astonished to hear from General Wadsworth, the military Governor of the District of Washington, that he had left him present for duty only 19,000 men, and that from that force he had orders to detach four good regiments to join General McClellan on the Peninsula, and four more to relieve Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton. He further reported that his command was entirely "inadequate to the important duty to which it was assigned." As General Wadsworth was a man of the highest intelligence, courage, and calm judgment, the President was greatly concerned by this emphatic statement. Orders were at once given to General E. A. Hitchcock, an accomplished veteran officer on duty at the War Department, and to Adjutant-General Thomas, to investigate the statement made by General Wadsworth. They reported the same night that it would require 30,000 men to man and occupy the forts, which, with the covering force of 25,000, would make 55,000 necessary for the proper defense of the city, according to the judgment of the council of corps commanders. They confirmed the report of Wadsworth that his efficient force consisted of 19,000, from which General McClellan had ordered eight regiments away. They therefore concluded "that the requirement of the President that the city should be left entirely secure had not been fully complied with." In accordance with this report the President directed that General McDowell's corps should

not be sent to the Peninsula until further orders.*

YORKTOWN.

GENERAL McCLELLAN arrived at Fort Monroe on the morning of the 2d of April. According to his own report he had ready the next day to move 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division artillery. They were of the flower of the volunteer army, and included also Sykes's brigade of regulars, Hunt's artillery reserve, and several regiments of cavalry. These were all on the spot, prepared to march, and an almost equal number were on their way to join him. He seemed at first to appreciate the necessity for prompt and decisive action, and with only one day's delay issued his orders for the march up the Peninsula between the York and James rivers. The first obstacle that he expected to meet was the force of General J. B. Magruder at Yorktown, which McClellan estimated at from 15,000 to 20,000. Magruder says his force consisted of 11,000, of which 6000 were required for the fortifications of Yorktown and only 5000 were left to hold the line across the Peninsula, 13 miles in length. His only object was to delay as long as possible the advance of the National troops upon Richmond, and his dispositions were made to that end. If he had had troops enough, he says that he would have made his line of defense between Ship Point, on the York, and the mouth of the Warwick, on the James. But his force being insufficient for that purpose, he took up as a second line the Warwick River, which heads only a mile or so from Yorktown and empties into the James some thirteen miles to the south. Yorktown and its redoubts, united by long curtains and flanked by rifle-pits, formed the left of his line, which was continued by the Warwick River, a sluggish and boggy stream running through a dense wood fringed with swamps. The stream was dammed in two places, at Wynn's Mill and at Lee's Mill; and Magruder constructed three more dams to back up the river and make the fords impassable. Each of these dams was protected by artillery and earth-works.

General McClellan was absolutely ignorant not only of these preparations made to receive him, but also of the course of the river and the nature of the ground through which it ran. He knew something of the disposition of Magruder's outposts on his first line, and rightly con-

jectured that they would retire as he advanced. His orders for the 4th of April were therefore punctually carried out, and he seemed to have expected no greater difficulty in his plan for the next day.† He divided his force into two columns — Heintzelman to take the right and march directly to Yorktown; and Keyes, taking the road to the left, to push on to the Half-way House in the rear of Yorktown, on the Williamsburg road. He expected Keyes to be there the same day, to occupy the narrow ridge in that neighborhood, "to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land, and to prevent reënforcements from being thrown in." Heintzelman went forward to the place assigned him in front of Yorktown, meeting with little opposition. Keyes marched by the road assigned him until he came to the enemy's fortified position at Lee's Mill, which, to use General McClellan's words, "he found altogether stronger than was expected, unapproachable by reason of the Warwick River, and incapable of being carried by assault." The discovery of this "unexpected" obstacle exercised a paralyzing influence upon the General-in-Chief. The energetic and active campaign that day begun was at once given up. Two days of reconnaissances convinced him that he could not break through the line which Magruder's little army of 11,000 men had stretched across the Peninsula, and he resolved upon a regular siege of the place. He began at the same time that campaign of complaint and recrimination against the Government which he kept up as long as he remained in the service.

He always ascribed the failure of his campaign at this point to two causes; first, to the want of assistance by the navy in reducing Yorktown, and second, to the retention of McDowell's corps in front of Washington. If the navy had silenced the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, he contended, he could have gone up the Peninsula unchecked. This is unquestionably true; it would be equally true to say in general terms that if somebody else would do our work we would have no work to do. He brings no proof to show that he had any right to expect that the navy would do this for him. It is true that he asked before he left Washington that the navy might cooperate with him in this plan, and received in reply the assurance that the navy would render him all the assistance in its power. The sworn testimony of Mr. Fox, the Assistant-

* General McClellan made in his report an elaborate effort to explain away these facts. He claims to have left a force of 73,000 for the defense of Washington, including in the number all the troops under Dix in Maryland, under Banks in the Shenandoah, all those at Warrenton, at Manassas, and on the lower Potomac.

But he does not deny the facts stated by Wadsworth and confirmed by Hitchcock and Thomas.

† In a letter on the 3d he wrote: "I hope to get possession of Yorktown day after to-morrow." ["McClellan's Own Story," p. 307.]

Secretary of the Navy, and of Admiral Goldsborough, shows that nothing was promised that was not performed, and that the navy stood ready to give, and did give, all the assistance to the army which was possible. Mr. Fox said:

Wooden vessels could not have attacked the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester with any degree of success. The forts at Yorktown were situated too high, were beyond the reach of naval guns; and I understood that General McClellan never expected any attack to be made upon them by the navy.

Admiral Goldsborough's evidence is to the same effect: he promised that the *Merrimac* should never go up the York River, and she did not; he never heard that he was expected to coöperate with the army in attacking Yorktown; he did everything that General McClellan requested of him. His orders from the department were clear and urgent, though general; he was "to extend to the army, at all times, any and all aid that he could render"; and he never refused to honor any draft that was made upon him. General McClellan pursued in this matter his invariable system. He asked for impossibilities, and when they were not accomplished for him he cherished it ever after as a precious grievance—like a certain species of lawyer, who in a case that he expects to lose always takes care to provide himself with a long bill of exceptions on which to base his appeal.

The greatest of his grievances was the retention of McDowell's corps, and his clamor in regard to this was so loud and long as to blind many careless readers and writers to the facts in the case. We have stated them already, but they may be briefly recapitulated here. A council of war of General McClellan's corps commanders, called by himself, had decided that Washington could not be safely left without a covering force of 55,000, including the garrisons of the forts. When he had gone, General Wadsworth reported that he had left only 19,000, and had ordered away nearly half of these. Two eminent generals in the War Department investigated this statement and found it true, whereupon the President ordered that McDowell's corps should for the present remain within reach of Washington. McClellan took with him to the Peninsula an aggregate force of over 100,000 men, afterwards largely increased. His own morning

report of the 13th of April, signed by himself and his adjutant-general, shows that he had with him actually present for duty 100,970. With this overwhelming superiority of numbers he could have detached 30,000 men at any moment to do the work that he had intended McDowell to do. But all the energy he might have employed in this work he diverted in attacking the Administration at Washington, which was doing all that it could do to support and provide for his army.

The attitude of the President towards him at this time may be seen from the following letter of the 9th of April, in which Mr. Lincoln answers his complaints with as much consideration and kindness as a father would use towards a querulous and petulant child:

Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly not without reluctance. After you left, I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My official order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th saying you had over 100,000 with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?*

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your

* The discrepancy cannot be accounted for. General McClellan's official morning report of the 13th of April, four days after the date of the President's letter, gives the following: "Number of troops composing the Army of the Potomac after its disembarkation on the Peninsula: Aggregate present for duty, 100,970; on special duty, sick, and in arrest, 4265; aggregate absent, 12,486,—total aggregate, 117,721." Yet with

statements like these on file in the War Department, over his own signature, he did not hesitate to inform the President that his force amounted to only 85,000; and even this sum dwindled so considerably, as years rolled by, that in his article in *THE CENTURY*, in May, 1885, on the Peninsula Campaign, he gives his available fighting force as "67,000 or 68,000."

own would have to do if that command was away. I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time, and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.

These considerations produced no impression upon General McClellan. From the beginning to the end of the siege of Yorktown, his dispatches were one incessant cry for men and guns. These the Government furnished to the utmost extent possible, but nothing contented him. His hallucination of overwhelming forces opposed to him began again, as violent as it was during the winter. On the 8th of April he wrote to Admiral Goldsborough, "I am probably weaker than they are, or soon will be." His distress is sometimes comic in its expression. He writes on the 7th of April, "The Warwick River grows worse the more you look at it." While demanding McDowell's corps *en bloc* he asked on the 5th for Franklin's division, and on the 10th repeated this request, saying that although he wanted more, he would be responsible for the results if Franklin's division were sent him. The Government, overborne by his importunity, gave orders the same day that Franklin's division should go to him, and the arrangements for transporting them were made with the greatest diligence. He was delighted with this news; and although the weather was good and the roads improving, he did nothing but throw up earth-works until they came. They arrived on the 20th, and no use whatever was made of them! He kept them in the transports in which they had come down the bay more than two weeks—in fact, until the day before the siege ended. It is hard to speak with proper moderation of so ridiculous a disposition of this most valuable force, so clamorously demanded by General McClellan, and so generously sent him by the President. General Webb, the intimate friend and staff-officer of McClellan, thus speaks of it:

Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander of the Corps of Engineers was instructed to devise the proper arrangements and superintend the landing of the troops; but,

extraordinary as it may seem, more than two weeks were consumed in the preliminaries, and when everything was nearly ready for the disembarkation the enemy had vanished from the scene. . . . How long it would have taken the whole of McDowell's corps to disembark at this rate . . . the reader may judge; and yet for days it had been McClellan's pet project, in connection with his plan of campaign, to utilize McDowell in just this manner as a flanking column.

The simple truth is, there was never an hour during General McClellan's command of the army that he had not more troops than he knew what to do with; yet he was always instinctively calling for more. Mr. Stanton one day said of him, with natural hyperbole:

If he had a million men, he would swear the enemy had two millions, and then he would sit down in the mud and yell for three.

As usual with him, he entirely mistook the position, the strength, and the intentions of the enemy. He repeatedly telegraphed to Washington that he expected to fight an equal or greater force—in fact, "all the available force of the rebels" in the neighborhood of Yorktown. We have the concurrent testimony of all the Confederate authorities that no such plan was ever thought of. Magruder's intentions, as well as his orders from Richmond, were merely to delay McClellan's advance as long as practicable. His success in this purpose surpassed his most sanguine expectations. In the early days of April he was hourly expecting an attack at some point on his thinly defended line of 13 miles, guarded, as he says, by only 5000 men, exclusive of the 6000 who garrisoned Yorktown. "But to my utter surprise," he continues, "he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault." At last, no less to his astonishment than to his delight, Magruder discovered that McClellan was beginning a regular siege, which meant a gain of several weeks for the rebel defense of Richmond, and absolute safety for the concentration of rebel troops in the mean time.

It is now perfectly clear to all military critics not blinded by partisanship or personal partiality that McClellan could have carried the line of Magruder by assault at any time during the early days of April. From the mass of testimony to this effect before us we will take only two or three expressions, of the highest authority. General A. S. Webb says:

That the Warwick line could have been readily broken within a week after the army's arrival before it, we now know.

General Heintzelman says, in his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

I think if I had been permitted, when I first landed on the Peninsula, to advance, I could have isolated the

troops in Yorktown, and the place would have fallen in a few days; but my orders were very stringent not to make any demonstration.

General Barnard, McClellan's Chief of Engineers, says in his final report of the campaign that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted:

There is reason to believe that they were not held by strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. . . . Our troops toiled a month in the trenches, or lay in the swamps of the Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unrelieved by the excitement of combat, impaired the morale. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there.

The testimony of the enemy is the same. Johnston, so soon as he came to examine it, regarded the position of Magruder as clearly untenable: saw that McClellan could not be defeated there; that the line was too long to be successfully defended; that the back-water was as much a protection to one side as the other; that there was a considerable unfortified space between Yorktown and the head of the stream, open to attack; and that the position could at any time be turned by way of York River. Every one seemed to see it except General McClellan. He went on sending dispatches every day to Washington for heavier guns and more men, digging a colossal system of earth-works for gradual approach upon one side of an intrenched camp of no strategic value whatever, the rear of which was entirely open; preparing with infinite labor and loss the capture of a place without a prisoner, the effect of which at the best would be merely to push an army back upon its reserves.

Even so late as the 16th of April, an opportunity to break Magruder's line was clearly presented to McClellan and rejected. He had ordered General W. F. Smith to reconnoiter a position known as Dam No. 1, between Lee's and Wynn's Mills, where there was a crossing covered by a one-gun battery of the enemy. For this purpose Smith pushed Brooks's Vermont brigade with Mott's battery somewhat close to the dam, carrying on a sharp fire. From this point he examined at his leisure, and in fact controlled, the position opposite, finding it feebly defended. A young officer of Brooks's staff, Lieutenant Noyes, crossed the river below the dam, where the water was only waist deep, and approached within fifty yards of the enemy's works. Returning after this daring feat, he repeated his observations to General Smith and to General McClellan, who had arrived on the ground and had ordered Smith to bring up his entire division to hold the advanced position occupied by Brooks's brigade. Smith, who per-

ceived the importance of Noyes's intelligence, obtained permission to send a party across the stream to see if the enemy's works had been sufficiently denuded to enable a column to effect a lodgment. Four companies of the 3d Vermont, numbering 200 men, under Captain Harrington, were ordered to cross the river, to ascertain "the true state of affairs." They dashed through the stream, and in a few moments gained the enemy's rifle-pits, where they maintained themselves with the utmost gallantry for half an hour. The enemy was thrown into great confusion by this bold and utterly unexpected movement. There were still several hours of daylight left, and another attempt was made to cross at the same point with a force no larger than Harrington's, assisted by a diversion of an equal force at the dam above. But the enemy being now thoroughly aroused and concentrated, the crossing was not made. It appears from General Smith's report that "no attempt to mass the troops of the division for an assault was made"; the only intention seemed to be "to secure the enemy's works if we found them abandoned!" He adds:

The moment I found resistance serious, and the numbers opposed great, I acted in obedience to the warning instructions of the General-in-Chief, and withdrew the small number of troops exposed from under fire.

"Thus," says General Webb, "a fair opportunity to break the Warwick line was missed."

The importance of this incident may be best appreciated by reading General Magruder's account of it. He calls it a serious attempt to break his line at the weakest part. If, instead of two hundred men, Smith had felt authorized to push over his entire division, the Peninsula campaign would have had a very different termination.

The little that was done greatly pleased General McClellan. He announced the movement of General Smith in a somewhat excited dispatch to the War Department, which Mr. Stanton answered with still more enthusiastic congratulation. "Good for the first lick!" he shouts; "Hurrah for Smith and the one-gun battery"—showing the intense eagerness of the Government to find motives for satisfaction and congratulation in McClellan's conduct. But there was no sequel to the movement; indeed, General McClellan's dispatches indicate considerable complacency that Smith was able to hold the position gained. General Webb says, "Reconnaissances were made, . . . but no assaulting columns were ever organized to take advantage of any opportunity offered."

No congratulations or encouragements from the Government now availed anything with

McClellan. Struggling with a command and a responsibility too heavy for him, he had fallen into a morbid state of mind in which prompt and energetic action was impossible. His double illusion of an overpowering force of the enemy in his front, and of a government at Washington that desired the destruction of his army, was always present with him, exerting its paralyzing influence on all his plans and actions. In his private letters he speaks of Washington as that "sink of iniquity"; of the people in authority as "those treacherous hounds"; of the predicament he is in, "the rebels on one side and the Abolitionists and other scoundrels on the other." "I feel," he says, "that the fate of a nation depends upon me, and I feel that I have not one single friend at the seat of government"—this at a moment when the Government was straining every nerve to support him.

The Confederates, as Mr. Lincoln had said, were daily strengthening their position by fortification and reinforcement. On the 17th of April, General Joseph E. Johnston took command of the army of the Peninsula. He says that his force after the arrival of Smith's and Longstreet's divisions amounted to about 53,000 men, including 3000 sick; he places the force of McClellan at 133,000, including Franklin's division of 13,000 floating idly on their transports.* He did nothing more than to observe the Union army closely, to complete the fortifications between Yorktown and the inundations of the Warwick, and to hold his own forces in readiness for a movement to the rear. He kept himself informed of the progress of McClellan's engineering work against Yorktown, as it was not his intention to remain long enough to spend an hour under fire. He did not expect to be hurried; he had long before that given his opinion that McClellan did not especially value time. Every day of delay was of course an advantage, but "an additional day or two gained by enduring a cannonade would have been dearly bought in blood," and he therefore determined to go before McClellan's powerful artillery should open upon him. Seeing, as we now can, what was occurring upon both sides of the Warwick River, there is something humiliating and not without a touch of the pathetic in the contrast between the clear vision of Johnston and the absolute blindness of McClellan, in relation to each other's attitude and purpose. While the former was simply watching for the flash of the first guns to take his departure,

glad of every day that the firing was postponed, but entirely indifferent to the enormous development of the siege-works going on in his sight, the latter was toiling with prodigious industry and ability over his vast earth-works and his formidable batteries, only pausing to send importunate dispatches to Washington for more guns and more soldiers, forbidding the advance of a picket beyond specified limits, carefully concealing every battery until all should be finished, not allowing a gun to be fired until the whole thunderous chorus should open at once, firmly convinced that when he was entirely ready he would fight and destroy the whole rebel army.

Nearly one hundred heavy Parrott guns, mortars, and howitzers were placed in battery against the town and camp of Yorktown and its outlying works, only fifteen hundred or two thousand yards away. Against the opinion of his ablest staff-officers, McClellan kept this immense armament silent for weeks while he was continually adding to it. Barnard, Chief of Engineers, says, "We should have opened our batteries on the place as fast as they were completed." Barry, Chief of Artillery, says:

The ease with which the 100 and 200 pounders of this battery [Battery No. 1] were worked, the extraordinary accuracy of their fire, and the since ascertained effects produced upon the enemy by it, force upon me the conviction that the fire of guns of similar caliber and power in the other batteries at much shorter ranges, combined with the cross-vertical fire of the thirteen and ten inch sea-coast mortars, would have compelled the enemy to surrender or abandon his works in less than twelve hours.

General McClellan's only reason for refusing to allow the batteries to open fire as they were successively finished was the fear that they would be silenced by the converging fire of the enemy as soon as they betrayed their position. That this was a gross error is shown by the Confederate reports. They were perfectly cognizant of the progress and disposition of his batteries; the very good reason why they did not annoy him in their construction was that the Union lines were, to use Johnston's words, "beyond the range of our old-fashioned ship guns." A few experimental shots were fired from the shore batteries on the 1st of May; the effect of them convinced the Confederate general of the enormous surplus strength of the Federal artillery. The shots from their first volley fell on the camp of his reserve, a mile and a half beyond the village.†

* His own force is correctly given. He only slightly exaggerates that of McClellan.

† On the 23d of April, McClellan wrote to the President: "Do not misunderstand the apparent inaction here—not a day, not an hour, has been lost. Works

have been constructed that may almost be called gigantic, roads built through swamps and difficult ravines, material brought up, batteries built. I have to-night in battery and ready for motion 5 100-pounder Parrott guns, 10 4½-inch ordnance guns, 18 20-pounder Par-

How long General McClellan would have continued this futile labor if he had been left alone, it is impossible to conjecture. If there was at first a limit in his own mind of the work to be done and the time to be given to it, it must have been continually moved forward until it passed out of sight. Up to the last moment he was still making demands which it would have taken weeks to fill. The completion of one work was simply an incentive to the beginning of another. Thus on the 28th of April,—a week after Franklin's arrival,—at a time when Johnston was already preparing to start for Richmond, he telegraphs to Washington as a pleasant bit of news that he "had commenced a new battery from right of first parallel," and adds: "Would be glad to have the 30-pounder Parrotts in the works around Washington at once. Am very short of that excellent gun." It is not difficult to imagine how such a dispatch at such a time smote upon the intense anxiety of the President. He answered in wonder and displeasure: "Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?" But the general, busy with his trenches and his epaulements, paid no regard to this searching question. Two days later, May 1, he continued his cheery report of new batteries and rifle-pits, and adds, "Enemy still in force and working hard"; and these stereotyped phrases last with no premonition of any immediate change until on the 4th he telegraphed, "Yorktown is in our possession," and later in the day began to magnify his victory, telling what spoils he had captured, and ending with the sounding phrases, "No time shall be lost. I shall push the enemy to the wall."

Johnston had begun his preparations to move on the 27th of April, and on the 3d of May, finding that McClellan's batteries were now ready to open,—a fact apparently not yet known to McClellan,—he gave orders for the evacuation, which began at midnight. He marched away from Yorktown with about 50,000 men. General McClellan, by his own morning report of the 30th of April, had in his camps and trenches, and scrambling in haste on board the transports that they had quitted the day before, the magnificent aggregate of 112,392 present for duty, and a total aggregate of 130,378.

rofts, 6 Napoleon guns, and 6 10-pounder Parrotts; this not counting the batteries in front of Smith and on his left — 45 guns. I will add to it to-morrow night 5 30-pounder Parrotts, 6 20-pounder Parrotts, from 5 to 10 13-inch mortars, and—if they arrive in time—one 200-pounder Parrott. Before sundown to-morrow I will

THE evacuation of Yorktown took General McClellan so completely by surprise that a good deal of valuable time was lost in hurried preparation to pursue the retiring enemy. Franklin's division, after their fortnight of delay on the transports, had been disembarked. They were hastily returned to their boats. Says Webb:

Several hours were consumed in having the commands properly provisioned for the march. The evacuation was discovered at dawn, and it was noon before the first column started in pursuit. Johnston by this time had taken his entire command to Williamsburg. Knowing that McClellan's advance would soon reach him, he made his dispositions at his leisure. He posted a strong rear-guard there under Longstreet to protect the movement of his trains. The Union cavalry under Sherman came into collision with this force about dark and was repulsed, losing one gun. The main body of the pursuing army came up during the night, under the command of Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes. It is strongly illustrative of General McClellan's relations with his corps commanders, that neither of these generals had any orders from him as to the conduct of the battle which was inevitable as soon as they overtook the enemy, and there was even serious doubt as to which among them was in command of the forces. Sumner had been ordered by the General-in-Chief to take command in his absence, but these orders had not been communicated to Heintzelman, who thought that he was to take control of the movement.

There was some confusion of orders as to the roads to be taken by the different commands, in consequence of which Hooker came into position on the left of the line and Smith on the right. The contrary disposition had been intended.

The morning of the 5th came with no definite plan of battle arranged. General Hooker, following his own martial instincts, moved forward and attacked the enemy at half-past 7 and was soon hotly engaged. He fought almost the entire rear-guard of Johnston during the whole forenoon. Heavy reinforcements thrown against him checked his advance and caused him to lose the ground he had gained. Hooker speaks in his report with much bitterness, not wholly unjustified, of the manner in which his division was left to fight an overwhelming force, "unaided in the presence of more than 30,000 of their comrades with arms in their hands," and we search the reports of General McClellan and the corps commanders in vain for any adequate explanation of this state of things.

The whole day was bloody and expensive essentially complete the redoubt necessary to strengthen the first parallel as far as Wormley's Creek from the left, and probably all the way to York River to-morrow night. *I will then be secure against sorties.* [McClellan to Lincoln, April 23. MS.] With a force of three to one he was waiting weeks in defensive works.

and without adequate result. The heroism of Hooker and Hancock, and their brave troops, was well-nigh wasted. There was no head, no intelligent director, no understood plan. McClellan arrived late in the day and was unable to contribute anything to the result, although the cheers with which he was welcomed showed how fully he possessed the confidence and affection of his troops. He had not anticipated so early an engagement, and was spending the day at Yorktown to dispatch Franklin's division up the river.

Actual contact with the enemy, however, made, as it always did, an exaggerated impression upon him. The affair, which when he heard of it at Yorktown seemed to him a mere skirmish with a rear-guard, suddenly acquired a portentous importance when surveyed in the light of the bivouac at Williamsburg, amidst the actual and visible signs of a sanguinary conflict. His dispatch to the War Department, written at 10 o'clock the night of the battle, betrays great agitation, and his idiosyncrasy of multiplying the number of his enemy, as a matter of course, asserts itself. "I find General Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, probably greater a good deal than my own." After a compliment to Hancock he continues, "I learn from the prisoners taken that the rebels intend to dispute every step to Richmond." One can only wonder what he expected them to say. "I shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here, while I resume the original plan. My entire force is undoubtedly inferior to that of the rebels, who will fight well."* Thus while Johnston was profiting by the darkness to prepare to continue his retrograde march at daybreak, McClellan was nerving himself to stand the risk of holding his ground at Williamsburg, while he "resumed the original plan" of a movement by water.

The next day, when he discovered that the enemy had moved away, leaving their wounded on the field of battle, his apprehension of attack subsided, but other difficulties rose before him. He telegraphed on the 7th to the Secretary of War that "until the roads improved both in front and rear no large body of troops could be moved." Johnston had apparently no difficulty in moving his troops, which McClellan thought a larger body than his own.

Reaching a place called Baltimore Cross-Roads, Johnston halted for five days, and, after receiving intelligence of the evacuation of

Norfolk and the destruction of the *Merrimac*, apprehending an attack upon Richmond by way of the James River, he ordered his forces to cross the Chickahominy on the 15th. Two days after this the rebel army encamped about three miles from Richmond, in front of the line of redoubts that had been constructed the previous year. It was a time of great apprehension, almost of dismay, at Richmond. The Confederate President, and most of his cabinet, hastily sent their families to places of safety. Mr. Davis, whose religious feelings always took on a peculiar intensity in critical times, had himself baptized at home, and privately confirmed at St. Paul's Church. There was great doubt whether the city could be successfully defended; the most important archives of the Government were sent, some to Lynchburg and some to Columbia.†

But General Johnston had reason to confirm his opinion that McClellan cared little for time. He remained several days at Williamsburg after he had ascertained that the enemy had disappeared from in front of him. His visions of overwhelming forces of rebels were now transferred to Franklin's front. On the 8th he telegraphed the War Department a story of 80,000 to 120,000 opposed to Franklin, but in full retreat to the Chickahominy. On the 10th he sends an urgent appeal to Washington for more troops, claiming that the enemy "are collecting troops from all quarters, especially well-disciplined troops from the South." His own army will inevitably be reduced by sickness, casualties, garrisons, and guards — as if that of the enemy would not. He therefore implores large and immediate reinforcements in a tone which implies that the President could make armies by executive decree. "If I am not reënforced," he says, "it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers, strongly entrenched." In face of a morning report of over 100,000 men present for duty he says: "I do not think it will be at all possible for me to bring more than 70,000 men upon the field of battle." This last statement was in one sense true; he never did, and it is to be presumed he never could, handle that many men at once. All his battles were fought piecemeal with a part of his force at a time.

He still protested stoutly against the original organization of his army corps, and asked that he might be permitted to break it up or at least to suspend it. He disliked his corps

* On the 6th of May the veteran General Wool sent this dispatch to the War Department, showing how his elders regarded at the time these jeremiads of the young general: "The desponding tone of Major-General McClellan's dispatch of last evening more than surprises me. He says his entire force is undoubt-

edly considerably inferior to that of the rebels. If such is the fact, I am still more surprised that they should have abandoned Yorktown." [War Records.]

† J. B. Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," entries of May 8, May 10, and May 19.

commanders, and naturally wished his friends to exercise those important commands. He blamed the corps organization for all the trouble at Williamsburg, and said, if he had come on the field half an hour later, all would have been lost. The President was greatly wounded by this persistent manifestation of bad temper, but bore it after his fashion with untiring patience and kindness. He sent an official order, authorizing McClellan to suspend temporarily the corps organization in the Army of the Potomac, and to adopt any that he might see fit, until further orders. At the same time he wrote a private letter to the general, full of wise and kindly warning. He said :

I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of division, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself alone excepted. Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps are of course the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them ; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz-John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything ? When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that senators and representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no great liberty with them. But to return. Are you strong enough — are you strong enough even with my help — to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once ? This is a practical and very serious question for you. The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.

General McClellan accepted the authorization with alacrity and the sermon with indifference. He at once formed two provisional army corps, giving Fitz-John Porter the command of one and Franklin the other.

After leaving Williamsburg and joining his army at Cumberland, he reiterated his complaints and entreated for reinforcements that it was not in the power of the Government to send him. His morbid apprehension had grown to such an extent that on the 14th of May he telegraphed his conviction that he would be compelled, with 80,000 men, to fight 160,000 rebels in front of Richmond ; and begged that the Government would send

him "by water" — he did not want them to come overland — "all the disposable troops," "every man" that could be mustered. The President, anxious to leave nothing undone to help and encourage him, replied to these important demands first by a friendly private note, in which he said :

I have done and shall do all I could and can to sustain you. I hoped that the opening of the James River and putting Wool and Burnside in communication, with an open road to Richmond, or to you, had effected something in that direction. I am still unwilling to take all our forces off the direct line between Richmond and here.

He afterwards sent a dispatch through the War Department, of which the essential points are as follows :

The President is not willing to uncover the Capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by way of the Potomac and York rivers than by a land march. In order therefore to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered — keeping himself always in position to save the Capital from all possible attack — so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to cooperate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond, . . . but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington ; and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. . . . The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moved forward.

Events as little foreseen by General McClellan as by the Government, and which had by him been declared impossible, — the defeat of our forces in the Shenandoah and the movement of a large rebel force to the upper Potomac, — prevented the execution of this plan. But it is worthy of notice that immediately on the receipt of the President's instructions, while he was waiting for McDowell to join him, General McClellan evinced no gratification at this compliance with his wishes. On the contrary, he lost no time in making a grievance of it ; he wrote a long and elaborate dispatch protesting against it, and asking that "McDowell should be placed explicitly under his orders in the ordinary way." In his report, and in all his subsequent apologies for his campaign, he makes this positive assertion :

This order rendered it impossible for me to use the James River as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey and to approach Richmond from the north.

This charge is an evident after-thought, and is no less lacking in adroitness than in candor. We will permit it to be answered by General

Webb, the ablest military writer on the Peninsula campaign, who is always the friend of McClellan, and his partisan wherever the writer's intelligence and conscience allow it. He says:

It is but repeating the proper criticisms made by other writers that General McClellan had frequently mentioned the Pamunkey as his prospective base; that he made no representation to the Government, at the time, that he wished to be free to move by the James; and that it was within his power during the first three weeks of June, when he found that McDowell was again withheld from him, to follow the latter route. On one point there can be no question — that the position of his army, as already given, along the left bank of the Chickahominy from Bottom's towards New Bridge, on May 20, with the White House, on the Pamunkey, as the base of supplies, was one of McClellan's own choice, uninfluenced by McDowell's movements.

It required ten days after the fight at Williamsburg for McClellan's headquarters to reach Cumberland, on the south bank of the Pamunkey, and on the next day he established his permanent depot at the White House, near by. On the 21st the army was brought together and established in line on the Chickahominy, the right wing being about seven and the left about twelve miles from Richmond, from which they were separated by two formidable barriers — the rebel army, and the river with its environment of woods and swamps, its fever-breathing airs and its sudden floods. The latter was first attacked. General McClellan began at once with great energy the building of several bridges over the stream, a work of special difficulty on account of the boggy banks, which made long approaches necessary. In this work, and in a voluminous correspondence with the President in regard to reënforcements, which we shall notice when we come to treat of those movements of Jackson's in the valley that caused the division of McDowell's force, he passed ten days; he pushed the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman across the river, and retained those of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter on the north side.

The monotony of camp life was broken up on the 27th of May by a brilliant feat of arms performed by Fitz-John Porter and his corps at Hanover Court House, where he attacked and defeated a rebel force under General Branch. The chief value of this battle was its demonstration of the splendid marching and fighting qualities of the troops engaged. General McClellan was greatly annoyed that the President did not seem to attach sufficient importance to this action; but General Johnston in his "Narrative," while not diminishing the gallantry of Porter and his troops, or denying the complete defeat of Branch, treats it merely as an incident of Branch's march under orders to join Anderson, which was accomplished

the same day at the point designated for this junction. There was no sequel to the fight. Porter and his victorious troops marched back to camp.

On the 26th of May, General McClellan informed the President that he was "quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle," and that he would be "free to strike" on the return of Porter. But several days elapsed without the blow being struck, until the enemy, as usual, accelerated matters by himself striking. It had been for some time the intention of General Johnston to attack the Union army before McDowell should join it; and learning, on the day of the battle of Hanover Court House, that McDowell was leaving Fredericksburg, he resolved at once to strike McClellan's force on both sides of the river. When we consider that the consolidated returns of the Army of the Potomac for the 31st of May showed an aggregate of 127,166 officers and men, of whom there were 98,000 present for duty, with 280 pieces of field artillery, and that General Johnston's force amounted to about 60,000 effectives, we cannot but think it was a fortunate circumstance for him that he did not attempt to carry this heroic plan into effect. At night, when he had called his general officers together for their instruction, Johnston was informed that McDowell's force, which had been marching southward, had returned to Fredericksburg. He then abandoned his idea of attacking McClellan on both sides of the river, and reverted to his former plan of assailing with his whole force the two corps on the south bank as soon as they had sufficiently increased the distance between themselves and the three corps on the north.

In this plan, as in the other one,—and we shall see, farther on, that the same was the case with General Lee,—General Johnston does not seem to have taken into the account the possible initiative of General McClellan. He makes his plans entirely without reference to it, choosing his time for attack absolutely at his own convenience. He takes it for granted that he will be met with a courageous and able defense — but nothing more. The worst he has to fear in any case is a repulse; there seems no thought of an offensive return in his mind. The Northern general, on the contrary, judged his adversary with more courtesy than justice. He evidently had no suspicion of Johnston's intentions. At the moment that the latter was calling his generals together to give orders for the assault, McClellan was telegraphing to Washington: "Richmond papers urge Johnston to attack, now that he has us away from gun-boats. I think he is too able for that."

Johnston's purpose was finally adopted and put in action with great decision and promptitude. On the 30th D. H. Hill informed him that the Federals were in force at Seven Pines, and that the indications were that all of Keyes's corps was south of the river; to which Johnston immediately responded by telling him he would attack the next morning. Within an hour or two his whole plan of battle was arranged. Orders were given to throw twenty-three of the twenty-seven brigades of which the Confederate army consisted against the two corps of Heintzelman and Keyes.* The rest were to observe the river by the Meadow and New bridges. After the plan of battle was arranged, a violent storm of rain came on and continued most of the night. This was a welcome incident to Johnston, as it inspired the hope that the river might overflow its banks and sever the communication between the two wings of the Federal army. He did not permit the rain to delay him.

The forces commanded by Longstreet and Hill attacked Casey's division of Keyes's corps with great impetuosity, and in overwhelming numbers, about 1 o'clock in the afternoon. Keyes's corps, supported by those of Heintzelman, defended their ground with gallantry and pertinacity; but the numbers opposed to them were too great, and they gradually and sullenly gave way, retiring inch by inch, until, as night came on, they had been forced more than a mile and a half east of the position that they had occupied in the morning.

The forces under G. W. Smith, accompanied by Johnston in person, whose duty it had been to strike the right flank of the Union army as soon as the assault of Longstreet and Hill became fully developed on the left, were delayed for some time on account of a peculiar condition of the atmosphere, which prevented the sound of the musketry from reaching from Seven Pines to the headquarters of Smith on the Nine-mile road. But about 4 o'clock, Johnston, having been informed of the progress of affairs in Longstreet's front, determined to put Smith in upon the Union right flank, being by this time relieved of all fear of a reinforcement from the other side of the river. Fortunately for the Union cause, the forces immediately opposite this position were commanded by General Sumner, an officer whose strongest traits were soldierly ardor and generosity. He had been ordered, as soon as the firing began, to hold himself in readiness to move to the assistance of his comrades at Fair Oaks; but he gave these orders a liberal interpretation, and instead of merely preparing to

move he at once marched with two divisions to the two bridges he had built and halted them, with his leading companies at the bridges. In this manner an hour of inestimable advantage was saved. The swollen river soon carried away one of the bridges, and the other was almost submerged when the order came to Sumner to cross.

Without delaying a moment on the west bank, Sumner marched through the thick mud in the direction of the heaviest firing and repulsed the attacks of Smith. This Union success was the result of Sumner's straightforward and unhesitating march. His appointment to the command of an army corps had been bitterly opposed and never forgiven by General McClellan; he had been treated by his commander with studied neglect and disrespect; and this magnificent service was his only revenge. About 7 o'clock the Confederates met their severest mischance of the day; General Johnston received at an interval of a few moments two severe and disabling wounds.

The firing ceased, "terminated by darkness only," Johnston is careful to say, before he had been borne a mile from the field. The command had devolved by seniority of rank upon General G. W. Smith.

There was great confusion and discouragement in the rebel councils. Jefferson Davis found hope in the suggestion that "the enemy might withdraw during the night, which would give the Confederates the moral effect of a victory." Early on June 1 the battle was renewed, and the Union troops reoccupied the ground lost on the day before. At 2 o'clock General Lee took command, and the battle died away by the gradual retirement of the Confederates.

A great battle had been fought absolutely without result. The Confederates had failed in their attempt to destroy McClellan's two outlying corps, but their failure entailed no other consequence. The losses were frightful upon both sides: the Union army lost 5000, and the Confederate loss was reported at something over 4000, which is generally considered an under-statement. But there was this enormous difference between the condition of the two armies: the Union troops south of the Chickahominy, though wearied by the conflict, with ranks thinned by death and wounds, had yet suffered no loss of *morale*; on the contrary, their spirits had been heightened by the stubborn fight of Saturday and the easy victory of Sunday. North of the river lay the larger portion of the army, which had not fired a gun nor lost a man in the action. It is hardly denied, at this day, by the most passionate of McClellan's partisans, that the way to Rich-

* In an article in *THE CENTURY* for May, 1885, General Johnston changes this statement to "twenty-two out of twenty-eight brigades."

mond was open before him on Saturday afternoon. It was his greatest opportunity.

Jackson was in the Valley of the Shenandoah detaching from Lee an army of 16,000 men. The enemy had thrown almost his whole force against McClellan's left wing, and had received more injury than he inflicted. Our right wing was intact; the material for bridging the upper Chickahominy had been ready for three days; the Confederate army was streaming back to Richmond in discouragement and disorder. Even so ardent a friend of McClellan as the Prince de Joinville writes :

The Federals had had the defensive battle they desired; had repulsed the enemy; but arrested by natural obstacles which perhaps were not insurmountable, they had gained nothing by their success. They had missed an unique opportunity of striking a blow.

If General McClellan had crossed his army, instead of one division, at the time that Johnston's entire force was engaged at Seven Pines,

* The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those "occasions" which, if not seized, do not repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing. [General Barnard]

Mr. William Henry Hurlbert, the translator of the Prince de Joinville's work, who was in Richmond during the battle, gives the following account of the condition of the Confederates on the morning of June 1 :

They were in a perfect chaos of brigades and regiments. The roads into Richmond were literally cov-

ered with stragglers, some throwing away their guns, some breaking them on the trees, all with the same story that their regiments had been "cut to pieces"—that the "Yankees were swarming on the Chickahominy like bees," and "fighting like devils." In two days of the succeeding week the provost-marshal's guard collected between 4000 and 5000 stragglers and sent them into camp. Had I been aware on that day of the actual state of things upon the field, I might easily have driven in a carriage through the Confederate lines directly into our own camps. It was not indeed until several days after the battle that anything like military order was restored throughout the Confederate positions. Appendix, p. 113.

“AS A BELL IN A CHIME.”

AS a bell in a chime
 Sets its twin-note a-ringing,
 As one poet's rhyme
 Wakes another to singing,
 So, once she has smiled,
 All your thoughts are beguiled
 As flowers and song from your childhood are bringing.
 Though moving through sorrow
 As the star through the night,
 She needs not to borrow,
 She lavishes, light.
 The path of yon star
 Seemeth dark but afar :
 Like hers it is sure, and like hers it is bright.
 Each grace is a jewel
 Would ransom the town,
 Her speech has no cruel,
 Her praise is renown ;
 'T is in her as though Beauty,
 Resigning to Duty
 The scepter, had still kept the purple and crown.

A LAKE MEMORY.

THE lake comes throbbing in with voice of pain
Across these flats, athwart the sunset's glow.
I see her face, I know her voice again,
Her lips, her breath, O God, as long ago.

To live the sweet past over I would fain,
As lives the day in the red sunset's fire,
That all these wild wan marshlands now would stain,
With the dawn's memories, loves, and flushed desire.

I call her back across the vanished years,
Nor vain — a white-armed phantom fills her place;
Its eyes the wind-blown sunset fires, its tears
This rain of spray that blows about my face.

William Wilfred Campbell.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN, AND THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.



As we have seen, it was the intention of the Administration to dispatch the whole of McDowell's corps to reinforce McClellan, as soon as the situation in northern Virginia would permit. Franklin's division was so dispatched, in ample time to have taken part in the operations against Yorktown, though General McClellan made no use whatever of that fine body of troops until Yorktown was evacuated. Preparations were vigorously made by the Government for the march of McDowell towards Richmond; and Shields's division, one of the best in Banks's corps, was ordered to reinforce him. The most important results were expected from such an attack as an officer of McDowell's ability and zeal would have made upon the left flank of the Confederate forces in front of Richmond. It is one of the admitted misfortunes of the war that this attack was never made, and the question as to who was responsible for it has given rise to much heated and more or less disingenuous discussion.

General Thomas Jonathan Jackson, commonly called "Stonewall," had won great credit

at the battle of Bull Run, but his first independent campaign resulted in signal defeat. In April, 1862, he was ordered by General Johnston to occupy the attention of Banks in the Shenandoah Valley. He advanced rapidly in pursuance of what he understood to be the spirit of his orders, and came in view of Shields's division at Kernstown, near Winchester, on the 22d of April. A brief skirmish took place that evening, in the course of which General Shields was severely wounded, his arm being broken by the fragment of a shell. He retired to Winchester, and General Nathan Kimball remained on the field in active command of the division. The next day, although it was Sunday, Jackson, thinking he had his enemy at a disadvantage, and unaware either of his numbers or of his disposition, attacked Kimball with great impetuosity, but met with a severe repulse. Kimball, who was ably seconded by Colonels Carroll and Tyler, not only beat off the attack of Jackson from both his flanks, but at the right moment assumed the offensive, and after a hotly contested fight, lasting two hours, as night was closing in he completely defeated the Confederates, who were driven from the field, leaving their dead and wounded and several guns. Banks, coming down from Harper's

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Ferry the next day, continued the pursuit up the valley as far as Mount Jackson. Shields's division in this action numbered about 7000; Jackson reported his own force as between 3000 and 4000. The losses reported on each side are: Shields 590, Jackson 718. Jackson frankly acknowledged his defeat, saying to Johnston:

I engaged the enemy yesterday, about 3 P.M., near Winchester, and fought until dusk; but his forces were so superior to mine that he repulsed me with the loss of valuable officers and men killed and wounded. But from the obstinacy with which our troops fought, and from their advantageous position, I am of the opinion that his loss was greater than mine in troops, but I lost one piece of artillery and three caissons.

Jackson's second campaign in the Shenandoah, which gained him in full measure that fame and position which were so near to his heart, occupied about a month. It may be said to have begun in his attack upon General Milroy's forces at McDowell on the 8th of May. In this affair, as in every battle of this famous campaign, he had much larger forces than those opposed to him — a fact entirely to his credit; there were Union troops enough in the department, if they had been properly brought together, to have overwhelmed him. After a fight of several hours he defeated Milroy, who fell back to join Frémont at the town of Franklin, while Jackson moved eastward to Harrisonburg. On the way he sent dispatches to Richmond, detailing the position of the Union troops, and asking permission to attack them. This was granted, and he at once began a swift and stealthy march through New Market and Luray to Front Royal. It was at this time that McClellan was daily clamoring for reënforcements from Washington; and the Government, yielding to his importunity, had promised that McDowell's corps should march overland to join him. The reasons why this promise could not be kept are best set forth in the following dispatch from Mr. Lincoln, whose communications to his generals were always clearer and more definite than any that he received from them. It is dated May 25:

General Banks was at Strasburg with about 6000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered in various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th pushed on to get north of Banks, on the road to Winchester. General Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which General Banks was beaten back in full retreat towards Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal with 10,000 troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. [In this

Geary was mistaken. Jackson's and Ewell's forces amounted to about 16,000.] Stripped bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and Frémont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his force remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, have always been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have.¹

Later in the day, the President, now sure that a large and formidable army was drawing near the Potomac, wrote a sharp dispatch to McClellan urging him either to take this opportunity "to attack Richmond, or give up the job"; to which the general, who was never disturbed by the presence of the enemy anywhere out of his sight, replied calmly that "the object of the movement was probably to prevent reënforcements being sent him," and that the time was very near when he would attack Richmond.

The campaign, opened thus inauspiciously for the Union arms, went rapidly from bad to worse. A series of doleful mischances succeeded, unrelieved by a ray of good fortune or good conduct. Mr. Lincoln, at Washington, was exerting himself to the utmost, sending a dozen dispatches a day to Banks, Frémont, McDowell, and McClellan — all admirable in clearness, intelligence, and temper, always directing the right thing to be done and the best way of doing it; but nothing seemed to avail.

The original surprise was inexcusable. On the 20th of May,¹ Frémont had reported to Banks that Jackson was on the way to attack him, but no proper preparation was made. After the defeat at Front Royal on the 23d, and at Winchester on the 25th, while Banks was in retreat to the Potomac, the only thought of the President was to stop Jackson at the river, and to detain him until a sufficient force could be gathered in the neighborhood of Strasburg to destroy or capture him on his return. Frémont was ordered to cross the mountains to Harrisonburg and come north down the valley with his force. McDowell, with a competent detachment under Shields, was ordered to Front Royal; a considerable army met the victorious forces of Jackson at the Potomac. These last were mostly of raw lev-

ies, not inured to marching or to fighting; but they accomplished their purpose of delaying for the moment the advance of Jackson towards Washington. His own intention, as well as his orders from Richmond, were, in the language of General Dabney,¹ "to press the enemy at Harper's Ferry, threaten an invasion of Maryland, and an assault upon the Federal capital." But on the 29th, while at Halltown,² preparing for an attack upon Harper's Ferry, he received information of the movement of troops that had been ordered by the President, which, as Dabney says, "imperiously required him to give up that attack and provide for his own safety." He then began his precipitate retreat up the valley, which by its celerity and success gained him even more credit than did his audacious advance.

It ought not to have been allowed to succeed; it was perfectly feasible to prevent it. Had the plain orders of the President been obeyed, Jackson could not have escaped from the predicament where his headlong energy and his contempt for his adversaries had placed him. It is idle to talk of his invincibility; he was generally whipped, like other men, when the conditions were not favorable to him. He was defeated severely at Kernstown in March, when he had been confident of victory; later, at Gaines's Mills, he did not particularly distinguish himself above others; Banks, with one-third his force, gave him all the work he could do at Cedar Mountain; while at Malvern Hill and White Oak Swamp his inefficiency in large tactics was recognized and severely criticized by generals on his own side. If Frémont and McDowell had met him at Strasburg, and Banks had followed upon his heels, as Mr. Lincoln had clearly and explicitly ordered, nothing could have prevented the capture or destruction of his entire command. Each of these generals had his task assigned him; it was in each case perfectly practicable. It involved only an expeditious march to the neighborhood of Strasburg, over roads more or less rough, undisturbed by the presence of an enemy in any considerable force.

General McDowell's part of the work was performed with his habitual energy and promptitude, notwithstanding the chagrin and displeasure with which he received his orders. On the evening of the 24th of May³ the President sent him a dispatch informing him that Frémont had been ordered by telegraph to move from Franklin on Harrisonburg, to relieve Banks, and to capture or destroy Jackson's or Ewell's forces. Mr. Lincoln continues:

You are instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line, or in

advance of the line, of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Your object will be to capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in coöperation with General Frémont, or, in case want of supplies or of transportation interferes with his movements, it is believed that the force with which you move will be sufficient to accomplish this object alone. The information thus far received here makes it probable that if the enemy operate actively against General Banks you will not be able to count upon much assistance from him, but may even have to release him.

It is remarkable that the President saw the situation with such accuracy the day before Banks's defeat at Winchester.

This order McDowell, though he called it "a crushing blow,"³ obeyed at once, directing Shields to take up his march to Catlett's, a station on the Orange and Alexandria road, about half-way between Fredericksburg and Front Royal, and reporting that he had done so. The President sent him an acknowledgment of his alacrity, at the same time expressing his regret at the change of his orders, and adding, "Everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your movements."³ This encouraged the general to make an earnest though respectful protest, which he sent the same night to the President, setting forth his belief that coöperation between himself and Frémont was not to be counted upon; that it would take him a week or ten days to get to the valley; that by that time the enemy would have retired. We shall see later that these forebodings at least were not realized. At the same time he telegraphed to Wadsworth, in command at Washington, his deep disgust; he did not think the rebel force in the mountains amounted to five thousand men. But with all this grumbling his deeds were better than his words; he pushed Shields forward with the greatest celerity. Shields, who was burning to go to Richmond, marched obediently, but in very bad humor. The dispatches of this officer read like a burlesque of those of his superior. He is loud in contempt of both armies in the Shenandoah. He thought when the movement first began that there was nothing in it; that the enemy would never come north; that if they did, they would be hemmed in and destroyed. As late as the 10th of May he was sure "they were not there to fight."³ As he went forward to Front Royal his boasting spirit asserted itself more and more. "I want no assistance," he said. He promised to "give Jackson a bloody reception," to "drive the enemy from the Shenandoah," and wanted to know if there was anything else he could do for the President—the task in question being unworthy of his powers.⁴

But neither the chagrin of McDowell nor the gasconading of Shields prevented them

¹ Dabney, p. 386.

² *Ibid.*, p. 387.

³ War Records.

⁴ May 26 and 27.

from striving with all their might to do the work assigned them. The President kept McDowell constantly informed of the condition of affairs, detailing the progress of Jackson northward, and urging the value and importance of the service expected of the Union troops. McDowell showed himself, as he always was, worthy of the confidence reposed in him. In spite of all obstacles,—accidents by rail, bad roads, and rough weather,—he got Shields's advance into Front Royal on the 30th of May; that is, in little more than half the time he thought he should require for the purpose. The same day the President sent him a dispatch from Frémont saying that he would be at Strasburg, or where the enemy was, at 4 P. M., May 31; and another from Saxton at Harper's Ferry, indicating that the enemy was still there. The President added, with justifiable exultation, "It seems the game is before you."

It remains to be seen how General Frémont executed his share of the task. On the 24th the President gave him an urgent order to move at once, by way of Harrisonburg, to the relief of Banks. He promptly replied that he "would move as ordered"; but made the unfortunate error of choosing an entirely different route from the one assigned him.¹ Thinking the road to Harrisonburg was more or less obstructed, and off his line of supplies, he moved northward by way of Petersburg and Moorefield, in the great valley lying west of the Shenandoah Mountains, and did not even inform the President of this discretionary modification of his orders, so that, on the 27th, when they were anxiously expecting at Washington to hear from him at Harrisonburg, they were astounded at receiving tidings from him at Moorefield, two good days' march from the line of Jackson's retreat, and separated by two counties and the Shenandoah range from the place where he was desired and expected to be. In response to the President's peremptory question why he was at Moorefield when he was ordered to Harrisonburg, he made an unsatisfactory reply, alleging the necessity of his choice of route, and his assumed discretion as to his orders. Dropping this matter, the President began again urging him forward to Strasburg. There was still time to repair the original error. Jackson was on the Potomac, much farther from the rendezvous than Frémont. But the latter could not be made to see the vital necessity of immediate action—his men were weary, his supplies were deficient, the roads were bad; Blenker's corps was straggling badly. Finally, on the 29th, his medical director told him his army needed a whole day's rest.

He promptly accepted this suggestion, and wasted twenty-four hours in this manner, while Jackson was rushing his ragged troops, who had known no rest for a month, up the narrow valley that formed his only outlet from destruction or captivity. In one day, says Major Dabney, the Stonewall Brigade marched "from Halltown to the neighborhood of Newton, a distance of thirty-five miles; and the 2d Virginia accomplished a march of forty miles without rations, over muddy roads and amidst continual showers." The race was to the swift. As Frémont's advance entered Strasburg on the 1st of June the rear-guard of Jackson's force was still in sight, leaving the place. The plan of the President, well combined and reasonable as it was, had failed through no fault of his, and Jackson had escaped. It is the contention of General McClellan and his partisans that the plan could not possibly have succeeded. One critic² disposes of the matter by a sneer at the thought of "trapping that wily fox, who knew every gorge and pass of the mountain." But an army of 16,000 men of all arms is not a fox; it must have roads to cross mountains, and bridges to pass over rivers. If Frémont had obeyed orders and had been where he should have been on the 30th of May, and if Banks and Saxton had kept a closer watch at Harper's Ferry and followed more immediately upon Jackson's rear, Jackson would have been surrounded at Strasburg by three times his own force, and would have been captured or his army dispersed and destroyed. This would have been richly worth all its cost, and the most captious or malevolent critic would have had nothing to say against the President who ordered it.

There was little prospect of defeating Jackson after he had slipped through the gap between Frémont and McDowell at Strasburg; but nevertheless an energetic pursuit was begun by Frémont up the Shenandoah and by part of Shields's division up the Luray Valley on the east, the former harassing Jackson's rear with almost daily skirmishes, and the latter running a race with him on a parallel line. There was hardly a possibility now of regaining the lost opportunity. No matter how severely pressed, it was almost surely in Jackson's power to escape across Brown's Gap to Albemarle County, where he would for a time be safe from pursuit; and this course, says Major Dabney, was in his mind as a final resort.³ But he was not even driven to this. There was one last chance of inflicting great damage upon him. One of Shields's brigades arrived at the bridge at Port Republic before him, and either should have taken and held or destroyed it.⁴ The officer in

¹ War Records.

² Swinton, "Army of the Potomac."

³ Dabney, p. 404.

⁴ War Records.

command did neither, and the bridge immediately after fell into Jackson's hands, giving him command of both sides of the river. The Confederate general and his adjutant and biographer ascribed the capture of this important position to supernatural means.¹

As soon as Jackson uttered his command [to seize the bridge] he drew up his horse, and, dropping the reins upon his neck, raised both his hands towards the heavens, while the fire of battle in his face changed into a look of reverential awe. Even while he prayed, the God of battles heard; or ever he had withdrawn his uplifted hands, the bridge was gained.

It would perhaps be irreverent to add that the bridge was not defended. On the same day, June 8, he fought a sharp but indecisive battle with Frémont at Cross Keys, and retiring in the night, he attacked and defeated Shields's small detachment at Port Republic. The mismanagement of the Union generals had opposed to him on both days forces greatly inferior to his own. Before these battles were fought the President, seeing that further pursuit was useless, had ordered Shields back to McDowell, Frémont to halt at Harrisonburg for orders, and Banks to guard the posts of Port Royal and Luray. The orders came too late to prevent two unfortunate engagements, but they showed that the civilian at Washington was wiser than the two generals at the front. They both passed thereafter into the ranks of the malcontents—the men with grievances. Shields went back to Washington, where he was received with open arms by the habitual critics of the President. Among them were those of his own household; for we read in Mr. Chase's diary that Shields told him, when he was ordered back, that "Jackson's capture was certain," and the general and the Secretary held harmonious council together over the "terrible mistakes" of the President.² This was the last important service of Frémont. He remained in charge of his department a few weeks longer, until he was placed, with others of similar rank, under the general command of Pope. He refused to serve under his junior, and was relieved, not appearing again in any conspicuous position, except for a moment in the summer of 1864, as a candidate for the Presidency in opposition to Mr. Lincoln.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

AFTER the battle of Fair Oaks, as well as before it, General McClellan kept up his continual cry for reënforcements. The hallucination that the enemy's force was double his own had become fixed upon him, and all his plans and

combinations were poisoned by this fatal error. The President did everything in his power to satisfy the general's unreasonable demands. He resolved to give him absolute control of all the troops on the Peninsula; and knowing that General Wool would never consent to being placed under McClellan's orders,—that veteran having expressed himself with characteristic severity in regard to his junior's insatiable demand for troops,—the President thought best to remove General Wool to Baltimore, transferring General Dix to Fort Monroe and placing him under the direct command of McClellan—a proceeding which greatly displeased General Dix, but to which he yielded under protest.³ His displeasure did not interfere with his convictions of duty. Immediately on arriving at Fort Monroe he sent to General McClellan a reënforcement of ten of the best regiments there.³ No efforts were spared to help and to encourage McClellan; both the President and the Secretary of War were perpetually sending him kind and complimentary messages in addition to the troops and guns which they gathered in from every quarter for him. A few days after Fair Oaks, in response to his repeated entreaties, McCall's division of McDowell's corps, a splendid body of about ten thousand men, was dispatched to him. He was for the moment delighted at hearing that these troops were coming; and having thus obtained the greater part of McDowell's corps, he was quite gracious in his acknowledgments to the Government. He said, June 7:

I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward reënforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery.

McCall and his perfectly appointed division of ten thousand men and five batteries of artillery began to arrive on the 11th, and were all present for duty on the 13th; and as if Providence were uniting with the Government to satisfy both the general's requirements, he was able to telegraph on the 12th that the weather was good and the roads and the ground were rapidly drying. The weather continued remarkably fine for several days; General Keyes on the 15th reported White Oak Swamp dried up so as to be fordable in many places.³ But the dry spell did not last forever, and on the night of the 15th General McClellan sends to Washington a note of lamentation³ saying that the rain has begun again, which will "retard his movements somewhat." It is characteristic of him that he always regarded bad weather as exclusively injurious to him, and never to the other side. The President once said of him that he seemed to think, in defiance of Scripture, that Heaven sent its rain only on

¹ Dabney, p. 413.

² Warden, "Life of Salmon P. Chase," pp. 444, 445.

³ War Records.

the just and not on the unjust. To an energetic general all kinds of weather have their uses. Johnston had embraced with alacrity the opportunity afforded by the terrible storm of May 30, and made it his ally in his attack on the 31st.

It must not be forgotten that, although McClellan and his apologists have been for years denouncing the Government for having withheld from him McDowell's corps, the best part of that corps was actually sent to him. Franklin's magnificent division went to him in April, and no use whatever was made of it for several weeks; McCall's equally fine division was dispatched to him before the middle of June. In each case he said he only awaited the arrival of that division to undertake immediate active operations; and in each case, on the arrival of the eagerly demanded reinforcements, he did nothing but wait the good pleasure of the enemy. His own official reports show that he received by way of reinforcements, after his arrival in the Peninsula and prior to the 15th of June, not less than 39,441 men, of whom there were 32,360 present for duty.¹ Yet all this counted for nothing with him; he let hardly a day pass without clamoring for more. He was not even inclined to allow the Administration any discretion in regard to the manner in which he was to be reinforced. He insisted that McDowell should be sent to him by water, and not by land, so that he should come in by his rear instead of by his right flank; and when he was informed that McCall's force was expected to be restored to McDowell's corps, when that army joined him, he bitterly resented it. He said it did not show a proper spirit in McDowell; and added sullenly, "If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them; but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results."² These selfish and petulant outbursts were met with unwearied patience and kindness on the part of the President. On the 15th of June he wrote:

The Secretary of War has turned over to me your dispatch about sending McDowell to you by water, instead of by land. I now fear he cannot get to you either way in time. Shields's division has got so terribly out of shape, out at elbows, and out at toes, that it will require a long time to get it in again. I expect to see McDowell within a day or two, when I will again talk with him about the mode of moving. McCall's division has nearly or quite reached you by now. This, with what you get from General Wool's old command, and the new regiments sent you, must give you an increase, since the late battles, of over twenty thousand. Doubtless the battles, and other causes, have decreased you half as much in the same time; but then the enemy have lost as many in the same way. I believe I would

come and see you were it not that I fear my presence might divert you and the army from more important matters.³

From this it will be seen that McClellan had no right to delay operations an hour after McCall's arrival from any pretended expectation of the immediate coming of McDowell; and, indeed, he admits in his report⁴ that as early as the 7th of June he had given up any such expectation. With no reason, therefore, for delay, but with every conceivable incentive to action, with an army amounting, after McCall joined him, to the imposing figure of 156,838, of whom an aggregate present of 127,327 is reported by McClellan himself as of the 20th of June,—though he makes a reduction to 114,691 of those "present for duty equipped,"—he wasted the month of June in a busy and bustling activity which was in its results equivalent to mere idleness. He was directly invited to attack by the fine weather of the middle of the month, which he describes as "splendid" in a dispatch of the 17th, and by the absence of Stonewall Jackson in the valley with his 16,000 veterans, reinforced by 10,000 troops from Lee's army, as McClellan himself believed and reported on the 18th. The President, by a dispatch of the same date, urged him to take advantage of this opportunity, saying:

If this is true, it is as good as a reinforcement to you of an equal force. I could better dispose of things if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond, and would be glad to be informed, if you think you can inform me with safety.

The terms in which General McClellan answered this inquiry are worthy of quotation as an illustration of that false air of energy and determination which he so often introduced into the expression of his intentions, while leaving, as in the last lines of this dispatch, a loophole for indefinite delay:⁵

Our army is well over the Chickahominy, except the very considerable forces necessary to protect our flanks and communications. Our whole line of pickets in front runs within six miles of Richmond. The rebel line runs within musket range of ours. Each has heavy support at hand. A general engagement may take place any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibits at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works. If 10,000 or 15,000 men have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence.

This is a singularly characteristic view. The fact of a large detachment having left Lee affords him no encouragement; it simply impresses him all the more with the idea of his enemy's strength.

mond, I stated in the foregoing dispatch (of June 7) that I should be ready to move when General McCall's division joined me." War Records.

⁵ June 18.

¹ War Records. ² McClellan's Report, June 14.

³ Lincoln, MS.

⁴ "As I did not think it probable that any reinforcements would be sent me in time for the advance on Rich-

After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries.¹

With these vague platitudes the President was forced to be content, and to wait, with the general, to see what Providence would ordain the day after to-morrow — or the next day.

As usual, it was the enemy that startled McClellan out of his procrastination. On the 13th of June, General J. E. B. Stuart, with some 1200 Confederate cavalry and a few guns, started to ride around McClellan's army; touching on his way the South Anna Railroad bridge, Hanover Court House, Tunstall's Station on the York River Railway, and thence to Jones's Bridge on the Chickahominy, which he stopped to repair, crossing it on the 15th, and entering Richmond by the river road the next day. It has rarely been the fortune of a general to inflict such an insult, without injury, upon an opponent. General McClellan did not seem to feel that any discredit attached to him for this performance. On the contrary he congratulated himself that Stuart had done so little harm.

The burning of two schooners laden with forage, and fourteen Government wagons, the destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, some little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a little *éclat*, were the precise results of this expedition.²

McClellan had for some time been vaguely meditating a change of base to the James River, and this raid of Stuart seems to have somewhat strengthened this purpose. Fitz John Porter, who more than any other possessed his confidence, says that he desired to effect this movement as soon as he gave up looking for McDowell to join him, which, we have seen from his report, was in the first week of June. "As early as June 18," Porter says, "he sent vessels loaded with supplies to the James River."³ It is not intended to intimate that he was fully resolved upon this course; but he appears to have kept it constantly before him, in his undecided, irresolute way, all through the month. His communication with Commodore John Rodgers, who commanded on the James, indicates a purpose to move to some point on that river. He says on the 24th:

In a few days I hope to gain such a position as to enable me to place a force above Ball's and Drewry's bluffs, so that we can remove the obstructions and place ourselves in communication with you so that you can cooperate in the final attack. In the mean time please keep me some gun-boats as near Drewry's Bluff as prudence will permit.¹

¹ War Records.

² McClellan's Report. War Records.

³ "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., p. 325.

⁴ Webb, "The Peninsula," pp. 119, 120.

On the 25th he pushed forward his picket line in front of Seven Pines to within four miles of Richmond, a point farther in advance than he had yet reached. At the same time he issued orders to his corps commanders south of the river that they were not to regard these new positions as their field of battle, but were to fall back, if attacked, to their old intrenchments.¹ He had by this time heard of the arrival of Jackson's corps, and also credited a false and impossible rumor of the arrival of Beauregard and his troops from the West. He was fully informed of the attack threatened within a few hours, and yet he sent to Washington for more troops.¹ "If I had another good division I could laugh at Jackson,"¹ he said, while he knew that Jackson was marching upon his right. He made his usual complaint and threat of putting the responsibility where it belonged. These wanton accusations at such a time moved the President, not to anger, but to genuine sorrow. Yet he answered with almost incredible patience:

Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying. The latter one, suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best with what you have; while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and shall omit, no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can.

It is impossible to say how long his desultory preparations would have lasted if General McClellan had been left to himself; but after the 23d of June, the power of deciding upon what day he should attack had already passed out of his hands. General Lee had made, at his leisure, all his arrangements for attacking the Union army, and had chosen the time and the manner of onset,—as Johnston did a month before,—without the slightest reference to any possible initiative of McClellan. He had, during the month allowed him by the inactivity of his opponent, brought together from every available source a great army, almost equal in numbers to the Army of the Potomac. Though there is a great disparity in the accounts of the different Confederate officers who have written upon this subject, there is no reason to doubt that the official estimate quoted with approval by General Webb, which states Lee's force as 80,762, is substantially correct. Webb says that McClellan's effective force for the "seven days' battles" was 92,500⁴—considerably less than his own official report of the 20th of June gives him. The Confederate forces were, like the army opposed to them, of the best material the country could furnish;

and no better men ever went to war, in any age or region. It is an unsolved and now an insolvable question whether the Confederates had gained or lost by the wounding of Johnston and the substitution of Lee as the commander of their principal army. They were both men of the best ability and highest character that the Southern States could produce; both trained soldiers, of calm temper, and great energy; and both equally honorable and magnanimous in their treatment of their subordinates. But General Lee had a great advantage over his predecessor in possessing the perfect confidence and personal friendship of Jefferson Davis, the head of the Confederate Government. He was always sure in his enterprises of what Johnston often lacked, the sincere and zealous support of the Richmond Government. He also enjoyed, to an unusual degree, the warm regard and esteem of those who were brought into personal or official relations with him. His handsome and attractive presence, his dignified yet cordial manner, a certain sincerity and gentleness which was apparent in all his words and actions, endeared him to his associates and made friends of strangers at first sight. Everything he asked for was given him. He had been the favorite of General Scott in the old army; he became the favorite of Mr. Davis in his new command. The army which Johnston gave up to him had been almost doubled in numbers by the time he considered himself ready to employ it against McClellan.¹

Lee's preparations were promptly and energetically made. Immediately after Stuart's raid was completed he ordered Stonewall Jackson to join him by a letter of the 16th, which gave minute instructions for his march and enjoined upon him the greatest secrecy and swiftness. To mask this movement he ostentatiously sent Jackson two brigades from Richmond, with drums beating and colors flying, a proceeding which was promptly reported to McClellan and caused him at first some perplexity,² but which he explained by his usual conclusion that Lee had so overwhelming a force that a few brigades here or there made no difference to him. The manœuvre was of little practical account, however, as McClellan was fully informed of Jackson's approach in time to provide against it, or to anticipate his arrival by taking the offensive. He even knew as early as the 25th that Jackson was to come in on his right and rear,² but he made no use of this knowledge except to reproach the Government for not sending him more troops. Jackson reported at Richmond in person on the 23d of June, in advance of his corps; and in a conference with Longstreet and the two Hills the

plan of attacking the Federal right wing, north of the Chickahominy, was agreed upon. As Jackson's troops had the greatest distance to march, it was left to him to say when the attack should be made. He named the morning of the 26th of June, giving himself, as it afterwards appeared, too little time.

General Lee matured his plan on the 24th, and issued his orders for the coming campaign. The most striking thing about them is his evident contempt for his opponent. He sent, in effect, almost his entire army to the north side of the Chickahominy to strike McClellan's right wing. The enemy is to be "driven from Mechanicsville"; the Confederates are to

sweep down the Chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge; General Jackson bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction towards Cold Harbor. They will then press forward towards the York River Railroad, closing upon the enemy's rear, and forcing him down the Chickahominy. Any advance of the enemy towards Richmond will be prevented by rigorously following his rear, and crippling and arresting his progress.

He anticipated the possibility of McClellan's abandoning his intrenchments on the south side of the river, in which case he is to be "closely pursued" by Huger and Magruder. Cavalry are to occupy the roads to arrest his flight "down the Chickahominy." General Lee's plan and expectation was, in short, to herd and drive down the Peninsula a magnificent army, superior in numbers to his own, and not inferior in any other respect — if we except the respective commanders-in-chief, who were at least equally distinguished engineers. In this enterprise he deserved and courted defeat by leaving the bulk of McClellan's army between himself and Richmond. When he laid his plan before Jefferson Davis, the latter saw at once this serious defect in it. He says:

I pointed out to him that our force and intrenched line between the left flank of the enemy and Richmond was too weak for a protracted resistance; and if McClellan was the man I took him for, . . . as soon as he found that the bulk of our army was on the north side of the Chickahominy he would not stop to try conclusions with it there, but would immediately move upon his objective point, the city of Richmond. If, on the other hand, he should behave like an engineer officer, and deem it his first duty to protect his line of communication, I thought the plan proposed was not only the best, but would be a success. Something of his old *esprit de corps* manifested itself in General Lee's first reponse that he did not know engineer officers were more likely than others to make such mistakes; but immediately passing to the main subject, he added, "If you will hold him as long as you can at the intrenchments, and then fall back on the detached works around the city, I will be upon the enemy's heels before he gets there."³

But everything shows that he anticipated no

¹ Johnston's "Narrative," pp. 145, 146.

² War Records.

³ Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 132.

such action on the part of McClellan. All his orders, all his dispositions, indicate clearly that he thought of nothing but driving him down the Chickahominy towards Yorktown, and capturing or dispersing his army. The measure of success he met with will always be, in the general judgment, a justification of his plan; but the opinion of the best military critics on both sides is that it never could have succeeded had it not been for McClellan's hallucination as to the numbers opposed to him. From the hour that Lee crossed his troops over the Chickahominy, leaving that river and McClellan's army between him and Richmond, he risked the fate of the Confederacy upon his belief that the Union general would make no forward movement. His confidence grew with every step of McClellan's retreat from Beaver Dam Creek to Malvern Hill, and was dearly paid for in the blood of his soldiers.

The first meeting between the two armies resulted in a terrible defeat for the Confederates. About 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 26th, the rebel forces, commanded by Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and A. P. Hill, attacked the Union troops in position on the east side of Beaver Dam Creek, commanded by General McCall, whose division had been added to Fitz John Porter's corps, ably assisted by Seymour, Meade, and Reynolds. Of the last two, the one gained an undying fame and the other a glorious death at Gettysburg. The Confederates were in greatly superior force, but the Union troops had the advantage of position; and though both sides fought with equal valor, before night fell the rebels were repulsed with great slaughter. General McClellan visited Fitz John Porter's headquarters at night, after the battle. He found an exultant and victorious army, almost unscathed by the fierce conflict of the day. Porter reports his loss at 250 out of the 5000 engaged, and says the enemy lost nearly 2000 of their 10,000 attacking.¹ If Porter, instead of McClellan, had been in command of the army, Richmond might have been under the Union flag the next day. His soldierly spirit, flushed with the day's success, comprehended the full advantage of the situation. He urged McClellan to seize his opportunity; he proposed "to hold his own at the Beaver Dam line, slightly reinforced, while General McClellan moved the main body of his army upon Richmond."² The General-in-Chief had not resolution enough to accept or reject this proposition

of his gallant subordinate. He returned to his own headquarters to make up his mind, and about "3 or 4 o'clock in the morning" sent his final order to Porter to retire to a position some four miles east, behind Boatswain Swamp, and there await the further attack of the enemy.

General Porter's personal devotion to McClellan, which was afterwards to bring him into lifelong trouble, has never allowed him to criticise this decision of his chief which overruled his own bold and intelligent plan. Let us see how the ablest and most efficient Confederate general engaged in this campaign regarded it. General Longstreet says:

In my judgment the evacuation of Beaver Dam Creek was very unwise on the part of the Federal commanders. We had attacked at Beaver Dam, and had failed to make an impression at that point, losing several thousand men and officers. This demonstrated that the position was safe. If the Federal commanders knew of Jackson's approach on the 26th, they had ample time to reinforce Porter's right before Friday morning, the 27th, with men and field defenses, to such extent as to make the remainder of the line to the right secure against assault. So that the Federals in withdrawing not only abandoned a strong position, but gave up the *morale* of their success, and transferred it to our somewhat disheartened forces; for, next to Malvern Hill, the sacrifice at Beaver Dam was unequaled in demoralization during the entire summer.³

It is hard to understand what General McClellan means when he says in his report that the 26th was "the day he had decided on for our final advance." If he thought it safe to attack Richmond with Lee and his army in front of him, how much more advantageous would such an attack have been with Lee and his army engaged in a desperate battle north of the Chickahominy. There is no indication in his orders or dispatches of these days — if we except one order to Porter, hereafter to be mentioned — that he had any more definite purpose than to await the action of the enemy, and retreat to the James, if necessary. His mind was filled with that fantastic idea he had adopted of an army of 200,000 under Lee. In his report, written a year afterwards, he reiterates and dwells upon this absurd and already disproved fiction, basing his persistent belief on the reports of his ridiculous detective service. This is the only explanation possible of his action during this momentous week while he was flying from phantom myriads which existed only in his own brain, and his brave army was turning and checking Lee's pursuing forces at every halt it made.

On the morning of the 27th Porter withdrew to his new position, famous ever thereafter as the battlefield of Gaines's Mill, or of the Chickahominy, as it is called by Southern writers. His ground, like that of the day before, was admirably chosen for defense. He had less

¹ "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., p. 331.

² We are here quoting the language of General Webb, whose testimony is beyond question. "The Peninsula," p. 130.

³ "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., p. 398.

than one-third the number of the host which was marching by every road on the west and north to destroy him.¹ He knew his force was too small to defend so long a line against such numbers, but his appeals to McClellan for reinforcements brought no response until late in the day, when Slocum's division was sent him. With the troops he had he made a magnificent fight, which, in spite of his subsequent history, makes us regret that he had not commanded the entire Army of the Potomac that day.

With the exception of the small detachments left on the south side of the river under Magruder to amuse McClellan, the whole army of General Lee, numbering over 60,000 men, was advancing upon Porter's single corps. It was led by the best generals of the South—Longstreet, the two Hills, Whiting, Hood, Ewell, and the redoubtable Jackson, whose corps, though marching with less than their usual celerity, had turned Beaver Dam Creek the night before, and had now arrived at the post assigned them opposite Porter's right. General Lee commanded on the field in person, and Jefferson Davis contributed whatever his presence was worth.

The battle began at noon, and as evening fell upon the desperately fought field the entire Confederate army, by a simultaneous advance, forced back the Union troops, overcome by numbers and wearied with seven hours of constant fighting.² There was no confusion except at the point on the right where Morell's line had been pierced by Hood's brigade, where two regiments were made prisoners. Everywhere else the Union soldiers retired fighting, turning from time to time to beat back the enemy, until night put an end to the conflict. Porter had lost 4000 in killed and wounded, one-sixth of his men; Lee something more, about one-twelfth of his. Lee had absolutely failed in his object—to dislodge the Union army from its position and "drive it down the Chickahominy."

Of the heroic valor of this sanguinary day's work there can be no question. There is much

question of the wisdom of it. If McClellan had made up his mind to retreat to the James, he might have withdrawn Porter to the south side of the Chickahominy during the night of the 26th, after his signal victory at Beaver Dam.³ But, as we have seen, he gave no definite orders until 3 o'clock the next morning, when he directed Porter to retire to Gaines's Mill. During all the terrible conflict of the 27th, he left his gallant subordinate to fight three times his force, with no intimation of his ultimate purpose. Porter had a right to think that the price of his tremendous sacrifice was to be the capture of Richmond. McClellan's orders to him on the 23d included these words:

The troops on this side will be held ready either to support you directly or to attack the enemy in their front. If the force attacking you is large, the general would prefer the latter course, counting upon your skill and the admirable troops under your command to hold their own against superior numbers long enough for him to make the decisive movement which will determine the fate of Richmond.

In addition to this we have the most unimpeachable authority for saying that Porter on the battlefield was left with the same impression. General Webb, who was present with General Porter during the fight, ordered to that duty from McClellan's headquarters, says:

He carried with him to General Porter the distinct impression, then prevailing at the headquarters of the army, that he was to hold this large force of the enemy on the left bank of the Chickahominy in order that General McClellan, with the main army, might break through and take Richmond.

It was this inspiring thought which moved Porter and his 20,000 to such a prodigious feat of arms. General Webb says:

The sacrifice at Gaines's Mill . . . was warranted, if we were to gain Richmond by making it; and the troops engaged in carrying out this plan, conceiving it to be the wish of the general commanding, were successful in holding the rebels on the left bank.⁴

But the general commanding was simply incapable of the effort of will necessary to carry

¹ "Porter's force consisted of Morell's, McCall's, and Sykes's divisions; in all, 17,330 infantry for duty. There were present with him 2534 artillery, of which, from the nature of the ground, but a small portion could be used; and 671 of the regular cavalry guarded the bridges." [Webb, "The Peninsula," p. 129.]

² Porter says: "The forces in this battle were: Union, 50 regiments, 20 batteries; in all, about 27,000 men [including the reinforcements received during the day]. Confederate, 129 regiments, 19 batteries; in all, about 65,000."

³ "At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th, our army would have been concentrated on the right bank, while two corps at least of the enemy's force were on the left bank. Whatever course we then took, whether to

strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right bank, or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated army, and a fair chance of a brilliant result in the first place; and in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the same case on the morning of the 27th as we were on that of the 28th—minus a lost battle and a compulsory retreat; or, had the fortified lines (thrown up expressly for the object) been held by 20,000 men (as they could have been), we could have fought on the other side with 80,000 men instead of 27,000; or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on the right bank of the Chickahominy, we might have fought and crushed the enemy on the left bank, reopened our communications, and then returned and taken Richmond." [From Report of General Barnard, Chief of Engineers, Army of the Potomac. War Records.]

⁴ Webb, "The Peninsula," p. 187.

out his share of the plan. He gives us to understand, in his report, and in subsequent articles, that he resolved upon his retreat to the James on the 25th of June. General Webb adopts this theory, and adds that McClellan thought that the capture of Richmond, with Lee beyond the Chickahominy, was not a proper military movement. It is not in the competence of any one to judge what were General McClellan's thoughts and intentions from the 23d to the 27th of June. So late as 8 o'clock on the night of the 27th, a dispatch from him to the War Department indicates that he thought the attack of Magruder on the right bank was more serious than that upon Porter on the left. "I may be forced," he says, "to give up my position during the night, but will not if it is possible to avoid it"; and as a matter of course the usual refrain follows: "Had I twenty thousand fresh and good troops, we would be sure of a splendid victory to-morrow."¹ Magruder, who had been left to guard Richmond with a thin curtain of troops, had been all day repeating the devices which were so successful at Yorktown. He had rattled about McClellan's entire front with so much noise and smoke as to create the impression of overwhelming numbers. Even the seasoned corps commanders were not unaffected by it. Franklin thought it not prudent to send any reinforcements from his line to Porter. Sumner offered to send two brigades, but thought it would be hazardous. The real state of the case can best be seen from Magruder's own report. He says:

From Friday night until Sunday morning I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger portion of it was on the opposite side of the Chickahominy. The bridges had been all destroyed; but one was rebuilt (the New Bridge), which was commanded fully by the enemy's guns from Golding's; and there were but 25,000 men between his army of 100,000 and Richmond. . . . Had McClellan massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our line of battle,—as was done at Austerlitz, under similar circumstances, by the greatest captain of any age,—though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum

would have insured him success; and the occupation of our works about Richmond, and consequently the city, might have been his reward. His failure to do so is the best evidence that our wise commander fully understood the character of his opponent.¹

D. H. Hill says the same thing:²

During Lee's absence Richmond was at the mercy of McClellan. . . . The fortifications around Richmond at that time were very slight. McClellan could have captured the city with very little loss of life. The want of supplies would have forced Lee to attack him as soon as possible, with all the disadvantages of a precipitated movement.³

General McClellan did not visit the field of battle during the day.⁴ At night he summoned Porter across the river, and there made known to him and the other corps commanders, for the first time, his intention to change his base to the James. Porter was ordered to retire to the south bank, and destroy the bridges after him. This was accomplished safely and in good order, and the bridges were destroyed soon after sunrise on the 28th. The movement to the James once resolved upon, it was executed with great energy and ability. General Keyes moved his corps, with artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp, and possessed himself of the ground on the other side, for the covering of the passage of the other troops and the trains, by noon of the 28th. General Porter's corps, during the same day and night, crossed the White Oak Swamp, and established itself in positions that covered the roads from Richmond. Franklin withdrew from the extreme right after a skirmish at Golding's Farm. Keyes and Porter continued in the advance, and established their two corps safely at Malvern Hill, thus securing the extreme left flank of the army in a commanding and important situation.

This movement took General Lee completely by surprise. Anticipating nothing but a retreat down the Chickahominy,⁵ he had thrown his left wing and his entire cavalry force in that direction; and when he became aware of his mistake, a good deal of precious time was already lost, and he was deprived,

the city, with only one-fourth of our force in his way. This fraction he could have beaten in four hours, and marched to Richmond in two hours more." [Published in the "New York Times," June 17, 1883.]

⁴ "Question. Were you with the right or left wing of the army during the battle of Gaines's Mill?"

"Answer. [General McClellan.] I was on the right bank of the river, at Dr. Trent's house, as the most central position." [Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.]

⁵ "General Lee, presuming that the Federalists would continue to withdraw, if overpowered, towards the York River Railroad and the White House, directed General Jackson to proceed with General D. H. Hill to a point a few miles north of Cold Harbor, and thence to march to that place and strike their line of retreat." [Dabney, p. 443.]

¹ War Records.

² "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., p. 361.

³ The following shows the opinion of two of the most prominent Confederate officers upon this matter. It is an extract from a letter of General J. E. Johnston to General Beauregard, dated Amelia Springs, August 4, 1862, immediately after the Seven Days' Battles:

"But for my confidence in McClellan's want of enterprise, I should on Thursday night, after three-fourths of the troops had crossed the Chickahominy, have apprehended that he would adopt the course you suggest for him. Had he done so, he might have been in Richmond on Friday before midday. By concentrating his troops on the south side of the river before daybreak on Friday he would have been between our main body and

during the three days that followed, of Stuart's invaluable services. But having ascertained on the 29th that McClellan was marching to the James, he immediately started in pursuit, sending his whole force by parallel roads to intercept the Army of the Potomac near Charles City Cross-roads, midway between the White Oak Swamp and the James. Longstreet was to march with A. P. Hill by the Long Bridge road; while Huger was to come up at the same time by the Charles City road, and General Holmes was to take up position below him on the river road. Jackson, crossing the Grapevine Bridge, was to come in from the north on the rear of the Federal army.

Even the terrible lessons of Beaver Dam and Gaines's Mill had not convinced General Lee of the danger of attacking the Army of the Potomac in position. These lessons were repeated all along the line of march. Sumner repulsed Magruder at Allen's Farm, and then, retiring to Savage's Station, he and Franklin met another fierce onslaught from the same force, and completely defeated them. It was with the greatest difficulty that Franklin could induce the gallant old general to leave the field. McClellan's orders were positive that the White Oak Swamp must be crossed that night; but to all Franklin's representations Sumner answered: "No, General, you shall not go, nor will I." When shown McClellan's positive orders, he cried out, "McClellan did not know the circumstances when he wrote that note. He did not know that we would fight a battle and gain a victory."¹ He only gave way and reluctantly took up his line of march for the southward on the positive orders of an aide-de-camp, who had just left McClellan.²

The next day occurred the battle of Glendale, or Frayser's Farm, as it is sometimes called. Jackson, with unusual slowness, had arrived at Savage's Station the day before, too late to take part in the battle there; and when he came to White Oak Swamp the bridge was gone and Franklin occupied the heights beyond. His force was therefore paralyzed during the day. He made once or twice a feeble attempt to cross the swamp, but was promptly met and driven back by Franklin. Huger, on the Charles City road, failed to break through some slight obstruction there. Holmes was in terror of the gunboats near Malvern Hill and could give no assistance; so that Longstreet and A. P. Hill were forced to attack

the Union center, at Glendale, on pretty nearly even terms. Here a savage and obstinate conflict took place, which was felt on both sides to be the crisis of the campaign. If the Union center had been pierced, the disaster would have been beyond calculation. On the other hand, if our army had been concentrated at that point, and had defeated the army of Lee, the city of Richmond would have been the prize of victory. General Franklin says that the Prince de Joinville, who was at that moment taking leave of the army to return to Europe, said to him with great earnestness, "Advise General McClellan to center his army at this point and fight the battle to-day. If he does, he will be in Richmond to-morrow." Neither side won the victory that day, though each deserved it by brave and persistent fighting. General McClellan, intent upon securing a defensive position for his army upon the James, left the field before the fighting began; while Longstreet, Lee, and Jefferson Davis himself were under the fire of the Union guns during the afternoon. When darkness put an end to the fighting the Federal generals, left to their discretion, had accomplished their purpose. The enemy had been held in check, the trains and artillery had gone safely forward by the road which the battle had protected, and on the next morning, July 1, the Army of the Potomac was awaiting its enemy in the natural fortress of Malvern Hill. It was at this place that General Lee's contempt for his enemy was to meet its last and severest chastisement.

The position strikingly resembled the battlefield of Gaines's Mill. The Union army was posted on a high position, covered on the right and on the left by swampy streams and winding ravines. Woods in front furnished a cover for the formation of the Confederate columns, but an open space intervening afforded full play for the terrible Federal artillery. It was not the place for a prudent general to attack, and Lee was usually one of the most prudent of generals. But he had his whole army well in hand, Jackson having come up in the night, and he decided to risk the venture. D. H. Hill took the liberty of representing the great strength of McClellan's position, and to give his opinion against an assault. Longstreet, who was present, laughed and said, "Don't get scared, now that we have got him whipped." "It was this belief in the demoralization of the Federal army," Hill says, "that made our

¹ "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., p. 375.

² The corps commanders were left almost entirely without directions, as the following, from the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, shows: "Question. By whom was the battle of Savage's Station fought? Did you yourself direct the move-

ments of the troops, or were they directed by the corps commanders?"

"Answer. [General McClellan.] I had given general orders for the movements of the troops; but the fighting was done under the direct orders of the corps commanders."

leader risk the attack." Lee evidently thought the position could be carried by a *coup de main*. The order to his generals of division is a curiosity of military literature :

Batteries have been established to rake the enemy's line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same.

On the part of the Confederates the battle was as ill executed as it was ill conceived. There was a vast amount of blood and valor wasted by them: while on the Union side, under the admirable leadership of Porter, Morell, and Couch, not a drop of blood nor an ounce of powder was thrown away. Successive attacks made by the Confederates from 1 o'clock until 9 were promptly and bravely repulsed by the Union soldiers. Jackson's forces suffered severely in getting into position early in the afternoon. One of Huger's brigades charged upon Couch about 3 o'clock, and was driven back, roughly handled. D. H. Hill waited a long time for the "yell" from Armistead, which was to be his signal for onset. But Armistead's yell in that roar of artillery was but a feeble pipe, and was soon silenced; and when Hill at last heard some shouting on his right and concluded to advance, he was repulsed and fearfully punished by the immovable brigades of Couch and Heintzelman. The most picturesque, perhaps we may say the most sensational, charge of the day was that made by Magruder late in the afternoon. His nine brigades melted away like men of snow under the frightful fire of Sykes's batteries and the muskets of Morell's steadfast infantry. This charge closed the fighting for the day. The Union line had not been broken.

One remarkable feature of the battle of Malvern Hill was that neither of the commanders-in-chief exercised any definite control over the progress of the fight. General Lee, it is true, was on the field, accompanied by Jefferson Davis; but with the exception of that preposterous order about Armistead's yell, he seems to have allowed his corps commanders to fight the battle in their own way. Their reports are filled with angry recriminations, and show a gross lack of discipline and organization. Early in the afternoon Lee ordered Longstreet and Hill to move their forces by the left flank, intending to cut off the expected retreat of McClellan. Longstreet says:

I issued my orders accordingly for the two division commanders to go around and turn the Federal right, when, in some way unknown to me, the battle was drawn on. We were repulsed at all points with fearful slaughter, losing six thousand men and accomplishing nothing.

General McClellan was seldom on the field. He left it in the morning before the

fighting began and went to his camp at Haxall's, which was under the protection of the gunboats. He came back for a little while in the afternoon, but remained with the right wing, where there was no fighting; he said his anxiety was for the right wing, as he was perfectly sure of the left and the center. In this way he deprived himself of the pleasure of witnessing a great victory won by the troops under the command of his subordinate generals. It is not impossible that if he had seen with his own eyes the magnificent success of the Union arms during the day he would have held the ground which had been so gallantly defended. To judge from the accounts of the officers on both sides, nothing would have been easier. The defeat and consequent demoralization of the Confederate forces surpassed anything seen in the war, and it might have been completed by a vigorous offensive on the morning of the 2d. Even Major Dabney, of Jackson's staff, whose sturdy partisanship usually refuses to recognize the plainest facts unfavorable to his side, gives this picture of the feeling of the division commanders of Jackson's corps the night of the battle:

After many details of loss and disaster, they all concurred in declaring that McClellan would probably take the aggressive in the morning, and that the Confederate army was in no condition to resist him.¹

But impressed by the phantasm of 200,000 men before him, McClellan had already resolved to retire still farther down the James to Harrison's Landing, in order, as he says, to reach a point where his supplies could be brought to him with certainty. Commodore Rodgers, with whom he was in constant consultation, thought this could best be done below City Point. The victorious army, therefore, following the habit of the disastrous week, turned its back once more upon its beaten enemy, and established itself that day at Harrison's Bar, in a situation which Lee, having at last gained some information as to the fighting qualities of the Army of the Potomac, declined to attack, a decision in which Jackson agreed with him. After several days of reconnaissances he withdrew his army, on the 8th of July, to Richmond, and the Peninsular Campaign was at an end.

HARRISON'S LANDING.

GENERAL McCLELLAN was greatly agitated by the battle of Gaines's Mill,² and by the emo-

¹ Dabney, p. 473.

² Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Alexander, of the Corps of Engineers, gave the following sworn evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War [p. 592]. He said he saw, on the evening of the 28th, at General McClellan's headquarters at Savage's Station, an order

tions incident to his forced departure for the James. Under the influence of this feeling he sent to the Secretary of War from Savage's Station, on the 28th of June, an extraordinary dispatch, which we here insert in full, as it seems necessary to the comprehension of his attitude towards, and his relations with, the Government :

I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish; but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat, and save the material and personnel of the army. If we have lost the day we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost the battle because my force was too small. I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large reinforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If at this instant I could dispose of 10,000 fresh men, I could gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and can not hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night; I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.¹

It is probable that no other general ever retained his commission for twenty-four hours

directing the destruction of the baggage of the officers and men, and he thought also the camp equipage; appealing to the officers and men to submit to this privation because it would be only for a few days, he thought the order stated. He went to the general at once, and remonstrated with him against allowing any such order to be issued, telling him he thought it would have a bad effect upon the army—would demoralize the officers and men; that it would tell them more plainly than in any other way that they were a defeated army, running for their lives. This led to some discussion among the officers at headquarters, and Colonel Alexander heard afterward that the order was never promulgated, but suppressed.

after the receipt of such a communication by his superiors; but it is easy to see the reason why he was never called to account for it. The evident panic and mental perturbation which pierces through its incoherence filled the President with such dismay that its mutinous insolence was entirely overlooked. He could only wonder what terrible catastrophe already accomplished, or to come, could have wrung such an outcry as this from the general commanding. Even the surrender of the army was not an impossible disaster to expect from a general capable of writing such a dispatch. Secretary Chase has left a memorandum showing that some such action was regarded as indicated by General McClellan's dispatches, and that even after his arrival at Harrison's Landing, General Marcy, his father-in-law and chief of staff, in a visit to Washington spoke of it as a possibility.² Not knowing the extent of the mischance which had fallen upon the army, the President hastened at once to send a kind and encouraging answer to McClellan's dispatches:

Save your army, at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government are to blame. Please tell at once the present condition and aspect of things.¹

The President also, with the greatest diligence, sent dispatches on the same day to General Dix, at Fort Monroe, to Admiral Goldsborough, commanding the naval forces in the James, and to General Burnside, in North Carolina, directing all three of them to strain every nerve in order to go to McClellan's assistance. At the same time he ordered³ Halleck to send a large portion of his forces to the rescue.

As the 29th and 30th of June passed with-

¹ War Records.

² This is the language of Mr. Chase's memorandum: "General McClellan himself, in his dispatches before reaching Harrison's Landing, referred to the possibility of being obliged to capitulate with his entire army; and after reaching that place, General Marcy, . . . who had been sent up to explain personally the situation to the President, spoke of the possibility of his capitulation at once, or within two or three days." [Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 447.]

³ This order was afterwards revoked on Halleck's representation that the detachment of so large a force would be equivalent to the abandonment of Tennessee. [War Records.]

out news of any further catastrophe, the President and the Secretary of War began to think better of the situation, and concluded that it might possibly be improved by change of base to the James. Mr. Stanton telegraphed to General Wool that it looked "more like taking Richmond than at any time before." But on the 1st of July a dispatch, dated at Turkey Bridge, arrived from General McClellan, who was still under the influence of great agitation, announcing that he is "hard pressed by superior numbers," and fearing that he shall be forced to abandon his material and save his men under cover of the gunboats. "If none of us escape, we shall at least have done honor to the country. I shall do my best to save the army. Send more gunboats."¹ While waiting for his troops to come to the new position he had chosen for them, he continued asking for reinforcements. "I need," he says, "50,000 more men, and with them I will retrieve our fortunes." The Secretary of War at once answered that reinforcements were on the way, 5000 from McDowell and 25,000 from Halleck. "Hold your ground," he says encouragingly, "and you will be in Richmond before the month is over."¹ On the morning of the battle of Malvern, McClellan writes again, "I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. . . . I now pray for time." It has been seen that his dread was uncalled for. Meanwhile, before hearing of the battle, the President had telegraphed :

It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country and will bring it out.

On the 2d, the flurry of the week having somewhat subsided, the President sent him the following :

Your dispatch of Tuesday morning induced me to hope your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you a moment. When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defense of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included in and about Washington 75,000 men. Now please be assured I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of Frémont's in the valley, all of Banks's, all of McDowell's not with you, and all in Washington taken together do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000. With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned I have not, outside of your army, 75,000 men east of the moun-

tains. Thus the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly is simply absurd. If in your frequent mention of responsibility you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that, in like manner, you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material, and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept.

This quiet and reasonable statement produced no effect upon the general. On the 3d he wrote again in a strain of wilder exaggeration than ever. He says :

It is of course impossible to estimate, as yet, our losses; but I doubt whether there are to-day more than 50,000 men with their colors. To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond and putting an end to this rebellion, reinforcements should be sent to me, rather much over than much less than 100,000 men. I beg that you will be fully impressed by the magnitude of the crisis in which we are placed.¹

The didactic, not to say magisterial, tone of this dispatch formed a not unnatural introduction to the general's next important communication to the President, laying before him an entire body of administrative and political doctrine, in which alone, he intimates, the salvation of the country can be found :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
CAMP NEAR HARRISON'S LANDING, VIRGINIA,
July 7, 1862.

MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front with the purpose of overwhelming us² by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State. The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

This rebellion has assumed the character of a war. As such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither con-

¹ War Records.

² This was at a time when Lee had given up all thought of attacking the Union army at Harrison's Landing.

fiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment.

In prosecuting the war all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessities of military operations; all private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes, all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by enactments — constitutionally made — should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended upon grounds of military necessity and security to all the slaves within a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a military measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

Unless the principles governing the further conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies; but should be mainly collected into masses and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army; one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love of my country.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General Commanding.

*His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President.*¹

This letter marks the beginning of General McClellan's distinctively political career. He had always been more or less in sympathy with the Democratic party, and consequently in an attitude of dormant opposition to the Administration; although, after the manner of officers

of the regular service, he had taken no pronounced political attitude. In fact, on his first assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, he had seemed to be in full sympathy with the President and Cabinet in the proceedings they thought proper to adopt for the suppression of the rebellion. He had even entered heartily into some of the more extreme measures of the Government. His orders to General Banks directing the arrest of the secessionist members of the Maryland legislature might have been written by a zealous Republican. "When they meet on the 17th," he says, "you will please have everything prepared to arrest the whole party, and be sure that none escape." He urges upon him the "absolute necessity of secrecy and success"; speaks of the exceeding importance of the affair — "If it is successfully carried out it will go far towards breaking the backbone of the rebellion." This was in September, 1861.² Later in that year he was repeatedly urged by prominent Democratic politicians to declare himself openly as a member of their party. They thought it would be to his advantage and to theirs to have the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Potomac decidedly with them. At this time he declined their overtures, but they were pressing repeated at Yorktown and afterwards; and he appears finally to have yielded to their solicitations, and the foregoing letter was the result. It is not at all probable that this document was prepared during the flight from the Chickahominy, or during the first days of doubt and anxiety at Harrison's Landing. It had probably been prepared long before, and is doubtless referred to in the general's dispatch of the 20th of June, in which he says, "I would be glad to have permission to lay before your Excellency my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country." He had at that time some vague and indefinite hope of taking Richmond; and such a manifesto as this, coming from a general crowned with a great victory, would have had a far different importance and influence from that which it enjoyed issuing from his refuge at Harrison's Bar, after a discrediting retreat. But the choice of occasion was not left to him. The letter could not be delayed forever; and such as it was, it went forth to the country as the political platform of General McClellan, and to the President as a note of defiance and opposition from the general in command of the principal army of the United States. Though more moderate in form, this letter was as mutinous in substance as the dispatch from Savage's Station.

¹ Slight errors having crept into this letter in its manifold publications, we print it here from the original manuscript received by the President.

² McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 153.

He assumes to instruct the President as to his duties and the limits of his constitutional power. He takes it for granted that the President has no definite policy, and proceeds to give him one. Unless his advice is followed, "our cause will be lost." He postures as the protector of the people against threatened arbitrary outrage. He warns the President against any forcible interference with slavery. He lets him know he can have no more troops, except on conditions known and approved. He tells him plainly that "a declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies." Finally, he directs him to appoint a commander-in-chief of the army, and thinks it necessary to inform him that he does not ask the place for himself.

The President, engrossed with more important affairs, paid no attention, then or afterwards, to this letter. He simply passed it by in good-natured silence. General McClellan continued his dispatches, constantly announcing an impending attack upon his position, and constantly asking for reinforcements. He continued this until General Lee withdrew his army to Richmond, a movement which General McClellan at once characterized as "a retreat."

During all the time that McClellan remained at Harrison's Landing his correspondence with the Government was full of recrimination and querulousness; and his private letters, which have been published since his death, show an almost indecent hostility to his superiors. He writes:

Marcy and I have just been discussing people in Washington, and conclude they are a "mighty trifling set." . . . I begin to believe they wish this army to be destroyed.¹

When you contrast the policy I urge in my letter to the President with that of Congress and of Mr. Pope, you can readily agree with me that there can be little natural confidence between the Government and myself. We are the antipodes of each other.²

I am satisfied that the dots in Washington are bent on my destruction. . . . Halleck is not a gentleman.³

We need not multiply these utterances of a weak and petulant mind. They have already been judged by the highest authority. General Sherman says, referring to this period, "The temper of his correspondence, official and private, was indicative of a spirit not consistent with the duty of the commanding general of a great army."⁴

The President had been much disturbed by the conflicting reports that reached him as to the condition of the Army of the Potomac, and he therefore resolved by a personal visit to satisfy himself of the state of affairs. He

reached Harrison's Landing on the 8th of July, and while there conferred freely, not only with General McClellan himself, but with many of the more prominent officers in command. With the exception of General McClellan, not one believed the enemy was then threatening his position. Sumner thought they had retired, much damaged; Keyes, that they had withdrawn to go towards Washington; Porter, that they dared not attack; Heintzelman and Franklin thought they had retired. Franklin and Keyes favored the withdrawal of the army from the James; the rest opposed it. Mr. Lincoln came back bearing a still heavier weight of care. One thing that gave him great trouble was the enormous amount of absenteeism in the army. On returning to Washington he wrote this note to General McClellan, which, like most of his notes, it is impossible to abridge:

I am told that over 160,000 men have gone into your army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day we made out 86,500 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be accounted for. I believe 23,500 will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left otherwise. Not more than 5000 of these have died, leaving 45,000 of your army still alive and not with it. I believe half or two-thirds of them are fit for duty to-day. Have you any more perfect knowledge of this than I have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you, and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers for the future?

To this note the general replied in a letter which can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory answer to the President's searching questions. He says, in general terms, that there is always a difference between the returns and the effective force of armies. He thinks, but is not certain, that the force given to him is not so much as 160,000, but admits that he has at that moment, present for duty, 88,665; absent by authority, 34,472; without authority, nearly 4000. This is very far from the "50,000 with their colors" which he reported a few days before; and he gives no adequate reason for the vast aggregate of those absent by authority.⁵

But another question, far more important and more grievous, was, what was to be done with the Army of the Potomac? General McClellan would listen to nothing but an enormous reinforcement of his army and another chance to take Richmond. Many of his prominent officers, on the contrary, thought that an advance on Richmond under existing conditions would be ill-advised, and that for the army to remain in its present position during the months of August and September would be more disastrous than an unsuccessful battle. The President had already placed General John Pope at the head of the Army of

¹ July 31. ² August 2. ³ August 10.

⁴ In his paper on "The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion," *THE CENTURY* for February, 1888.

⁵ War Records.

Virginia, in front of Washington, and he now resolved to send to Corinth for General Halleck, whom he placed in chief command of the armies of the United States. This was done by an order of the 11th of July, and General Halleck was requested to start at once for Washington. As soon as he could place his command in the hands of General Grant, the next officer in rank in his department, he came on to Washington, assumed command of the army on the 23d, and the very next day was sent to the camp of General McClellan, where he arrived on the 25th. He asked the general his wishes and views in regard to future operations. McClellan answered that he purposed to cross the James River and take Petersburg. Halleck stated his impression of the danger and impracticability of the plan, to which McClellan finally agreed. The General-in-Chief then told him that he regarded it as a military necessity to concentrate Pope's army and his on some point where they could at the same time cover Washington and operate against Richmond; unless it should be that McClellan felt strong enough to take the latter place himself with such reënforcements as would be given him. McClellan thought he would require 30,000 more than he had. Halleck told him that the President could only promise 20,000; and that, if McClellan could not take Richmond with that number, some plan must be devised for withdrawing his troops from their present position to some point where they could unite with General Pope without exposing Washington. McClellan thought that there would be no serious difficulty in withdrawing his forces for that purpose; but he feared the demoralizing influence of such a movement on his troops, and preferred that they should stay where they were until sufficient reënforcements could be sent him. Halleck had no authority to consider that proposition, and told him that he must decide between advising the withdrawal of his forces to meet those of Pope, or an advance upon Richmond with such forces as the President could give him. Halleck gained the impression that McClellan's preference would be to withdraw and unite with General Pope; but after consultation with his officers, he informed Halleck the next morning that he would prefer to take Richmond. He would not say that he thought the proba-

bilities of success were in his favor, but that there was "a chance," and that he was "willing to try it." His officers were divided on the subject of withdrawing or of making an attack upon Richmond. McClellan's delusion as to the number of the enemy had infected many of the most intelligent generals in his command. General Keyes, in a letter to Quartermaster-General Meigs, assured him that the enemy "have 200,000—more than double our number." At the same time General Meigs himself, simply from reading the Richmond newspapers and using his common sense in connection with their accounts, had formed an estimate of the rebel force very much nearer the truth than that made by the generals in front.¹ He found it to consist of 152 regiments, which, at an average of 700 men,—too high an average,—would give a total force of 105,000. By General McClellan's returns for the 10th of August he himself had an aggregate present of 113,000 men.¹

Halleck's return to Washington was followed by a shower of telegrams from McClellan urging the reënforcement of his army. "Should it be determined to withdraw it," he says on the 30th of July, "I shall look upon our cause as lost, and the demoralization of the army certain"—a statement which certainly was lacking in reserve. The weight of opinion, however, among the generals of highest rank was on the other side. General Keyes wrote in the strongest terms urging the withdrawal of the army.¹ General Barnard, McClellan's chief of engineers, and General Franklin counseled the immediate withdrawal from the James to reunite with the forces covering the Capital.¹ Upon General Halleck's return to Washington this course was resolved upon. General Halleck's first order in that direction was dated the 30th of July, and requested McClellan to send away his sick as quickly as possible. Four days afterwards, without having taken in the mean while any steps to obey the order, he sent General Hooker to Malvern Hill. He drove the Confederates from there after a sharp cavalry skirmish. This so brightened McClellan's spirits that he telegraphed to Halleck on the 5th that "with reënforcements he could march his army to Richmond in five days"—a suggestion to which Halleck made the curt rejoinder, "I have no reënforcements to send you."²

¹ War Records.

² General Hooker told the Committee on the Conduct of the War a curious story about this affair. He said that after General McClellan received his orders to abandon Harrison's Landing he went to him voluntarily and suggested that, with the forces they had there, they could take Richmond, and urged him to do it. So confident was Hooker, that he was willing to take the advance, and so assured McClellan. On reaching his camp, about two hours after that interview, he says he

found on his table an order from General McClellan to prepare himself with three days' rations and a supply of ammunition, and be ready to march at 2 o'clock the next day. "I firmly believe," said Hooker, "that order meant Richmond. I had said to McClellan that if we were unsuccessful it would probably cost him his head, but that he might as well die for an old sheep as for a lamb. But before the time arrived for executing that order it was countermanded." [Hooker, Testimony, Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.]

The order to dispose of the sick was not promptly obeyed, because General McClellan insisted upon knowing the intentions of the Government in regard to his army; and after being informed that it was to be withdrawn from the James, several days more were wasted in wearisome interchange of dispatches between himself and Halleck, McClellan protesting with the greatest energy and feeling against this movement, and Halleck replying with perfect logic and temper in defense of it. In a long and elaborate dispatch, in which Halleck considered the whole subject, he referred to the representation made to him by McClellan and some of his officers that the enemy's forces around Richmond amounted to 200,000, and that McClellan had reported that they had since received large reënforcements. He adds:

General Pope's army is only about 40,000; your effective force, about 90,000. You are 30 miles from Richmond and General Pope 80 or 90, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers on one or the other as he may elect. Pope's army could not be diminished to reënforce you; if your force is reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to hold your present position against the enemy. You say your withdrawal from your present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army. I cannot understand why this should be, unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. You may reply, "Why not reënforce me here so that I can strike Richmond from my present position?" You told me that you would require 30,000 additional troops; you finally said that you would have "some chance of success" with 20,000; but you afterwards telegraphed me you would require 35,000. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reënforced would almost destroy it in that climate. In the mean time Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

He tells McClellan, in conclusion, that a large

number of his highest officers are decidedly in favor of the movement.

Weary at last of arguments, Halleck became more and more peremptory in his orders; and this failing to infuse any activity into the movements of McClellan, he had recourse to sharp dispatches of censure which provoked only excuses and recriminations. In some of his replies to Halleck's urgent dispatches, enjoining the greatest haste and representing the grave aspect of affairs in northern Virginia, McClellan replied in terms that indicated as little respect for Halleck as he had shown for the President and the Secretary of War. On the 6th of August, in answer to an order insisting on the immediate dispatch of a battery of artillery to Burnside, he calmly replies, "I will obey the order as soon as circumstances permit. My artillery is none too numerous now." On the 12th, little or no progress having yet been made, he says:

There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufacture vessels. It is not possible for any one to place this army where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington is in danger now, this army could scarcely arrive in time to save it. It is in much better position to do so from here than from Aquia.

At the same time the Quartermaster-General reported that "nearly every available steam vessel in the country was then under the control of General McClellan." Only on the 17th of August was McClellan able to telegraph that he had left his camp at Harrison's Bar, and only on the 27th of the month, when Pope's campaign had reached a critical and perilous stage, did he report himself for orders at Alexandria, near Washington.



"O YE SWEET HEAVENS!"

O YE sweet heavens! your silence is to me
 More than all music. With what full delight
 I come down to my dwelling by the sea
 And look out from the lattice on the night!
 There the same glories burn serene and bright
 As in my boyhood; and if I am old
 Are they not also? Thus my spirit is bold
 To think perhaps we are coeval. Who
 Can tell when first my faculty began
 Of thought? Who knows but I was there with you
 When first your Maker's mind, celestial spheres,
 Contrived your motion ere I was a man?
 Else, wherefore do mine eyes thus fill with tears
 As I, O Pleiades! your beauty scan?

T. W. Parsons.

possessed him, hope slipped farther and farther away from his heart.

Cármen sat silently beside him. Her open hand rested upon the stone bench, not far from his, but he had not the courage to take it. Her eyes were turned eastward towards the snow mountains. High above the snow-capped peaks was a glory of red and golden cloud, but the mountains below were cold and colorless. To Pem's mind the White Woman seemed more than ever a dead, cold woman, half hidden beneath her shroud of snow. And as this dreary thought came into his mind, linking itself with the sorrowful thoughts already there, and by an allegory making the sorrow of them still more keen, there came from his lips a sob. Doubtless

there is no sound more pathetic than the sob of a strong man.

And then Pem felt a soft hand, not cold, but warm, in his; and at that instant a shifting of the clouds changed the current of the sunlight, and the White Woman was lit up by a ruddy, life-giving glow.

Pem's heart bounded. He raised his head, and his eyes met Cármen's—looking full at him now, bright through tears and full of love.

"Señor, Señor mio," said Cármen, as they rose at last from the stone bench, yet still looked eastward on the splendor of gold and crimson clouds and crimson snow, "it was here in Guadalupe Hidalgo that the treaty of peace between the conquered Mexicans and the conquering Americans was signed."

THE END.

Thomas A. Janvier.

ARMY HOSPITALS AND CASES.

MEMORANDA AT THE TIME, 1863-66.

BY WALT WHITMAN.

[Of reminiscences of the Secession War, after the rest is said, it remains to give a few special words—in some respects the typical words of all, and the most definitive—of the army hospitals and samples of those that filled them, of the killed and wounded in action, and of soldiers who lingered afterward, from these wounds, or were laid up by disease or prostration. The general statistics have perhaps been printed already, but, as introductory to the incidents I am going to describe, they can bear to be briefly stated again. There were over 2,000,000 men (for all periods of enlistment, large and small) furnished to the Union army during the war, New York State furnishing nearly 500,000, which was the greatest number of any one State. The losses by disease, wounds, killed in action, accidents, etc. were altogether about 300,000, or approximating to that number. Over 6,000,000 cases were treated in the army hospitals. The number sounds strange, but it is true. More than two-thirds of the deaths were from prostration or disease. To-day there lie buried over 300,000 soldiers in the various national army cemeteries, more than half of them marked "unknown." In full mortuary statistics of the war the greatest deficiency arises from our not having the rolls, even as far as they were kept, of most of the Southern military prisons, a gap which probably both adds to, and helps to conceal, the indescribable horrors of those places. It is, however, certain that over 25,000 Union soldiers died in the

hands of the enemy.* And now, leaving all figures and their "sum totals," I feel sure a few genuine memoranda of such things, made at the time and on the spot, defective as they are, but with all the associations of those persons, scenes, and places brought back, will not only go directest to the right spot, but give a clearer and more actual sight of "army hospitals and cases" during that period than anything else. I begin with verbatim extracts from letters home to my mother in Brooklyn, the second year of the war.—W. W.]

Washington, Oct. 13, 1863.—There has been a new lot of wounded and sick arriving for the last three days. The first and second days, long strings of ambulances with the sick. Yesterday the worst, many with bad and bloody wounds, inevitably long neglected. I thought I was cooler and more used to it, but the sight of some cases brought tears into my eyes. I had the luck yesterday, however, to do lots of good. Had provided many nourishing articles for the men for another quarter, but, fortunately, had my stores where I could use them at once for these new-comers, as they arrived, faint, hungry, fagged out from their journey, with soiled clothes, and all bloody. I distributed these articles, gave partly to the nurses I knew, or to those in charge. As many as possible I fed myself.

* The latest official compilation (1885) shows the Union mortality to have been 359,528, of whom 29,498 died in Southern prisons.—EDITOR.

Then I found a lot of oyster soup handy, and bought it all at once.

It is the most pitiful sight, this, when the men are first brought in, from some camp hospital broke up, or a part of the army moving. These who arrived yesterday are cavalrymen. Our troops had fought like devils, but got the worst of it. They were Kilpatrick's cavalry;—were in the rear, part of Meade's retreat, and the reb cavalry, knowing the ground and taking a favorable opportunity, dashed in between, cut them off, and shelled them terribly. But Kilpatrick turned and brought them out, mostly. It was last Sunday.

Oct. 27, 1863.—If any of the soldiers I know (or their parents or folks) should call upon you,—as they are often anxious to have my address in Brooklyn,—you just use them as you know how, and if you happen to have pot-luck, and feel to ask them to take a bite, don't be afraid to do so. I have a friend, Thomas Neat, 2d New York Cavalry, wounded in leg, now home in Jamaica, on furlough; he will probably call. Then possibly a Mr. Haskell, or some of his folks, from western New York: he had a son died here, and I was with the boy a good deal. The old man and his wife have written me and asked me my Brooklyn address; he said he had children in New York, and was occasionally down there. When I come home I will show you some of the letters I get from mothers, sisters, fathers, etc. They will make you cry.

How the time passes away! To think it is over a year since I left home suddenly—and have mostly been down in front since. The year has vanished swiftly, and oh, what scenes I have witnessed during that time! And the war is not settled yet; and one does not see anything certain, or even promising, of a settlement. But I do not lose the solid feeling, in myself, that the Union triumph is assured, whether it be sooner or whether it be later, or whatever roundabout way we may be led there; and I find I don't change that conviction from any reverses we meet, nor delays, nor blunders. One realizes here in Washington the great labors, even negative ones, of Lincoln;—that it is a big thing to have just kept the United States from being thrown down and having its throat cut. I have not wavered or had any doubt of the issue since Gettysburg.

18th September, 1863.—Here, now, is a specimen hospital case: Lorenzo Strong, Co. A, 9th New York Cavalry (his brother, Horace L. Strong, Rochester, N. Y.), shot by a shell last Sunday; right leg amputated on the field. Sent up here Monday night, 14th.

Seemed to be doing pretty well till Wednesday noon, 16th, when he took a turn for the worse, and a strangely rapid and fatal termination ensued. Though I had much to do, I staid and saw it all. It was a death-picture characteristic of these soldiers' hospitals: the perfect specimen of physique,—one of the most magnificent I ever saw,—the convulsive spasms, and working of muscles, mouth, and throat. There are two good women nurses, one on each side. The doctor comes in and gives him a little chloroform. One of the nurses constantly fans him, for it is fearfully hot. He asks to be raised up, and they put him in a half-sitting posture. He called for "Mark" repeatedly, half-deliriously, all day. Life ebbs, runs now with the speed of a mill-race; his splendid neck, as it lays all open, works still, slightly; his eyes turn back. A religious person coming in offers a prayer, in subdued tones; around the foot of the bed, and in the space of the aisle, a crowd, including two or three doctors, several students, and many soldiers, has silently gathered. It is very still and warm, as the struggle goes on, and dwindles, a little more, and a little more—and then welcome oblivion, painlessness, death. A pause, the crowd drops away, a white bandage is bound around and under the jaw, the propping pillows are removed, the limpsy head falls down, the arms are softly placed by the side, all composed, all still—and the broad white sheet is thrown over everything.

April 10, 1864.—Unusual agitation all around concentrated here. Exciting times in Congress. The Copperheads are getting furious, and want to recognize the Southern Confederacy. "This is a pretty time to talk of recognizing such —," said a Pennsylvania officer in hospital to me to-day, "after what has transpired the last three years." After first Fredericksburg I felt discouraged myself, and doubted whether our rulers could carry on the war. But that has passed away. The war *must* be carried on. I would willingly go in the ranks myself if I thought it would profit more than as at present, and I don't know sometimes but I shall, as it is. Then there is certainly a strange, deep, fervid feeling formed or aroused in the land, hard to describe or name; it is not a majority feeling, but it will make itself felt. M., you don't know what a nature a fellow gets, not only after being a soldier a while, but after living in the sights and influences of the camps, the wounded, etc.—a nature he never experienced before. The stars and stripes, the tune of Yankee Doodle, and similar things, produce such an effect on a fellow as never before. I have seen them bring tears on some men's

cheeks, and others turn pale with emotion. I have a little flag (it belonged to one of our cavalry regiments), presented to me by one of the wounded; it was taken by the Secesh in a fight, and rescued by our men in a bloody skirmish following. It cost three men's lives to get back that four-by-three flag—to tear it from the breast of a dead rebel—for the name of getting their little "rag" back again. The man that secured it was very badly wounded, and they let him keep it. I was with him a good deal; he wanted to give me some keepsake, he said,—he didn't expect to live,—so he gave me that flag. The best of it all is, dear M., there is n't a regiment, cavalry or infantry, that would n't do the like, on the like occasion.

April 12.—I will finish my letter this morning; it is a beautiful day. I was up in Congress very late last night. The House had a

* *Hospitals Ensemble. August, September, and October, 1863.*—I am in the habit of going to all, and to Fairfax Seminary, Alexandria, and over Long Bridge to the great Convalescent Camp. The journals publish a regular directory of them—a long list. As a specimen of almost any one of the larger of these hospitals, fancy to yourself a space of three to twenty acres of ground, on which are grouped ten or twelve very large wooden barracks, with, perhaps, a dozen or twenty, and sometimes more than that number, small buildings, capable altogether of accommodating from 500 to 1000 or 1500 persons. Sometimes these wooden barracks, or wards, each of them perhaps from 100 to 150 feet long, are ranged in a straight row, evenly fronting the street; others are planned so as to form an immense V; and others again are ranged around a hollow square. They make altogether a huge cluster, with the additional tents, extra wards for contagious diseases, guard-houses, sutler's stores, chaplain's house; in the middle will probably be an edifice devoted to the offices of the surgeon in charge and the ward surgeons, principal attachés, clerks, etc. The wards are either lettered alphabetically, Ward G, Ward K, or else numerically, 1, 2, 3, etc. Each has its ward surgeon and corps of nurses. Of course, there is, in the aggregate, quite a muster of employees, and over all the surgeon in charge. Here in Washington, when these army hospitals are all filled (as they have been already several times), they contain a population more numerous in itself than the whole of the Washington of ten or fifteen years ago. Within sight of the Capitol, as I write, are some thirty or forty such collections, at times holding from 50,000 to 70,000 men. Looking from any eminence and studying the topography in my rambles, I use them as landmarks. Through the rich August verdure of the trees, see that white group of buildings off yonder in the outskirts; then another cluster half a mile to the left of the first; then another a mile to the right, and another a mile beyond, and still another between us and the first. Indeed, we can hardly look in any direction but these clusters are dotting the landscape and environs. That little town, as you might suppose it, off there on the brow of a hill, is indeed a town, but of wounds, sickness, and death. It is Finley Hospital, north-east of the city, on Kendall Green, as it used to be called. That other is Campbell Hospital. Both are large establishments. I have known these two alone to have from 2000 to 2500 inmates. Then there is Carver Hospital, larger still, a walled and military city regularly laid out, and guarded by squads of sentries.

very excited night session about expelling the men that proposed recognizing the Southern Confederacy. You ought to hear (as I do) the soldiers talk; they are excited to madness. We shall probably have hot times here, not in the military fields alone. The body of the army is true and firm as the North Star.

May 6, 1864.—M., the poor soldier with diarrhea is still living, but, oh, what a looking object! Death would be a relief to him—he cannot last many hours. Cunningham, the Ohio soldier, with leg amputated at thigh, has picked up beyond expectation; now looks indeed like getting well. [He died a few weeks afterward.] The hospitals are very full.* I am very well indeed. Hot here today.

May 23, 1864.—Sometimes I think that should it come when it *must*, to fall in battle, one's anguish over a son or brother killed might

Again, off east, Lincoln Hospital, a still larger one; and, half a mile farther, Emory Hospital. Still sweeping the eye around down the river towards Alexandria, we see, to the right, the locality where the Convalescent Camp stands, with its 5,000, 8,000, or sometimes 10,000 inmates. Even all these are but a portion. The Harwood, Mount Pleasant, Armory Square, Judiciary Hospitals, are some of the rest, and all large collections.

Summer of 1864.—I am back again in Washington, on my regular daily and nightly rounds. Of course there are many specialties. Dotted a ward here and there are always cases of poor fellows, long suffering under obstinate wounds, or weak and disheartened from typhoid fever, or the like; marked cases, needing special and sympathetic nourishment. These I sit down and either talk to or silently cheer them up. They always like it hugely (and so do I). Each case has its peculiarities, and needs some new adaptation. I have learnt to thus conform—learnt a good deal of hospital wisdom. Some of the poor young chaps, away from home for the first time in their lives, hunger and thirst for affection; this is sometimes the only thing that will reach their condition. The men like to have a pencil, and something to write in. I have given them cheap pocket-diaries, and almanacs for 1864, interleaved with blank paper. For reading I generally have some old pictorial magazines or story-papers—they are always acceptable. Also the morning or evening papers of the day. The best books I do not give, but lend to read through the wards, and then take them to others, and so on; they are very punctual about returning the books. In these wards, or on the field, as I thus continue to go round, I have come to adapt myself to each emergency, after its kind or call, however trivial, however solemn, every one justified and made real under its circumstances; not only visits and cheering talk and little gifts, not only washing and dressing wounds (I have some cases where the patient is unwilling any one should do this but me), but passages from the Bible, expounding them, prayer at the bedside, explanations of doctrine, etc. (I think I see my friends smiling at this confession, but I was never more in earnest in my life.) In camp and everywhere, I was in the habit of reading or giving recitations to the men. They were very fond of it, and liked declamatory poetical pieces. We would gather in a large group by ourselves, after supper, and spend the time in such readings, or in talking, and occasionally by an amusing game called the game of twenty questions.

be tempered with much to take the edge off. Lingered and extreme suffering from wounds or sickness seem to me far worse than death in battle. I can honestly say the latter has no terrors for me, as far as I myself am concerned. Then I should say, too, about death in war, that our feelings and imaginations make a thousand times too much of the whole matter. Of the many I have seen die, or known of, the past year, I have not seen or known one who met death with terror. In most cases I should say it was a welcome relief and release.

Yesterday I spent a good part of the afternoon with a young soldier of seventeen, Charles Cutter, of Lawrence, Massachusetts (1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, Battery M); he was brought to one of the hospitals mortally wounded in abdomen. Well, I thought to myself, as I sat looking at him, it ought to be a relief to his folks if they could see how little he really suffered. He lay very placid, in a half lethargy, with his eyes closed. As it was extremely hot, and I sat a good while silently fanning him and wiping the sweat, at length he opened his eyes quite wide and clear and looked inquiringly around. I said, "What is it, my boy? Do you want anything?" He answered quietly, with a good-natured smile, "Oh, nothing; I was only looking around to see who was with me." His mind was somewhat wandering, yet he lay in an evident peacefulness that sanity and health might have envied. I had to leave for other engagements. He died, I heard afterward, without any special agitation, in the course of the night.

Washington, May 26, 1863.—M., I think something of commencing a series of lectures, readings, talks, etc. through the cities of the North, to supply myself with funds for hospital ministrations. I do not like to be so beholden to others; I need a pretty free supply of money, and the work grows upon me and fascinates me. It is the most magnetic as well as terrible sight: the lots of poor wounded and helpless men depending so much, in one ward or another, upon my soothing or talking to them, or rousing them up a little, or perhaps petting or feeding them their dinner or supper (here is a patient, for instance, wounded in both arms), or giving some trifle for a novelty or change—anything, however trivial, to break the monotony of those hospital hours.

It is curious: when I am present at the most appalling scenes, deaths, operations, sickening wounds (perhaps full of maggots), I keep cool and do not give out or budge, although my sympathies are very much excited; but often, hours afterward, perhaps when I am home, or

out walking alone, I feel sick, and actually tremble, when I recall the case again before me.

[The following memoranda describe some of the last cases and hospital scenes of the war, from my own observation.]

Two brothers, one South, one North.—*May 28-29, 1865.*—I staid to-night a long time by the bedside of a new patient, a young Baltimorean, aged about nineteen years, W. S. P. (2d Maryland, Southern), very feeble, right leg amputated, can't sleep; has taken a great deal of morphine, which, as usual, is costing more than it comes to. Evidently very intelligent and well-bred; very affectionate; held on to my hand, and put it by his face, not willing to let me leave. As I was lingering, soothing him in his pain, he says to me suddenly: "I hardly think you know who I am. I don't wish to impose upon you — I am a rebel soldier." I said I did not know that, but it made no difference. Visiting him daily for about two weeks after that, while he lived (death had marked him, and he was quite alone), I loved him much, always kissed him, and he did me. In an adjoining ward I found his brother, an officer of rank, a Union soldier, a brave and religious man (Colonel Clifton K. Prentiss, 6th Maryland infantry, Sixth Corps, wounded in one of the engagements at Petersburg, April 2, lingered, suffered much, died in Brooklyn, August 20, 1865). It was in the same battle both were hit. One was a strong Unionist, the other Secesh; both fought on their respective sides, both badly wounded, and both brought together here after a separation of four years. Each died for his cause.

Sunday Afternoon, July 30.—Passed this afternoon among a collection of unusually bad cases, wounded and sick Secession soldiers, left upon our hands. I spent the previous Sunday afternoon there also. At that time two were dying. Two others have died during the week. Several of them are partly deranged. To-day I went around among them elaborately. Poor boys, they all needed to be cheered up. As I sat down by any particular one, the eyes of all the rest in the neighboring cots would fix upon me, and remain steadily riveted as long as I sat within their sight. Nobody seemed to wish anything special to eat or drink. The main thing asked for was postage stamps, and paper for writing. I distributed all the stamps I had. Tobacco was wanted by some.

One called me over to him and asked me in a low tone what denomination I belonged to. He said he was a Catholic — wished to find some one of the same faith — wanted some

good reading. I gave him something to read, and sat down by him a few minutes. Moved around with a word for each. They were hardly any of them personally attractive cases, and no visitors come here. Of course they were all destitute of money. I gave small sums to two or three, apparently the most needy. The men are from quite all the Southern States, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, etc.

Wrote several letters. One for a young fellow named Thomas J. Byrd, with bad wound and diarrhea. Was from Russell County, Alabama; been out four years. Wrote to his mother; had neither heard from her nor written to her in nine months. Was taken prisoner last Christmas, in Tennessee; sent to Nashville, then to Camp Chase, Ohio, and kept there a long time; all the while not money enough to get paper and postage stamps. Was paroled, but on his way home the wound took gangrene; had diarrhea also; had evidently been very low. Demeanor cool and patient. A dark-skinned, quaint young fellow, with strong southern idiom; no education.

Another letter, for John W. Morgan, aged 18, from Shellot, Brunswick County, North Carolina; been out nine months; gun-shot wound in right leg, above knee; also diarrhea; wound getting along well; quite a gentle, affectionate boy; wished me to put in the letter for his mother to kiss his little brother and sister for him. [I put strong envelopes on these, and two or three other letters, directed them plainly and fully, and dropped them in the Washington post-office the next morning myself.]

The large ward I am in is used for secession soldiers exclusively. One man, about forty years of age, emaciated with diarrhea, I was attracted to, as he lay with his eyes turned up, looking like death. His weakness was so extreme that it took a minute or so, every time, for him to talk with anything like consecutive meaning; yet he was evidently a man of good intelligence and education. As I said anything, he would lie a moment perfectly still, then, with closed eyes, answer in a low, very slow voice, quite correct and sensible, but in a way and tone that wrung my heart. He had a mother, wife, and child living (or probably living) in his home in Mississippi. It was long, long since he had seen them. Had he caused a letter to be sent them since he got here in Washington? No answer. I repeated the question, very slowly and soothingly. He could not tell whether he had or not — things of late seemed to him like a dream. After waiting a moment, I said: "Well, I am going to walk down the ward a moment, and when I come back you can tell me. If you have not written, I will sit down and write." A few minutes

after, I returned; he said he remembered now that some one had written for him two or three days before. The presence of this man impressed me profoundly. The flesh was all sunken on face and arms; the eyes low in their sockets and glassy, and with purple rings around them. Two or three great tears silently flowed out from the eyes, and rolled down his temples (he was doubtless unused to be spoken to as I was speaking to him). Sickness, imprisonment, exhaustion, etc. had conquered the body; yet the mind held mastery still, and called even wandering remembrance back.

There are some fifty Southern soldiers here; all sad, sad cases. There is a good deal of scurvy. I distributed some paper, envelopes, and postage stamps, and wrote addresses full and plain on many of the envelopes.

I returned again Tuesday, August 1, and moved around in the same manner a couple of hours.

September 22, 1865.—Afternoon and evening at Douglas Hospital to see a friend belonging to 2d New York Artillery (Hiram W. Frazee, Serg't), down with an obstinate compound fracture of left leg received in one of the last battles near Petersburg. After sitting a while with him, went through several neighboring wards. In one of them found an old acquaintance transferred here lately, a rebel prisoner, in a dying condition. Poor fellow, the look was already on his face. He gazed long at me. I asked him if he knew me. After a moment he uttered something, but inarticulately. I have seen him off and on for the last five months. He has suffered very much; a bad wound in left leg, severely fractured, several operations, cuttings, extractions of bone, splinters, etc. I remember he seemed to me, as I used to talk with him, a fair specimen of the main strata of the Southerners, those without property or education, but still with the stamp which comes from freedom and equality. I liked him; Jonathan Wallace, of Hurd County, Georgia, age 30 (wife, Susan F. Wallace, Houston, Hurd County, Georgia). [If any good soul of that county should see this, I hope he will send her word.] Had a family; had not heard from them since taken prisoner, now six months. I had written for him, and done trifles for him, before he came here. He made no outward show, was mild in his talk and behavior, but I knew he worried much inwardly. But now all would be over very soon. I half sat upon the little stand near the head of the bed. Wallace was somewhat restless. I placed my hand lightly on his forehead and face, just sliding it over the surface. In a moment or so he fell into a calm, regular-breathing lethargy or sleep, and remained so while I sat there. It was dark, and the lights were lit. I hardly

know why (death seemed hovering near), but I staid nearly an hour. A Sister of Charity, dressed in black, with a broad white linen bandage around her head and under her chin, and a black crape over all and flowing down from her head in long wide pieces, came to him, and moved around the bed. She bowed low and solemn to me. For some time she moved around there noiseless as a ghost, doing little things for the dying man.

December, 1865.— The only remaining hospital is now "Harewood," out in the woods, north-west of the city. I have been visiting there regularly every Sunday during these two months.

January 24, 1866.— Went out to Harewood early to-day, and remained all day.

Sunday, February 4, 1866.— Harewood Hospital again. Walked out this afternoon (bright, dry, ground frozen hard) through the woods. Ward 6 is filled with blacks, some with wounds, some ill, two or three with limbs frozen. The boys made quite a picture sitting round the stove. Hardly any can read or write. I write for three or four, direct envelopes, give some tobacco, etc.

Joseph Winder, a likely boy, aged twenty-three, belongs to 10th Colored Infantry (now in Texas); is from Eastville, Virginia. Was a slave; belonged to Lafayette Homeston. The master was quite willing he should leave. Joined the army two years ago; has been in one or two battles. Was sent to hospital with rheumatism. Has since been employed as cook. His parents at Eastville; he gets letters from them, and has letters written to them by a

friend. Many black boys left that part of Virginia and joined the army; the 10th, in fact, was made up of Virginia blacks from thereabouts. As soon as discharged is going back to Eastville to his parents and home, and intends to stay there.

Thomas King, formerly 2d District Colored Regiment, discharged soldier, Company E, lay in a dying condition; his disease was consumption. A Catholic priest was administering extreme unction to him. (I have seen this kind of sight several times in the hospitals; it is very impressive.)

Harewood, April 29, 1866. Sunday afternoon.— Poor Joseph Swiers, Company H, 155th Pennsylvania, a mere lad (only eighteen years of age); his folks living in Reedsburgh, Pennsylvania. I have known him now for nearly a year, transferred from hospital to hospital. He was badly wounded in the thigh at Hatcher's Run, February 6, 1865.

James E. Ragan, Atlanta, Georgia; 2d United States Infantry. Union folks. Brother impressed, deserted, died; now no folks, left alone in the world, is in a singularly nervous state; came in hospital with intermittent fever.

Walk slowly around the ward, observing, and to see if I can do anything. Two or three are lying very low with consumption, cannot recover; some with old wounds; one with both feet frozen off, so that on one only the heel remains. The supper is being given out: the liquid called tea, a thick slice of bread, and some stewed apples.

That was about the last I saw of the regular army-hospitals.

Walt Whitman.

RESTLESSNESS.

(Written before visiting Florence.)

WOULD I had waked this morn where Florence smiles,
 Abloom with beauty, a white rose full-blown,
 Yet rich in sacred dust, in storied stone
 Precious past all the wealth of Indian isles.
 From olive-hoary Fiesole to feed
 On Brunelleschi's dome my hungry eye,
 And see against the lotos-colored sky
 Spring the slim belfry graceful as a reed;
 To kneel upon the ground where Dante trod;
 To breathe the air of immortality
 From Angelo and Raphael,— *to be*,
 Each sense new-quickened by a demi-god;
 To hear the liquid Tuscan speech at whiles
 From citizen and peasant; to behold
 The heaven of Leonardo washed with gold.—
 Would I had waked this morn where Florence smiles!

Emma Lazarus.



GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN



"SUNDAY MORNING."

(Photographed by
Mrs. J. O. Wright.)

AMERICAN MACHINE CANNON AND DYNAMITE GUNS.





NOT long since, in New York, a distinguished general of the Union armies, now on the retired list, gave utterance to remarks the substance of which was as follows:

The next war will be marked by terrific and fearful slaughter. So murderous have warlike weapons become, and so fertile has the inventive power of man grown in producing means of killing his fellows, that the Rebellion and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 will seem mild in comparison with it. Machine cannon, dynamite guns, and magazine rifles now do in the space of a minute what formerly required hours; while steam, electricity, chemistry, and all the agents which man has called to his aid will be utilized in the work of destruction.

It is indeed so; and yet in the extreme mortality of modern war will be found the only hope that man can have of even a partial cessation of war. Taken at its best, war is a terrible thing, and bloodshed and death are necessary attributes; but, like the cut of the surgeon's knife when at its sharpest and deepest, it is bound to make the wound heal the quickest. Therefore all means which will bring the enemy to terms in the shortest possible time—except such as are absolutely objectionable—are justified in war. Americans are dubbed a peace-loving people, and are laughed at for their small army and navy and antiquated armament. How passing strange, then, that not only the first, but the most perfect, of modern weapons are their creation! The Gatling gun, the Gardner, the Lowell, the Hotchkiss, the dynamite guns, and the best of magazine rifles are their inventions. History furnishes many proofs that it is to the improvements of arms that nations have owed their success in war; and in these utilitarian days that nation which first puts into intelligent practice on the battle-field the proper use of machine guns must inevitably come off the victor. Some of us remember the halo of mystery

that attached to the mitrailleuse, at the breaking out of the Franco-Prussian war, and the tales told of this wonderful machine; we can also remember the cruel disappointment that its supporters were subjected to when it was put to the crucial test of service. It consisted of thirty-seven rifle-barrels arranged in a cylinder; the barrels being open at the breech, the cartridges were placed in a disk, which was then clamped against the barrels, and all the car-



GATLING POLICE GUN.

tridges were exploded simultaneously. The cartridges were paper-cased, a vital imperfection in machine guns. Owing to the number of barrels, the gun and carriage were heavy and cumbersome, so as to absorb the recoil of so great a discharge. Moreover, the rate of fire was not rapid, as much time was necessarily taken up in loading.

We have called the Gatling the progenitor of machine guns, because it was the first. It was invented by Dr. Robert Gatling, then of Indiana, in 1861; but though brought to the attention of the American Government, it was

not given a trial till some years after the war of the Rebellion, when, in an improved condition, it was finally adopted. Since then all the governments of the world have used more or less of them. Its first actual service of importance was in the war of 1870-71 between Germany and France. To be sure, it was not till nearly the close of the war, and when the failure of the mitrailleuse was acknowledged, that it was used. If it had been used in the beginning, the result might have been different. The following, taken from the war correspondence of the "London Journal" at the time, shows its effects:


Up to this time we had not seen any Prussians beyond a few skirmishers in the plain, though our battery of Gatlings had kept blazing away at nothing in particular all the while; but now an opportunity of its being in use occurred. A column of troops appeared in the valley below us, coming from the right — a mere dark streak upon the white snow; but no one in the battery could tell whether they were friends or foes, and the commander hesitated about opening fire. But now an aide-de-camp came dashing down the hill with orders to pound them at once — a French journalist, it seems, having discovered them to be enemies, when the general and all his staff were as puzzled as ourselves. *Rr-rr-a go* our Gatlings, the deadly hail of bullets crushes into the thick of them, and slowly back into the woods the dark mass retires, leaving, however, a trace of black dots upon the white snow behind it. This, their famous and 4 o'clock effort and its failure, has decided the day. That one discharge was enough.

The main features of the Gatling gun in the latest form may be summed up as follows:

It has from six to ten rifle-barrels, each with a corresponding lock. These barrels are grouped about and revolve around a central shaft to which they are parallel, and the bore of the barrels extends through from end to end. The breech-ends are firmly fastened into a disk or rear barrel-plate, which is screwed to the shaft, and the muzzles

pass through another disk. The shaft projects beyond the muzzles and extends backward for some distance behind the breeches. The barrels and locks are revolved together around the shaft by turning a crank on the side of the casing surrounding the breech. Besides this motion, the locks have a forward and backward motion of their own, the first of which places the cartridges in the barrels and closes the breech at the time of each discharge, while the latter one extracts the empty cartridge-cases after firing. It is only when the handle or crank is worked forward, which turns the barrels from left to right, that the gun is loaded and fired. On the top of the gun is a hopper, which receives the cartridges from a feed-case; and when the gun is in action there are, in the ten-barrel gun, five cartridges going through the process of loading and five more in different stages of extraction. These several operations are continuous, and the operations of loading, firing, and extracting are carried on uniformly. The cartridge falls from the hopper into the breech-block at the top, and before it revolves so as to be underneath it is shoved into place, the hammer drawn back, and, as it reaches the lowest point of revolution, the breech is closed, the hammer released, and the cartridge fired. As it comes up on the left-hand side, the ejector and extractor is at work, the empty shell falls to the ground, and the barrel is ready for another cartridge as it reaches its place on top. Therefore in one entire revolution ten cartridges can be fired, and the number of cartridges that can be fired in a given space of time will depend upon the strength, endurance, and rapidity of action of the man who turns the crank. A new feed called, from its inventor, the Accles feed, makes the supply of cartridges positive and certain in action, and

with it, it is claimed the gun can be fired at the rate of 1200 shots per minute, and at all degrees of elevation and depression. Of course it will be understood that this rate cannot be kept up long, since the heat evolved by the discharge of 1200 cartridges is so enormous that the gun cannot stand it; the barrels heat, and the parts of the breech mechanism become jammed and clogged. Still, this gun has passed through the severest tests known on the experimental ground,



LATEST MODEL OF GATLING FIELD GUN.




has been fired at angles of elevation from 0 to 89 degrees, has been turned upside down and fired continuously in that position, showing that its feed was positive. The drum contains 102 cartridges, and the gun has a number of times emptied the drum in 2 1/2 seconds, and eight drums in 41.4 seconds. At one trial 63,600 cartridges were fired without stopping to wipe out or clean the barrels, and the working of the gun proved satisfactory. The gun is made

in different sizes, from .42 caliber up to 1 inch. This latter size makes it practically equal to a field-piece, and indeed its range, upwards of 3000 yards, is nearly as great. The gun has a lateral motion from side to side, so that as the crank is turned it sweeps, with its fire, a wide zone. The illustrations show the different styles of gun for different purposes. The practical value of an invention is determined by the results attained in actual service, and under this test the Gatling has shown even greater superiority than on the experimental ground. During the Russo-Turkish war, the war of Chili and Peru, England's fights with Zulus, with Ashantees, in Egypt, wherever the Gatling was used, it did its work well, and rained upon the foe a hail of bullets so deadly that he was absolutely paralyzed. In the Zulu war it is stated that in one place, within a radius of 500 yards, 473 dead Zulus lay in groups of from 14 to 30, mowed down by the fire of one Gatling. The annals of war do not present any greater slaughter than that. It is claimed that the Gatling can fire for short spaces of time more shots than any other machine gun, and at greater degrees of elevation and depression. When mounted on a tripod it can traverse an entire circle, thereby covering

any point desired. In naval service the smaller calibers can be mounted on tops, and thus cover the decks of an enemy's vessel, while the larger sizes are especially valuable against torpedo boats. In common with other machine guns, it requires but few men and horses to manipulate it or to transport it. For the clearing of mobs in streets, for the protection of buildings containing treasure, for use in revolts in penitentiaries, it is a terrible weapon of defense and destruction. Its adaptations for the purposes of flank defense; protecting roads, defiles, and bridges; covering crossings of streams; increasing infantry fire at critical moments;

repulsing cavalry; covering the retreat of a column; and its intensity and continuity of fire—all render it of surpassing importance.

Another machine gun, now world-famous, and of a different type from the Gatling, though the invention of an American, is the Gardner gun. If the Gatling can fire a greater number of shots per minute and at greater ranges than any other gun, on the other hand it is claimed for the Gardner that for simplicity,



TWO-BARRELED GARDNER GUN ON TRIPOD.

durability, lightness, ease of operation, and accuracy it has no equal. It is made in all calibers from .45 inch up to 1 inch. It consists of two simple breech-loading rifle-barrels placed parallel to each other 1.4 inches apart, both inclosed in a case. These two barrels are loaded and fired and relieved of shells by a mechanism at the breech which is operated, as in the Gatling, by a hand-crank. One man inserts the heads of the cartridges projecting from a feed-case into the feed-guide; another man turns the crank by which the gun is fired, and as the cartridges disappear down the feed-guide their places are supplied from another case. The operations of inserting the cartridge,



GARDNER GUN IN THE BOW OF A LAUNCH.

drawing back the hammer, releasing it, and extracting the empty shell all go on automatically within the casing around the breech, and alternately on each barrel. The weight of the two-barreled gun is about 110 pounds. It is easily carried on the backs of pack-animals, or in small boats, as shown in the illustrations. The rate of fire of this gun is barely 500 shots a minute, but this rate can be kept up continuously, and 10,000 rounds have been fired without intermission or mishap. The gun has been fired successfully and practically adopted in Italy, Denmark, Mexico, the United States, and England. In the war of the latter with Burmah a four-gun Gardner battery did great service, as will be seen by the following extracts taken from the report of Captain Lloyd, R. A., commanding a battery of four Gardner guns in that campaign:

... Having thus satisfied ourselves that we had a good weapon in our hands, we set to work to equip a battery of four guns. . . . The favorite tactics of the dakoits is to lay in ambush in dense jungle, where they are at home and completely safe; they then fire a volley into our unsuspecting troops and depart. When the dakoits oppose our advance by clinging to the jungle in front, their position, never extensive, would be quickly searched out by our machine guns. Again, their value would be ap-

preciated in storming stockades, some of which are bullet-proof, and some are not. In the latter case the guns, having a range of two thousand yards, would keep up a stream of bullets out of the enemy's reach. . . . In like manner they would be utilized in the attack on dakoit villages. . . . Moreover, the power of these guns for counter-attack as well as for passive defense cannot fail to be recognized.

The aim of Mr. Gardner, the inventor, was not to make a powerful gun, but rather to establish a minimum of weight and space, and within that limit to achieve the greatest possible rapidity of fire. As compared with the Gatling, the Gardner has not so rapid a rate of fire; but the breeches being incased in water-jackets, the firing at its maximum rate can be kept up longer. The gun is easier of transport, and moreover is, after some firing, much steadier and more accurate. The feed-case of the Gatling having a powerful spring to press the cartridges into the hopper, and this spring being operated by the turning of the crank, it follows that much more strength is required of the man who turns the crank in the Gatling than in the Gardner. A very interesting bit of history to Americans is the present given by General Grant to the Viceroy of China and the Mikado of Japan. Desiring to give these dignitaries a present which would show to some extent his appreciation of the courtesies extended to him when in China and Japan,



GARDNER GUN IN TRANSPORT.

he ordered two Gardner guns of special design to be made. On the breech of the barrel-chamber of one of the guns is the engraved inscription :

TO HIS EXCELLENCY
VICEROY LI HUNG CHIANG,
FROM
U. S. GRANT.

The other gun is similarly inscribed to the Mikado of Japan. While the regular models were followed, yet special attention was given to nicety of finish of every part. The carriages and mounts of the guns are made entirely of bronze and steel. The wheels are finished in wood, the feloes of oak, and the spokes of hickory. The limber-chests, each with a capacity of 7200 rounds, are of oak and highly polished. It is understood that these guns occupy positions of honor and ornament in the palaces of their respective owners.

But great as is our admiration for the Gardner and Gatling guns, it must give way before the astonishment and wonder excited by another American invention but very recently perfected. It is the Maxim automatic machine gun, invented in 1883, but only within a year past brought to a state of wonderful and ingenious perfection. It is with a feeling almost akin to shame that we state that this gun is made in England, although the inventor is American. It is, as its name indicates, an automatic machine gun, and only requires the pressure of the finger on the trigger to explode the first cartridge, and the gun, then left alone, will load and fire itself as long as cartridges are fed to it. The gun proper consists of an ordinary gun-barrel, two-thirds of which are surrounded by a casing of metal in which water is automatically injected by each discharge of the barrel. By means of this casing, or water-jacket, it is impossible to overheat the gun by firing.


The remaining third is surrounded by a steel case of rectangular shape, inside of which is the mechanism for operating the gun. This mechanism consists of a main-spring, tumbler,

sears, and firing-pin, similar to those used in the old-fashioned pistol. In addition is the lever, which, when the gun is fired, is thrown into action by the recoil. The arrangement is at once set in motion—the empty shell withdrawn, a new cartridge inserted, the breech closed, a cartridge fired, and a certain quantity of water admitted into the water-jacket. The cartridges are placed in pockets on a belt.



GARDNER GUN ON DECK.

Each belt contains 333 of these pockets, and two or more belts may be joined together. The end of the belt is introduced in the breech-casing, and the finger pressed on the trigger to fire the first cartridge, after which the gun may be left alone, and the automatic action, set in motion by the recoil, fires the rest. As the recoil is but three-quarters of an inch, some idea may be had of the wonderful ingenuity of the gun by considering that it will fire the 666 cartridges of the double belt in a little over a minute, or at the rate of ten a second; in other words, it requires but one-tenth of a second to load the gun, fire a cartridge, throw out the empty shell, and put in a full one. Again, the recoil of the gun



MAXIM FIELD GUN WITH BULLET-PROOF SHIELD.

does another work. Over the casing is a small tank of water, and at each discharge of the gun a small quantity of cool water is injected from the cistern into the water-jacket, and after the heat of the gun has risen sufficiently, the water escapes in the form of steam from two little apertures at the front end of the jacket. The cartridge contains from 70 to 90 grains of powder, and the heat evolved in the discharge of one cartridge is sufficient to raise the temperature of the water at the rate of $1\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ Fahrenheit per pound. And as much heat is required to melt four pounds of iron as is necessary to evaporate five pounds of water. It can be seen from this what an effectual absorbent of heat is the water-jacket, and in fact it requires the discharge of 1000 cartridges before the water is heated sufficiently to cause steam to make its appearance. The rate of fire is regulated by means of a quadrant graduated from 200 up to 700, so that by putting the hand on this the gun not only can swing from side to side, and thus traverse with its fire a wide arc, but also can throw out such fire as is wished. The field-piece is 3 feet high, 4 feet 9 inches long from muzzle to rear of breech, and weighs but 50 pounds, and its carriage about 100 pounds. The maximum rate of firing is about 600 shots per minute, but it has fired continuously 5000 shots, and so accurately that it is said its inventor, by putting his hand on the traversing lever, has written his name on a target board 400 yards from the muzzle, *in the dark*. Comparing this gun with other machine guns, its advantages become at once apparent. Indeed, it can hardly be compared with other guns, since the field

it opens is entirely new, and of broader range than others. In machine guns the causes that render guns unserviceable are as follows: First, cartridges may and often do hang fire, due to age, or perhaps to dampness in the atmosphere at the time of firing, or to deterioration due to climate, etc. It follows, therefore, that the crank being turned by a skillful man very fast, the breech is unlocked, and the cartridge partly or wholly withdrawn while in the act of exploding, thus driving the forward end of the empty case into the chamber, and rendering the gun useless for the time being. Secondly, it has been found impossible to fire many more than 1000 rounds in rapid succession, because of the heating of barrels and expansion of parts. Thirdly, when the cartridges are fed by gravity they are dependent on their own weight alone for falling into the proper position in the chamber, and therefore a skillful man may work the crank so rapidly that it becomes impossible for the cartridge to attain its proper position when fed by gravity alone, and it is crushed in the act of falling. If the cartridges are not fed by gravity but by positive feed, such as a special spring, the spring also has to be worked by the man at the crank, requiring an outlay of strength that soon renders him useless, and which jars the gun and injures its accuracy. Fourthly, the machine guns are all dependent upon a single spring extractor for throwing out the empty cartridge-case, and in rapid firing the chamber becomes clogged, the case adheres so strongly to the walls that the extractor is unable to work, and sometimes breaks.

As compared with the foregoing faults of


other guns, the Maxim stands as follows: First, since there is but one barrel, but *one cartridge* can enter at a time; and if it is bad or unserviceable it will not explode, and the gun, without recoil, stops at once, and the cartridge must be ejected before a fresh one can be inserted. The cartridge is in no danger of being prematurely exploded by hot parts, since overheating is rendered impossible by the water-jacket, and therefore the fire can be practically continuous. Again, the cartridges being *drawn in one by one*, automatically, the objections open to the positive and gravity feeds are obviated, and the empty shell is thrown out, since a grooved slide, moving in a transverse direction, seizes it by the head and moves it bodily. The cartridge shell cannot fasten to the walls of the chamber, because this grooved slide is an independent piece. There is also another advantage that the Maxim possesses over other machine guns. It can readily be seen that any gun having two or more barrels, in order to shoot accurately, must have both barrels absolutely parallel to the vertical plane passing through the line of sight, and when there are more than two barrels they must also be parallel to each other. An error of the smallest fraction of an inch, in the direction of the line of fire, will, at a distance of one hundred yards, amount to several feet. If a gun has errors of this sort, then is there accounted for one of the principal causes of inaccuracy of fire; and rough usage, heating, etc. only render this trouble greater. But no such mechanical difficulty exists with the Maxim, since there is but one barrel. It is simple in its mechanism, is easily taken apart, oiled and cleaned, and put together again; while its automatic action, accuracy of fire, power of regulation, and the little attention needed make it the most perfect of machine guns.

The Hotchkiss revolving cannon is another American invention, although the principal factory is in France. The revolving cannon may


be best said to be the revolver on a large scale. The gun has five barrels and five chambers, which, as they are slowly revolved, are fired in succession, and can be quickly reloaded by hand. A rate of twenty shots per minute is easily obtainable with the 6-pounder gun; but as these are cannon, the heat evolved by expenditure of so much powder is immense, and therefore makes it practically impossible to fire but a few shots at this rapid rate. The gun is made so as to throw shells from 1 pound up to 32 pounds in weight.

Although a great deal has been said about the failure of Americans to turn out heavy guns equal to those of same caliber made abroad, yet the 8-inch rifles in the navy, and the new 12-inch rifled mortar or howitzer made by the United States Army Ordnance Department, certainly are the superiors of guns of their caliber the world over. This latter gun, of which we present a picture, has a caliber of 12 inches, is rifled, and fires a 630-pound shell with 35 pounds of powder. It has been fired at angles of from 30° to 75° elevation, and at 60° gave a range of $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Moreover, this range is accurate; that is, if a space the size of a vessel of war be marked off, five out of every seven shots would fall either on the decks or near enough seriously to injure her at this range.

Lastly, we turn to the torpedo weapon that has excited so much wonder and interest not only at home but abroad. We mean the dynamite gun. As is well known, many attempts in years past have been made to throw shells charged with dynamite from guns fired with gunpowder; but, due to the terrific shock of discharge, the shells generally burst in the guns, and were more dangerous to those firing than to those fired at. Mr. Mefford of Ohio, in



UNITED STATES 12-INCH RIFLED BREECH-LOADING MORTAR, OR HOWITZER.




PNEUMATIC DYNAMITE SEA-COAST GUN.

1883, devised his first pneumatic gun, in which he used compressed air as the propelling power. The use of compressed air is of great advantage, the pressure being low, and diminishing so slowly as to be, for practical purposes, constant; and by automatic arrangements it can be cut off as the projectile leaves the bore, so that there is no waste. Again, the pressure is kept entirely under control by means of valves, and a constant muzzle velocity is obtained. Also, instead of heating the gun, the use of compressed air actually cools it. The gun first made was 2 inches in diameter; this was followed by one 4 inches in diameter, and then by the one represented in the illustration—8 inches in diameter. The experiments have been conducted under the supervision of Captain C. L. Zalinski, 5th United States Artillery, and they attained a degree of perfection that astonished the world. The gun may be briefly described as follows: The barrel consists of four lengths of wrought-iron tubing $\frac{5}{8}$ of an inch thick and lined with $\frac{1}{8}$ -inch seamless brass tubing. This barrel is supported on an iron truss, which in turn rests on a carriage which is supported by two hollow cast-iron pillars. The pillars rest on a platform, which is pivoted at the front in a manner similar to that of heavy guns. To the rear of the gun, protected by a wall, are placed a boiler-engine and air pumps for keeping the reservoirs full. The traversing and leveling are controlled by pneumatic cylinders worked by means of valve-levers. The air reser-

voir consists of eight wrought-iron tubes $12\frac{1}{2}$ inches diameter, and with a total capacity of 137 cubic feet. They are arranged in two tiers on each side of the platform. On the gun are two sights resting in *V*'s on the left trunnion, and on the same side is the firing-lever, so that the same person can aim and fire the gun. A pressure-gauge, showing the air pressure at any time, is also in such a position that the person firing can see it, and thus, by changing the air pressure, can correct any shot desired. The projectile has a brass body 3 feet 4 inches long, and a conical point of wrought iron 12 inches long, and a tail made of pine wood. This is inserted in the breech, which is opened and closed by a flat disk opening inwards, and sealed by a felt wad.

The gun, on account of the uniformity of pressure of air on the projectile, can be fired with great accuracy up to two thousand yards, and, as has been demonstrated time and time again, with perfect safety. The shells are charged with from fifty to sixty pounds of gelatine or gelatinous dynamite, and in experiments made September 20, 1887, proved that within given ranges the shell was perfectly under control. So perfect are the automatic arrangements, that to fire any number of shots within a given time the reservoir does not have to be entirely recharged. The instant the projectile leaves the tube the air is cut off, and the pressure on the gauge is hardly diminished. One of the most im-




8-INCH DYNAMITE GUN.

portant features of the shell is the electric fuse — the invention of Captain Zalinski. In each shell there are two batteries — one a wet one, kept charged, and the other a dry one, which is put in action by moisture. These two are on one circuit, arranged in series, part of which is composed of fine platinum wire surrounded by gunpowder, and the end of which is in a capsule, while the other end is surrounded by fulminate of mercury, which, when detonated, explodes a small tube of dynamite, and this then explodes the main charge. The wet battery explodes the shell on impact either direct or oblique. The dry battery is arranged so that the circuit is closed by being moistened, as on striking the water, which rushes through holes in the head of the projectile, which are covered with thin metal flaps.

So perfect are the arrangements of this fuse that the shell can be exploded by the slightest contact with water, or at any depth. The gun as designated is a torpedo gun. It has not, and probably never can have, the range that powder guns have — certainly not without destroying its qualities as to accuracy; but as a torpedo, it is superior to all others. It has greater speed, costs less, is far more accurate and sure, and has a field of action above as well as below water. Arrangements are made now to mount three guns of 15-inch caliber on a special gun-boat just constructed for this purpose, and it is safe to say that this vessel is in itself capable of entering any channel and harbor in the world and clearing it of torpedoes. A few of the huge charges of dynamite detonated on the bottom would explode every torpedo, either singly or in groups, placed there, and charged with high explosives.

So terrific is the force of detonation that a charge of 200 pounds of dynamite dropped on the deck of a vessel, or exploded in the air above it, would probably kill or render *hors de*

combat every human being in that vessel, by concussion and shock alone. Of all American inventions, the dynamite gun is the only one that has had the practical encouragement of the United States Government in the shape of appropriations. Owing to the neglect of our legislators to provide means of defense for our sea-coast, we are laying up for ourselves an awful retribution, that sooner or later will visit us unless we speedily take the



8-INCH SHELL.

means to correct the evil; and through our national egotism and belief in our military genius we are losing track of the very means that help the inventive powers of our countrymen to devise wondrous weapons of offense and defense. "In peace prepare for war" should be hung up in great black letters on the walls of the council chambers of our national legislators, to warn them that the same fate has overtaken every nation that has neglected its opportunities, and that the people will not hold them guiltless when the invitations and premiums to attack us we are offering to other nations shall finally be accepted.

William R. Hamilton.



WRECK OF THE UNITED STATES COAST SURVEY SCHOONER "SILLIMAN" BY A 55-POUND SHELL FROM THE PNEUMATIC DYNAMITE GUN, SEPTEMBER 20, 1887.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

FIRST PLANS FOR EMANCIPATION.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.²

COMPENSATED ABOLISHMENT.



HE annual message of President Lincoln at the opening of Congress in December, 1861, treated many subjects of importance—foreign relations, the condition of the finances, a reorganization of the Supreme Court, questions of military administration, the building of a military railroad through Kentucky to east Tennessee, the newly organized Territories, a review of military progress towards the suppression of rebellion. It contained also a vigorous practical discussion of the relations between capital and labor, which pointed out with singular force that “the insurrection is largely, if not exclusively, a war upon the first principle of popular government—the rights of the people.” In addition to these topics, it treated another question of greater importance than all of them, but for the present in so moderate a tone, and with such tentative suggestions, that it excited less immediate comment than any other. This was the question of slavery.

It had not escaped Mr. Lincoln's notice that the relations of slavery to the war were producing rapidly increasing complications and molding public thought to new and radical changes of opinion. His revocation of Frémont's proclamation had momentarily checked the clamor of importunate agitators for military emancipation; but he saw clearly enough that a deep, though as yet undefined, public hope clung to the vague suggestion that slavery and rebellion might perish together. As a significant symptom of this undercurrent of public feeling, there came to him in November a letter from George Bancroft, the veteran Democratic politician and national historian; a man eminent not only for his writing upon the science of govern-

ment, but who as a member of President Polk's cabinet had rendered signal and lasting service in national administration. Mr. Bancroft had lately presided at a meeting in New York called to collect contributions to aid the suffering loyalists of North Carolina. As it happened on all such occasions, the inflamed popular patriotism of the hour sprang forward to bold speech and radical argument. Even the moderate words of Mr. Bancroft on taking the chair reflected this reformatory spirit:

If slavery and the Union are incompatible, listen to the words that come to you from the tomb of Andrew Jackson: “The Union must be preserved at all hazards.” . . . If any one claims the compromises of the Constitution, let him begin by placing the Constitution in power by respecting it and upholding it.³

In the letter transmitting these remarks and the resolutions of the meeting to Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Bancroft made a yet more emphatic suggestion. He wrote:

Your administration has fallen upon times which will be remembered as long as human events find a record. I sincerely wish to you the glory of perfect success. Civil war is the instrument of Divine Providence to root out social slavery; posterity will not be satisfied with the result, unless the consequences of the war shall effect an increase of free States. This is the universal expectation and hope of men of all parties.⁴

Such a letter, from a man having the learning, talent, and political standing of its author, is of itself historic; but Mr. Lincoln's reply gives it a special significance. November 18, 1861, he wrote:

I esteem it a high honor to have received a note from Mr. Bancroft, inclosing the report of proceedings of a New York meeting taking measures for the relief of Union people of North Carolina. I thank you and all others participating for this benevolent and patriotic movement. The main thought in the closing paragraph of your letter is one which does

² It will be remembered that in announcing editorially “Abraham Lincoln: A History,” November, 1886, it was stated as follows: When “the military portion of this history is reached in magazine publication, care will be taken to avoid as much as possible the repetition of details already given in THE CENTURY'S war series, while fully presenting that part of the military narrative in which is explained the re-

lation of the President to these events.” In order to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, this statement is here repeated. It is expected that, with the excisions referred to, the work will extend through twelve or thirteen numbers more of the magazine.—EDITOR OF THE CENTURY.

³ “The New York Times,” Nov. 8, 1861.

⁴ Unpublished MS.

not escape my attention, and with which I must deal in all due caution, and with the best judgment I can bring to it.¹

This language gives us the exact condition of Mr. Lincoln's mind on the subject of slavery at that time. He hoped and expected to effect an "increase of free States" through emancipation; but we shall see that this emancipation was to come through the voluntary action of the States, and that he desired by this policy to render unnecessary the compulsory military enfranchisement which Frémont had attempted and which his followers advocated.

The prudent caution and good judgment which President Lincoln applied to the solution of this dangerous problem becomes manifest when we reëxamine its treatment in his annual message mentioned above. Not referring directly to any general plan or hope of emancipation, he nevertheless approached the subject by discussing its immediate and practical necessities in phraseology which gave him limit for expansion into a more decisive policy. It is worth while, not merely to quote the whole passage, but to emphasize the sentences which were plainly designed to lead Congress and the country to the contemplation of new and possible contingencies.

Under and by virtue of the act of Congress entitled "An Act to Confiscate Property used for Insurrectionary Purposes," approved August 6, 1861, the legal claims of certain persons to the labor and service of certain other persons have become forfeited; and numbers of the latter, *thus liberated, are already dependent on the United States, and must be provided for in some way.* Besides this, it is not impossible *that some of the States will pass similar enactments for their own benefit respectively, and by operation of which persons of the same class will be thrown upon them for disposal.* In such case I recommend *that Congress provide for accepting such persons from such States, according to some mode of valuation, in lieu, pro tanto, of direct taxes, or upon some other plan to be agreed on with such States respectively; that such persons, on such acceptance by the General Government, be at once deemed free; and that, in any event, steps be taken for colonizing both classes (or the one first mentioned, if the other shall not be brought into existence) at some place or places in a climate congenial to them.* It might be well to consider, too, whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such colonization. . . . The war continues. In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle. I have, therefore, in every case, thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the primary

object of the contest on our part, leaving all questions which are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate action of the legislature.

In the exercise of my best discretion I have adhered to the blockade of the ports held by the insurgents, instead of putting in force, by proclamation, the law of Congress enacted at the late session for closing those ports. So, also, obeying the dictates of prudence, as well as the obligations of law, instead of transcending, I have adhered to the act of Congress to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes. If a new law upon the same subject shall be proposed, its propriety will be duly considered. The Union must be preserved; and hence, *all indispensable means must be employed.* We should not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable.²

Apparently these propositions covered the simple recommendation of colonization, an old and familiar topic which had friends in both free and slave States; but the language, when closely scanned, is full of novel suggestions: that the war has already freed many slaves; that the war may free many more; that the President will impartially consider any new law of Congress increasing emancipation for rebellion; that he will not hastily adopt extreme and radical measures; but that, finally to preserve the Union, *all indispensable means must be employed.* These declarations, in fact, cover the whole of his subsequent treatment of the slavery question.

Congress was too busy with pressing practical legislation to find time for immediately elaborating by debate or enactment any of the recommendations thus made. It is not likely that the President expected early action from the national legislature, for he at once turned his own attention to certain initiatory efforts which he had probably carefully meditated. He believed that under the pressure of war necessities the border slave States might be induced to take up the idea of voluntary emancipation if the General Government would pay their citizens the full property value of the slaves they were asked to liberate; and this experiment seemed to him most feasible in the small State of Delaware, which retained only the merest fragment of a property interest in the peculiar institution.

Owing to the division of its voters between Breckinridge, Bell, Lincoln, and Douglas, the electoral vote of Delaware had been cast for Breckinridge in the presidential election of 1860; but more adroit party management had succeeded in effecting a fusion of the Bell and Lincoln vote for member of Congress, and George P. Fisher had been elected by a small majority. It is of little importance to know the exact shade of Mr. Fisher's politics during the campaign: when the rebellion broke out he was an ardent Unionist, a steadfast friend of

¹ Unpublished MS.

² "Congressional Globe," Appendix, Dec. 3, 1861.

Mr. Lincoln, and perhaps more liberal on the subject of slavery than any other border State representative. He entered readily into Mr. Lincoln's views and plans, which were to induce the legislature of Delaware to pass an act of gradual emancipation of the 1798 slaves which it contained by the census of 1860, on condition that the United States would pay to Delaware, to be distributed among its slave owners in proper ratio, the sum of \$400 for each slave, or a total of \$719,200.

Mr. Lincoln during the month of November had with his own hand written drafts of two separate bills embracing the principal details of the scheme. By the first, all negroes in Delaware above the age of thirty-five years should become free on the passage of the act; all born after its passage should remain free; and all others, after suitable apprenticeship for children, should become free in the year 1893; also, that the State should meanwhile prevent any of its slaves being sold into servitude elsewhere.¹ The provisions of the second draft were slightly different. Lincoln's manuscript explains:

On reflection I like No. 2 the better. By it the nation would pay the State \$23,200 per annum for thirty-one years. All born after the passage of the act would be born free. All slaves above the age of thirty-five years would become free on the passage of the act. All others would become free on arriving at the age of thirty-five years until January, 1893, when all remaining of all ages would become free, subject to apprenticeship for minors born of slave mothers, up to the respective ages of twenty-one and eighteen.¹

Upon consultation with the President, Mr. Fisher undertook to propose and commend the scheme to his influential party friends in Delaware, and if possible to induce the legislature of that State to adopt it.

One of the drafts prepared by Mr. Lincoln was rewritten by the friends of the measure in Delaware, embodying the necessary details to give it proper force and local application to become a law of that State. In this shape it was printed and circulated among the members of the legislature, then holding a special session at Dover. The legislature of Delaware is not a large body; nine members of the Senate and twenty-one members of the House constituted the whole number. No record remains of the discussions, formal or informal, which the proposition called forth. The final action, however, indicates the sentiment which prevailed. The friends of emancipation probably ascertained that a hostile majority would

vote it down, and therefore the laboriously prepared bill was never introduced. The pro-slavery members, unwilling to lose the opportunity of airing their conservatism, immediately prepared a joint resolution reciting the bill at full length and then loading it with the strongest phrases of condemnation which their party zeal could invent. They said it would encourage the abolition element in Congress; that it evinced a design to abolish slavery in the States; that Congress had no right to appropriate a dollar for the purchase of slaves; that they were unwilling to make Delaware guarantee the public faith of the United States; that when the people of Delaware desired to abolish slavery within her borders they would do so in their own way; and intimated that the "suggestions of saving expense to the people" were a bribe, which they scornfully repelled. A majority of the twenty-one members of the House passed this joint resolution; but when it came to the Senate, on the 7th of February, four of its nine members voted "aye," four voted "no," and one was silent or absent; and so the joint resolution went back "non-concurred in."² This seems to have closed the legislative record on the subject.

Mr. Lincoln was doubtless disappointed at this failure to give his plan of compensated gradual abolishment a starting-point by the favorable action of the State of Delaware. But he did not abandon the project, and his next step was to bring it, through Congress, to the attention of the country and the States interested. On the 6th of March he sent to the Senate and the House of Representatives a special message, recommending the adoption of the following joint resolution:

Resolved, That the United States ought to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system.³

His message explained that this was merely the proposal of practical measures which he hoped would follow. He said:

The point is not that all the States tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation; but that while the offer is equally made to all, the more northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain to the more southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say "initiation" because, in my judgment, gradual, and not sudden, emancipation is better for all. . . . Such a proposition on the part of the General Government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the

¹ Unpublished MS.

² Delaware Senate Journal, Special Session, 1861-62.

³ "Congressional Globe," March 6, 1862, p. 1102.

State and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as a matter of perfectly free choice with them. In the annual message last December, I thought fit to say, "The Union must be preserved; and hence, all indispensable means must be employed." I said this, not hastily, but deliberately. War has been made, and continues to be, an indispensable means to this end. A practical reacknowledgment of the national authority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue; and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency towards ending the struggle, must and will come.¹

To this public recommendation he added some cogent reasons in private letters to influential persons. Thus, three days after his message, he wrote to the editor of "The New York Times":

I am grateful to the New York journals, and not less so to "The Times" than to others, for their kind notices of the late special message to Congress. Your paper, however, intimates that the proposition, though well intentioned, must fail on the score of expense. I do hope you will reconsider this. Have you noticed the facts that less than one-half day's cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware, at four hundred dollars per head?—that eighty-seven days' cost of this war would pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri at the same price? Were those States to take the steps, do you doubt that it would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense? Please look at these things, and consider whether there should not be another article in "The Times."²

So again, to Senator McDougall, who was opposing the scheme with considerable earnestness in the Senate, he wrote privately on March 14:

As to the expensiveness of the plan of gradual emancipation, with compensation, proposed in the late message, please allow me one or two brief suggestions. Less than one-half day's cost of the war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at four hundred dollars per head. Thus:

All the slaves in Delaware by the census of 1860 are.....	1798	
		\$400
Cost of slaves.....		\$719,200
One day's cost of the war.....		\$2,000,000

Again, less than eighty-seven days' cost of this war would, at the same price, pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri. Thus:

Slaves in Delaware.....	1,798	
" " Maryland.....	87,188	
" " District of Columbia.....	3,181	
" " Kentucky.....	225,490	
" " Missouri.....	114,665	
	432,622	
		\$400
Cost of slaves.....		\$173,045,800
Eighty-seven days' cost of the war.....		\$174,000,000

Do you doubt that taking the initiatory steps on the part of those States and this District would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense? A word as to the *time* and *manner* of incurring the expense. Suppose, for instance, a State devises and adopts a system by which the institution absolutely ceases therein by a named day—say January 1, 1862. Then let the sum to be paid to such State by the United States be ascertained by taking from the census of 1860 the number of slaves within the State, and multiplying that number by four hundred—the United States to pay such sums to the State in twenty equal annual installments, in six per cent. bonds of the United States. The sum thus given, as to *time* and *manner*, I think would not be half as onerous as would be an equal sum raised *now* for the indefinite prosecution of the war; but of this you can judge as well as I.²

It was between the dates of these letters that President Lincoln made the most important personal effort to secure favorable action on his project of gradual abolishment. At his request such members of Congress from the border slave-States of Delaware, Maryland, [West] Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri as were present in Washington came in a body to the Executive Mansion on March 10, where a somewhat lengthy interview and discussion of this subject ensued, the substance of which was authentically reported by them. In reading the account of the interview, it must be remembered that Lincoln was addressing the representatives of such slave States as had remained loyal, and his phrases respecting his attitude and intention towards slavery were not intended by him to apply to the States whose persistent rebellion had forfeited the consideration and rights which the others could justly claim.

In explanation of his message the President recited to the assembled border State members the complications and embarrassments resulting from army operations among loyal or partly loyal communities, and the irritating conflicts of opinion produced thereby in the Northern States. Disclaiming any intention to injure or wound the loyal slave States, and recognizing that the right of emancipation was exclusively under their own control, he had proposed this offer in good faith—not as a threat, but as the shortest and easiest way to end the war by eliminating its cause and motive.

He did not ask an immediate answer, but pressed it upon their serious consideration, and hoped that after earnest conference and inquiry their views of duty and the interests of their constituents might enable them to accept it

1 "Congressional Globe," March 6, 1862, page 1102.

2 Unpublished MS.

voluntarily and in the same patriotic spirit in which it was made.¹

It is not to be wondered at that his auditors were unable to give him affirmative replies, or even remote encouragement. Representing slaveholding constituencies, their natural attitude was one of unyielding conservatism. Their whole tone was one of doubt, of qualified protest, and of apprehensive inquiry. They had not failed to note that in his annual message of December 3, and his special message of March 6, he had announced his determination to use all "indispensable means" to preserve the Union, and had hinted that necessity might force him to employ extreme measures; and one of them asked pointedly "if the President looked to any policy beyond the acceptance or rejection of this scheme." His answer was frank and direct. Mr. Crisfield of Maryland writes:

The President replied that he had no designs beyond the action of the States on this particular subject. He should lament their refusal to accept it, but he had no designs beyond their refusal of it. . . . Unless he was expelled by the act of God or the Confederate armies, he should occupy that house for three years, and as long as he remained there Maryland had nothing to fear, either for her institutions or her interests, on the points referred to.²

The day on which this interview was held, Roscoe Conkling introduced into the House of Representatives the exact joint resolution which the President had recommended in his message of the 6th, and debate on the subject was begun. The discussion developed a wide

¹ An extended quotation from the abstract of the President's remarks as written out by Mr. Crisfield, representative from Maryland, will be read with interest: "After the usual salutations and we were seated, the President said, in substance, that he had invited us to meet him to have some conversation with us in explanation of his message of the 6th; that since he had sent it in, several of the gentlemen then present had visited him, but had avoided any allusion to the message, and he therefore inferred that the import of the message had been misunderstood, and was regarded as inimical to the interests we represented; and he had resolved he would talk with us, and disabuse our minds of that erroneous opinion. The President then disclaimed any intent to injure the interests or wound the sensibilities of the slave States. On the contrary, his purpose was to protect the one and respect the other. That we were engaged in a terrible, wasting, and tedious war; immense armies were in the field, and must continue in the field as long as the war lasts; that these armies must, of necessity, be brought into contact with slaves in the States we represented, and in other States as they advanced; that slaves would come to the camps, and continual irritation was kept up. That he was constantly annoyed by conflicting and antagonistic complaints: on the one side, a certain class complained if the slave was not protected by the army — persons were frequently found who, participating in these views, acted in a way unfriendly to the slaveholder; on the other hand, slaveholders complained that their rights were interfered with, their slaves induced to abscond and protected within the lines. These

divergence of views among representatives. Moderate Republicans generally supported the resolution; even somewhat extreme antislavery men, such as Lovejoy in the House and Sumner in the Senate, indicated their willingness to join in the liberal compensation the President had proposed, if the loyal slave States would consent to relinquish their portion of the disturbing and dangerous evil. Since it was not a practical measure, but simply an announcement of policy, the opposition was not strenuous; a few border State representatives and the more obstinate Democrats from free States joined in a somewhat ill-natured dissent. The resolution was passed on the following day (yeas, 89; nays, 31). The action of the Senate was very similar, though the debate was a little more delayed. The resolution was passed in that body April 2 (yeas, 32; nays, 10), and received the President's signature on the 10th of April, 1862.

By his initiative and influence Mr. Lincoln thus committed the executive and legislative departments of the Government to the policy of compensated emancipation; and there is no doubt that, had his generous offer been accepted by the border States within a reasonable time, the pledge embodied in the joint resolution would have been promptly redeemed. Though it afterwards turned out that this action remained only sentimental and prospective, it nevertheless had no inconsiderable effect in bringing to pass a very important practical measure.

In its long contest for political supremacy, complaints were numerous, loud, and deep; were a serious annoyance to him, and embarrassing to the progress of the war; that it kept alive a spirit hostile to the Government in the States we represented; strengthened the hopes of the Confederates that at some day the border States would unite with them and thus tend to prolong the war; and he was of opinion, if this resolution should be adopted by Congress and accepted by our States, these causes of irritation and these hopes would be removed, and more would be accomplished towards shortening the war than could be hoped from the greatest victory achieved by Union armies. That he made this proposition in good faith, and desired it to be accepted, if at all, voluntarily, and in the same patriotic spirit in which it was made; that emancipation was a subject exclusively under the control of the States, and must be adopted or rejected by each for itself; that he did not claim, nor had this Government, any right to coerce them for that purpose; that such was no part of his purpose in making this proposition, and he wished it to be clearly understood. That he did not expect us there to be prepared to give him an answer, but he hoped we would take the subject into serious consideration, confer with one another, and then take such course as we felt our duty and the interests of our constituents required of us." There followed after this much informal discussion, also reported in brief by Mr. Crisfield, for which there is no room in this note. The whole will be found in McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 210 *et seq.*

² McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 211.

slavery had clung with unyielding tenacity to its foothold in the District of Columbia, where it had been the most irritating eyesore to Northern sentiment. Whatever might be conceded to the doctrine of State sovereignty, antislavery men felt that the peculiar institution had no claim to the exclusive shelter of the Federal flag; on the other hand, proslavery men saw that to relinquish this claim would be fatal to their determination to push it to a national recognition and existence. Hence the abolition or the maintenance of slavery in the District of Columbia had become a frequent issue in party politics. The prohibition of the slave trade in the District was indeed effected in the great compromise of 1850; but this concession was more than counterbalanced by the proslavery gains of that political bargain, and since then the abolition of slavery itself in this central Federal jurisdiction seemed to have become impossible until rebellion provoked the change. Under the new conditions antislavery zeal was pushing its lance into every joint of the monster's armor, and this vulnerable point was not overlooked. The Constitution placed the District of Columbia exclusively under the legislation of Congress, and by their rebellious withdrawal from their seats in the two houses the Southern members and senators had voluntarily surrendered this citadel of their propagandism.

President Lincoln had not specifically recommended abolishment in the District in his annual message; but he had introduced a bill for such a purpose when he was a member of Congress in 1849, and it was well known that his views had undergone no change. Later on, the already recited special message of March 6 embraced the subject in its larger aspects and recommendations. Thus, with perfect knowledge that it would receive executive sanction, the House on April 11 (yeas, 92; nays, 38) and the Senate on April 3 (yeas, 29; nays, 14) passed an act of immediate emancipation of the slaves in the District of Columbia, with compensation to the owners, to be distributed by a commission, the whole not to exceed an aggregate of \$300 per slave. The act also appropriated the sum of \$100,000 for expenses of voluntary emigration to Hayti or Liberia.

President Lincoln signed the act on the 16th of April, and in his short message of approval said:

I have never doubted the constitutional authority of Congress to abolish slavery in this District; and I have ever desired to see the National capital freed from the institution in some satisfactory way. Hence there has never been in my mind any question upon the subject except the one of expediency, arising in view of all the circumstances. . . . 1

am gratified that the two principles of compensation and colonization are both recognized and practically applied in the act.¹

Certain omissions in the law, which the President pointed out, were remedied by supplementary enactments, which among other safeguards and provisions added to the boon of freedom the privilege of education by opening public schools to colored children.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES.

BEFORE enough time had elapsed to judge of the probable effect of Lincoln's offer of compensation to the border States, a new incident occurred which further complicated the President's dealings with the slavery question. About the middle of May he was surprised to learn from the newspapers that General David Hunter, whom he had recently sent to command the Department of the South, had issued an order of military emancipation. Reciting that the Department of the South was under martial law, the order declared, "Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible. The persons in these three States—Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina—heretofore held as slaves are therefore declared free."

So far as can be judged, General Hunter was moved to this step by what seemed to him the requirements of his new surroundings and the simple dictates of natural justice. He was a warm personal and political friend of President Lincoln, was entirely free from motives of selfish ambition, and was not a man who would suffer himself to be made the instrument of a political combination. Of strong antislavery convictions, his duty as a soldier in the service of the Union was as single-hearted and as sacred as that of a crusader sent to rescue the Holy Sepulcher from the Infidel. In his eyes rebellion and slavery were intertwined abominations to be struck and conquered simultaneously.

When he took command of the Department of the South he found himself surrounded by new conditions. The capture of Port Royal in the preceding November had been followed by the flight of the whole white population, leaving the entire coast from North Edisto River to Warsaw Sound, a distance of sixty or seventy miles, in the hands of the captors. This was the region of the famous sea island cotton plantations, in which the slaves outnumbered the whites nearly five to one. In their sudden flight the whites were compelled to abandon their slaves as well as their homes, and a large negro population thus fell immediately to the care and protection of the Union army.

¹ "Congressional Globe," April 16, 1862.

The exercise of common humanity forced the military administration of the department beyond mere warlike objects. The commander, General Thomas W. Sherman, issued an address¹ to the white inhabitants, inviting them to return and reoccupy their lands and homes, and continue their peaceful vocations under the auspices and protection of the Government of the United States. Except in a very few instances the friendly invitation was defiantly refused. They not only preferred ruin and exile, but did such mischief as lay in their power by ordering their cotton to be burned¹ and circulating among the blacks the statement that the Yankees would seize them, send them away, and sell them into slavery in Cuba. Such was the distrust excited by the falsehood, that a month after the capture of Port Royal but about 320 blacks had ventured into Sherman's camps; nearly all these were decrepit, or were women and children, there being only sixty able-bodied men among them.²

For the present the slaves made most of their abrupt holiday. But their scanty clothing wore out, the small stock of provisions on the plantations was exhausted. At the time of their masters' flight much of the cotton crop was still in the fields. In the increasing demand for this product it became an object for the Government to collect and preserve what was left; and this work, begun under the joint orders of the War and Treasury departments, set on foot the first organization of the colored population for labor and government. Military orders divided the country into districts, with agents to superintend the plantations, to enroll and organize the blacks into working parties, to furnish them necessary food and clothing, and to pay them for their labor.

Private philanthropy also gave timely and valuable assistance. Relief societies, organized in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, collected funds and employed teachers, some fifty of whom reached Beaufort the 9th of March, 1862, and began a much-needed work of combined encouragement, guardianship, and instruction, thus replacing the elements of social government which the slaves had lost by the withdrawal of their masters and mistresses.

The control of the captured and abandoned cotton and other property fell to the Treasury Department, and in this connection Secretary Chase, at the President's request, gave the educational enterprise his official sanction and supervision; later on, the War Department assumed and continued the work. Compelled

from the first to rely upon "contrabands" for information and assistance, and to a large extent for military labor, it gave them in return not only wages for the actual service performed, but necessary food and shelter for the destitute, and with the return of the spring season furnished them, so far as possible, seed and implements of husbandry, and encouraged them to renew their accustomed labor in the gardens and fields of the abandoned plantations, in order to provide for, or at least contribute to, their own maintenance. Under this treatment confidence was quickly established. In two months the number of blacks within the Union lines increased from 320 to over 9000.³

When General Hunter took command of the Department of the South, this industrial and educational organization of the blacks was just beginning. Military usefulness was of the first importance in his eyes, particularly as his forces were insufficient for offensive movement. It was not unnatural that, seeing the large colored population within his lines, much of it unemployed, his thoughts should turn to the idea of organizing, arming, and training regiments of colored soldiers; and assuming that the instructions of the War Department conferred the necessary authority, he began the experiment without delay. It was amid all these conditions, which at that time did not exist elsewhere, that General Hunter issued the already recited order announcing that slavery and martial law were incompatible, and declaring free all slaves in his department. The presence of the Union army had visibly created a new order of things, and he doubtless felt it a simple duty to proclaim officially what practically had come to pass.

The mails from the Department of the South could only come by sea; hence a week elapsed after the promulgation of Hunter's order before knowledge of it came to the President through its publication in the New York newspapers. The usual acrimonious comments immediately followed: radicals approved it, Democrats and conservatives denounced it; and the President was assailed for inaction on the one hand and for treachery on the other. Lincoln's own judgment of the act was definite and prompt. "No commanding general shall do such a thing, upon my responsibility, without consulting me," he wrote in answer to a note from Chase, who wished the order to stand.

Three days later (May 19, 1862) the President published a proclamation reciting that the Government had no knowledge or part in the issuing of Hunter's order of emancipation, that neither Hunter nor any other person had been authorized to declare free the slaves of any State, and that his order in that respect was altogether void. The President continued:

¹ War Records.

² T. W. Sherman to Thomas, Dec. 15, 1861. War Records.

³ T. W. Sherman to Adjutant-General, Feb. 9, 1862. War Records.

I further make it known that whether it be competent for me, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether at any time, in any case it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field. These are totally different questions from those of police regulations in armies and camps.

While the President thus drew a sharp distinction between the limited authority of commanders in the field and the full reservoir of executive powers in his own hands, for future contingencies, he utilized the occasion for a forcible admonition to the border slave-States. Reminding them that he by recommendation, and Congress by joint resolution, had made them a formal tender and pledge of payment for their slaves if they would voluntarily abolish the institution, he counseled them in words of parental wisdom and affection not to neglect this opportunity of financial security to themselves and patriotic benefit to their country. He said:

To the people of those States I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue; I beseech you to make the arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The changes it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven—not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done by one effort in all past times as, in the providence of God, it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.¹

The "signs of the times" were indeed multiplying to a degree that ought to have attracted the notice of the border States, even without the pointing finger of the President. How far the presence of the Confederate armies, embodying a compact proslavery sentiment, had up to that time interfered locally with the relations of master and slave we have no means of knowing; we do know that before the end of the rebellion the conditions of war—military necessity—brought even the rebel Government and the unconquered slave communities to the verge of emancipation and the general military employment of the blacks. But Northern armies, embodying a compact antislavery sentiment, stationed or moving in slave communities, acted on the "institution" as a disturbing, relaxing, and disintegrating force, constant in operation, which no vigilance

could shut out and no regulations could remedy. Whether in Kentucky or Virginia, Missouri or Mississippi, the slave gave the Union soldiers his sympathy and his help; while for services rendered, and still more for services expected, the soldiers returned friendship and protection, finding no end of pretexts to evade any general orders to the contrary.

From the army this feeling communicated itself sometimes directly to Congress, sometimes to the soldier's Northern home, from which it was in turn reflected upon that body. The antislavery feeling at the North, excited by the ten-years' political contention, intensified by the outbreak of rebellion, was thus fed and stimulated, and grew with every day's duration of the war. Conservative opinion could not defend a system that had wrought the convulsion and disaster through which the nation was struggling. Radical opinion lost no opportunity to denounce it and attack its vulnerable points.

Of the operations of this sentiment the debates and enactments of Congress afford an approximate measure. During the long session from December 2, 1861, to July 17, 1862, the subject seemed to touch every topic at some point, while the affirmative propositions of which slavery was the central and vital object were of themselves sufficiently numerous to absorb a large share of the discussions. Leaving out of view the many resolutions and bills which received only passing attention, or which were at once rejected, this second session² of the Thirty-seventh Congress perfected and enacted a series of antislavery measures which amounted to a complete reversal of the policy of the General Government. At the date of the President's proclamation quoted above calling attention to the "signs of the times," only a portion of these measures had reached final enactment; but the drift and portent of their coming was unmistakable. In the restricted limits of these pages it is impossible to pass them in review separately or chronologically; nor does the date of their passage and approval always indicate the relation in which they engrossed the attention of Congress. The consideration of the general subject was, we may almost say, continuous, and the reader will obtain a better idea of their cumulative force and value from a generalized abstract, showing the importance and scope of the several acts and sections as related to each other.

First. One of the earliest forms of the discussion arose upon the constantly recurring question of returning to slave-owners such runaways as sought the protection of the Union camps, and regarding which various command-

¹ Proclamation, May 19, 1862.

² The first session of the Thirty-seventh Congress

was the special session held in July and August, 1861, under President Lincoln's proclamation.

ers had issued such different and contradictory orders. It has already been stated that the President left his officers full discretion on this point, because it fell properly within the necessities of camp and police regulations. The somewhat harsh and arbitrary order No. 3, issued by General Halleck in Missouri, provoked widespread comment and indignation; and though the general insisted that the spirit of the order was purely military, and not political, it undoubtedly hastened and intensified congressional action. By an act approved March 13, 1862, a new article of war was added to the army regulations, which enjoined, under usual penalties, that "All officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor who may have escaped," etc. Later, Section 10 of the Confiscation Act¹ was virtually an amendment of the fugitive-slave law; providing that the claimant might not use its authority until he had taken an oath of allegiance, and prohibiting any person in the army or navy from surrendering a fugitive slave, or presuming to decide the validity of the owner's claim.

Second. No less to fulfill the dictates of propriety and justice than for its salutary influence on the opinion of foreign nations, the annual message of the President had recommended a recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Hayti and Liberia, and the appointment of diplomatic representatives to those new states. This was duly authorized by an act approved June 5, 1862. Similar reasons also secured the passage of "An act to carry into effect the treaty between the United States and her Britannic Majesty for the suppression of the African slave-trade," approved July 11, 1862. That this action betokened more than mere hollow profession and sentiment is evinced by the fact that under the prosecution of the Government, the slave-trader Nathaniel P. Gordon was convicted and hanged in New York on the 21st of February, 1862, this being the first execution for this offense under the laws of the United States, after their enforcement had been neglected and their extreme penalty defied for forty years.

Third. The third marked feature of congressional antislavery enactment was one which, in a period of peace, would have signalized the culmination of a great party triumph and taken its place as a distinctive political landmark. Now, however, in the clash and turmoil of war it was disposed of, not so much in the light of a present party conquest, as the simple necessary registration of accomplished

¹ Approved July 17, 1862.

facts, wrought beyond recall by passing events, recognized by public opinion, and requiring only the formality of parliamentary attestation. Its title was, "An act to secure freedom to all persons within territories of the United States," approved June 19, 1862. This was the realization of the purpose which had called the Republican party into being, namely, the restoration of the Missouri Compromise, its extension and application to all Territories of the United States, and as a logical result the rejection and condemnation of the proslavery doctrines of the Dred Scott decision, the demand for a congressional slave code, and the subversive "property theory" of Jefferson Davis. These were the issues which had caused the six-years' political contention between the North and the South; and upon its defeat at the ballot-box by the election of President Lincoln, the South had appealed to the sword.

Fourth. Still advancing another step in the prevalent antislavery progress, we come to the policy of compensated emancipation so strenuously urged by the President. Action on this point has already been described, namely, the joint resolution of Congress, approved April 10, 1862, virtually pledging the aid of the Government to any State which would adopt it, and the act, approved April 16, 1862, with its amendments, actually abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, with compensation to owners. The earnestness of Congress in this reform is marked by the additional step that under acts approved May 21 and July 11, 1862, certain provisions were made for the education of colored children in the cities of Washington and Georgetown, District of Columbia.

Fifth. By far the most important of all the antislavery laws of this period, both in scope and purpose, was a new Confiscation Act, perfected after much deliberation, passed at the close of the session, and approved by the President July 17, 1862. The act of August 6, 1861, only went to the extent of making free the slaves actually employed in rebel military service. The new law undertook to deal more generally with the subject, and indeed extended its provisions somewhat beyond the mere idea of confiscation. While other subjects were included, its spirit and object would have been better expressed by the title of "An act to destroy slavery under the powers of war." In addition to other and usual penalties for treason or rebellion, it declared that slaves of persons guilty and convicted of these crimes should be made free; that slaves of rebels escaping and taking refuge within the army lines, slaves captured from rebels or deserted by them and coming under the control of the United States Government, and slaves of rebels found in

any place occupied by rebel forces and afterwards occupied by the Union army, should all be deemed captives of war and be forever free.

Sixth. Coupled with the foregoing sweeping provisions, intended to destroy title in slave property as a punishment for treason and rebellion, were other provisions, which, under guarded phraseology, looked to the active organized employment of slaves as a substantial military force—which military service should in its turn also, in specified cases, work enfranchisement from bondage. Thus, in certain amendments of the militia laws¹ it was enacted that the President might enroll and employ contrabands in such camp labor or military service as they were fitted for, and that their wives, mothers, and children, if they belonged to armed rebels, should become free by virtue of such service. Section 11 of the Confiscation Act, however, conferred a still broader authority upon the Government for this object. It provided:

That the President of the United States is authorized to employ as many persons of African descent as he may deem necessary and proper for the suppression of this rebellion, and for this purpose he may organize and use them in such manner as he may judge best for the public welfare.

This section allowed a latitude of construction which permitted the organization of a few of the earliest regiments of colored soldiers.

In tracing the antislavery policy of President Lincoln, his opinions upon some of the prominent features of these laws become of special interest. He followed the discussion and perfecting of the Confiscation Act with careful attention, and as it neared its passage prepared a veto message, pointing out several serious defects, which Congress hastily remedied in anticipation by an explanatory joint resolution. When the bill and resolution were submitted to him he signed both, as being substantially a single act, and, to place himself right upon the record, transmitted with his notice of approval a copy of the draft of his intended veto message. The constitutional objection and the imperfections of detail in the original bill do not require mention here, but his views on emancipation and military employment of slaves may not be omitted.

There is much in the bill to which I perceive no objection. It is wholly prospective; and it touches neither person nor property of any loyal citizen, in which particular it is just and proper. . . . It is also provided that the slaves of persons convicted under these sections shall be free. I think there is an unfortunate form of expression, rather than a sub-

stantial objection, in this. It is startling to say that Congress can free a slave within a State, and yet if it were said the ownership of the slave had first been transferred to the nation, and that Congress had then liberated him, the difficulty would at once vanish. And this is the real case. The traitor against the General Government forfeits his slave at least as justly as he does any other property; and he forfeits both to the Government against which he offends. The Government, so far as there can be ownership, thus owns the forfeited slaves, and the question for Congress in regard to them is, "Shall they be made free or be sold to new masters?" I perceive no objection to Congress deciding in advance that they shall be free. To the high honor of Kentucky, as I am informed, she has been the owner of some slaves by *escheat*, and has sold none, but liberated all. I hope the same is true of some other States. Indeed, I do not believe it would be physically possible for the General Government to return persons so circumstanced to actual slavery. I believe there would be physical resistance to it which could neither be turned aside by argument nor driven away by force. In this view I have no objection to this feature of the bill. . . . The eleventh section simply assumes to confer discretionary power upon the Executive. Without the law, I have no hesitation to go as far in the direction indicated as I may at any time deem expedient. And I am ready to say now, I think it is proper for our military commanders to employ, as laborers, as many persons of African descent as can be used to advantage.²

The number and variety of antislavery provisions cited above show how vulnerable was the peculiar institution in a state of war, and demonstrate again the folly and madness of the slaveholders' appeal to arms. All the penalties therein prescribed were clearly justifiable by the war powers of the nation and sustained by military necessity. So far the laws had not touched a single right of a loyal slaveholder in a slave State, either within or without the territory held by Confederate arms; but day by day it became manifest that the whole slave system was so ramified and intertwined with political and social conditions in slave States, both loyal and disloyal, that it must eventually stand or fall in mass. In short, the proof was more absolute in war than in peace that slavery was purely the creature of positive law in theory, and of universal police regulations unremittingly enforced in practice.

It must not be supposed that the discussion and enactment of these measures proceeded without decided opposition. The three factions of which Congress was composed maintained the same relative position on these topics that they had occupied since the beginning of the rebellion. The bulk of the resistance was furnished by the Democratic members,

¹ An act to amend the act calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, approved February 28, 1795, and

the acts amendatory thereof, and for other purposes, approved July 17, 1862, sections 12 and 13.

² Senate Journal, July 17, 1862; pp. 872, 873.

who, while as a rule they condemned the rebellion, reiterated their previous accusations that the Republican party had provoked it. Now again at every antislavery proposition, no matter how necessary or justifiable, they charged that it was a violation of express or implied political faith, and a stumbling-block to reconciliation, which, against the plainest evidences, they assumed to be still possible. In a hopeless minority, and with no chance to affect legislation affirmatively even by indirection, they yet maintained the attitude of an ill-natured opposition, yielding assent only to the most necessary war measures, while with sophistical and irritating criticism they were industriously undermining public confidence in the President and his adherents by every party and parliamentary device they could invent.

There is little doubt that this action of the Democrats in Congress, in addition to its other pernicious effects, served to render the border-State delegations more stubborn and intractable against making any concessions towards the liberal and reformatory policy which President Lincoln so strongly urged. The statesmen and politicians of the border slave-States were quick enough to perceive the danger to their whole slave system, but not resolute enough to prepare to meet and endure its removal, and accept a money equivalent in exchange. Against evidence and conviction they clung tenaciously to the idea that the war ought to be prosecuted without damage to slavery; and their representatives and senators in Congress, with a very few brave exceptions, resisted from first to last all antislavery enactments. We may admit that in this course they represented truly the majority feeling and will of their several constituencies; but such an admission is fatal to any claim on their part to political foresight or leadership. Indeed, one of the noticeable and lamentable features of the earlier stages of the rebellion was the sudden loss of power among border-State leaders, both at home and in Congress. We can now see that their weakness resulted unavoidably from their defensive position. During the secession stage they only ventured to act defensively against that initial heresy, and as a rule the offensive and unscrupulous conspirators kept the advantage of an aggressive initiative. Now in the new stage of antislavery reaction they were again merely on the defensive and under the disadvantage which that attitude always brings with it. In Congress, as a faction, they were sadly diminished in numbers and shorn of personal prestige. They could count only a single conspicuous representative — the venerable John J. Crittenden; but burdened with the weight of years, and hedged by the tangles and pitfalls of his conservative obligations, he was timid,

spiritless, despondent. The record of the border-State delegations, therefore, during this strong antislavery movement of congressional enactment is simply one of protests, excuses, appeals, and direful prophecies.

Against them the positive affirmative progress of antislavery sentiment gathered force and volume from every quarter. Whatever the momentary or individual outcry, it was easy to perceive that every antislavery speech, resolution, vote, or law received quick sustaining acceptance from public sentiment in the North and from the fighting Union armies in the South. The Republican majority in Congress noted and responded to these symptoms of approval, and the radical leaders in that body were constantly prompted by them to more advanced demands and votes. Antislavery opinion in Congress not only had the advantage of overpowering numbers, but also of conspicuous ability. A high average talent marked the Republican membership, which, as a rule, spoke and voted for the before-mentioned antislavery measures; while among those whose zeal gave them especial prominence in these debates, the names of Charles Sumner in the Senate and of Thaddeus Stevens and Owen Lovejoy in the House need only be mentioned to show what high qualities of zeal and talent pursued the peculiar institution with unrelenting warfare.

To the rebellious South, to the loyal population of the border slave-States, and to the extreme conservatism of the North, particularly that faction represented by Democratic members of Congress, President Lincoln's proposal of gradual compensated abolishment doubtless seemed a remarkable if not a dangerous innovation upon the practical politics of half a century. But this conservatism failed to comprehend the mighty sweep and power of the revolution of opinion which slavery had put in motion by its needless appeal to arms. In point of fact, the President stood sagaciously midway between headlong reform and blind reaction. His steady, cautious direction and control of the average public sentiment of the country alike held back rash experiment and spurred lagging opinion. Congress, with a strong Republican majority in both branches, was stirred by hot debate on the new issues. The indirect influence of the Executive was much greater than in times of peace: a reckless President could have done infinite damage to the delicate structure of constitutional government. As it was, antislavery resentment was restrained and confined to such changes of legislation as were plainly necessary to vindicate the Constitution, laws, and traditions which the rebellion had wantonly violated; but these were sufficiently numerous and pointed to mark a pro-

found transformation of public policy in little more than a year. Under the occasion and spur which the rebellion furnished, a twelvemonth wrought that which had not been dreamed of in a decade, or which would otherwise have been scarcely possible to achieve in a century.

Four months had now elapsed since President Lincoln proposed and Congress sanctioned the policy of compensated emancipation in the border slave-States. Except in its indirect influence upon public opinion, no definite result had as yet attended the proposal. Great fluctuations had occurred in the war and great strides had been made in legislation; but the tendency so far had been rather to complicate than simplify the political situation, to exasperate rather than appease contending factions and conflicting opinions. This condition of things, while it might have endured for a while, could not prolong itself indefinitely. Little by little the war was draining the lifeblood of the republic. However effectually the smoke and dust of the conflict might shut the view from the general eye, or however flippantly small politicians might hide the question under the heat and invective of factional quarrel, President Lincoln, looking to the future, saw that, to replenish the waste of armies and maintain a compact popular support, the North must be united in a sentiment and policy affording a plain, practical aim and solution, both political and military. The policy he decided upon was not yet ripe for announcement, but the time had arrived to prepare the way for its avowal and acceptance. As the next proper step in such a preparation, the President, on the 12th of July, 1862, again convened the border-State delegations at the Executive Mansion, and read to them the following carefully prepared second appeal to accept compensation for slaves in their respective States:

GENTLEMEN: After the adjournment of Congress, now near, I shall have no opportunity of seeing you for several months. Believing that you of the border States hold more power for good than any other equal number of members, I feel it a duty which I cannot justifiably waive to make this appeal to you. I intend no reproach or complaint when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradual emancipation message of last March the war would now be substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is one of the most potent and swift means of ending it. Let the States which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever join their proposed confederacy, and they cannot much longer maintain the contest. But you cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them so long as you show a determination to perpetuate the institution within your own States. Beat them at elections, as you have overwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and I know what the lever of their

power is. Break that lever before their faces, and they can shake you no more forever. Most of you have treated me with kindness and consideration, and I trust you will not now think I improperly touch what is exclusively your own when, for the sake of the whole country, I ask, "Can you, for your States, do better than to take the course I urge?" Discarding punctilios and maxims adapted to more manageable times, and looking only to the unprecedentedly stern facts of our case, can you do better in any possible event? You prefer that the constitutional relation of the States to the nation shall be practically restored without disturbance of the institution; and if this were done, my whole duty, in this respect, under the Constitution and my oath of office, would be performed. But it is not done, and we are trying to accomplish it by war. The incidents of the war cannot be avoided. If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion—by the mere incidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. How much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war, and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event. How much better to thus save the money which else we sink forever in the war. How much better to do it while we can, lest the war ere long render us pecuniarily unable to do it. How much better for you as seller, and the nation as buyer, to sell out and buy out that without which the war could never have been, than to sink both the thing to be sold and the price of it in cutting one another's throats. I do not speak of emancipation at once, but of a decision at once to emancipate gradually. Room in South America for colonization can be obtained cheaply and in abundance, and when numbers shall be large enough to be company and encouragement for one another, the freed people will not be so reluctant to go.

I am pressed with a difficulty not yet mentioned—one which threatens division among those who, united, are not too strong. An instance of it is known to you. General Hunter is an honest man. He was, and I hope still is, my friend. I valued him none the less for his agreeing with me in the general wish that all men everywhere could be freed. He proclaimed all men free within certain States, and I repudiated the proclamation. He expected more good and less harm from the measure than I could believe would follow. Yet, in repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction, if not offense, to many whose support the country cannot afford to lose. And this is not the end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is increasing. By conceding what I now ask you can relieve me and, much more, can relieve the country in this important point. Upon these considerations I have again begged your attention to the message of March last. Before leaving the capital, consider and discuss it among yourselves. You are patriots and statesmen, and as such I pray you consider this proposition; and at the least commend it to the consideration of your States and people. As you would perpetuate popular government for the best people in the world, I beseech you that you do in no wise omit this. Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest

views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewith forever.

It is doubtful whether the President expected any more satisfactory result from this last appeal to the border-State representatives than had attended his previous one. He had had abundant occasion to observe their course in the congressional debates; the opportunity had been long before them and they had not taken advantage of it; amid the revolutionary impulse and action which were moving the whole country their inaction on this subject was equivalent to resistance. This effort therefore, like the former one, proved barren: most of them answered with a qualified refusal; twenty of them¹ signed a written reply on July 14, which, while it pledged an unchangeable continuance of their loyalty, set forth a number of mixed and inconsequential reasons against adopting the President's recommendation. They thought the project too expensive. They said slavery was a right which they ought not to be asked to relinquish, that the proposition had never been offered them in a tangible shape, that a different policy had been announced at the beginning of the war, that radical doctrines had been proclaimed and subversive measures proposed in Congress. In short, it was a general plea for non-action. Seven others² of their number drew up an address dissenting from the conservative views of the majority, and promising that "We will, as far as may be in our power, ask the people of the border States calmly, deliberately, and fairly to consider your recommendations." Two others³ wrote separate replies in the same spirit; but with only a minority to urge the proposition upon their people, it was plain from the first that no hope of success could be entertained.

EMANCIPATION PROPOSED AND POSTPONED.

MILITARY events underwent great fluctuations in the first half of the year 1862. During the first three months Union victories followed each other with a rapidity and decisiveness which inspired the most sanguine hopes for the

early and complete suppression of the rebellion. Cheering news of important successes came from all quarters—Mill Springs in Kentucky, Roanoke Island in North Carolina, Forts Henry and Donelson in Tennessee, Pea Ridge in Arkansas, Shiloh in Tennessee, Island No. 10 in the Mississippi River, the reduction of Forts Jackson and St. Philip on the lower Mississippi, the capture of New Orleans in Louisiana, and, finally, what seemed the beginning of a victorious advance by McClellan's army upon Richmond. In the month of May, however, this tide of success began to change. Stonewall Jackson's raid initiated a series of discouraging Union defeats, and McClellan's formidable advance gradually changed into disastrous retreat.

No one noted this blighting of a longed-for fruition with a keener watchfulness and more sensitive suffering than did President Lincoln. As the military interest and expectancy gradually lessened at the circumference and slowly centered itself upon the fatal circles around the rebel capital, his thoughts by day and anxiety by night fed upon the intelligence which the telegraph brought from the Union camps on the Chickahominy and the James. It is safe to say that no general in the army studied his maps and scanned his telegrams with half the industry—and, it may be added, with half the intelligence—which Mr. Lincoln gave to his. It is not surprising, therefore, that before the catastrophe finally came the President was already convinced of the substantial failure of McClellan's campaign as first projected, though he still framed his letters and telegrams in the most hopeful and encouraging language that the situation would admit. But aware of the impending danger, he took steps to secure such a reënfacement of the army, and provide for such a readjustment of the campaign, as might yet secure the final and complete victory which had lain so temptingly within McClellan's grasp. A part of this programme was the consolidation of an army under Pope. The culmination of disaster doubtless came sooner than he thought possible. McClellan himself did not seem apprehensive of sudden danger when on June 26 he telegraphed:

The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate measures, and will do my best to outmaneuver, outwit, and outfight the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discour-

¹ From Kentucky, Senator Garrett Davis and Representatives Henry Grider, Aaron Harding, Charles A. Wickliffe, George W. Dunlap, Robert Mallory, John J. Crittenden, John W. Menzies, and James S. Jackson; from Missouri, Senator Robert Wilson and Representatives James S. Rollins, William A. Hall, Thomas L. Price, and John S. Phelps; from Maryland, Representatives John W. Crisfield, Edwin H. Webster, Cornelius L. Leary, Francis Thomas, and Charles B. Calvert; from Virginia, Senator John S. Carlile.

² From Missouri, Representative John W. Noell; from Kentucky, Representative Samuel L. Casey; from Tennessee, Representative Andrew J. Clements; from Delaware, Representative George P. Fisher; from Virginia, Senator Waiteman T. Willey and Representatives William G. Brown and Jacob B. Blair.

³ Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri and Representative Horace Maynard of Tennessee.

aged if you learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me.¹

This was the language of a man still possessing courage and faith, but the events of the two days following robbed him of both. Early on the morning of the 28th he sent the Secretary of War his memorable telegram already quoted, which was a mere blind cry of despair and insubordination :

I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. . . . If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

The kind and patient words with which President Lincoln replied to this unsoldierly and unmanly petulance, and the vigorous exertions put forth by the War Department to mitigate the danger with all available supplies and reënforcements, have been related. The incident is repeated here to show that the President and Cabinet promptly put into execution a measure which had probably been already debated during the preceding days. The needs of the hour, and Lincoln's plan to provide for them, cannot be more briefly stated than in the two letters which follow, the first of which, written on this 28th day of June, he addressed to his Secretary of State. It was evidently written in a moment of profound emotion produced by McClellan's telegram, for nowhere in all his utterances is there to be found a stronger announcement of his determination to persevere unflinchingly in the public and patriotic task before him :

My view of the present condition of the war is about as follows: The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact, there soon will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the Western army be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and east Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should, in every event, be kept about Washington for its protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect

¹ McClellan to Stanton, June 26, 1862, 12 M. War Records.

² Unpublished MS.

to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force, were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard is it to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly.²

This letter was of course not needed for the personal information of Mr. Seward, but was placed in his hands to enable him to reassure those who might doubt the President's courage and determination. The other letter, written in advance and dated the 30th, was addressed to the governors of the loyal States. It ran as follows :

The capture of New Orleans, Norfolk, and Corinth by the National forces has enabled the insurgents to concentrate a large force at and about Richmond, which place we must take with the least possible delay; in fact, there will soon be no formidable insurgent force except at Richmond. With so large an army there the enemy can threaten us on the Potomac and elsewhere. Until we have reëstablished the National authority, all these places must be held, and we must keep a respectable force in front of Washington. But this, from the diminished strength of our army by sickness and casualties, renders an addition to it necessary in order to close the struggle which has been prosecuted for the last three months with energy and success. Rather than herald the misapprehension of our military condition and of groundless alarm by a call for troops by proclamation, I have deemed it best to address you in this form. To accomplish the object stated, we require, without delay, one hundred and fifty thousand men, including those recently called for by the Secretary of War. Thus reënforced, our gallant army will be enabled to realize the hopes and expectations of the Government and the people.²

Armed with these letters, Mr. Seward proceeded hastily to New York City. The brief correspondence which ensued indicates the progressive steps and success of his mission. On this same 30th of June he telegraphed from New York to Secretary Stanton :

Am getting a foundation for an increase of one hundred and fifty thousand. Shall have an important step to communicate to-night or to-morrow morning. Governors Morgan and Curtin here, and communicate with others by telegraph. Let me have reliable information when convenient, as it steadies my operations. . . . Will you authorize me to promise an advance to recruits of \$25 of the \$100 bounty? It is thought here and in Massachusetts that without such payment recruiting will be very difficult, and with it probably entirely successful.²

To this the Secretary of War replied on the following day :

The existing law does not authorize an advance of the bounty. . . . Discreet persons here suggest that the call should be for 300,000 men,—double the number you propose,—as the waste will

be large. Consider the matter. The President has not come into town yet; when he arrives you will receive his answer.

Later in the day he added to the above:

The President approves your plan, but suggests 200,000, if it can be done as well as the number you mention.¹

It is probable that a further discussion, and perhaps also further information of the disaster and despondency on the Peninsula, brought more fully to the minds of President and Secretary of War the gravity of the crisis and the need of decisive action; for Mr. Stanton sent a third telegram to Mr. Seward, saying:

Your telegram received. I will take the responsibility of ordering the \$25 bounty out of the nine millions [appropriation] at all hazards, and you may go on that basis. I will make and telegraph the order in an hour. The President's answer has already gone.¹

Mr. Seward's answer to this was all that could be desired under the circumstances:

The Governors respond, and the Union Committee approve earnestly and unanimously. . . . Let the President make the order, and let both papers come out [in] to-morrow morning's papers, if possible. The number of troops to be called is left to the President to fix. No one proposes less than 200,000; make it 300,000 if you wish. They say it may be 500,000 if the President desires. Get the \$25 advance fixed, and let the terms be made known.¹

Accordingly, on the morning of July 2 there appeared in the newspapers a formal correspondence, purporting to be the voluntary request of eighteen governors of loyal States to the President,

that you at once call upon the several States for such numbers of men as may be required to fill up all military organizations now in the field, and add to the army heretofore organized such additional numbers of men as may, in your judgment, be necessary to garrison and hold all of the numerous cities and military positions that have been captured by our armies. . . . All believe that the decisive moment is near at hand, and to that end the people of the United States are desirous to aid promptly in furnishing all reinforcements that you may deem needful to sustain our Government.

To which the President's reply announced:

GENTLEMEN: Fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed to me in so patriotic a manner by you in the communication of the 28th day of June, I have decided to call into the service an additional force of 300,000 men.

"It was thought safest to mark high enough,"¹ said Mr. Lincoln in a private telegram to Governor Morgan of New York; while in another private circular to all the governors he explained his desire a little more fully.

I should not want the half of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the war in two weeks. But time is everything; and if I get 50,000 new men in a month I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference between old and new troops still against me. The quicker you send, the fewer you will have to send. Time is everything; please act in view of this. The enemy having given up Corinth, it is not wonderful that he is thereby enabled to check us for a time at Richmond.¹

It was doubtless the sudden collapse of McClellan's Richmond campaign which brought President Lincoln to the determination to adopt his policy of general military emancipation much sooner than he would otherwise have done. The necessity of a comprehensive rearrangement of military affairs was upon him, and it was but natural that it should involve a revision of political policy. The immediate present was provided for in the call just issued for 300,000 volunteers; but he had learned by experience that he must count new possibilities of delays and defeats, and that his determination, so recently recorded, to "maintain this contest" to ultimate triumph, compelled him to open new sources of military strength. He recognized, and had often declared, that in a republic the talisman which wrought the wonders of statesmanship and the changes of national destiny was public opinion. We now know that in the use of this talisman he was the most consummate master whose skill history has recorded. We are justified in the inference that his foresight had perceived and estimated the great and decisive element of military strength which lay as yet untouched and unappropriated in the slave population of the South. To its use, however, there existed two great obstacles—prejudice on the part of the whites, the want of a motive on the part of the blacks. His problem was to remove the one and to supply the other. For the first of these difficulties the time was specially propitious in one respect. In the momentary check and embarrassment of all the armies of the Union, generals, soldiers, and conservative politicians would tolerate reprisal upon rebels with forbearance if not with favor; and for their consent to the full military employment of the blacks he might trust to the further change of popular sentiment, the drift of which was already so manifest. The motive which would call the slaves to the active help of the Union armies lay ready made for his use—indeed, it had been in steadily increasing action from the beginning of hostilities till now, as far and as effectively as the Government would permit.

¹ Unpublished MS.

McClellan's change of base occurred about the 1st of July, 1862. Lincoln's final appeal to the border States took place shortly afterward, on July 12; and his vivid portrayal of the inevitable wreck of slavery in the stress of war doubtless gathered color and force from recent military events. Already, before the border-State delegations gave him their written replies, he knew from their words and bearing that they would in effect refuse the generous tender of compensation; and he decided in his own mind that he would at an early day give notice of his intention to emancipate the slaves of rebellious States by military proclamation. His first confidential announcement of the new departure occurred on the day following his interview with the border-State representatives, and is thus recorded in the diary of Secretary Welles:

On Sunday, the 13th of July, 1862, President Lincoln invited me to accompany him in his carriage to the funeral of an infant child of Mr. Stanton. Secretary Seward and Mrs. Frederick Seward were also in the carriage. Mr. Stanton occupied at that time, for a summer residence, the house of a naval officer, I think Hazzard, some two or three miles west or north-westerly of Georgetown. It was on this occasion and on this ride that he first mentioned to Mr. Seward and myself the subject of emancipating the slaves by proclamation in case the rebels did not cease to persist in their war on the Government and the Union, of which he saw no evidence. He dwelt earnestly on the gravity, importance, and delicacy of the movement; said he had given it much thought, and had about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity, absolutely essential for the salvation of the nation, that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued, etc., etc. This was, he said, the first occasion where he had mentioned the subject to any one, and wished us to frankly state how the proposition struck us. Mr. Seward said the subject involved consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to bestow on it mature reflection before giving a decisive answer; but his present opinion inclined to the measure as justifiable, and perhaps he might say expedient and necessary. These were also my views. Two or three times on that ride the subject, which was of course an absorbing one for each and all, was adverted to, and before separating, the President desired us to give the subject special and deliberate attention, for he was earnest in the conviction that something must be done. It was a new departure for the President, for until this time, in all our previous interviews, whenever the question of eman-

ipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in any way alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing any interference by the General Government with the subject. This was, I think, the sentiment of every member of the Cabinet, all of whom, including the President, considered it a local domestic question appertaining to the States respectively who had never parted with their authority over it. But the reverses before Richmond, and the formidable power and dimensions of the insurrection, which extended through all the slave States and had combined most of them in a confederacy to destroy the Union, impelled the Administration to adopt extraordinary measures to preserve the national existence. The slaves, if not armed and disciplined, were in the service of those who were, not only as field laborers and producers, but thousands of them were in attendance upon the armies in the field, employed as waiters and teamsters, and the fortifications and intrenchments were constructed by them.

Within the next four days Congress finished its business and adjourned, the Confiscation Act being an important part of its final work. The President, as we have seen, signed the bill with its amendatory resolution, and the Government was thus brought face to face with the practical duty of enforcing its provisions through military directions and orders in further detail. It has been explained how the Confiscation Act and other laws broadened and multiplied the forfeitures of title to slaves for the crimes of treason and rebellion. We have the evidence of the President's written comments that he considered these penalties just and the imposition of them constitutional. In the administration of the laws thus enacted there therefore remained to be examined only the convenience of their practical enforcement and the general effect upon public opinion of the policy they established.

We have no record of the specific reasoning of President Lincoln upon these points. We only know that within the five days following the adjournment of Congress (July 17 to July 22, 1862) his mind reached its final conclusions. The diary of Secretary Chase contains the following record of what occurred at the Cabinet meeting at the Executive Mansion on July 21:

I went at the appointed hour, and found that the President had been profoundly concerned at the present aspect of affairs, and had determined to take some definite steps in respect to military action and slavery. He had prepared several orders,¹ the first

Second. That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers, within and from said States, so many persons of African descent as can be advantageously used for military or naval purposes, giving them reasonable wages for their labor.

Third. That as to both property and persons of African descent, accounts shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail to show quantities and amounts, and from whom both property and such persons shall have come, as a basis upon which compensation can be made in proper cases; and the several departments of

1 WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, July 22, 1862.

First. Ordered that military commanders within the States of Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas in an orderly manner seize and use any property, real or personal, which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands, for supplies, or for other military purposes; and that while property may be destroyed for proper military objects, none shall be destroyed in wantonness or malice.

of which contemplated authority to commanders to subsist their troops in the hostile territory; the second, authority to employ negroes as laborers; the third, requiring that both in the case of property taken and of negroes employed accounts should be kept with such degree of certainty as would enable compensation to be made in proper cases. Another provided for the colonization of negroes in some tropical country. A good deal of discussion took place upon these points. The first order was universally approved. The second was approved entirely, and the third by all except myself. I doubted the expediency of attempting to keep account for the benefit of the inhabitants of rebel States. The colonization project was not much discussed. The Secretary of War presented some letters from General Hunter, in which he advised the department that the withdrawal of a large proportion of his troops to reinforce General McClellan rendered it highly important that he should be immediately authorized to enlist all loyal persons, without reference to complexion. Messrs. Stanton, Seward, and myself expressed ourselves in favor of this plan, and no one expressed himself against it. (Mr. Blair was not present.) The President was not prepared to decide the question, but expressed himself as averse to arming negroes.¹

This Cabinet discussion came to no final conclusion, and we learn from the same diary that on the following day, Tuesday, July 22, 1862,—which was regular Cabinet day,—the subject was resumed. Further conference was had on organizing negro regiments, but Lincoln decided that the moment had not yet arrived when this policy could be safely entered upon. Writes Chase:

The impression left upon my mind by the whole discussion was, that while the President thought that the organization, equipment, and arming of negroes like other soldiers would be productive of more evil than good, he was not unwilling that commanders should, at their discretion, arm, for purely defensive purposes, slaves coming within their lines.

But on the kindred policy of emancipation the President had reached a decision which appears to have been in advance of the views of his entire Cabinet. Probably greatly to their surprise, he read to them the following draft of a proclamation warning the rebels of the pains and penalties of the Confiscation Act, and while renewing his tender of compensation to loyal States which would adopt gradual abolishment, adding a summary military order, as Commander-in-Chief, declaring free the slaves of all States which might be in rebellion on January 1, 1863. The text of this first draft of the Emancipation Proclamation is here printed for the first time:

this Government shall attend to and perform their appropriate parts towards the execution of these orders.

By order of the President,

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

¹ Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 439.

In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled, "An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes," approved July 17, 1862, and which act and the joint resolution explanatory thereof are herewith published, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion, or any rebellion against the Government of the United States, and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures, as within and by said sixth section provided.

And I hereby make known that it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure for tendering pecuniary aid to the free choice or rejection of any and all States, which may then be recognizing and practically sustaining the authority of the United States, and which may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, gradual abolishment of slavery within such State or States; that the object is to practically restore, thenceforward to be maintained, the constitutional relation between the General Government and each and all the States wherein that relation is now suspended or disturbed; and that for this object the war, as it has been, will be prosecuted. And as a fit and necessary military measure for effecting this object, I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, do order and declare that on the first day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or States wherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not then be practically recognized, submitted to and maintained, shall then, thenceforward, and forever be free.²

Of the Cabinet proceedings which followed the reading of this momentous document we have unfortunately only very brief memoranda. Every member of the council was, we may infer, bewildered by the magnitude and boldness of the proposal. The sudden consideration of this critical question reveals to us with vividness the difference in mental reach, readiness, and decision between the President and his constitutional advisers. Only two of the number gave the measure their unreserved concurrence, even after discussion. It is strange that one of these was the cautious Attorney-General, the representative of the conservative faction of the slaveholding State of Missouri, and that the member who opposed the measure as a whole, and proposed to achieve the result indirectly through the scattered and divided action of local commanders in military departments, was the antislavery Secretary

² The indorsement on the above paper, also in Lincoln's own handwriting, is as follows: "Emancipation proclamation as first sketched and shown to the Cabinet in July, 1862." The diary of Secretary Chase shows the exact date to have been July 22, 1862.

of the Treasury, Mr. Chase, representing perhaps more nearly than any other the abolition of the free State of Ohio. All were astonished, except the two to whom it had been mentioned a week before. None of the others had even considered such a step. But from the mind and will of President Lincoln the determination and announcement to his Cabinet came almost as complete in form and certain in intention on that memorable Tuesday of July as when, two months later, it was given to the public, or as officially proclaimed on the succeeding New Year's Day, an irrevocable executive act.

A fragmentary memorandum in the handwriting of Secretary Stanton shows us distinctly the effect produced upon the assembled council. The manuscript is here reproduced as nearly as the types conveniently permit. The very form of the record shows the Secretary's strong emotion and interest in the discussion:

Tuesday, July 22.

The President proposes to issue an order declaring that, all Slaves in states in rebellion on the _____ day of _____

The Attorney-General and Stanton are for its immediate promulgation.

Seward against it; argues strongly in favor of cotton and foreign governments.

Chase silent.

Welles _____

Seward argues — That foreign nations will intervene to prevent the abolition of slavery for sake of cotton. Argues in a long speech against its immediate promulgation. Wants to wait for troops. Wants Halleck here. Wants drum and fife and public spirit. We break up our relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for sixty years.

Chase — Thinks it a measure of great danger, and would lead to universal emancipation — The measure goes beyond anything I have recommended.

The omissions in this bit of historical manuscript are exceedingly provoking, but some of them are supplied by President Lincoln's own narrative, recorded and published by the artist Carpenter, whose application for permission to paint his historical picture of the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation called it forth:

"It had got to be," said he [Mr. Lincoln], "midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game. I now determined upon the adoption of the emancipation pol-

icy; and without consultation with, or the knowledge of, the Cabinet, I prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, after much anxious thought, called a Cabinet meeting upon the subject. . . . All were present excepting Mr. Blair, the Postmaster-General, who was absent at the opening of the discussion, but came in subsequently. I said to the Cabinet that I had resolved upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice, but to lay the subject-matter of a proclamation before them, suggestions as to which would be in order after they had heard it read. Mr. Lovejoy was in error when he informed you that it excited no comment excepting on the part of Secretary Seward. Various suggestions were offered."¹

At this point we interrupt the President's relation a moment to quote in its proper sequence the exact comment offered by Secretary Chase,² as recorded in his diary:

I [Chase] said that I should give to such a measure my cordial support, but I should prefer that no new expression on the subject of compensation should be made; and I thought that the measure of emancipation could be much better and more quietly accomplished by allowing generals to organize and arm the slaves (thus avoiding depredation and massacre on one hand, and support to the insurrection on the other), and by directing the commanders of departments to proclaim emancipation within their districts as soon as practicable. But I regarded this as so much better than inaction on the subject, that I should give it my entire support.³

The President's narrative continues:

"Mr. Blair, after he came in, deprecated the policy on the ground that it would cost the Administration the fall elections. Nothing, however, was offered that I had not fully anticipated and settled in my own mind until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in substance, 'Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help; the Government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the Government.' His idea," said the President, "was that it would be considered our last *sbriek*, on the retreat. [This was his precise expression.] 'Now,' continued Mr. Seward, 'while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war.'" Mr. Lincoln continued: "The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of State struck me with very great force. It was an aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon the subject, I had entirely overlooked. The

There was nothing in the proposed proclamation of emancipation about arming the blacks. That branch of the discussion, while it occurred at the same time, had exclusive reference to the military order quoted on page 201, also then under consideration.

¹ Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 440.

¹ Carpenter, "Six Months at the White House," pp. 20-23.

² On this point the President is reported as saying: "Secretary Chase wished the language stronger in reference to the arming of the blacks." (Carpenter, "Six Months at the White House," p. 21.) If these were his words, his memory was slightly at fault.

result was that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting for victory."

Instead of the proclamation thus laid away, a short one was issued three days after, simply containing the warning required by the sixth section of the Confiscation Act. The already quoted military order to make seizures under the act had been issued on the day when the

proclamation was discussed and postponed, meanwhile the Government, by its new military arrangements, sending reinforcements to McClellan, organizing a new army under Pope, and calling Halleck from the West to exercise a superior and guiding control over a combined campaign towards Richmond, seemed to have provided the needful requirements for early and substantial success.



Lincoln as a Military Man.*

THE recent publication in *THE CENTURY*, in the Nicolay and Hay history of Abraham Lincoln, of documents, letters, etc. hitherto inaccessible to the public has shown the phenomenal superiority in civil matters of this man of men to his associates and his surroundings. Whether as a publicist, diplomat, statesman, constitutional lawyer, or "politician," he had no equal in those fateful and momentous days from 1861 to 1865.

There are some who estimate his military ability as equal to his civil. My own reading of and acquaintance with the war of the Rebellion led me to entertain this opinion some years since, albeit my judgment in such matters is not entitled to weight enough to warrant its publication.

But of all war-students none was so well qualified to speak with authority on this point as the late Colonel Robert N. Scott. His intimate personal acquaintance with the prominent actors in that war, his varied personal experience of military service, and, above all, his relation to and familiarity with the "Rebellion Records," gave him the right to speak with authority.

Having to call upon him some years since at his "War Records" office, the business in hand led naturally to some discussion of the leaders of the army. Colonel Scott showed me letters, tables, and documents, then unpublished, that led him to certain conclusions in respect to certain men. Then looking up, he said, with enthusiasm and vehemence, "I tell you, M., the biggest military man we had was Abraham Lincoln." He disclaimed for him, of course, knowledge of military technique; but, in respect to what should and what should not be done, and when and where, he said Lincoln "was more uniformly right and less frequently wrong than any man we had."

WASHINGTON, D. C.

R. D. M.

O could I feel as I have felt, or be what I have been,
Or weep as I could once have wept o'er many a vanished scene,—
As spring, in deserts found, seem sweet, all brackish though they
be,
So midst the withered waste of life, those tears would flow to me.

James Herbert Morse.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR

General Buell attempts to show a "sudden change" on the part of General Mitchel "from easy assurance to anxious uncertainty." In speaking of Mitchel's report to the Secretary of War of the capture of Bridgeport, Buell quotes:

"This campaign is ended, and I can now occupy Huntsville in perfect security, while all of Alabama north of the Tennessee floats no flag but that of the Union." Stanton [continues Buell] answered his glowing dispatches naturally, "Your spirited operations afford great satisfaction to the President." Three days after Mitchel's dispatch as quoted, he telegraphed Stanton, May 4, in explanation of some unexpected developments of the enemy, and says: "I shall soon have watchful guards among the slaves on the plantations from Bridgeport to Florence, and all who communicate to me valuable information I have promised the protection of my Government. Should my course in this particular be disapproved, it would be impossible for me to hold my position. I must abandon the line of railway, and northern Alabama falls back into the hands of the enemy. No reinforcements have been sent to me, and I am promised none except a regiment of cavalry and a company of scouts, neither of which have reached me. I should esteem it a great military and political misfortune to be compelled to yield up one inch of the territory we have conquered." And again the same day: "I have promised protection to the slaves who have given me valuable assistance and information. If the Government disapproves of what I have done, I must receive heavy reinforcements or abandon my position."

General Buell stops, in quoting, at the pith of Mitchel's dispatch. After the word "position" the dispatch ends: "*With the aid of the negroes in watching the river, I feel myself sufficiently strong to defy the enemy.*"

1 New York: The Century Co.

If nothing more, it is necessary that the discipline of your command shall be vindicated. You will therefore cause the negroes, if still in your camp, to be arrested and held until 12 o'clock to-morrow. If in that time the owners or their agents shall call for them, they will be allowed to take them away, and, if necessary, will be protected from harm or molestation. If they do not call for them, you will release and expel the negroes from your camp, and in future no fugitive slaves will be allowed to enter or remain in your lines.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF EMANCIPATION.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

IN order to understand the unfortunate consequence of the long delay of McClellan in moving his army from the James to the Potomac, a few words of retrospect are here necessary. On June 26, 1862, General John Pope was appointed to the command of the Army of Virginia, consisting of the corps of Frémont, Banks, and McDowell. Frémont, having refused to serve under his junior, was relieved of his command, and his place taken by General Franz Sigel. McDowell and Banks, who might with much more reason have objected to the arrangement, accepted it with soldierly and patriotic promptness. General Pope, though still a young man, was a veteran soldier. He was a graduate of the class of 1842 at West Point, had served with distinction in the Mexican War, and had had a great success in the capture of Island No. 10 in the Mississippi River in the spring of 1862. He had made a very favorable impression, not only upon the President but upon most members of the Cabinet. He remained in Washington for several weeks after having been assigned to his new command, awaiting the arrival of General Halleck, the new General-in-Chief, and only left there to put himself at the head of his troops on the 29th of July.

In the latter part of June the President, being deeply anxious in regard to the military situation, and desiring to obtain the best advice in his power, had made as privately as possible a visit to General Scott in his retirement to ask his counsel. The only record of this visit is a memorandum from Scott approving the President's own plan of sending McDowell's command to reënforce McClellan before Richmond, a plan the execution of which was prevented by Lee's attack. It is probable that at this same interview the appointment of Halleck as General-in-Chief was again suggested by General Scott. Secretary Chase says in his diary that so far as he knew no member of the Cabinet was consulted in regard to it.² The appointment when made

was received with general approval. Halleck was not McClellan, which was sufficient for the more vehement opponents of that general; and he was not a Republican, which pleased the other party. In fact he shocked the Secretary of the Treasury by saying at the first Cabinet meeting he attended, "I confess I do not think much of the negro." If Halleck never fulfilled the high expectations at first entertained of him, he at least discharged the duties of his great office with intelligence and fidelity. His integrity and his ability were alike undoubted. His deficiencies were rather those of temperament. In great crises he lacked determination and self-confidence, and was always more ready to avoid than to assume embarrassing responsibility.

General Halleck had arrived from the West, had taken command of all the armies of the Republic on July 23, and started at once on a visit to the Army of the Potomac. After his return from the James the question of McClellan's removal from command of the Army of the Potomac was much discussed in Administration circles. The President himself was averse to it. Secretary Chase was the most prominent member of the Government in its favor. He urged it strongly upon General Halleck, thinking it necessary to the revival of the credit of the country. Halleck agreed with him in condemning McClellan's military operations, but thought that "under his orders" McClellan "would do very well." Pope, in conversation with the Secretary of the Treasury, said he had warned the President that he could not safely command the Army of Virginia if its success was to depend on the co-operation of McClellan, for he felt assured that his coöperation would fail at some time when it would be most important. But the resolution was taken, upon Halleck's report, to withdraw McClellan with his army. On the 30th, as we have seen, McClellan was ordered to send away his sick. On the 3d of August he was directed to move his army to Aquia Creek. Reiterated orders, entreaties, arguments, and reproaches were all powerless to hasten his

² Secretary Welles says Scott, Stanton, and Pope favored Halleck's appointment.— *Lincoln and Seeward*.

movements or to bring him to the Potomac in less than three weeks. His first troops, Reynolds's division, joined the Army of Virginia on the 23d of August.

In the mean time Pope had begun his campaign with an error of taste more serious than any error of conduct he ever committed. He had issued an address to his army containing a few expressions which had made almost all the officers of the Army of the Potomac his enemies.¹

This address, which had no other purpose than to encourage and inspire his men, was received, to Pope's amazement, with a storm of angry ridicule which lasted as long as he remained in command of the Army of Virginia, and very seriously weakened his hold upon the confidence of his troops and the respect of the public. As a matter of course it rendered impossible any sincere sympathy and support from General McClellan and those nearest to him. It may even be doubted whether there had been from the beginning any probability of a good understanding between them. From the moment Pope arrived from the West he was regarded with jealousy by the friends of McClellan as a certain rival and possible successor.

In the last days of June, when McClellan made his first intimation of a change of base, Pope had suggested, and the President had conveyed his suggestion to McClellan, that it would be better for the latter, if forced to leave the line of the Chickahominy, to fall back on the Pamunkey. The source from which the suggestion came was sufficient to insure its rejection if there had been no other reason. Pope had taken great pains to establish friendly relations with McClellan, writing him, as soon as he assumed command, a long and cordial letter giving him a full account of his situation and intentions, and inviting his confidence and sympathy in return. McClellan answered a few days later in a briefer letter, in which he clearly foreshadowed an intention to resist the withdrawal of his army from its present position. Handicapped by this lack of cordial sympathy for him in the Army of the Potomac, Pope left Washington on the 29th of July to begin his work, the first object of which was to make a demonstration in the direction of Gordonsville to assist in the withdrawal of

McClellan's army from the James. In pursuance of this intention Generals Banks and Sigel were ordered to move to Culpeper Court House. Banks promptly obeyed his orders, arriving there shortly before midnight on the 8th of August. Sigel, from some mistake as to the road, did not get there until the evening of the next day. By that time Banks had gone forward to Cedar Mountain, and at that point with a force of less than 8000 men of all arms, he attacked the army corps of Stonewall Jackson, consisting of Ewell's, Hill's, and Jackson's divisions, with such vigor and impetuosity that he came near defeating them. He inflicted such a blow upon Jackson as to give him an exaggerated idea of his numbers; and hearing two days afterwards that Banks had been reinforced, Jackson thought best to retire to the Rapidan.

By this time General Lee, having become convinced that McClellan was about to leave the Peninsula, concluded to concentrate a large force upon Pope's advance, to attack and if possible to destroy it. On the 13th of August General Longstreet was ordered to the Rapidan with the divisions of Longstreet and Jackson, and Stuart's cavalry corps. General Lee disposed of an army of about 55,000 men. Pope, finding himself so greatly outnumbered, wisely retreated behind the Rappahannock, where he established himself without loss on the 20th of August.

Thus far Pope had made no mistake. He had succeeded in checking the advance of Jackson, in withdrawing such a force of the enemy from Richmond as to leave McClellan's retreat unmolested, and had established his army in good condition on the north bank of the Rappahannock. Under orders from General Halleck he held the line of this river for eight days, repulsing several attempts of the enemy to cross, in hope, as the General-in-Chief said, "that during this time sufficient force from the Army of the Potomac would reach Aquia Creek to enable us to prevent any further advance of Lee, and eventually, with the combined armies, to drive him back upon Richmond."² Baffled in his repeated attempts to cross the Rappahannock in front of Pope's position, General Lee resolved upon a flank movement to the left and intrusted it to Stone-

1 . . . I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when found—whose policy has been attack, and not defense. . . . I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy; and it is my purpose to do so, and that speedily . . . I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions, and holding them;

of lines of retreat, and of bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position that a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance; disaster and shame lurk in the rear. . . . [Pope's address "To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia," July 14, 1862.]

² Halleck, Report of Nov. 25, 1862. War Records.

Wall Jackson. The latter executed the task with amazing audacity and swiftness, marching round the left and rear of the Union army through the villages of Amissville, Orlean, and Salem, pouring his forces through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains and striking Pope's line of communication and a valuable depot of supplies at Manassas Junction. Jackson retired from this place and took up his position in the morning of the 28th of August just north of the Warrenton Turnpike, near the old battlefield of Bull Run. Longstreet's corps was so far behind Jackson that a rapid change of front and concentration of all the troops at Pope's and Halleck's disposal ought to have destroyed Jackson, isolated as he was from the rest of Lee's army. But his position was not ascertained as soon as it should have been. Owing to causes which have led to infinite controversy, the Union forces were not brought together with the energy and celerity required, and therefore it came about that in the morning of August 29 Pope's main army confronted Jackson on the Warrenton Pike at Groveton; Porter was some three miles on the left near the Manassas Gap Railroad, and Longstreet was on the march from Thoroughfare Gap to effect his junction with Jackson's right. There was still an opportunity to win a great victory.

General Fitz John Porter, when at Warrenton Junction on the evening of the 27th of August, had received an order from General Pope to march at 1 A. M. to Bristoe Station; but, in the exercise of his own discretion, he did not march until dawn. This delay, however, had as yet no specially disastrous results, and would probably never have been brought into such prominence as it afterwards assumed had it not been for the light which it was supposed to cast upon subsequent events. Porter was, however, in his place on the morning of the 29th, with his splendid corps in fighting trim some distance from General Pope's left and a little in rear of his line of battle. He had been ordered to Centreville the night before, but his orders had been changed, early in the morning, to proceed to Gainesville instead. No time had been lost by this change, as his new order found him, on his march, at Manassas Junction, whence he pushed out his column on the Gainesville road to a little stream called Dawkins Branch, where he halted.

About 9 o'clock General Pope issued to McDowell and Porter a joint order¹ directing them to move their commands towards Gainesville, and to establish communication between themselves and the main body on the Warrenton Turnpike. General McDowell relates in his testimony before the general court-martial of Fitz John Porter that he met General Porter

near the little stream just mentioned, about five miles from Manassas Junction and three miles from Gainesville. They had some conversation in regard to the joint order, and McDowell communicated to Porter a dispatch he had just received from General Buford, to the effect that a considerable body of Confederate troops was approaching from the direction of Gainesville. Concluding from this and other circumstances that there was immediate need of the presence of one of them on the left flank of the main body of the Union army then engaged with the enemy at Groveton, McDowell resolved to take his troops in that direction. On leaving General Porter he said to him, "You put your force in here and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road on the left of the troops engaged at that point." McDowell reached Pope about 5 P. M. and reported to him with King's division, commanded by Hatch, as King was suffering from a severe illness.

The battle which had raged all day between Pope's and Jackson's armies was ebbing to its close, neither side having gained any decided advantage. McDowell's men were put in at the left of the line for the last sharp hour of fighting; they lost heavily, but fought with the greatest gallantry. They finally retired in good order, leaving one gun in the hands of the enemy, which had "continued to fire," says the Confederate Colonel Law, "until my men were so near it as to have their faces burnt by its discharges." At 4:30 Pope, who had waited all day for Porter's flanking attack upon Jackson's right and rear, sent Porter a peremptory order directing him to push forward into action, keeping his right in communication with Pope's left.

There is much discussion whether this order was delivered at 5 or 6 o'clock. Captain Douglas Pope, who bore it, says it was delivered at the earlier hour; General Porter claims that it was an hour later; but, at all events, Porter, who had found indications of a strong force in his front, waited in position till it grew dark and then retired in the direction of Manassas Junction. That night General Pope in deep exasperation sent an order to Porter, couched in harsh and peremptory terms, directing him to report in person with his command on the field for orders. Early next morning, August 30, Porter reported with all of his command but one brigade; and on this day one of the most sanguinary conflicts of the war, the second battle of Bull Run, was fought. It was a battle which General Pope was under no necessity of fighting. He might easily have retired behind Bull Run and waited until Franklin's corps, which had been moving from Alexandria with inexplicable slowness, had joined him and replenished his supplies. But the reports of a retreat by the enemy, the

¹ War Records.

admirable fighting qualities of his troops displayed on the 29th before his eyes, and the fact that on the 30th he had Porter's magnificent corps under his immediate orders, and more than all perhaps the temperament of the man, who was always ready to fight when there was a fair chance for him, determined him to stay where he was and to risk a new battle on that historic field. He made a mistake in supposing that the principal force against him was north of the Warrenton Turnpike. He placed, therefore, the bulk of his own army on that side and attacked with great energy early in the afternoon. Porter's corps fought with its old-time bravery; but his troops having come within the range of the enfilading fire of Longstreet's guns, the attack failed on the left. Later, Longstreet advanced on the Confederate right. A furious struggle took place for the position of Bald Hill, west of the Sudley Springs road; and later Sykes's regulars, successfully defending into the night the Henry House Hill from the assault of the Confederates, covered the retreat of the Union army across the Stone bridge to Centreville. On both sides it was one of the hardest fought battles of the war.

The day after the battle General Lee made no attempt to pursue or molest Pope's army; but on the evening of the 1st of September he essayed his usual flanking experiment with Jackson's corps upon the Union right wing at Chantilly. Pope had foreseen this, and prepared for it, and a very severe action took place, beginning at sunset and terminating in the darkness, in the midst of a furious thunder-storm. Jackson had gone too fast and too far. He was readily repulsed, but the Union army met with a heavy loss in the death of Generals Philip Kearny and Isaac I. Stevens. There were few men in the service more able, industrious, modest, and faithful than Stevens; and Kearny was an ideal soldier — brave, cool, patient, and loyal.

On the morning of the 1st, Pope, who seemed far more dispirited and discouraged by the evident hostility towards him existing among

the officers of the Army of the Potomac than by any of his losses in battle, had telegraphed to General Halleck his opinion that the army should be withdrawn to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and in that secure place reorganized and rearranged. "When there is no heart in their leaders," he says, "and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the men."¹ These orders were given the next day, and the army was brought back without molestation.

General Pope attributed the failure of this campaign to General Porter's inaction and his disobedience of orders upon the 27th and 29th, and in this opinion many officers of the highest rank and integrity agreed. The general court-martial by which the charges were considered found General Porter guilty and sentenced him to be cashiered. He, assured of his own integrity, persistently protested against the injustice of this sentence and sought in every possible way to have it reversed.² It became in a certain sense a political question; and when, a quarter of a century later, the Democratic party had gained control of the House of Representatives and the Presidency, General Porter was restored to his former position in the army. With all the testimony adduced, it is probable that Porter would not have been convicted had it not been for his own letters written during the progress of the campaign. These show a spirit of contempt and scorn for his superior officer which go far to explain his behavior on this occasion.³ It was these letters which furnished the theory of the prosecution of Porter: that he sincerely felt the good of the army and of the country required that Pope should be deposed from the command for which he honestly believed him unfit, and that McClellan should have his old army back again. His magnificent courage and conduct on other fields have a tendency to blind the eyes of just criticism in this matter; but there seems no resemblance between this languid soldier of the 29th of August and that son of thunder who at Beaver Dam and Gaines's Mill withstood the

¹ War Records.

² A board of three general officers appointed by President Hayes to reëxamine the case acquitted General Porter of all blame except for indiscreet and unkind criticism of his superior officer. A bill was passed by Congress restoring him to the army, but it was vetoed by President Arthur, who, however, removed Porter's continuing disabilities by an Executive order. After the accession of President Cleveland the bill was once more passed and this time approved by the President, and General Porter was restored to his place in the army and honorably retired.

³ In a letter of August 27th to Burnside from Warrenton Junction he says: "I find a vast difference between these troops and ours. . . . I hear that they are much demoralized, and need some good troops to give heart and, I think, head. We are working now to get behind Bull Run, and I presume will be there in a

few days if strategy does not use us up. The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in an inverse proportion. . . . I would like to be ordered to return to Fredericksburg. . . . I do not doubt the enemy have a large amount of supplies provided for them, and believe they have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from it with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our companions. . . . If you can get me away, please do so." Later he indulges in a pardonable pleasantry at the expense of his commander's magniloquent address to his troops: "Our line of communication is taking care of itself, in compliance with orders." On the morning of the 29th he wrote: "I hope Mac is at work and we shall soon be ordered out of this. It would seem, from proper statements of the enemy, that he was wandering round loose; but I expect they know what they are doing, which is more than any one here or anywhere knows."

onset of Lee and his army from noon to night of a long summer's day, with the same men and guns who were idling in the shade that afternoon by Dawkins Branch. What he gallantly and gladly did for the glory and honor of a commander he loved and admired he was incapable of doing when the glory and honor was to inure to the benefit of a commander whom he hated and despised.

General Pope regarded the inefficiency of McClellan in forwarding reinforcements to him from Alexandria as another important factor in his failure. He says in his report that Reynolds's division, which joined him on the 23d of August at Rappahannock station, and the corps of Heintzelman and Porter, about 18,000 between them, which arrived on the 26th and 27th at Warrenton Junction, were "all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's Landing which ever drew trigger under my command." Franklin and Sumner with 20,000 effectives reported to him at Centreville too late to redeem the campaign. It is a fact not without significance that the last troops which joined him before the hard fighting began did so before McClellan took charge at Alexandria. General Sumner, that brave old warrior who considered it a personal injury to be kept from any battlefield within his reach, broke out in hot anger when he learned that McClellan had said his corps was not in a condition for fighting. "If I had been ordered to advance right on," he said afterwards,¹ "from Alexandria by the Little River Turnpike, I should have been in that Second Bull Run battle with my whole force." He was made to waste forty-eight hours in camp and in a fruitless march to the Aqueduct bridge.

In the matter of Franklin's corps the correspondence of General McClellan himself furnishes the most undeniable evidence that he did not think best to hurry matters in reinforcing Pope. Halleck on the 27th had telegraphed him the probability of a general battle. "Franklin's corps," he said, "should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions." This order was repeated later in the day in more urgent terms, that "Franklin's corps should move in the direction of Manassas as soon as possible." McClellan answered, not that Franklin had started, but that he had sent orders to him to "prepare to march." He afterwards discovered that Franklin was in Washington, and gave orders to place the corps in "readiness to move." In the afternoon he sent dispatches indicating his belief that it might be better for Franklin not to go, and questioning whether

Washington was safe; and in the evening of the same day this conviction had gained such strength in his mind that he squarely recommended that the troops in hand be held for the defense of the capital. On the morning of the 28th Halleck telegraphed direct an order to Franklin to move towards Manassas, but at 1 o'clock in the afternoon General McClellan replied, "The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery, he shall go." At 4:10 o'clock he added: "General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in a condition to move; may be by to-morrow morning." Halleck, in despair at this inertia, had telegraphed at 3:30 o'clock: "Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is reinforced." To this, after the lapse of an hour, McClellan answered:

Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin or Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them now. . . .

At night General Halleck, with vehement earnestness, ordered —

There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps towards Manassas. They must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long, there will be no necessity to go at all; for Pope will either be defeated or be victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief.

At last McClellan answered that he had ordered Franklin to march at 6 in the morning of the 29th. He then enumerated the force he had in hand, amounting to about thirty thousand men, and added, with a naïveté which in view of Halleck's urgent telegrams for two days would be comical if the consequences had not been so serious, "If you wish any of them to move towards Manassas, please inform me."

On the 29th of August he got Franklin started, but still protested against the order to move him, and continually through the day sent dispatches suggesting that Franklin should go no farther, until at last Halleck, even his excessive patience giving way, replied at 3 o'clock, "I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. . . . I am tired of guesses." At a quarter before 3 in the afternoon of the 29th, General McClellan sent the following extraordinary dispatch to Mr. Lincoln, which to do him justice must be given entire:

The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring

¹ Sumner's testimony. Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

towards Thoroughfare Gap. This by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: first, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe.

No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.

There can be no mistaking the transparent menace of this dispatch. Of the alternatives he suggested, he meant but one. By his protests of the last three days, as well as by his actions, he had clearly shown his disinclination to attempt to open communication with Pope. There is but one course, therefore, left which commends itself to his judgment; that is, to leave the Army of Virginia to its fate. This dispatch was sent directly to the President in answer to a request from him for news, and the President replied, one must confess, with more of magnanimity than of dignity:

I think your first alternative, "to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope," is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels.

During the two entire days, the 29th and 30th, while Pope was engaged in his desperate struggle at Bull Run with the whole of Lee's army, the singular interchange of telegrams between Halleck and McClellan continued — the one giving orders growing more and more peremptory every hour, and the other giving excuses more or less unsatisfactory for not obeying them. But late at night of the 31st of August, when the fighting was virtually over, General Halleck, upon whom the fatigue and excitement of the past week had had a most depressing effect, suddenly betrayed that weakness of character which so often surprised his friends, and sent to McClellan a dispatch breathing discouragement in every word, in which, saying that he was "utterly tired out," he begged McClellan "to assist him in this crisis with his ability and experience." To this General McClellan replied with unusual promptness a few minutes after receiving it, asking for an interview to settle his position. In a letter an hour later he gave his decided opinion that Pope had been totally defeated and that everything available should be drawn in at once: he thinks such orders should be sent immediately; he has no confidence in Pope's dispositions; "to speak frankly," he says,—"and the occasion requires it,—there appears to be a total absence of brains, and

I fear a total destruction of the army." He falls back again into his sententious strain:

The occasion is grave and demands grave measures. The question is the salvation of the country. . . . It is my deliberate opinion that the interests of the nation demand that Pope shall fall back to-night if possible, and not one moment is to be lost.

The same advice was repeated by Pope the next morning, and Halleck at once gave the necessary orders. On September 1, General McClellan visited Washington and conversed with Halleck and the President. Mr. Lincoln had been greatly distressed and shocked by the account Pope had given of the demoralization of the Army of the Potomac, which in his opinion proceeded from the spirit of hostility and insubordination displayed openly by some of its most prominent officers. He requested McClellan to use his great personal influence with his immediate friends in that army to correct this evil. McClellan, while not crediting the report of Pope, nevertheless complied with the request of the President, and sent a letter to Porter urging him and all his friends, for his sake, to extend to General Pope the same support they had always given him, to which Porter replied in loyal and soldierly terms. On the next day (September 2), Mr. Lincoln placed the defenses of Washington and the command of the troops as they arrived from the front in the hands of General McClellan. There is no other official act of his life for which he has been more severely criticised, but we need not go far to find a motive for it.

The restoration of McClellan to command was Mr. Lincoln's own act. The majority of the Cabinet were strongly opposed to it. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Treasury agreed, upon the 29th of August, in a remonstrance against McClellan's continuance in command of any army of the Union. They reduced it to writing; it was signed by themselves and the Attorney-General, and afterwards by the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary of the Navy concurred in the judgment of his colleagues, but declined to sign it, on the ground that it might seem unfriendly to the President. In the Cabinet meeting of the 2d of September the whole subject was freely discussed. The Secretary of War disclaimed any responsibility for the action taken, saying that the order to McClellan was given him directly by the President and that General Halleck considered himself relieved from responsibility by it, although he acquiesced and approved the order. He thought that McClellan was now in a position where he could shirk all responsibility, shielding himself under Halleck, while Halleck would shield himself under the President. Mr. Lincoln took a dif-

ferent view of the transaction, saying that he considered General Halleck as much in command of the army as ever, and that General McClellan had been charged with special functions, to command the troops for the defense of Washington, and that he placed him there because he could see no one who could do so well the work required.¹ The Secretary of the Treasury in recording this proceeding does not disguise his scorn for the lack of spirit displayed by the President, and on a later date he adds:

It is indeed humiliating, but prompted I believe by a sincere desire to serve the country, and a fear that should he supersede McClellan by any other commander no advantage would be gained in leadership, but much harm in the disaffection of officers and troops.

Mr. Lincoln certainly had the defects of his great qualities. His unbounded magnanimity made him incapable sometimes even of just resentments. In regard to offenses committed against himself he used laughingly to say, "I am in favor of short statutes of limitations." General McClellan's worst offenses had been committed against the President in person. The insulting dispatch from Savage's Station and the letter from Harrison's Landing, in which he took the President to task for the whole course of his civil and military administration, would probably have been pardoned by no other ruler that ever lived; yet Mr. Lincoln never appeared to bear the slightest ill-will to the general on account of these affronts. He did feel deeply the conduct of McClellan towards Pope. He was outraged at McClellan's suggestion to leave Pope to his fate. He said to one of his household on the 30th of August, "He has acted badly towards Pope; he really wanted him to fail";² and after he had placed him again in command of the Army of the Potomac he repeated this severe judgment, but he added, "There is no one in the army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he can." Again he said, "We must use the tools we have; if he cannot fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight." In the interests of the country he condoned the offenses against Pope as readily as those against himself.

It may perhaps even be said that McClellan, so far from suffering at the President's hands for his unbecoming conduct towards him, gained a positive advantage by it. It was not alone for his undoubted talents as an organizer and drill-master that he was restored to his command. It was a time of gloom and doubt in the political as well as in the military situa-

tion. The factious spirit was stronger among the politicians and the press of the Democratic party than at any other time during the war. Not only in the States of the border, but in many Northern States, there were signs of sullen discontent among a large body of the people that could not escape the notice of a statesman so vigilant as Lincoln. It was of the greatest importance, not only in the interest of recruiting, but also in the interest of that wider support which a popular government requires from the general body of its citizens, that causes of offense against any large portion of the community should be sedulously avoided by those in power. General McClellan had made himself, by his demonstration against the President's policy, the leader of the Democratic party. Mr. Lincoln, for these reasons, was especially anxious to take no action against McClellan which might seem to be dictated by personal jealousy or pique; and besides, as General Pope had himself reported, there was a personal devotion to McClellan among those in high command in the Army of the Potomac which rendered it almost impossible for any other general to get its best work out of it. General Hitchcock, one of the most accomplished officers of the old army, gave this as the reason for his declining the command of that army.

It is difficult to regard without indignation the treatment, however necessary and justifiable, which the principal actors in this great transaction received. McClellan, whose conduct from beginning to end can only be condemned, received command of a great army, reorganized and reinforced, and with it a chance for magnificent achievement, if he had been able to improve it, which no officer before or since ever enjoyed on this continent. Pope, who had fought with the greatest bravery and perseverance a losing battle against Lee's entire army all the way from the Rappahannock to the Potomac, encouraged at every point with the hope of reinforcements which only reached him too late, and finally by his misfortunes adding a new illustration to the prestige of his rival and enemy, received simply the compliments and congratulations of his superiors and was then removed to a distant department of the frontier, to take no further part in the stirring scenes of a war in which he was so well qualified to bear an honorable part. McDowell, a perfect soldier, among the bravest, ablest, and most loyal officers of the army, who had done his whole duty and much more, who zealously went before and beyond the orders of his superiors, always seeking the post of utmost danger and toil, was found at the close of this campaign, of which he was the true hero, with his reputa-

¹ Chase's Diary. Warden, p. 456 et seq.

² J. H., Diary.

tion so smirched and tarnished by senseless and malignant calumny that he was never after during the war considered available for those high and important employments for which he was better equipped than almost any of his comrades. A court of inquiry, it is true, vindicated him completely from every charge that malice or ignorance had invented against him: but the two disasters of Bull Run, in successive summers, for neither of which he was to blame, remained in the general mind inseparably connected with his name.

General McClellan himself never appreciated the magnanimity with which he had been treated. In fact, he thought the magnanimity was all upon his side. As time wore on he continually exaggerated in his own mind the services he had rendered and the needs of the Government at the time he had been placed in command, until he created for himself the fantastic delusion that he had saved the Administration from despair! In the last lines he ever wrote, shortly before his death, he gives this absolutely new and most remarkable account of the visit which Lincoln and Halleck made to him on the 2d of September:

He [the President] then said that he regarded Washington as lost, and asked me if I would, under the circumstances, as a favor to him, resume command and do the best that could be done. Without one moment's hesitation, and without making any conditions whatever, I at once said that I would accept the command and would stake my life that I would save the city. Both the President and Halleck again asserted that it was impossible to save the city, and I repeated my firm conviction that I could and would save it. They then left, the President verbally placing me in entire command of the city and of the troops falling back upon it from the front.¹

It is possible that in the lapse of twenty years General McClellan's memory had become so distorted by constant dwelling upon imagined wrongs that he was at last capable of believing this absurd fiction. It was a fancy adopted in the last years of his life. A year after his removal from command he wrote a voluminous report of his entire military history, filling an octavo volume. He was then the acknowledged favorite of the Democratic party, the predestined candidate for the Presidency in opposition to Lincoln. He embodied in that report every incident or argument he could think of to justify his own conduct and to condemn that of the Government. Yet in this interminable document there is no hint that Lincoln or Halleck thought the capital was lost. He apparently never dreamed of such a thing while Lincoln lived; he gave no

intimation of such a charge while Halleck survived, although their relations were frankly hostile. Only after both these witnesses had passed away, and a direct contradiction was thus rendered impossible, did it occur to him to report this conversation between his patriotic heroism and their craven despair!

There is another proof that this story was an after-thought. In a letter to his family, written on the 2d, the very morning of this pretended conversation, he merely says:

I was surprised this morning, when at breakfast, by a visit from the President and Halleck, in which the former expressed the opinion that the troubles now impending could be overcome better by me than by any one else. Pope is ordered to fall back upon Washington, and as he reënters everything is to come under my command again.

When we consider that in these private letters he never omits an opportunity for heroic posturing, it is impossible to believe that if Lincoln and Halleck an hour or two before had been imploring him to save the capital, he would not have mentioned it. The truth is, McClellan himself has left evidence of the fact that he thought Washington in danger. He wrote to his wife:

I do not regard Washington as safe against the rebels. If I can quietly slip over there I will send your silver off.

If it was worth while to cumber these pages with the refutation of a calumny so transparently false, we could bring the testimony of a score of witnesses to show that Mr. Lincoln, during the first days of September, was unusually cool and determined. Grieved and disappointed as he was at the failure of Pope's campaign, his principal preoccupation was not at any time the safety of Washington. It was that Lee's army, as he frequently expressed it, "should not get away without being hurt." On Monday morning he said: "They must be whipped here and now. Pope must fight them; and if they are too strong for him, he can gradually get back to these fortifications." At the time McClellan falsely represents him as hopeless of saving Washington he had no thought of the safety of that place in his mind, except as a secondary and permanent consideration. He was making ready a force to attack the enemy. On the 3d of September he wrote with his own hand this order, which sufficiently shows the mood he was in:

Ordered, that the General-in-Chief, Major-General Halleck, immediately commence and proceed with all possible dispatch to organize an army for active operations from all the material within and coming within his control, independent of the forces he may deem necessary for the defense of Washington, when such active army shall take the field.

¹ THE CENTURY, May, 1886. "McClellan's Own Story," p. 535.

This order, countersigned by the Secretary of War, was delivered to Halleck by General Townsend, and the work of preparing the army for the offensive was at once begun. McClellan, under Halleck's direction, went heartily to work to execute these orders of the President. He had none of the protecting airs he gives himself in his memoirs; his conduct was exemplary. "McClellan," said Lincoln on the 5th, "is working like a beaver. He seems to be aroused to doing something by the sort of snubbing he got last week." The work he was now engaged upon was congenial staff work, and he performed it with great zeal and efficiency. It suited him in after years to pretend that he was acting without orders and without communication with the Government. It was his favorite phrase that he went to Antietam with a "halter about his neck." But his letters written at the time contradict those assertions. He wrote from Washington, on the 7th of September:

I leave here this afternoon to take command of the troops in the field. The feeling of the Government towards me, I am sure, is kind and trusting.

ANTIETAM.

As soon as General McClellan was replaced in command of the Army of the Potomac he began to put the forces in order; and the ease and rapidity with which this was accomplished show that both he and General Pope, with very different intentions, had equally exaggerated the state of their demoralization. The troops were not in so bad a condition at Centreville as Pope imagined, and the army that Mr. Lincoln handed over to McClellan at Washington was both in numbers and morale a formidable host. Its morning returns show an aggregate of over 100,000 men, and General McClellan himself reports that he had at Antietam 87,000. But the vast discrepancy between the force on paper and the effectives in battle gives a margin of which writers sometimes avail themselves according to their prejudices or prepossessions. General Palfrey, who took part in the campaign and who has since examined the reports on both sides with scrupulous care, says that in this single instance McClellan overstated the number of his troops in action, and that 70,000 would be nearer the mark. It is true he could afford it, as in the same estimate he very nearly doubled the number of the enemy. The Confederate rosters show some forty-five brigades of infantry, exclusive of cavalry and artillery. Lee says in his report that he commanded at Antietam about 40,000 troops.¹

McClellan's time for training and drilling

¹ War Records.

his recovered army was brief; for within a few days the news came that Lee had crossed the Potomac into Maryland. There was no time now for indecision, and Lincoln's stern and constantly repeated injunction, "You must find and hurt this enemy now," had to be obeyed.

General Lee has given in his own report a sufficiently clear statement of what he hoped to accomplish by his invasion of Maryland. The supplies of rich and productive districts were thus made accessible to his army, and he wished to "prolong this state of affairs in every way desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pass without endeavoring to inflict further injury upon the enemy." He also makes an acknowledgment which shows that he, in common with others at Richmond, had been grossly deceived by the accounts which rebel refugees from Maryland, and their sympathizing correspondents at home, had given of the oppressive tyranny of Lincoln, and the resentment it had caused in that commonwealth. He says:

The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide against contingencies which its course towards the people of that State had given it reason to apprehend. At the same time it was hoped that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberties. The difficulties that surrounded them were fully appreciated, and we expected to derive more assistance in the attainment of our object from the just fears of the Washington Government than from active demonstration on the part of the people, unless success should enable us to give them assurance of continued protection.

In a hasty note he informed the Richmond Government of his purpose, and took the initial steps to execute it with great promptness. He crossed his entire army between the 4th and 7th of September near Leesburg, and camped in the vicinity of Frederick. He took it for granted that our force at Harper's Ferry would be at once withdrawn; thereafter he intended to move the army into western Maryland, establish his communications with Richmond through the Shenandoah Valley, and then to move into Pennsylvania and draw McClellan from his base to fight in a field of his own selection. If all his surmises had been correct, if Miles had been withdrawn from Harper's Ferry, if Maryland had risen in revolt, if McClellan had allowed him to range through western Maryland at his leisure, the plan would have been an admirable one and the results of it most fruitful; but all these expectations failed. After two days at Frederick he found that Maryland was contented

with the oppressor's yoke, and that Miles remained at Harper's Ferry. He therefore considered it necessary to detach a large portion of his force under Jackson, McLaws, and Walker to surround and capture the garrison at that place: the rest of the army withdrew from Frederick to Boonsboro'.

Meantime McClellan was slowly approaching. He felt, of course, the need of more troops. With an army about him so enormous that, as he says in his report,¹ it would occupy fifty miles of road in marching order, he still paused on the 11th to write to General Halleck, begging for reënforcements. He first assures him that the capital is in no danger and that all the troops there may safely be sent to him; but in order to guard against any possible rejoinder he adds, "Even if Washington should be taken while these armies are confronting each other this would not, in my judgment, bear comparison with the ruin and disaster which would follow the defeat of this army," an opinion which has no especial value except as showing what General McClellan's judgment was worth in such a matter. Except when he was in Washington, he always regarded its possible capture as a trifling affair. But his demand was complied with: Porter's corps was ordered to join him, with a kind message from the President, which he acknowledged courteously, and then — asked for Keyes's corps! He was in no haste; he ordered his officers beforehand to avoid collisions. He attempts in his report to account for his tardy marching on the ground that the authorities at Washington wished him not to go too far from the capital. General Halleck says that no order capable of bearing this construction was ever given. He says:

I telegraphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac. . . . I thought he should keep more upon the Potomac and press forward his left rather than his right, so as more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry, which was the point then in most danger.²

But two days after the above-mentioned letter asking for reënforcements, McClellan received information which was enough to put a soul of enterprise into the veriest laggard that ever breathed. There never was a gen-

¹ McClellan, "Army of the Potomac," p. 188.

² Halleck's testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War.

³ Palfrey, "The Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 20 et seq.

⁴ He telegraphed to the President: "I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but am confident, and no time shall be lost. . . . I think Lee has made a gross mistake, and that he will be severely punished for it. . . . I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency." [War Records.]

⁵ If he had thrown forward his army with the vigor

eral so fruitlessly favored by fortune as McClellan, and never was such a piece of good luck offered, even to him, as that which fell into his hands on the 13th of September. He had been advancing in his leisurely manner from Washington on parallel roads, making only about six miles a day, when on the 13th he arrived at Frederick and one of his officers brought to him Lee's special order of the 9th, that a private soldier had found, containing his entire plan of campaign. By this he learned that his enemy was before him, a day's march away; that his whole force was inferior to his own; and that it was divided into two portions, one in camp near Boonsboro' and the other besieging Miles at Harper's Ferry. It is not too much to say that his enemy had been delivered into his hands. After he had read this order the contest between him and Lee, other things being equal, would have been like a fight between a man blindfolded and one having use of his eyes. He not only knew of the division of his enemy's army in half, but he knew where his trains, his rear-guard, his cavalry, were to march and to halt, and where the detached commands were to join the main body.³

He seemed to appreciate the importance of his discovery,⁴ but it was not in his nature to act promptly enough. Franklin was at Buckeystown, about twelve miles east of South Mountain, a prolongation northward of the Blue Ridge, beyond which Lee's army lay. Instead of giving him immediate orders to march with all possible speed to Harper's Ferry, he wrote at his leisure a long and judicious instruction directing him to march to that point the next day. The weather was perfect; the roads were in good order. McClellan knew there was no enemy between him and Crampton's Gap. Every possible consideration urged him to make use of every instant of time.⁵ The precious opportunity was neglected, and it was noon the next day, the 14th of September, when Franklin stormed the crest of the mountain after a brilliant and easy victory over General Cobb's detachment of McLaws's division, which had been left to guard the pass. The Union right wing spent the whole of the same day in a stubborn fight for the position of Fox's and Turner's Gaps, some six miles farther north.

used by Jackson in his advance on Harper's Ferry, the passes of South Mountain would have been carried before the evening of the 13th, at which time they were very feebly guarded; and then, debouching into Pleasant Valley, the Union commander might next morning have fallen upon the rear of McLaws at Maryland Heights and relieved Harper's Ferry, which did not surrender till the morning of the 15th. But he did not arrive at South Mountain until the morning of the 14th, and by that time the Confederates, forewarned of his approach, had recalled a considerable force to dispute the passage. [Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 202.]

After sharp fighting, in which General Reno, an officer of the highest merit, was killed, and Colonel Hayes, afterwards President of the United States, was wounded, advanced positions were secured. At neither Crampton's nor Turner's was the victory pushed to advantage. Franklin did nothing to relieve the beleaguered garrison at Harper's Ferry, and the force at Turner's Gap rested on the ground that they had won until, when the mists of the morning cleared away on the 15th, they saw the enemy had retreated from their front. Much valuable time had been lost, and more than time; for early on the morning of the 15th the blundering and bewildered defense of Harper's Ferry had ceased by the surrender of the garrison, its unhappy commander having been killed after he had displayed the white flag.

But McClellan had not yet lost all his advantage; and the sacrifice of Harper's Ferry would have been amply compensated if he had moved at once with all possible speed upon Lee, who, with only Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's troops, had taken up his position at Sharpsburg. Jackson was still south of the Potomac. He had no fear of night marches, and was making all possible speed to join Lee through the day and night of the 15th. The force of McLaws got away from in front of Franklin, and, though making a long *détour* and crossing the Potomac twice, still joined the main army at Sharpsburg on the 17th. All this time, while the scattered detachments of Lee were moving with the utmost expedition to join their main body, making two or three times the distance which separated Lee from McClellan, the latter made his preparations for an attack, as if, to quote Johnston again, "time was of no especial value to him." On the 15th he marched down to Antietam Creek and placed his soldiers in position. He rode from end to end of his line, enjoying one of the grandest greetings ever given by an army to its commander. The thunder of cheers which met him at every point showed that there was no lack of morale in that mighty army, and that they were equal to any service their beloved commander might choose to require of them.

It seems almost incredible, as we write it, and it will appear inexplicable to such readers as may come after us, that McClellan made no movement during the afternoon¹ of Monday, the 15th, and did nothing during the entire day of the 16th but to advance a portion of his right wing across Antietam Creek, and this while the ragged legions of Lee were streaming in from across the Potomac to take up their positions for the impending conflict.

¹ McClellan in his memoirs, p. 586, blames Burnside for the slowness of the march on the 15th.

² Lee to Davis, September 18, 1862. War Records.

Every minute which he thus let slip was paid for in the blood of Union soldiers next day. Never had McClellan's habit of procrastination served him so ill a turn as during the whole day of the 16th. Lee's error of dividing his army would have been fatal to him if even on the morning of the 16th McClellan had advanced upon him in force. The loss of the afternoon of the 15th in that case would scarcely have been felt. The reduction of Harper's Ferry had taken a day longer than Lee expected, and when night fell the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, A. P. Hill, and Walker were still beyond the Potomac.² He would have been compelled to withstand the attack of McClellan's whole army with nothing but the divisions of D. R. Jones and D. H. Hill on the right and center, and of Hood, Ewell, and J. R. Jones on the left. But before noon of the 17th most of Lee's forces were on the ground, and the rest arrived during the battle. McClellan had rejected the proffered favors of fortune. His delay had given back to Lee all the advantages afforded McClellan by the separation of Lee's army and the discovery of his plan of campaign. Lee had had unbroken leisure for forty-eight hours to study his ground and the dispositions of his antagonist, which had been made in plain view under his eyes. Lee's advantage of position was fully equal to McClellan's advantage of numbers; and it was therefore on even terms between the two armies that the battle of Antietam began.

The ground was highly favorable to Lee. In front of him was Antietam Creek, the high wooded ground affording an advantageous position and cover for his batteries. There was little field for maneuvering, and little was attempted. From daylight till dark of the 17th the battle went on. There was nothing of it but sheer, persistent, brutal slaughter. McClellan's plan was to throw forward his right wing, the corps of Hooker leading, supported by that of Mansfield, and by those of Sumner and Franklin if necessary; when the battle became well engaged on the right, the left wing, under Burnside, was to cross the lower bridge to try to turn the enemy's right. On this simple plan the battle was contested. Hooker advanced early in the morning and fought until his corps, giving and receiving about equal injuries, was shattered to pieces, and himself borne from the field, severely wounded. General Meade succeeding him in command, Mansfield came to his assistance. His corps also did heroic service, and its veteran commander was killed in the front of his foremost line. His corps was led during the rest of the day by General A. S. Williams. As our left remained entirely inactive, Lee was able to use most of his force

on our right, and his resistance was so obstinate that Sumner's corps was drawn into the conflict, where it met with heavy losses; Richardson, one of the best division commanders in the army, received a mortal hurt, and Sedgwick was twice wounded. Before the battle ended on the right even Franklin's corps, which it had been intended to hold in reserve, was drawn into the whirlpool of blood and fire. Corps by corps, division by division, one might almost say brigade by brigade, those brave and devoted troops were hurled in succession, without intelligent plan, without any special concert of action, against Lee's left. The carnage was frightful, the result in no proportion to the terrible expense. It was afternoon before the left wing, under Burnside, began its part of the work. The lower bridge was crossed about 1 o'clock and the west bank gained, but no farther advance was made by Burnside until after 3. He then moved forward his forces, under General Cox's command, upon the enemy's right, making good progress, until, late in the afternoon, as if good fortune, weary of having her favors rejected by General McClellan, had turned to the other side, the Light Division of A. P. Hill, which had marched seventeen miles in seven hours, arrived on the field from Harper's Ferry and made a vigorous attack upon our extreme left, killed General Rodman, and threw his division into some disorder. This unlooked-for demonstration checked the advance of the Federal column, and it fell back a little distance to the hills on the west of the Antietam. Night came on, and the long, desperate battle was at an end. The tactical advantage was with General McClellan. On his left, his center, and his right he had gained a little ground. Both armies had suffered losses which it shocks the sense to contemplate. They were almost equal — over 12,000 killed and wounded on the Union side, over 11,000 on the Confederate;¹ but Lee's loss was more than one-fourth of his army, while McClellan's was only one-sixth of his. In his report General McClellan says:

The night brought with it grave responsibilities. Whether to renew the attack on the 18th or to defer it, even with the risk of the enemy's retirement, was the question before me.

There could be little doubt of his decision of the question. He was keenly alive to the

¹ On the Union side 12,410 at Antietam and 15,203 in the campaign, not including the losses at Harper's Ferry, which were 12,737. The closest estimate that can be made shows a loss of about 11,172 to the Confederates at Antietam, and of 13,964 during the campaign.

² McClellan, "Army of the Potomac," p. 211.

³ It is hard to say whether these words, from a letter written by General McClellan on the 18th, are more comic or pathetic: "Those in whose judgment I rely

sufferings of his army. He loved them, and was loved by them in return. The piled heaps of the slain, the thousands of wounded and dying, the wreck and havoc of the conquered field, all impressed his imagination so powerfully that he was unable to conceive the worse condition of the enemy. There rose before his mind also an appalling picture of the consequences that would ensue if he risked another battle and lost it. He saw Lee's army marching in triumph on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York, the country ravaged, the cause lost.² Every impulse of his heart and conscience forbade him to assume so enormous a responsibility. He would not absolutely decide which course to adopt, but, after his habit, concluded to wait until the 19th before making a final decision.³

The occasion, however, would not wait for him. General Lee knew, if McClellan did not, that his army was in no condition to risk another battle. The straggling of McClellan's force was one of the reasons that induced him to delay. No doubt there was a great deal of it in his command. One day President Lincoln, exasperated at the discrepancy between the aggregate of troops he had sent to McClellan and the number McClellan reported as having been received, exclaimed in a simile of concise grotesqueness, "Sending men to that army is like shoveling fleas across a barnyard; not half of them get there." But the case on the other side was worse still. Lee reported to Jefferson Davis on the 21st of September that the efficiency of his army was "paralyzed by the loss to its ranks of the numerous stragglers."⁴ "On the morning after the battle," he says, "General Evans reported to me on the field, where he was holding the front position, that he had but 120 of his brigade present, and that the next brigade to his, that of General Garnett, consisted of but 100 men. General Pendleton reported that the brigades of Generals Lawton and Armistead, left to guard the ford at Shepherdstown, together contained but 600 men. This," he adds feelingly, "is a woful condition of affairs." But of course General McClellan had no personal knowledge of this; and, as we have seen in the course of this narrative, he was utterly destitute of those intuitions of the situation and the intention of his enemy which we find in all great commanders. The fight of the day before had been so terri-

tell me that I fought the battle splendidly and that it was a masterpiece of art. . . . God has been good in sparing the lives of all my staff. Generals Hooker, Sedgwick, Dana, Richardson, and Hartsuff, and several other general officers, wounded. Mansfield is dead, I fear." On the 20th he wrote: "I feel that I have done all that can be asked in twice saving the country." ["McClellan's Own Story," p. 612.]

⁴ War Records.

ble in the struggle and carnage, he had made his personal influence so little felt on the field,¹ he had gained so little advantage in comparison with his frightful losses, that it would be unjust to expect to find in him on the morning of the 18th that alacrity and elation of victory which would have impelled him in pursuit of his shattered enemy. Beaten as Lee was, his promising campaign brought to a disastrous failure by his own error, he was still less affected by it than was McClellan by his victory. He even thought for the moment, before twilight had settled on the battle on the 17th, of executing with his usual instrument his usual movement, of sending Stonewall Jackson by the left to attack the right flank of McClellan's army.² He opposed a bold front to his ill fortune, and closes his description of the battle by saying that he deemed it injudicious to push his advantage further.

McClellan was almost alone in his decision not to continue the battle on the 18th. General Burnside, who commanded on the left, testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War³ that he thought the attack should be renewed at early dawn, and gave this opinion to McClellan the night of the battle. General McClellan said he would think the matter over and make up his mind before morning, and a staff-officer of Burnside's was kept in waiting through the night at McClellan's headquarters to learn his decision.

General Franklin, in command of the center, also testified that he showed McClellan a position on our right of great importance, and advised an attack on that place in the morning. He says there was no doubt that we could carry it, as we had plenty of artillery bearing on it. He thought that by this means the whole left flank of the enemy would have been uncovered. When asked what reasons were given for rejecting this plan,⁴ he repeated McClellan's customary fatal excuse for delay, that he would prefer to wait for reinforcements. Hooker, who had commanded the right wing, was also of the opinion that the attack should be resumed, although his wounds would have prevented his taking part in it.

But it was too much to expect of General McClellan that he should follow such advice.

He had had, it is true, a moment of elation on the morning of the 15th after the engagement at South Mountain. To attack an enemy in position, and drive him, was to McClellan so new a sensation that he was evidently greatly exhilarated by his success at Turner's Gap. He reported Lee as admitting "that he had been shockingly whipped" and "making for Shepherdstown in a perfect panic."⁵ But after the terrible conflict at Antietam the cold fit came on, and his only dispatches to Washington were of his heavy losses and of holding what he had gained. He evidently thought more of being attacked on that day than of attacking. "The battle," he says, "will probably be renewed to-day. Send all the troops you can, by the most expeditious route."⁶ It was therefore with feelings of the greatest relief that he saw Lee's rear-guard disappear across the Potomac, and in the forenoon of the 19th he joyfully telegraphed to Washington, "Our victory was complete. The enemy is driven back into Virginia. Maryland and Pennsylvania are now safe."⁷

The President received this news, as was natural, with mingled gratitude and disappointment. He was glad and thankful for the measure of success which had been achieved, but the high hope he had entertained of destroying Lee's army before it recrossed the Potomac was baffled. His constant entreaty to McClellan, from the time he put him in command of the army up to the day of the battle, was, "Please do not let him get off without being hurt."⁸ It was with this hope and purpose that he had given McClellan everything he asked for, infusing his own indomitable spirit into all the details of work at the War Department and the headquarters of the army. It was by his order that McClellan had been pushed forward, that Porter had been detached from the defense of Washington, that the militia of Pennsylvania had been hurried down to the border. He did not share General McClellan's illusion as to the monstrous number of the enemy opposed to him; and when he looked at the vast aggregate of the Army of the Potomac by the morning report on the 20th of September, "93,149 present for duty," he could not but feel that the result was not commensurate with the efforts made and the resources employed.

¹ He did very little in the way of compelling the execution of the orders which he did give. He passed the whole day till towards the middle of the afternoon, when all the fighting was over, on the high ground near Fry's house, where he had some glasses strapped to the fence. . . . He made absolutely no use of the magnificent enthusiasm which the army then felt for him. [Palfrey, "The Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 119.]

² While the attack on our center was progressing, General Jackson had been directed to endeavor to turn the enemy's right, but found it extending nearly to the Potomac, and so strongly defended with artillery that

the attempt had to be abandoned. [Report of General Lee. War Records.]

³ General McClellan in his memoirs contradicts this testimony.

⁴ Franklin, testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War.

⁵ War Records.

⁶ McClellan to Halleck, Sept. 18, 1862. War Records.

⁷ McClellan to Halleck. War Records.

⁸ Lincoln to McClellan, Sept. 12, 1862. War Records.

EMANCIPATION ANNOUNCED.

WHEN, on the 22d of July, after full Cabinet discussion, President Lincoln decided to postpone the proclamation of emancipation which he had first prepared, in order to wait for a victory, all indications afforded a reasonable hope that the delay would not be a long one. The union of the armies of McClellan and Pope had been ordered, and once combined they would outnumber any force they were likely to meet. Halleck had been called to Washington to exercise chief command and secure unity of orders and movements. The new call for volunteers was expected to bring quick reinforcements.

We have seen through what deplorable shortcomings of McClellan and some of his officers this reasonable hope was frustrated, and how, instead of an expected victory, an unnecessary and most disheartening defeat augmented President Lincoln's difficulties and responsibilities; how the combined armies were forced back upon Washington in such disaster and discouragement that the President felt compelled to intrust their reorganization to the very man whose weakness and jealousy had been the main cause of the result.

The damaging effect of these reverses extended beyond mere military results; they gave a new and serious character to the political conditions and complications which were an inseparable part of the President's great task. They sharpened anew the underlying prejudice and distrust between the two factions of his supporters—radicals and conservatives, as they began to be called; or, more properly speaking, those who were anxious to destroy and those who were willing to preserve slavery. Each faction loudly charged the other with being the cause of failure, and clamored vehemently for a change of policy to conform to their own views. Outside of both was the important faction of those Democrats who either yielded the war only a sullen support or opposed it as openly as they safely might, and who, on the slavery issue, directed their denunciations wholly against the radicals. It may be safely said that at no time were political questions so critical and embarrassing to Mr. Lincoln as during this period. His own decision had been reached; his own course was clearly and unalterably marked out. But the circumstances surrounding him did not permit his making it known, and he was compelled to keep up an appearance of indecision which only brought upon him a greater flood of importunities. During no part of his administration were his acts and words so persistently misconstrued as in this interim by men who gave his words the color and meaning of their own eager desires and ex-

pectations. To interpret properly Mr. Lincoln's language it must be constantly borne in mind that its single object was to curb and restrain the impatience of zealots from either faction. If we group together his several letters and addresses of this period, we may see that his admonitions and rebukes were given to both with equal earnestness and impartiality. Occasions were not wanting; for all request and advice which came to him was warped to one side or the other by the culminating contest, in which he alone could give the final and deciding word. On the 26th of July, 1862, he wrote the following letter to Reverdy Johnson, then on public business at New Orleans, who had made communications touching affairs in the Department of the Gulf:

Yours of the 16th, by the hand of Governor Shepley, is received. It seems the Union feeling in Louisiana is being crushed out by the course of General Phelps. Please pardon me for believing that it is a false pretense. The people of Louisiana—all intelligent people everywhere—know full well that I never had a wish to touch the foundations of their society, or any right of theirs. With perfect knowledge of this they forced a necessity upon me to send armies among them, and it is their own fault, not mine, that they are annoyed by the presence of General Phelps. They also know the remedy—know how to be cured of General Phelps. Remove the necessity of his presence. And might it not be well for them to consider whether they have not already had time enough to do this? If they can conceive of anything worse than General Phelps within my power, would they not better be looking out for it? They very well know the way to avert all this is simply to take their place in the Union upon the old terms. If they will not do this, should they not receive harder blows rather than lighter ones? You are ready to say I apply to friends what is due only to enemies. I distrust the wisdom if not the sincerity of friends who would hold my hands while my enemies stab me. This appeal of professed friends has paralyzed me more in this struggle than any other one thing. You remember telling me the day after the Baltimore mob in April, 1861, that it would crush all Union feeling in Maryland for me to attempt bringing troops over Maryland soil to Washington. I brought the troops notwithstanding, and yet there was Union feeling enough left to elect a legislature the next autumn, which in turn elected a very excellent Union United States Senator!¹ I am a patient man—always willing to forgive on the Christian terms of repentance, and also to give ample time for repentance. Still, I must save this Government, if possible. What I cannot do, of course I will not do; but it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed.²

Two days later to a citizen of Louisiana he sent another letter, full of phrases quite as positive and significant. He wrote:

¹ Mr. Reverdy Johnson himself.

² Unpublished MS.

Mr. Durant complains that in various ways the relation of master and slave is disturbed by the presence of our army, and he considers it particularly vexatious that this, in part, is done under cover of an act of Congress, while constitutional guaranties are suspended on the plea of military necessity. The truth is, that what is done and omitted about slaves is done and omitted on the same military necessity. It is a military necessity to have men and money; and we can get neither, in sufficient numbers or amounts, if we keep from, or drive from, our lines slaves coming to them. . . . He speaks of no duty—apparently thinks of none—resting upon Union men. He even thinks it injurious to the Union cause that they should be restrained in trade and passage without taking sides. They are to touch neither a sail nor a pump, but to be merely passengers,—dead-heads at that,—to be carried snug and dry throughout the storm, and safely landed, right side up. Nay, more; even a mutineer is to go untouched, lest these sacred passengers receive an accidental wound. Of course the rebellion will never be suppressed in Louisiana if the professed Union men there will neither help to do it nor permit the Government to do it without their help. Now, I think the true remedy is very different from what is suggested by Mr. Durant. It does not lie in rounding the rough angles of the war, but in removing the necessity for the war. . . . If they will not do this, if they prefer to hazard all for the sake of destroying the Government, it is for them to consider whether it is probable I will surrender the Government to save them from losing all. If they decline what I suggest, you scarcely need to ask what I will do. What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or would you prosecute it in future with elder-stalk squirts charged with rose water? Would you deal lighter blows rather than heavier ones? Would you give up the contest, leaving any available means unapplied? I am in no boastful mood. I shall not do more than I can, and I shall do all I can to save the Government, which is my sworn duty as well as my personal inclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious dealing.¹

In these two letters the President's reproof was addressed to conservatives to correct ill-timed complaints that the interests of slaveholders were allowed to suffer in the rude necessities of military operations and administration. But complaints equally unreasonable were assailing him from the other side. Mr. Greeley of the "New York Tribune" was criticising the President for exactly the alleged fault of not doing more of that which had brought these complaints from Louisiana. In his paper of August 20 he addressed a long open letter to Mr. Lincoln, accusing him of failure to execute the Confiscation Act "from

mistaken deference to rebel slavery," and alleging that he was "unduly influenced by the counsels, the representations, the menaces of certain fossil politicians hailing from the border slave-States." "We complain," he continued, "that a large proportion of our regular army officers, with many of the volunteers, evince far more solicitude to uphold slavery than to put down the rebellion." These phrases are samples of two columns or more of equally unjust censure. Mr. Lincoln always sought, and generally with success, to turn a dilemma into an advantage; and shrewdly seizing the opportunity which Mr. Greeley had created, he in turn addressed him the following open letter through the newspapers in reply, by which he not merely warded off his present personal accusation, but skillfully laid the foundation in public sentiment for the very radical step he was about to take on the slavery question.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1862.

HON. HORACE GREELEY.

DEAR SIR: I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the "New York Tribune." If there be in it any statements, or assumptions of fact, which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always supposed to be right. As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be—"the Union as it was."² If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors,

¹ Lincoln to Bullitt, July 28, 1862. MS.; also incorrectly printed in several works.

² This letter was first printed in the "National Intelligencer" of August 23, 1862. As originally written it contained after the words, "the Union as it was," the phrase, "Broken eggs can never be mended, and the

longer the breaking proceeds the more will be broken," which "was erased, with some reluctance, by the President, on the representation, made to him by the editors, that it seemed somewhat exceptionable, on rhetorical grounds, in a paper of such dignity." [Welling in "North American Review," February, 1880, p. 168.]

and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.

Yours,
A. LINCOLN.

When Mr. Lincoln wrote the foregoing letter the defeat of General Pope at the second battle of Bull Run had not yet taken place; on the contrary, every probability pointed to an easy victory for the Union troops in the battle which was plainly seen to be impending. We may therefore infer that he hoped soon to be able to supplement the above declarations by issuing his postponed proclamation, which would give the country knowledge of his final designs respecting the slavery question. But instead of the expected victory came a sad and demoralizing defeat, which prolonged, instead of shortening, the anxiety and uncertainty hanging over the intentions of the Administration. Under this enforced necessity for further postponement of his fixed purpose, in addition to his many other perplexities, the President grew sensitive and even irritable upon this point. He was by nature so frank and direct, he was so conscientious in all his official responsibilities, that he made the complaints and implied reproaches of even his humblest petitioner his own. The severe impartiality of his self-judgment sometimes became almost a feeling of self-accusation, from which he relieved himself only by a most searching analysis and review of his own motives in self-justification. In the period under review this state of feeling was several times manifested. Individuals and delegations came to him to urge one side or the other of a decision, which, though already made in his own mind, forced upon him a re-examination of its justness and its possibilities for good or evil. Imperceptibly these mental processes became a species of self-torment, and well-meaning inquirers or advisers affected his overstrung nerves like so many persecuting inquisitors. A phlegmatic nature would have turned them away in sullen silence, or at most with an evasive commonplace. But Lincoln felt himself under compulsion, which he could not resist, to state somewhat precisely the difficulties and perplexities under which he was acting, or, rather, apparently refusing to act; and in such statements his public argument, upon hypothesis assumed for illustration, was liable to outrun his private conclusions upon facts which had controlled his judgment.

It is in the light of this mental condition that we must judge the well-known reply made by him on the 13th of September to a deputation from the religious denominations of Chicago requesting him to issue at once a proclamation of universal emancipation. He said:

The subject presented in the memorial is one upon which I have thought much for weeks past, and I may even say for months. I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men, who are equally certain that they represent the Divine will. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps in some respects both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others, on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, I will do it. These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right. . . . What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves, when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would be influenced by it there? And what reason is there to think it would have any greater effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress, which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who come within our lines? Yet I cannot learn that that law has caused a single slave to come over to us. . . . Now, then, tell me, if you please, what possible result of good would follow the issuing of such a proclamation as you desire? Understand, I raise no objections against it on legal or constitutional grounds, for, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in time of war I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy; nor do I urge objections of a moral nature, in view of possible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South. I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion. . . . Do not misunderstand me because I have mentioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that have thus far prevented my action in some such way as you desire. I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement. And I can assure you that the subject is on my mind, by day and night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be God's will, I will do. I trust that in the freedom with which I have canvassed your views I have not in any respect injured your feelings.

This interview of the Chicago delegation with the President lasted more than an hour, during which a long memorial was read, interspersed with much discursive conversation and interchange of questions and replies. The report of his remarks, which was written out and published by the delegation after their return home, is not a verbatim reproduction, but merely a

condensed abstract of what was said on the occasion.¹ Much adverse criticism has been indulged in because of his assumed declaration that an emancipation proclamation would be as inoperative as "the Pope's bull against the comet," and that he nevertheless issued so preposterous a document within two weeks after the interview. The error lies in the assumption that his words were literally reported. To measure rightly his utterance as a whole, the conditions under which the interview occurred must continually be kept in mind. The Administration and the country were still in the shadow of the great disasters of the Peninsula and of the second Bull Run. With corresponding elation the rebels had taken the aggressive and crossed the Potomac to invade Maryland. A new campaign was opening, and a new battle-cloud was gathering. Whether victory or fresh defeat was enfolded in its gloom was a question of uncertainty and of fearful anxiety to the President, straining his thought and imagination to an abnormal and almost unendurable tension. It was at such a moment that the Chicago delegation had appeared with a repetition of a request which seemed to him inopportune. Habitually open and patient to every appeal, he was nevertheless becoming restive under the unremitting and unreasoning pressure regarding this single point. Could no one exercise patience but himself? Could antislavery people not realize and rest content with the undreamed-of progress their cause had already made — slavery abolished in the District of Columbia, the Territories restored to freedom, almost wholesale emancipation provided through the Confiscation Act? Had he not aided these measures, signed these laws, ordered their enforcement, and was he not, day and night, laboring to secure compensated emancipation in the border States? Had he not the very proclamation they sought lying written in his desk, waiting only the favorable moment when he might announce it? Why must they push him to the wall, and compel him to an avowal which might blight the ripening public sentiment and imperil the desired consummation? We may infer that with some such feelings he listened to the dogmatic memorial of the delegation; for his whole answer is in the nature of a friendly protest and polite rebuke against their impolitic urgency, and the impressive rhetorical figure he employs was not intended to foreshadow his decision, but to illustrate the absurdity of attempting to pluck the fruit before it was ripe. The great pith and point of the interview is his strong and unqualified declaration that he held the sub-

ject under advisement, and that he regarded his military authority clear and ample. He said:

Understand, I raise no objections against it on legal or constitutional grounds, for, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in time of war I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy.

Three days after this interview the great battle of Antietam was begun, which resulted in a victory for the Union forces. The events of war had abruptly changed political conditions, and the President seized the earliest possible opportunity to announce the policy which he had decided upon exactly two months before. His manner and language on this momentous occasion have been minutely recorded in the diaries of two members of the Cabinet, and liberal quotations from both will form the most valuable historical presentation of the event that can be made. The diary of Secretary Chase reads as follows:

MONDAY, Sept. 22, 1862.

To Department about 9. State Department messenger came with notice to heads of Departments to meet at 12. Received sundry callers. Went to the White House. All the members of the Cabinet were in attendance. There was some general talk, and the President mentioned that Artemus Ward had sent him his book. Proposed to read a chapter which he thought very funny. Read it, and seemed to enjoy it very much; the heads also (except Stanton), of course. The chapter was "High-handed Outrage at Utica." The President then took a graver tone, and said, "Gentlemen, I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared on this subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought, all along, that the time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation of emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to any one; but I made the promise to myself, and [hesitating a little] to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfill that promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in

¹ "Chicago Tribune," Sept. 23, 1862, and "National Intelligencer," Sept. 26, 1862.

the expressions I use, or in any minor matter, which any one of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive the suggestions. One other observation I will make. I know very well that many others might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But, though I believe that I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time since, I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more; and, however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take."¹

The foregoing account written by Mr. Chase is fully corroborated by the following extract from the diary of Secretary Welles, in which the same event is described:

SEPTEMBER 22.

A special Cabinet meeting. The subject was the proclamation for emancipating the slaves, after a certain date, in States that shall then be in rebellion. For several weeks the subject has been suspended, but the President says never lost sight of. When it was submitted, and now in taking up the proclamation, the President stated that the question was finally decided,—the act and the consequences were his,—but that he felt it due to us to make us acquainted with the fact and to invite criticisms on the paper which he had prepared. There were, he had found, not unexpectedly, some differences in the Cabinet; but he had, after ascertaining in his own way the views of each and all, individually and collectively, formed his own conclusions and made his own decisions. In the course of the discussion on this paper, which was long, earnest, and, on the general principle involved, harmonious, he remarked that he had made a vow—a covenant—that if God gave us the victory in the approaching battle he would consider it an indication of Divine will, and that it was duty to move forward in the cause of emancipation. It might be thought strange, he said, that he had in this way submitted the disposal of matters when the way was not clear to his mind what he should do. God had decided this question in favor of the slaves. He was satisfied it was right—was confirmed and strengthened in his action by the vow and results. His mind was fixed, his decision made, but he wished his paper announcing his course as correct in terms as it could be made without any change in his determination.²

In addition to its record of the President's language, the diary of Secretary Chase proceeds with the following account of what was said by several members of the Cabinet:

¹ Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," pp. 481, 482.

² Welles, Diary. Unpublished MS.

³ Hay's Diary (MS.) contains the following record: "September 23, 1862. The President rewrote the proclamation on Sunday morning carefully. He called the Cabinet together on Monday, made a little talk to them, and read the momentous document. Mr. Blair and Mr.

The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation Proclamation, making remarks on the several parts as he went on, and showing that he had fully considered the whole subject, in all the lights under which it had been presented to him. After he had closed, Governor Seward said: "The general question having been decided, nothing can be said farther about that. Would it not, however, make the proclamation more clear and decided to leave out all reference to the act being sustained during the incumbency of the present President; and not merely say that the Government 'recognizes,' but that it will maintain, the freedom it proclaims?" I followed, saying: "What you have said, Mr. President, fully satisfies me that you have given to every proposition which has been made a kind and candid consideration. And you have now expressed the conclusion to which you have arrived clearly and distinctly. This it was your right, and, under your oath of office, your duty, to do. The proclamation does not, indeed, mark out exactly the course I would myself prefer. But I am ready to take it just as it is written, and to stand by it with all my heart. I think, however, the suggestions of Governor Seward very judicious, and shall be glad to have them adopted." The President then asked us severally our opinions as to the modification proposed, saying that he did not care much about the phrases he had used. Every one favored the modification, and it was adopted. Governor Seward then proposed that in the passage relating to colonization some language should be introduced to show that the colonization proposed was to be only with the consent of the colonists and the consent of the States in which colonies might be attempted. This, too, was agreed to, and no other modification was proposed. Mr. Blair then said that, the question having been decided, he would make no objection to issuing the proclamation; but he would ask to have his paper, presented some days since, against the policy, filed with the proclamation.³ The President consented to this readily. And then Mr. Blair went on to say that he was afraid of the influence of the proclamation on the border States and on the army, and stated, at some length, the grounds of his apprehensions. He disclaimed most expressly, however, all object on to emancipation *per se*, saying he had always been personally in favor of it—always ready for immediate emancipation in the midst of slave States, rather than submit to the perpetuation of the system.⁴

The statement of Mr. Welles which relates the Cabinet proceedings is as follows:

All listened with profound attention to the reading, and it was, I believe, assented to by every member. Mr. Bates repeated the opinions he had previously expressed in regard to the deportation of the colored race. Mr. Seward proposed two slight verbal alterations, which were adopted. A general discussion then took place, covering the whole ground—the constitutional question, the war

Bates made slight objections; otherwise the Cabinet was unanimous. The next day Mr. Blair, who had promised to file his objections, sent a note stating that as they referred only to the time of the act, he would not file them, lest they should be subject to misconstruction."

⁴ Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 482.

power, the expediency and the effect of the movement. After the matter had been very fully debated, Mr. Stanton made a very emphatic speech sustaining the measure, and in closing said the act was so important, and involved consequences so vast, that he hoped each member would give distinctly and unequivocally his own individual opinion, whatever that opinion might be. Two gentlemen, he thought, had not been sufficiently explicit, although they had discussed the question freely, and it was understood that they concurred in the measure. He referred, he said, to the Secretary of the Treasury and (hesitating a moment) the Secretary of the Navy. It was understood, I believe, by all present that he had allusion to another member, with whom he was not in full accord. Mr. Chase admitted that the subject had come upon him unexpectedly and with some surprise. It was going a step further than he had ever proposed, but he was prepared to accept and support it. He was glad the President had made this advance, which he should sustain from his heart, and he proceeded to make an able impromptu argument in its favor. I stated that the President did not misunderstand my position, nor any other member; that I assented most unequivocally to the measure as a war necessity, and had acted upon it. Mr. Blair took occasion to say that he was an emancipationist from principle; that he had for years, here and in Missouri, where he formerly resided, openly advocated it; but he had doubts of the expediency of this executive action at this particular juncture. We ought not, he thought, to put in jeopardy the patriotic element in the border States, already severely tried. This proclamation would, as soon as it reached them, be likely to carry over those States to the secessionists. There were also party men in the free States who were striving to revive old party lines and distinctions, into whose hand we were putting a club to be used against us. The measure he approved, but the time was inopportune. He should wish, therefore, to file his objections. This, the President said, Mr. Blair could do. He had, however, considered the danger to be apprehended from the first objection mentioned, which was undoubtedly serious, but the difficulty was as great not to act as to act. There were two sides to that question. For months he had labored to get those States to move in this matter, convinced in his own mind that it was their true interest to do so, but his labors were vain. We must make the forward movement. They would acquiesce, if not immediately, soon; for they must be satisfied that slavery had received its death-blow from slave-owners — it could not survive the rebellion. As regarded the other objection, it had not much weight with him; their clubs would be used against us take what course we might.¹

The Cabinet discussion of the proclamation being completed, Mr. Seward carried the document with him to the State Department, where the formal phraseology of attestation and the great seal were added. The President signed it the same afternoon, and it was published in full by the leading newspapers of the country on the morning of September 23d. As

¹ Welles in "Galaxy," December, 1862, pp. 846, 847.

elsewhere, the reading of the official announcement created a profound interest in Washington, and a serenade was organized the next evening, which came to the Executive Mansion and called on the President for a speech. His reference to the great event was very brief. He said:

I appear before you to do little more than acknowledge the courtesy you pay me, and to thank you for it. I have not been distinctly informed why it is that on this occasion you appear to do me this honor, though I suppose it is because of the proclamation. What I did, I did after a very full deliberation, and under a very heavy and solemn sense of responsibility. I can only trust in God I have made no mistake. I shall make no attempt on this occasion to sustain what I have done or said by any comment. It is now for the country and the world to pass judgment, and maybe take action upon it.

Two days after the proclamation was issued a number of the governors of loyal States met for conference at Altoona, Pennsylvania; and it was charged at the time that this occurrence had some occult relation to the President's action. There was no truth whatever in the allegation. It was directly contradicted by the President himself. He said to the Hon. George S. Boutwell, who mentioned the rumor to him a few weeks after the occurrence:

I never thought of the meeting of the governors. The truth is just this: When Lee came over the river, I made a resolution that if McClellan drove him back I would send the proclamation after him. The battle of Antietam was fought Wednesday, and until Saturday I could not find out whether we had gained a victory or lost a battle. It was then too late to issue the proclamation that day; and the fact is I fixed it up a little Sunday, and Monday I let them have it.²

The collateral evidence is also conclusive on this point. The Altoona meeting originated with Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania, who, warned that Lee's army was about to cross the Potomac, was with all diligence preparing his State to resist the expected invasion. On the 6th of September he telegraphed to the governor of Massachusetts and others:

In the present emergency would it not be well that the loyal governors should meet at some point in the border States to take measures for the more active support of the Government?

Receiving favorable replies, the governors of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia united in a joint invitation, under date of September 14, for such a meeting to be held at Altoona on the 24th. The object was simply to consult on the best means of common

² Boutwell, "The Lawyer, the Statesman, and the Soldier," pp. 116, 117.

defense and the vigorous prosecution of the war. There was no design to organize any pressure upon the President, either about the question of slavery or about the removal of McClellan from command, and the President neither anticipated nor feared any interference of this character. Several members of the body, differing in political sentiment, indignantly denied the accusation of a political plot, which, indeed, would have been impossible in a gathering of men of such strong individual traits, holding diverse views, and clothed with greatly varying interests and responsibilities.

The Proclamation of Emancipation was as great a surprise to them as to the general public, gratifying some and displeasing others. It was not strange that it should immediately engage their eager interest and call out some sort of joint response. The proclamation had been printed on the 23d; the Altoona gathering was called on the 14th and held on the 24th. Between the date of the call and the day of the meeting the military situation was altogether changed. The battle of Antietam had driven Lee's army in retreat back across the Potomac. Instead of emergency measures for defense, the assembled governors could now quietly discuss points of general and mutual interest, relating to the recruiting, organization, equipment, and transportation of troops, the granting of furloughs, and the care and removal of the sick and wounded. Their conference passed in entire harmony; and a day or two later they nearly all proceeded to Washington for a personal interview with the President and the Secretary of War. They presented a written address to the President, signed then and within a few days afterward by the governors of sixteen of the free States and the governor of West Virginia, reiterating devotion to the Union, loyalty to the Constitution and laws, and earnest support to the President in suppressing rebellion; and embracing only the single specific recommendation that a reserve army of 100,000 men ought constantly to be kept on foot, to be raised, armed, equipped, and trained at home, ready for emergencies. The written address also contained a hearty indorsement of the new emancipation policy announced in the President's proclamation. This declaration, as was to have been expected, developed the only antagonism of views which grew out of the whole transaction. The address was written at Washington, and was therefore not discussed at Altoona. Properly speaking, it was the supplementary action of only a portion of the assembled delegates. It was, however, transmitted for signature to all the loyal executives; but the governors of the States of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri

replied, that while concurring in the other declarations of the address, they declined signing it, because they dissented from that portion of it which indorsed the Proclamation of Emancipation.

Coming as it did immediately after the announcement of his new policy, President Lincoln could not but be gratified at the public declarations emanating from the Altoona meeting. On his military policy it assured him of the continuation of an individual official support. On his emancipation policy it gave him a public approval from the present official power of seventeen States, as against the dissent of only five States of the border, where indeed he had no right to expect, for the present at least, any more favorable official sentiment. Nevertheless, it did not free the experiment from uncertainty and danger. It was precisely this balance of power, political and military, wielded by these hesitating border States, which was essential to the success of the Union cause; but he had measured the probability with an acuteness of judgment and timed his proceeding with a prudence of action that merited success, and in due time triumphantly justified his faith.

Every thoughtful reader will have more than a passing curiosity to examine the exact phraseology of a document which ushered in the great political regeneration of the American people. It reads as follows:

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relations between the United States and each of the States and the people thereof, in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed. That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure, tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued. That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their

actual freedom. That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States, or parts of States if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall, on that day, be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections, wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.

Then, after reciting the language of "An act to make an additional article of war," approved March 13, 1862, and also sections 9 and 10 of the Confiscation Act, approved July 17, 1862, and enjoining their enforcement upon all persons in the military and naval service, the proclamation concludes:

And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the acts and sections above recited. And the Executive will, in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States, who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States and the people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed, be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.

A careful reading and analysis of the document shows it to have contained four leading propositions: (1.) A renewal of the plan of compensated abolishment. (2.) A continuance of the effort at voluntary colonization. (3.) The announcement of peremptory military emancipation of all slaves in States in rebellion at the expiration of the warning notice. (4.) A promise to recommend ultimate compensation to loyal owners.

The political test of the experiment of military emancipation thus announced by the President came almost immediately in the autumn elections for State officers and State legislatures, and especially for representatives to the thirty-eighth Congress. The decided failure of McClellan's Richmond campaign and the inaction of the Western army had already produced much popular discontent, which was only partly relieved by the victory of Antietam. The canvass had been inaugurated by the Democratic party with violent protests against the antislavery legislation of Congress, and it now added the loud outcry that the Administration had changed the war for the Union to a war for abolition. The party conflict became active and bitter, and the Democrats, having all the advantage of an aggressive issue, made

great popular gains, not only throughout the middle belt of States, but in New York, where they elected their governor, thus gaining control of the executive machinery, which greatly embarrassed the Administration in its later measures to maintain the army. The number of Democrats in the House of Representatives was increased from forty-four to seventy-five, and the reaction threatened for a time to deprive Mr. Lincoln of the support of the House.

But against this temporary adverse political current the leaders and the bulk of the Republican party followed Mr. Lincoln with loyal adhesion, accepting and defending his emancipation policy with earnestness and enthusiasm. In his annual message of December 1, 1862, the President did not discuss his Emancipation Proclamation, but renewed and made an elaborate argument to recommend his plan of compensated abolishment, "not in exclusion of, but additional to, all others for restoring and preserving the national authority throughout the Union." Meanwhile the Democratic minority in the House, joined by the pro-slavery conservatives from the border slave-States, lost no opportunity to oppose emancipation in every form. On the 11th of December Mr. Yeaman of Kentucky offered resolutions declaring the President's proclamation unwarranted by the Constitution and a useless and dangerous war measure. But these propositions were only supported by a vote of forty-seven, while they were promptly laid on the table by a vote of ninety-five members. The Republicans were unwilling to remain in this attitude of giving emancipation a merely negative support. A few days later (December 15), Mr. S. C. Fessenden of Maine put the identical phraseology in an affirmative form, and by a test vote of seventy-eight to fifty-two the House resolved:

That the proclamation of the President of the United States, of the date of 22d September, 1862, is warranted by the Constitution, and that the policy of emancipation, as indicated in that proclamation, is well adapted to hasten the restoration of peace, was well chosen as a war measure, and is an exercise of power with proper regard for the rights of the States and the perpetuity of free government.

With the proclamation thus heartily indorsed by nearly every free State governor and nearly two-thirds of the loyal representatives, Mr. Lincoln, who had accurately foreseen the dangers as well as the benefits of the critical step he had taken, could well afford to wait for the full tide of approval, for which he looked with confidence and which came to him from that time onward with steadiness and ever-growing volume, both from the armies in the field and the people in their homes throughout the loyal North.

A REGRET.

OH, could we but have seen, while they were ours,
The grace of days forever passed away;
Had we but felt the beauty of the flowers
That bloomed for us — before they knew decay;
Could we have known how we should yearn in vain
For looks and smiles no more to greet our sight,
Or how the fruitless tears would fall like rain
For hours of sweet communion, vanished quite;
Their worth to us — had we but better known,
Then had we held them dearer, while our own,
Had kept some salvage from the joys o'erthrown,
And loneliness itself had found us less alone!

Agnes Maule Machar.



THE SHERIFF'S POSSE.

PICTURES OF THE FAR WEST. III.



HIS picture is not so sincere as it might be. The artist, in the course of many rides over these mountain pastures, by daylight or twilight or moonrise, has never yet encountered anything so sensational as a troop of armed men on the track of a criminal. Yet rumors are passing, from turbulent camps above us in the mountains or from the seductive valley towns, that easily suggest some such night journey as this. The riders make haste slowly, breasting slope after slope of the interminable cattle-ranges, on the alert, as they climb out of gulch after gulch of shadow, for the next long outlook ahead.

It may be mentioned that by far the greater number of criminals confined in the jails of the far West are there for a class of offenses peculiar to the country. They are men dangerous in one direction, perhaps, but generally not depraved. The "trusties" are often domesticated upon ranches near the town, and apparently are unwatched, and on the best of terms with the ranchman's family. They have a simple faith in the necessity for a certain sort of action, under given circumstances, which supports them under sentence of the law, and serves instead of a clear conscience. They have done nothing of which they are ashamed.

For example, a cattle-man meets a sheep-man on the hills. The sheep-man represents to the cattle-man that his only possible course is to take his band across the cattle-man's range — to "sheep" him, in the local phrase. A sheep-

man makes no treaty with the owners of the land he crosses that he will not "turn into the fields, or into the vineyards"; that he will not "drink of the water of the well"; but go by the highway until he has passed on. The land belongs to him as much as to the cattle-man who has pitched in its borders. But it is a perfectly clear case to the cattle-man that the sheep-man's multitude will lick up all before them, and that his own multitude must starve on what is left. He does not waste time praying, "Curse me this sheep-man!" He goes out against the sheep-man, without prayerful preliminaries. He "lays for him" at night, when he has lighted his solitary fire in the sage-brush. The next day a disorganized band of sheep, minus a grimy shepherd, goes wandering back to the river, to the despair of a masterless dog.

The case is tried in the valley town and the murderer is acquitted, the sentiment of the community being with him to a much greater extent than would be generally admitted. No judge nor jury nor term of punishment could have altered his personal conviction and that of his friends that his deed was only an effort in self-defense and an act of public justice.

If such a fugitive as this is overhauled in a night-chase by the sheriff and his men, he is treated as a comrade "in trouble." To quote a description, given in Hibernian good faith, of a young man at large with the murder of his father — in defense of his mother, it is claimed — on his head, "He is a perfect gentleman if he is n't crossed."

* * *

by which we can separate the work of one from that of the other, and we may imagine them associated in all the work attributed to either, except that at Avignon.

W. J. Stillman.

NOTES BY TIMOTHY COLE, ENGRAVER.

ST. CATHERINE OF ALEXANDRIA.

NOVEMBER 5, 1887.—At Pisa I found undoubtedly the finest work of Simone Memmi—small panels of single saints. Such rare and delicate work I had not supposed him capable of. The finish of these paintings is most exquisite, and reminds me much of the treatment of Duccio, whom he succeeded. Of these I had begun to engrave the Santa Chiara, but subsequently abandoned it for the St. Catherine.

MAY 25, 1888.—“St. Catherine of Alexandria,” by Simone Martini, called Simone Memmi, is a detail from a panel in the library of the Seminario at Pisa. The panel itself is a detail of what was once a large and beautiful work. It is now dismembered, and some of its parts are found in the Pisa Academy and the others at the Seminario; none of the panels, however, are lost. It was painted in the year 1320 for the high altar of the Church of St. Catherine, Pisa, and was composed of seven principal compartments representing half-length figures of apostles and saints. One of these, a Madonna and Child, occupied the center, the others being disposed on each side. They are about two feet high, and are each inclosed in a handsome framework. Above each are two small half-lengths, and above and between each of these two is a smaller medallion, the whole forming a panel about four feet high. These seven principal panels represent, besides the Madonna and Child, the following saints: St. John

the Evangelist, St. Mary Magdalene, St. Peter, St. John the Baptist, St. Catherine of Alexandria, and St. Dominic.

The predella to the picture consisted of an Ecce Homo in the center, and twelve saints, male and female, six on each side—half-lengths, perhaps nine inches high. The whole when complete must have measured some 14 or 15 feet long by 6 or 7 feet high.

It is painted in tempera upon wood. The backgrounds and glories are of gold, as well as much of the trimming and ornamentation of the draperies. The drapery of St. Catherine is richly ornamented, and the painting of this is exquisite for delicacy and cleanliness, as is the engraved work in the glory around the head—far too delicate and neat to be done justice to in any engraving. It will be noticed that the execution of the patterns in the drapery is flat, without regard to foreshortening in the folds. Attention does not appear to have been directed to this foreshortening until a century later, in the time of Pietro della Francesca (1415–1492). The color of the drapery is of a warm gray tone, yellowish in the lighter portions, and the dark folds of a neutral or bluish tint. The flesh tints are similar in tone, but darker. The book is red, but of a soft, agreeable tone; the hand which holds it has been restored. St. Catherine, as patron saint and martyr, has several attributes. The crown is hers by right as sovereign princess; she bears the palm as martyr; she holds the book as significant of her learning.

THE ALL-KIND MOTHER.

LO, whatever is at hand
Is full meet for the demand:
Nature oft times giveth best
When she seemeth chariest.
She hath shapen shower and sun
To the need of every one—
Summer bland and winter drear,
Dimpled pool and frozen mere.
All thou lackest she hath still,
Near thy finding and thy fill.
Yield her fullest faith, and she
Will endow thee royally.

Loveless weed and lily fair
She attendeth, here and there—
Kindly to the weed as to
The lorn lily teared with dew.
Each to her hath use as dear
As the other; an thou clear
Thy cloyed senses thou may'st see
Haply all the mystery.
Thou shalt see the lily get
Its divinest blossom; yet
Shall the weed's tip bloom no less
With the song-bird's gleefulness.

Thou art poor, or thou art rich—
Never lightest matter which:
All the glad gold of the noon,
All the silver of the moon,
She doth lavish on thee, while
Thou withholdest any smile
Of thy gratitude to her,
Baser used than usurer.
Shame be on thee an thou seek
Not her pardon, with hot cheek,
And bowed head, and brimming eyes,
At her merciful “Arise!”

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

THE REMOVAL OF McCLELLAN.—FINANCIAL MEASURES.— SEWARD AND CHASE.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.



THE latter part of September wore away in resting the exhausted Army of the Potomac, and beginning anew the endless work of equipment and supply—work which from the nature of the case can never be finished in an army of 200,000 men, any more than in a city of the same size. But this was a lesson which McClellan appeared never able to learn. So long as a single brigade commander complained that some of his men needed new shoes it seemed impossible for McClellan to undertake active operations until that special want was supplied. When that was done some company of cavalry was short a few horses, and the vicious circle of importunate demand and slow supply continued. On the 23d of September, General McClellan discovered signs of heavy reënforcements moving towards the enemy from Winchester and Charlestown. The fact of the enemy's remaining so long in his front, instead of appearing to him as a renewed opportunity, only excited in him the apprehension that he would be again attacked. He therefore set up a new clamor for reënforcements. "A defeat at this juncture would be ruinous to our cause. . . General Sumner with his corps and Williams's (Banks's) occupy Harper's Ferry and the surrounding heights. I think," is the doleful plaint with which the dispatch closes, "he will be able to hold his position till reënforcements arrive." Four days afterwards he writes again in the same strain:

This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign. . . My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side.

He is full of apprehension in regard to an attack upon Maryland, and prays that the river may rise so that the enemy may not cross.

² In his memoirs McClellan tries to create the impression that the President was satisfied with his delay at this time; but his private letters printed in the same volume leave no doubt of the contrary. He says, referring to the President's visit, October 2, "His ostensi-

The President, sick at heart at this exasperating delay, resolved at the end of the month to make a visit to McClellan's camp to see if in a personal interview he could not inspire him with some sense of the necessity for action. The morning report of the 30th of September showed the enormous aggregate of the Army of the Potomac, present and absent, including Banks's command in Washington, as 303,959. Of this number over 100,000 were absent, 28,000 on special duty, and 73,000 present for duty in Banks's command, leaving 100,000 present for duty under McClellan's immediate command. This vast multitude in arms was visited by the President in the first days of October. So far as he could see, it was a great army ready for any work that could be asked of it. During all his visit he urged with as much energy as was consistent with his habitual courtesy the necessity for an immediate employment of this force.² McClellan met all his suggestions and entreaties with an amiable inertia, which deeply discouraged the President. After a day and a night spent in such an interchange of views the President left his tent early in the morning and walked with a friend³ to an eminence which commanded a view of a great part of the camp. For miles beneath them, glistening in the rising sun, spread the white tents of the mighty hosts. The President gazed for a while in silence upon the scene, then turned to his friend and said: "Do you know what that is?" He answered in some astonishment, "It is the Army of the Potomac." "So it is called," responded the President; "but that is a mistake: it is only McClellan's body-guard." He went back to Washington taking little comfort from his visit; and after a few days of painful deliberation, getting no news of any movement, he sent McClellan the following positive instructions:

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN: I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy

ble purpose is to see the troops and the battle-field; I incline to think that the real purpose of his visit is to push me into a premature advance into Virginia."

³ Hon. O. M. Hatch of Illinois, from whom we have this story.

or drive him South. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington and cover the latter by your operations, you can be reinforced by 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line, between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river; also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

These orders were emphasized a few days later by a repetition of the same stinging insult which Lee had once before inflicted upon McClellan on the Peninsula. Stuart's cavalry crossed the Potomac, rode entirely around the Union army, recrossed the river lower down, and joined Lee again without damage. McClellan seems to have felt no mortification from this disgraceful occurrence, which he used merely as a pretext for new complaints against the Government. He seemed to think that he had presented a satisfactory excuse for his inefficiency when he reported to Halleck that his cavalry had "marched 78 miles in 24 hours while Stuart's was marching 90." He pretended that he had at the time only a thousand cavalry. This led to a remarkable correspondence¹ between him and the Government, which shows the waste and destruction of military material under McClellan. By the reports from the Quartermaster-General's office, there were sent to the Army of the Potomac, during the six weeks ending the 14th of October, 10,254 horses and a very large number of mules. "The cost of the horses issued within the last six weeks to the Army of the Potomac," says General Meigs, "is probably not less than \$1,200,000." We may well ask in the words used by the Quartermaster-General in another place: Is there an instance on record of such a drain and destruction of horses "in a country not a desert"? Day after day the tedious controversy went on. This frightful waste of horses was turned by McClellan, as he turned everything, into a subject of reproach against the Government. To one of his complaining dispatches the President sent this sharp rejoinder: "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses

of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?" And again: "Stuart's cavalry outmarched ours, having certainly done more marked service on the Peninsula and everywhere since." These dispatches elicited only new complaints, vindications, and explanations.

It was not alone the pretended lack of horses which kept him idle. In his dispatches to Washington he continually complained—and the complaint was echoed in the correspondence of his satellites and by his adherents in the press—that the army was unable to improve the fine weather on account of the deficiency of all manner of supplies.² The Secretary of War, thinking it necessary at last to take notice of this widespread rumor, addressed¹ a letter to the General-in-Chief demanding a report upon the subject. General Halleck reported that on several occasions where General McClellan had telegraphed that his army was deficient in certain supplies it was ascertained that in every instance the requisition had been immediately filled, except in one, where the Quartermaster-General was forced to send to Philadelphia for the articles needed. He reported that there had been no neglect or delay in issuing all the supplies asked for, and added his belief "that no armies in the world, while in campaign, have been more promptly or better supplied than ours." The General-in-Chief further reported that there had been no such want of supplies as to prevent General McClellan's compliance with the orders, issued four weeks before, to advance against the enemy; that "had he moved to the south side of the Potomac he could have received his supplies almost as readily as by remaining inactive on the north side." He then goes at some length into a detailed and categorical contradiction of General McClellan's complaining dispatches. But we need not go outside of the General's own staff for a direct denial of his accusations. General Ingalls, the Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, makes this just and sensible statement in a letter to the Quartermaster-General dated the 26th of October:

I have seen no real suffering for want of clothing, and do not believe there has been any only where it can be laid directly to the charge of regimental and brigade commanders and their quartermasters, and I have labored, I hope with some effect, in trying to instruct them. I have frequently remarked that an army will never move if it waits until all the different commanders report that they are ready and want no more supplies. It has been my pride

¹ War Records.

² This mania of General McClellan's for providing camp material sometimes assumed an almost ludicrous form. It suddenly occurred to him on the 7th of October to telegraph to the Quartermaster-General asking

how long it would take to give him three or four thousand hospital tents. Meigs answered that a sufficient supply had already been sent him, and that to provide the additional number he spoke of would take a long time and half a million of dollars.

to know the fact that no army was ever more perfectly supplied than this has been, as a general rule.

The President, weary of the controversy, at last replies:

Most certainly I intend no injustice to any, and if I have done any I deeply regret it. To be told, after more than five weeks' total inaction of the army, and during which period we have sent to the army every fresh horse we possibly could, amounting in the whole to 7,918,¹ that the cavalry horses were too much fatigued to move, presents a very cheerless, almost hopeless, prospect for the future, and it may have forced something of impatience in my dispatch. If not recruited and rested then, when could they ever be?

General Halleck, in a letter on the 7th of October, had urged McClellan to follow and seek to punish the enemy. He says:

There is a decided want of legs in our troops. They have too much immobility, and we must try to remedy the defect. A reduction of baggage and baggage trains will effect something, but the real difficulty is, they are not sufficiently exercised in marching; they lie still in camp too long. After a hard march one day is time enough to rest. Lying still beyond that time does not rest the men.²

The President's proclamation of emancipation had been promulgated to the army in general orders on the 24th of September. It will be remembered that General McClellan, in his manifesto from Harrison's Landing, had admonished the President against any such action. His subsequent negotiations with the Democratic politicians in the North had not tended to make him any more favorably disposed towards such radical action. His first impulse was to range himself openly against the proclamation. We are informed by General W. F. Smith that McClellan prepared a protest against it, which he read to some of his intimate friends in the army. The advice of Smith, and perhaps of others, induced him not to commit so fatal a breach of discipline. For a moment he thought of throwing up his commission. In a private letter of September 25 he said:

The President's late proclamation, the continuation of Stanton and Halleck in office, render it almost impossible for me to retain my commission and self-respect at the same time.³

He could not, however, pass over with entire silence an order of such momentous importance; and so after two weeks of meditation,

having heard from his friends in New York,⁴ he issued on the 7th of October a singular document calling the attention of the officers and soldiers of his army to the President's proclamation. He made absolutely no reference to the proclamation itself. He used it, as he says, simply as an opportunity for "defining the relations borne by all persons in the military service towards the civil authorities," a relation which most of his army understood already at least as well as himself. In a few commonplace phrases he restates the political axiom that the civil authority is paramount in our government and that the military is subordinate to it. He therefore deprecated any intemperate discussion of "public measures determined upon and declared by the Government" "as tending to impair and destroy the efficiency of troops"; and significantly adds, "The remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls." There is no reason to believe that this order of General McClellan's was issued with any but the best intentions. He believed, and he thought the army believed, that the President's antislavery policy was ill-advised and might prove disastrous. He therefore issued this order commanding his soldiers to be moderate in their criticisms and condemnations of the President, and to leave to the people at the polls the work of correcting or punishing him. When the troops of the Army of the Potomac had an opportunity of expressing at the polls their sense of the political question at issue between Lincoln and McClellan, the latter had occasion to discover that there was a difference between the sentiment of staff headquarters and the sentiment of the rank and file.

The President's peremptory order to move, which we have mentioned as having been issued on the 6th of October, having produced no effect, he wrote to General McClellan on the 13th of the month a letter so important in its substance and in its relations to subsequent events that it must be printed entire. Having already given the general his orders and told him what to do, he now not only tells him how to do it, but furnishes him unanswerable reasons why it should be done.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 13, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN.

MY DEAR SIR: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in

¹ It was really many more than this.

² War Records.

³ "McClellan's Own Story," p. 615.

⁴ He wrote, October 5: "Mr. Aspinwall [then at McClellan's camp] is decidedly of the opinion that it is my duty to submit to the President's proclamation." ["McClellan's Own Story," p. 655.]

working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do, without the railroad last named. He now wagens from Culpeper Court House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which can not and must not be ignored. Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to "operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if he would permit.

If he should move northward I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should present; and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say "try"; if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable—as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub toward the rim, and this, whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Hay Market, and Fredericksburg; and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Aquia Creek,

meet you at all points from Washington; the same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way.

The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, 5 miles; Gregory's, 13; Snicker's, 18; Ashby's, 28; Manassas, 38; Chester, 45; and Thornton's, 53. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack, if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length running for Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

In the absence of any definite plan or purpose of his own, General McClellan accepted this plan of the President's, giving in his report a characteristic reason, that "it would secure him the largest accession of force." But even after he adopted this decision the usual delays supervened; and on the 21st, after describing the wretched condition of his cavalry, he asked whether the President desired him "to march on the enemy at once or to await the reception of new horses," to which, on the same day, the President directed the General-in-Chief to send the following reply:

Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th instant. If you have not been and are not now in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity. Telegraph when you will move and on what lines you propose to march.

With the exercise of a very little sagacity General McClellan should have discovered from the tone of this dispatch that the President's mood was taking on a certain tinge of austerity. Nevertheless he continued his preparations at perfect leisure, and four days afterwards he sent a long letter asking for definite instructions in regard to the details of guards to be left on the upper Potomac; to which he received a reply saying that "the Government had intrusted him with defeating and driving back the rebel army in his front," and directing him to use his own discretion as to the matters in question. As General McClellan in his dispatch had referred with some apprehension to the probable march of Bragg's army

eastward, General Halleck concluded his answer with this significant intimation: "You are within twenty miles of Lee, while Bragg is distant about four hundred miles."

He finally got his army across the Potomac on the 1st of November. It had begun crossing on the 26th of October, and as the several detachments arrived in Virginia, they were slowly distributed on the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge under the vigilant and now distrustful eye of the President.

There is no doubt that the President's regard and confidence, which had withstood so much from General McClellan, was now giving way. The President had resisted in his behalf, for more than a year, the earnest and bitter opposition of the most powerful and trusted friends of the Administration. McClellan had hardly a supporter left among the Republican senators, and few among the most prominent members of the majority in the House of Representatives. In the Cabinet there was the same unanimous hostility to the young general. In the meeting of the 2d of September, when the President announced that he had placed McClellan in command of the forces in Washington, he was met by an outbreak of protest and criticism from the leading members of the Government which might well have shaken the nerves of any ruler. But the President stood manfully by his action.¹ He admitted the infirmities of McClellan, his lack of energy and initiative; but for this exigency he considered him the best man in the service, and the country must have the benefit of his talents, although he had behaved badly. We need not refer again to the magnanimity with which the President had overlooked the insolent dispatches of General McClellan from Savage's Station and Harrison's Landing. He closed his ears persistently during all the months of the winter and spring to the stories which came to him from every quarter in regard to the tone of factious hostility to himself which prevailed at McClellan's headquarters. But these stories increased to such an extent during the summer and autumn that even in his mind, so slow to believe evil, they occasioned some trouble. Soon after the battle of Antietam an incident came to his hearing of which he felt himself obliged to take notice. Major John J. Key, brother to Colonel Thomas M. Key, of McClellan's staff, was reported to have said, in reply to the question, put by a brother officer, "Why was not the rebel army bagged immediately after the battle near Sharpsburg?" "That is not the game. The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of the other; that both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make a com-

promise and save slavery." The President sent an aide-de-camp to Major Key to inform him of this grave charge, and to invite him to disprove it within twenty-four hours. A few minutes after this notice was sent, the Major appeared at the Executive Mansion in company with Major Turner, the officer to whom the remark had been made. A trial, as prompt as those of St. Louis dispensing justice under the oak at Vincennes, then took place. The President was judge and jury, attorney for the prosecution and for the defense, and he added to these functions that of clerk of the court, and made a record of the proceedings with his own hand, which we copy from his manuscript:

At about 11 o'clock A. M., September 27, 1862, Major Key and Major Turner appear before me. Major Turner says: "As I remember it, the conversation was, I asked the question why we did not bag them after the battle at Sharpsburg. Major Key's reply was, 'That was not the game: we should tire the rebels out and ourselves; that that was the only way the Union could be preserved, we come together fraternally, and slavery be saved.'" On cross-examination Major Turner says he has frequently heard Major Key converse in regard to the present trouble, and never heard him utter a sentiment unfavorable to the maintenance of the Union. He has never uttered anything which he, Major T., would call disloyalty. The particular conversation detailed was a private one.

Upon the reverse of this record the President made the following indorsement:

In my view it is wholly inadmissible for any gentleman holding a military commission from the United States to utter such sentiments as Major Key is within proved to have done. Therefore let Major John J. Key be forthwith dismissed from the military service of the United States.

The President's memorandum continues:

At the interview of Major Key and Major Turner with the President, Major Key did not attempt to controvert the statement of Major Turner, but simply insisted and tried to prove that he was true to the Union. The substance of the President's reply was that if there was a game even among Union men to have our army not take any advantage of the enemy when it could, it was his object to break up that game.

Speaking of the matter afterwards the President said, "I dismissed Major Key because I thought his silly, treasonable expressions were 'staff talk,' and I wished to make an example."²

He was still not ready to condemn General McClellan. He determined to give him one more chance. If McClellan, after Antietam, had destroyed the army of Lee, his official position would have been impregnable. If, after Lee had recrossed the Potomac, McClellan

¹ Welles, "Lincoln and Seward," pp. 195, 196.

² J. H., Diary.

had followed and delivered a successful battle in Virginia, nothing could afterwards have prevented his standing as the foremost man of his time. The President, in his intense anxiety for the success of the national arms, would have welcomed McClellan as his own presumptive successor if he could have won that position by successful battle. But the general's inexplicable slowness had at last excited the President's distrust. He began to think, before the end of October, that McClellan had no real desire to beat the enemy. He set in his own mind the limit of his own forbearance. He adopted for his own guidance a test which he communicated to no one until long afterwards, on which he determined to base his final judgment of McClellan. If he should permit Lee to cross the Blue Ridge and place himself between Richmond and the Army of the Potomac, he would remove him from command.¹

When it was reported in Washington that Lee and Longstreet were at Culpeper Court House, the President sent an order, dated the 5th of November, to General McClellan, which reached him at Rectortown on the 7th, directing him to report for further orders at Trenton, New Jersey, and to turn the command of the Army of the Potomac over to General Burnside. General Buckingham delivered his message first to Burnside and then came with him to McClellan's tent. McClellan says in his memoirs that with the eyes of the two generals upon him he "read the papers with a smile"; but when they were gone, he turned to finish a letter he had been writing, and broke out in the heartfelt ejaculation, "Alas for my poor country!"² He took credit to himself in after years for not heading a mutiny of the troops. He said, "Many were in favor of my refusing to obey the order, and of marching upon Washington to take possession of the Government."³

Thus ended the military career of George Brinton McClellan. Now that the fierce passions of the war, its suspicions and its animosities, have passed away, we are able to judge him more accurately and more justly than was possible amid that moral and material tumult and confusion. He was as far from being the traitor and craven that many thought him as from being the martyr and hero that others would like to have him appear. It would be unfair to deny that he rendered, to the full measure of his capacity, sincere and honest service to the Republic. His technical knowledge was extensive, his industry untiring; his private character was pure and upright, his in-

tegrity without stain. In the private life to which he retired he carried with him the general respect and esteem and the affection of a troop of friends; and when by their partiality he was afterwards called to the exercise of important official functions, every office he held he adorned with the highest civic virtues and accomplishments. No one now can doubt his patriotism or his honor, and the fact that it was once doubted illustrates merely the part which the blackest suspicions play in a great civil war, and the stress to which the public mind was driven in the effort to account for the lack of results he gave the country in return for the vast resources which were so lavishly placed in his hands.

It was in this native inability to use great means to great ends that his failure as a general lies. It was in his temperament to exaggerate the obstacles in front of him, and this, added to his constitutional aversion to prompt decisions, caused those endless delays which wasted the army, exasperated the country, and gave the enemy unbroken leisure for maturing his plans and constant opportunity for executing them. His lethargy of six months in front of Washington, to the wonder and scorn of the Southern generals; his standing at gaze at Yorktown, halted with his vast army by Magruder's men in buckram; his innocent astonishment at Williamsburg at finding that the rebels would not give up Richmond without a fight; his station astride the Chickahominy, waiting for the enemy to grow strong enough to attack him, while his brave soldiers were fading to specters with the marsh fevers; his refusal to assume the offensive after the Confederate repulse at Seven Pines; his second refusal of the favors of the fortune of war when Lee took his army north of the Chickahominy and Porter fought him all day with little more than one corps, but with splendid courage; his starting for the James, in this crisis of his fate, when he should have marched upon the scantily guarded city of Richmond; his final retreat from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Landing, breaking the hearts of the soldiers who had won on that field a victory so complete and so glorious—all these mistakes proved how utterly incapable he was of leading a great army in a grand war. No general had ever been offered such wonderful opportunities, and they continued to be offered to him to the end. When Pope had drawn away the enemy from Richmond, and given him an unmolested embarkation, and had fought with undaunted valor against Lee's army, before which at last he was forced to give way for the want of relief which he had the right to expect from McClellan, the President, magnanimously ignoring all his own causes of quarrel, gave to McClellan

¹ These are the President's own words, taken down at the time they were uttered.

² "McClellan's Own Story," p. 660.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 652.

once more his old army, reënforced by Pope's, and sent him against an enemy who, in a contempt for his antagonist acquired in the Peninsula, had crossed the Potomac and then divided his army in half. As a crowning favor of chance this was made known to McClellan, and even this incalculable advantage he frittered away, and gave Lee forty-eight hours in which to call in his scattered battalions. After Antietam, for six long weeks of beautiful autumn weather he lingered on the north bank of the Potomac, under the constant pressure of the President's persuasions, and afterwards under the lash of his orders and reproaches, unable to make up his mind to pursue the enemy so long as he could find excuse for delay in a missing shoelace or a broken limber.

The devoted affection which he received from his army was strange when we consider how lacking he was in those qualities which generally excite the admiration of soldiers. When Sumner, swinging his hat, charged in front of his lines at Savage's Station, his white hair blowing in the wind; when Phil. Kearney, who had lost his bridle arm in Mexico, rode in the storm of bullets with his reins in his teeth, his sword in his right hand, there was something which struck the imagination of their troopers more than far more serious merits would have done. But no one ever saw General McClellan rejoicing in battle. At Williamsburg, the first Peninsula fight, while Hooker and Kearney and Hancock were in the thick of the conflict, he was at the wharf at Yorktown, very busy, doing an assistant quartermaster's duty; the day of Fair Oaks he spent on the north side of the river; when at Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines's Mill the current of war rolled to the north side, he staid on the south bank; during the retreat to the James he was far in advance, selecting with his intelligent engineer's eye the spots where Sumner, Franklin, and the rest were to fight their daily battles; and even in the fury and thunder of Malvern Hill — the most splendid feat of arms ever performed by the Army of the Potomac, a sight which a man with the true soldier blood in his veins might give his life to see — he spent the greater part of those glorious hours, the diapason of his greatest victory booming in his ears, in his camp at Haxall's or on board the gun-boats, coldly and calmly making his arrangements for the morrow's retreat and for the coöperation of the navy; and at Antietam, the only battle where he really saw his own troops attacking the enemy, he enjoyed that wonderful sight "all day," says General Palfrey,

"till towards the middle of the afternoon, when all the fighting was over, on the high ground near Fry's house, where he had some glasses strapped to the fence, so that he could look in different directions." We make no imputation on his courage: he was a brave man; but he was too much cumbered with other things to take part in his own battles.

With such limitations as these it is not likely that posterity will rank him among the leading generals of our war. The most his apologists ask for him is a place among the respectable, painstaking officers of the second order of talent, the "middle category of meritorious commanders";¹ but when we see such ardent friends and admirers of his person as General Webb and General Palfrey brought by a conscientious and careful study of his career to such a conviction of his continuous mistakes as they have expressed, we may well conclude that the candid historian of the future will have no sentiment but wonder when he comes to tell the story of McClellan's long mismanagement of a great, brave, and devoted army, backed by a government which strained every nerve to support him, and by a people whose fiery zeal would have made him the idol of the nation if he had given them the successes which their sacrifices deserved, and which were a dozen times within his grasp.

We have evidence from a candid and intelligent, if not altogether impartial, witness of the impression made upon the peace party of the North by the dismissal of General McClellan from command. On the 8th of November, 1862, Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, arrived in New York from a visit to England. The Democrats, or the Conservatives, as he called them, had carried the State and elected Mr. Seymour governor. He found them in great exultation over their victory. They imagined that the Government would at once desist from the measures which they had denounced as arbitrary or illegal; or, if not at once, they were certain that after the 1st of January, when Mr. Seymour would be inaugurated, the Government would not dare to exercise its war powers within the limits of the State of New York. They confided to the urbane and genial representative of the British Government much more specious hopes than these — hopes which they were not yet ready to avow to their own countrymen:² that the President would "seek to terminate the war, not to push it to extremity; that he would endeavor to effect a reconciliation with the people of the South and renounce the idea

¹ Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 229.

² I listened with attention to the accounts given me of the plans and hopes of the Conservative party. At the bottom I thought I perceived a desire to put

an end to the war even at the risk of losing the Southern States altogether; but it was plain it was not thought prudent to avow the desire. [Letter of Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, Nov. 17, 1862.]

of subjugating or exterminating them.”¹ But these rising hopes, Lord Lyons says, “were dashed by the next day’s news.” The dismissal of General McClellan caused “an irritation not unmixed with consternation and despondency. The general had been regarded as the representative of Conservative principles in the army. Support of him had been made one of the articles of the Conservative electoral programme. His dismissal was taken as a sign that the President had thrown himself entirely into the arms of the extreme Radical party, and an attempt to carry out the policy of that party would be persisted in.” The “party” and the “policy” referred to were, of course, the Republican party of the nation and the policy of carrying the war through to the end, and saving the Union intact by all the means within the power of the Government; and in this forecast the Conservative gentlemen of New York, who sought the accomplished envoy of Great Britain to unbosom to him their joys and their griefs, showed that however they may have been lacking in patriotism or self-respect, they were not deficient in either logic or sagacity.

FINANCIAL MEASURES.

THE wisdom displayed by Mr. Lincoln in choosing his Cabinet, not from among his personal adherents, but from among the most eminent representatives of the Republicans of the country, shone out more and more clearly as the war went on, and its enormous exigencies tested the utmost powers of each member of the Government. A great orator and statesman has said that in this respect Mr. Lincoln showed at the outset that nature had fitted him for a ruler, and accident only had hid his earlier life in obscurity.

I cannot hesitate [says Mr. Evarts] to think that the presence of Mr. Seward and Mr. Chase in the great offices of State and Treasury, and their faithful concurrence in the public service, and the public repute of the President’s conduct of the Government, gave to the people all the benefits which might have justly been expected from the election of either to be himself the head of the Government, and much else besides. I know of no warrant in the qualities of human nature to have hoped that either of these great political leaders would have made as good a minister under the administration of the other, as President, as both of them did under the administration of Mr. Lincoln. I see nothing in Mr. Lincoln’s great qualities and great authority with this people which could have commensurately served our need in any place, in the conduct of affairs, except at their head.²

We do not question that posterity will confirm this sober and impartial judgment of one

of the most intelligent of contemporary observers. Lincoln, Chase, and Seward were, by a long interval, the first three Republicans of their time, and each, by what would almost appear a special favor of Providence, was placed in a position where he could be of most unquestioned service to the country. Had either of the three, except Lincoln, been President, the nation must have lost the inestimable services of the other two. We have already dwelt at some length upon the responsibility which devolved during these years upon the Secretary of State, and upon the unflinching courage, sagacity, and industry with which he met it. Before recounting an incident which threatened for a time to deprive the President of the powerful assistance of his two great subordinates, it will be necessary to review, in a manner however brief and inadequate, some of the main points in the administration of the finances during the war.

The Republican party came to power at a time when its adversaries had reduced the credit of the country to a point which now appears difficult to believe. Even before the election of Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Cobb, the Secretary of the Treasury, was compelled to pay twelve per cent. for the use of the small sums necessary to meet the ordinary expenses of the Government, and early in the session of Congress which began in December, 1860, after the election of Mr. Lincoln, amid the gathering gloom of imminent civil war, Congress authorized the issue of ten millions of Treasury notes, payable in one year, to be issued at the best rate obtainable by the Secretary of the Treasury. That officer having advertised for bids for half the amount authorized, only a small sum was offered, the rates ranging from twelve to thirty-six per cent. The Secretary accepted the offers at twelve, obtaining, even at that exorbitant rate, the meager sum of half a million dollars. Afterwards a syndicate of bankers, upon hard conditions proposed by themselves, took the remaining four and a half millions at twelve per cent. A month after, when Mr. Cobb had retired and Mr. Dix had assumed the charge of the Treasury, the slight increase of public confidence derived from the character of the new Secretary enabled him to dispose of the other five millions at an average of ten and five-eighths per cent. In February, Congress having authorized a further loan of twenty-five millions at six per cent., Mr. Dix was able to obtain eight millions at a discount of ten per cent. It was in this depressed and discouraging state of the public finances that Mr. Chase took charge of the Treasury. Without any special previous experience, without any other

¹ Letter of Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, Nov. 17, 1862.

² W. M. Evarts, Eulogy on Chase delivered at Dartmouth College.

preparation for his exacting task than great natural abilities, unswerving integrity and fidelity, and unwearying industry, he grappled with the difficulties of the situation in a manner which won him the plaudits of the civilized world and will forever enshrine his name in the memory of his fellow-citizens. To quote Mr. Evarts again:

The exactions of the place knew no limits. A people wholly unaccustomed to the pressure of taxation, and with an absolute horror of a national debt, was to be rapidly subjected to the first without stint, and to be buried under a mountain of the last. Taxes which should support military operations on the largest scale, and yet not break the back of industry, which alone could pay them; loans, in every form that financial skill could devise, and to the farthest verge of the public credit; and finally, the extreme resort of governments under the last stress and necessity, of the subversion of the legal tender, by the substitution of what has been aptly and accurately called the coined credit of the Government for its coined money — all these exigencies and all these expedients made up the daily problems of the Secretary's life. . . . Whether the genius of Hamilton, dealing with great difficulties, transcended that of Chase, meeting the largest exigencies with greater resources, is an unprofitable speculation. They stand together, in the judgment of their countrymen, the great financiers of our history.

Immediately upon assuming office Mr. Chase addressed himself to the difficult work before him. The only provisions which had been made by law for the support of the Government were the fragments of the loan, authorized but unsold, of his predecessor. Satisfied that the rates at which money had been borrowed both by Cobb and by Dix were unnecessarily degrading to the national credit, he firmly refused terms similar to those which they had accepted, and succeeded in borrowing \$8,000,000, none of it at a lower rate than ninety-four, and a few days later he borrowed \$5,000,000 more at par. Even in May, after the outbreak of the war, he was able to place some \$9,000,000 of Government loans at a rate only a little below their face value. These were of course but temporary make-shifts, based upon previous legislation; but when Congress met on the Fourth of July, in that first special session called by President Lincoln, an entirely new system of finance had to be instituted. The national debt on the 1st of July was \$90,000,000, and there was a balance in the Treasury of only \$2,000,000.

There was something appalling in the sudden and monstrous increase of the expenses of the Government as a consequence of the war. The appropriations for the fiscal year 1860-61 were but \$79,000,000, and the estimates for the year following, notwithstanding the threatening outlook, were only for \$75,000,000. Nobody

foresaw the coming exigencies, no provision was made to meet them. Mr. Chase's estimates for the first fiscal year of his administration reached the astounding aggregate of \$318,500,000, but before the short session of Congress adjourned even this enormous sum was found inadequate. To meet these immense demands he proposed to raise \$80,000,000 by taxes and \$240,000,000 by loans. By increasing the taxes upon imports he expected to add \$27,000,000 to the \$30,000,000 already derived from the tariff, and \$3,000,000 from miscellaneous sources made up \$60,000,000, leaving \$20,000,000 to be derived from direct taxes and the excise.¹ Congress responded with the greatest decision and patriotism to the proposition of the Secretary. They authorized, on the 17th of July, a loan of \$250,000,000, and passed laws increasing duties on a great number of articles; they apportioned a direct tax of \$20,000,000 among the States, which was cheerfully paid by the loyal States, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to enforce it by commissioners for the States in rebellion. The estimates voted for the army were \$207,000,000; for the navy, \$56,000,000; and only \$1,300,000 for civil and miscellaneous purposes. Every day during the summer and autumn the expenses of the war increased; for the last quarter of the year they averaged nearly \$50,000,000 a month.

One of the first measures of relief adopted by the Secretary under the authority of Congress was the issue of the so-called "demand notes," payable in coin, for the payment of salaries or other debts of the United States, and by a later act made receivable for public dues. There was, at first, a great distrust of this form of paper money, and the Secretary of the Treasury and other public officers, in order to create confidence, joined in an agreement to receive them in payment of their salaries. General Scott issued a circular to the army announcing the issue of paper money and advising its acceptance. Several corporations declined to accept them in payment of freight. There is an instance recorded where a bank in New York refused to accept a large amount of them except as a special deposit, which deposit was afterwards withdrawn, the value of the notes having increased with the rise of gold, in which they were payable, to fifty per cent. premium in other paper money. But this and other like expedients gave only temporary relief. For the permanent and wholesome administration of financial affairs a great national loan was necessary, and Mr. Chase held, in the city of New York, on the 19th of August, 1861, a conference with the representatives of the principal bankers of the United States. He laid before them, with

¹ Round numbers are used in this chapter.

equal eloquence and judgment, not only the needs of the Government, but the safety and value of its securities; and after a long and earnest discussion, during the course of which it seemed at one time possible that his mission would result in failure, he formed a syndicate of banks which advanced the Government \$50,000,000, and after this loan was successfully placed \$50,000,000 more were derived from the same source, the Government paying seven and three-tenths per cent. for the money, and later he used the authority conferred upon him by the act of July 17, 1861, to issue \$50,000,000 more of six per cent. bonds at a rate making them equivalent to seven per cents.

When Congress met in December and the Secretary in his first annual report gave an account of his stewardship, he reported an aggregate of \$197,000,000 realized from loans in all forms. The receipts from customs were less than had been expected, and on the other hand the expenditures had grown to a sum much larger than in June had been imagined possible. The estimates of the summer session were based upon an army of 300,000 men; double that number were now under arms. The pay and the rations of soldiers and sailors had also been augmented, and the Secretary found himself under the necessity of asking increased appropriations to the amount of \$200,000,000. To meet this needed sum he proposed to increase the tariff and the direct tax, to impose duties on liquors and tobacco, on notes and deeds, and to modify the income tax to the advantage of the Government. In the presence of the vast obligations devolving upon the Administration he did not hesitate to face the facts, and with a courage unusual in history, and a sagacity as surprising as his courage, he announced to Congress that the public debt, which on the 1st of July, 1860, was but \$64,000,000, and on the 1st of July, 1861, was \$90,000,000, would probably amount on the 1st of July, 1862, to \$517,000,000.¹

It was apparent that the volume of currency in the country was not sufficient for the enormous requirements of the public expenditure. The banks could neither pay coin to the Government for bonds, nor dispose of them to their customers for specie. The weaker institutions were already tottering, and the stronger ones feared a crisis which would result in universal disaster. They met in convention on the 27th of December and agreed upon a suspension of specie payments, which took place the following day. The Government necessarily fol-

lowed the example of the banks, and the new year began with the melancholy spectacle of all the public and private institutions of the country redeeming their broken promises with new ones.

The public debt had risen to \$300,000,000; the treasury was almost empty; the daily expenditures amounted to nearly \$2,000,000. It was estimated that \$350,000,000 were needed to pay the expenses of the Government to the close of the fiscal year, and the treasury had means for meeting the drafts of the Government for less than two months. In the world of finance, as well as in the world of politics, it was generally agreed that the only resort of the Government was paper money. Leading bankers throughout the United States urged this upon the Secretary of the Treasury as the only practicable expedient. The leading statesmen in both houses of Congress were brought with extreme reluctance to the same conclusion. To no one was this decision more painful than to the Secretary of the Treasury. He agreed with the greatest of his predecessors, in that famous report which has become a classic in our politics and our finances, that—

The emitting of paper money by the authority of the Government is wisely prohibited to the individual States by the Constitution, and the spirit of that prohibition ought not to be disregarded by the Government of the United States. . . . The wisdom of the Government will be shown in never trusting itself with the use of so seducing and dangerous an expedient. . . . The stamping of paper is an operation so much easier than the laying of taxes, that a government in the practice of paper emissions would rarely fail in any such emergency to indulge itself too far in that resource to avoid as much as possible one less auspicious to present popularity. If it should not even be carried so far as to be rendered an absolute bubble, it would at least be likely to be extended to a degree which would occasion an inflated and artificial state of things incompatible with the regular and prosperous course of the political economy.

But in spite of all this reluctance Mr. Chase felt that an emergency was upon the Government from which this was the only issue. He saw that the corporate institutions of the country would not receive the notes of the Government unless they were made a legal tender by act of Congress.

"This state of things," he wrote, "was the high road to ruin, and I did not hesitate as to the remedy." He threw the entire weight of his influence upon his friends in Congress and urged them to prompt and thorough action. In a letter to Mr. Stevens, of the Committee of Ways and Means, he said:

The provision making the United States notes a legal tender has doubtless been well considered by

¹ It actually was \$524,000,000 on the 1st of July, 1862, and on the 1st of July following it was \$1,100,000,000; Mr. Chase having estimated it in his report of December at \$1,000,000,000.

the committee, and their conclusion needs no support from any observation of mine. I think it my duty to say, however, that in respect to this provision my reflections have conducted me to the same conclusion they have reached. It is not unknown to them that I have felt, nor do I wish to conceal that I now feel, a great aversion to making anything but legal coin a payment of debts. It has been my anxious wish to avoid the necessity of such legislation. It is at present impossible, however, in consequence of the large expenditures entailed by the war and the suspension of the banks, to procure sufficient coin for current disbursements. It has therefore become indispensably necessary that we should resort to the issue of United States notes. The making them a legal tender might still be avoided if the willingness manifested by the people generally, by railroad companies, and by many of the banking institutions, to receive and pay them as money in all transactions were absolutely, or practically, universal; but, unfortunately, there are some persons and some institutions which refuse to receive and pay them, and whose action tends not merely to the unnecessary depreciation of the notes, but to establish discriminations in business against those who in this matter give a cordial support to the Government and in favor of those who do not. Such discriminations should, if possible, be prevented, and the provision making notes a legal tender in a great measure at least prevents it by putting all citizens in this respect upon the same level both in respect to rights and duties.¹

And several days later, on hearing some intimation that the committee thought he was not specially earnest in desiring the passage of the bill, he wrote to Mr. Spaulding:

It is true that I came with reluctance to the conclusion that the legal-tender clause is a necessity, but I came to it decidedly and I support it earnestly. . . . Immediate action is of great importance; the treasury is nearly empty. I have been obliged to draw for the last installment of the November loan. As soon as it is paid I fear the banks generally will refuse to receive United States notes. You will see the necessity of urging the bill through without more delay.

In both houses of Congress the measure received the most violent denunciation on the part of those opposed to it, and even those who voted in favor of it explained their votes in speeches filled with deprecation of the necessity which demanded it. Mr. Sumner, after reciting in an eloquent and impassioned speech the evil which he thought would result from such a measure, concluded by saying:

If I mention these things it is because of the unforgotten solicitude I feel with regard to this measure, and not with the view of arguing against the exercise of a constitutional power, when in the opinion of the Government in which I place trust the necessity for its exercise has arrived.

Mr. Fessenden and Mr. Morrill spoke in the same strain of sorrowful apprehension, but the bill became a law on the 25th of February, 1862.

This important law, which Mr. Chase, as Secretary of the Treasury, urged upon Congress, and which Mr. Chase, as Chief-Justice of the United States, afterwards decided to be unconstitutional, authorized the issue of \$150,000,000 of United States notes not bearing interest, payable at the Treasury of the United States, in denominations of not less than five dollars. These notes were to be received in payment of all debts and demands of every kind due to the United States, except duties on imports, which were payable in coin; and they were to be paid by the United States in satisfaction of all claims against the Government, except for interest upon the public debt, which also was to be paid in coin, the receipts from customs being devoted to this purpose; and these notes were to be lawful money and legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, with the exceptions above mentioned, and they were to be received at par in exchange for Government bonds. By a later act the demand notes were also made a legal tender, as some of the banks had refused to receive them without such provision. It was thought in February that \$150,000,000 of this currency would be enough, but in June it was evident that this would not be the case; \$150,000,000 more were demanded by the Secretary and at once authorized by Congress. \$35,000,000 of this last issue were to be in denominations less than five dollars.

Even this vast volume of currency did not satisfy the insatiable demands of the time, and the rapidly increasing popularity of the United States notes, or greenbacks, as they were called, induced the Government to ask, and Congress to grant, a wide extension of the authority to issue them, so that before the war ended \$1,250,000,000 of legal tender had been authorized by Congress. Of this \$450,000,000 were in legal-tender United States notes; \$400,000,000 in Treasury notes payable not more than three years from date, and bearing interest not exceeding six per cent.; \$400,000,000 in Treasury notes redeemable after three years, bearing a currency interest not exceeding seven and three-tenths per cent. This full authority was not availed of by the Secretary of the Treasury. The legal tenders outstanding on the 30th of June, 1864, amounted to \$600,000,000, and a year later, under the administration of Mr. Fessenden, they amounted to \$669,000,000. The public debt at the close of the fiscal year 1864 was \$1,740,000,000, and the next year \$2,682,000,000, which was increased some

¹ Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 244.

\$200,000,000 by the necessary expenses that followed as a sequel of the war.¹

This is not the place to reopen the controversy which outlasted the war and for years afterwards was an element of disorganization in politics and of a bitter and somewhat demoralizing dispute in both houses of the Congress of the United States. It will probably be the verdict of posterity, as it was the opinion of the ablest statesmen of the time, that a legal-tender act was a necessary exercise of the powers of the Government in a time of supreme emergency; that the result of that act was all that its advocates hoped for in sustaining the Government in a period of vast and compulsory expenditure; and that the evils which grew out of it, great as they unquestionably were, were not so disastrous as the fears of intelligent economists at the time apprehended.

Gold, having been driven from circulation by the legal-tender notes, became at once the favorite stock for speculation in Wall street, and while the premium upon it rose to a certain extent in proportion to the increase of volume of paper money, and was subject to violent fluctuations in consequence of military successes or disasters, there was no such method in the course of its quotations as to render them explicable by either of these influences. It had become, so to speak, a fancy stock, and there was no more reason for its wilder fluctuations than for those of other securities which rise and fall in obedience to the currents of Wall street and without reference to intrinsic values. Just before the passage of the legal-tender bill the premium upon gold was $4\frac{3}{8}$ per cent., and shortly after it became a law the premium fell to $1\frac{1}{2}$; but it gradually rose until in the middle of July it was 17, in the middle of October, $32\frac{1}{2}$, and at the end of the year, 34. On the 25th of February, 1863, after the legal-tender law had been in operation for a year, the premium on gold had risen to $72\frac{1}{2}$; the brilliant successes of the National cause at Gettysburg and Vicksburg reduced it to $23\frac{1}{2}$; it rose again in October to $56\frac{3}{8}$, and rose no higher than that until the following spring, when on the 14th of April, 1864, it was quoted at 88, and on the 22d of June, as the consequence of an ill-advised bill passed by Congress to prevent speculation in gold, the premium climbed at once to the frightful altitude of 130, falling the day afterwards to 115. On the 1st of July it jumped to 185, on the 2d it fell back to 130, and on the 6th the unfortunate law, born of a short-sighted patriotism, was repealed. The

mischief, however, was not yet over, for five days later there was a rise to 185,—the highest figure attained during the war,—followed by a sharp fall, which continued until gold was quoted on the 26th of September at 87, thus falling nearly 100 per cent. in less than three months. There was no warrant in the financial or the military condition of the country for these wild fluctuations. They were the offspring of the desperate efforts of cupidity and enterprise which found their predestined prey in the fears and apprehensions of more timid speculators. The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized in March, 1864, to sell surplus gold for the purpose of checking this speculation; and in April, the premium having risen to 75, Mr. Chase went in person to New York to try the effect of the sale of "cash gold" upon the trade in phantom gold.² The day he arrived the speculators defied him by running the premium to 88. He sold in a few days about \$11,000,000, reducing the premium to 65, with convulsive fluctuations; but the moment the pressure of the Treasury was removed the price of gold mounted as before. The same experiment was frequently tried afterwards, with more or less success.

The troubles of the time, which had reduced the treasury of the United States to a condition of impoverishment, had exercised, as was natural, exactly the contrary effect upon the banks of New York. The timidity of capital had accumulated a great surplus of money in these institutions, with a far smaller number of loans and discounts than usual. The deposits amounted at the end of 1861 to \$146,000,000. At the suggestion of Mr. Cisco, the Assistant Treasurer in New York, the Secretary of the Treasury adopted a system of temporary loans which was sanctioned by Congress in a clause of the legal-tender law, and the authority thus given was increased by successive acts until the limit was fixed at \$150,000,000. These loans were not only of great advantage to the Government as well as to the lenders, but they also served as a useful balance to the money market. In times of severe pressure the reimbursement of large sums was often the means of temporary relief. Another expedient authorized by Congress, on the 1st of March, 1862, was the issuing of certificates of indebtedness to such creditors of the United States as chose to receive them in payment of audited accounts. They were payable one year from date, with interest at six per cent. The power to issue them was unlimited, and their extensive issue

¹ The cost of conducting the war, after it was fully inaugurated, was scarcely at any time less than \$30,000,000 a month. At many times it far exceeded that amount. Sometimes it was not less than \$90,000,000 a month; and the average expenses of the war, from its incep-

tion to its conclusion, may be said to have been about \$2,000,000 each day. The public debt reached its maximum on August 31, 1865, on which day it amounted to \$2,845,907,626.56. [J. J. Knox, "United States Notes."]

² Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 358.

led at last to their serious depreciation. Another important clause of the legal-tender act, in addition to those we have mentioned, was that which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue coupon or registered bonds to an amount not exceeding \$500,000,000, redeemable at the pleasure of the United States after five years and payable twenty years from date, and bearing interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually. They were to be exempt from taxation by State authority, and the coin from duties on imports was to be set aside as a special fund for the payment of interest on the bonds and notes of the United States and for other specified purposes. These were the famous "five twenty" bonds, which, issued at first at a slight discount below par in paper, justified the faith and the sagacity of their earliest purchasers by a steady rise during all the years of their existence and were all paid in gold, or converted into other securities, long before the time fixed for their redemption. "All these measures," the Secretary said in his annual report of December, 1862, "worked well." If Congress had passed at the previous session the national banking law which he urged upon it, he thought that no financial necessity would at that time have demanded additional legislation. But the bill which had been introduced for that purpose the year before had found few supporters. Its only prominent advocate in the House of Representatives was Mr. Samuel Hooper of Massachusetts, a gentleman whose sound judgment and whose large knowledge of financial subjects gave great and deserved weight to his opinions. He could do nothing more at the moment than to obtain leave to bring in a bill for that purpose; but in the course of the year that followed, the absolute necessity for some such measure became every day more apparent. The coin in the country, variously estimated at from \$150,000,000 to \$210,000,000, was absolutely inadequate to the demands of the time. The system of State banks in existence at the beginning of the war was not only incommensurate to the needs of the country, but radically vicious in itself. There was no uniformity of credit, no guaranty whatever of authenticity in circulation. Out of 1500 banks there were said to be fewer than 300 whose notes were not counterfeited. There was but a comparatively small number whose notes were not subject to discount outside of the State in which they were issued, and a citizen traveling from the Mississippi to the Hudson found the contents of his wallet changing in value whenever he crossed a State line. Of course with the immense demand for currency created by the war all these evils were greatly increased and aggravated, and when Congress

met again in December, 1862, the Secretary urged anew, with the added weight of authority which came from a more fully matured plan and an enlarged experience, the scheme, which had been treated with neglect the year before, for establishing a safe and uniform currency throughout the nation.

The National Bank Act was prepared in accordance with the views of Mr. Chase by E. G. Spaulding of New York and Samuel Hooper of Massachusetts, who were members of the Committee of Ways and Means, and during the month of December, 1861, it was printed for the use of that committee. The bill encountered most earnest opposition in the committee, which was busily engaged on the loan and internal-revenue bills and other important work, and it was finally laid aside. In his report for 1862, Mr. Chase again, notwithstanding the suspension of specie payments, earnestly advocated the measure. He said that among the advantages which would arise from its passage would be "that the United States bonds would be required for banking purposes, a steady market would be established, and their negotiation greatly facilitated. . . . It is not easy to appreciate the full benefits of such conditions to a Government obliged to borrow"; it will "reconcile as far as practicable the interests of existing institutions with those of the whole people," and will supply "a firm anchorage to the union of the States."

The bill is understood to have had the sanction of every member of the Administration, and President Lincoln earnestly advocated its passage in his annual message in 1862; and in 1863 he said, "The enactment by Congress of a national banking law has proved a valuable support of the public credit, and the general legislation in relation to loans has fully answered the expectations of its favorers. Some amendments may be required to perfect existing laws, but no change in their principles or general scope is believed to be needed." Again, in 1864, he favored the taxation of the issues of State banks and the substitution of national-bank notes therefor. About fourteen months thereafter the same bill which had been printed for the use of the Committee of Ways and Means was introduced by Mr. Sherman and referred to the Finance Committee of the Senate, from which it was reported by him on February 2, 1863, with amendments. Ten days later it passed that body by a vote of 23 to 21; and on the 20th, same month, it also passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 78 to 64.¹

It was warmly advocated by those who appreciated its advantages, and as earnestly opposed by those who thought they foresaw the growth of a powerful monetary system dangerous to the popular liberties. Its chief opponent in the Senate was Mr. Collamer, who ably represented the traditions of the past; it was most efficiently advocated by Mr. John Sherman of Ohio, to whom was reserved a part of great

¹ Address of Comptroller Knox before the Merchants' Association of Boston, Nov. 27, 1880. "Bankers' Magazine," Vol. XV., p. 545.

honor and usefulness in bringing to a close the financial history of the war.

The bill was thoroughly revised, discussed, and repassed a little more than one year afterwards (June 3, 1864). . . . The vote in the Senate was 30 in favor and 9 against the bill, and in the House the vote was 78 to 63.¹

The principal features of this comprehensive scheme were to open to private capital the business of national banking so freely that there could be no reasonable accusation of privilege or monopoly; to give to the whole system of banks a homogeneous circulation of notes, having a common impression, authenticated by a common authority, made safe by an adequate provision of specie, and secured for redemption by the pledge of United States bonds deposited in Washington; and finally by the Act of March 3, 1865, to tax out of existence the circulation of the banks organized under State laws. The whole system being thus based upon Government bonds, several hundreds of millions of United States notes were funded in bonds. It was the Secretary's belief, afterwards fully justified under the wise and masterly administration of Mr. Sherman, that this system of national banks would be of invaluable assistance in the resumption of specie payments by the Government. He said:

If temporarily these associations redeem their issues with United States notes, resumption of specie payment will not thereby be delayed or endangered, but hastened and secured; for, just as soon as victory shall restore peace, the ample revenue already secured by wise legislation will enable the Government through advantageous purchases of specie to replace at once large amounts, and at no distant day the whole of this circulation, by coin, without detriment to any interest, but, on the contrary, with great and manifest benefit to all interests.

The bill was constantly amended and improved, and, although it might be too much to say that it was ever rendered entirely perfect, it is perhaps now unquestioned that few more wise and beneficent measures have ever been devised by American statesmanship.

No financial operations so prodigious as those which we have thus briefly sketched had ever before been known. The largest loans ever made by England were those which she negotiated in the terrible years of 1812-13 when she was fighting at the same time Napoleon and the United States. The British Government borrowed in those years \$534,000,000, only a little more than Mr. Chase borrowed in nine months. The estimated wealth of the United Kingdom at that time, and of the loyal States in 1860, was almost exactly the same, in each case something over \$100,000,000,000. Nowhere, we believe, do the annals of the world record

such an appreciation of the public credit as that which is seen from the time of Mr. Lincoln's accession to the presidency until the period of the resumption of specie payment after the close of the war. It was hard for Mr. Buchanan's Secretaries of the Treasury to borrow money to pay the ordinary expenses of the Government at twelve per cent. Mr. Chase, as soon as Congress had given him command of the machinery required, in the legal-tender currency, the popular loan, and the national banking law, found no great difficulty in supplying at six per cent. the ravenous wants of a most costly war; and under the operation of the laws provided for him and similar legislation called for by his successors the Government credit gradually rose until its four per cents. sold at 130, and its three per cents. commanded a premium. At the beginning the Secretary was forced to rely more upon individual patriotism than upon public confidence; but long before the war ended he had hundreds of millions at his command.

In all these important labors Mr. Chase had the constant support of the President. Mr. Lincoln exercised less control and a less constant supervision over the work of the Treasury than over some other departments. But he rated at their true value the industry and the ability of the Secretary and the immense responsibility devolved upon his department, and contributed to its success in every way in his power. He sometimes made suggestions of financial measures,² but did not insist on their being adopted, and when the Secretary needed his powerful assistance with Congress he always gave it ungrudgingly. In regular and special messages he urged upon Congress the measures which the Secretary thought important,³ and in frequent and informal conferences at the Executive Mansion with the leading members of both houses he exerted all his powers of influence and persuasion to assist the Secretary in obtaining what legislation was needed.

SEWARD AND CHASE.

MR. SEWARD and Mr. Chase became at an early day, and continued to be, respectively, the representatives in the Cabinet of the more conservative and the more radical elements of the Republican party. Each exerted himself with equal zeal and equal energy in the branch of the public service committed to his charge; but their relative attitudes towards the President soon became entirely different. Mr. Seward, while doing everything possible to

¹ Address of Comptroller Knox.

² Lincoln to Chase, May 18, 1864.

³ Especially the message of January 19, 1863, in favor of the funding bill and the bill to provide a national currency.

serve the national cause, and thus unconsciously building for himself an enduring monument in the respect and regard of the country, was, so far as can be discerned, absolutely free from any ambition or afterthought personal to himself. He was, during the early part of the war, so intent upon the work immediately in hand that he had no leisure for political combinations; and later, when the subject of the next Presidential nomination began to be considered and discussed, he recognized the fact that Mr. Lincoln was best qualified by his abilities, his experience, and his standing in the country to be his own successor.

The attitude of Mr. Chase was altogether unlike this. As we have seen, he did all that man could do to grapple with the problem of supplying the ways and means of the gigantic war. With untiring zeal and perfect integrity he devoted his extraordinary ability to the work of raising the thousands of millions expended in the great struggle which was crowned with a colossal success. But his attitude towards the President, it is hardly too much to say, was one which varied between the limits of active hostility and benevolent contempt. He apparently never changed his opinion that a great mistake had been committed at Chicago, and the predominant thought which was present to him through three years of his administration was that it was his duty to counteract, as far as possible, the evil results of that mistake. He felt himself alone in the Cabinet. He looked upon the President and all his colleagues as his inferiors in capacity, in zeal, in devotion to liberty and the general welfare. He sincerely persuaded himself that every disaster which happened to the country happened because his advice was not followed, and that every piece of good fortune was due to his having been able, from time to time, to rescue the President and the rest of the Cabinet from the consequences of their own errors. He kept up a voluminous correspondence with friends in all sections of the country, to which we should hesitate to refer had it not been that he retained copies of his letters, and many years afterwards gave them into the hands of a biographer for publication. These letters are pervaded by a constant tone of slight and criticism towards his chief and his colleagues. He continually disavows all responsibility for the conduct of the war. "My recommendations," he says, "before [Halleck] came in were generally disregarded, and since have been seldom ventured. . . . Those who reject my counsels ought to know better than I

do."¹ "I do not wonder that dissatisfaction prevails. . . . It is sad to think of the delay and inaction which have marked the past."² To Senator Sherman he wrote:

The future does not look promising to me. . . . We, who are called members of the Cabinet, but are in reality only separate heads of departments, meeting now and then for talk on whatever happens to come uppermost, not for grave consultation on matters concerning the salvation of the country—we have as little to do with it as if we were the heads of factories supplying shoes or clothing. . . . It is painful to hear complaints of remissness, delays, discords, and dangers, and feel that there must be ground for such complaints, and know, at the same time, that one has no power to remedy the evils complained of, and yet be thought to have.³

To another he said:

Some consolation, in the review of the disasters we have experienced, may perhaps be found in the supposition that they were necessary to convince the President and the country that a decided measure in relation to slavery was absolutely necessary. . . . Though charged with the responsibility of providing means for the vast expenditures of the war, I have little more voice in its conduct than a stranger to the Administration.⁴

He says if his judgment had more weight the war would be prosecuted with more vigor and success. The letters in this strain are innumerable. In all of them he labors to keep himself distinct and separate from the rest of the Government, protesting against its faults and errors, and taking credit for the good advice he wastes upon them. He says:

We have fallen on very evil days. . . . The President has hitherto refused to sanction any adequate measures for the liberation of the loyal population of the South from slavery to the rebels. . . . Then we have placed and continued in command generals who have never manifested the slightest sympathy with our cause as related to the controlling question of slavery. . . . All these causes tend to demoralization, and we are demoralized. . . . It is some consolation to me that my voice, and, so far as opportunity has allowed, my example, has been steadily opposed to all this. I have urged my ideas on the President and my associates till I begin to feel that they are irksome to the first and to one or two at least of the second.⁵

All this time, with the most facile self-deception, he believed in his own loyalty and friendship for the President, and nightly recorded in his diary his sorrow for Mr. Lincoln's fatal course. September 12 he writes:

The Secretary of War informed me that he had heard from General Halleck that the President is going out to see General McClellan, and commented with some severity on his humiliating submissive-

¹ Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 443.

² *Ibid.*, p. 458.

³ *Ibid.*, 379.

⁴ Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 491.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 453, 454.

ness to that officer. It is indeed humiliating, but prompted, I believe, by a sincere desire to serve the country. . . . I think that the President, with the most honest intentions in the world, and a naturally clear judgment and a true, unselfish patriotism, has yielded so much to border State and negro-phobic counsels that he now finds it difficult to arrest his own descent towards the most fatal concessions. He has already separated himself from the great body of the party which elected him; distrusts most those who represent its spirit, and waits — for what?†

He says in another place :

September 11th. How singularly all our worst defeats have followed administrative cr—no, blunders. McDowell defeated at Bull Run, because the Administration would not supersede Patterson by a general of more capacity, vigor, and devotion to the cause; McClellan defeated at Richmond, because the Administration recalled Shields and forced Frémont to retire from the pursuit of Jackson; . . . Pope defeated at Bull Run, because the Administration persisted in keeping McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac.²

He never lost an opportunity for ingratiating himself with the general in favor, or the general in disgrace. He paid equally assiduous homage to the rising and the setting sun. In the dawn of McClellan's first successes in the West he made haste to write to him :

The country was indebted to me . . . in some considerable degree for the change of your commission from Ohio into a commission of major-general of the army of the Union, and your assignment to the command of the Department of the Ohio. I drew with my own hand the order extending it into Virginia. . . . It was my wish that you should remain in command of the Mississippi, but in this I was overruled.³

His present command, however, he says, is a more important one, and he wishes Kentucky and Tennessee to be included in it, and thinks both will be done. When McClellan was appointed General-in-Chief, the Secretary, eager to be the first to tell the good news, immediately wrote a note to Colonel Key, McClellan's judge-advocate: "McClellan is Commander-in-Chief. Let us thank God and take courage."⁴ To newly appointed and promoted generals he wrote in the same strain.⁵ Even when he had become estranged from a prominent officer the slightest appeal to his *amour propre* was sufficient to bring about a reconciliation. After he had lost all confidence in McClellan and almost given up the President for not dismissing him, General John Cochran came to him and said McClellan would like to retire from active command if he could

do so without disgrace—which could be accomplished, and a more active general secured, by restoring him to the chief command, "where he could act in unison with myself," says the Secretary.⁶ He entered at once into *pour-parlers*, saying how much he had once admired and confided in McClellan; how the general came to lose his confidence; how heartily he had supported him with supplies and reinforcements, notwithstanding his mistrust; his entire willingness to receive any correction which facts would warrant; his absolute freedom from personal ill-will. When the amiable ambassador told him that Colonel Key had often expressed his regret that McClellan had not conferred and acted in concert with the Secretary, he replied, "I think if he had, that the rebellion would be ended now."⁷ Further letters followed between them which are faithfully recorded in his diary; but during these platonic negotiations McClellan was finally removed from command.

Mr. Chase cultivated, however, the closest relations with those generals who imagined they had a grievance against the Administration. He took General Shields to his arms when he returned from the Shenandoah after his disastrous experience with Jackson. Shields's account of how he would have destroyed Stonewall Jackson if the President had permitted him did not apparently touch the Secretary's sense of humor. He received it all in good faith; assured Shields that if he had had his way he should have been supported, and wrote in his diary: "Sad! sad! yet nobody seems to heed. General Shields and I talked all this over, deploring the strange fatality which seemed to preside over the whole transaction. He dined with us and after dinner rode out." To Hooker, after the failure of the Chickahominy campaign, he said, "General, if my advice had been followed, you would have commanded the army after the retreat to the James River, if not before";⁸ to which Fighting Joe of course responded, "If I had commanded, Richmond would have been ours." He warmly sympathized with General Hunter after the revocation of his emancipation order in South Carolina, and allowed his preference for military emancipation to carry him, in one instance, to the point of absolute disloyalty to the President. On the 31st of July, 1862, he wrote a long letter to General Butler in New Orleans striving to convert the views of the President in relation to slavery in the Gulf States, and urging in place of them his own opinions, "to which,"

1 Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 470.

2 Ibid., p. 469.

3 Shuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 427.

4 Ibid., p. 445.

5 Ibid., p. 457.

6 Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 499.

7 Ibid., p. 500.

8 Ibid., p. 487.

he said, "I am just as sure the masses will and the politicians must come, as I am sure that both politicians and masses have come to opinions expressed by me when they found few concurrents"; and he concluded his letter with this rash and mischievous advice:

Of course, if some prudential consideration did not forbid, I should at once, if I were in your place, notify the slaveholders of Louisiana that henceforth they must be content to pay their laborers wages. . . . It is quite true that such an order could not be enforced by military power beyond military lines, but it would enforce itself by degrees a good way beyond them, and would make the extension of military lines comparatively quite easy.¹

Here the obvious objection presented itself, that such a course would be in direct contra-vention to the President's known policy, and would be immediately repudiated and revoked by him. The Secretary foresaw this, and added a prediction so reckless, and so disloyal to his constitutional chief, that if it were not printed by his authority it would be difficult to believe he had written it: "It may be said that such an order would be annulled. I think not. It is plain enough that the annulling of Hunter's order was a mistake. It will not be repeated." A volume could not more clearly show the Secretary's opinion of the President.

The surest way to his confidence and regard was to approach him with conversation derogatory to Mr. Lincoln. He records in his diary an after-dinner conversation with an officer whom he seems to have met for the first time: "I asked him what he thought of the President."² He apparently had no perception of the gross impropriety of such a question coming from him. The officer evidently knew what sort of reply was expected. He said:

A man irresolute, but of honest intentions; born a poor white, in a slave State, and of course among aristocrats; kind in spirit and not envious, but anxious for approval, especially of those to whom he has been accustomed to look up—hence solicitous of support of the slaveholders in the border States, and unwilling to offend them; without the large mind necessary to grasp great questions, uncertain of himself, and in many things ready to lean too much on others.³

Of course, after a dictum so thoroughly in harmony with his own opinions, the Secretary naïvely records that he "found this gentleman well read and extremely intelligent." In reply to a correspondent, whose letters were filled with the most violent abuse of the President and other officers of the Government, he had no word of rebuke. He simply replied:

I am not responsible for the management of the war and have no voice in it, except that I am not forbidden to make suggestions; and do so now and then when I can't help it.⁴

He had no defense for his colleagues against the attacks of his correspondent, except to say:

Nor should you forget that a war managed by a President, a commanding general, and a secretary, cannot, especially when the great differences of temperament, wishes, and intellectual characteristics of these three are taken into account, reasonably be expected to be conducted in the best possible manner. This condition can only be remedied by the President, and, as yet, he fears the remedy most.

The President was not unaware of this disposition of his minister of finance towards him. Presidents in even a greater degree than kings are kept informed of all currents of favor and hostility about them; for besides being to an equal degree the source of favors and of power, they are not surrounded by any of that divinity which hedges the hereditary ruler, and they are compelled to listen to the crude truth from the hundreds of statesmen and politicians who surround them. And, besides this, the Secretary of the Treasury was a man too direct and too straightforward to work in the darkness. He records in his diary a singular conversation which he held with Mr. Thurlow Weed, an intimate and trusted counselor of the President and the bosom friend of the Secretary of State:

Weed called, and we had a long talk. . . . I told him I did not doubt Mr. Seward's fidelity to his ideas of progress, amelioration, and freedom, but that I thought he adhered too tenaciously to men who proved themselves unworthy and dangerous, such as McClellan; that he resisted too persistently decided measures; that his influence encouraged the irresolution and inaction of the President in respect to men and measures, although personally he was as decided as anybody in favor of vigorous prosecution of the war, and as active as anybody in concerting plans of action against the rebels.⁵

It is altogether probable that Mr. Weed would consider it his duty to communicate to his friends this disparaging view entertained of them by the Secretary of the Treasury; and when we consider that Mr. Chase talked and wrote in this strain to hundreds of people in regard to his associates, it is likely that they were as thoroughly aware of his opinions and utterances as if he had made them in Cabinet meeting. But Seward was, as the President once said of him, "a man without gall"; and it was the lifelong habit of Mr. Lincoln to disregard slights that were personal to himself.

General Hunter, that gave him this highly satisfactory view of the President's character.

¹ Shuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 377.

² Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 505.

³ It is doubtless by a slip of the pen that the Secretary attributed this conversation to General Hunter. It was evidently General Halpine, who called with

⁴ Warden, p. 549.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

He had the greatest respect and admiration for Mr. Chase's capacity; he believed thoroughly in his devotion to the national cause; and seeing every day the proof of his pure and able management of the finances of the Government, he steadily refused to consider the question of the Secretary's feelings towards himself.

It was near the end of the year 1862 that an incident occurred which threatened for a time to deprive the Government of the services of the Secretaries both of State and of the Treasury. A strong feeling of discontent, gradually ripening into one of hostility, had grown up in the Senate against Mr. Seward. It was founded principally upon the ground formulated by Mr. Chase in his interview with Weed that he "adhered too tenaciously to men who proved themselves unworthy and dangerous, such as McClellan; that he resisted too persistently decided measures; that his influence encouraged the irresolution and inaction of the President in respect to men and measures"; and Mr. Sumner, who had up to this time been friendly rather than otherwise to Mr. Seward, was suddenly brought into sympathy with his opponents by discovering in the diplomatic correspondence a phrase bracketing together the secessionists and the extreme antislavery men for equal condemnation and criticism.¹

The feeling against the Secretary of State at last attained such a height in the Senate that a caucus was called to consider the matter, which resulted in a vote being taken demanding of the President the dismissal of Mr. Seward from his Cabinet. As a matter of taste and expediency this resolution later in the evening was withdrawn and another adopted in its place requesting the President to reconstruct the Cabinet, in which, although Mr. Seward's name was not mentioned, the intention of the Republican senators remained equally clear. A committee was appointed to present the sense of the caucus to the President; but before this was carried into effect, Senator King of New York, meeting the Secretary of State, acquainted him with these proceedings, and he, with his son, the Assistant-Secretary of State, at once presented their resignations to the President.

¹ Mr. Seward, writing to Mr. Adams on the 5th of July, 1862, had used this phrase: "It seems as if the extreme advocates of African slavery and its most vehement opponents were acting in concert together to precipitate a servile war — the former by making the most desperate attempts to overthrow the Federal Union, the latter by demanding an edict of universal emancipation as a lawful and necessary, if not, as they say, the only legitimate way of saving the Union." When we reflect that only eight days after these words were written the President informed Mr. Seward of his intention to issue his emancipating edict, we may imagine how far the Secretary was from pene-

On the morning of the 19th of December a committee of nine waited upon the President and presented him the resolutions adopted the day before. A long and earnest conference took place between the President and the committee, which was marked on both sides by unusual candor and moderation. They attacked, one by one, the Secretary of State, not for any specific wrong-doing, but for a supposed lukewarmness in the conduct of affairs, and especially for a lack of interest in the antislavery measures of the Administration, which they considered essential to a successful prosecution of the war. When the President reported this conference to his Cabinet afterwards he said, in his own peculiar imagery:

While they seemed to believe in my honesty, they also appeared to think that when I had in me any good purpose or intention Seward contrived to suck it out of me unperceived.

The conference ended without other result than an appointment for the committee to call again in the evening. Lincoln at once called the Cabinet together and laid the entire matter before them. He gave them distinctly to understand that in this proceeding he was not inviting or intimating that he desired the resignation of any of them. He said he could not afford to lose any of them; that he did not see how he could get on with a Cabinet composed of new material; and he dismissed the council with the request that they also should meet him that evening. The committee and the Cabinet — Seward of course being absent — came together in accordance with the President's instruction, and each party was greatly surprised to find the other there. Mr. Lincoln was determined, however, to have a thorough and frank discussion, so that hereafter neither in his government nor in the Senate should it be possible to say that there were any points between them concealed or unexplained. The President stated the case and read the resolutions of the senators, commenting upon parts of it with some gentle severity. A general discussion then took place, marked with singular frankness, both in the attack and the defense, Collamer and Fessenden speaking with more mildness than the others, but Grimes, Sumner,

trating the mind of his chief — a fault for which he ought not perhaps to be blamed, considering the extreme reticence which the President observed at that time in regard to his intentions. Still, the dispatch was unnecessary, and the critics of the Secretary contended, not without reason, that it should not have been sent before being submitted to the President's approval. He had also said, writing to Mr. Dayton on the 22d of April, that "the rights of the States and the condition of every human being in them will remain subject to exactly the same laws and forms of administration, whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall fail." This also had given great offense to the radical antislavery men.

and Trumbull attacking the Cabinet generally, and Mr. Seward particularly, with considerable sharpness. The Cabinet defended themselves in general and their absent colleague with equal energy but with unruffled temper. Mr. Chase alone seemed to feel himself in a false position. As we have seen in his interview with Weed, he was in the habit of using precisely the same expressions in regard to the Secretary of State as those employed by the senators. Brought to bay thus unexpectedly and summoned to speak before both parties to the controversy, he naturally felt the embarrassment of the situation. He could not join the Senate in their attack upon the Administration and he could not effectively defend his colleagues in the presence of eight senators, to all of whom he had probably spoken in derogation of the President and the Secretary of State. He protested with some heat against the attitude in which he was placed, and said he would not have come if he had expected to be arraigned. When the fire of the discussion had burned itself out, Mr. Lincoln then took a formal vote. "Do you, gentlemen," he said, "still think Seward ought to be excused?" Grimes, Trumbull, Sumner, and Pomeroy said "Yes." Collamer, Fessenden, and Howard declined to commit themselves. Harris was opposed to it and Wade was absent. The meeting broke up late at night, says Secretary Welles, "in a milder spirit than it met." The free talk had cleared the air somewhat, and both parties to the controversy respected each other more than before. As the senators were retiring, Mr. Trumbull paused for a moment at the door, then, turning, walked rapidly back to the President and said to him privately, but with great vehemence, that the Secretary of the Treasury had held a very different tone the last time he had spoken with him.

The news of this stormy meeting quickly transpired, and the next morning there was great discussion and excitement in the town. The resignation of Seward was regarded as irrevocable, and all the amateur Cabinet-makers were busy in the preparation of a new Administration. The hopes of all the enemies of the Government were greatly stimulated by this indication of divided counsels, and the partisans of General McClellan in particular thought they saw in this conjuncture the occasion for his return to power. In fact, they felt so sure of his speedy restoration to command that they began to stipulate as the price of their adhesion to him that he should dictate his own terms on his return; that he must insist upon the disposal of all the important commands in the army.¹ They imagined that the

¹ Welles, Diary.

President would be so helpless that the friends of McClellan might demand any terms they thought good.

The President, though deeply distressed at the turn which affairs had taken, preserved his coolness and kept his own counsel. On the morning of the 20th, in the presence of several other members of the Cabinet who had called for further discussion of the crisis, the Secretary of the Treasury tendered his resignation. He held the written paper in his hand, but did not advance to deliver it. The President stepped forward and took it with an alacrity that surprised and, it must be said, disappointed Mr. Chase. He then at once dismissed the meeting. From the moment when he saw Mr. Chase holding his resignation in his hand, his way was clear before him. He at once sent an identical note to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, saying:

You have respectively tendered me your resignations as Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. I am apprised of the circumstances which may render this course personally desirable to each of you; but after most anxious consideration my deliberate judgment is that the public interest does not admit of it. I therefore have to request that you will resume the duties of your Departments respectively.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

The next morning Mr. Seward addressed a brief note to the President, dated at the Department of State, and saying: "I have cheerfully resumed the functions of this Department, in obedience to your command"; and inclosed a copy of this note to the Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Chase found his position not quite so simple as that of the Secretary of State. He did not follow Mr. Seward's example in returning to the Cabinet as promptly as he did in leaving it. He wrote him a brief letter, saying:

I have received your note and also a call from Mr. Nicolay, to whom I have promised an answer to the President to-morrow morning. My reflections strengthen my conviction that being once honorably out of the Cabinet no important public interest now requires my return to it. If I yield this judgment, it will be in deference to apprehensions which really seem to me unfounded. I will sleep on it.

He had seen in the face of the President the gratification which the tender of his resignation had imparted, and returning to his house, while not entirely comprehending what had happened, he seemed conscious that he had made a misstep. He wrote a letter to the President, from which we take a few paragraphs:

Will you allow me to say that something you said or looked when I handed you my resignation this morning made on my mind the impression

that having received the resignations both of Governor Seward and myself you felt that you could relieve yourself from trouble by declining to accept either, and that this feeling was one of gratification.

He then went on to say that he was glad of any opportunity to promote the comfort of the President, but that he did not desire him to decline accepting his resignation. He said :

Recent events have too rudely jostled the unity of your Cabinet and disclosed an opinion too deeply seated, and too generally received in Congress and in the country, to be safely disregarded, that the concord in judgment and action essential to successful administration does not prevail among its members. By some the embarrassment of Administration is attributed to me; by others, to Mr. Seward; by others still, to other heads of Departments. Now neither Mr. Seward nor myself is essential to you or to the country. We both earnestly wish to be relieved from the oppressive charge of our respective Departments, and we have both placed our resignations in your hands.

He concluded by saying he thought both himself and Mr. Seward could better serve the country at that time as private citizens than in the Cabinet. He did not immediately transmit this letter to the President, and after hearing from Mr. Seward that he had gone back to the Cabinet his suggestion that both would better retire was no longer practicable. After a Sunday passed in very serious consideration, he resolved to withdraw his resignation. He was unable, even then, to imitate the brevity of Mr. Seward's note. He sent to the President his note of the 20th inclosed in another, in which he said that reflection had not much, if at all, changed his original impression, but that it had led him to the conclusion that he had in this matter to conform his action to the President's judgment. He would therefore resume his post as Secretary of the Treasury, ready, however, to retire at any moment if, in the President's judgment, the success of the Administration might be in the slightest degree promoted thereby.

The untrained diplomatist of Illinois had thus met and conjured away, with unsurpassed courage and skill, one of the severest crises that ever threatened the integrity of his Administration. He had to meet it absolutely unaided: from the nature of the case he could take no advice from those who were nearest him in the Government. By his bold and original expedient of confronting the senators with the Cabinet, and having them discuss their mutual misunderstandings under his own eye, he cleared up many dangerous miscon-

ceptions, and, as usually happens when both parties are men of intelligence and good-will, brought about a friendlier and more considerate feeling between his government and the Republican leaders than had ever before existed. By placing Mr. Chase in such an attitude that his resignation became necessary to his own sense of dignity he made himself absolute master of the situation; by treating the resignations and the return to the Cabinet of both ministers as one and the same transaction he saved for the nation the invaluable services of both, and preserved his own position of entire impartiality between the two wings of the Union party. The results of this achievement were not merely temporary. From that hour there was a certain loosening of the hitherto close alliance between Mr. Chase and the Republican opposition to the President, while a kind of comradeship, born of their joint sortie and reëntrance into the Government, gave thereafter a greater semblance of cordiality to the relations between the Secretaries of State and of the Treasury. But above all, the incident left the President seated more firmly than ever in the saddle. When the Cabinet had retired, and left the President with the resignation of Mr. Chase in his hands, he said to a friend who entered soon after, in one of those graphic metaphors so often suggested to him by the memories of his pioneer childhood, and which revealed his careless greatness perhaps more clearly than his most labored official utterances, "Now I can ride; I have got a pumpkin in each end of my bag."¹

Nearly a year later he said in a conversation relating to this matter :

I do not see how it could have been done better. I am sure it was right. If I had yielded to that storm and dismissed Seward the thing would all have slumped over one way, and we should have been left with a scanty handful of supporters. When Chase gave in his resignation I saw that the game was in my hands, and I put it through.

Though the opposition to Mr. Seward did not immediately come to an end,² it never exhibited such vitality again, and its later manifestations were treated far more cavalierly by Mr. Lincoln. He had even before this dismissed one very respectable committee from New York who had called to express an unfavorable opinion of the premier, by saying with unwonted harshness, "You would be willing to see the country ruined if you could turn out Seward";³ and after this incident he never again allowed the Secretary of State to be attacked in his presence.

¹ J. H., Diary.

² There was a long and heated discussion between Mr. Greeley and Mr. Raymond, in the columns of the

"Tribune" and "Times," in regard to the culpability of the Secretary of State in the matter of his dispatches.

³ Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 468.

SLOW-BURNING CONSTRUCTION.¹



THE fearful losses of life and property by fire in the United States have lately attracted the attention which is due to the causes of such loss and to the means for preventing them. Coincidentally with these investigations a very profound change in the conduct of the business of fire insurance companies is in progress. Until within a very recent period the management of an insurance company issuing policies of indemnity against loss by fire has consisted mainly in taking risks as they might happen to be, a more or less careful inspection having been made into the condition of the property before issuing a policy, for the purpose of estimating the rate of premium to be charged rather than with a view to improving such conditions.

The notice of the owners or occupants has sometimes been called to glaring defects, and a somewhat desultory inspection has been maintained; not so much with the intention of informing the owner or occupant how to protect the property against fire so as to reduce the loss to the lowest terms, but rather for the purpose of informing the underwriters, that they may not take or maintain too low a rate of premium. In fact, there has been until recently a passive indifference and sometimes a frankly acknowledged objection on the part of prominent underwriters to the introduction of the most effective safeguards, lest the reduction of premiums that might be demanded should diminish the profits of the insurance companies.

It may be admitted that under this system many fire insurance companies have been established and conducted by men of conspicuous ability, with great profit to the stockholders and indirectly with great benefit to the assured. These companies have done a world-wide business, scattering their risks, and by the very breadth of their operations and income they have been enabled to reduce their premiums to the very lowest terms that the system itself would permit, subject as it has been to an excessive expense; but as the amount of property at risk has increased in recent years with very great rapidity, the companies of a safe kind have been unable to carry the full lines required in the concentrated hazards of our great cities. Owners have therefore been obliged to seek insurance wherever they could get it, sometimes exhausting all the fire insurance companies of the world. At the same time an unwholesome competition has grown up among

the underwriters themselves by which their previously heavy expenses in the conduct of their business have been increased, while badly managed or small companies have been led to take risks at less than cost—a method ending inevitably in bankruptcy or in withdrawal from business.

In the opinion of competent experts from eighty to ninety per cent. of all the stock fire insurance companies organized to transact business within the limits of the United States, or empowered thereto, have agencies in the State of New York, which renders it incumbent on them to make returns to the Commissioner of Insurance of that State giving a statement of all their transactions in the United States. There could be no better indication of the rapid growth of wealth in this country during the last twenty-five or thirty years than a comparison of the sum of the insurance written by these companies. In 1859, before the civil war, the sum of the risks taken by companies making these returns was a fraction under \$1,500,000,000. In the year 1887 the amount in round numbers was \$12,250,000,000.

The proportion of loss to the value of the property insured has slowly diminished: there has been a little improvement in the construction of buildings in some of the great cities, though not much elsewhere, so that the loss by fire now ranges from \$100,000,000 to \$130,000,000 a year. The cost of sustaining fire insurance companies whose function is simply to distribute this loss over a wider field is about \$65,000,000 a year; to this must be added the cost of sustaining expensive fire departments, which may be computed at a minimum at not less than \$25,000,000 a year, and is probably more, to say nothing of the additional cost of water supply for fire purposes. The fire tax of the United States may therefore be estimated at a minimum of \$180,000,000, or at a maximum of over \$200,000,000, in a normal year in which no great conflagration occurs.

Within the last five years a great change has taken place in the views of the leading men who conduct the business of the fire insurance companies, and a system is rapidly coming into vogue for the frequent inspection of buildings with a view to the prevention of loss by protecting them, so far as their generally bad construction will permit, from the dangers which must occur from fires that are unavoidable, by installing apparatus to check the rapid spread of fires when they do oc-

¹ Copyright, 1888, by Edward Atkinson.

aly of the most aggravated nature ; and if our voters valued the elective franchise as highly as they ought, if they had any adequate conception of its sacredness, they would find some way of preventing the men who spend their lives in breaking the laws from performing the functions of government.

As to the exclusion from franchise of those who have been *convicted* of crimes or misdemeanors, that is a perfectly practicable matter. All that is needful is that the clerks of all the criminal courts, including the police courts, be required to keep full lists of all persons convicted, their names, nativities, ages, and places of residence, specifying the charges under which they were convicted and the nature and extent of the sentence pronounced upon them, and that these lists be furnished to the boards of registration. The law should forbid the inscription upon the voting-lists of the names of such criminals and misdemeanants before the time of their disfranchisement has expired, and should make the attempt of such persons to register an offense punishable by imprisonment and perpetual disfranchisement. Such a law would not lack enforcement ; for the representatives of each party, watching the registry lists, would take good care that no disfranchised persons of the other party were permitted to register.

The statute should also require the same lists of criminals and misdemeanants to be furnished by the clerks of the criminal courts to the judge of the district courts in which naturalization is effected ; and should forbid the bestowment of the franchise, until the expiration of a specified time, upon those foreigners who had thus brought upon themselves the censure of the criminal law.

It is also an open question whether the names of persons receiving aid from the public authorities, as paupers or dependents, should not be reported in the same way, and excluded from the lists of voters. Some worthy persons would thus be debarred from the suffrage, but there is no good law that does not entail some hardship. And it must not be forgotten that the great majority — probably nineteen-twentieths — of those who receive aid from the public almoner are persons who have come to want through vice or laziness, not through misfortune. Worthy poor there are, but not many of them fall into the hands of the overseer. And those who hang upon the city or the county for maintenance are, in the overwhelming majority of cases, persons who are morally certain to sell their votes for liquor or money. They constitute a considerable portion of the bribable voters. It may be regarded as a safe assumption that the man who has come to be dependent as a pauper

upon the state is not a man properly qualified to take part in ruling the state.

This disfranchisement, like that for petty crime, should not be permanent but temporary. The door out of pauperism and its disabilities into full citizenship should be kept wide open ; but the distinction between the two conditions should be sharply made. It is not improbable that the effect of such a law would be to restrain from pauperism many of those who now too easily slide down into its quagmire, and then find it hard to extricate themselves.

It must never be forgotten that laws which regulate suffrage must deal with classes, not with individuals. Common sense teaches that persons under twenty-one years of age lack the experience which would qualify them to exercise the suffrage wisely ; therefore, as a class, they are debarred. To many intelligent youth this might be regarded as an injustice, but it is a good rule, on the whole, and is maintained without question. Similarly we might find in the class that cannot read and write some persons of fair intelligence, and in the class that has fallen under the censure of the criminal law some who are not evilly disposed, and in the class of paupers and dependents some who would not sell their votes ; but these persons would all be highly exceptional individuals, and the rule must be made for the class, not for the exceptions. And the proposition is that the law leave ample room and strong encouragement for these exceptional persons to extricate themselves from the disfranchised classes, and to reinstate themselves in full citizenship.

But if all these criminals and misdemeanants and paupers should be reported, according to this plan, by the clerks of the courts and the overseers of the poor to the boards of registration, and if by law the names of persons thus reported were excluded for a longer or shorter period from the voting-lists, it is certain that we should at once and very materially reduce the number of our corruptible and dangerous voters. It is not easy to estimate this reduction, but the best data I can find indicate that from one-twentieth to one-fifteenth of the voters would thus be placed upon the retired list. A city with 100,000 inhabitants would effect a reduction of perhaps 1500 in its vote. The names thus erased would not include the whole of the purchasable vote, but they would take in a large share of it. The heeler and the briber would find their power vastly circumscribed ; the use of money in elections would be materially abridged ; the saloon element would find its cohorts weakened and scattered, and the whole political atmosphere would be sensibly cleared.

It may be said that such a penalty as disfranchisement would have no terrors for the

chronic law-breaker; over some of them, however, I believe that it would exert considerable deterrent influence. But that has little to do with the case. Primarily the question is not whether this measure will do them any good, but whether it will prevent them from doing harm to the state.

It may be urged, also, that disfranchisement is a severe penalty for the lesser offenses. Permanent disfranchisement would be; temporary disfranchisement is not. In view of the enormous injury inflicted upon the state by these multitudes of petty criminals and misdemeanants it is no more than equitable that the state should inflict upon them this temporary disability. And the enforcement of some such rule could not but react favorably upon public opinion, greatly raising the popular estimate of the value of citizenship. In that excellent article from which I have before quoted, and to which I am greatly indebted, Mr. Colby says:

The establishment of a moral qualification for the suffrage, besides strengthening the state by practically disabling its domestic enemies, could not fail to enhance the value and dignity of the franchise itself to all law-abiding citizens, and to increase their willingness to discharge their duties as soldiers, as jurymen, and as voters. The bestowal and retention

of the ballot once made dependent upon conduct, its possession will become a badge of respectability, if not of honor, and must soon render the country itself worthier of the sacrifices of its citizens.¹

One of the first duties of patriotism is to rescue the suffrage from the influences that are now corrupting it. But this is not the only duty of patriotism. If we could purge our voting-lists of the ignorant and the vicious, these classes would still be here in the midst of us; and our duty to them would still be urgent, after our duty to the state was done. To leave them in their ignorance and vice is not to be thought of; they must be prepared for citizenship. The task is arduous, but it must not be declined. The intelligence and good-will of our Christian citizens are able not only to hold in check the selfishness and brutality of these illiterate and alien elements, but to do something far better—to transform them, or many of them, into patriotic Americans. This may require some revival of our own patriotism and some diminution of our partisanship, and it may call for an order of heroism and consecration not much below that which we look for in war-time; but these requirements will not be thought too hard by men who rightly value the freedom and the peace of their native land.

¹ "Journal of Social Science," Vol. XVII., p. 98.

Washington Gladden.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

A Question of Command at Franklin.

A NOTE FROM GENERAL STANLEY.

THERE appears in THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for August, 1887, an article by Colonel Henry Stone on Hood's campaign in Tennessee in general, and the battle of Franklin in particular, in which there are two errors to which I deem it proper to call attention.

On page 603 of the magazine Colonel Stone states: "Beyond Ruger, reaching from the ravine to the river below, was Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps,—all veterans,—consisting of three brigades, commanded by Generals William Grose and Walter C. Whitaker and Colonel Kirby. *All the troops in the works were ordered to report to General Cox, to whom was assigned the command of the defenses.*" The italics are mine.

Colonel Stone did not view these statements from the standpoint of an officer well informed as to the rights of command. Had he done so he would have seen that General Cox was in reality only the commander of a division of the Twenty-third (Schofield's) Corps, that for the time being he was in command of that corps, that "all the troops in the works" could not have been ordered to report to him without removing me from the command of the Fourth Corps, and that no one will claim that the latter idea was ever thought of by any one.

Colonel Stone personally knew very little about the matter he described, and perhaps is excusable to some extent, as he easily could have been led into making this misstatement by General Cox himself; for the latter, in the book written by him entitled "The March to the Sea: Franklin and Nashville," on page 86 complacently styles himself "commandant upon the line."

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
FRANKLIN, TENN., Nov. 30, 1864.

GENERAL KIMBALL: The Commanding General directs that you report with your command to Brigadier-General J. D. Cox for position on the line to-day. Very respectfully,

J. A. CAMPBELL,
Major and A. A. G.

This so-called order was as informal as a written order well could be, and was simply a direction to General Kimball as to where he could find information as to the place to which he had been assigned.

General Schofield, in a letter to me of September 5, 1887, says in reference to the order: "My recollection is, and I infer the same from their language, that the orders had reference solely to the posting of the troops on the designated line."

If General Schofield had directed General Kimball to report with his command to one of General Schofield's aides-de-camp for position on the line, that

aide-de-camp could have asserted that he was "the commandant upon the line" with as much propriety as General Cox has now done.

The order, on its face, clearly indicates to a military person, even though he were ignorant of the facts, that the direction was given only for the temporary purpose therein stated.

An orderly or a guide might have been sent to show General Kimball where he was to go, but it is usual to transmit important orders by an officer, and General Cox was the one selected by General Schofield; and in order that there might be no mistake that it was by his order, General Schofield sent the memorandum order to General Kimball.

The Twenty-third (Schofield's) Corps consisted of Cox's and two brigades of Ruger's division, and was the first corps to arrive on the field, about daylight, and was followed in about three hours by the Fourth (Stanley's) Corps, composed of Kimball's, Wagner's, and Wood's divisions. General Kimball's division was the leading division of the Fourth Corps, and it was quite natural that General Schofield should direct General Cox—who had been on the ground since daylight—to show General Kimball his position in line, and having done this, his authority ceased; and this brief authority, little as it was, only lasted a few minutes, and had entirely ceased long before the battle was commenced, and could not warrant the statement that General Cox was "commandant upon the line" even for a minute.

So far as I know and believe, General Cox gave no orders to the Fourth Corps after showing General Kimball where he was to go. It would have made very little difference if he had attempted to assume the authority to give orders, as my division commanders, knowing he could not have had authority to give orders, would have paid no attention to them.

The following is a copy of a letter from General Schofield, which was written in reply to one I wrote to him concerning the misleading statement of Colonel Stone's:

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE ATLANTIC,
GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, NEW YORK CITY, Sept. 5, 1887.
GENERAL D. S. STANLEY, Department of Texas, San Antonio,
Texas.

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of August 29 was received here September 3. From my best recollection and from examination of my records, I have no doubt General Cox quotes in the Appendix to his "Franklin and Nashville" the only orders given by me at Franklin which could be construed as placing any part of your corps, the Fourth, under his command. Those orders directed General Kimball, commanding your leading division, and Captain Bridges with four batteries of artillery, to report to General Cox "for position on the line."

Those orders were given in the morning, when you were understood to be with your rear-guard retarding the advance of the enemy, and hence not at the head of your column. My recollection is, and I infer the same from their language, that the orders had reference solely to the posting of the troops on the designated line, as they arrived at Franklin, under the direction of General Cox, who was the senior officer then present at that point. How those orders were construed by General Cox I do not know, though I observe that he refers to himself as "the commandant upon the line," by which I suppose he may mean simply the senior officer actually present there at the moment.

Of course it was not intended by me to deprive you at any time of the command of any portion of your corps which might be within reach of your orders. But you will doubtless recall the fact that the movement of the enemy which we had most reason to guard against was not a direct attack in front at Franklin, but one to strike our flank and rear by crossing the Harpeth above that point, and it was necessary to be prepared for either or both of those attacks. Hence it could not have been known in the morning, when those orders were issued, whether you would be in the afternoon on the line south of Franklin with Cox, or on the north side of the river and several miles from Franklin with Wilson, resisting Hood's attempt to cross the river; nor what portion

of your corps would, in the latter case, be with you, and what portion would have to remain with Cox. Therefore the orders given relative to the temporary posting of your troops in the morning could have had nothing to do with the question of your command of them in any battle which did occur, or might have occurred, in the afternoon. The latter question would have been determined in either case by the 122d Article of War, which is applicable to all such cases.

As the enemy chose the direct attack in front at Franklin, you of course remained in command, except perhaps for a moment, of all your troops engaged in resisting that attack, while I assumed *immediate* command, during the battle, of Wood's division of your corps, which had been stationed on the north bank of the river in readiness to support Wilson, and hence was beyond the reach of your orders while you were engaged in the battle on the south side of the river.

I observe that Cox says, "The commandants of the two corps [you and he] met on the turnpike just as Opdycke and his men were rushing to the front." Assuming this to be exact, there must have been a moment of time before that meeting when Cox had the authority, and it was his duty, to order your reserve brigade [Opdycke's] into action; not by reason of any order I had given, but under the authority and duty imposed upon him by the 122d Article of War.

In respect to your being with me on the north side of the river before the battle, I say most emphatically that was your proper place. The usual preparations for battle on the south side of the river had long since been made. The vital question remaining was to meet in line any attempt of the enemy in force to cross the river above. The moment such attempt was known it would have been your duty to lead Wood's division, followed by Kimball's and in turn by such other troops as I should judge necessary and expedient, as rapidly as possible to the support of Wilson. To do this without delay it was necessary for you to be where you were. And as soon as it became known that Hood had decided to make the attack in front, you rode to that point as rapidly as possible. What more could a corps commander do?

Thoughtless critics seem to assume that all the corps commanders of an army ought to be together at the point where the enemy chooses to make an attack. But I do not think any intelligent reader of military history will question the propriety of your conduct at Franklin.

It has not seemed to me that General Cox intended to do you any injustice. Yet he evidently wrote his account of the events which actually happened without giving so much thought, as you must necessarily have done, to those other probable events which did not happen, and in which, if they had, you would have been called upon to act by far the most important part. All the soldiers of an army can't act the same part in the same battle, nor any soldier the same part in any two consecutive battles.

That Cox happened to form the curtain of the main line at Franklin was because you had done the most vital service all the previous day and night. You acted nobly the part assigned you, so did also Cox. The honor gained was enough for both. I hope there will be no difference between you.

Inclosed you will find an extract from a letter on this subject written by me to General Cox from Rome, Italy, December 5, 1881.

Yours very truly,

[Signed]

J. M. SCHOFIELD.

Again, Colonel Stone states in his article in THE CENTURY, on page 605, "Meantime, General Schofield had retired to the fort, on a high bluff on the other side of the river, some two miles away, by the road, and had taken General Stanley with him."

This statement is erroneous. The facts are that General Schofield's headquarters were not over three-quarters of a mile from the nearest point of our main line.

Before it was certainly known that there was to be an attack, I was with him and went to the front as soon as the firing commenced. When it began General Schofield, who was not far away, came forward to Fort Granger on the bluff, within a quarter of a mile of the nearest line, where he could see the whole field, which was the proper place for him to be.

The following letter from General Kimball fully corroborates the foregoing, as does also my report of the battle which will be published in a future volume of the War Records:

OGDEN, UTAH, May 22, 1888.

GENERAL D. S. STANLEY, U. S. Army, San Antonio, Texas.

DEAR GENERAL: I am in receipt of your letter of the 12th instant, with the "printed correspondence." Referring to the battle at Franklin, Tennessee, on the 30th day of November, 1864, I

have to say that I did not receive any order or other command from General Cox on that day or during the battle, excepting the direction given me as to the position my division was to occupy in the line of battle. I was directed in orders from General Schofield, commanding the army, to "report to General Cox for position on the line to-day." My division was in the lead of our corps from Spring Hill, and the first to arrive at Franklin inside the line already formed by the troops of General Cox's command (Cox's and Ruger's divisions, Twenty-third Corps). While awaiting your arrival with the other divisions of your command, and your orders as to our positions in line of battle, General Cox requested me to form on his right; but not knowing what might be your orders in relation to positions to be occupied by your divisions I was somewhat slow in complying with his request, but soon afterwards, and before your arrival, I received the orders from General Schofield above alluded to. Complying, I immediately formed my division on the line indicated by General Cox, my left forming his right near the locust grove and west of Carter's house, my line extending westward until my right rested near the river below the town, and in this position you found me upon your arrival; and when I informed you of General Cox's request and of General Schofield's order, and my action in the matter, you approved, and directed me to remain in line as formed and to hold it, which I did during the battle and until our withdrawal after midnight by order of General Schofield.

I then understood that General Schofield had command of and directed the movements of our forces from Pulaski to and during the battle at Franklin, and thence to Nashville, and that you had command of the Fourth Corps, and Cox of the troops composing the Twenty-third Corps. I received no orders from General Cox other than the direction as to my position in line heretofore mentioned; after that, none. I did not know that he was, or that he assumed to be, in command of our forces in line during that battle. I know that he did not command nor give me any directions during that battle. I had no orders from any officer until I received the order from General Schofield directing the withdrawal from Franklin and the retirement to Brentwood and Nashville. . . .

Very respectfully yours, etc.,
NATHAN KIMBALL.

D. S. Stanley,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS.

REPLY BY GENERAL COX.

I HAVE hitherto believed that General Stanley and myself were in entire accord as to the facts of the battle of Franklin. The reasons are as follows: In August, 1881, when I was preparing to write the volume in the Scribner war series of histories entitled "The March to the Sea: Franklin and Nashville," General Stanley opened a correspondence with me, kindly offering to assist me by the loan of papers, etc. In a letter dated Cincinnati, 24th of August, 1881, thankfully accepting the offer, I took the opportunity to compare our recollections of the principal facts. I wrote:

Let me state a few consecutive points within my own memory and ask you to compare it with yours, premising that I have not yet begun the systematic review of the documents in my possession.

1. Two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps were present and acting under my command, Ruger's on the right of the Columbia Pike and my own (Reilly commanding) on the left.

2. Schofield had only intended to cover the crossing of trains, and had not meant to fight south of the Harpeth. He had therefore ordered me to send my own artillery and wagons over the river early, and had arranged that Major Goodspeed, your chief of artillery, should detail some batteries as your troops came in, and they reported to me.

3. After putting my own command in position, I reported to General Schofield that my troops were not sufficient to reach the river on the right, and that flank was consequently exposed. Kimball's division reported to me and was assigned that place.

4. I received a written dispatch from General Schofield saying that two brigades of Wagner's were out as rear-guard, and one (Opdycke's) would report within the lines to act as my reserve; that Wagner was ordered to bring the other two brigades in whenever Hood showed a purpose of serious attack. I showed this note to Wagner and found he had such orders.

5. When Hood formed and advanced, Wagner did not order in the two brigades, but ordered them to fight. One of my staff, still living, heard him send the order from the Carter house. In his excitement he had forgotten his orders apparently, and did not change, though reminded of them.

6. Being at the left of the line on the parapet, watching the enemy's advance, I was amazed to see Wagner's two brigades open fire. They were quickly run over by the enemy and came back in confusion.

7. I immediately sent an aide to Opdycke to warn him to be ready to advance in case of a break at the center, and to order the commanders of brigades, etc., to withhold their fire till Wagner's men should get in. The two aides who were with me are both dead, one being killed while performing part of the above duty. Opdycke afterward told me that he got no order and acted on his own judgment, and I have accepted that as the fact.

8. I almost immediately followed my order and rode to the pike. There I met Opdycke advancing, and met you also. We all went forward together. When Opdycke reached the parapet you and I were trying to rally the fugitives immediately in rear of the line. While thus employed you were wounded, and your horse was also hit. You asked me to look at the hurt, and I urged you to go and have surgical attention to it. I dismounted Captain Tracy, one of my aides, and gave you my horse, which he was riding. To say anything here of the impression your conduct made on me would violate the old maxim about "praise to face," etc.

9. Opdycke and the artillery continued to act under my orders till we left the lines at midnight. Orders to the rest of Wagner's division and to Kimball went from your headquarters, you continuing in command of the Fourth Corps till we got back to Nashville, notwithstanding your hurt.

As I have already said, I have not yet begun the collation of documents; but I have taken advantage of your kind letter to give the above outline, and to ask for any illustration, correction, or addition which may occur to you, so that I may give careful attention to any point on which my memory should differ from yours.

To this General Stanley replied from Fort Clark, Texas, under date of October 17, 1881, saying, among other things:

The nine points submitted in your letter are, to the best of my memory, exactly correct. I think it may be true that Opdycke did not receive your order. When I arrived at the left of his brigade the men were just getting to their feet, as they had been lying down, I presume to avoid the enemy's bullets.

This outline, thus explicitly agreed upon, is that which I followed in the volume referred to. The use of the designation "commandant upon the line" means, of course, as the context shows, the line south of the Harpeth River, upon which Hood made his principal attack. I may say, with the utmost sincerity, that my personal relation to that line is so clearly shown in the "nine points" that I did not regard the use of the designation as making any claim, but only as a periphrase to avoid repetition of the author's own name in a narrative written in the third person. I should be quite content to have the reader substitute the proper name for the phrase.

I should be equally indifferent to the conclusion that the command I exercised was by virtue of an Article of War instead of by the orders of General Schofield, if it were not that, both from clear memory and many circumstances, I have always felt personally sure that my mode of statement was the true one. The order to the batteries to supply the place of mine, already sent over the river, was identical in form to that to General Kimball. If it put these under my command, it had the same effect in the other case. It has been one of the liveliest surprises of my life to learn that anybody took a different view of the matter.

General Stanley came to the center of the Twenty-third Corps line, on the Columbia Turnpike, when Wagner's two brigades of the Fourth Corps came through it in their retreat. In rallying those brigades he was wounded, and went back to his quarters north of the river. With the exception of those few minutes, there is complete agreement that I was the senior officer on that line from daylight in the morning till midnight, and the agreed "nine points" show whether this was merely nominal.

The same "points" had settled the fact that I sent no orders to Kimball's division during the actual engagement; but it may be proper now to add that no one else did, the original directions to hold the re-

curved extension of our right proving to be all that were necessary.

If any statement of mine could fairly be interpreted to derogate from the full personal command of General Schofield over the whole army, I should indeed feel that it needed correction. In the volume referred to I said, what I have always repeated, that his position in the fort north of the river was almost the only one from which he could survey and guide the whole field. My duty was simply to perform faithfully the part assigned me. The fortune of war brought it about that Hood attacked the Twenty-third Corps line, instead of turning it, as would have been wiser strategy for him. In the latter event no doubt General Stanley would have been in the critical place, and mine would have been comparatively insignificant. It is also true that General Schofield *could* have ordered me to report to General Stanley as my senior, as he ordered portions of the Fourth Corps to report to me; but *he did not*, and I have tried to narrate history as it was, not as it might have been.

CINCINNATI, O.

J. D. Cox.

REPLY BY COLONEL STONE.

I SHALL make no other reply to General Stanley's criticism than to quote from the official reports.

General Schofield, whose report is dated December 31, 1864, says :

General J. D. Cox deserves a very large share of credit for the brilliant victory at Franklin. The troops were placed in position and entrenched under his immediate direction, and *the greater portion of the line engaged was under his command during the battle.*

Of the sixty-two regiments in "the line engaged" only twenty-four belonged to the Twenty-third Corps that day. The rest were of the Fourth Corps, of which General Stanley was commander.

General Kimball, a division commander in the Fourth Corps, whose report is dated December 5, says that he sent a regiment to report to General Ruger *at the request of General Cox*. This shows that he then recognized General Cox as in command.

General Opdycke, commanding a brigade of the Fourth Corps, states in his report that about 4 P. M. General Cox sent him a request to have his brigade ready, and adds, "I got no other orders till after the battle."

General Ruger, commanding a division in the Twenty-third Corps, states in his report that he was ordered to report to General Cox.

General Wagner, of the Fourth Corps, makes no mention of reporting to any one after reaching his final position.

These are all the commanders of all the troops engaged, except General Cox's own division.

On the 2d of December, General Cox made a full and detailed report, in which he says :

About noon [of November 30] General Kimball, commanding the first division, Fourth Corps, *reported to me by order of the commanding general*. . . . About 1 o'clock, General Wagner, commanding second division of the Fourth Corps, *reported to me his division*. . . . and informed me that he was under orders to keep out two brigades until the enemy should make advance in line in force, when he was to retire, skirmishing, and become a reserve to the line established by me. . . . Captain Bridges *(Fourth Corps artillery) was ordered by the commanding general to report to me with three batteries*. . . . About 2 o'clock the enemy . . . came into full view. . . . The fact was reported

to the commanding general, as well as the disposition of our own troops as they were, and his orders received in reference to holding the position.

In a subsequent report, covering the same ground, under date of January 10, 1865, General Cox says :

At 2 o'clock . . . General Wagner *presented orders to report to me*. . . . At 3 o'clock . . . the order was reiterated to General Wagner to withdraw his brigade. . . . He was at that time in person near the Carter house, my headquarters.

I leave these quotations to speak for themselves. Nothing was further from my intention than to do even a seeming injustice to General Stanley — one of the most gallant, capable, and experienced soldiers in the army. The value of his services during the retreat from Pulaski to Nashville is inestimable. His conduct that day, and all days, was that of a brave, resolute, able commander.

As to the distance between the fort to which General Schofield retired and the battle-ground, I may add that from careful measurement on the maps, from personal observation within a few years, and from the estimates of residents of Franklin, I see no reason to doubt the correctness of my statement that it was "some two miles, by the road." Of course, in an air line it is much less.

Henry Stone.

BOSTON.

The Canal at Island No. 10.

IN THE CENTURY for September, 1888, is published a communication relating to the claims for the credit for the construction of the Island No. 10 Canal; and as the details of that work were wholly planned and executed under the direct supervision of Captain Tweeddale and myself, of Bissell's Engineers, it may not be inappropriate to make some historical corrections as to the claims for credit of the initiation of the enterprise. It is probably as difficult to designate the original project of the scheme as it would be now to ascertain who first proposed a canal at the Isthmus of Darien; but certainly De Lesseps designed the Panama Canal. General Hamilton or Mr. Banvard may have first suggested the possibility of the cut-off, but certainly Colonel Bissell was the first to explore the route and to put it in practical operation. The method and practical operations of performing the difficult part of the work, viz., cutting off great forest trees six feet below the surface of the water, was designed and executed by Captain Tweeddale and myself. It is impossible to conjecture how Mr. Banvard can substantiate a claim to any part of the work, for at the time he mentions, August 20, 1861, both ends of the canal were many miles within the rebel lines, which at that time were formed at Columbus, Ky., on the Mississippi River, and therefore the New Madrid Canal at that time would have been of about as much use to the Federal forces as a railroad up the side of Lookout Mountain.

M. Randolph,

Late Captain Co. A, Bissell's Engineers.

NEW YORK.

READING THE CENTURY for August and September, 1885, and September, 1888, I have been amused at the strife for honors with regard to the canal above New Madrid, cutting off Island No. 10. Honors must be scarce when two men, neither of whom is entitled to

this one, claim it. I suppose THE CENTURY is desirous of correct history, although this brilliant achievement is of humble origin.

The circumstances are these: Captain J. A. Mower, 1st U. S. Infantry, afterwards General, took from a raft floating down the river a refugee from Island No. 10 named Morrison, who claimed to have formerly run a saw-mill at the mouth of the creek just above New Madrid. He suggested to Captain Mower that a canal could be cut. Captain Mower sent him as a prisoner to me (as I commanded the 1st U. S. Infantry)

with this information. I sent him to the nearest headquarters (which happened to be General Hamilton's), *en route to General Pope.*

Morrison, the saw-mill man, suggested the canal. Captain Mower, 1st U. S. Infantry, accepted the idea. General Pope ordered it, and Colonel Bissell executed it. There are officers of the regular army still living, besides myself, who remember the circumstances.

*George A. Williams,
Maj. and Bvt. Lt.-Col., U. S. Army.*

NEWBURG, N. Y.

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

The Imperfections of American Law Procedure.

NO one is more deeply interested in having a prompt, rapid, effective, and respected system of legal procedure than the man who never goes to law and who would hardly know the crier of a court from the judge. He is interested in having it well known that the state has provided a ready and efficient remedy for those acts which provoke lawsuits, for the known existence of such a remedy is a strongly deterrent force upon men who are disposed to commit such acts. No one can say how large is the percentage of men who are so wavering on the brink of such acts that the efficiency of the state's judicial machinery is just the check necessary to prevent them from acting and thus to keep them out of the state's legal statistics; but the fact is plain that the force, large or small, works in favor of the great mass of voters, who never go to law.

That part of the remedy which constitutes law procedure has not been in this country quite so satisfactory to laymen as to lawyers. The latter may easily find fault with the ignorant complaints of the former, may call for bills of particulars, and may make strikingly favorable comparisons of the American with other systems. They forget that such comparisons, when partial in the smallest degree, may omit just the point in which our system is imperfect. Of course it cannot but be an enormous improvement on the primitive American process, in which the summons and complaint were supplied by the tomahawk, while judgment was enforced by the scalping-knife, with leg-bail or a tribal warfare as a court of last resort. Nor is promptness alone the touchstone of the highest comparative worth. The Russian political prisoner would thank the god of freedom who should give him American law procedure instead of that system of childishness, cruelty, intentional or unintentional, and unrestrained power which, we are now coming to learn, has borne intolerable sway all these years at St. Petersburg. The American system, again, is so permeated with democratic characteristics that our people would find a German or a French system an intolerable substitute: while the English system has too many survivals of the very expensive methods of the past to stand as our ideal in all points.

One thing should be remembered, however, as it is just the point in which the American system is most apt to break down: if the English system does compel the parties litigant to pay roundly for summary justice, it seems to give them what they pay for. If

the English law reviews are to be trusted, it is possible for an English plaintiff to hurry a rich and influential defendant through their whole system of courts and out at the court of last resort with a rapidity likely to take away the breath of an American lawyer or judge. We find a cause tried in January, and the course of appeals over by the middle of February, so that one number of a review contains all the steps of the case. Lawyers who show a disposition to make impudence take the place of law meet summary suppression. Wire-drawn objections to the impaneling of a jury, or to the use of the word "through" in an indictment, and the like, which with us tend to the delay or perversion of justice and the newspaper glorification and advertisement of the "great lawyers" who have invented them, really seem, during the past fifteen years, to have become exceedingly unpopular in English courts, and to be persistently wiped out as merely the worst enemies of substantial justice. It may be necessary for the English suitor to be backed by a popular subscription in order to meet the unconscionable expenses of his suit; but, at all events, he and his opponent and the general public know that substantial justice is a matter of only a few weeks.

American courts have given sound law without unconscionable expense, and with entire fearlessness; but it cannot be said that rapidity is a common characteristic of the forty or more systems of courts kept up by our Federal, State, and Territorial governments. The most venerable of them all is peculiarly distinguished by the fact that its docket is so congested that when it gets a case it is equivalent to a postponement of justice for three years. This high example has not been neglected elsewhere: we have courts or systems that are dilatory and others that are prompt; but he who does not prefer the latter can generally keep away from them. The knave who wishes to pose as an honest citizen can often fortify his position by a suit for damages, knowing that a careful selection of his forum and a diligent use of its opportunities for delay will enable him to put off inquiry until the public shall have forgotten the matter. The criminal's lawyer has a stronger confidence in the American court's weakness for "fine points" than he has in the eternal rules of law or evidence. The rich defendant who wishes to resist the establishment of a point against him can in like manner use our system of appeals, carrying his opponent through all the courts of a State, permitting him just to see daylight in the court of last resort, and then

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

THE EDICT OF FREEDOM.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.



IN his preliminary proclamation of September 22 President Lincoln had announced his intention to urge once more upon Congress his policy of compensated abolitionism. Accordingly his annual message of December 1, 1862, was in great part devoted to a discussion of this question. "Without slavery," he premised, "the rebellion could never have existed; without slavery it could not continue." His argument presented anew, with broad prophetic forecast, the folly of disunion, the brilliant destiny of the Republic as a single nation, the safety of building with wise statesmanship upon its coming population and wealth. He stated that by the law of increase shown in the census tables the country might expect to number over two hundred millions of people in less than a century.

And we will reach this too [he continued] if we do not ourselves relinquish the chance, by the folly and evils of disunion, or by long and exhausting war springing from the only great element of national discord among us. While it cannot be foreseen exactly how much one huge example of secession, breeding lesser ones indefinitely, would retard population, civilization, and prosperity, no one can doubt that the extent of it would be very great and injurious. The proposed emancipation would shorten the war, perpetuate peace, insure this increase of population, and proportionately the wealth of the country. With these we should pay all the emancipation would cost, together with our other debt, easier than we should pay our other debt without it.

He therefore recommended that Congress should propose to the legislatures of the several States a constitutional amendment, consisting of three articles, namely: one providing compensation in bonds for every State which should abolish slavery before the year 1900; another securing freedom to all slaves who during the rebellion had enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of war—also providing compensation to loyal owners; the third authorizing Congress to provide for colonization.

The plan [continued the message] consisting of these articles is recommended, not but that a restoration of the national authority would be accepted without its adoption. Nor will the war, nor proceedings under the proclamation of September 22,

1862, be stayed because of the recommendation of this plan. Its timely adoption, I doubt not, would bring restoration, and thereby stay both. And, notwithstanding this plan, the recommendation that Congress provide by law for compensating any State which may adopt emancipation before this plan shall have been acted upon is hereby earnestly renewed. Such would be only an advance part of the plan, and the same arguments apply to both. This plan is recommended as a means, not in exclusion of, but additional to, all others for restoring and preserving the national authority throughout the Union. . . . The plan is proposed as permanent constitutional law. It cannot become such without the concurrence of, first, two-thirds of Congress, and, afterwards, three-fourths of the States. The requisite three-fourths of the States will necessarily include seven of the slave States. Their concurrence, if obtained, will give assurance of their severally adopting emancipation at no very distant day upon the new constitutional terms. This assurance would end the struggle now and save the Union forever. . . . We can succeed only by concert. It is not, "Can any of us imagine better?" but, "Can we all do better?" Object whatsoever is possible, still the question recurs, "Can we do better?" The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.

Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history. We, of this Congress and this Administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We—even we here—hold the power, and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free—honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. Other means may succeed, this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.²

No immediate action followed this patriotic appeal. No indications of reviving unionism were manifested in the distinctively rebel States. No popular expression of a willingness to abandon slavery and accept compensation came from the loyal border-slave States, ex-

² Annual Message, December 1, 1862.

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In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled "An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes" Approved July 17, 1862, and which act, and the joint Resolution explanatory thereof, are herewith published, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to, and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion, or any rebellion against the government of the United States, and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures, as within and by said sixth section provided.

And I hereby make known that it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure for tendering pecuniary aid to the free choice or rejection, of any and all States, which may then be recognizing and practically sustaining the authority of the United States, and which may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, gradual ^{abolishment} ~~adoption~~ of slavery within such State or States, — that the object is to peacefully restore, thenceforward to ^{be} maintain, the constitutional relation between the general government, and each, and all the States, wherein that relation

is now suspended, or disturbed; and that, for this object, the war, as it has been, will be prosecuted. And, as a fit and necessary military measure for effecting this object, I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, do order and declare that on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand, eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or States, wherein the Constitutional authority of the United States shall not then be practically recognized, submitted to, and maintained, shall then, thenceforward, and forever, be free.

*Emancipation Proclamation
as first sketched and
shown to the Cabinet on
July 1862.*

INDORSEMENT ON THE DOCUMENT GIVEN ABOVE.

cept, perhaps, in a qualified way from Missouri, where the emancipation sentiment was steadily progressing, though with somewhat convulsive action owing to the quarrel which divided the unionists of that State. Thus the month of December wore away and the day approached when it became necessary for the President to execute the announcement of emancipation made in his preliminary proclamation of September 22. That he was ready at the appointed time is shown by an entry in the diary of Secretary Welles:

At the meeting to-day [December 30, 1862], the President read the draft of his Emancipation Proclamation, invited criticism, and finally directed that copies should be furnished to each. It is a good and well prepared paper, but I suggested that a part of the sentence marked in pencil be omitted. Chase advised that fractional parts of States ought not to be exempted. In this I think he is right, and so stated. Practically there would be difficulty in freeing parts of States and not freeing others—a clash between central and local authorities.¹

¹ Unpublished MS.

It will be remembered that when the President proposed emancipation on the 22d of July and again when he announced emancipation on the 22d of September he informed his Cabinet that he had decided the main matter for himself and that he asked their advice only upon subordinate points. In now taking up the subject for the third and final review there was neither doubt nor hesitation in regard to the central policy and act about to be consummated. But there were several important minor questions upon which, as before, he wished the advice of his Cabinet, and it was to present these in concise form for discussion that he wrote his draft and furnished each of them a copy on the 30th of December, as Mr. Welles relates. This draft, omitting its mere routine phraseology and quotations from the former proclamation, continued as follows:

Now therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of the United States, and as a proper and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my intention so to do, publicly proclaimed for one hundred days as aforesaid, order and designate as the States and parts of States in which the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States the follow-

By the President of the
United States of America
In Proclamation

I Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relations between the United States, and each of the states, and the people thereof, in which states that relation is, or may be suspended, or disturbed.

That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress to again recommence the adoption of a practical measure tending pecuniary and to the free acceptance or rejection of all slave-states, so called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which states, ^{with} may then have voluntarily accepted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate, or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent upon this continent, or elsewhere, ^{with their consent} ^{with the pecuniary aid} ^{of the Government} will be continued.

the
country.

That on the first day of January in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any state, or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive government, ^{including the military and naval authority thereof} of the United States, will, ~~during the continuance in office of the present administration,~~ ^{and maintain the freedom of} recognize, such persons, ~~as being free,~~ and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.

That the executive will, on the first day of January, aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States, and parts of states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof shall, on that day be, in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the

qualified voters of such state shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.

That attention is hereby called to an Act of Congress entitled "An Act to make an additional Article of War" approved March 13, 1862, and which act is in the words and figure following.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That hereafter the following shall be promulgated as an additional article of war for the government of the army of the United States and shall be obeyed and observed as such:

Article — All officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor, who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due, and any officer who shall be found guilty by a court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service.

Sec. 2. *And be it further enacted.* That this act shall take effect from and after its passage.

Also to the ninth and tenth sections of an Act entitled "An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes," approved July 17, 1862, and which sections are in the words and figure following.

Sec. 9. *And be it further enacted.* That all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the government of the United States or who shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto escaping from such persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army; and all slaves captured from such persons or deserted by them and coming under the control of the government of the United States; and all slaves of such persons found on [or] being within any place occupied by rebel forces and afterwards occupied by the forces of the United States shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude and not again held as slaves.

Sec. 10. *And be it further enacted.* That no slave escaping into any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, from any other State, shall be delivered up, or in any way impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime, or some offence against the laws, unless the person claiming said fugitive shall first make oath that the person to whom the labor or service of such fugitive is alleged to be due is his lawful owner, and has not borne arms against the United States in the present rebellion nor in any way given aid and comfort therein: and no person engaged in the military or naval service of the United States shall, under any pretence whatever, assume to decide on the validity of the claim of any person to the service or labor of any other person, or surrender up any such person to the claimant, on pain of being dismissed from the service.

And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the act, and sections above recited.

And the executive will, ^{in due time as the merit requires} recommend that all citizens of the United States who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the Constitutional relation between the United States, and their respective states, and people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.

In witness whereof, I have
S. J. hereunto set my hand, and caused
the seal of the United States to be
affixed.

Done at the City of Washington,
this twenty second day of September,
in the year of our Lord, one thousand, eight
hundred and sixty two, and sixty two,
and of the Independence of the United
States, the eighty seventh.

Abraham Lincoln.

By the President
William H. Seward,
Secretary of State

INDORSEMENT.

WASHINGTON, JANUARY 4, 1864. MY DEAR MRS. BARNES: I have the pleasure of sending you, with the President's permission, the original draft of his September proclamation. The body of it is in his own handwriting, the pencilled additions in the hand of the Secretary of State, and the final beginning and ending in the hand of the chief clerk. Yours very sincerely, F. W. SEWARD.
MRS. EMILY W. BARNES, ALBANY, N. Y.

By the President of the United States of America:
A Proclamation.

Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to-wit:

That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.

That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be, in good faith, represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States."

Now, therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, ^{publicly} proclaim for the full period of one hundred days, from the day first abovementioned, order and designate

as the States and parts of States wherein the people therein of respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to-wit:

Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, (except the Parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemine, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James Arcensin, Amunition, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the City of New Orleans,) Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, (except the fortyeight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, including the Cities of Norfolk & Portsmouth; and which excepted parts are, for the present, left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued.

And by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the Military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.


And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.

And I further declare and make known, that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.

And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty three, and of the



Independence of the United States
of America the eighty-seventh.

Abraham Lincoln

By the President;
William H. Seward
Secretary of State

ing, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, except the Parishes of

Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of

And by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order, and declare, that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward forever shall be, free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons, and will do no act, or acts, to repress said persons, or any of them, in any suitable efforts they may make for their actual freedom. And I hereby appeal to the people so declared to be free to abstain from all disorder, tumult, and violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and in all cases, when allowed, to labor faithfully for wages.

And I further declare, and make known, that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison and defend forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.¹

It will be seen that this draft presented for discussion, in addition to mere verbal criticism, the question of defining the fractional portions of Virginia and Louisiana under Federal control and the yet more important policy, now for the first time announced by the President, of his intention to incorporate a portion of the newly liberated slaves into the armies of the Union.

Mr. Welles's diary for Wednesday, December 31, 1862, thus continues:

We had an early and special Cabinet meeting—convened at 10 A. M. The subject was the proclamation of to-morrow to emancipate the slaves in the rebel States. Seward proposed two amendments. One included mine, and one enjoining upon, instead of appealing to, those emancipated to forbear from tumult. Blair had, like Seward and myself,

proposed the omission of a part of a sentence and made other suggestions which I thought improvements. Chase made some good criticisms and proposed a felicitous closing sentence. The President took the suggestions, written in order, and said he would complete the document.¹

From the manuscript letters and memoranda we glean more fully the modifications of the amendments proposed by the several members of the Cabinet. The changes suggested in Mr. Seward's note were all verbal, and were three in number. *First*: Following the declaration that "the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons," he proposed to omit the further words which had been used in the September proclamation, "and will do no act, or acts, to repress said persons, or any of them, in any suitable efforts they may make for their actual freedom." Mr. Welles had suggested the same change. *Secondly*: The next sentence, which read, "And I hereby appeal to the people so declared to be free to abstain from all disorder," etc., Mr. Seward proposed should read, "And I hereby command and require the people so declared to be free to abstain from all disorder," etc. *Thirdly*: The phrase, "and in all cases, when allowed, to labor faithfully for wages," he proposed should read, "and I do recommend to them in all cases, when allowed, to labor faithfully for just and reasonable wages."¹

The criticisms submitted by Mr. Chase were quite long and full, and since they suggested the most distinctive divergence from the President's plan, namely, that of making no exceptions of fractional portions of States, except the forty-eight counties of West Virginia, his letter needs to be quoted in full:

¹ Unpublished MS.

In accordance with your verbal direction of yesterday I most respectfully submit the following observations in respect to the draft of a proclamation designating the States and parts of States within which the proclamation of September 22, 1862, is to take effect according to the terms thereof.

I. It seems to me wisest to make no exceptions of parts of States from the operation of the proclamation other than the forty-eight counties of West Virginia. My reasons are these:

1. Such exceptions will impair, in the public estimation, the moral effect of the proclamation, and invite censure which it would be well, if possible, to avoid.

2. Such exceptions must necessarily be confined to some few parishes and counties in Louisiana and Virginia, and can have no practically useful effect. Through the operation of various acts of Congress the slaves of disloyal masters in those parts are already enfranchised, and the slaves of loyal masters are practically so. Some of the latter have already commenced paying wages to their laborers, formerly slaves; and it is to be feared that if, by exceptions, slavery is practically reëstablished in favor of some masters, while abolished by law and by the necessary effect of military occupation as to others, very serious inconveniences may arise.

3. No intimation of exceptions of this kind is given in the September proclamation, nor does it appear that any intimations otherwise given have been taken into account by those who have participated in recent elections, or that any exceptions of their particular localities are desired by them.

II. I think it would be expedient to omit from the proposed proclamation the declaration that the Executive Government of the United States will do no act to repress the enfranchised in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. This clause in the September proclamation has been widely quoted as an incitement to servile insurrection. In lieu of it, and for the purpose of shaming these misrepresentations, I think it would be well to insert some such clause as this: "not encouraging or countenancing, however, any disorderly or licentious conduct." If this alteration is made, the appeal to the enslaved may, properly enough, be omitted. It does not appear to be necessary, and may furnish a topic to the evil-disposed for censure and ridicule.

III. I think it absolutely certain that the rebellion can in no way be so certainly, speedily, and economically suppressed as by the organized military force of the loyal population of the insurgent regions, of whatever complexion. In no way can irregular violence and servile insurrection be so surely prevented as by the regular organization and regular military employment of those who might otherwise probably resort to such courses. Such organization is now in successful progress, and the concurrent testimony of all connected with the colored regiments in Louisiana and South Carolina is that they are brave, orderly, and efficient. General Butler declares that without his colored regiments he could not have attempted his recent important movements in the Lafourche region; and General Saxton bears equally explicit testimony to the good credit and efficiency of the colored troops recently sent on an expedition along the coast of Georgia. Considering these facts, it seems to me that it would be best to omit from the proclamation all reference to

military employment of the enfranchised population, leaving it to the natural course of things already well begun; or to state distinctly that, in order to secure the suppression of the rebellion without servile insurrection or licentious marauding, such numbers of the population declared free as may be found convenient will be employed in the military and naval service of the United States.

Finally, I respectfully suggest, on an occasion of such interest, there can be no imputation of affectation against a solemn recognition of responsibility before men and before God; and that some such close as follows will be proper:

"And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice warranted by the Constitution, and of duty demanded by the circumstances of the country, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God."¹

It is not remembered whether Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, was present at the Cabinet meeting, but he appears to have left no written memorandum of his suggestions, if he offered any. Stanton was preëminently a man of action, and the probability is that he agreed to the President's draft without amendment. The Cabinet also lacked one member of being complete. Mr. Caleb B. Smith, Secretary of the Interior, had lately been transferred to the vacant bench of the United States District Court of Indiana, and his successor, Mr. Usher, was not appointed until about a week after the date of which we write.

The unpublished memorandum of Mr. Blair, Postmaster-General, proposed a condensation of several of the paragraphs in the President's draft as follows:

I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States shall be free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. And, in order that they may render all the aid they are willing to give to this object and to the support of the Government, authority will be given to receive them into the service whenever they can be usefully employed, and they may be armed to garrison forts, to defend positions and stations, and to man vessels. And I appeal to them to show themselves worthy of freedom by fidelity and diligence in the employments which may be given to them, by the observance of order, and by abstaining from all violence not required by duty or for self-defense. It is due to them to say that the conduct of large numbers of these people since the war began justifies confidence in their fidelity and humanity generally.¹

The unpublished memorandum of Attorney-General Bates is also quite full, and combats the recommendation of Secretary Chase concerning fractions of States.

I respectfully suggest [he wrote] that: 1. The President issue the proclamation "by virtue of the power in him vested as Commander-in-Chief of

the army and navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion," etc., "and as a proper and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion."—Date, January, 1863. 2. It is done in accordance with the first proclamation of September 22, 1862. 3. It distinguishes between States and parts of States, and designates those States and parts of States "in which the people thereof, respectively, are this day (January 1, 1863) in rebellion against the United States."

These three propositions being true, I think they ought to be followed out, without excess or diminution, by action, not by the declaration of a principle nor the establishment of a law for the future guidance of others. It is a war measure by the President,—a matter of fact,—not a law by the legislature. And as to what is proposed to be done in the future the least said the better. Better leave yourself free to act in the emergencies as they arise, with as few embarrassing committals as possible. Whether a particular State or part of a State is or is not in actual rebellion on the 1st of January, 1863, is a simple matter of fact which the President in the first proclamation has promised to declare in the record. Of course it must be truly declared. It is no longer open to be determined as a matter of policy or prudence independently of the fact. And this applies with particular force to Virginia. The eastern shore of Virginia and the region round about Norfolk are now (December 31, 1862) more free from actual rebellion than are several of the forty-eight counties spoken of as West Virginia. If the latter be exempt from the proclamation, so also ought the former. And so in all the States that are considered in parts. The last paragraph of the draft I consider wholly useless, and probably injurious—being a needless pledge of future action, which may be quite as well done without as with the pledge.

In rewriting the proclamation for signature Mr. Lincoln in substance followed the suggestions made by the several members of the Cabinet as to mere verbal improvements; but in regard to the two important changes which had been proposed he adhered rigidly to his own draft. He could not consent to the view urged by Secretary Chase, that to omit the exemption of fractional parts of States would have no practical bearing. In his view this would touch the whole underlying theory and legal validity of his act and change its essential character. The second proposition favored by several members of the Cabinet, to omit any declaration of intention to enlist the freedmen in military service, while it was not so vital, yet partook of the same general effect as tending to weaken and discredit his main central act of authority.

Mr. Lincoln took the various manuscript notes and memoranda which his Cabinet advisers brought him on the 31st of December,

and during that afternoon and the following morning with his own hand carefully rewrote the entire body of the draft of the proclamation. The blanks left to designate fractional parts of States he filled according to latest official advices of military limits;¹ and in the closing paragraph suggested by Chase he added, after the words "warranted by the Constitution," his own important qualifying correction, "upon military necessity."

It is a custom in the Executive Mansion to hold on New Year's Day an official and public reception, beginning at 11 o'clock in the morning, which keeps the President at his post in the Blue Room until 2 in the afternoon. The hour for this reception came before Mr. Lincoln had entirely finished revising the engrossed copy of the proclamation, and he was compelled to hurry away from his office to friendly handshaking and festal greeting with the rapidly arriving official and diplomatic guests. The rigid laws of etiquette held him to this duty for the space of three hours. Had actual necessity required it he could of course have left such mere social occupation at any moment; but the President saw no occasion for precipitancy. On the other hand, he probably deemed it wise that the completion of this momentous executive act should be attended by every circumstance of deliberation. Vast as were its consequences, the act itself was only the simplest and briefest formality. It could in no wise be made sensational or dramatic. Those characteristics attached, if at all, only to the long past decisions and announcements of July 22 and September 22 of the previous year. Those dates had witnessed the mental conflict and the moral victory. No ceremony was attempted or made of this final official signing. The afternoon was well advanced when Mr. Lincoln went back from his New Year's greetings, with his right hand so fatigued that it was an effort to hold the pen. There was no special convocation of the Cabinet or of prominent officials. Those who were in the house came to the executive office merely from the personal impulse of curiosity joined to momentary convenience. His signature was attached to one of the greatest and most beneficent military decrees of history in the presence of less than a dozen persons; after which it was carried to the Department of State to be attested by the great seal and deposited among the official archives.

Since several eminent lawyers have publicly questioned the legal validity of Mr. Lincoln's

¹ The fractional parts of States excepted in the proclamation were as follows: In Louisiana, the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans,

including the city of New Orleans; in Virginia, the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth.

Edict of Freedom,—as his final Emancipation Proclamation may be properly styled,—it is worth while to gather, if possible, Mr. Lincoln's own conception and explanation of the constitutional and legal bearings of his act. There is little difficulty in arriving at this. His language, embodied in a number of letters and documents, contains such a distinct and logical exposition of the whole process of his thought and action, from the somewhat extreme conservatism of his first inaugural to his great edict of January 1, 1863, and the subsequent policy of its practical enforcement, that we need but arrange them in their obvious sequence.

The proper beginning is to be found in his letter of April 4, 1864, to A. G. Hodges, Esq., of Frankfort, Kentucky. In this he says:

I am naturally antislavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral question of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery. I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government—that nation, of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save slavery or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution together. When, early in the war, General Fremont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an indispensable necessity. When, a little later, General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunter attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come. When in March and May and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensa-

ble necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition, and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter.

The question of legal and constitutional validity he discusses briefly, but conclusively, in his letter of August 26, 1863, to James C. Conkling, of Springfield, Illinois. In this, addressing himself to his critics, he says:

You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its Commander-in-Chief with the law of war in time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that, by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies the world over destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy.

Admitting the general principle of international law, of the right of a belligerent to appropriate or destroy enemies' property, there came next the question of how his military decree of enfranchisement was practically to be applied.

This point, though not fully discussed, is sufficiently indicated in several extracts. In the draft of a letter to Charles D. Robinson he wrote, August 17, 1864:

The way these measures were to help the cause was not by magic or miracles, but by inducing the colored people to come bodily over from the rebel side to ours.¹

And in his letter to James C. Conkling of August 26, 1863, he says:

But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept.

The actual tangible military result which he declares was his constitutional and legal warrant for his edict of military emancipation is set forth in the following extracts. Whether we judge it by the narrow technical rules of applied jurisprudence, or by the broader principles of the legal philosophy of Christian nations, it forms equally his complete vindication. In the draft of a letter to Isaac M. Schermerhorn he wrote, September 12, 1864:

Any different policy in regard to the colored man deprives us of his help, and this is more than we can bear. We cannot spare the hundred and forty

¹ Unpublished MS.

or fifty thousand now serving us as soldiers, seamen, and laborers. This is not a question of sentiment or taste, but one of physical force, which may be measured and estimated as horse-power and steam-power are measured and estimated. Keep it, and you can save the Union. Throw it away, and the Union goes with it.¹

And in the one already quoted, to Robinson, August 17, 1864:

Drive back to the support of the rebellion the physical force which the colored people now give and promise us, and neither the present nor any coming Administration can save the Union. Take from us and give to the enemy the hundred and thirty, forty, or fifty thousand colored persons now serving as soldiers, seamen, and laborers and we cannot longer maintain the contest.

So also in an interview with John T. Mills he said:

But no human power can subdue this rebellion without the use of the emancipation policy and every other policy calculated to weaken the moral and physical forces of the rebellion. Freedom has given 200,000 men, raised on Southern soil. It will give us more yet. Just so much it has subtracted from the enemy. . . . Let my enemies prove to the contrary that the destruction of slavery is not necessary to a restoration of the Union. I will abide the issue.

We might stop here and assume that President Lincoln's argument is complete. But he was by nature so singularly frank and conscientious, and by mental constitution so unavoidably logical, that he could not, if he had desired, do things or even seem to do them by indirection or subterfuge. This, the most weighty of his responsibilities and the most difficult of his trials, he could not permit to rest upon doubt or misconception. In addition to what we have already quoted he has left us a naked and final restatement of the main question, with the unequivocal answer of his motive and conviction. It has been shown above how Mr. Chase, in the discussions of the final phraseology of the January proclamation, urged him to omit his former exemptions of certain fractional parts of insurrectionary States. Despite the President's adverse decision, Mr. Chase continued from time to time to urge this measure during the year 1863. To these requests the President finally replied as follows on the 2d of September:

Knowing your great anxiety that the Emancipation Proclamation shall now be applied to certain parts of Virginia and Louisiana which were exempted from it last January, I state briefly what appear to me to be difficulties in the way of such a step. The original proclamation has no constitutional or legal justification, except as a military measure. The exemptions were made because the military necessity did not apply to the exempted localities. Nor does that ne-

cessity apply to them now any more than it did then. If I take the step must I not do so without the argument of military necessity, and so without any argument except the one that I think the measure politically expedient and morally right? Would I not thus give up all footing upon Constitution or law? Would I not thus be in the boundless field of absolutism? Could this pass unnoticed or unresisted? Could it fail to be perceived, that without any further stretch I might do the same in Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, and even change any law in any State?¹

In these extracts we have the President's outline explanation of the legal validity of the proclamation. Like all his reasoning, it is simple and strong, resting its authority on the powers of war and its justification upon military necessity. As to the minor subtleties of interpretation or comment which it might provoke from lawyers or judges after the war should be ended, we may infer that he had his opinions, but that they did not enter into his motives of action. On subsequent occasions, while continuing to declare his belief that the proclamation was valid in law, he nevertheless frankly admitted that what the courts might ultimately decide was beyond his knowledge as well as beyond his control.

For the moment he was dealing with two mighty forces of national destiny, civil war and public opinion; forces which paid little heed to theories of public, constitutional, or international law where they contravened their will and power. In fact it was the impotence of legislative machinery, and the insufficiency of legal dicta to govern or terminate the conflicts of public opinion on this identical question of slavery, which brought on civil strife. In the South slavery had taken up arms to assert its nationality and perpetuity; in the North freedom had risen first in mere defensive resistance, then the varying fortunes of war had rendered the combat implacable and mortal. It was not from the moldering volumes of ancient precedents, but from the issues of the present wager of battle, that future judges of courts would draw their doctrines to interpret to posterity whether the Edict of Freedom was void or valid.

When in the preceding July the crisis of the McClellan campaign had come upon the President he had written his well-considered resolve: "I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me." Grand as was the historical act of signing his decree of liberation, it was but an incident in the grander contest he was commissioned and resolved to maintain. That was an issue, not alone of the bondage of a race, but of the life of a nation, a principle of government, a question of primary human right.

Was this act, this step, this incident in the

¹ Unpublished MS.

contest, wise or unwise? Would it bring success or failure? Would it fill the army, weaken the enemy, inspirit the country, unite public opinion? These, we may assume, and not a lawyer's criticisms of phrase or text, dictum or precedent, were the queries which filled his mind when he wrote his name at the bottom of the famous document. If the rebellion should triumph, establishing a government founded on slavery as its corner-stone, manifestly his proclamation would be but waste paper, though every court in Christendom outside the Confederate States should assert its official authority. If, on the other hand, the Union arms were victorious, every step of that victory would become clothed with the mantle of law. But if, in addition, it should turn out that the Union arms had been rendered victorious through the help of the negro soldiers, called to the field by the promise of freedom contained in the proclamation, then the decree and its promise might rest secure in the certainty of legal execution and fulfillment. To restore the Union by the help of black soldiers under pledge of liberty, and then, for the Union, under whatever legal doctrine or construction, to attempt to reënslave them, would be a wrong at which morality would revolt. "You cannot," said Mr. Lincoln in one of his early speeches, "repeal human nature."

The problem of statesmanship therefore was not one of theory, but of practice. Fame is due Mr. Lincoln, not alone because he decreed emancipation, but because events so shaped themselves under his guidance as to render the conception practical and the decree successful. Among the agencies he employed none proved more admirable or more powerful than this two-edged sword of the final proclamation, blending sentiment with force, leaguely liberty with Union, filling the voting armies at home and the fighting armies in the field. In the light of history we can see that by this edict Mr. Lincoln gave slavery its vital thrust, its mortal wound. It was the word of decision, the judgment without appeal, the sentence of doom.

But for the execution of the sentence, for the accomplishment of this result, he had yet many weary months to hope and to wait. Of its slow and tantalizing fruition, of the gradual dawning of that full day of promise, we cannot get a better description than that in his own words in his annual message to Congress nearly a year after the proclamation was signed:

When Congress assembled a year ago the war had already lasted nearly twenty months, and there had been many conflicts on both land and sea, with varying results. The rebellion had been pressed back into reduced limits; yet the tone of public feeling and opinion, at home and abroad,

was not satisfactory. With other signs, the popular elections, then just past, indicated uneasiness among ourselves; while amid much that was cold and menacing the kindest words coming from Europe were uttered in accents of pity that we were too blind to surrender a hopeless cause. Our commerce was suffering greatly by a few armed vessels built upon and furnished from foreign shores, and we were threatened with such additions from the same quarter as would sweep our trade from the sea and raise our blockade. We had failed to elicit from European governments anything hopeful upon this subject. The preliminary emancipation proclamation, issued in September, was running its assigned period to the beginning of the new year. A month later the final proclamation came, including the announcement that colored men of suitable condition would be received into the war service. The policy of emancipation and of employing black soldiers gave to the future a new aspect, about which hope and fear and doubt contended in uncertain conflict. According to our political system, as a matter of civil administration the General Government had no lawful power to effect emancipation in any State, and for a long time it had been hoped that the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military measure. It was all the while deemed possible that the necessity for it might come, and that if it should the crisis of the contest would then be presented. It came, and, as was anticipated, it was followed by dark and doubtful days. Eleven months having now passed we are permitted to take another review. The rebel borders are pressed still further back, and by the complete opening of the Mississippi the country dominated by the rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical communication between them. Tennessee and Arkansas have been substantially cleared of insurgent control, and influential citizens in each, owners of slaves and advocates of slavery at the beginning of the rebellion, now declare openly for emancipation in their respective States. Of those States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, Maryland and Missouri, neither of which three years ago would tolerate any restraint upon the extension of slavery into new Territories, only dispute now as to the best mode of removing it within their own limits.

Of those who were slaves at the beginning of the rebellion, full one hundred thousand are now in the United States military service, about one-half of which number actually bear arms in the ranks; thus giving the double advantage of taking so much labor from the insurgent cause and supplying the places which otherwise must be filled with so many white men. So far as tested it is difficult to say they are not as good soldiers as any. No servile insurrection or tendency to violence or cruelty has marked the measures of emancipation and among the blacks. These measures have been much discussed in foreign countries, and contemporary with such discussion the tone of public sentiment there is much improved. At home the same measures have been fully discussed, supported, criticised, and denounced, and the annual elections following are highly encouraging to those whose official duty it is to bear the country through this great trial. Thus we have the new reckoning. The crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past.¹

¹ Annual Message, Dec. 8, 1863.



By
Alfred
Damon
Runyon

Two men were caught in a Moro trap, and the Datto's guns sang near;
And one wore an officer's shoulder strap, the other a private's gear;
One was a black of the Twenty-fourth, and one was a Southern man,
And both were caught in a dark defile by the lines of the Moro clan.

Oh, wonder it is, and pity it is, that they send the Scouts alone
To die in the silent jungle paths with never a word or groan;
Wonder it is, and pity it is; but the two stood back to back,
And never a word between them passed as they waited the first attack.

What prayers they said they said them low, and to their beating hearts,
That thumped so loud and out of tune; and now the battle starts.
A ring of flame about them ran; a tongue of fire shot through;
Then as machines their muscles moved, and aimed their rifles true.

The bullets whined, the wounded shrieked, the rifle bores grew hot,
But still the two stood back to back, and answered shot for shot.
And now the Moro fire dies down, and now there comes a hush—
And white and black, with bayonets fixed, await the bolo rush.

They heard the Moro chief call out: "*Oh, black man, hark to me!
You give to us the Christian dog and you shall go out free.
Heed you the call of color and blood—what need we longer fight?
In color and blood you're brother to me. Oh, black man, give the white!*"

Now one was a white of the Southern breed, and cheap he held the black;
And little he'd thought, as the two had fought, of the man behind his back;
He loved to live as the White Man lives, but the Datto's words rang true;
And he had no doubt, as the chief called out, what the black behind would do.

Two men they stood them back to back, and never a word they said;
But, face to face with an easy death, what thoughts were in each head!
"*You go,*" the white man spoke at last; "*for you owe naught to me;
You go; for I can die alone, that you may go out free!*"

"*You go; it seems your time has come to draw the color line—
You and your breed owe naught to me, nor certainly to mine.
I'll go to death as my fathers went,*" between his cold, set lips—
"*My fathers, who used to use your kind for trade—and poker chips!*"

One was a black of the Twenty-fourth, and his face was washed with fear;
And his breath came quick, and his bowels were sick, as he thought of the knife
blades near.

Then, steady his hand swung to his belt, and back to the bolt again—
And he loaded and fired, as a well-drilled man, and counted his dead to ten.

And: "Man," he said, "in ole Kaintuck a mammy she prays foh me;
An' Ah laks toe lib lak yo' laks toe lib, but ouah end it am plain toe see.
Ouah colah an' blood it ain't de same, but we sets toe de same old boahd—
An' if we diffah in skin an' blood, w'y, we pass dat up toe de Lawd!

"Ouah colah an' blood it ain't de same, but de flag dat covahs us bofe—
It nevah has changed on de colah line, an' dey didn't colah ouah oafe;
Yo' go yo' route to de Gates o' Gawd, an' I shell trabel mine—
An' we shell see, when we reach His knee, how He's drawin' de colah line!

"Doan fink Ah'm fightin' foh lub o' yo', or de breed dat yo laks toe brag—
Ah'm fightin' foh mammy, in ole Kaintuck—an' lub o' mah kentry's flag—
Yo' watch dem niggahs along yo' front, an' Ah'll attend toe mine—
An' we'll go up toe de Gates o' Gawd toe settle de colah line!"

Two men they stood them back to back, and the white man called to the chief:
"He's answered the call of the color line, and his answer will bring you grief.
We don't declare as brothers-in-blood, or the burden of friendship drag,
But we do unite on a color line, and our color's our country's flag."

Two men lay dead in the jungle path, and their faces stared at the sky;
And out in the bush on each man's front the Moros were piled waist high.
And when the warriors they went in to mutilate the dead,
They found them lying back to back, but white and black were red!

"How strange it is," the chief he cried, "these men should choose to go—
They did not love each other's kind—in blood they differed so.
For one was black, and one was white, and yet they chose to die
Because they served a single flag—in honor they shall lie!

"What Gods they worshipped I know not; what Gods I do not care—
They fought me well, and for their flag, and they shall have a prayer.
For be he white, or be he black, his flag be what it may—
All honor to him who dies for that—my men, kneel down and pray!"

Two mounds they stand in a jungle path; they buried them back to back;
And the wondering Moros tell the tale of the white man and the black.
Oh, the warlike Moros pass that way to kneel in silent prayer,
And ask their gods for the spirit of the men they buried there!



ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

RETALIATION.—THE ENROLLMENT AND THE DRAFT.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

RETALIATION.



HE policy of arming the blacks having been officially announced in the final Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863, steps were taken as rapidly as the nature of the case permitted to put the plan into practical execution. Mr. Lincoln not only watched these efforts with great interest, but from time to time personally wrote letters to several of his commanders urging them to active efforts in organizing negro regiments. If a single argument were needed to point out his great practical wisdom in the management of this difficult question, that argument is found in the mere summing up of its tangible military results.

We have seen that at the beginning of December, 1863, less than a year after the President first proclaimed the policy, he was able to announce in his annual message that about fifty thousand men formerly slaves were then actually bearing arms in the ranks of the Union forces. A report made by the Secretary of War on April 2, 1864, shows that the number of negro troops then mustered into the service of the United States as soldiers had increased to 71,976,² and we learn further from the report of the Provost-Marshal General that at the close of the war there were in the service of the United States, of colored troops, 120 regiments of infantry, 12 regiments of heavy artillery, 10 companies of light artillery, and 7 regiments of cavalry, making a grand aggregate of 123,156 men. This was the largest number in service at any one time, but it does not represent all of them. The entire number commissioned and enlisted in this branch of the service during the war, or, more properly speaking, during the last two years of the war, was 186,017 men.³

This magnificent exhibit is a testimony to Mr. Lincoln's statesmanship which can hardly be overvalued. If he had adopted the policy when it was first urged upon him by impulsive

enthusiasts it would have brought his administration to political wreck, as was clearly indicated by the serious election reverses of 1862; but disregarding the impatience and the bad judgment of his advisers, and using that policy at the opportune moment, he made it not only a powerful lever to effect emancipation, but a military overweight, aiding effectually to crush the remaining rebel armies and bring the rebellion as a whole to a speedy and sudden collapse.

One point of doubt about employing negroes as soldiers was happily removed almost imperceptibly by the actual experiment. It had been a serious question with many thoughtful men whether the negro would fight. It was apprehended that his comparatively recent transition from barbarism to civilization and the inherited habits of subjection and dependence imposed upon him by two centuries of enslavement had left his manhood so dwarfed and deadened as to render him incapable of the steady and sustained physical and moral courage needful to armies in modern warfare. Practical trial in skirmish and battle gave an immediate and successful refutation to this fear, and proved the gallantry and trustworthiness of the black soldier in the severest trials of devotion and heroism. Within half a year after Lincoln's order of enlistment the black regiments had furnished such examples of bravery on many fields that commanders gave them unstinted praise, and white officers and soldiers heartily accepted them as worthy companions-in-arms.

The rebel authorities watched the experiment of arming the blacks with the keenest apprehension and hostility. In Mr. Lincoln's order of July 22, 1862, directing military commanders to seize and use property, real or personal, for military purposes, and to employ "persons of African descent as laborers," Jefferson Davis professed already to discover a wicked violation of the laws of war, apparently forgetting that his own generals were everywhere using such persons in military labor. When it was learned that Hunter and Phelps were endeavoring to organize negro regiments, the language employed to express Southern affectation of surprise and protest borders on the ludicrous. "The best authenticated news-

² Stanton's Report, April 2, 1864, unpublished MS.

³ Report of the Provost-Marshal General.

papers received from the United States," writes General Lee, "announce as a fact that Major-General Hunter has armed slaves for the murder of their masters, and has thus done all in his power to inaugurate a servile war, which is worse than that of the savage, inasmuch as it superadds other horrors to the indiscriminate slaughter of ages, sexes, and conditions"; and Phelps is charged with imitating the bad example.¹ Halleck very properly returned this and another letter, as insulting to the Government of the United States. A little later the Confederate War Department issued a formal order:

That Major-General Hunter and Brigadier-General Phelps be no longer held and treated as public enemies of the Confederate States, but as outlaws; and that in the event of the capture of either of them, or that of any other commissioned officer employed in drilling, organizing, or instructing slaves, with a view to their armed service in this war, he shall not be regarded as a prisoner of war, but held in close confinement for execution as a felon at such time and place as the President shall order.²

Mr. Davis seems to have cultivated a sort of literary pride in these formulas of invective, for in his sensational proclamation of outlawry against General Butler and all commissioned officers in his command he repeats: "African slaves have not only been incited to insurrection by every license and encouragement, but numbers of them have actually been armed for a servile war—a war in its nature far exceeding the horrors and most merciless atrocities of savages." In this it was ordered that "negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said States"; and that Butler and his commissioned officers, "robbers and criminals deserving death, be whenever captured reserved for execution."³

President Lincoln's two proclamations of emancipation excited similar threats. About a week after the first was issued it was made a subject of discussion in the Confederate senate at Richmond, and a Confederate writer recorded in his diary the next day: "Some of the gravest of our senators favor the raising of the black flag, asking and giving no quarter hereafter."⁴ When the final proclamation reached Richmond, Jefferson Davis was writing his annual message to the rebel Congress, and he ransacked his dictionary for terms to stigmatize it. "Our detestation of those who have at-

tempted the most execrable measure recorded in the history of guilty man is tempered by profound contempt for the impotent rage which it discloses."⁵ This new provocation also broadened his field of retaliation. He now declared that he would deliver "such criminals as may attempt its execution"—all commissioned officers of the United States captured in States embraced in the proclamation—to the executives of such States, to be punished for exciting servile insurrection.

The Confederate Congress, while responding to the full degree of the proposed retaliation, nevertheless preferred to keep the power of such punishment in the hands of the central military authorities, apparently as promising a more certain and summary execution. That body passed a joint resolution, approved by Davis May 1, 1863, which prescribed that white officers of negro Union soldiers "shall, if captured, be put to death or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court," the trial to take place "before the military court attached to the army or corps" making the capture, or such other military court as the Confederate President should designate.⁶

When the Confederate threats regarding negro soldiers were first launched the experiment had not yet been formally authorized by the Government; and as there was no probability that any early capture of such persons would be made by the enemy, no attention was paid to rebel orders and proclamations on the subject. A year later, however, when negro regiments were springing into full organization simultaneously in many places, the matter became one of grave import. As a rule, the black regiments were commanded by white officers, often selected, as was specially the case with the 54th Massachusetts, from the very best material, whose bravery in incurring this additional risk deserved the extra watchfulness and protection of the Government. The most elementary justice required that if it called the black man to do a soldier's duty it must cover him with a soldier's right, and Northern sentiment was prompt in urging the claim. Frederick Douglass has related how he pressed the point upon Mr. Lincoln, and the President's reply:

As to the exchange and general treatment of colored soldiers when taken prisoners of war, he should insist on their being entitled to all privileges of such prisoners. Mr. Lincoln admitted the justice of my demand for the promotion of colored soldiers for good conduct in the field, but on the matter

¹ Lee to Halleck, August 2, 1862. "Rebellion Record," Vol. IX., p. 246.

² General Orders, Aug. 21, 1862.

³ Davis, Proclamation, December 23, 1862. "American Annual Cyclopædia," 1862, p. 738.

⁴ Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I., p. 159.

⁵ Davis, Annual Message, January 12, 1863. "American Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 786.

⁶ C. S. Statutes-at-Large for 1863, p. 167.

of retaliation he differed from me entirely. I shall never forget the benignant expression of his face, the tearful look of his eye, and the quiver in his voice when he deprecated a resort to retaliatory measures. "Once begun," said he, "I do not know where such a measure would stop." He said he could not take men out and kill them in cold blood for what was done by others. If he could get hold of the persons who were guilty of killing the colored prisoners in cold blood, the case would be different, but he could not kill the innocent for the guilty.¹

Nevertheless, in view of the great success which attended the enlistment of black recruits, it became necessary for the Government to adopt a settled policy on the question, and on July 30, 1863, the President issued the following comprehensive order:

It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations, and the usages and customs of war, as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism and a crime against the civilization of the age.

The Government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers, and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession.

It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for every one enslaved by the enemy, or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works, and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war.²

It is a gratification to record that the rebel Government did not persist in the barbarous conduct it had officially announced, and that sanguinary retaliation did not become necessary. There were indeed some unimportant instances of imprisonment of captured blacks, as hostages for which, a few rebel soldiers were ordered into confinement by General Halleck, but the cases were not pushed to extremity under executive sanction on either side. Much more serious excesses, however, occurred under the responsibility and conduct of individual officers growing out of mistaken zeal or uncurbed passion; it is probable that most of them went unrecorded. In October, 1862,

when the guerrilla outrages in Missouri were in one of their moments of fiercest activity, a Union citizen of Palmyra was abducted and murdered under circumstances which clearly marked it as an instance of concerted and deliberate partisan revenge. In retaliation for this, Colonel John McNeil, the Union officer in local command, having demanded the perpetrators, which demand was not complied with, ordered the execution of ten rebel guerrillas of the same neighborhood, and carried out the order with military publicity and formality.³ Even admitting the strong provocation, modern sentiment cannot justify a punishment tenfold as severe as that demanded by the Mosaic law. Less than a month later there was brief mention in a letter of the rebel Major-General Holmes to the Confederate War Department of an analogous occurrence in northern Texas. "A secret organization," he wrote, "to resist the [Confederate] conscript act in northern Texas, has resulted in the citizens organizing a jury of investigation, and I am informed they have tried and executed forty of those convicted, and thus this summary procedure has probably crushed the incipient rebellion."⁴ Even without details the incident is a convincing explanation of the seeming unanimity for rebellion in that region.

The most shocking occurrence of this character, however, followed the employment of negro soldiers. We cannot in our day adequately picture the vindictive rage of many rebel masters at seeing recent slaves uniformed and armed in defense of a government which had set them free. Under the barbarous institution, to perpetuate which they committed treason and were ready to die, they had punished their human chattels with the unchecked lash, sold them on the auction-block, hunted them with bloodhounds; and it is hardly to be wondered at that amid the license of war individuals among them now and then thought to restore their domination by the aid of military slaughter. As an evidence that such thoughts existed here and there we need only cite the language of Major-General John C. Breckinridge, late Vice-President of the United States. Writing under date of August 14, 1862, to the Union commander at Baton Rouge, he recites in a list of alleged "outrages" that "information has reached these headquarters that negro slaves are being organized and armed to be employed against us"; and adds, "I am

¹ Frederick Douglass, *Reminiscences*, "New York Tribune," July 5, 1885.

² Report Provost-Marshal General, March 17, 1866. *Mass. and Doc.*, 1865-66, Part III., p. 63.

³ It is proper to mention that this retaliatory action was under the authority of the State of Missouri. General Curtis, commanding the Department of the Missouri at that time, wrote under date of December 24, 1862:

"General McNeil is a State general, and his column was mainly State troops: the matter has therefore never come to my official notice. . . . When persons are condemned to be shot by Federal authority, the proceedings have to be approved by the President, but no case of this sort has arisen under my command."—*War Records*, Vol. XXII. Part I., pp. 860-1.

⁴ *War Records*, Vol. XIII., p. 908.

authorized by Major-General Van Dorn, commanding this department, to inform you that the above acts are regarded as in violation of the usage of civilized warfare, and that in future, upon any departure from these usages, he will raise the black flag and neither give nor ask quarter."¹

More official bravado, from however conspicuous a personage, only deserves mention when, as in this instance, it illustrates a type of feeling which in one case at least manifested itself in an incident of shocking barbarity.

In the spring of the year 1864 President Lincoln went to Baltimore to attend the opening of a large fair for the benefit of the Sanitary Commission. In concluding the address which he was called upon to make on that occasion he said:

A painful rumor, true, I fear, has reached us of the massacre, by the rebel forces at Fort Pillow, in the west end of Tennessee, on the Mississippi River, of some three hundred colored soldiers and white officers, who had just been overpowered by their assailants. There seems to be some anxiety in the public mind whether the Government is doing its duty to the colored soldier, and to the service, at this point. At the beginning of the war, and for some time, the use of colored troops was not contemplated; and how the change of purpose was wrought I will not now take time to explain. Upon a clear conviction of duty, I resolved to turn that element of strength to account; and I am responsible for it to the American people, to the Christian world, to history, and on my final account to God. Having determined to use the negro as a soldier, there is no way but to give him all the protection given to any other soldier. The difficulty is not in stating the principle, but in practically applying it. It is a mistake to suppose the Government is indifferent to this matter, or is not doing the best it can in regard to it. We do not to-day *know* that a colored soldier, or white officer commanding colored soldiers, has been massacred by the rebels when made a prisoner. We fear it, believe it, I may say, but we do not *know* it. To take the life of one of their prisoners on the assumption that they murder ours, when it is short of certainty that they do murder ours, might be too serious, too cruel, a mistake. We are having the Fort Pillow affair thoroughly investigated; and such investigation will probably show conclusively how the truth is. If after all that has been said it shall turn out that there has been no massacre at Fort Pillow it will be almost safe to say there has been none, and will be none, elsewhere. If there has been the massacre of three hundred there, or even the tenth part of three hundred, it will be conclusively proven; and, being so proven, the retribution shall as surely come. It will be matter of grave consideration in what exact course to apply the retribution; but in the supposed case it must come.²

The investigation referred to by the President was made by the Committee on the Con-

duct of the War, and included the sworn testimony of about eighty witnesses, mostly actual participants in the occurrence. The committee found that Fort Pillow, Tennessee, situated on the Mississippi River, and garrisoned by about 557 Union troops, of whom 262 were colored, was captured by assault, by an overwhelming force of Confederates under General Forrest, on April 12, 1864, and that "of the men from 300 to 400 are known to have been killed at Fort Pillow, of whom at least 300 were murdered in cold blood after the post was in possession of the rebels and our men had thrown down their arms and ceased to offer resistance."

It further appears that this inhumanity was directed principally against the colored soldiers. The rebel general and his subordinates stoutly denied the accusation of vindictiveness, but their explanations and later evidence failed to shake the general substance of the committee's allegation and proof. Indeed it would be difficult to refute the conclusiveness of the first report of General Forrest himself. On the third day after his exploit he telegraphed to General Polk:

I attacked Fort Pillow on the morning of the 12th instant with a part of Bell's and McCulloch's brigades, numbering _____, under Brigadier-General J. R. Chalmers. After a short fight we drove the enemy, seven hundred strong, into the fort under cover of their gun-boats, and demanded a surrender, which was declined by Major L. W. Booth, commanding United States forces. I stormed the fort, and after a contest of thirty minutes captured the entire garrison, killing five hundred and taking one hundred prisoners, and a large amount of quartermaster's stores. The officers in the fort were killed, including Major Booth. I sustained a loss of twenty killed and sixty wounded. The Confederate flag now floats over the fort.³

The astonishing result is further explained by the contemporaneous threats made officially by these Confederate officers. On the 25th of March preceding, in demanding the surrender of Paducah, Kentucky, General Forrest wrote: "If you surrender, you shall be treated as prisoners of war; but if I have to storm your works, you may expect no quarter."⁴

And on the day following the Fort Pillow massacre, General A. Buford, one of Forrest's brigadiers, said in his demand for the surrender of Columbus, Kentucky:

Should you surrender, the negroes now in arms will be returned to their masters. Should I, however, be compelled to take the place, no quarter will be shown to the negro troops whatever; the white troops will be treated as prisoners of war.

And in a subsequent correspondence Forrest wrote, under date of June 20, to the Union general, C. C. Washburn: "I regard captured

¹ W. R., Vol. XV., pp. 550 and 551.

² Raymond, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," pp. 502-3.

³ "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 189.

⁴ "Rebellion Record," Vol. VIII., p. 73.

negroes as I do other captured property, and not as captured soldiers."¹ The language of these officers at Paducah and Columbus is a sufficient commentary on their achievement at Fort Pillow.

President Lincoln formally took up the consideration of the subject on the 3d of May by writing to the several members of his Cabinet:

It is now quite certain that a large number of our colored soldiers, with their white officers, were, by the rebel force, massacred after they had surrendered at the recent capture of Fort Pillow. So much is known, though the evidence is not yet quite ready to be laid before me. Meanwhile I will thank you to prepare, and give me in writing, your opinion as to what course the Government should take in the case.²

The answers of his advisers differed widely. Mr. Seward affirmed the duty of the Government to vindicate the right of all its soldiers to be regarded and treated as prisoners of war; nevertheless he urged great caution in any proceedings looking to retaliation, and advised for the present only the setting apart and rigorous confinement of an equal number of Confederate prisoners as hostages until the rebel Government could be called upon to explain or disavow the cruelties and give pledges that they should not be repeated. Mr. Chase held the same view, except that he advised that the hostages should be selected from rebel prisoners of highest rank, in number equivalent, according to the rules of exchange, to the officers and men murdered at Fort Pillow. Mr. Stanton also advised that the hostages be selected from rebel officers; that Forrest, Chalmers, and all officers and men concerned in the Fort Pillow massacre be excluded from the benefit of the President's proclamation of amnesty and from the privilege of exchange, and their delivery for punishment be demanded from the Richmond authorities, in default of which delivery the President should take such measures against the hostages as the state of things then existing might make necessary. The advice of Mr. Welles was essentially the same as that of Mr. Stanton. Mr. Blair, on the contrary, took different ground.

There are two reasons [he wrote] which would prevent me from ordering the execution of prisoners, man for man, in retaliation for the massacre at Fort Pillow. *First*. That I do not think the measure would be justified by the rules of civilized warfare, even in a contest between alien enemies. *Second*. Because even if allowable in such a contest it would not be just in itself or expedient in the present contest. . . . And the inclination of my mind

is, to pursue the actual offenders alone in such cases as the present; to order the most energetic measures for their capture, and the most summary punishment when captured. . . . A proclamation or order that the guilty individuals are to be hunted down will have far greater terror and be far more effectual to prevent the repetition of the crime than the punishment of parties not concerned in that crime.

Mr. Bates agreed in opinion with Mr. Blair. He would demand of the enemy a disavowal or avowal of the act. If he disavow it, then demand the surrender of the generals guilty of the Fort Pillow massacre to be dealt with at your discretion. If he avow and justify the act, then instruct your commanders to cause instant execution upon any and all participants in the massacre, whether officers or privates, who should fall into their power. He added:

I would have no compact with the enemy for mutual slaughter; no cartel of blood and murder; no stipulation to the effect that if you murder one of my men I will murder one of yours! Retaliation is not mere justice. It is avowedly revenge; and it is wholly unjustifiable, in law and conscience, unless adopted for the sole purpose of punishing past crime and of giving a salutary and blood-saving warning against its repetition.

Mr. Usher also joined in the opinion that punishment should not be visited upon innocent persons, but he urged

that the Government should set apart for execution an equal number of prisoners who since the massacre have been, or may hereafter from time to time be, captured from Forrest's command.

He also urged another reason:

We are upon the eve of an impending battle. Until the result shall have been known it seems to me to be inexpedient to take any extreme action in the premises. If favorable to our arms, we may retaliate as far as the laws of war and humanity will permit. If disastrous and extreme measures should have been adopted, we may be placed in a position of great embarrassment, and forced to forego our threatened purpose in order to avoid a worse calamity.

It is probable that this view took a deep hold upon the Cabinet. Grant was about entering upon his Wilderness campaign, and its rapid succession of bloody conflicts crowded out of view and consideration a topic so difficult and so hazardous as wholesale retaliation for the Fort Pillow barbarity, which, on one hand, strict justice demanded, and which, on the other, enlightened humanity forbade. In these opposing duties there could be little doubt as to which the kind heart of the President would incline. He had long since laid down for himself a rule of conduct applicable to

¹ "Rebellion Record," Vol. X., p. 724.

² Lincoln to the Cabinet, May 3, 1864. Unpublished MS.

this class of cases. In his annual message of December 3, 1861, he had declared :

In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle.

It does not appear that the Fort Pillow question was ever seriously renewed in the Cabinet or definitely concluded by the President.

The proceedings relating to retaliation which we have thus far sketched bring us back to another and by no means the least interesting phase of the general subject of negro soldiers. We may here anticipate the course of events so far as to say that in the autumn and winter of 1864 the cause of the South was already lost and the collapse of the Confederate Government plainly foreshadowed to all except the leaders, whose infatuation and wounded vanity made them unwilling to acknowledge and accept defeat. Yet this effort to avoid confession of error in one direction compelled them to admit it in another. They had seceded from slavery, had made it the corner-stone of their government, had anathematized President Lincoln for his decrees of emancipation, had pronounced the ban of outlawry and had prescribed the sentence of death against every white officer who might dare to command negro troops; but now in their extremity some of them proposed to throw consistency to the winds and themselves commit the acts upon which they had invoked the reprobation of mankind and for which they had ordained extreme punishment.

It would be difficult to estimate the benefit they had derived from the direct military labor of the slave, especially in building fortifications. They now proposed not only to put arms in his hands and make him a soldier to fight in the ranks, but also, as a final step, to emancipate him for the service. Even the flexible political conscience of Jefferson Davis, however, winced a little at the bold abandonment of principle which this policy involved, and in his message of November 7, 1864, to the Confederate Congress he argues the question with the reluctance of a man preparing to walk over live coals. We have not space to abridge his hair-splitting arguments to justify the South in what they had so vociferously denounced when done by the North. The sum of his recommendation is that the 20,000 slaves then employed in various labors in the Confederate army should be increased to 40,000, be drilled in "encamping, marching, and park-

ing trains," and "employed as a pioneer and engineer laborer." He says :

I must dissent from those who advise a general levy and arming of the slaves for the duty of soldiers. Until our white population shall prove insufficient for the armies we require and can afford to keep in the field, to employ as a soldier the negro, who has merely been trained to labor, and as a laborer,—the white man accustomed from his youth to the use of firearms,—would scarcely be deemed wise or advantageous by any; and this is the question now before us. But should the alternative ever be presented of subjugation or of the employment of the slave as a soldier, there seems no reason to doubt what should then be our decision.¹

While he dwells on the "improbable contingency of our need of resorting to this element of resistance," he nevertheless points out that the Confederate Government might buy the slave from his master and engage to liberate him as a reward for faithful military service.

Mr. Davis's hesitating and tentative recommendation was seed sown on barren ground. If the dose was unpalatable to him it appears to have been yet more bitter to the members of the Confederate Congress, who doubtless felt, as has been pithily expressed by a Confederate writer, that it was an admission of the inherent injustice of slavery; that "if the negro was fit to be a soldier he was not fit to be a slave"; that the proposition "cut under the traditions and theories of three generations in the South"; and that "by a few strokes of the pen the Confederate Government had subscribed to the main tenet of the abolition party in the North and all its consequences, standing exposed and stultified before the world."² They debated the unwelcome subject with qualms and grimaces through November, December, January, and most of February. On the 11th of January and again on the 18th of February the proposal received a notable championship in letters from General Lee, in which he declared the measure of employing negro soldiers "not only expedient but necessary," and recommended that the Confederate President be empowered "to call upon individuals or States for such as they are willing to contribute, with the condition of emancipation to all enrolled."³ Even under this pressure, however, the rebel lawmakers could not wholly conquer their repugnance. Nearly six weeks more elapsed, and the fall of Richmond was already imminent, when on the 30th of March, 1865,⁴ the Confederate Congress passed an act upon the subject. The writer already quoted sums up the result as follows :

¹ "American Annual Cyclopædia," 1864, p. 697.

² Pollard, "Life of Jefferson Davis," pp. 453-4.

³ Lee to Hunter, Jan. 11, 1865. (THE CENTURY,

August, 1888), and Lee to Barksdale, Feb. 18, 1865 (McCabe, "Life of Lee," p. 574).

⁴ Report of Provost-Marshal General Fry.

The law, as finally enacted, was merely to authorize the President to receive into the military service such able-bodied slaves as might be patriotically tendered by their masters, to be employed in whatever capacity he might direct; no change to be made in the relation of owners of slaves, at least so far as it appeared in the bill. The fruits of this emasculated measure were two companies of blacks, organized from some negro vagabonds in Richmond, which were allowed to give balls at the Libby Prison and were exhibited in fine fresh uniforms on Capitol Square as decoys to obtain sable recruits. But the mass of their colored brethren looked on the parade with unenvious eyes, and little boys exhibited the early prejudices of race by pelting the fine uniforms with mud.¹

THE ENROLLMENT AND THE DRAFT.

THE successive steps by which the army of the United States, numbering some seventeen thousand men when Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, grew to the vast aggregate of a million soldiers deserve a word of notice. We can do no more than to summarize briefly the process, referring those of our readers who may wish to study the matter more in detail to the admirable historical statement of General Fry appended to the report of the Secretary of War to the Thirty-ninth Congress. The first troops mustered into the service were the militia of the District of Columbia; thirty-eight companies were thus obtained. On the 15th of April was issued, under the law of 1803, the President's proclamation calling for 75,000 troops for ninety days. Their work was the protection of the capital; their service mainly ended with the battle of Bull Run. On the 3d of May the President issued a call for 42,000 volunteers to serve three years, unless sooner discharged; he increased at the same time the regular army by eight regiments, and directed the enlistment of 18,000 seamen. This was done without authority from Congress, but the act was legalized when that body came together. The volunteers called for were immediately raised and many more were offered; but the recruits for the regular army came in slowly, and the new regiments were in fact never fully organized until the close of the war. After the disastrous battle of Bull Run the patriotism of Congress promptly rose to the emergency, and within a few days successive acts were passed giving the President authority to raise an army of a million men.

So enthusiastic was the response of the people in those early days that the chief embarrassment of the Government was at first to check and repress the offers of volunteers. Some regions were more liberal in their tenders of troops than others; individuals and companies rejected from one State whose quota was full

enlisted from another; pious frauds were practiced to get a place under the colors. Much confusion and annoyance afterwards resulted from these causes. Under authority of the acts of Congress referred to, a force of 637,126 men was in the service in the spring of 1862. This, it was thought, would be adequate for the work of suppressing the insurrection: the expenses of the military establishment had risen to appalling proportions, and the ill-advised resolution was taken of putting a stop to volunteer recruiting on the 3d of April. As the waste of the armies went on without corresponding successes, the error which had been committed was recognized, and recruiting was resumed in June; but before much progress was made, the ill fortune of McClellan² in the Peninsula, and its unfavorable effect on the public mind, chilled and discouraged recruitment. The necessity for more troops was as evident to the country as to the Government.

While General McClellan was on his retreat to the James, the governors of the loyal States signed a letter to the President requesting him to issue a call for additional troops, and it was in response to this that Mr. Lincoln issued his call, on the 2d of July, 1862, for 300,000 volunteers. The need of troops continuing and becoming more and more pressing, the call for 300,000 nine months' militia was issued on the 4th of August, and in some of the States a draft from the militia was ordered, the results of which were not especially satisfactory. Only about 87,000 of the 300,000 required were reported as obtained in this way, and this number was greatly reduced by desertion before the men could be got out of their respective States.

In Pennsylvania a somewhat serious organization was formed in several counties for resisting the draft. Governor Curtin reported several thousand recusants in arms. They would not permit the drafted men who were willing to go to their duty to leave their homes, and even forced them to get out of the railway trains after they had embarked. By the prompt and energetic action of the State and National Governments, working in harmony, this disorder was soon suppressed. But there, as elsewhere, the enrollment was inefficient and the results entirely inadequate.

Early in the year 1863 it became evident that the armies necessary for an effective prosecution of the war could not be filled by volunteering, nor by State action alone, and a bill for enrolling and calling out the national forces was introduced in the Senate in the beginning of February, and at once gave rise in that body to a hot discussion. It was attacked by the Democratic senators, who were mostly from the border States, with the greatest en-

¹ Pollard, "Life of Jefferson Davis," p. 456.

² Report of Provost-Marshal General, Part I., p. 9.

ergy and feeling. They contended that it was in direct violation of the Constitution, and, if passed, would be subversive of the liberties of the country. They were joined by Mr. Richardson, who had succeeded Mr. Douglas as senator from Illinois, and who warned his colleagues that they were plunging the country into civil war.¹ The bill was principally defended by Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts and Mr. Collamer of Vermont, the former laying most stress upon the necessities of the country, and the latter characteristically advocating the measure on legal and constitutional grounds. The bill passed the Senate, and came up in the House on the 23d of February. Mr. Olin, who had charge of it, announced at the beginning, with a somewhat crude candor, that he proposed to permit discussion of the merits of the bill for a reasonable time and then to demand a vote upon it. He was not willing to hazard the loss of a bill he deemed so important by opening it to propositions for amendment. But in spite of this warning, perhaps by reason of it, an animated discussion at once sprung up and many amendments were offered, some in good faith, and some with the purpose of nullifying the bill. The measure was attacked with great violence. The object and purpose of the President was proclaimed by Democratic members to be the establishment of an irresponsible despotism, and the destruction of constitutional liberty was prophesied as certain in case the bill should pass. There was a great difference of tone between the opponents and the supporters of the Administration; the latter, confident in their strength, were far more moderate in their expressions than the former, but there were reproaches and recriminations on both sides. Democrats, like Mr. Cox of Ohio, Mr. Biddle of Pennsylvania, and Messrs. Mallory and Wickliffe of Kentucky, claimed that the antislavery measures of the Administration were the sole cause of military failure, and that if the President would return to constitutional ways the armies would soon be filled by volunteering; to which the Republicans answered that the cessation of volunteering was due to the treasonable speech and conduct of the opposition. Some unimportant amendments were attached to the bill, which was sent back to the Senate for concurrence, and after another debate, scarcely less passionate than the first, the amendments of the House were adopted, and the measure became a law by the approval of the President, on the 3d of March, 1863. It was the first law enacted by Congress by which the Government of the United States, without the intervention of the authorities of the several States, appealed directly to the nation to create large armies. The act declared that, with

certain exceptions especially set forth, all able-bodied male citizens, and persons of foreign birth who had declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of 20 and 45, should constitute the national forces, and empowered the President to call them forth by draft. All were to be called out if necessary: the first call was actually for one-fifth, but that was a measure of expediency. The act provided for the appointment or detail, by the President, of a Provost-Marshal General, who was to be the head of a bureau in the War Department, and for dividing the States into districts coinciding with those for the election of congressmen. The District of Columbia and the Territories formed additional districts. A provost-marshal was authorized for each of these districts, with whom were associated a commissioner and a surgeon. The board thus formed was required to divide its district into as many subdistricts as might be found necessary, to appoint an enrolling officer for each, and to make an enrollment immediately. Colonel James B. Fry, an assistant adjutant-general of the army, who had formerly been chief-of-staff to General Buell, and who was not only an accomplished soldier but an executive officer of extraordinary tact, ability, and industry, was made Provost-Marshal General. Officers of the army, selected for their administrative capacity, were appointed provost-marshals for the several States. The enrollment began the latter part of May, and was pushed forward with great energy, except in the border States, where some difficulty was found in selecting the proper boards of enrollment. While there was more or less opposition, General Fry says:

It could not be said to be serious. Some of the officers were maltreated, and one or two assassinated, but prompt action on the part of the civil authorities, aided when necessary by military patrols, secured the arrest of guilty parties and checked these outrages.

Those who attempted to obstruct enrollment officers were promptly punished, and orders from the War Department gave a clear definition of what constituted impediments to the drafts. Not only the assaulting or obstructing of officers was cause for punishment, but even standing mute and the giving of false names subjected the offender to summary arrest.

In addition to the duties of enrolling all citizens capable of bearing arms, of drafting from these the numbers required for military service, and of arresting deserters and returning them to the army, the Provost-Marshal General was also charged with the entire work of recruiting volunteers. This insured harmony and systematic action in the two methods of raising troops, and the work was carried on

¹ "Congressional Globe," Feb. 4, 1863, p. 709.

with constantly increasing efficiency and success. A comparatively small number of men was obtained strictly by the draft, but the draft powerfully stimulated enlistments, and the money obtained by commutation furnished an ample fund for all the expenses of the bureaus of recruitment. Improvements in the law and the modes of executing it were constantly made, until at the close of the war the system was probably as perfect as human ingenuity could make it under the peculiar conditions of American life. The result proved the vast military resources of the nation. In April, 1865, with a million soldiers in the field, the enrollment showed that the national forces not called out consisted of 2,245,000 more. We need not cumber these pages with the figures of the successive calls and their results; we quote the aggregates from General Fry's final report (p. 46). The quotas charged against the States, under all calls made by the President during the four years from the 15th of April, 1861, when his first proclamation echoed the guns at Sumter, to the 14th of April, 1865, when Lincoln died and recruiting ceased, amounted to 2,759,049, the terms of service varying from three months to three years. The aggregate number of men credited on the several calls, and put into service in the army, navy, and marines, was 2,690,401. This left a deficiency of 68,648, which would have been readily filled if the war had not closed. In addition to these some 70,000 "emergency men" were from first to last called into service.¹

During the progress of the work an infinite variety of questions arose as to the quotas and the credits of the several States, and the President was overwhelmed by complaints and reclamations from various governors in the North. Even the most loyal supporters of the Administration exerted themselves to the ut-

most to have the demands upon them reduced and their credits for troops furnished raised to the highest possible figure; while in those States which were politically under the control of the opposition these natural importunities were aggravated by what seemed a deliberate intention to frustrate so far as possible the efforts of the Government to fill its depleted armies.² The most serious controversy that arose during the progress of the enrollment was that begun and carried on by Governor Seymour of New York.

So long as the administration of Governor E. D. Morgan lasted, the Government received most zealous and efficient support from the State of New York. It is true that at the close of Governor Morgan's term, the last day of 1862, the Adjutant-General reported the State deficient some 28,000 men in volunteers under the various calls of the Government, 18,000 of which deficiency belonged to the city of New York. But in spite of this deficiency there had never been any lack of cordial coöperation on the part of the State government with that of the nation. In the autumn of that year, however, in the period of doubt and discouragement which generally prevailed throughout the Union, General Wadsworth, the Republican candidate for governor, had been defeated after a most acrimonious contest by Horatio Seymour, then, and until his death, the most honored and prominent Democratic politician of the State. He came into power upon a platform denouncing almost every measure which the Government had found it necessary to adopt for the suppression of the rebellion; and upon his inauguration, on the first day of 1863, he clearly intimated that his principal duty would be "to maintain and defend the sovereignty and jurisdiction of his State."

The President, anxious to work in harmony

¹ The following details of the several calls and their results are taken from the report made to Congress by the Secretary of War in the session of 1865-66:

	<i>Number</i>	<i>Term</i>
	<i>of Men.</i>	<i>Service.</i>
Call of April 15, 1861, for 75,000 men, produced	98,235	3 months
	2,715	6 months
Calls of May 3, July 22 and 25, 1861, for 500,000	9,056	1 year
	30,952	2 years
	657,863	3 years
Call of July 2, 1862, for 500,000	419,627	3 years
Call of August 4, 1862, for 300,000	86,960	9 months
Proclamation of June 15, 1863, for militia (100,000)	16,361	6 months
Calls of October 15, 1863, and February 1, 1864, for 500,000	374,807	3 years
Call of March 14, 1864, for 200,000	284,021	3 years
Militia mustered in the spring of 1864	83,612	100 days
	149,356	1 & 2 yrs.
Call of July 13, 1864, for 500,000	234,798	3 years
	728	4 years
	151,105	1 year
Call of December 19, 1864, for 300,000	5,076	2 years
	48,065	3 years
	312	4 years

The aggregate shows a great many more soldiers than

ever served, as a large number enlisted more than once. Veteran volunteers to the number of 150,000 reenlisted in 1863-64. Deserters and bounty-jumpers must also be deducted.

² Though the President knew that fairness and accuracy prevailed in the demands made upon the different localities for their proportion of troops, he was so much embarrassed by complaints that he found it necessary at last to constitute a board, consisting of Attorney-General Speed, General Delafield, Chief of Engineers, and Colonel Foster, Assistant Adjutant-General, to examine into the proper quotas and credits, and to report errors if they found any therein, and he announced in the order constituting the board that its determination should be final and conclusive. The board went carefully over the whole subject, explained the mode of proceeding adopted by the Provost-Marshal General, and said, "The rule is in conformity to the requirements of the laws of Congress and is just and equitable; we have carefully examined and proved the work done under this rule by the Provost-Marshal General and find it has been done with fairness." This report was formally approved by the President.

with the governors of all the loyal States, and especially desirous on public grounds to secure the cordial coöperation in war matters of the State administration in New York, had written to Mr. Seymour soon after his inauguration as governor, inviting his confidence and friendship.

You and I [he said] are substantially strangers, and I write this chiefly that we may become better acquainted. I, for the time being, am at the head of a nation which is in great peril, and you are at the head of the greatest State of that nation. As to maintaining the nation's life and integrity, I assume and believe there cannot be a difference of purpose between you and me. If we should differ as to the means it is important that such difference should be as small as possible; that it should not be enhanced by unjust suspicions on one side or the other. In the performance of my duty the coöperation of your State, as that of others, is needed—in fact, is indispensable. This alone is sufficient reason why I should wish to be at a good understanding with you. Please write me at least as long a letter as this, of course saying in it just what you think fit.¹

The governor waited three weeks and then made a cold and guarded reply, retaining in this private communication the attitude of reserve and distrust he had publicly assumed.

I have delayed [he said] answering your letter for some days with a view of preparing a paper in which I wished to state clearly the aspect of public affairs from the standpoint I occupy. I do not claim any superior wisdom, but I am confident the opinions I hold are entertained by one-half of the population of the Northern States. I have been prevented from giving my views in the manner I intended by a pressure of official duties, which at the present stage of the legislative session of this State confines me to the executive chamber until each midnight.

After the adjournment, which will soon take place, I will give you without reserve my opinion and purpose with regard to the condition of our unhappy country. In the meanwhile I assure you that no political resentments or no personal objects will turn me aside from the pathway I have marked out for myself. I intend to show to those charged with the administration of public affairs a due deference and respect, and to yield them a just and generous support in all measures they may adopt within the scope of their constitutional powers. For the preservation of this Union I am ready to make any sacrifice of interest, passion, or prejudice.²

This closed the personal correspondence between them. The governor never wrote the promised letter; he did not desire to commit himself to any friendly relations with the President. With the narrowness of a bitterly prejudiced mind he had given an interpretation to

the President's cordial overture as false as it was unfavorable. In an article,³ published with his sanction many years afterwards, he is represented as expressing his conviction that at the time of this correspondence there was a conspiracy of prominent Republicans to force Lincoln out of the White House; that the President was aware of it, and that this was "the cause of the anxiety which he displayed to be on intimate friendly terms with Mr. Seymour." There could be no intimate understanding between two such men. Mr. Lincoln could no more comprehend the partisan bitterness and suspicion which lay at the basis of Mr. Seymour's character than the latter could appreciate the motives which induced Lincoln to seek his cordial coöperation in public work for the general welfare. He gave the same base interpretation to a complimentary message which Stanton sent him in June, 1863, thanking him for the energy with which he had sent forward troops for the defense of Pennsylvania, and when, a year later, Stanton invited him to Washington for a consultation,³ he refused either to go or to reply to the invitation.

Mr. Thurlow Weed is quoted as saying in his later years that Mr. Lincoln, after Seymour's election and before his inauguration, authorized Mr. Weed to say to him that holding his position he could wheel the Democratic party into line and put down the rebellion; and that if he would render this great service to the country Mr. Lincoln would cheerfully make way for him as his successor.⁴ Mr. Weed says he made this suggestion to Seymour; but that he preferred to administer his office as an irreconcilable and conscientious partisan. It is probable that Mr. Weed, as is customary with elderly men, exaggerated the definiteness of the proposition; but these letters show how anxious Lincoln was that Seymour should give a loyal support to the Government, and in how friendly and self-effacing a spirit he would have met him.

In what must be said in regard to the controversy in which Governor Seymour soon found himself engaged with the National Government there is no question of his personal integrity or his patriotism. He doubtless considered that he was only doing his duty to his State and his party in opposing almost every specific act of the National Government. The key to all his actions in respect to the draft is to be found in his own words: "It is believed," he said, "by at least one-half of the people of the loyal States that the conscription act is in itself a violation of the supreme constitutional

¹ Lincoln to Seymour, March 23, 1863. MS.

² Seymour to Lincoln, April 14, 1863. MS.

³ "New York Times," Aug. 18, 1879.

⁴ Memoir by T. W. Barnes, p. 428.

law."¹ This belief he heartily shared, and no moral blame attaches to him for trying to give it effect in his official action. His conduct led to disastrous results; his views of government were shown to be mistaken and unsound. The nation went on its triumphant way over all the obstacles interposed by him and those who believed with him, and during the quarter of a century which elapsed before his death his chief concern was to throw upon the Government the blame of his own factious proceedings. He constantly accused the Administration of Mr. Lincoln of an unfair and partisan execution of the law, which he regarded in itself as unconstitutional. He assumed that because the enrollment of the arms-bearing population of New York City, which had given a majority for him, showed an excess over the enrollment in the rural districts, which had given a large majority for Wadsworth, the city was to be punished for being Democratic and the country rewarded for being Republican; to which the most natural reply was that the volunteering had been far more active in the Republican districts than it had been in the Democratic. He attacked all the proceedings of the provost-marshals. He accused them of neglect and contumacy towards himself. All these accusations were wholly unfounded. General Fry was a man as nearly without politics as a patriotic American can be. He came of a distinguished Democratic family, and during a life passed in the military service his only preoccupation had been the punctual fulfillment of every duty confided to him. The district provost-marshals for the city of New York were selected with especial care from those recommended by citizens of the highest character in the place. Three provost-marshal generals were appointed for New York, and great pains were taken to choose "those who would be likely to secure the favor and coöperation of the authorities and the people of New York."² They were Major Townsend, Colonel Nugent, and Major Diven. Nugent and Diven were war Democrats, and the last "an intimate acquaintance and personal friend of Governor Seymour." Townsend was a well-known resident of Albany. They were specially charged to put themselves in communication with the

Governor, to acquaint themselves with his views and wishes, and to give them due weight in determining the best interests of the Government; and to endeavor, by all means in their power, to secure for the execution of the enrollment act the aid and hearty coöperation of the Governor, the State officers, and the people. A letter was at the same time written to the Governor by the Provost-Marshal General commending these officers to him and asking for them his coöperation. A similar letter was sent to the mayor of New York City. The Government exhausted all its powers in endeavoring to commend the enrollment to the favorable consideration of the civil officers of the State. "But Governor Seymour," says General Fry, "gave no assistance; in fact, so far as the Government officers engaged in the enrollment could learn, he gave the subject no attention." Without the aid or countenance of the Governor, in face of his quiet hostility, the enrollment was carried forward as rapidly as possible. The work was impeded by numerous and important obstacles; the large floating population of the city threw great difficulties in the way of the enrollment; opposition was encountered in almost every house that the enrolling officers entered. Where artifice did not succeed violence was sometimes attempted. In some places organized bodies of men opposed the enrollment, in others secret societies waged a furtive warfare against the officers. But in spite of all these drawbacks the enrollment was made with remarkable fairness and substantial success. It was no more imperfect than was inevitable, and the draft which followed it was conducted in such a manner as to neutralize to a great extent the irregularities and hardship that might have resulted from the errors it contained.³ The enrollment having been completed, orders for the draft in the State of New York were issued on the 1st of July. At that date drafting had been going on for some time in New England. Colonel Nugent was left at liberty, if thought expedient, to execute the draft in New York City by districts, and in one or more at a given time, rather than all at once, throughout the city. Governor Seymour was notified in almost daily letters, from the 1st to the 13th of July, of the drafts which had been

¹ The attacks upon the constitutionality of the enrollment act were mainly political. Several attempts were made to have it declared invalid by the courts, but these were generally unsuccessful. In the United States circuit courts of Pennsylvania and Illinois two important decisions were rendered, the one by Judge Cadwalader and the other by Judge Treat (Judge Davis concurring), affirming the constitutionality of the law. Only one important decision in the contrary sense was obtained, and that was in the supreme court of Pennsylvania, Chief-Justice Lowrie and Justices Woodward and Thompson concurring in the decision that the law was unconstitutional, Justices Strong and Read

dissenting. This decision was afterwards reversed. Chief-Justice Lowrie was a candidate for reelection and Justice Woodward ran for governor the next year. The main issue in the canvass was this decision. They were both defeated by large majorities, A. G. Curtin being reelected governor, and Daniel Agnew taking the place of Lowrie on the bench. The court, thus reconstituted, reversed the former decision, Woodward and Thompson dissenting.

² General J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription of 1863."

³ Official Report of Provost-Marshal General.

ordered in the several districts. The Provost-Marshal General begged him to do all in his power to enable the officers to complete the drafts promptly, effectually, fairly, and successfully.¹ He paid no attention to these requests further than to send his adjutant-general to Washington on the 11th of July for the purpose of urging the suspension of the draft. But while this officer was away upon his mission the evil passions excited in the breasts of the lowest class of Democrats in New York City by the denunciations of the enrollment act and of the legally constituted authorities who were endeavoring to enforce it, broke out in the most terrible riot which this Western Continent has ever witnessed.

The state of popular distrust and excitement which naturally arose from the discussion of the enrollment was greatly increased by the vehement utterances of the more violent Democratic politicians and newspapers. Governor Seymour, in a speech delivered on the Fourth of July, which was filled with denunciations of the party in power, said:

The Democratic organization look upon this Administration as hostile to their rights and liberties; they look upon their opponents as men who would do them wrong in regard to their most sacred franchises.

The "Journal of Commerce" accused the Administration of prolonging the war for its own purposes, and added, "Such men are neither more nor less than murderers." "The World," denouncing "the weak and reckless men who temporarily administer the Federal Government," attacked especially the enrollment bill as an illegal and despotic measure. The "Daily News," which reached a larger number of the masses of New York than any other journal, quoted Governor Seymour as saying that neither the President nor Congress, without the consent of the State authorities, had the right to force a single individual against his will "to take part in the ungodly conflict which is distracting the land." It condemned the manner in which the draft was being executed as "an outrage on all decency and fairness," the object of it being to "kill off Democrats and stuff the ballot-boxes with bogus soldier votes." Incendiary hand-bills in the same sense were distributed through the northern districts of

the city, thickly populated with laboring men of foreign birth.

Although there had been for several days mutterings of discontent in the streets and even threats uttered against the enrolling officers, these demonstrations had been mostly confined to the drinking-saloons, and no apprehensions of popular tumult were entertained. Even on Saturday morning, the 11th of July, when the draft was to begin at the corner of Forty-third street and Third Avenue, there was no symptom of disturbance. The day passed pleasantly away, the draft was carried on regularly and good-humoredly, and at night the superintendent of police, as he left the office, said "the Rubicon was passed and all would go well."² But the next day, being Sunday, afforded leisure for the ferment of suspicion and anger. Every foreigner who was drafted became a center of sympathy and excitement. There were secret meetings in many places on Sunday night, and on the next morning parties of men went from shop to shop compelling workmen to join them and swell the processions which were moving to the offices of the enrollment board. The commissioner proceeded quietly with his work, the wheel was beginning to turn, a few names were called and recorded, when suddenly a large paving-stone came crashing through the window and landed upon the reporters' table, shivering the inkstands and knocking over one or two bystanders; and with hardly a moment's interval a volley of stones flew through the windows, putting a stop to the proceedings. The crowd, kindled into fury by its own act, speedily became a howling mob; the rioters burst through the doors and windows, smashed the furniture of the office into splinters, sprinkled camphene upon the floor, and set the building on fire. When the fire department arrived they found the mob in possession of the hydrants, and the building was soon reduced to ashes. This furious outburst took the authorities completely by surprise.³ The most trustworthy portion of the organized militia had been ordered to Pennsylvania to resist the invasion of General Lee. There was only a handful of troops in the harbor, and the mob, having possession of the street railways, prevented for a time the rapid concentration of these, while the police, who were admirable in organization and efficiency, being at the time under Repub-

¹ General J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription of 1863."

² "American Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 811.

³ General Fry, in his valuable treatise, "New York and the Conscription of 1863," gives the following as reasons why no large military force was assembled to preserve the public peace in New York: "On the occasion of the first draft these questions were carefully weighed by the President and the War Department. The conclusions were that no exception in the applica-

tion of the law should be made in New York, that no presumption that the State or city authorities would fail to cooperate with the Government should be admitted, that a Federal military force ought not to be assembled in New York City on the mere assumption that a law of the United States would be violently and extensively resisted, and that if it were thought best to assemble such a force there was none to be had without losing campaigns then going on or battles then impending."

lican control,¹ were of course inadequate, during the first hours of the outbreak, to deal with an army of excited and ignorant men, recruited in an instant from hundreds of workshops and excited by drink and passionate declamation. The agitation and disorder spread so rapidly that the upper part of the city was in a few hours in full possession of the maddened crowd, the majority of them filled with that aimless thirst for destruction which rises so naturally in a mob when the restraints of order are withdrawn. They were led by wild zealots, excited by political hates and fears, or by common thieves, who found in the tumult their opportunity for plunder. By 3 o'clock in the afternoon the body of rioters in the upper part of the city numbered several thousand. Their first fury was naturally directed against the enrolling offices. After the destruction of the building in the Ninth District they attacked the block of stores in which the enrolling office of the Eighth District stood.² The adjoining shops were filled with jewelry and other costly goods, and were speedily swept clean by the thievish hands of the rioters, and then set on fire; here, as before, the firemen were not permitted to play on the flames. But the political animus of the mob was shown most clearly by the brutal and cowardly outrages inflicted upon negroes. They dashed with the merriment of fiends at every colored face they saw, taking special delight in the maiming and murdering of women and children. Late in the afternoon of the 13th the mob made a rush for the fine building of the Colored Orphan Asylum.³ This estimable charity was founded and carried on by a society of kind-hearted ladies; it gave not only shelter but instruction and Christian training to several hundred colored orphans. A force of policemen was hastily gathered together, but could defend the asylum for a few minutes only, giving time for most of the inmates to escape. The policemen were then disabled by the brutal mob, who rushed into the building, stealing everything which was portable, and setting the house on fire. They burned the residences of several Government officers, and a large hotel which refused them liquor.

For three days these horrible scenes of unchained fury and hatred lasted. An attack upon the "New York Tribune" office was a further evidence of the political passion of the

mob,⁴ headed at this point by a lame secessionist barber who had just before been heard to express the hope that he "might soon shave Jeff. Davis in New York," and who led on the rioters with loud cheers for General McClellan; but after dismantling the counting-room they were attacked and driven away by the police. From beginning to end they showed little courage; they were composed, in great number, of the most degraded class of foreigners, and as a rule they made no stand when attacked in any number by either the police or the military. The only exception to this rule was in the case of a squad of marines who foolishly fired into the air when confronting the rioters. Colonel O'Brien, having sprained his ankle while gallantly resisting the mob, stepped into a drug store for assistance while his detachment passed on. The druggist, fearing the rioters, begged O'Brien to leave his shop, and the brave soldier went out among the howling mob. In a moment they were upon him and beat and trampled him into unconsciousness. For several hours the savages dragged the still breathing body of their own countryman up and down the streets, inflicting every indignity upon his helpless form, and then, shouting and yelling, conveyed him to his own door. There a courageous priest sought to subdue their savagery by reading the last offices for the dying over the unfortunate officer; then the climax of horror was reached by the brutal ruffians jostling the priest aside and closing the ceremonies by dancing upon the corpse. But a squad of fifty regulars was able to work its will against thousands of them. The city government, the trusty and courageous police force, and the troops in the harbor at last came into harmonious action and gradually established order throughout the city.

The State government was of little avail from beginning to end of the disturbance. Governor Seymour, having done all he could to embarrass the Government and rouse the people against it, had left the city on the 11th and gone to Long Branch in New Jersey. On the receipt of the frightful news of the 13th he returned to the city a prey to the most terrible agitation. He was hurried by his friends to the City Hall, where a great crowd soon gathered, and there, in sight of the besieged "Tribune" office, he made the memorable address the discredit of which justly clung to him all his days. His terror and his sympathy with the mob, in conflict with his convictions of public duty, completely unmanned him. He addressed the rioters in affectionate tones as his "friends," and assured them that he had "come to show them a test of his friendship." He informed them that he had sent his adjutant to Washington to confer with the authorities

¹ Several years afterwards Governor Seymour said: "The draft riots of 1863 were put down mainly by the energy, boldness, and skill of the police department. In saying this I am certainly not influenced by prejudice, for the force was politically and in some degree personally unfriendly to myself."

² Broadway, near Twenty-eighth street.

³ Fifth Avenue and Forty-fourth street.

⁴ Trial of J. H. Whittier, Aug. 12, 1863.

there and to have the draft suspended. This assurance was received with the most vociferous cheers. He urged them to act as good citizens, leaving their interests to him. "Wait until my adjutant returns from Washington," he said, "and you shall be satisfied." The words in this extraordinary speech for which the governor was most blamed were those in which he addressed the mob as his friends; but this was a venial fault, pardonable in view of his extreme agitation. The serious matter was his intimation that the draft justified the riot, and that if the rioters would cease from their violence the draft would be stopped.¹ He issued two proclamations on the 14th, the one mildly condemning the riot and calling upon the persons engaged in it to retire to their homes and employments, and the other, somewhat sterner in tone, declaring the city and county of New York to be in a state of insurrection, and warning all who might resist the State authorities of their liability to the penalties prescribed by law. It is questionable if the rioters ever heard of the proclamations, and if they did the effect of these official utterances was entirely nullified by the governor's sympathetic speeches. The riots came to a bloody close on the night of Thursday, the fourth day. A small detachment of soldiers² met the principal body of rioters at Third Avenue and Twenty-first street, killed thirteen and wounded eighteen more, taking some dozens of prisoners. The fire of passion had burned itself out by this time, and the tired mob, now thoroughly dominated, slunk away to its hiding-places. During that night and the next day the militia were returning from Pennsylvania, several regiments of veterans arrived from the Army of the Potomac, and the peace of the city was once more secured. The rioters had kept the city in terror for four days and had destroyed two millions of property. For several days afterwards arrests went on, and many of the wounded law-breakers died in their retreats, afraid to call for assistance.

There were unimportant disturbances in other places which were speedily put down by the local authorities, but, as Mr. Greeley says: "in no single instance was there a riot incited by drafting wherein Americans by birth bore any considerable part, nor in which the great body of the actors were not born Europeans, and generally of recent importation." The part taken by Archbishop Hughes in this occurrence gave rise to various comments. He placarded about the city on the 16th of

July an address "to the men of New York who are now called in many papers rioters," inviting them to come to his house and let him talk to them, assuring them of immunity from the police in going and coming. "You who are Catholics," the address concluded, "or as many of you as are, have a right to visit your bishop without molestation." On the 17th, at 2 o'clock, a crowd of four or five thousand persons assembled in front of the Archbishop's residence,³ and the venerable prelate, clad in his purple robes and full canonical attire, appeared at the window and made a strange speech to the mob, half jocular and half earnest, alternately pleading, cajoling, and warning them. He told them that he "did not see a riotous face among them." He did not accuse them of having done anything wrong. He said that every man had the right to defend his house or his shanty at the risk of his life; that they had no cause to complain, "as Irishmen and Catholics," against the Government; and affectionately suggested whether it might not be better for them to retire to their homes and keep out of danger. He begged them to be quiet in the name of Ireland—"Ireland, that never committed a single act of cruelty until she was oppressed; Ireland, that has been the mother of heroes and of poets, but never the mother of cowards." The crowd greeted his speech with uproarious applause and quietly dispersed.

The number of those who lost their lives during the riots has never been ascertained. The mortality statistics for that week and the week succeeding show an increase of five or six hundred over the average. Governor Seymour estimated the number of killed and wounded at one thousand.

Naturally, in such days of terror and anger, there were not wanting those who asserted that the riots were the result and the manifestation of a widespread treasonable conspiracy involving leading Democrats at the North. The President received many letters to this effect, one relating the alleged confession of a well-known politician, who, overcome with agitation and remorse, had in the presence of the editors of the "Tribune" divulged the complicity of Seymour and others in the preparation of the *émeute*.⁴ But he placed no reliance upon the story, and there was in fact no foundation for it. With all his desire to injure the Administration, Governor Seymour had not the material of an insurrectionist in his composi-

was, under the circumstances, making a concession to the mob, and endangering the successful enforcement of the law of the land. [General J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription of 1863."]

¹ While the riot was going on, Governor Seymour had an interview with Colonel Nugent, the acting Provost-Marshal General of New York City, and insisted on the colonel's announcing a suspension of the draft. The draft had already been stopped by violence. The announcement was urged by the governor no doubt because he thought it would allay the excitement; but this

² Of the 12th Regulars, under Captain Putman.

³ Corner of Madison Avenue and Thirty-sixth street.

⁴ J. R. Gilmore to Lincoln, July 17, 1863. MS.

tion, and when the riot came his excitement and horror was the best proof that he had not expected it.

The scenes of violence in New York were not repeated anywhere else, if we except a slight disturbance in Boston, but the ferment of opposition was so general as to give great disquietude to many friends of the Government throughout the country. Leading Unionists in Philadelphia, fearing a riot there, besought the President by mail and telegraph to stop the draft. In Chicago a similar appeal was made, and by recruitment and volunteering the necessity for a draft was avoided in Illinois until the next year.

No provision of the enrollment law excited such ardent opposition as that which was introduced for the purpose of mitigating its rigors — the provision exempting drafted men from service upon payment of three hundred dollars. "The rich man's money against the poor man's blood" was a cry from which no demagogue could refrain, and it was this which contributed most powerfully to rouse the unthinking masses against the draft. The money paid for exemptions was used, under the direction of the Provost-Marshal General, for the raising of recruits and the payment of the expenses of the draft. It amounted to a very large sum — twenty-six millions of dollars. After all expenses were paid there was a balance of nine millions left to the credit of the Bureau in the Treasury of the United States. The exemption fund was swelled by the action of county and municipal authorities, especially by those of New York, who in the flurry succeeding the riots passed in great haste an ordinance to pay the commutation for drafted men of the poorer class. A certain impetus was given to volunteering also, but the money came in faster than the men; and in June, 1864, the Provost-Marshal General reported that out of some 14,000 drafted men 7000 were exempted for various reasons and 5000 paid money commutation. This statement was sent to Congress by the President with the recommendation that the commutation clause be repealed. This was done¹ after a hot discussion which exhibited a curious change of front on the question, Messrs. Saulsbury, Richardson, and other Democrats energetically opposing the repeal, and making it the occasion for as bitter attacks on the Administration as those which had been for a year directed against the law.²

It may not be without interest to look for a moment at the measures pursued by the Confederate authorities to raise and maintain their army. There is a striking contrast between methods and results on either side of the line.

The methods of the Confederates were far more prompt and more rigorous than those of the National Government, while the results attained were so much less satisfactory that their failure in this respect brought about the final catastrophe of their enterprise. They began the war with forces greatly superior in numbers to those of the Nation. Before the attack on Fort Sumter their Congress had authorized the raising of an army of 100,000 men and Mr. Davis had called into service 36,900 men, more than twice the army of the United States; and immediately after beginning hostilities he called for 32,000 more. On the 8th of May the Confederate Congress gave Mr. Davis almost unlimited power to accept the services of volunteers without regard to place of enlistment, and a few days later he was relieved by statute of the delays and limitations of formal calls, and all power of appointments to commissions was placed in his hands. So that, while from the beginning to the end the most punctilious respect was paid by the National executive and legislature to the rights of the loyal States in the matter of recruitment, the States which had seceded, on the pretext of preserving their autonomy, speedily gave themselves into the hands of a military dictator. In December, 1861, the term of enlistment was changed from one to three years, the pitiful bounty of fifty dollars being given as compensation. During all that winter recruiting languished, and several statutes continually increasing in severity were passed with little effect; and on the 16th of April, 1862, the Confederate Congress passed a sweeping measure of universal conscription, authorizing the President to call and place in the military service for three years, unless the war should end sooner, "all white men who are residents of the Confederate States, between the ages of 18 and 35 years," not legally exempt from service; and arbitrarily lengthening to three years the terms of those already enlisted. A law so stringent was of course impossible of perfect execution. Under the clamor and panic of their constituencies the Confederate Congress passed, repealed, and modified various schemes of exemption intended to permit the ordinary routine of civil life to pursue its course, but great confusion and heart-burnings arose from every effort which was made to ease the workings of the inexorable machine. The question of overseers of plantations was one especially difficult to treat. The law of the 11th of October, 1862, exempted one man for every plantation of twenty negroes. This system was further extended from time to time, but owners of slaves were obliged to pay five hundred dollars a year for each exemption. By one statute it was provided that on plantations where these exemptions were granted the exempt should pay two

¹ Law approved July 4, 1864.

² "Congressional Globe," June 23, 1864.

hundred pounds of meat for every able-bodied slave on the plantation. Gradually all exemptions as of right were legislated away and the whole subject left to the discretion of the executive, which vastly increased his power and his unpopularity. It finally rested upon him to say how many editors, ministers, railroad engineers, and expressmen were absolutely required to keep up the current of life in the business of the country.

The limit of age was constantly extended. In September, 1862, an act of the Confederate Congress authorized the President to call into service all white men resident in the Confederate States, between the ages of 18 and 45; and in February, 1864, another law included all between 17 and 50, which gave occasion to Grant for his celebrated *mot*—afterwards credited by him to General Butler—that the Confederates were robbing the cradle and the grave to fill their armies.


Severe and drastic as were these laws, and unrelenting as was the insurrectionary Government in their execution, they were not carried out with anything like the system and thor-

oughness which characterized the action of the National authorities. The Confederate generals were constantly complaining that they got no recruits, or not enough to supply the waste of campaigns. On the 30th of April, 1864, the chief of the Bureau of Conscription at Richmond made a report to the Secretary of War, painting in the darkest colors the difficulties encountered by him in getting soldiers into the ranks, though he had all the laws and regulations he needed and there were men enough in the country. He said, and in these words confessed that the system had failed and that the defeat of the revolt was now but a question of time:

The results indicate this grave consideration for the Government, that fresh material for the armies can no longer be estimated as an element of future calculation for their increase, and that necessity demands the invention of devices for keeping in the ranks the men now borne on the rolls. The stern revocation of all details, an appeal to the patriotism of the State claiming large bodies of able-bodied men, and the accretions by age are now almost the only unexhausted sources of supply. For conscription from the general population the functions of this bureau may cease with the termination of the year 1864.



THOMAS EDGER. (AFTER THE STEEL PLATE ENGRAVED BY C. TURNER FROM THE PAINTING BY JOHN SIMPSON. PUBLISHED BY W. KENNETH.)



THE SPINNER. ORIGINAL OWNED BY WILLIAM SCOTT, MONTREAL.

TEMPTATION.

I COME to try man's weakness or his strength,
Yet honor need not droop nor virtue fall:
I wait on God; and so may rise at length,
The whitest, strongest angel of them all.

Edith Willis Linn.

THE CLOSE OF LINCOLN'S CAREER.

BY NOAH BROOKS,

Author of "Abraham Lincoln: A Biography for Young People," "American Statesmen," etc.

CLOSING SCENES OF THE WAR DRAMA — THE GREAT TRAGEDY — THE DOOM OF THE CONSPIRATORS.

CLOSING SCENES OF THE WAR DRAMA.



In the latter part of the month of March, 1865, Washington saw many signs of a collapse of the rebellion. The Confederate army appeared to be badly demoralized, and deserters, who arrived constantly in large numbers, reported that men from Alabama, Georgia, Florida, and the Carolinas could not be expected to have any heart in a fight which then seemed only for the defense of Virginia, while their own States were overrun by the armies of the Union. During the month of March more than 3000 deserters were received at Washington, and great numbers were quartered at Fort Monroe, Annapolis, and other points nearer the lines, where they were put to work in the quartermaster's department or in the naval service. One curiosity of the times was a Confederate regimental band which had deserted in a body with its instruments, and was allowed to march through the streets of the national capital playing Union airs. This was one of the oddest signs of the final break-up. People recalled a story, told by Hooker, that when the Union army scaled and occupied Lookout Mountain, a rebel sentry on duty on the crest of one of the most difficult precipices saw our men pile up in solid masses over steeps which had been thought inaccessible, and was so surprised that he forgot to run, but stood with feet rooted to the spot, watching the Union force climbing up, and streaming past him, and driving the enemy far to the rear, until he was left alone, a statue of amazement. Recovering himself at last, he threw down his musket, stripped off his rebel-gray jacket, stood on them both, and, looking far off to the sunny South, stretched out as a map below him, said, "How are you, Southern Confederacy?"

But, notwithstanding such indications of a collapse of the rebellion, at this very time many Northern Union newspapers, led by Horace Greeley and others of his stamp, were demanding that appeals should be made to the Southern people "to stop the flow of blood and the waste of treasure," and that some message should be sent to the Southerners "so terse that

it will surely be circulated, and so lucid that it cannot be misconstrued or perverted," by way of an invitation to cease fighting. Curiously enough, the nearer the time came for a final surrender, the more fervid was the demand for negotiation and appeal from the unreasonable radicals in the ranks of Northern Unionists. But all this was soon to end; and while a small party was asking, "Why not negotiate?" the downfall came.

The army of Grant had been enveloping Petersburg on March 28 and 29, and about ten o'clock on the morning of April 3 word was received in Washington from President Lincoln at City Point that that city had been evacuated, and that our army was pushing into it, sweeping around it, and pursuing the flying squadrons of Lee. At a quarter to eleven in that forenoon came a despatch to the War Department from General Weitzel, dated at Richmond, announcing the fall of the Confederate capital. It was not many minutes before the news spread like wildfire through Washington, and the intelligence, at first doubted, was speedily made positive by the circulation of thousands of newspaper "extras" containing the news in bulletins issued from the War Department. In a moment of time the city was ablaze with an excitement the like of which was never seen before, and everybody who had a piece of bunting spread it to the breeze; and from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other the air seemed to burn with the bright hues of the flag. The sky was shaken by a grand salute of 800 guns, fired by order of the Secretary of War—300 for Petersburg and 500 for Richmond. Almost by magic the streets were crowded with hosts of people, talking, laughing, hurraing, and shouting in the fullness of their joy. Men embraced one another, "treated" one another, made up old quarrels, renewed old friendships, marched through the streets arm in arm, singing and chatting in that happy sort of abandon which characterizes people when under the influence of a great and universal happiness. The atmosphere was full of the intoxication of joy. The departments of the Government and many stores and private offices were closed for the day, and hosts of hard-worked clerks had their full share of the general holiday. Bands of music, apparently without any special direction or

formal call, paraded the streets, and boomed and blared from every public place, until the air was resonant with the expression of the popular jubilation in all the national airs, not forgetting "Dixie," which, it will be remembered, President Lincoln afterward declared to be among the spoils of war.

The American habit of speech-making was never before so conspicuously exemplified. Wherever any man was found who could make a speech, or who thought he could make a speech, there a speech was made; and a great many who had never before made one found themselves thrust upon a crowd of enthusiastic sovereigns who demanded of them something by way of jubilant oratory. One of the best of these offhand addresses extorted by the enthusiastic crowds was that of Secretary Stanton, who was called upon at the War Department by an eager multitude clamorous for more details and for a speech. The great War Secretary, for once in his life so overcome by emotion that he could not speak continuously, said this:

"American and fellow-citizens: In this great hour of triumph my heart, as well as yours, is penetrated with gratitude to Almighty God for his deliverance of the nation. Our thanks are due to the President, to the army and navy, to the great commanders by sea and land, to the gallant officers and men who have periled their lives upon the battle-field, and drenched the soil with their blood. Henceforth all commiseration and aid should be given to the wounded, the maimed, and the suffering, who bear the marks of their great sacrifices in the mighty struggle. Let us humbly offer up our thanks to divine Providence for his care over us, and beseech him to guide and govern us in our duties hereafter, as he has carried us forward to victory; to teach us how to be humble in the midst of triumph, how to be just in the hour of victory, and to help us secure the foundations of this republic, soaked as they have been in blood, so that it shall live for ever and ever. Let us not forget the laboring millions in other lands, who in this struggle have given us their sympathies, their aid, and their prayers; and let us bid them rejoice with us in our great triumph. Then, having done this, let us trust the future to him who will guide us as heretofore, according to his own good will." Nearly every line of this address was punctuated with applause.

The Secretary then read Grant's despatch, announcing the capture of Richmond, and the fact that the city was on fire, upon which the Secretary asked the crowd what they would reply to Grant. Some cried, "Let her burn!" others, "Burn it! burn it!" but one voice shouted, "Hold Richmond for the Northern mudsills!" which sally was received with considerable

laughter. Mr. Stanton introduced to the crowd Willie Kettles, a bright Vermont boy about fourteen years old, an operator in the telegraph-room of the War Office, who had been the fortunate recipient of the important despatch announcing the capture of Richmond. Of course the crowd wanted a speech from the lad, who discreetly held his tongue, and bowed with modesty. Secretary Seward, who happened to be at the War Department to hear the news, was espied and called out, and he made a little address in which he said that he had always been in favor of a change in the cabinet, particularly in the War Department, and that recent events proved that he was right. "Why," said he, "I started to go to 'the front' the other day, and when I got to City Point they told me it was at Hatcher's Run, and when I got there I was told it was not there but somewhere else, and when I got back I am told by the Secretary that it is at Petersburg; but before I can realize that, I am told again that it is at Richmond, and west of that. Now I leave you to judge what I ought to think of such a Secretary of War as this." The crowds continually circulated through the city, and from a building near the War Department Senator Nye of Nevada and Preston King of New York spoke, and at Willard's Hotel General Butler, Green Clay Smith of Kentucky, and Vice-President Johnson responded to the eager and uproarious demand. The day of jubilee did not end with the day, but rejoicing and cheering were prolonged far into the night. Many illuminated their houses, and bands were still playing, and leading men and public officials were serenaded all over the city. There are always hosts of people who drown their joys effectually in the flowing bowl, and Washington on April 3 was full of those. Thousands besieged the drinking-saloons, champagne popped everywhere, and a more liquorish crowd was never seen in Washington than on that night. Many and many a man of years of habitual sobriety seemed to think it a patriotic duty to "get full" on that eventful night, and not only so, but to advertise the fact of fullness as widely as possible. I saw one big, sedate Vermonter, chief of an executive bureau, standing on the corner of F and Fourteenth streets, with owlish gravity giving away fifty-cent "shin-plasters" (fractional currency) to every colored person who came past him, brokenly saying with each gift, "Babylon has fallen!"

On the night of April 4, in pursuance of a recommendation by the Secretary of State, the city was generally illuminated. All the public buildings and a great proportion of private residences and business houses were alight with fireworks and illuminations of every de-

scription. The War Department was gorgeously decorated with a mass of flags, the windows were filled with lights, and a huge transparency of patriotic devices crowned the portico. The same was true of the Navy Department, the Winder building (occupied by the Government), the White House, and the State and Treasury buildings. Secretary Seward was the author of a much-admired motto over the portico of the State Department, which read: "At home Union is order, and Union is peace. Abroad Union is strength, and strength is peace." Over another entrance of the building was: "Peace and good will to all nations, but no entangling alliances and no foreign intervention." The Treasury had over its chief entrance a huge transparency which was a tolerable imitation of a ten-dollar, interest-bearing United States note, with a mammoth facsimile of Treasurer Spinner's signature in all its unique ugliness. The Treasury motto was: "U. S. Greenbacks and U. S. Grant. Grant gives the greenbacks a metallic ring."

With that wonderful adaptability which is characteristic of the American people, Richmond was no sooner in our hands than all the machinery of war, transportation, and subsistence began to tend thither, and orders were at once carried out to rebuild railroads, equip steamboat lines, and put up piers and bridges, so that in a few days Washington was in regular communication with Richmond, and that city was used as a base of supplies against whatever of rebellion might be left in arms. The Orange and Alexandria route to Richmond was at once reestablished, although for the time being the line of transportation was from Washington via Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg. Steamers were at once despatched from Washington to Richmond with hospital supplies, and a United States mail agent took possession of the Richmond post-office; and while Washington was celebrating the downfall of the rebel capital, the General Post-office received its first regular mail from the captured city. Governor Peirpoint, who, as Senator Sumner picturesquely said, had been carrying the State government of loyal Virginia in his trousers pocket for several years, announced that the peripatetic ark of the government finally rested in its proper seat; and so the "Common Council of Alexandria," as Sumner had contemptuously styled the loyal legislature of Virginia, was once more holding sittings in Richmond.

But greater things were yet to come. Most people were sleeping soundly in their beds when, at daylight on the rainy morning of April 10, 1865, a great boom startled the misty air of Washington, shaking the very earth, and breaking the windows of houses about Lafayette

Square, and moving the inhabitants of that aristocratic locality to say once more that they would be glad when Union victories were done with, or should be celebrated elsewhere. Boom! boom! went the guns, until five hundred were fired. A few people got up in the chill twilight of the morning, and raced about in the mud to learn what the good news might be, while others formed a procession and resumed their parades,—no dampness, no fatigue, being sufficient to depress their ardor. But many placidly lay abed, well knowing that only one military event could cause all this mighty poth in the air of Washington; and if their nap in the gray dawn was disturbed with dreams of guns and of terms of armies surrendered to Grant by Lee, they awoke later to read of these in the daily papers; for this was Secretary Stanton's way of telling the people that the Army of Northern Virginia had at last laid down its arms, and that peace had come again.

But the great news had really reached Washington the night before (Palm Sunday), and a few newspaper men and others of late habits, who were up through the darkness and the dampness of those memorable hours, had sent the glad tidings all over the Union from Maine to California, and had then unbent themselves in a private and exclusive jollification. When the capital was broad awake, and had taken in the full value of the news, the fever-heat that had fired the city on the day after the fall of Richmond did not return. Popular feeling had culminated then, and after that great event there was nothing that could surprise us, not even if "Jeff" Davis himself had come to Washington to surrender. The streets were shockingly muddy, but were all alive with people singing and cheering, carrying flags, and saluting everybody, hungering and thirsting for speeches. General Butler was called out, among others, and he made a speech full of surprising liberality and generosity toward the enemy. The departments gave another holiday to their clerks; so did many business firms; and the Treasury employees assembled in the great corridor of their building and sang "Old Hundredth" with thrilling, even tear-compelling effect. Then they marched in a body across the grounds to the White House, where the President was at breakfast, and serenaded him with "The Star-Spangled Banner."

As the forenoon wore on, an impromptu procession came up from the navy-yard, dragging six boat-howitzers, which were fired through the streets as they rolled on. This crowd, reinforced by the hurraing legions along the route, speedily swelled to enormous proportions, and filled the whole area in front of the White House, where guns were fired and bands played

while the multitude waited for a speech. The young hope of the house of Lincoln—"Tad"—made his appearance at the well-known window from which the President always spoke, and was received with great shouts of applause, whereupon he waved a captured rebel flag, to the uproarious delight of the sovereign people below. When Lincoln came to the window shortly after, the scene before him was one of the wildest confusion. It seemed impossible for men adequately to express their feelings. They fairly yelled with delight, threw up their hats again and again, or threw up one another's hats, and screamed like mad. From the windows of the White House the surface of that crowd looked like an agitated sea of hats, faces, and arms. Quiet being restored, the President briefly congratulated the people on the occasion which called out such unrestrained enthusiasm, and said that as arrangements were being made for a more formal celebration, he would defer his remarks until that occasion; "for," said he, "I shall have nothing to say then if it is all dribbled out of me now." He said that as the good old tune of "Dixie" had been captured on the 9th of April, he had submitted the question of its ownership to the Attorney-General, who had decided that that tune was now our lawful property; and he asked that the band should play it, which was done with a will, "Yankee Doodle" following. Then the President proposed three cheers for General Grant and the officers and men under him, then three cheers for the navy, all of which were given heartily, the President leading off, waving his hand; and the laughing, joyous crowd dispersed.

The special celebration to which Lincoln referred was that of the 11th of April, when, in answer to the customary serenade, the President made a long and formal speech. All of the government buildings were again illuminated, and the people, almost with unanimity, followed the example. The night was misty, and the exhibition was a splendid one. The reflection of the illuminated dome of the Capitol on the moist air was remarked as being especially fine; it was seen many miles away. Arlington House, across the river, the old home of Lee, was brilliantly lighted, and rockets and colored lights blazed on the lawn, where ex-slaves by the thousand sang "The Year of Jubilee."

The notable feature of the evening, of course, was the President's speech, delivered to an immense throng of people, who, with bands, banners, and loud huzzas, poured into the semi-circular avenue in front of the Executive Mansion. After repeated calls, loud and enthusiastic, the President appeared at the window, which was a signal for a great outburst. There was

something terrible in the enthusiasm with which the beloved Chief Magistrate was received. Cheers upon cheers, wave after wave of applause, rolled up, the President patiently standing quiet until it was all over. The speech was longer than most people had expected, and of a different character. It was chiefly devoted to a discussion of the policy of reconstruction which had been outlined by him in previous public documents. It began with the words, now classic, "We meet this evening, not in sorrow, but in gladness of heart. The evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond, and the surrender of the principal insurgent army, give hope of a righteous and speedy peace, whose joyous expression cannot be restrained. In the midst of this, however, he from whom all blessings flow must not be forgotten. A call for a national thanksgiving is being prepared, and will be duly promulgated. Nor must those whose harder part gave us the cause of rejoicing be overlooked. Their honors must not be parceled out with others. I myself was near the front, and had the high pleasure of transmitting much of the good news to you, but no part of the honor for plan or execution is mine. To General Grant, his skilful officers and brave men, all belongs. The gallant navy stood ready, but was not in reach to take active part."

While the crowd was assembling in front of the house, and before the President went up-stairs to the window from which he was to speak, I was with him, and noticed that his speech was written out, and that he carried a roll of manuscript in his hand. He explained that this was a precaution to prevent a repetition of the criticisms which had sometimes been made by fastidious persons upon his off-hand addresses. Senator Sumner, it may be remembered, had objected to the President's using on a former occasion the expression, "The rebels turned tail and ran," as being undignified from the lips of the President of the United States. Lincoln recalled that criticism with a smile. From a point of concealment behind the window drapery I held a light while he read, dropping the pages of his written speech one by one upon the floor as he finished them. Little Tad, who found the crowd no longer responsive to his antics, had now sought the chief point of attraction, and scrambled around on the floor, importuning his father to give him "another," as he collected the sheets of paper fluttering from the President's hand. Outside was a vast sea of faces, illuminated by the lights that burned in the festal array of the White House, and stretching far out into the misty darkness. It was a silent, intent, and perhaps surprised multitude. Within stood the tall, gaunt figure of the President, deeply thoughtful, intent upon the elucidation of the policy which should be

pursued toward the South. That this was not the sort of speech which the multitude had expected is tolerably certain. In the hour of his triumph as the patriotic Chief Magistrate of a great people, Lincoln appeared to think only of the great problem then pressing upon the Government—a problem which would demand the highest statesmanship, the greatest wisdom, and the firmest generosity.

I have said that some of Lincoln's more fastidious critics had objected to certain of his offhand phrases, which readily took with the multitude, and which more graphically conveyed his meaning than those commonly used by the scholars. Against advice, he had, in a formal message to Congress, adhered to the use of the phrase "sugar-coated pill." He argued that the time would probably never come when the American people would not understand what a sugar-coated pill was; and on this historic occasion he used another favorite figure of his when he said, "Concede that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than smashing it." But it turned out that Senator Sumner, for one, was no better pleased with this metaphor than he had been with others on previous occasions; for in a letter to Dr. Lieber of Philadelphia, next day, he wrote: "The President's speech, and other things, augur confusion and uncertainty in the future, with hot controversy. Alas! alas!" And still later in that year, Sumner said: "The eggs of crocodiles can produce only crocodiles, and it is not easy to see how eggs laid by military power can be hatched into an American State."

Years have passed since then, and the grave has long since closed over the President and the senators who opposed his policy and his judgment. Posterity has vindicated the wisdom of Lincoln, and has dealt charitably with the errors of those who in their day lacked that charity which is now entreated of mankind for them. That they meant well, that they were patriotic, that they were sincere, no man can doubt; but as we turn our thoughts backward to that April night when the great President made his last public speech to a silent and wondering crowd, we may well regard his figure with veneration and reverence, aware now, if we were not then, that he builded better than they knew. In the general jubilation of that hour, however, there was very little criticism of the President's last public speech. It was felt, perhaps, that the man who had brought us safe through the great trial of our strength and patience, himself strong and patient, might well be trusted with the adjustment of terms of reunion. Reunion was then the foremost thought in the minds of men.

Slavery was dead, peace had returned, and henceforth the grateful task of reuniting the long-estranged brotherhood of the States was ours. Is it any wonder that men fairly cried with joy when this happy consummation rose in their minds?

But even while we stood under the light of a new day, joyful as a people, triumphant as citizens, there was preparing for us a portentous and inconceivable disaster.

THE GREAT TRAGEDY.

THE afternoon and evening of April 14, 1865, were cold, raw, and gusty. Dark clouds enveloped the capital, and the air was chilly with occasional showers. Late in the afternoon I filled an appointment by calling on the President at the White House, and was told by him that he "had had a notion" of sending for me to go to the theater that evening with him and Mrs. Lincoln; but he added that Mrs. Lincoln had already made up a party to take the place of General and Mrs. Grant, who had somewhat unexpectedly left the city for Burlington, New Jersey. The party was originally planned for the purpose of taking General and Mrs. Grant to see "Our American Cousin" at Ford's Theater, and when Grant had decided to leave Washington, he (the President) had "felt inclined to give up the whole thing"; but as it had been announced in the morning papers that this distinguished party would go to the theater that night, Mrs. Lincoln had rather insisted that they ought to go, in order that the expectant public should not be wholly disappointed. On my way home I met Schuyler Colfax, who was about leaving for California, and who tarried with me on the sidewalk a little while, talking about the trip, and the people whom I knew in San Francisco and Sacramento whom he wished to meet. Mr. Lincoln had often talked with me about the possibilities of his eventually taking up his residence in California after his term of office should be over. He thought, he said, that that country would afford better opportunities for his two boys than any of the older States; and when he heard that Colfax was going to California, he was greatly interested in his trip, and said that he hoped that Colfax would bring him back a good report of what his keen and practised observation would note in the country which he (Colfax) was about to see for the first time.

The evening being inclement, I stayed within doors to nurse a violent cold with which I was afflicted; and my room-mate McA— and I whiled away the time chatting and playing cards. About half-past ten our attention was attracted to the frequent galloping of

cavalry or the mounted patrol past the house which we occupied on New York Avenue, near the State Department building. After a while quiet was restored, and we retired to our sleeping-room in the rear part of the house. As I turned down the gas, I said to my room-mate: "Will, I have guessed the cause of the clatter outside to-night. You know Wade Hampton has disappeared with his cavalry somewhere in the mountains of Virginia. Now, my theory of the racket is that he has raided Washington, and has pounced down upon the President, and has attempted to carry him off." Of course this was said jocosely and without the slightest thought that the President was in any way in danger; and my friend, in a similar spirit, banteringly replied, "What good will that do the rebs unless they carry off Andy Johnson also?" The next morning I was awakened in the early dawn by a loud and hurried knocking on my chamber door, and the voice of Mr. Gardner, the landlord, crying, "Wake, wake, Mr. Brooks! I have dreadful news." I slipped out, turned the key of the door, and Mr. Gardner came in, pale, trembling, and woebegone, like him who "drew Priam's curtain at the dead of night," and told his awful story. At that time it was believed that the President, Mr. Seward, Vice-President Johnson, and other members of the Government, had been killed; and this was the burden of the tale that was told to us. I sank back into my bed, cold and shivering with horror, and for a time it seemed as though the end of all things had come. I was aroused by the loud weeping of my comrade, who had not left his bed in another part of the room.

When we had sufficiently collected ourselves to dress and go out of doors in the bleak and cheerless April morning, we found in the streets an extraordinary spectacle. They were suddenly crowded with people—men, women, and children thronging the pavements and darkening the thoroughfares. It seemed as if everybody was in tears. Pale faces, streaming eyes, with now and again an angry, frowning countenance, were on every side. Men and women who were strangers accosted one another with distressed looks and tearful inquiries for the welfare of the President and Mr. Seward's family. The President still lived, but at half-past seven o'clock in the morning the tolling of the bells announced to the lamenting people that he had ceased to breathe. His great and loving heart was still. The last official bulletin from the War Department stated that he died at twenty-two minutes past seven o'clock on the morning of April 15.

Instantly flags were raised at half-mast all over the city, the bells tolled solemnly, and with incredible swiftness Washington went into deep, universal mourning. All stores, govern-

ment departments, and private offices were closed, and everywhere, on the most pretentious residences and on the humblest hovels, were the black badges of grief. Nature seemed to sympathize in the general lamentation, and tears of rain fell from the moist and somber sky. The wind sighed mournfully through streets crowded with sad-faced people, and broad folds of funeral drapery flapped heavily in the wind over the decorations of the day before. Wandering aimlessly up F street toward Ford's Theater, we met a tragical procession. It was headed by a group of army officers walking bareheaded, and behind them, carried tenderly by a company of soldiers, was the bier of the dead President, covered with the flag of the Union, and accompanied by an escort of soldiers who had been on duty at the house where Lincoln died. As the little cortège passed down the street to the White House, every head was uncovered, and the profound silence which prevailed was broken only by sobs and by the sound of the measured tread of those who bore the martyred President back to the home which he had so lately quitted full of life, hope, and courage.

On the night of the 17th the remains of Lincoln were laid in the casket prepared for their reception, and were taken from the large guest-chamber of the house to the famous East Room, where so many brilliant receptions and so many important public events had been witnessed; and there they lay in state until the day of the funeral (April 19). The great room was draped with crape and black cloth, relieved only here and there by white flowers and green leaves. The catafalque upon which the casket lay was about fifteen feet high, and consisted of an elevated platform resting on a dais and covered with a domed canopy of black cloth which was supported by four pillars, and was lined beneath with fluted white silk. In those days the custom of sending floral tributes on funereal occasions was little known, but the funeral of Lincoln was remarkable for the unusual abundance and beauty of the devices in flowers that were sent by individuals and public bodies. From the time the body had been made ready for burial until the last services in the house, it was watched night and day by a guard of honor, the members of which were one major-general, one brigadier-general, two field officers, and four line officers of the army and four of the navy. Before the public were admitted to view the face of the dead, the scene in the darkened room—a sort of *chapelle ardente*—was most impressive. At the head and foot and on each side of the casket of their dead chief stood the motionless figures of his armed warriors.

When the funeral exercises took place, the

floor of the East Room had been transformed into something like an amphitheater by the erection of an inclined platform, broken into steps, and filling all but the entrance side of the apartment and the area about the catafalque. This platform was covered with black cloth, and upon it stood the various persons designated as participants in the ceremonies, no seats being provided. In the northwest corner were the pall-bearers — senators Lafayette S. Foster of Connecticut, E. D. Morgan of New York, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, Richard Yates of Illinois, Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio, and John Conness of California; representatives Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, A. H. Coffroth of Pennsylvania, Green Clay Smith of Kentucky, Schuyler Colfax of Indiana, E. B. Washburne of Illinois, and H. G. Worthington of Nevada; Lieutenant-General Grant, Major-General Halleck, and Brevet Brigadier-General Nichols; Vice-Admiral Farragut, Rear-Admiral Shubrick, and Colonel Zeilin, of the Marine Corps; civilians O. H. Browning, George Ashmun, Thomas Corwin, and Simon Cameron. The New York Chamber of Commerce was represented by its officers, and the New York Associated Merchants by Simeon Draper, Moses Grinnell, John Jacob Astor, Jonathan Sturges, and Hiram Walbridge. Next to them, at the extreme southern end of the room, were the governors of the States; and on the east side of the coffin, which lay north and south, and opposite the main entrance of the East Room, stood Andrew Johnson, President of the United States. He was supported on each side by his faithful friend Preston King and ex-Vice-President Hamlin. Behind these were Chief Justice Chase and his associates on the Supreme Bench, and near them were the members of the cabinet and their wives, all of whom were in deep mourning. On the right of the cabinet officers, at the northern end of the room, were the diplomatic corps, whose brilliant court costumes gleamed in strange contrast with the somber monotony of the rest of the spectacle. The members of the Senate and House of Representatives were disposed about the room and adjoining apartments, and at the foot of the catafalque was a little semicircle of chairs for the family and friends. Robert T. Lincoln, son of the President, was the only one of the family present, Mrs. Lincoln being unable to leave her room, where she remained with "Tad." General Grant, separated from the others, sat alone at the head of the catafalque, and during the solemn services was often moved to tears. The officiating clergymen were the Rev. Dr. Gurley, pastor of the President, who preached the funeral sermon; the Rev. Dr. Hall, of the Epiphany Episcopal Church; the Rev. Dr. Gray,

who was chaplain of the Senate; and Bishop Simpson, who was an intimate friend of Lincoln. A singular omission, whether intentional or not I do not know, was that no music of any sort was mingled with the exercises.

The sight of the funeral pageant will probably never be forgotten by those who saw it. Long before the services in the White House were over, the streets were blocked by crowds of people thronging to see the procession, which moved from the house precisely at two o'clock, amid the tolling of bells and the booming of minute-guns from three batteries that had been brought into the city, and from each of the many forts about Washington. The day was cloudless, and the sun shone brilliantly upon cavalry, infantry, artillery, marines, associations, and societies, with draped banners, and accompanied in their slow march by mournful dirges from numerous military bands. The Ninth and Tenth Regiments of Veteran Reserves headed the column; next came a battalion of marines in gorgeous uniforms; then the Sixteenth New York and the Eighth Illinois Cavalry Regiments; then eight pieces of United States light artillery in all the pomp and panoply peculiar to that branch of the service; next several mounted major-generals and brigadiers, accompanied by their staffs; then army and naval officers on foot by the hundred, more mounted officers, and pall-bearers in carriages; then the funeral car, a large structure canopied and covered with black cloth, somewhat like the catafalque which had been erected in the White House. The casket rested on a high platform eight or ten feet above the level of the street. As it passed many shed tears, and all heads were uncovered. The car was guarded by a detachment of the First West Virginia Artillery, on foot, and the company of cavalry known as the President's body-guard, also on foot; then came the carriages for the family, and then the President, the cabinet, the diplomatic corps, both houses of Congress, and others.

One noticeable feature of the procession was the appearance of the colored societies which brought up the rear, humbly, as was their wont; but just before the procession began to move, the Twenty-Second United States Colored Infantry (organized in Pennsylvania), landed from Petersburg, marched up to a position on the avenue, and when the head of the column came up, played a dirge, and headed the procession to the Capitol. The coffin was taken from the funeral car and placed on a catafalque within the rotunda of the Capitol, which had been darkened and draped in mourning. When the lying in state at the Capitol was over, the funeral procession from Washington to Springfield, Illinois, began, the cortège passing over

the same route which was taken by Abraham Lincoln when he left his home for the national capital to assume the great office which he laid down only with his life.

It would be superfluous now to dwell on the incidents of that historic and most lamentable procession, or to recall to the minds of the present and passing generation the impressiveness of the wonderful popular demonstration of grief that stretched from the seaboard to the heart of Illinois. History has recorded how thousands of the plain people whom Lincoln loved came out from their homes to stand bareheaded and reverent as the funeral train swept by, while bells were tolled and the westward progress through the night was marked by camp-fires built along the course by which the great emancipator was borne at last to his dreamless rest.

THE DOOM OF THE CONSPIRATORS.

THE court-room in which were tried in May, 1865, the eight conspirators arraigned for being concerned in the plot against the lives of the heads of the Government, was a place of fascinating and perhaps morbid interest. The trial was arranged to be secret, but it was finally opened to those who could procure passes from the president of the court. The room in which the trial was held is a part of the great United States Arsenal establishment, attached to which is the penitentiary in which the conspirators were confined. It is on the banks of the Potomac, in the suburbs of the city. Entering an old-fashioned brick building, one was shown into a large, bare room on the ground floor, where sat a couple of staff-officers receiving the credentials of those who applied for admission; they sent these up to the court, where an officer inspected them, and returned them, if satisfactory, with the desired card of admission. A narrow flight of stairs brought the visitor to a small chamber in the second story, where a knot of orderlies were lounging about, and an officer inspected one's pass; after another flight of stairs, another inspection of the pass permitted one to enter the court-room, which was in the third story. It was an apartment about twenty-five feet wide and thirty feet long, the entrance being at the end opposite the penitentiary. Looking up the room, one saw that it was divided lengthwise into two parts, the portion on the right being occupied by the court, sitting around a long, green-covered table, General Hunter at one end, and Judge-Advocate-General Holt with his assistants at the other. The part of the room which was not occupied by the court was railed off, and was taken up with a few seats for reporters and spectators generally, who were crowded confusedly about, and rested as best they could against the bare, whitewashed

walls of the room. At the farther end of the apartment was a wooden railing, behind which, on a narrow, raised platform, sat the accused men, all in a solemn row, with an armed soldier sitting between every two persons. At the left-hand corner behind them was a heavy iron door opening into the corridor along which were the cells of the prisoners. Each one of the accused was manacled hand and foot, and sat grimly against the wall, facing the court and the witnesses, the witness-stand being a raised box in the center of the room.

On the left, in the line of prisoners, sat Mrs. Surratt, deeply veiled, with her face turned to the wall, slowly and constantly fanning herself, and never raising her head except when ordered to show her countenance for the purpose of identification by witnesses. She was a dark-looking, fleshy, placid, and matronly woman, apparently about forty-five years of age. She was accused of being privy to the plot, assisting both before and after the assassination, and secreting in her house the arms and other implements to be used in carrying out the conspiracy.

Next the guard who sat by Mrs. Surratt's side was Herold, a small, dark fellow, about twenty-five years old, with a low, receding forehead, scanty black hair and whiskers, a stooping figure, protruding teeth, and a vulgar face. This man was Booth's intimate companion, and left him only when he was burned out in the Maryland barn.

Next was Payne, the assassin detailed for the murder of Seward. He sat bolt upright against the wall, looming up like a young giant above all the others. Payne's face would defy the ordinary physiognomist. It certainly appeared to be a good face. His coarse, black hair was brushed well off his low, broad forehead; his eyes were dark gray, unusually large and liquid. His brawny, muscular chest, which was covered only by a dark, close-fitting "sweater," was that of an athlete. He was apparently not much over twenty-four years old, and his face, figure, and bearing bespoke him the powerful, resolute creature that he proved to be. It was curious to see the quick flash of intelligence that involuntarily shot from his eyes when the knife with which he had done the bloody work at Seward's house was identified by the man who found it in the street near the house in the gray dawn of the morning after that dreadful night. The knife was a heavy, horn-handled implement, with a double edge at the point, and a blade about ten inches long, thick at the back, but evidently ground carefully to a fine point. This knife was subsequently given to Robinson, the faithful nurse who saved the life of Seward, and who was afterward made a paymaster in the army of the United States.

Next in order sat Atzerot, who had been assigned, it was believed, to the murder of Vice-President Johnson, but whose heart failed him when the time came to strike the blow. This fellow might safely challenge the rest of the party as the completest personification of a low and cunning scoundrel. He was small and sinewy, with long, dark-brown hair, dark-blue and unsteady eyes, a receding, narrow chin and forehead, and a generally villainous countenance. It was observed that when any ludicrous incident disturbed the gravity of the court, as sometimes happened, Atzerot was the only man who never smiled, although the others, Payne especially, would often grin in sympathy with the auditors.

O'Laughlin, who was supposed to have been set apart for the murder of Stanton or Grant, had the appearance of the traditional stage villain. He had a high, broad forehead, a mass of tangled black hair, a heavy black mustache and chin-whiskers, and his face was blackened by a rough, unshaven beard. His large eyes, black and wild, were never still, but appeared to take in everything within the room, scanning each new arrival at the door, watching the witnesses, but occasionally resting on the green trees and sunny sky seen through the grated window on his left. He often moved his feet, and the clanking of his manacles would attract his attention, and he would look down, then back and forth at the scene within the courtroom. A California vigilance committee in 1849 probably would have hanged him "on general principles." He was accused of being in league with both Surratt and Herold, and was seen at Stanton's house on the night of the murder, asking for General Grant.

Spangler, the stage-carpenter of Ford's Theater, was about forty, heavily built, sandy in complexion, slovenly in appearance. He held Booth's horse at odd times, kept clear the way to the rear of the theater, and was suspected of being his lackey. The poor creature, more than any other, appeared to be under the influence of imminent bodily fear. His hands were incessantly moving along his legs from knee to thigh, his bony fingers traveling back and forth like spiders, as he sat with his eyes fixed on each witness.

Dr. Mudd, the companion and associate of Booth, who received the flying assassin into his house on the night of the murder, and set his fractured limb, in appearance was about thirty-five years of age, and had mild blue eyes, a good, broad forehead, ruddy face, hair scanty and thin, a high head, and a sanguine temperament. He sat in his shirt-sleeves, with a white handkerchief knotted loosely about his neck, and attentively regarded the proceedings with the air of a man who felt sure of himself.

Last in the row, and looking out of the window upon the pleasant sky and tree-tops beyond, was Arnold, the "Sam" of Booth's correspondence, who, writing from Hookstown, Maryland, informed the assassin that he had concluded to "give up the job," and was tired of keeping up appearances. This man was as uneasy as a caged whelp. He leaned his head on the rail before him, or looked out of the window, or lounged against the wall, or rested his chin on his breast, and was generally absolutely inattentive to everything that went on. He had retreated from the conspiracy, and was caught at Fort Monroe, where he had gone to get out of the way until suspicion had passed. It then appeared that he figured only in the original plan of abducting Lincoln, and was to have caught him on the stage when the rest of the villains had thrown him over from the box.

The appearance and demeanor of the court, it must be admitted, were neither solemn nor impressive. The members of the commission sat about in various negligent attitudes, and a general appearance of disorder was evident. Many ladies were present, and their irrepressible whispering was a continual nuisance to the reporters, who desired to keep track of the evidence. The witnesses were first examined by the judge-advocate, the members of the court putting in a question now and then, and the counsel for the prisoners taking up the cross-examination, each counselor attending only to the witness whose testimony affected his own client. The witnesses were brought in without regard to any particular criminal, all being tried at once. Occasionally an attorney for one prisoner would "develop" the witness under examination in such a manner as to injure the cause of another of the defendants, and then a petty quarrel would ensue between the different counsel.

Of the eight prisoners at the bar, Payne, Atzerot, Herold, and Mrs. Surratt were declared by the court guilty of murder, and were hanged on July 7, 1865. O'Laughlin, Arnold, and Dr. Mudd were found guilty of being accessory to the conspiracy, and were sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for life. Spangler, who impressed most people as being a weak creature and unaware of being concerned in any real crime, was sentenced to six years' imprisonment, and, with O'Laughlin, Arnold, and Mudd, was sent to the forts of the Dry Tortugas. Dr. Mudd was pardoned by President Johnson in February, 1869, and Arnold and Spangler about a month later in the same year. O'Laughlin died of yellow fever while in prison at Fort Jefferson, Florida. John H. Surratt, who was at first believed to have been the would-be assassin of Mr. Seward, escaped from Washington immediately after the tragedy, and fled

to Canada; thence he went to Italy, where he enlisted in the Papal Zouaves, but was traced by the sleuth-hounds of the United States detective force, and was brought back to this country on an American frigate in December, 1866, and tried, but not convicted.

A painful and depressing feature of this tragical business was the ease with which many well-meaning but unreasonable people not only appeared to forget the awfulness of the crime committed, but made objection to the findings of the court. Judge John A. Bingham, who assisted the judge-advocate in the trial, was unjustly, even wickedly, pursued by some of these wrong-headed persons for the part he took in the conviction of Mrs. Surratt. All the evidence in her case pointed unerringly to her guilt as an intelligent accomplice of the assassins. And the fact that Payne sought her house as a place of refuge after his murderous assault upon Seward, was only one of many more conclusive evidences of her active share in the great conspiracy. Her sex appears to have blinded the judgment of many who did not follow the trial with attentiveness.

It was natural, but to a lover of Lincoln almost surprising, that while the lifeless form of the martyr was being borne home to Illinois, the newly installed President, Andrew Johnson, was surrounded, courted, and flattered by eager crowds of courtiers and office-seekers in Washington. If Johnson had just been inaugurated, after a political campaign in which he

had defeated Lincoln, and was expected to overturn everything that remained of his predecessor's work, the appearance of things would not have been different from what it was. Multitudes from every part of the country rushed upon Washington, some with windy and turgid addresses to the new President, and many more with applications for official favor. To a thoughtful man this exhibition was disgusting beyond description.

Nor was one's respect for a pure democracy heightened by the habitual pose of President Johnson. It was a remarkable illustration of the elasticity and steadiness of our form of government that its machinery moved on without a jar, without tumult, when the head was suddenly stricken down. But the vulgar clamor of the crowds that beset Johnson, the boisterous ravings of the successor of Lincoln, and the complete absorption of Washington quidnuncs in speculations on the "policy" of the new head of the Government, saddened those who regarded this noble spectacle with hearts sore with grief for the loss of him who was yet unburied.

All these petty details are but a small part of our history; but they do belong to history. Posterity is already making up its verdict. We must be content to leave to posterity the final adjustment of all things. Smaller men are passing out of human memory. In the words of one who knew him well, Lincoln "belongs to the ages."

Noah Brooks.




UNANSWERED.

HER eyes are closed, that were the door
Through which the light had fond access
To her sweet soul: forevermore
The fair soul-house is tenantless.

Her eyes are closed; yet, in the night
That saw her fuller life begin,
The watchers knew the clearest light,
Just dawned, was that her eyes shut in.

O strangely radiant gates of Death!
Could we look past you through her eyes,
Should we too lay aside our breath
With such eternal glad surprise?

Charles Buxton Going.



STATUE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN; CHICAGO.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

THE PRESIDENT AND THE DRAFT—VALLANDIGHAM—THE PEACE PARTY AT THE POLLS.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE DRAFT.



URING the entire summer and autumn of 1863, Governor Seymour and his friends made the proceedings of the Government in relation to the enrollment law the object of special and vehement attack.² On the 17th of October the President made a call for 300,000 volunteers, and at the same time ordered that the draft should be made for all deficiencies which might exist on the 5th of January following, on the quotas assigned to districts by the War Department.³ Shortly after this the Democratic State committee issued a circular making the military administration of the Government, and especially the law calling for troops, the object of violent attack, greatly exaggerating the demands of the Government, claiming that no credits would be allowed for those who had paid commutation, and basing these charges upon a pretended proclamation of the 27th of October which had never been issued. The President, with the painstaking care which distinguished him, prepared with his own hand the following contradiction of this misleading circular:⁴

The Provost-Marshal General has issued no proclamation at all. He has, in no form, announced anything recently in regard to troops in New York, except in his letter to Governor Seymour of October 21, which has been published in the newspapers of that State. It has not been announced nor decided in any form by the Provost-Marshal General, or any one else in authority of the Government, that every citizen who has paid his three hundred dollars' commutation is liable to be immediately drafted again, or that towns that have just raised the money to pay their quotas will have again to be subject to similar taxation or suffer the operation of the new conscription, nor is it probable that the like of this ever will be announced or decided.

The circular we have referred to went on to claim that the State had been thoroughly canvassed, and that the victory of the Demo-

² See also THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for last month.—EDITOR.

³ General J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription of 1863," p. 49.

⁴ Dated, Executive Mansion, Washington, Oct. 31, 1863. MS.

cratic ticket was assured. But the result showed that the Democratic leaders were as far wrong in their prophecy as in their history. The Republican State ticket was elected by a majority of 30,000 over the Democratic, and the principal State of the Union decided in favor of the President the vehement controversy which had raged all the year between Seymour and Lincoln—a verdict which was repeated in the following year when Governor Seymour was a candidate for reelection.

In the early part of December the President, anxious in every way to do justice and to satisfy, if possible, the claims of Governor Seymour, consented to the appointment of a commission to inquire into the whole subject of the enrollment in New York. The principal member of the commission, chosen by Governor Seymour, was William F. Allen, his intimate friend and an ardent Democrat in politics; of the other members, General Love of Indiana was also a Democrat; Chauncey Smith of Massachusetts was a lawyer, not prominently identified with either political party. Judge Allen clearly dominated the commission, and they agreed with him in condemning the principle on which the enrollment and the draft were conducted. They reported that, instead of numbering the men of a given district capable of bearing arms and making that number the basis of the draft,—which was the course the enrolling officers, in direct obedience to the law of Congress, had pursued,—the quotas should be adjusted upon the basis of proportion to the entire population. They did not indorse the injurious attacks made by the governor upon the enrolling officers and agents, but distinctly stated that their fidelity and integrity were unimpeached. The essential point of their report was simply that the quota should be in proportion to the total population of the district, and not according to the number of valid men to be found in it. When the President required from the Provost-Marshal General his opinion upon the report, General Fry made this reasonable criticism:

The commission has evidently been absorbed by the conviction that the raising of men is, and will necessarily continue to be, equivalent to levying special taxes and raising money, and they would therefore require the same proceeds, under the en-

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rollment act, from a district of rich women which they would from a district with the same number of men of equal means. I assume that we are looking for personal military service from those able to perform it, that we make no calls for volunteers in the sense in which the commission understand it, but that we assign to the districts under the enrollment act fair quotas of the men we have found them to contain.

The President entirely agreed with the Provost-Marshal General that it was manifestly unjust to require as many drafted men from a district that had been depleted of its young men by the patriotic impulse which filled the army at the beginning of the war as were justly called for from one that had contributed nothing to the field, a course which would have been the logical result of yielding to the demands of Governor Seymour and the recommendation of the commission. But, wishing to make all possible concessions to the State authorities, he resolved once more to reduce the quota of New York, and explained his action in a letter to the Secretary of War dated February 27, 1864.

So long as Governor Seymour remained in office he continued his warfare upon the enrollment act and the officers charged with its execution. On the 18th of July, 1864, the President made a third call for troops under the act, and the governor promptly renewed his charges and complaints. At this time, however, both he and Mr. Lincoln were candidates before the people — the one for the Presidency, and the other for the Governorship of New York; and it was probably for this reason that Mr. Seymour's correspondence was carried on at this time with the Secretary of War instead of Mr. Lincoln. But it afforded no new features; there were the same complaints of excessive quotas, of unfair, unequal, and oppressive action, as before. He said again that there had been no opportunity given to correct the enrollment, upon which the Provost-Marshal General reported that the governor had been duly informed of the opportunities to make corrections, and that an order had been issued from his own headquarters in reference to the matter. No efforts were spared by the Government to insure a rigid revision of the lists. The governor spoke with great vehemence of the disparity between the demand made upon New York and Boston, saying that in one of the cities 26 per cent. of the population was enrolled, and in the other only 12½ per cent. General Fry replied to this that the proportion of enrollment to population in Boston was not 12½ but 16.92 per cent.; that less than 17 per cent. in New York and Brooklyn were enrolled, and that, in fine, the enrollment was a mere question of fact — it was the ascertainment of the number of men of a certain de-

scription in defined areas; that the enrollments were continuously open to revision, and that any name erroneously on them would be stricken off as soon as the error was pointed out by anybody to the Board of Enrollment. He then showed that the quotas throughout New York were in fact smaller than in many other States where the proportion of men was large, and closed his report by saying that he "saw no reason why the law should not be applied to New York as well as to other States." This report Mr. Stanton¹ transmitted to the governor, expressing the somewhat sanguine trust that it would satisfy him that his objections against the quotas assigned to New York were not well founded. He recalled the fact that a commission had been appointed the year before with a view to ascertain whether any mistake or errors had been made by the enrolling officers, but that the commissioners bore their testimony to the fidelity with which the work was done; that with a view to harmony the President had directed a reduction in some districts, but without the increase of others recommended by the commissioners; and that a basis for the assignment being now absolutely fixed by act of Congress, the War Department had no power to change it.

The voters of New York in the autumn election decided to retire Governor Seymour to private life, and his successor, Governor Fenton, gave to the Government, during the rest of the war, a hearty and loyal support.

While the controversy between the Government and its opponents in regard to the enrollment and the draft was going on, the President, disappointed and grieved at the persistent misrepresentations of his views and his intentions by those of whom he had expected better things, and feeling that he was unable, by any power of logic or persuasion, to induce the leaders of the Democratic party to do him justice or to cooperate with him in the measures which he was convinced were for the public good, thought for a time of appealing directly to the people of the United States in defense of the conduct of the Government. He prepared a long and elaborate address, which he intended more especially for the consideration of the honest and patriotic Democrats of the North, setting forth, with his inimitable clearness of statement, the necessity for the draft, the substantial fairness of the provisions of the law, and the honesty and equity with which, as he claimed, the Government had attempted to carry it out. But, after he had finished it, doubts arose in his mind as to the propriety or the expediency of addressing the public directly in that manner, and it was never published. It is here, for the first time, printed, from Mr. Lincoln's own manuscript, and it is

¹ Aug. 11, 1864.

a question whether the reader will more admire the lucidity and the fairness with which the President sets forth his views, or the reserve and abnegation with which, after writing it, he resolved to suppress so admirable a paper :

“It is at all times proper that misunderstanding between the public and the public servant should be avoided ; and this is far more important now than in times of peace and tranquillity. I therefore address you without searching for a precedent upon which to do so. Some of you are sincerely devoted to the republican institutions and territorial integrity of our country, and yet are opposed to what is called the draft, or conscription.

“At the beginning of the war, and ever since, a variety of motives, pressing, some in one direction and some in the other, would be presented to the mind of each man physically fit for a soldier, upon the combined effect of which motives he would, or would not, voluntarily enter the service. Among these motives would be patriotism, political bias, ambition, personal courage, love of adventure, want of employment, and convenience, or the opposite of some of these. We already have, and have had in the service, as appears, substantially all that can be obtained upon this voluntary weighing of motives. And yet we must somehow obtain more, or relinquish the original object of the contest, together with all the blood and treasure already expended in the effort to secure it. To meet this necessity the law for the draft has been enacted. You who do not wish to be soldiers do not like this law. This is natural ; nor does it imply want of patriotism. Nothing can be so just and necessary as to make us like it if it is disagreeable to us. We are prone, too, to find false arguments with which to excuse ourselves for opposing such disagreeable things. In this case, those who desire the rebellion to succeed, and others who seek reward in a different way, are very active in accommodating us with this class of argument. They tell us the law is unconstitutional. It is the first instance, I believe, in which the power of Congress to do a thing has ever been questioned in a case when the power is given by the Constitution in express terms. Whether a power can be implied, when it is not expressed, has often been the subject of controversy ; but this is the first case in which the degree of effrontery has been ventured upon, of denying a power which is plainly and distinctly written down in the Constitution. The Constitution declares that ‘the Congress shall have power . . . to raise and support armies ; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.’ The whole scope of the conscription act is ‘to

raise and support armies.’ There is nothing else in it. It makes no appropriation of money, and hence the money clause just quoted is not touched by it. The case simply is, the Constitution provides that the Congress shall have power to raise and support armies ; and by this act the Congress has exercised the power to raise and support armies. This is the whole of it. It is a law made in literal pursuance of this part of the United States Constitution ; and another part of the same Constitution declares that ‘this Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’ Do you admit that the power is given to raise and support armies, and yet insist that by this act Congress has not exercised the power in a constitutional mode ? — has not done the thing in the right way ? Who is to judge of this ? The Constitution gives Congress the power, but it does not prescribe the mode, or expressly declare who shall prescribe it. In such case Congress must prescribe the mode, or relinquish the power. There is no alternative. Congress could not exercise the power to do the thing if it had not the power of providing a way to do it, when no way is provided by the Constitution for doing it. In fact, Congress would not have the power to raise and support armies, if even by the Constitution it were left to the option of any other, or others, to give or withhold the only mode of doing it. If the Constitution has prescribed a mode, Congress could and must follow that mode ; but, as it is, the mode necessarily goes to Congress, with the power expressly given. The power is given fully, completely, unconditionally. It is not a power to raise armies if State authorities consent ; nor if the men to compose the armies are entirely willing ; but it is a power to raise and support armies given to Congress by the Constitution, without an if.

“It is clear that a constitutional law may not be expedient or proper. Such would be a law to raise armies when no armies were needed. But this is not such. The republican institutions and territorial integrity of our country cannot be maintained without the further raising and supporting of armies. There can be no army without men. Men can be had only voluntarily or involuntarily. We have ceased to obtain them voluntarily, and to obtain them involuntarily is the draft — the conscription. If you dispute the fact, and declare that men can still be had voluntarily in sufficient numbers, prove the assertion by yourselves volunteering in such numbers, and I shall gladly give up the draft. Or if not a sufficient number, but

any one of you will volunteer, he for his single self will escape all the horrors of the draft, and will thereby do only what each one of at least a million of his manly brethren have already done. Their toil and blood have been given as much for you as for themselves. Shall it all be lost rather than that you, too, will bear your part?

"I do not say that all who would avoid serving in the war are unpatriotic; but I do think every patriot should willingly take his chance under a law, made with great care, in order to secure entire fairness. This law was considered, discussed, modified, and amended by Congress at great length, and with much labor; and was finally passed, by both branches, with a near approach to unanimity. At last, it may not be exactly such as any one man out of Congress, or even in Congress, would have made it. It has been said, and I believe truly, that the Constitution itself is not altogether such as any one of its framers would have preferred. It was the joint work of all, and certainly the better that it was so.

"Much complaint is made of that provision of the conscription law which allows a drafted man to substitute three hundred dollars for himself; while, as I believe, none is made of that provision which allows him to substitute another man for himself. Nor is the three hundred dollar provision objected to for unconstitutionality; but for inequality, for favoring the rich against the poor. The substitution of men is the provision, if any, which favors the rich to the exclusion of the poor. But this being a provision in accordance with an old and well-known practice, in the raising of armies, is not objected to. There would have been great objection if that provision had been omitted. And yet being in, the money provision really modifies the inequality which the other introduces. It allows men to escape the service who are too poor to escape but for it. Without the money provision, competition among the more wealthy might, and probably would, raise the price of substitutes above three hundred dollars, thus leaving the man who could raise only three hundred dollars no escape from personal service. True, by the law as it is, the man who cannot raise so much as three hundred dollars, nor obtain a personal substitute for less, cannot escape; but he can come quite as near escaping as he could if the money provision were not in the law. To put it another way: is an unobjectionable law which allows only the man to escape who can pay a thousand dollars, made objectionable by adding a provision that any one may escape who can pay the smaller sum of three hundred dollars? This is the exact difference at this point between the present law and all former draft laws. It is true that by this law a somewhat larger

number will escape than could under the law allowing personal substitutes only; but each additional man thus escaping will be a poorer man than could have escaped by the law in the other form. The money provision enlarges the class of exempts from actual service simply by admitting poorer men into it. How then can the money provision be a wrong to the poor man? The inequality complained of pertains in greater degree to the substitution of men, and is really modified and lessened by the money provision. The inequality could only be perfectly cured by sweeping both provisions away. This, being a great innovation, would probably leave the law more distasteful than it now is.

"The principle of the draft, which simply is involuntary or enforced service, is not new. It has been practiced in all ages of the world. It was well known to the framers of our Constitution as one of the modes of raising armies, at the time they placed in that instrument the provision that 'the Congress shall have power to raise and support armies.' It had been used just before, in establishing our independence, and it was also used under the Constitution in 1812. Wherein is the peculiar hardship now? Shall we shrink from the necessary means to maintain our free government, which our grandfathers employed to establish it and our own fathers have already employed once to maintain it? Are we degenerated? Has the manhood of our race run out?

"Again, a law may be both constitutional and expedient, and yet may be administered in an unjust and unfair way. This law belongs to a class, which class is composed of those laws whose object is to distribute burthens or benefits on the principle of equality. No one of these laws can ever be practically administered with that exactness which can be conceived of in the mind. A tax law, the principle of which is that each owner shall pay in proportion to the value of his property, will be a dead letter, if no one can be compelled to pay until it can be shown that every other man will pay in precisely the same proportion, according to value; nay, even, it will be a dead letter, if no one can be compelled to pay until it is certain that every other one will pay at all—even in unequal proportion. Again, the United States House of Representatives is constituted on the principle that each member is sent by the same number of people that each other one is sent by; and yet, in practice, no two of the whole number, much less the whole number, are ever sent by precisely the same number of constituents. The districts cannot be made precisely equal in population at first, and if they could, they would become unequal in a single day, and much more so in

the ten years, which the districts, once made, are to continue. They cannot be remodeled every day; nor, without too much expense and labor, even every year.

"This sort of difficulty applies in full force to the practical administration of the draft law. In fact, the difficulty is greater in the case of the draft law. First, it starts with all the inequality of the congressional districts; but these are based on entire population, while the draft is based on those only who are fit for soldiers, and such may not bear the same proportion to the whole in one district that they do in another. Again, the facts must be ascertained, and credit given, for the unequal numbers of soldiers which have already gone from the several districts. In all these points errors will occur in spite of the utmost fidelity. The Government is bound to administer the law with such an approach to exactness as is usual in analogous cases, and as entire good faith and fidelity will reach. If so great departures as to be inconsistent with such good faith and fidelity, or great departures occurring in any way, be pointed out they shall be corrected; and any agent shown to have caused such departures intentionally shall be dismissed.

"With these views, and on these principles, I feel bound to tell you it is my purpose to see the draft law faithfully executed."

VALLANDIGHAM.

GENERAL BURNSIDE took command of the Department of the Ohio (March 26, 1863) with a zeal against the insurgents only heightened by his defeat at Fredericksburg. He found his department infested with a peculiarly bitter opposition to the Government and to the prosecution of the war, amounting, in his opinion, to positive aid and comfort to the enemy, and he determined to use all the powers confided to him to put an end to these manifestations, which he considered treason-

¹ One of Burnside's own staff-officers, Colonel J. M. Cutts, wrote to the President July 30: "Order 38 has kindled the fires of hatred and contention. Burnside is foolishly and unwisely excited, and if continued in command will disgrace himself, you, and the country, as he did at Fredericksburg."

² At the first threat of civil war Vallandigham made haste to declare himself opposed to any forcible execution of the laws. He declared the States of the Union the only judges of the sufficiency and justice of secession, and declared he would never vote one dollar of money whereby one drop of American blood should be shed in civil war; and in February preceding the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln he proposed to amend the Constitution by dividing the Union into four sections, giving each section a veto on the passage of any law or the election of Presidents or Vice-Presidents, and allowing to each State the right of secession on certain specified terms. Having thus early taken his stand, he

able; and in the execution of this purpose he gave great latitude to the exercise of his authority. He was of a zealous and impulsive character, and weighed too little the consequences of his acts where his feelings were strongly enlisted. He issued, on the 13th of April, an order which obtained wide celebrity under the name of General Order No. 38, announcing that "all persons found within our lines, who commit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country, will be tried as spies and traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death." He enumerated, as among the acts which came within the view of this order, the writing and carrying of secret letters; passing the lines for treasonable purposes; recruiting for the Confederate service; harboring, concealing, or feeding public enemies within our lines; and passing beyond this reasonable category of offenses, he declared that "the habit of declaring sympathies for the enemy will no longer be tolerated in this department, and persons committing such offenses will at once be arrested, with a view to being tried, as above stated, or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends." And in conclusion he added a clause which may be made to embrace, in its ample sweep, any demonstration not to the taste of the general in command: "It must be distinctly understood that treason, expressed or implied, will not be tolerated in this department."

This order at once excited a most furious denunciation on the part of those who, either on account of their acts, or their secret sympathies, felt themselves threatened by it, and many even of those opponents of the Administration who were entirely loyal to the Union¹ criticised the order as illegal in itself and liable to lead to dangerous abuses. The most energetic and eloquent of General Burnside's assailants was Clement L. Vallandigham, who had been for several years a member of Congress from Ohio, whose intemperate denunciation of the Government had caused him the loss of his seat,² and whose defeat had only heightened the acerb-

retained his position with more consistency than was shown by any other member of his party. After his defeat by General R. C. Schenck, in his canvass for reelection to Congress, he renewed his attacks upon the Government and its war policy with exaggerated vehemence.

In a speech delivered in the House of Representatives on the 14th of January, 1863, he boasted that he was of that number who had opposed abolitionism or the political development of the antislavery sentiment of the North and West from the beginning. He called it the development of the spirit of intermeddling, whose children are strife and murder. He said: "On the 14th of April I believed that coercion would bring on war, and war disunion. More than that, I believed, what you all in your hearts believe to-day, that the South could never be conquered — never. And not that only, but I was satisfied. . . that the secret but real purpose of the war was to abolish slavery in the States,

ity of his opposition to the war. General Order No. 38 furnished him a most inspiring text for assailing the Government, and he availed himself of it in Democratic meetings throughout the State. A rumor of his violent speeches came to the ears of the military authorities in Cincinnati, and an officer was sent, in citizen's clothes, to attend a meeting which was held at Mount Vernon, Ohio, where Mr. Vallandigham and other prominent Democrats were the orators of the day. The meeting was an enthusiastic one, full of zeal against the Government and of sympathy with the South. Mr. Vallandigham, feeling his audience thoroughly in harmony with him, spoke with unusual fluency and bitterness, greatly enjoying the applause of his hearers, and unconscious of the presence of the unsympathizing recorder, who leaned against the platform a few feet away and took down some of his most malignant periods. He said it was the design of those in power to usurp a despotism; that it was not their intention to effect a restoration of the Union; that the Government had rejected every overture of peace from the South and every proposition of mediation from Europe; that the war was for the liberation of the blacks and the enslavement of the whites; that General Order No. 38 was a base usurpation of arbitrary power; that he despised it and spat upon it and trampled it under his feet. Speaking of the conscription act, he said the people were not deserving to be free men who would submit to such encroachment on their liberties. He called the President "King Lincoln," and advised the people to come up together at the ballot box and hurl the tyrant from his throne. The audience and the speaker were evidently in entire agreement. The crowd wore in great numbers the distinctive badges of "Copperheads" and "Butternuts," and amid cheers which Vallandigham's speech elicited the witness heard a shout that "Jeff Davis was a gentleman, which was more than Lincoln was."

The officer returned to Cincinnati and made his report. Three days later, on the evening of the 4th of May, a special train went up to Dayton, with a company of the 115th Ohio, to arrest Mr. Vallandigham. Reaching Dayton they went at once to his house, where they arrived shortly before daylight, and demanded admittance. The orator appeared at an upper window and, being informed of their business,

refused to allow them to enter. He began shouting in a loud voice; pistols were fired from the house; the signals were taken up in the town, and, according to some preconceived arrangement, the fire bells began to toll. There was evidently no time to be lost. The soldiers forced their way into the house; Vallandigham was compelled to make a hasty toilet, and was hurried to the cars, and the special train pulled out of the station before any considerable crowd could assemble. Arriving at Cincinnati, Vallandigham was consigned to the military prison and kept in close confinement. During the day he contrived, however, to issue an address to the Democracy of Ohio, saying:

I am here in a military bastille for no other offense than my political opinions, and the defense of them, and of the rights of the people, and of your constitutional liberties. . . . I am a Democrat — for the Constitution, for law, for the Union, for liberty — this is my only crime. . . . Meanwhile, Democrats of Ohio, of the North-west, of the United States, be firm, be true to your principles, to the Constitution, to the Union, and all will yet be well. . . . To you, to the whole people, to Time, I appeal.

While he was issuing these fervid words his friends in Dayton were making their demonstration in another fashion. The town was filled with excitement all day. Crowds gathered on the streets discussing and denouncing the arrest. Great numbers of wagons loaded with rural friends and adherents of the agitator came in from the country and, the excitement increasing as night came on, a crowd of several hundred men moved, hooting and yelling, to the office of the Republican newspaper. Some one threw a brick at the building, then a volley of pistol shots was fired, and the excitement of the crowd wreaked itself on the unoffending building, which was first sacked, and then destroyed by fire. Later in the night a company of troops arrived from Cincinnati, and before midnight the crowd was dispersed and order was restored.

Mr. Vallandigham was promptly tried by a military commission, convened May 6 by General Burnside, consisting of officers of his staff and of the Ohio and Kentucky volunteers. Mr. Vallandigham made no individual objection to the court, but protested that they had no authority to try him; that he was in neither the land nor naval forces of the United States, nor in the militia, and was therefore amenable only to the

. . . and with it . . . the change of our present democratical form of government into an imperial despotism. . . . I do not support the war; and to-day I bless God that not the smell of so much as one drop of its blood is upon my garments. . . . Our Southern brethren were to be whipped back into love and fellowship at the point of the bayonet. Oh, monstrous delusion! . . . Sir, history will record that after nearly six thousand years of folly and wickedness in every

form and administration of government, theocratic, democratic, monarchic, oligarchic, despotic, and mixed, it was reserved to American statesmanship, in the nineteenth century of the Christian era, to try the grand experiment, on a scale the most costly and gigantic in its proportions, of creating love by force and developing fraternal affection by war, and history will record, too, on the same page, the utter disastrous and most bloody failure of the experiment."

civil courts. This protest was, of course, disregarded, and his trial went on. It was proved that he made the speech of which we have already given an abstract. He called as witness in his defense Mr. S. S. Cox, who was also one of the orators of the occasion, and who testified that the speech of Mr. Vallandigham, though couched in strong language, was in no respect treasonable. When the evidence was all in, the accused entered a protest against the entire proceeding, repeating the terms of his original protest, and adding that his alleged offense itself was not known to the Constitution nor to any law thereof. "It is," he said, "words spoken to the people of Ohio, in an open and public political meeting, lawfully and peaceably assembled under the Constitution and upon full notice. It is words of criticism of the public policy of the public servants of the people, by which policy it was alleged that the welfare of the country was not promoted. It was an appeal to the people to change that policy, not by force, but by free elections and the ballot box. It is not pretended that I counseled disobedience to the Constitution or resistance to laws and lawful authority. I never have. Beyond this protest, I have nothing further to submit." There were no speeches either in prosecution or in defense. When the court was cleared it remained in deliberation for three hours and returned a decision that the accused was guilty of the charge of "publicly expressing, in violation of General Order No. 38, from Headquarters Department of the Ohio, his sympathy for those in arms against the Government of the United States, declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion." They therefore sentenced him to be placed in close confinement in some fortress of the United States, to be designated by the commanding officer of the department, there to be kept during the continuance of the war. General Burnside approved the finding and the sentence, and designated Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, as the place of confinement in accordance with the sentence.

But before the finding of the commission was made public, Mr. George E. Pugh, as counsel for Vallandigham, applied to Judge Leavitt of the United States Circuit Court, sitting in Cincinnati, for a writ of habeas corpus. On the 11th of May the case was heard, and extended arguments were made by Mr. Pugh in favor of the motion, and by Mr. Perry, who appeared on behalf of General Burnside, against it. But the most noticeable feature of the trial was a written address from General Burnside himself, presented to the district attorney, in which he explained and defended his

action. He began by saying that he was prohibited by law and by his duty from criticising the policy of the Government; that such abstention from injurious criticism was binding on every one in the service. He then went on to say:

If it is my duty and the duty of the troops to avoid saying anything that would weaken the army by preventing a single recruit from joining the ranks, by bringing the laws of Congress into disrepute, or by causing dissatisfaction in the ranks, it is equally the duty of every citizen in the department to avoid the same evil. . . . If I were to find a man from the enemy's country distributing in my camp speeches of their public men that tended to demoralize the troops, or to destroy their confidence in the constituted authorities of the Government, I would have him tried and hung, if found guilty, and all the rules of modern warfare would sustain me. Why should such speeches from our own public men be allowed?

He even went so far as to disapprove the use of party names and party epithets, saying, "The simple names of patriot and traitor are comprehensive enough."

If the people [he said] do not approve the policy of the Government they can change the constitutional authorities at the proper time and by the proper method. Let them freely discuss the policy in a proper tone; but my duty requires me to stop license and intemperate discussion, which tend to weaken the authority of the Government and army: whilst the latter is in the presence of the enemy it is cowardly so to weaken it. . . . There is no fear of the people losing their liberties; we all know that to be the cry of demagogues, and none but the ignorant will listen to it.

Judge Leavitt denied the motion for habeas corpus in a long decision, in which he thoroughly reviewed the legal points involved in the case. The essential point of his decision was this: General Burnside, by order of the President, had been appointed to the military supervision of the Department of the Ohio, including, among other States, the State of Ohio. The precise extent of his authority was not known to the court, but it might properly be assumed that the President had clothed him with all the powers necessary to the efficient discharge of his duties. It is not claimed that in time of war the President is above the Constitution. He derives his power, on the contrary, expressly from the provision of that instrument that he shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy. The Constitution does not specify the powers he may rightfully exercise in this character, nor are they defined by legislation. No one denies, however, that the President, in this character, is invested with very high powers, which he has exercised, as commander-in-chief, from time to time during the present rebellion.

His acts in this capacity must be limited to such as are deemed essential to the protection and preservation of the Government and the Constitution. And in deciding what he may rightfully do under this power, where there is no express legislative declaration, the President is guided solely by his own judgment, and is amenable only for an abuse of his authority by impeachment. The occasion which calls for the exercise of this power exists only from the necessity of the case; and when the necessity exists there is a clear justification of the act. The judge concludes that if this view of the power of the President is correct, it implies the right to arrest persons who, by their mischievous acts of disloyalty, impede or endanger the military operations of the Government.

And if the necessity exists, I see no reason [he said] why the power does not attach to the officer in command of a military department. The President cannot discharge the duties in person; he, therefore, constitutes an agent to represent him, clothed with the necessary power for the efficient supervision of the military interests of the Government throughout the department. . . . In the exercise of his discretion General Burnside issued the order (No. 38) which has been brought to the notice of the court.

Judge Leavitt would not comment on that order, but only referred to it because General Burnside had stated his motives for issuing it, and also because it was for its supposed violation that he ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. He had done this under his responsibility as the commanding general of the department, and in accordance with what he supposed to be the power vested in him by the appointment of the President. It was virtually an act of the Executive Department under the power vested in the President by the Constitution, and the court therefore refused to annul or reverse it.

The arrest, trial, and sentence of Vallandigham took the President somewhat by surprise, and it was only after these proceedings were consummated that he had an opportunity seriously to consider the case. If he had been consulted before any proceedings were initiated there is reason to believe he would not have permitted them; ¹ but finding himself in presence of an accomplished fact, the question

now given him to consider was, whether he should approve the sentence of the court, or, by annulling it, weaken the authority of the general commanding the district, and greatly encourage the active and dangerous secession element in the West. He concluded to accept the act of Burnside as within his discretion as military commander; but as the imprisonment of Vallandigham in the North would have been a constant source of irritation and political discussion, the President concluded to modify his sentence to one which could be immediately and finally executed, and the execution of which would excite far less sympathy with the prisoner, and, in fact, seriously damage his prestige and authority among his followers. The method of punishment which he chose was doubtless suggested by a paragraph in Burnside's Order No. 38, which had mentioned, as a form of punishment for the declaration of sympathies with the enemy, deportation "beyond our lines into those of their friends." He therefore commuted the sentence of Vallandigham, and directed that he be sent within the Confederate lines.² This was done about a fortnight after the court-martial. Mr. Vallandigham was sent to Tennessee, and, on the 25th of May, was escorted by a small cavalry force to the Confederate lines near Murfreesboro'. After a short parley with the rebel videttes, who made no objection to receiving the prisoner, he was delivered into the hands of a single private soldier of an Alabama regiment, Mr. Vallandigham making a formal protest to the effect that he was within the Confederate lines by force and against his will, and that he surrendered as a prisoner of war.

The arrest and sentence of this distinguished Democrat produced a profound sensation throughout the country. It occasioned general rejoicing in the South. The Government in Richmond saw in it a promise of counter-revolution in the North, and some of the Confederate generals built upon it the rosiest hopes for future campaigns. General Beauregard, writing to a friend in Mobile,³ said the Yankees, by sending Vallandigham into Bragg's lines, had indicated a point of attack. He suggested that, Hooker being disposed of for the next six months at least, Lee should act on the

¹ General Burnside, feeling, after the trial, that his act had subjected the Administration to violent attack, thought proper to signify to the President that his resignation was at his service if desired, to which the President answered: "When I shall wish to supersede you I will let you know. All the Cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting, for instance, Vallandigham, some perhaps doubting there was a real necessity for it; but, being done, all were for seeing you through with it." [Lincoln to Burnside, May 29, 1863. MS.]

² The order under which Vallandigham was sent South was dated the 19th of May and transmitted by telegraph from Washington to General Burnside: "The President directs that, without delay, you send C. L. Vallandigham, under secure guard, to the headquarters of General Rosecrans, to be put by him beyond our military lines, and in case of his return within our lines, he be arrested and kept in close custody for the term specified in his sentence." [McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 162.]

³ May 26, 1863. War Records, Vol. XIV., p. 955.

defensive, and send Bragg 30,000 men to take the offensive at once. Let Bragg—or some better soldier who is sufficiently shadowed forth in parenthesis—“destroy or capture (as it is done in Europe) Rosecrans’s army; then march into Kentucky; raise 30,000 more men there and in Tennessee; then get into Ohio and call upon the friends of Vallandigham to rise for his defense and support; then call upon Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri to throw off the yoke of the accursed Yankee nation; then”—his plan growing more and more magnificent as it took grandeur and color under his pen—“call upon the whole North-west to join in the movement, form a Confederacy of their own, and join us by a treaty of alliance, defensive and offensive. What would then become of the North-east?” demanded the doughty creole. “How long would it take us to bring it back to its senses?” The feeling in the North, if less exuberant in its expression, was equally serious. No act of the Government has been so strongly criticised, and none having relation to the rights of an individual created a feeling so deep and so widespread. No further legal steps were taken in the case, except an application which was made by Vallandigham’s counsel for a writ of certiorari to bring up the proceedings of the military commission for review in the Supreme Court of the United States. This motion was denied, on the evident ground that no such writ could be issued by the Supreme Court to any such military commission, as the court had no jurisdiction over the proceedings of such a tribunal. But in the Democratic newspapers, in public meetings, in a multitude of leading articles and pamphlets, the question was discussed with the greatest earnestness and even violence, the orators and politicians of the Democratic party regarding the incident as the most valuable bit of political capital which had fallen to them during the year. Even some of the most loyal newspapers of the North joined in the general attack, saying that by the statutes Vallandigham was a prisoner of state, and that the Secretary of War was bound to report him as such to the circuit judge of the district in which his supposed offenses were committed, to be regularly tried by the civil tribunal. But the principal criticism was, of course, confined to the ranks of the opposition. Their newspapers and public men vied with one another in a chorus of condemnation. To a meeting, held in Albany on the 16th of May, Governor Seymour wrote:

It is an act which has brought dishonor upon our country; it is full of danger to our persons and our homes; it bears upon its front a conscious violation of law and justice. . . . The transaction involved a series of offenses against our most sacred rights. It interfered with the freedom of speech; it violated

our rights to be secure in our homes against unreasonable searches and seizures; it pronounced sentence without trial, save one which was a mockery—which insulted as well as wronged. . . . If this proceeding is approved by the Government, and sanctioned by the people, it is not merely a step towards revolution—it is revolution; it will not only lead to military despotism, it establishes military despotism. . . . If it is upheld, our liberties are overthrown. . . . The action of the Administration will determine, in the minds of more than one-half of the people of the loyal States, whether the war is waged to put down rebellion at the South, or destroy free institutions at the North. We look for its decision with most solemn solicitude.

The meeting to which Governor Seymour sent this passionate address passed a series of resolutions insisting upon their loyalty and the services they had rendered the country, but demanding that the “Administration shall be true to the Constitution, shall recognize and maintain the rights of the States and the liberties of the citizen, shall everywhere outside the lines of military occupation and the scenes of insurrection exert all its powers to maintain the supremacy of the civil over military law”; and in view of these principles they denounced “the recent assumption of a military commander to seize and try a citizen of Ohio, Clement L. Vallandigham, for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the military orders of that general.” The resolutions further set forth that such an assumption of military power strikes a fatal blow at the supremacy of law. They enumerated the provisions of the Constitution defining the crime of treason and the defenses to which those accused of that crime are entitled, and said “that these safeguards of the rights of the citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary power were intended more especially for his protection in times of civil commotion.” They further resolved:

That in the election of Governor Seymour the people of this State, by an emphatic majority, declared their condemnation of the system of arbitrary arrests, and their determination to stand by the Constitution. And that, regarding the blow struck at a citizen of Ohio as aimed at the rights of every citizen of the North, they denounce it as against the spirit of our laws and Constitution, and most earnestly call upon the President of the United States to reverse the action of the military tribunal which has passed a cruel and unusual punishment upon the party arrested, prohibited in terms by the Constitution, and to restore him to the liberty of which he has been deprived.

A copy of these resolutions was sent to the President and received his most careful consideration. He answered on the 12th of June, in a letter which demands the close perusal of every student of our history: He accepted in

the beginning, and thanked the meeting for, the resolutions expressing the purpose of sustaining the cause of the Union despite the folly and wickedness of any administration. He referred to the safeguards of the Constitution for the defense of persons accused of treason, and contended that these provisions of the Constitution had no application to the case in hand. The arrests complained of were not made for the technical crime of treason. He then proceeded, in language so terse and vigorous that it is difficult to abridge a paragraph without positive mutilation, to describe the circumstances under which this rebellion began, and the hopes of the insurgents, which were founded upon the inveterate respect of the American people for the forms of law.

Prior to my installation here [he said] it had been inculcated that any State had a lawful right to secede from the National Union, and that it would be expedient to exercise the right whenever the devotees of the doctrine should fail to elect a President to their own liking. I was elected contrary to their liking; and, accordingly, so far as it was legally possible, they had taken seven States out of the Union, had seized many of the United States forts, and had fired upon the United States flag, all before I was inaugurated, and, of course, before I had done any official act whatever. The rebellion thus begun soon ran into the present civil war; and, in certain respects, it began on very unequal terms between the parties. The insurgents had been preparing for it for more than thirty years, while the Government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had carefully considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It undoubtedly was a well-pondered reliance with them that in their own unrestricted efforts to destroy Union, Constitution, and law all together the Government would, in a great degree, be restrained by the same Constitution and law from arresting their progress. Their sympathizers pervaded all departments of the Government and nearly all communities of the people. From this material, under cover of "liberty of speech," "liberty of the press," and "habeas corpus," they hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew that in times such as they were inaugurating, by the Constitution itself, the "habeas corpus" might be suspended; but they also knew they had friends who would make a question as to who was to suspend it; meanwhile their spies and others might remain at large to help on their cause. Or if, as has happened, the Executive should suspend the writ, without ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such cases, and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this, which might be at least of some service to the insurgent cause. It needed no very keen perception to discover that part of the enemy's programme, so soon as, by open hostilities, their machinery was fairly put in motion. Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard

as being within the exceptions of the Constitution, and as indispensable to the public safety. Nothing is better known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incompetent to such cases. Civil courts are organized chiefly for trials of individuals, or, at most, a few individuals acting in concert, and this in quiet times and on charges of crimes well defined in the law. Even in times of peace bands of horse-thieves and robbers frequently grow too numerous and powerful for the ordinary courts of justice. But what comparison in numbers have such bands ever borne to the insurgent sympathizers, even in many of the loyal States? Again, a jury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor. And yet again, he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion or inducement may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.

He then applied to the case in hand the clear provision of the Constitution that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless, when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," and went on to say:

This is precisely our present case — a case of rebellion wherein the public safety does require the suspension. Indeed, arrests by process of courts and arrests in cases of rebellion do not proceed altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed at the small percentage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime, while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against the Government, which, at most, will succeed or fail in no great length of time. In the latter case arrests are made, not so much for what has been done as for what probably would be done. The latter is more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former. In such cases the purposes of men are much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his Government is discussed cannot be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; much more if he talks ambiguously — talks for his country with "buts" and "ifs" and "ands." Of how little value the constitutional provisions I have quoted will be rendered, if arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall have been committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples. General John C. Breckinridge, General Robert E. Lee, General Joseph E. Johnston, General John B. Magruder, General William B. Preston, General Simon B. Buckner, and Commodore Franklin Buchanan, now occupying the very highest places in the rebel war service, were all within the power of the Government since the rebellion began, and were nearly as well known to be traitors then as now. Unquestionably, if we had seized and held them, the insurgent cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then committed any crime defined in the law. Every one of them, if arrested, would have been discharged on habeas corpus were the writ allowed to operate. In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not

unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.

Referring to the charge made in the resolutions that Mr. Vallandigham was arrested for no other reason than words addressed to public meetings in criticism of the course of the Administration, Mr. Lincoln said :

If this assertion is the truth and the whole truth,—if there was no other reason for the arrest,—then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But [he went on] Mr. Vallandigham was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the Administration, or the personal interests of the commanding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him.

If it could be shown that his arrest was made on mistake of fact, the President would be glad to correct it. But, he said :

Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings until he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked Administration of a contemptible Government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a case to silence the agitator and to save the boy is not only constitutional, but, withal, a great mercy.

He then stated clearly his belief that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them.

The Constitution itself [he said] makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally take no strong measure in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man, because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting that the American people will, by means of military arrests during the Rebellion, lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus, throughout the indefinite peaceful future, which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics, during temporary illness, as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life.

The President parried the political thrust in the resolutions by reminding the gentlemen of Albany that although they addressed him as "Democrats," not all Democrats were of their way of thinking.

He on whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me ; and the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in these resolutions by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham on habeas corpus is a Democrat of better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the battlefield, I have learned that many approve the course taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a single one condemning it.

The President fortified his argument by an incident of pertinent history especially adapted to touch the sympathies of Democrats—the arbitrary arrests made by General Jackson at New Orleans ; his defiance of the writ of habeas corpus, and his imprisonment of the judge who had issued it. Near the close of this strong and adroit defense of the action of Burnside the President made a remarkable admission in these words :

And yet let me say that in my own discretion I do not know whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. While I cannot shift the responsibility from myself, I hold that, as a general rule, the commander in the field is the better judge of the necessity in any particular case. . . . It gave me pain when I learned that Mr. Vallandigham had been arrested,—that is, I was pained that there should have seemed to be a necessity for arresting him,—and it will afford me great pleasure to discharge him so soon as I can, by any means, believe the public safety will not suffer by it. I further say that as the war progresses it appears to me, opinion and action, which were in great confusion at first, take shape and fall into more regular channels, so that the necessity for strong dealing with them gradually decreases. I have every reason to desire that it should cease altogether, and far from the least is my regard for the opinions and wishes of those who, like the meeting at Albany, declare their purpose to sustain the Government in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion. Still I must continue to do so much as may seem to be required by the public safety.

There are few of the President's state papers which produced a stronger impression upon the public mind than this. Its tone of candor and courtesy, which did not conceal his stern and resolute purpose ; his clear statement of the needs of the country ; his terse argument of his authority under the Constitution to suspend the writ of habeas corpus when, in case of rebellion, the public safety required it ; his contrast of the venial crime of the simple-minded soldier boy, which was punished by

death, with the deeper guilt of the wily agitator, who claimed immunity through the Constitution he was endeavoring to destroy; the strong, yet humorous, common sense of his doubt whether a permanent taste for emetics could be contracted during a fit of sickness—met with an immediate and eager appreciation among the citizens of the country, and rendered this letter remarkable in the long series of Mr Lincoln's political writings. It is needless to say that it did not meet with equal approbation in all quarters. It was received by the politicians of New York, to whom it was addressed, with the gravest displeasure. They answered in an angry yet forcible paper, claiming that the original act of tyranny by which Mr. Vallandigham was arrested had been aggravated by the claim of despotic power which they assumed to find in the President's letter. They wrote with so much heat and feeling that they hardly paused to measure their epithets; otherwise they would scarcely have been guilty of the impertinence of speaking to the President of his "pretensions to more than legal authority," and of criticising his crystal-clear statement as the "misty and cloudy forms of expression" in which these pretensions are set forth. But it is not worth while to rescue either of these letters from the oblivion which soon overtook them. In the words of Mr. Lincoln on another occasion, "the world little noted nor long remembered them." Their first letter had no function nor result but to call into being the President's admirable reply, and the second was little more than a cry under punishment.

In the State of Ohio the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham had precipitated an issue which was in its solution greatly to the advantage of the cause of the Union. When, on the 11th of June, the Democratic convention of the State met at Columbus, it was found to be completely under the control of those opposed to the war, and the excitement consequent upon Vallandigham's arrest and banishment designated him as the only serious candidate for the office of governor. Nominating him by acclamation was the readiest and most practical way of signifying their disapproval of the proceedings of the Government. They passed a series of resolutions affirming their devotion to the Union, denouncing the arrest and banishment of Vallandigham as a forcible violation of the Constitution and a direct insult offered to the sovereignty of the people of Ohio, saying that the Democratic party was fully competent to decide whether Mr. Vallandigham was a fit man to be nominated for governor, and that the attempt to deprive them of that right by his arrest and banishment was an unmerited imputation upon their intelligence and loyalty.

They therefore called upon the President to restore Mr. Vallandigham to his home in Ohio. The committee appointed to present these resolutions accompanied them with a long letter signed by the most prominent Democrats of Ohio, arguing, upon lines similar to those followed in the Albany letter, that the action of the Government towards Vallandigham was illegal and unconstitutional; that it had created widespread and alarming disaffection among the people of the State; that it was not an offense against any law to contend that the war could not be used as a means of restoring the Union, or that a war directed against slavery would inevitably result in the final destruction of both the Constitution and the Union. They took up the President's letter to the Albany committee and insisted that Mr. Vallandigham was not warring upon the military; they disagreed entirely with the President on the subject of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; they represented the President as claiming that the Constitution is different in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace or public security, and that he had the right to engraft limitations or exceptions upon these constitutional guarantees whenever, in his judgment, the public safety required it. Having attributed to him these absurd pretensions, they proceeded solemnly to deny them, and ask:

If an indefinable kind of constructive treason is to be introduced and grafted upon the Constitution unknown to the laws of the land and subject to the will of the President whenever an insurrection or invasion shall occur in any part of this vast country, what safety or security will be left for the liberties of the people?

The President sent a reply to this letter, briefer than the one he had devoted to Albany, and not so full in its discussion of the constitutional question at issue. For his views in this regard he referred the Ohio committee to his Albany letter. He simply repudiated the opinions and intentions which the Ohio committee had gratuitously imputed to him. But he assumed the full responsibility for the exercise of the enormous powers which he believed the Constitution, under the circumstances, conferred upon him.

You ask, in substance, whether I really claim that I may override all the guaranteed rights of individuals on the plea of conserving the public safety—when I may choose to say the public safety requires it. This question, divested of the phraseology calculated to represent me as struggling for an arbitrary personal prerogative, is either simply a question who shall decide, or an affirmation that nobody shall decide, what the public safety does require in cases of rebellion or invasion. The Constitution contemplates the question as likely to occur for decision,

but it does not expressly declare who is to decide it. By necessary implication, when rebellion or invasion comes, the decision is to be made, from time to time, and I think the man whom, for the time, the people have, under the Constitution, made the commander-in-chief of their army and navy, is the man who holds the power, and bears the responsibility of making it. If he uses the power justly, the same people will probably justify him; if he abuses it, he is in their hands to be dealt with by all the modes they have reserved to themselves in the Constitution.

He disclaimed, in courteous language, any purpose of insult to Ohio in Mr. Vallandigham's case; and referring to the peremptory request of the committee that Vallandigham should be released from his sentence, and to the further claim of the committee that the Democracy of Ohio are loyal to the Union, he proposed, on what he considered very easy conditions, to comply with their request. He offered them the following propositions:

1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union, and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion.

2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase or favor the decrease or lessen the efficiency of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and

3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.

If the committee, or a majority of them, would write their names upon the back of the President's letter, thus committing themselves to these propositions and to nothing else, he would then publish the letter and the names, which publication would be, within itself, a revocation of Vallandigham's sentence. This would leave Mr. Vallandigham himself absolutely unpledged; the President's object being to gain for the cause of the Union so large a moral reinforcement from this clear definition of the attitude of the other gentlemen as to compensate for any damage that Mr. Vallandigham could possibly do on his return. The President concluded this letter with the same frankness

that he used in that to Albany. "Still," he said, "in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public service may seem to require." This overture of the President was promptly rejected by the committee. They treated it as an evasion on his part of the questions involved in the case, and as implying not only an imputation upon their own sincerity and fidelity as citizens of the United States, but also a concession of the legality of Mr. Vallandigham's arrest and banishment.

Evidently nothing could come from negotiations with parties whose points of view were so far apart as those of the President and the Democratic leaders in New York and Ohio. The case must be resolved by the people of the State whose sovereignty it was said had been violated, and the issue was made in the clearest possible manner by the nomination of Mr. Vallandigham for governor of Ohio. The convention which nominated him determined to leave no doubt of their position, not only denouncing the action of General Burnside and the President, but expressing their deep humiliation and regret at the failure of Governor Tod of Ohio to protect the citizens of the State in the enjoyment and exercise of their constitutional rights. The Union party, meeting at Columbus, nominated for governor John Brough, a war Democrat, and adopted a brief platform of unqualified devotion to the Union, in favor of a most vigorous prosecution of the war, and the laying aside of personal preferences and prejudices, and pledging hearty support to the President. Upon this issue the canvass proceeded to its close. Before it ended, Mr. Vallandigham himself intervened once more—not in person, indeed, but by letters from Canada. On entering the rebel lines he had gone at once to Richmond, where he was kindly and courteously received by the Confederate authorities, although both on his side and on theirs the forms appropriate to the fiction that he was a prisoner of war were carefully observed.¹ After a conference with the leading men of the Confederate Government, he went southward and arrived on the 22d of June at Bermuda in a vessel called the *Lady Davis*, which had run the blockade at Wilmington. He made only a brief stay in Bermuda and then took

¹ John B. Jones, a clerk in the rebel war office, made on the 22d of June, 1863, the following entry in his diary: "To-day I saw the memorandum of Mr. Ould, of the conversation held with Mr. Vallandigham, for file in the archives. He says if we can only hold out this year that the peace party of the North would sweep the Lincoln dynasty out of political existence. He seems to have thought that our cause was sinking, and feared we would submit, which would, of course, be ruinous to his party. But he advises strongly against any invasion of Pennsylvania, for that would unite all

parties at the North, and so strengthen Lincoln's hands that he would be able to crush all opposition and trample upon the constitutional rights of the people. Mr. V. said nothing to indicate that either he or the party had any other idea than that the Union would be reconstructed under Democratic rule. The President [Davis] indorsed with his own pen on this document that in regard to invasion of the North experience proved the contrary of what Mr. V. asserted." [Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I., pp. 357, 358.]

passage for Halifax, Nova Scotia, where he arrived on the 5th of July. From the Canadian side of Niagara Falls he issued an address to the people of Ohio,¹ which began with this clever and striking exordium :

Arrested and confined for three weeks in the United States a prisoner of state, banished thence to the Confederate States, and there held as an alien enemy and prisoner of war, though on parole, fairly and honorably dealt with, and given leave to depart, an act possible only by running the blockade at the hazard of being fired upon by ships flying the flag of my own country, I found myself first a free man when on British soil. And to-day, under protection of the British flag, I am here to enjoy and, in part, to exercise the privileges and rights which usurpers insolently deny me at home. . . . Six weeks ago, when just going into banishment because an audacious but most cowardly despotism caused it, I addressed you as a fellow-citizen. To-day, and from the very place then selected by me, but after wearisome and most perilous journeyings for more than four thousand miles by land and upon sea, still in exile, though almost within sight of my native State, I greet you as your representative.

He thanked and congratulated the Democrats of Ohio upon the nominations they had made. He indorsed their platform, which he called "elegant in style, admirable in sentiment." He claimed that his arrest was the issue before the country. "The President," he said, "accepts the issue. . . . In time of war there is but one will supreme—his will; but one law—military necessity, and he the sole judge." He was convinced that the war could never be prosecuted to a successful termination.

If this civil war [he said] is to terminate only by the subjugation or submission of the Southern force in arms, the infant of to-day will not see the end of it. . . . Traveling a thousand miles or more, through nearly one-half of the Confederate States, and sojourning for a time at widely different points, I met not one man, woman, or child who was not resolved to perish rather than to yield to the pressure of arms, even in the most desperate extremity.

He announced, therefore, that he returned with his opinion in favor of peace not only unchanged, but confirmed and strengthened.

¹ "Rebellion Records," Vol. VII. Documents, pp. 438, 439.

² While sojourning at Niagara Falls, Mr. Vallandigham had come into communication with a person who called himself William Cornell Jewett of Colorado, who passed his time writing letters to the newspapers and to public men in favor of putting an end to the war by foreign mediation. After the result of the Ohio election had convinced Vallandigham that little was to be expected in the way of peace from the efforts of the Democratic party, he wrote Jewett a letter strongly favoring an immediate acceptance of the mediation of France in the controversy between the States. He said: "The South and the North are both

defeated by the unprecedented majority of 101,000 votes, 62,000 of which were cast in the State and 39,000 by the soldiers in the field, to whom a State statute had given the privilege of voting.

In view of this overwhelming defeat, Mr. Vallandigham thought it prudent to remain during the winter beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. He was in constant correspondence, however, with his associates and adherents,² and demonstrations were made from time to time against the Government for its treatment of him. On the 29th of February, 1864, Mr. Pendleton of Ohio offered a resolution in the House of Representatives that the arrest and banishment of Mr. Vallandigham were "acts of mere arbitrary power in palpable violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States," which was rejected by a strict party vote, 47 Democrats voting in favor of it, and 77 Union members voting against it, only two Democrats voting with the majority. Vallandigham's course in opposition to the war had been so exasperating to the Union sentiment of the country, his speeches had been so full of vehement malice, that even those who thought his original arrest an unjustifiable stretch of military power felt no sympathy with the object of it and were inclined to acquiesce in the President's disposition of the case. The situation was not without a humorous element also, to which the American mind is always hospitable. The spectacle of this furious agitator, condemned by court-martial to a long imprisonment and then handed over by the contemptuous mercy of the President to the care and keeping of his friends beyond the Union lines; his frantic protests that the Confederates were not his friends, but that he was their most formidable and dreaded enemy; the friendly receptions and attentions he met with in the South and among the sympathizing British officials in the West Indies and the Northern provinces; his nomination by the Democratic convention of his State, which was forced immediately to apply to the President to give them back their candidate—affected the popular mind as an event rather ridiculous than

indebted to the great powers of Europe for having so long withheld recognition from the Confederate States. The South has proved her ability to maintain herself by her own strength and resources, without foreign aid, moral or material; and the North and West—the whole country, indeed—these great powers have served incalculably, by holding back a solemn proclamation to the world that the Union of these States was finally and formally dissolved. They have left to us every motive and every chance for reunion. . . . Foreign recognition now of the Confederate States could avail little to delay or prevent final reunion." (W. C. Jewett, Letter to "Liverpool Mercury," November 4.)

serious, and the constitutional question involved received probably less attention than it deserved. His letters from Canada aroused little or no sympathy, and when, in June, 1864, he returned to the United States, the President declined to take any notice of his presence.¹

Emboldened by impunity, Vallandigham began at political meetings a new series of speeches more violent in tone than those which had caused his arrest. But as the effect of them was clearly beneficial to the Union cause, no means were taken to silence him. He defied the Government and the army; he made vague threats that in case he was arrested the persons and property of those instigating such a proceeding should be held as hostages.² He was not molested, and in August was allowed to take a prominent part in the National Democratic Convention at Chicago, where he rendered valuable service to the Union party³ as chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, and offered the motion that the nomination of General McClellan should be made unanimous.

THE DEFEAT OF THE PEACE PARTY AT THE POLLS.

THE reverses sustained by the Union arms during the summer and autumn of 1862 had their direct effect in the field of politics. Every unsuccessful movement, and especially every defeat of the National forces, increased the strength and the audacity of the opposition to the Government and the war. There were, it is true, hundreds of thousands of Democratic soldiers in the ranks fighting to uphold the Union; and as a result of this — because men's sentiments are far more influenced by their actions than their actions are inspired by their sentiments — they were generally induced to take the Republican view of public affairs, and by degrees to unite themselves with the Republican party. But they seemed to exert no influence whatever upon their friends and re-

lations at home. The Democratic party remained as solid in its organization, as powerful in its resistance to the Government, as ever. The great liberating measure of the President, the proclamation of September, had its influence also in exasperating and consolidating the opposition. This act, which not only renders his name immortal, but glorifies the age in which he lived, contributed to the defeat of his party in some of the most important States of the Union. In the autumn of 1862 the Democrats carried New York, electing Horatio Seymour governor over that patriotic and accomplished gentleman, General James S. Wadsworth; the adjoining State of New Jersey was also carried by them. There were heavy losses of congressmen in the great States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana; and even in the President's own State of Illinois the opposition inflicted upon him a peculiarly painful defeat, electing nine of his opponents and only four of his friends.

The Union sentiment was still sufficiently powerful throughout the North to elect an easy working majority in the House of Representatives, and the Republican predominance in the Senate was, of course, untouched; so that so far as legislation was concerned there was no danger that the Government would be embarrassed by an opposition majority. But the losses it met with in the elections were none the less serious and discouraging. A war disapproved by a free people cannot long be carried on by the will of the Government, and if the ratio of losses indicated by the elections of 1862 had continued another year the permanency of the Republic would have been gravely compromised. But the intelligence of the American people gradually acknowledged the wisdom and accepted the leadership of the President, and moved forward to the advanced platform upon which Mr. Lincoln had placed himself. The right of suffrage given by the State legislatures to the soldiers in the field reinforced the voting strength of the Republicans

¹ When Mr. Lincoln first heard of Vallandigham's return he wrote a joint letter to Governor Brough and General Heintzelman, who had succeeded Burnside in command of the department, directing them to "consult together freely; watch Vallandigham and others closely, and upon discovering any palpable injury or imminent danger to the military proceeding from him, them, or any of them, arrest all implicated; otherwise do not arrest without further order. Meanwhile report the signs to me from time to time." But, after writing the letter, he concluded not to send it. [Unpublished MS., June 20, 1864.]

He was, in fact, a little nonplused by Vallandigham's return. He had seriously thought of annulling the sentence of exile, but had been too much occupied with other matters to do it. After he had returned, the President said: "The only question to decide was whether he could afford to disregard the contempt of authority and breach of discipline displayed in Vallandigham's

action; otherwise, it could not but result in benefit to the Union cause to have so violent and indiscreet a man go to Chicago as a firebrand to his own party." Fernando Wood had told him that he could do nothing more politic than to bring Vallandigham back. "In that case," he said, "he could promise him two Democratic candidates for the Presidency this year. These war Democrats," said Mr. Wood, "are scoundrelly hypocrites; they want to oppose you and favor the war at once, which is nonsense. There are but two sides in this fight — yours and mine; war and peace. You will succeed while the war lasts, I expect, but we shall succeed when the war is over. I intend to keep my record clear for the future."

² McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 176.

³ The Illinois Democrats were greatly troubled by Vallandigham's apparition. W. R. Morrison said to J. H., June 18, "How much did you fellows give Fernandy Wood for importing him?" [J. H., Diary.]

at home, and the ballot and the bullet worked harmoniously together. Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1862 Mr. Lincoln was exposed to the bitterest assaults and criticisms from every faction in the country. His conservative supporters reproached him with having yielded to the wishes of the radicals; the radicals denounced him for being hampered, if not corrupted, by the influence of the conservatives. On one side he was assailed by a clamor for peace, on the other by vehement and injurious demands for a more vigorous prosecution of the war. He stood unmoved by these attacks, converging upon him from every quarter, and rarely took the trouble to defend himself against them. Coming from every side, the pressure neutralized itself, like that of the atmosphere. To one friend who assailed him with peculiar candor, he made a reply which may answer as a sufficient defense to all the radical attacks which were so rife at the time.

I have just received and read your letter of the 20th. The purport of it is that we lost the late elections, and the Administration is failing because the war is unsuccessful, and that I must not flatter myself that I am not justly to blame for it. I certainly know that if the war fails, the Administration fails, and that I will be blamed for it, whether I deserve it or not. And I ought to be blamed, if I could do better. You think I could do better; therefore you blame me already. I think I could not do better; therefore I blame you for blaming me. I understand you now to be willing to accept the help of men who are not Republicans, provided they have "heart in it."—Agreed. I want no others. But who is to be the judge of hearts, or of "heart in it"? If I must discard my own judgment, and take yours, I must also take that of others; and by the time I should reject all I should be advised to reject, I should have none left, Republicans or others—not even yourself. For be assured, my dear sir, there are men who have "heart in it" that think you are performing your part as poorly as you think I am performing mine. I certainly have been dissatisfied with the slowness of Buell and McClellan; but before I relieved them I had great fears I should not find successors to them who would do better; and I am sorry to add, that I have seen little since to relieve those fears. I do not clearly see the prospect of any more rapid movements. I fear we shall at last find out the difficulty is in our case rather than in particular generals. I wish to disparage no one—certainly not those who sympathize with me; but I must say I need success more than I need sympathy, and that I have not seen the so much greater evidence of getting success from my sympathizers than from those who are denounced as the contrary. It does seem to me that in the field the two classes have been very much alike in what they have done and what they have failed to do. In sealing their faith with their blood, Baker, and Lyon, and Bohlen, and Richardson, Republicans, did all that men could do; but did they any more than Kearney, Stevens, and Reno, and Mansfield, none of whom were Republicans, and some at least

of whom have been bitterly and repeatedly denounced to me as secession sympathizers? I will not perform the ungrateful task of comparing cases of failure. In answer to your question, Has it not been publicly stated in the newspapers, and apparently proved as a fact, that from the commencement of the war the enemy was continually supplied with information by some of the confidential subordinates of as important an officer as Adjutant-General Thomas? I must say "No," as far as my knowledge extends. And I add that if you can give any tangible evidence upon the subject, I will thank you to come to this city and do so.¹

The movements for peace which were made at this period on both sides of the line were feeble and without result. Mr. Foote of Tennessee introduced a resolution in the Confederate House of Representatives to the effect "that the signal success with which Divine Providence has so continually blessed our arms for several months past would fully justify the Confederate Government in dispatching a commissioner or commissioners to the Government at Washington City, empowered to propose the terms of a just and honorable peace." Mr. Holt of Georgia offered as a substitute a resolution setting forth that the people of the Confederate States have been always anxious for peace, and that "whenever the Government of the United States shall manifest a like anxiety it should be the duty of the President of the Confederate States to appoint commissioners to treat upon the subject." But both resolution and substitute were laid on the table by a large majority. In the Senate of the United States Mr. Garrett Davis offered a resolution² recommending to the States to choose delegates to a convention to be held at Louisville, Kentucky, to take into consideration the condition of the United States and the proper means for a restoration of the Union; this was laid upon the table. Mr. Vallandigham also offered resolutions for peace in the House of Representatives; but neither in the North nor in the South was there at that time a party sufficiently powerful to bring any measures for peace to the point of legislation, though on both sides there was a strong current of agitation for the termination of the war, which, being regarded and treated as treasonable, was easily held in check.

From time to time there were unauthorized attempts of individuals, inspired by restlessness or a love of notoriety, to set on foot amateur negotiations for peace. One of the most active and persistent of the peace politicians of the North was Fernando Wood of New York. He held a unique position in his party. While strongly sympathizing with the secessionists, and openly affiliating with them in public, he

¹ Lincoln to Schurz, Nov. 24, 1862. MS.

² "Congressional Globe," third session Thirty-seventh Congress, Part I., p. 4, Dec. 2, 1862.

nevertheless tried to keep up a sort of furtive confidential relation with the leading members of the Government. He frequently visited the White House, the State Department, and the Treasury Department, but emulated the discretion of Nicodemus as to the hour of his visits. No rebuffs daunted him; he apparently cared nothing for the evident distrust with which his overtures were received. He kept them up as long as the war lasted, probably in the hope that the time might come for him to play a conspicuous and important part in the final negotiations for peace. He used every occasion to ingratiate himself with the President. He wrote, congratulating him on the change in the War Department in the beginning of 1862, as indicating the President's "ability to govern, and also his executive power and will."¹ Later in the same year he wrote complaining that the radical abolitionists of New York represented him as hostile to the Administration and as in sympathy with the States in rebellion against the Government. He denied these charges, and begged the President to "rely upon his support in his efforts to maintain the integrity of the Union."¹ In September, after making a speech furiously denouncing the Government for its arbitrary arrests, he wrote a confidential note to the President, making the usual explanation that he had been incorrectly reported: "All I said applied to those arrests that had been made through error or misrepresentation, and exclusively as to the truly loyal." In November, after a similar tirade, he wrote to Mr. Seward, with a striking lack of originality, making the same plea of an incorrect report. "I did not," he said, "utter the treasonable sentiments reported." Having in this way, as he thought, established himself in the confidence of the President, he wrote him a letter on the 8th of December, 1862, pretending that he had "reliable and truthful authority" to say that the Southern States would send representatives to the next Congress provided that a full and general amnesty should permit them to do so, no guaranty or terms being asked for other than the amnesty referred to.

As an humble but loyal citizen [he said], deeply impressed with the great necessity of restoring the Union of these States, I ask your immediate attention to this subject. The magnitude of the interests at stake warrant some executive action predicated upon this information, if it be only to ascertain if it be grounded upon even probable foundation. If it shall prove groundless no harm shall have been done, provided the inquiry be made, as it can be, without compromising the Government or injury to the cause in which it is now engaged. If, however, it shall prove well founded, there is no estimate too high to place upon its national value.

¹ MS.

² McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 296.

The immediate object of his letter became evident in the following paragraph:

Now, therefore, Mr. President, I suggest that gentlemen whose former political and social relations with the leaders of the Southern revolt [*sic*] may be allowed to hold unofficial correspondence with them on this subject—the correspondence to be submitted to you. It may be thus ascertained what, if any, credence may be given to these statements, and also whether a peaceful solution of the present struggle may not be attainable.²

The President answered on the 12th of December. Referring to the first paragraph above quoted, he said:

I strongly suspect your information will prove to be groundless; nevertheless, I thank you for communicating it to me. Understanding the phrase in the paragraph above quoted, "the Southern States would send representatives to the next Congress," to be substantially the same as that the people of the Southern States would cease resistance, and would re-inaugurate, submit to, and maintain the national authority within the limits of such States, under the Constitution of the United States, I say that in such case the war would cease on the part of the United States, and that if, within a reasonable time, "a full and general amnesty" were necessary to such end, it would not be withheld. I do not think it would be proper now for me to communicate this formally or informally to the people of the Southern States. My belief is that they already know it; and when they choose, if ever, they can communicate with me unequivocally. Nor do I think it proper now to suspend military operations to try any experiment of negotiation. I should nevertheless receive with great pleasure the exact information you now have, and also such other as you may in any way obtain. Such information might be more valuable before the 1st of January than afterwards.

These last words refer, of course, to the impending proclamation of emancipation.

Between the date of Mr. Lincoln's letter and Mr. Wood's reply came the frightful carnage at Fredericksburg, which emboldened Mr. Wood to say that the President's reply had filled him with profound regret.

It declines [he said] what I had conceived to be an innocent effort to ascertain the foundation for information in my possession of a desire in the South to return to the Union. It thus appears to be an indication on your part [*sic*] to continue a policy which, in my judgment, is not only unwise, but, in the opinion of many, is in conflict with the constitutional authority vested in the Federal Government.

He protested earnestly against this policy, and felt encouraged to renew the suggestions of his letter of the 8th.

I feel [he said] that military operations so bloody and exhausting as ours must sooner or later be suspended. The day of suspension must come. The

only question is whether it shall be before the whole American people, North and South, shall be involved in general ruin, or whether it shall be whilst there is remaining sufficient of the recuperative element of life by which to restore our once happy, prosperous, and peaceful American Union.

To this letter the President made no reply.

Other volunteers from time to time tendered their services in the same field. Mr. Duff Green, a Virginia politician, wrote to the President from Richmond as early as the 20th of January, asking permission to visit Washington. He said that if he could see Mr. Lincoln and converse with him on the subject he could do much to pave the way for an early termination of the war. Receiving no encouragement from Washington, he asked the same permission from Richmond, but this request came to nothing. In the summer of 1863, however, an effort for peace negotiations was made, which came with such high sanction and involved personages of such individual and political importance that it requires particular mention.

About the middle of June, Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy, became convinced that the time was auspicious for initiating negotiations for peace. He thought he saw reasons for great encouragement in the attitude of the North; the great gains of the Democratic party in the last autumnal elections, the pamphlet of Mr. George Ticknor Curtis attacking the measures of the Administration, a public meeting in favor of peace held without disturbance in the city of New York in which violent speeches were made by Mr. Fernando Wood and others, and the nomination for governor of Ohio of Vallandigham are all mentioned by him¹ as facts going to show that the people of the North were wearying of the war. On this insufficient evidence he wrote to Mr. Davis proposing that he should go to Washington, ostensibly to negotiate some questions involving the exchange of prisoners, but saying that he "was not without hopes that indirectly he could now turn attention to a general adjustment, upon such basis as might ultimately be acceptable to both parties, and stop the further effusion of blood in a contest so irrational, unchristian, and so inconsistent with all recognized American principles." He assured Mr. Davis that he entertained but one idea of the basis of final adjustment—the recognition of the sovereignty of the States, and the right of each in its sovereign capacity to determine its own destiny. He did not believe the Federal Government was yet ripe for such acknowledgment, but he did believe that the time had come for a

proper presentation of the question to the authorities at Washington. "While, therefore," he says, "a mission might be dispatched on a minor point, the greater one could possibly, with prudence, discretion, and skill, be opened to view and brought in discussion, in a way that would lead eventually to successful results. This would depend upon many circumstances," he adds complacently, "but no little upon the character and efficiency of the agent. . . . So feeling, I have been prompted to address you these lines." Upon the receipt of this letter Mr. Davis sent a telegram requesting his Vice-President to go immediately to Richmond. He arrived there on the 22d of June; but in the ten days which had elapsed since his letter was written he found that changes of the utmost importance had taken place in the military situation. On the one hand the Confederate authorities had despaired of the condition of Pemberton at Vicksburg, and expected that any day might bring them tidings of his surrender, but on the other hand they were anticipating with sanguine enthusiasm the most magnificent results from Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania. Mr. Stephens, in the work which he wrote at his leisure after the war was ended, represents that in these changed conditions he was inclined to give up his mission, thinking that no good could result from it, as the movement of Lee into Pennsylvania would greatly excite the war spirit and strengthen the war party—a view of the case in which Mr. Davis positively declined to agree. He thought Mr. Lincoln would be more likely to receive a commissioner for peace if General Lee's army was actually threatening Washington than if it was lying quietly south of the Rappahannock. The Confederate Cabinet being called together, they agreed with Mr. Davis; they thought the Federal Government might be best approached while under the threat of the guns of Lee, and before they should receive fresh hope and encouragement from the surrender of Pemberton, which was now considered inevitable. An arrangement was made for Stephens to proceed by land on the route taken by Lee's army, and to communicate with the Washington authorities from his headquarters;² but excessive rains and the badness of the roads caused a change of route, and the invalid Vice-President was therefore saved a most distressing journey, from which he would have come "bootless home and weather-beaten back." Mr. Mallory, the Secretary of the Confederate Navy, gave him a small steamer, and accompanied by Mr. Robert Ould as his secretary, he steamed away to Fort Monroe. In any case his mission

¹ Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., p. 558.

² Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., p. 566.

would probably have been fruitless, but he states only the truth when he claims that he arrived at an unlucky moment. He communicated with Admiral Lee in Hampton Roads on the Fourth of July, just after Lee's march to the North had ended in disastrous failure at Gettysburg. He sent the admiral a letter stating that he was "bearer of a communication in writing from Jefferson Davis, Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate land and naval forces, to Abraham Lincoln, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," and that he desired to proceed directly to Washington in his own steamer, the *Torpedo*. The titles by which Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Davis were designated in this note had been the subject of anxious consultation in Richmond. Stephens's commission from the Confederate President gave Mr. Lincoln the title above quoted to avoid the necessity of claiming the style of President for Mr. Davis; but in case Mr. Lincoln should stand upon his dignity and refuse the letter addressed to him as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, Mr. Davis had prepared for Mr. Stephens a duplicate letter addressed to Mr. Lincoln as President and signed by Mr. Davis in the same style; if to this letter objections were made, on the ground that Mr. Davis was not recognized to be President of the Confederacy, Mr. Stephens's mission was then to be at an end, "as such conference," Mr. Davis said, "is admissible only on a footing of perfect equality." But all this care, foresight, and punctilio went for nothing. As soon as Mr. Lincoln received the telegram in which Admiral Lee announced to the Secretary of the Navy the arrival of Mr. Stephens, he immediately wrote on the back of the dispatch a note to be sent by Mr. Welles to Admiral Lee, in which, without paying any attention whatever to the style of Mr. Stephens's application, he went directly to the heart of the matter. This draft of an order ran:

You will not permit Mr. Stephens to proceed to Washington or to pass the blockade. He does not make known the subjects to which the communication in writing from Mr. Davis relates, which he bears and seeks to deliver in person to the President, and upon which he desires to confer. Those subjects can only be military, or not military, or partly both. Whatever may be military will be readily received if offered through the well understood military channel. Of course nothing else will be received by the President when offered, as in this case, in terms assuming the independence of the so-called Confederate States, and anything will be received and carefully considered by him when offered by any influential person, or persons, in terms not assuming the independence of the so-called Confederate States.¹

This note he afterwards evidently considered as entering too much into detail, and he there-

fore caused the Secretary of the Navy to send this brief reply to Admiral Lee:

The request of A. H. Stephens is inadmissible. The customary agents and channels are adequate for all needful communication and conferences between the United States forces and the insurgents.

Mr. Stephens, when he came afterwards to relate the history of this abortive mission,² frankly admitted that his ulterior purpose was not so much to act upon Mr. Lincoln and the then ruling authorities at Washington as through them, when the correspondence should be published, upon the great mass of the people in the Northern States, who were becoming, he thought, so sensitively alive to the great danger of their own liberties. He wanted, he said, "to deeply impress the growing constitutional party at the North with a full realization of the true nature and ultimate tendencies of the war"; to show them "that the surest way to maintain their liberties was to allow us the separate enjoyment of ours."

Though this hope was baffled by the rebuff which Mr. Stephens received at Fort Monroe, which prevented him from laying before his sympathizing friends of the North his view of their endangered liberties and the best means of preserving them, it may be doubted whether the partisans of peace at the North lost anything by this incident. Certainly, throughout the whole summer of 1863, they fought their losing battle with a courage and a determination equal to that which their sympathizers were displaying in the South. But the very energy and malice with which they carried on the contest roused the loyal people of the North to still greater efforts and increased the dimensions of their ultimate triumph. The election in New Hampshire, the first which took place in the spring of 1863, while it brought victory to the Republicans, still gave painful evidence of the bitter hostility of the Democratic party to the prosecution of the war. Senator Daniel Clark, writing to Mr. Lincoln,³ said:

Scarcely a Democrat supported the Administration. Almost every one who had heretofore avowed himself for the Union and the country turned in for peace and party. Yet we have beaten them. They have retired from the field. The two houses in convention will choose a Republican governor, and Frank Pierce in retirement will not have beaten Abraham Lincoln in office.

There were after this, during the summer and early autumn, moments of depression and discouragement in which it seemed that the malignant energy displayed by the opposition

¹ Lincoln, autograph MS.

² Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., p. 561.

³ March 13. MS.

could not be without disastrous effect, and as the day of election drew near in the "October States" both sides felt justified in renewing their utmost efforts. In Pennsylvania the contest presented features of special interest. Andrew G. Curtin,¹ who, as governor of the State, had given not only efficient but enthusiastic support to the war, was opposed by Judge George W. Woodward, who, as one of the Democratic justices of the Supreme Court of the State, had just aimed a blow at the prosecution of the war which would have been fatal if followed up and sustained by other courts. He had declared the enrollment law unconstitutional, and upon the record thus made had been nominated for governor. The friends of Mr. Curtin relied on the war spirit to carry their candidate through, and towards the close of the campaign they claimed, most unjudiciously, that General McClellan, whose popularity was still great among the Democrats of Pennsylvania, was in favor of the election of Curtin, with whom he had always sustained friendly personal relations. Just on the eve of election this matter came to the attention of McClellan. Desiring to keep his political standing with his party intact, he sought an interview with Judge Woodward and published a letter declaring that, "having had a full conversation with the judge, he found that their views agreed, and that he regarded his election as governor of Pennsylvania called for by the interests of the nation."² But even this dilatory reënförment of the peace party was not enough to save their canvass; the Republicans of the State were as thoroughly alive to the emergency as their opponents, and the vote polled was greater by many thousands than had ever been cast before. Governor Curtin was reëlected by a majority of over fifteen thousand, and Chief-Justice Lowrie, who with Woodward had aimed from the bench the most mischievous blow ever dealt at the enrollment bill, was defeated for reëlection by Daniel Agnew, and the court, thus reconstituted, reversed its previous judgment.

In Ohio the contest was marked with equal bitterness and enthusiasm. The Democrats, working against hope, but with undaunted persistency for their banished candidate, Vallandigham, were buried under the portentous

majority of one hundred thousand votes. This overwhelming triumph of the Union party in the October States made success certain in the general election of the next month. The tide had turned, and the current now swept steadily onward in one way. The great State of New York, which had been shaken to its center by the frightful crimes and excitement incident to the draft riots, now witnessed a great popular political reaction; and reversing the majority of ten thousand given to Seymour in 1862, the Republican State ticket was elected by thirty thousand, and the legislature also passed into the hands of the Unionists. The success of the year which was dearest to the heart of the President was that attained in Maryland. The second passage of rebel armies over her territory seemed at last to have purged the secession sentiment from that State, and four Unionists out of her five districts were elected to Congress, and an emancipation State ticket was carried by twenty thousand majority.

Throughout the West the Union sentiment asserted itself with irresistible strength. An attempt marked with singular boldness and energy had been made during the year by the leaders of the peace party to gain control of the great States of the North-west, which for a time seemed to them so promising that the rebel emissaries in Canada, being informed of it, gave encouragement to their principals in Richmond to hope for the formation of a North-western Confederacy in opposition to the National Government. Meetings were continually held, secret societies were everywhere active, and every effort was made in public and in private to form a basis of organized hostility against the Government. The culmination of this important and dangerous movement may be regarded as having taken place at Springfield, Illinois, on the 17th of June. A great mass meeting, enormous in numbers and wild with enthusiasm, under the presidency of Senator Richardson, listened during all a summer's day to the most furious and vehement oratory, and at last passed resolutions demanding nothing less than submission to the South. They resolved "that a further offensive prosecution of this war tends to subvert the Constitution and the Government, and entails upon this nation all the disastrous conse-

¹ To show how the political emergency overcame the most inveterate personal hostilities, we give a characteristic letter which Simon Cameron wrote to Lincoln September 18, 1863. He said that Curtin would be reëlected, and that all his friends would support him, but that "if the result were to operate simply on his own private fortunes, there are many good Republicans and pious Christians who would see him in — first. He will cheat us when it is over, and, if he can, sell us to our enemies. But he is now, by one of those accidents which sometimes control great events, the rep-

resentative of the loyalty of this State, and his defeat might be disastrous to the country. My heart is too much engaged in the struggle for ending the rebellion to allow me to hesitate at even the support of Mr. Curtin."

² This letter of McClellan was a severe disappointment to Curtin, who had regarded him as his friend. A friend (now Sir John Puleston, M. P.) who was with him when the newspaper containing McClellan's letter was received said, "'Et tu, Brute!' was not a circumstance to it." [J. H., Diary.]

quences of misrule and anarchy"; that they were "in favor of peace upon a basis of restoration of the Union"; for the accomplishment of which they proposed "a national convention to settle upon terms of peace, which should have in view the restoration of the Union as it was, and the securing by constitutional amendment of such rights of the several States and people thereof as honor and justice demand."

This bold challenge was accepted by the Republicans with equal determination and superior means. The guns of Vicksburg and of Gettysburg might have been regarded as sufficient answer to the resolutions of the Springfield mass meeting, but the Copperheads¹ of that State only clamored the louder for peace after these great victories, and the political canvass went on with tenfold vehemence in the tacit truce of arms that followed the battles of July. The Republicans prepared for the beginning of September the greatest mass meeting of the campaign; and to give especial significance to the occasion, it was to take place at the home of Lincoln, on the very spot where defiant treason had trumpeted to the world its challenge in June.

It was the ardent wish of the Illinois Republicans that Mr. Lincoln might be with them on this important day. Mr. James C. Conkling, chairman of the committee of arrangements, wrote urging him to come in person.

There is a bad element [he said] in this State, as well as others, and every public demonstration in favor of law and order and constitutional government will have a favorable influence. The importance of our meeting, therefore, at the capital of a State which has sent so many soldiers into the army, and which exercises such a controlling power in the West, cannot be overestimated.²

For a moment the President cherished the hope of going to Springfield and once more in his life renewing the sensation, so dear to politicians, of personal contact with great and enthusiastic masses, and of making one more speech to shouting thousands of his fellow-citizens. The temptation, however, only lasted for a moment, and instead of going he wrote a letter which was read amid the hushed attention of an immense auditory, and passed in a moment into the small number of American political classics. The meeting was an enormous one in numbers and in hot, tumultuous feeling; it was addressed by the greatest orators of the Republican party; speaking went on

continuously at many stands from morning until twilight. The speeches were marked by the most advanced and unflinching Republican doctrine; the proclamation of emancipation, the arming of negroes, received universal adhesion, and of course every reference to Mr. Lincoln's name was received with thunders of applause; but with all these features of the highest interest and importance, the meeting can only live in the memories of men as the occasion of the letter which Mr. Lincoln wrote to its chairman:

Your letter, inviting me to attend a mass meeting of unconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois on the 3d day of September, has been received. It would be very agreeable to me to thus meet my old friends at my own home, but I cannot just now be absent from here so long as a visit there would require.

The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to the Union, and I am sure my old political friends will thank me for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble men whom no partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the nation's life.

There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways. First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is to give up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If you are, you should say so plainly. If you are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise.

I do not believe any compromise embracing the maintenance of the Union is now possible. All I learn leads to a directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military—its army. That army dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Any offer of terms made by any man or men within that range, in opposition to that army, is simply nothing for the present, because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise if one were made with them.

To illustrate: Suppose refugees from the South and peace-men of the North get together in convention and frame and proclaim a compromise embracing a restoration of the Union; in what way can that compromise be used to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and I think can ultimately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which the controllers of Lee's army are not agreed can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we should waste time which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage, and that would be all.

¹ The "peace Democrats" of the North were variously nicknamed "Butternuts" and "Copperheads." The former name referred to the domestic dye which gave color to the uniforms of the Confederate soldiers, and the latter was the name of the most venomous snake in the West. In each case the nickname was assumed and borne with bravado by the younger

Democrats, who in some instances wore butternuts as breastpins, and in others, with a clever return upon their opponents, cut the copper head of the Goddess of Liberty from the old-fashioned red cent and bore it as their cognizance.

² Conkling to Lincoln, Aug. 21. MS.

A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who control the rebel army, or with the people first liberated from the domination of that army by the successes of our own army. Now, allow me to assure you that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or from any of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to my knowledge or belief. All charges and insinuations to the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept a secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself the servant of the people according to the bond of service,—the United States Constitution,—and that as such I am responsible to them.

But, to be plain, you are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself upon that subject. I certainly wish all men could be free, while I suppose you do not. Yet I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is not consistent with even your view, provided you are for the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I had not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation to save the Union exclusively by other means.

You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of war in time of war. The most that can be said—if so much—is that slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it, and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes and non-combatants, male and female.

But the proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid it needs no retraction. If it is valid it cannot be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to think its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after the retraction than before the issue? There was more than a year and a half of trial to suppress the rebellion before the proclamation issued, the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice that it was coming, unless averted by those in revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the issue of the proclamation as before.

I know, as fully as one can know the opinion of others, that some of the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most important successes, believe the emancipation policy and the use of the colored troops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion, and that at least one of these important successes could not have been achieved when it was but for the aid of black

soldiers. Among the commanders holding these views are some who have never had any affinity with what is called "Abolitionism" or with "Republican party politics," but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit these opinions as being entitled to some weight against the objections often urged that emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith.

You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you—but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare you will not fight to free negroes. I thought that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept.

The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great North-west for it. Nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a hand. On the spot, their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great national one, and let none be banned who bore an honorable part in it. And while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that anything has been more bravely and well done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro', Gettysburg, and on many fields of lesser note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they have been present. Not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou; and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all. For the great Republic—for the principle it lives by and keeps alive—for man's vast future—thanks to all.

Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and come to stay; and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then have been proved that among free men there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And there will be some black men who can remember that with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet they have helped mankind on to this great consummation; while I fear there will be some white ones unable to forget that with malignant heart and deceitful speech they strove to hinder it.

Still let us not be over sanguine of a speedy, final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently

apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in His own good time, will give us the rightful result.¹

Among all the state papers of Mr. Lincoln from his nomination to his death this letter is unique. It may be called his last stump speech, the only one made during his Presidency. We find in it all the qualities that made him in Illinois the incomparable political leader of his party for a generation. There is the same close, unerring logic, the same innate perception of political conduct, the same wit and sarcasm, the same touch of picturesque eloquence, which abounded in his earlier and more careless oratory, but all wonderfully heightened, strengthened, and chastened by a sense of immense responsibility. In this letter, which the chairman took only ten minutes to read, he said more than all the orators at all the stands. It was, like most of his speeches, addressed principally to his opponents, and in this short space he appealed successively to their reason, to their sympathies, and to their fears. By a succession of unanswerable syllogisms he showed them how untenable was their position. He appealed to their generosity, to their sense of duty, to their patriotism, even to their love of glory, and in the end he held out to them with dignified austerity the prospect of shame and self-reproach which lay before them if they continued their hostility to the sacred cause of humanity and nationality. The style of this letter is as remarkable as its matter; each sentence, like a trained athlete, is divested of every superfluous word and syllable, yet nowhere is there a word lacking, any more than a word too much. Modest as he was, he knew the value of his own work, and when a friend called to ask him if he was going to Springfield he replied, "No, I shall send them a letter instead; and it will be a rather good letter."²

The Springfield convention, taking up the gauntlet thrown down by the disloyal massmeeting of June, resolved "that we will lay aside all party questions and forget all party prejudices and devote ourselves unreservedly to the

support of our Government, until the rebellion shall be finally and forever crushed": they resolved that "whatever else may die, the Union shall live to perpetuate civil liberty; whatever else may perish, the Government shall survive in all its constitutional integrity; whatever else may be destroyed, the nation shall be preserved in its territorial unity; and to this end we pledge anew our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor."³

In this spirit the campaign was fought through to its victorious close, and on the night of the 3d of November the President, sitting in the War Department, had the pleasure of learning from all the clicking wires about him that the cause of nationality and freedom was triumphant from one end of the Union to the other; that the people had come up fully abreast of him on the question of emancipation, and that the nation was now substantially united in the resolute purpose to prosecute the war to its legitimate conclusion. These victories at the polls made sure the good results of this summer of battles; the Administration felt itself confirmed anew and strengthened for the work before it. To those members of the Administration who had formerly acted with the Democratic party there was a certain sense of humiliation and disappointment. Mr. Stanton said, "The disheartening thing in the affair was that there seemed to be no patriotic principle left in the Democratic party, the whole organization voting solidly against the country."⁴ Mr. Seward, on the contrary, came back from Auburn, where he had gone home to vote, in the highest spirits. He considered the political attitude of New York absolutely safe in the present and future. He thought "the crowd that follows power had come over to the Republicans; the Democrats had lost their leaders when Toombs and Davis and Breckinridge forsook them and went South; the inferior Northern Democrats who succeeded to the leadership had proved their incompetency; the best and most energetic portion of the rank and file of the party were now voting shoulder to shoulder with the Republicans."⁵

proceeding in relation to it was due to truth and to your own character, shamefully assailed as it has been. The development is an imperishable monument of wisdom and virtue." After discussing the question of emancipation, he continued: "I write under the impression that the victory of the United States in this war is inevitable; compromise is impossible. Peace on any other basis would be the establishment of two nations, each hating the other, both military, both necessarily warlike, their territories interlocked with a tendency of never-ceasing hostility. Can we leave to posterity a more cruel inheritance, or one more hopeless of happiness and prosperity?" Mr. Lincoln answered this letter in a tone expressive of his reverence for the age and illustrious character of the writer.

³ "History of Sangamon County," p. 315.

⁴ J. H., Diary, Nov. 3, MS.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 8, MS.

¹ Lincoln to James C. Conkling, Aug. 26, 1863.
² Nothing he ever uttered had a more instantaneous success. Mr. Sumner immediately wrote to him: "Thanks for your true and noble letter. It is a historical document. The case is admirably stated, so that all but the wicked must confess its force. It cannot be answered." Henry Wilson wrote him: "God Almighty bless you for your noble, patriotic, and Christian letter. It will be on the lips and in the hearts of hundreds of thousands this day." Among the letters which the President most appreciated was one from the venerable Josiah Quincy, then ninety-one years of age, who wrote: "Old age has its privileges, which I hope this letter will not exceed; but I cannot refrain from expressing to you my gratification and my gratitude for your letter to the Illinois convention—happy, timely, conclusive, and effective. What you say concerning emancipation, your proclamation, and your course of

No party," he said, "can survive an opposition to a war. The Revolutionary heroes were political oracles till 1812, and afterwards the 'soldiers of the late war' succeeded to their honors. But we are hereafter a nation of soldiers. These people will be trying to forget years hence that they ever opposed this war. I had to carry affidavits to prove I had nothing to do with the Hartford Convention. Now the party that gained eminence by the folly of the Federalists in opposing the war have the chalice commended to their own lips. I told the Democratic leaders," he said, with his habitual subacid good nature, "how they might have saved themselves and carried the next Presidential election, by being more loyal and earnest in support of the Administration than the Republican party. The Lord knows that would not have been hard."

Although in this memorable contest the Republicans presented a united front to the common enemy, within their own organization there were those bitter differences of opinion which always arise among men of strong convictions. The President's anteroom was thronged with earnest men who desired to warn him in person against the machinations of other men equally earnest, and his mail was encumbered by letters from every part of the country, and every shade of faction, filled with similar denunciations and warnings. The pure and able Senator Dixon of Connecticut wrote: "The heresies of Sumner are doing immense harm in a variety of ways. If his doctrine prevails, this country will be ruined. I do hope you and Mr. Seward will stand firm." From the other wing of the party came the most passionate denunciations of Seward and those who were associated with him in the popular mind; and after the election Senator Chandler of Michigan, one of the most powerful of the Republicans who had by this time assumed to themselves the title of Radicals, having seen in the newspapers a paragraph that Mr. Thurlow Weed and Governor Morgan had been in consultation with the President in regard to his message, wrote a vehement letter to the President, telling him there was a "patriotic organization in all the free and border States, containing over one million voters, every man of whom is your friend upon the Radical measures of your Administration; but there is not a Seward, Weed, or Blair man among them. How are these men," he asked, "to be of service to you in any way? They are a millstone about your neck. You drop them and they are politically ended forever. Conservatives and traitors are buried together. For God's sake do not exhume their remains in your message. They will smell

worse than Lazarus after he had been buried three days."¹ There was no man slower than Mr. Lincoln to take personal offense at even the most indiscreet advice or censure; but he answered this letter of Mr. Chandler in a tone of unusual dignity and severity. "I have seen," he said, "Governor Morgan and Thurlow Weed separately, but not together, within the last ten days; but neither of them mentioned the forthcoming message, or said anything, so far as I can remember, which brought the thought of the message to my mind. I am very glad the elections this autumn have gone favorably and that I have not by native depravity, or under evil influences, done anything bad enough to prevent the good result. I hope to 'stand firm' enough to not go backward, and yet not go forward fast enough to wreck the country's cause."²

In the month of October Mr. Hood, the postmaster at Chattanooga, wrote to the President a letter setting forth the particulars of a scheme which Emerson Etheridge, Clerk of the House of Representatives, had entered into to give control of the next House to the opposition. Etheridge was a member of Congress from Tennessee before the war, and his sincere attachment to the Union in the face of much obloquy and persecution at home had endeared him to the Republicans in Congress and caused him to be given the post of Clerk of the House; but in the course of two years of war he had become separated from his former political affiliations and now sympathized with the opposition. Mr. Hood, who wrote apparently with great regret as a personal friend of Etheridge, claimed to have become aware of Etheridge's intention to leave off the rolls of the House the names of all members whose certificates did not bear on their face the statement that they had been elected "according to the laws of the State or of the United States." He based this action upon the provisions of a law which had been hurriedly passed during the last day of the Thirty-seventh Congress. At the same time it was understood that he had intimated to the Democratic members what his action would be, so as to allow them to provide themselves with certificates in the form required. The President, on the receipt of this news, put himself confidentially in communication with leading Republicans in all the loyal States, requesting them, without publicity, to have prepared duplicate certificates meeting the objection which it was thought that Etheridge would raise to the ordinary ones. This was in most cases attended to, but not in all, so that when the members began to arrive in Washington a few days before the day fixed for the opening of Congress, a general impression of the contemplated action of Etheridge

¹ Chandler to Lincoln, Nov. 15, 1863. MS.

² Lincoln to Chandler, Nov. 20, 1863. MS.

had transpired and there was some uneasiness in regard to the issue. The President had done what he could to meet the legal requirements of the case; but, that having been done, he was not inclined to rely exclusively upon moral force. In view of the threatened outrage he sent for some of the leading members of Congress and told them the main thing was to be sure that all the Union members should be present. "Then," he said, "if Mr. Etheridge undertakes revolutionary proceedings, let him be carried out on a chip, and let our men organize the House."¹ This practical solution of the trouble had occurred to others, and the Rev. Owen Lovejoy, disregarding for a moment the etiquette of his sacred calling, announced that he was quite ready himself to take charge of Etheridge, and was confident of his muscular superiority to the Tennessean.

There was not so much uncertainty in regard to the issue as to prevent an animated contest among the Republicans for the caucus nomination for the speakership. The prominent candidates were Mr. Schuyler Colfax of Indiana and Mr. Elihu B. Washburne of Illinois. Mr. Cox of Ohio was the principal candidate for the barren honor of the caucus nomination among the Democrats; though for some time before the meeting of Congress there was a good deal of not very practical talk in regard to the nomination of General Frank P. Blair of Missouri as a compromise candidate to be supported by the Democrats and by a few of the so-called Conservative Republicans. General Blair, while one of the earliest and ablest Republicans of the border States, one who had distinguished himself equally in politics and in the field in the cause of freedom and of progress, had, through the vehemence of the factional fight which had so long been raging in Missouri, been gradually forced, partly by the denunciations of his enemies, and partly by his own combative instincts, into an attitude almost of hostility to the Republican party of the nation. Mr. Lincoln saw this with great regret. He had a high personal regard for Blair, and deplored the predicament into which his passionate temper and the assaults of his enemies were gradually crowding him. In the autumn of 1863 the Postmaster-General, in conversation with the President, said that his brother Frank would be guided by the President's wishes as to whether he should continue with his command in the field or take the seat in Congress to which he had been elected from Missouri. The President answered in a letter, dated 2d of November, saying:

Some days ago I understood you to say that your brother, General Frank Blair, desired to be guided by my wishes as to whether he will occupy his seat

in Congress or remain in the field. My wish, then, is compounded of what I believe will be best for the country and best for him; and it is that he will come here, put his military commission in my hands, take his seat, go into caucus with our friends, abide the nominations, help elect the nominees, and thus aid to organize a House of Representatives which will really support the Government in the war. If the result shall be the election of himself as Speaker, let him serve in that position. If not, let him retake his commission and return to the army. For the country this will heal a dangerous schism; for him it will relieve from a dangerous position. By a misunderstanding, as I think, he is in danger of being permanently separated from those with whom only he can ever have a real sympathy—the sincere opponents of slavery. It will be a mistake if he shall allow the provocations offered him by insincere time-servers to drive him from the house of his own building. He is young yet. He has abundant talent—quite enough to occupy all his time without devoting any to temper. He is rising in military skill and usefulness. His recent appointment to the command of a corps, by one so competent to judge as General Sherman, proves this. In that line he can serve both the country and himself more profitably than he could as a member of Congress upon the floor. The foregoing is what I would say if Frank Blair were my brother instead of yours.²

In pursuance of this letter Blair came to Washington, though before Congress assembled his candidacy for the speakership had passed out of sight. He took his seat, served for some months, and went back to the army in command of a corps, as the President had promised. This relinquishment of and restoration to a high command in the army occasioned much feeling and a violent attack upon the President on the part of the Radical Republicans, which continued even after he had submitted in a message to Congress the entire correspondence, which reflected nothing but credit upon all parties.

The canvass for Speaker closed on Saturday night, the 5th of December, Washburne withdrawing from the field, and Colfax being nominated by acclamation. All the next day there was great excitement at the hotels frequented by politicians in regard to Etheridge's proposed course of action, which was now no longer a secret to any one. The comments he everywhere heard upon his conduct had its effect upon his nerves, and he began to talk in a complaining and apologetic tone, saying he was simply obeying the law and there was no reason why Republicans should regard him vindictively. The next day, when the House opened, while he did not flinch from the position he had occupied, he did nothing arbitrary or revolutionary. He left off the roll the names of all those members whose certificates were not, in his opinion, in due form, but readily

¹ J. G. N., MS. Memoranda.

² MS.

entertained a motion to restore them. This met with a hot protest from some of the pro-slavery members, but a vote was taken showing a majority of twenty for the Government. Mr. Washburne nominated Mr. Colfax, and he was elected by the same majority in a total vote of 181, the Democratic vote being scattered among many members, Mr. Cox receiving more than any other.

As soon as Congress came together Mr. Fernando Wood renewed his furtive overtures with the Government for the appointment of peace commissioners from what he called his wing of the Democratic party, making no secret of his belief that he himself was the most appropriate choice which could be made for such a function. He urged the President to publish some sort of amnesty for the Northern sympathizers with the rebellion which would include Mr. Vallandigham and permit him to return to the country. He promised that in that case there should be two Democratic candidates in the field at the next Presidential election. The President declined his proposition, but he would not take no for an answer. He called again on the morning of the 14th of December and the President refused to see him, merely sending word by a servant that he had nothing further to say to him.¹ Later in the day Mr. Wood offered, in the House of Representatives, a resolution "that the President be requested to appoint three commissioners, who shall be empowered to open negotiations with the authorities at

¹ J. G. N.. MS. Memoranda.

Richmond to the end that this bloody, destructive, and inhuman war shall cease, and the Union be restored upon terms of equity, fraternity, and equality under the Constitution." This resolution was laid upon the table by a party vote, and Mr. Green Clay Smith of Kentucky offered resolutions opposing "any armistice, or intervention, or mediation, or proposition for peace from any quarter so long as there shall be found a rebel in arms against the Government; and we ignore," the resolutions continued, "all party names, lines, and issues, and recognize but two parties in this war—patriots and traitors." Second: "That we hold it to be the duty of Congress to pass all necessary bills to supply men and money, and the duty of the people to render every aid in their power to the constituted authorities of the Government in the crushing out of the rebellion and in bringing the leaders thereof to condign punishment." The third resolution tendered the thanks of Congress to the soldiers in the field. The first resolution was passed by a party vote of ninety-three to sixty-five; the second and third were passed unanimously, with the exception of Mr. B. G. Harris of Maryland. Several times during the session this battle of resolutions was renewed, but always with the same result; the Democratic party constantly favoring negotiations for peace while as constantly declaring their devotion to the Union, and the Republicans repudiating every suggestion of negotiation or compromise so long as the enemies of the Republic bore arms against it.

THE WESTERN SOLDIER.



WHEN General Sherman said to General Grant, "Your belief in victory I can compare to nothing but the faith of the Christian in the Saviour," he specified

one of the leading characteristics of the typical Western soldier. At no time, from Sumter to Appomattox, did that devoted servant of the demands of courage and fortitude doubt the success of the Union cause. It was a part of his temperament, of his philosophy, to look for triumph. Not that he was simply a good-humored optimist, unregardful of adverse conditions, nor yet a victim of blind superstition, political or theological, but that heredity and experience had equipped him with a sense of confidence in himself, in his country, and in the force called fortune that was alike heroic

and logical. He came of a stock that had conquered the frontier wilderness through a long and hard discipline of toil, vigilance, and sacrifice, and in so doing had exalted self-reliance as the first of virtues. His idea of duty had its root in a deep growth of previous endurance, which was also a present possession of honor and practical advantage. The past appealed to him at a short distance and in voices that were personally familiar; the Union meant to him a tangible daily blessing, purchased for him by the direct efforts of his father and grandfather in the founding of new States; and he scorned to think for a moment that he could not repeat such service with similar results upon the field of battle.

In the beginning, to be sure, he misjudged the proportions of the undertaking; but when the whole truth was made plain to him it only served to emphasize his loyalty and confirm

his purpose of success. He reenlisted for three years as readily as he had enlisted for three months. It did not occur to him that he could do otherwise. The only thing that caused him thought was the question of adjusting his home affairs to a longer absence. He had kissed his mother, or wife, or sweetheart good-bye expecting to return in time to cultivate his corn-crop and exchange work with his neighbors as usual during the wheat harvest. Now he must send back word that unforeseen circumstances delayed him, and that they would have to get along somehow without him. If the farm could be rented on shares, or managed with hired labor, and if his creditors would wait for their money until the next pay-day, he would be content. The war might last the whole three years, though he hardly thought it could; but it would end all right — that he knew; and he must see it through, of course. Thus he talked and wrote — not in a lofty and star-spangled style, but calmly, simply, manfully. And in that mood he went forward, prepared for any test, equal to every emergency. It was his way. He wore a blue uniform that never fitted him, and followed a flag instead of a plow; but he did not stop to consider what the change implied from a sentimental point of view. Perhaps it was because he did not care.

In short, the qualities of faith, of resolution, and of self-control which distinguished General Grant were peculiar also to the potential battalions of the West that he commanded. His calculations and their capabilities were in perfect accord. That was first conclusively demonstrated at Fort Donelson, where the first substantial Union victory was achieved, and where the South first began to rectify its disparaging notions of Northern pluck and steadfastness. It is from Fort Donelson, in reality, that the story of the war properly dates. The prior fighting had all been desultory, experimental, and ineffective; but there a blow was struck that had vital significance. It was no longer to be fancied that the military instinct was a sectional monopoly, and that the Union could be saved only by sending five men against one. The big-fisted, hairy-breasted Westerners had not yet learned to keep step with tactical precision, nor to handle their weapons in an entirely graceful fashion; but they went where they were ordered, and they knew how to "get the bulge," as they called it. On the other hand, it was evident that the boasted knight-hood of the enemy was not merely "dubbed with unhacked rapier and on carpet consideration," but had a solid basis of determination and intrepidity. These were the thoughts of the soldiers of the two armies as they fraternized, after the surrender, in the cabins on that bleak and memorable hilltop.

They had not known each other before; henceforth they would meet with a better understanding. "You-all 'll git licked next time," the Confederates insisted; and the Federals smiled, and said, "Not much, Mary Ann."

When they came together again at Shiloh, where there were no fortifications to divide them, and where Thermopylæ was repeated a dozen times over, they learned a like lesson of mutual respect for bravery that never flinched, and enterprise that never wearied. The same is to be said as to Corinth, Perryville, and Stone's River. It was through these severe experiences that the soldiers of the West, contending with foemen worthy of their steel, became thoroughly inured to the hardship and peril of their new vocation. At the opening of the third year of the war they were veterans. They moved invincibly upon Vicksburg, and made its capture their celebration of the Fourth of July. Then ensued the startling tragedy of Chickamauga, relieved from utter mortification only by the tenacious and splendid valor of George H. Thomas. After Chickamauga — what? That was the query that the soldiers discussed with eager interest around the camp-fires in Tennessee and Mississippi. The general belief among them was that Grant would be selected to retrieve the disaster, and so they were not surprised when he was sent to Chattanooga. They wondered, however, why such a step was not sooner taken, and why Rosecrans was left beleaguered for a whole month when there were so many troops doing indifferent service elsewhere. Some of them contended, moreover, that if Grant had been ordered to join and supersede Rosecrans immediately after the fall of Vicksburg the Chickamauga calamity would have been prevented.

The men in the ranks were much given to speculations of this kind. They could not know what unseen complications their commanders had to deal with, nor what sinister influences sometimes frustrated the best-laid plans; and so they were privileged to esteem their personal opinions as highly as they pleased. That was one of the advantages of being a private. Curiously enough, they often anticipated important events as accurately as if they had been advised of the carefully concealed moving causes, which goes to show — does it not? — that there is a certain degree of reciprocity between military science and unscientific common sense. They had views concerning the relative merits of the different generals too, derived from close observation, and not always incorrect, by any means. Their prime favorite at all times was Grant. Their feeling towards him was not exactly one of affection, but rather one of implicit trust, which was better than

affection, in the sense that reason is preferable to emotion. He never made speeches to them, and never solicited their admiration in any form of parade; but the humblest of them could always reach him with their petitions, and he had a quiet way of simplifying things that was very pleasing. Sherman had their approbation, with a difference. He was "bully," they would say, but over-demonstrative. Thomas they honored profoundly. Halleck impressed them as a man who thought the war was being prosecuted for the sole purpose of giving lessons in strategy. McPherson delighted them; and so did Logan, after they found him out; and Blair and Dodge. They would have liked Sheridan more if he had been less severe.

They assumed a right of criticism towards their regimental and company officers that was almost as free as that exercised by the average voter with regard to political officials. In some instances they did injustice, no doubt; but, generally speaking, their estimates were sagacious and proper. They had no patience with pretense of any description, and they were quick to detect it. Thus, if a colonel invested his headquarters with unnecessary pomp and formality, as a colonel was occasionally known to do, they would nudge one another in passing and exchange looks and comments that rarely failed to produce a change. On one occasion a lieutenant-colonel, riding out to battle, forfeited the esteem of his regiment by holding a picture of his wife in his hand and gazing fixedly upon it; but he afterwards restored himself to favor by a daring act that cost him two ugly wounds. Another officer of the same rank, on a toilsome march, gained a cheer by alighting from his horse and giving his place in the saddle to a limping soldier; but when the major at his side did the same thing there was no response. The first had performed a kindness without prompting, while the second was a mere imitator. It was by such distinctions that officers were notified of the sharp watch that was being kept upon them, and admonished that they were mortal as well as those who wore no shoulder-straps. Now and then the instruction took a more amusing turn, as when a captain, noted for his conceit, undertook to lecture his company upon the necessity of increased respect for officers, and was checked by a droll fellow who said, with a grin and an extravagant salute, "Cap., I used to know you when you made harness."

At first the idea prevailed that the best men for officers were those who had figured as marshals in civic processions, or as captains in wolf-hunts, or as leaders in the sham warfare of the militia; but, as a rule, such selections proved to be disappointing. The most satisfactory officers were those who had won esteem

in private life as intelligent and successful business men. It was ascertained early in the war that one might be very brave and adventurous and yet not be the right kind of man to hold a commission, there were so many other duties for him to fulfill besides that of waving his sword in the bloody vicissitudes of battle. The constant care and active perseverance required to insure comfort, to maintain discipline, and to promote efficiency were quite as important as obligations of a more shining order. It was not an easy task to adapt the Western soldier to those rigid but indispensable rules which often seemed to be only arbitrary devices for trying his patience and subduing his energy. He could not see for a long time what so much drilling had to do with putting down the rebellion, or how the Union was being saved by compelling him to observe a given neatness in his apparel and to do his eating and sleeping according to an invariable time-table. But experience gradually enlightened him in this respect, and towards the last he came to be quite proud of his martial education, though he never forgot how irksome and provoking the process of learning had been. When the war was almost ended, one was heard to say on being aroused from a comfortable snooze, "The first thing I'm goin' to do after I git home is to hire a man to come and beat the reveille under my window every morning for a month, so I can poke my head out and tell him to go — to — thunder."

There were some officers who, like their men, were restive under the restraint and routine which necessity imposed upon them. They were unable, in particular, to appreciate the value of the minute records they had to keep, and the many reports they had to make; they had not enlisted, they would protest, for service of that mild and sedentary character. One of them went so far at one time as to refuse flatly to prepare an additional copy of one of his returns. "I've furnished a duplicate and a triplicate and a quadruplicate," he declared, "and I won't send any more — not another d—uplicate." He changed his mind, however, when ordered under arrest. "I s'pose I'll have to do it," he grimly observed, "or the war can't go on." Many a company commander squared his tangled accounts and preserved his reputation by placing "lost in action" opposite the list of articles for which he had no vouchers. The deception did not signify that the property had been misappropriated, but only that the bookkeeping was irregular. Those who made money dishonestly during the war were others than soldiers. The men who did the fighting did not do the stealing. In all history, it may truly be said, there was never another army that had so many opportunities for plunder and yet

pursued its way with so much integrity. There was devastation where it marched, but solely because war at best exacts devastation as a penalty. At times more Federal troops were employed in protecting the property of the Southern people than in carrying on the work of fighting the Southern army. That was a mistake, as experience proved, and it was abandoned after a while; but it had its origin in principle, and illustrated a point of character.

The Western soldier watched eagerly for pay-day, however. He was not in the service on account of the wages, but nevertheless he wanted his money when it was due. That was one of the links that connected him with home, with family, with happiness. He liked to fold up the crisp new bills and put them in a letter to the woman who wrote him so cheerfully about herself and the children, in spite of the constant lump in her throat, and the burden of suspense that made even her dreams a source of agony. It was his habit to think a great deal more about those whom he had left behind him than about those with whom he was in daily association, or about himself and his adventures. If he happened to be in the rear, he was curious to know what was going on at the front; and the approach of a battle, with its hidden possibilities of gain or loss, absorbed his attention for the time. But it was news from home that had the largest place in his mind; and often a very little matter thus related would stir him deeply — as when he would read on the margin of his wife's last letter a babyish scrawl saying, "Dear papa, come back as soon as you can to me and mamma." That had coaxed a smile from mamma, he knew; ah, yes, and afterwards she had gone off by herself to cry, poor, dear woman! Then he would wish that the bugles might blow, or the drums beat, or the guns crack on the picket line. He was a soldier "for three years or during the war," and he must not let himself grow homesick. Some, alas, did fall victims to that insidious and pathetic influence. They had no disease that the doctors could discover, and yet they died — died of the *maladie du pays*.

These examples of death produced by morbid longing might easily have been more numerous if the soldiers as a class had not been blessed with that indefatigable sense of humor which a modern philosopher has declared to be the next best thing to an abiding faith in Providence. They insisted upon seeing the comic side of their toils and misfortunes, and were even able sometimes to invent a ludicrous side when in reality none existed. If melancholy sought to enter a camp it was apt to be halted and turned back by a dry joke from the first sentinel it encountered. There was grumbling in plenty, and it did not always stop short of profanity; but the

profanity was usually of that robust and peculiar quality which Emerson guarantees to have a "fructifying" effect. There was always room left for a laugh, if indeed the oath did not prepare the way for the laugh. The chaplains strove diligently for a season to correct this undevout tendency; but in course of time they practically gave it up, on the hypothesis, it may be assumed, that it was better to tolerate a certain kind of profanity than to enlarge the sick-list by repressing it. There is some reason to suspect that some of them had an eye to personal success. Those chaplains were most popular who did least preaching, and devoted their time mainly to works which helped to promote the comfort and welfare of the soldiers. Not a few of them thus endeared themselves to the ranks as they could never have done by the best of strictly spiritual service; and occasionally, too, they won admiration by acts of military sense and courage, like that of the one who, being ordered to burn the transportation and supplies that he had charge of in the rear of the Federal lines at the battle of Corinth, said, "No, sir; the boys are not whipped yet," and thus saved what the panic-stricken commander would have foolishly destroyed.

It was lucky for the soldiers of the West that to their gift of humor was added the even more important attribute of large and capable feet; for they had much marching to do, and were thus fitted to do it in a proper manner. They were always glad when an order came for such an experience. It suited them best to be moving; not only because that "looked like business," as they said, but also because it implied change of scene, duty, and diet. If the march lasted only a day, and had nothing but swamp-water and mosquitoes at the end of it, still it was a welcome relief; and when it was prolonged for weeks, and led to a great battle, like the march of Sherman's forces from Memphis to Chattanooga in the autumn of 1863, it became a supreme gratification. That notable expedition afforded the troops a rare chance to look upon the homes of the South in a continuous and leisurely way, and to learn how the war had affected them. The picture was sad enough in some respects; in others it was merely unpleasant; in yet others it was ludicrous. The Western soldier did not allow any of it to surprise him, unless it was the presence of so much chicken and honey where there were so many signs of general distress and decay. That seemed to him anomalous, and he took care to leave no cause for like wonder on the part of anybody who should visit that region after him. As for the rest, it was only what he had expected. It was the logic of things; and that was all there was to be said about it.

To be with the advance guard of the column, or with the roaming scouts and foragers, was to see army life in its most enjoyable aspect. The novelty of it was unending, with just sufficient peril to keep one thoughtful of his cartridges. If the people had entertained a conception of Yankee soldiers as creatures of low-browed ferocity and rapacity, they were speedily undeceived. A better-natured order of invaders never marched into any country. They were disposed to make themselves agreeable, so far as duty permitted, and to effect their "cramping," as they named the procedure by which they obtained necessary supplies, with as little offense as possible. They liked to sit on the doorsteps and chat with the women, and fumble at the toes of the babies, and have the negro urchins dance for them to the juba-patting of a presumptive Uncle Tom. It was very pleasant to them to hear a feminine voice again, if it did drawl its words and cut curious antics of pronunciation. The fact appeared very plainly that the Southern women were true to the cause for which the Southern men were fighting; and their blue-coated visitors really admired their fidelity while dutifully pretending to find it very shocking and lamentable. Their eyes snapped and their cheeks flamed very prettily as they talked of Chickamauga, and ironically pitied the poor Federals whom Bragg had "done got" surrounded at Chattanooga. They could not know—though they must have suspected—that they were then entertaining the very men who were to aid in delivering that beleaguered army, and inflicting a defeat upon Bragg from which he would never recover.

Many of these fair secessionists, with all their haughtiness and vindictiveness, were capable of pleading for the privilege of Rahab to bind scarlet lines in their windows against apprehended dangers. They knew how to be exceedingly polite and flattering when they wanted guards placed about their dwellings or their paltry residue of cows, sheep, and pigs saved from confiscation. Sometimes such negotiations led to episodes of marked romantic interest, in which the soldiers tasted nectar with their bacon and hard-tack, and made vows wholly unauthorized by the army regulations, thus attesting the loyalty of human nature to love in war as in peace. In some instances, too, these performances contained an element of treachery, and furnished prisoners to lurking bands of Confederate cavalry. In other words, it was not safe to assume that because the daughters of the South were willing to incline their ears to Federal love-making, they could not play the wooers false for a military advantage. Their hearts were well under control in that particular. They accepted homage with a reser-

vation of the right to profit by it as they might choose. There should have been some genuine Unionists among them, according to popular report, but on that march of forty days the soldiers came across only one, as they believed. She wore a large pink sun-bonnet and a well-starched white dress, and stood at a wood-pile in a stooping posture, with her back to a party of advancing foragers. The sergeant of the squad stole up behind her, put an arm quickly around her waist, and kissed her. Then he waited to be condemned. But instead of resenting the assault, she lifted a radiant face and said in a soft, appreciative tone, "You 'll find me right yer ev'ry day a-pickin' up chips."

The Federal commanders had cause repeatedly to attribute the failure of their schemes and hopes to the vigilance of the non-combatants of the South, especially the women. It was almost impossible to execute any movement that depended upon the mystification of the enemy. A voluntary and comprehensive system of spying and reporting existed which kept the Confederate authorities so well advised that they could rarely be taken unawares. By common consent those of both sexes who were at home watched continually in every direction for those signs by which the intentions of an army are foreshadowed and the opposite side made acquainted with valuable facts. From the day that a Federal regiment crossed the Ohio River, it was never exempt from this sort of surveillance; and the most innocent-looking old man, or meek-visaged woman, or wondering child was a possible bearer of important secrets to the nearest Confederate headquarters. There was no way to escape such an agency of mischief. The only thing that could be done in that connection was to deal summarily with all spies whose acts were definitely covered by the laws of war. One such, with a pass signed by General Bragg and other convicting documents on his person, was captured, tried by court-martial, and sentenced to be hanged. At the last moment, when sitting upon his coffin, with the gallows directly before him, he was offered an unconditional pardon if he would reveal the whereabouts of a certain prominent character under whose orders he had been immediately acting. He drew himself up, his hands tied behind him,—he was a slight, boyish, handsome fellow,—and answered scornfully, "Would *you* betray a friend? I'd rather die a thousand deaths!" That was as much as he cared to say. With a quick but firm step he ascended the scaffold and made good his fatal declaration. It was an odd coincidence, many of the soldiers remarked, that his name was Davis.

It is to be presumed that the Confederate spies notified Bragg promptly of every step

that Sherman took during that forty days' journey, and thus enabled him to divine in due season that the objective point in the case was Chattanooga. But Sherman's soldiers had no means of forecasting their destination. They thought one day that it might be one place, and another day another place. It was certain, at least, that they were not making such a long march merely "to take the kinks out of their legs and hunt up a little poultry," as their commander was said to have observed. There was hard work to be done somewhere, they were satisfied; but what it was or where it was they did not really know until they were ferried hastily over the Tennessee River by night and halted in the baleful shadow of Missionary Ridge. Then they understood. The enemy was to be forced from the strongest position that he had yet held, and Grant had sent for them — waited for them — to insure the success of the undertaking. They were very proud of that, and they were anxious to begin the assault. It was past noon when the last of their artillery crossed the river. At 1 o'clock they moved forward. A drizzling rain was falling, and as they mounted the hill a fantastic drapery of mist involved them. They looked above only to see the low-lying clouds that hid the summit of the ridge, as similar clouds concealed Lookout Mountain, where Hooker's men were also ascending. From the clouds came crash of cannon and peal of musketry to dispute their right to be there. The haze and the smoke met, mingled, and blotted out the heavens; it was as if night had suddenly intervened, and a new sky in which the stars were made by the bursting shells. Then, after a time, it grew lighter. It was not yet sundown, and they stood upon the top of the hill. There they rested for the next day's struggle.

The situation was not conducive to sleep, and the boys longed for the morning to come that they might go on. They got an early start, with bright weather to encourage them, and advanced rapidly to the next hill and to the main ridge, gaining a position at length that meant victory if they could hold it. And they did hold it. They were there for that purpose, and Grant was watching them from Orchard Knob. It was so awfully hot at times that they had to fall back a little; and then they would advance again, driving the enemy before them, and pushing on still farther than they had been before. Column after column was hurled upon them, as Grant had anticipated; it was a part of the plan for them to contend against heavy odds, and they did it with their accustomed courage and faith. In the pauses of the battle they would look about them for chances to serve wounded comrades, or to identify dead ones — and there were plenty

of those sorrowful opportunities. And when they died, they did it as if with a feeling that death was not a thing that they could afford to make a fuss about. "Boys," said one, "the doctor was mistaken; I can't live — I've got to go." The words were hardly spoken when he ceased to breathe. Said another, "Turn me over, some of you, so I can see — the colors"; and when they turned him over he was dead. Still another raised his hand as though it belonged to somebody else and with his own fingers closed his eyes for the grave. Thus it was that they talked and acted on Missionary Ridge. It was the way they had talked and acted when at home; and they saw no reason to do differently because they were in Tennessee instead of Illinois, or Iowa, or Kansas, or Minnesota. They realized, as they often quaintly remarked, that the Government did not provide against accidents to its soldiers. Certain things were to be taken for granted. If they should fortunately escape, very well; if not, then still very well. Such was their philosophy; and in a considerable measure it was also their religion.

In this brilliant and tremendous campaign against Bragg, the Western soldier touched elbows with the soldier of the East, and from that time on, more or less, they marched and fought together. The conjunction furnished a curious and suggestive study. The two types of men differed materially, and comparison was not only easy, but inevitable; in fact, the comparisons made themselves. It was evident that the Eastern soldier was not fortified by the same serene and immovable belief in victory that supported his Western comrade. He had grit and pride to match the best, but he admitted the possibility of failure, and was regardful of lines of retreat and partial to intrenchments. The idea of a campaign conducted without scrupulous regard for the art of war as taught by books did not meet his approval. He preferred to be so led that no disrespect should be shown to the opinions of Cæsar. Battles had been won, he conceded, by simply getting within fighting range of the enemy and staying there until success happened; but he doubted the excellence of such achievements, and held that it was better to be patient and do things scientifically. He thought the rebellion might ultimately be overcome if the North would stand sufficient drafting, and he feared that Mr. Lincoln had some bad advisers who were inducing him so to complicate matters in a political way as to discourage an amicable settlement of the contest. These views were expressed in confident, not to say dogmatic, terms. The Eastern soldier took himself and his cogitations seriously, so much so that at times he was a bit tiresome. But then

he had humorous intervals on other subjects, and at all times he was a man who obeyed orders whether he liked them or not.

The thing about the man from the Potomac that the Westerners thought most peculiar was his persistent admiration of McClellan. They could not understand why he should think a man a great soldier who had organized so much victory that never came to pass, and avoided so many defeats by reversing the theory of Hudibras, that military honor is to be won, like a widow, with brisk attempt, "not slow approaches, like a virgin." It seemed to them that while their Eastern brother's McClellanism, as they denominated it, included certain technical virtues that were undoubtedly worth having, it also tended to confuse and hamper him in the presence of circumstances to which they were always superior. He excelled them in drill, they frankly acknowledged; he wore his uniform as if he had never worn anything else, and in all his actions there was a distinct and self-conscious air of martial propriety. It was not true, as was grotesquely asserted, that he wore a corset, used cosmetics, and slept with gloves on. But it was true that he was remarkably fastidious, and attached much importance to his wardrobe. The deprivations of the siege of Chattanooga would probably not have vanquished him, had he been there to bear them, but his endurance would have lacked the capital cheerfulness which was displayed in that extremity of hunger and raggedness. Perhaps he would have joined in the search for undigested kernels of grain which had already served as food for horses and mules, but it would have been with a countenance bereaved of the power to smile; and certainly he could not have surveyed himself in patches and tatters and found it possible to exclaim, as did a Western soldier under those conditions, "Oh, no, I ain't sufferin' for clothes, but my heart 's a-breakin' for a diamond breast-pin!" He was

not so constituted. His home life had not qualified him for sacrifices of that kind. He could and did make them, let it be remembered to his honor; but he never learned how to do it in the Western mood of ready and tonic buoyancy.

The Western soldier felt that the victory of Chattanooga, following so soon after the successes of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, should bring the war rapidly to an end; but when he ascertained that such was not to be the case, he made the best of it, as he did of everything. He went on, as fast as the enemy could be persuaded to get out of the way, from Chattanooga to Atlanta; from Atlanta to the sea; thence to Richmond; and at last to Washington. His work was done, and done so well that it was its own most vivid and eloquent commendation. So they mustered him out. He was a soldier no longer, but a visiting citizen at the National Capital, who was to take the first train for home. His uniform was discarded with a sense of surpassing relief. The new garments which he hastened to put on made him feel stiff and awkward, and somehow his thoughts seemed to be affected in the same queer way. It was like beginning life all over again. His talk was not so much of what was past as of what was to come. The Union had been saved,— he had known all the time that it would be,— and he was eager now to get back to his folks. It cost him a little pang to give up his gun; he had come to regard it with a kind of affection. The pungent scent of battle smoke still lingered in its joints and creases. By that sign he had conquered. And having conquered, he was ready to go home. He had gone away under a heavy obligation to his country; now he was his country's creditor, and it acknowledged the debt with pride and gladness—

The debt immense of endless gratitude;
Still paying, still to owe.

Henry King.

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

No New Sectional Division.

THE old sectional line in the United States is fast vanishing. It may even be said already to have been wiped out a part of the way, when Delaware breaks her long succession of senators from one party, and West Virginia is claimed for weeks by both parties. It is obvious that neither North nor South can be counted upon as "solid" in future national struggles.

This result was as inevitable as it is desirable. The ancient division between the two sections was due to a single cause, and it could not long survive the final removal of that cause. It is an abnormal state of things

in a republic for a great group of States always to support the same party in an election— almost as abnormal as for all the men in a community to hold the same political opinions. The natural order is one of divergences among States as among individuals. No better illustration of this truth could be desired than is furnished by the experience of New England. Of all parts of the country this has always been regarded as the most distinctly defined and differentiated. The Yankee has been considered a type, almost a race, and one would have expected to find Yankees in every Yankee State taking the same side of a great public controversy. So far, however, has this been from the case that even such close neighbors as New Hamp-

learn much from Corot in the way of technical secrets; no one can learn from him how to idealize nature except a man who, like himself, chances to be born with a poet's heart; and we can do no more than hope that all new poets who may be born to paint shall be souls of Corot's sort. But we must indeed hope this; for what the world needs just now are not mournful temperaments, reading into nature the sorrow of the human race, but apostles of the joy and peace which those who seek can always find in her, valiant yet tender singers like Corot—happy singers of a glad new day.

VIII.

THE more we study Corot's art the more we love the man who stands behind it; and I have dwelt at some length on the record of his life because it completes the revelation of a strong and serious will, of perseverance, modesty, and self-reliance, of noble desires, unflinching courage, sincerity, and loving-kindness.

It is a little the fashion nowadays to think of artists as excusing themselves, on the strength of being artists, from the duties and virtues we demand of commoner clay. It is too much our way to think of them as eccentric, egotistic, nervously excitable or morbidly sensitive, at odds with a prosaic world and often at odds with themselves—pushed one way by the artistic impulse, pulled another by mere human loves and obligations. We think too often of them thus to pardon or condemn them accord-

ing as we value art or care little for it as a factor in the progress and aspiration of the world.

Corot's story is of priceless value as proving how far wrong are these ideas; and all the more because it is not an exceptional story. Men like Corot, in all the essentials of what even a pharisaical world would call good conduct, have never been rare among artists and are not rare to-day; nor men as courageous and persevering in disappointment, as simple, modest, and laborious in success. As was Corot, so, in a more or less marked degree, were almost all the great painters and sculptors of his great time. Not all of them could be so cheery and happy, but most of them were as single-minded in their devotion to art, as generous and sincere in their dealings with their fellows.

Let me make a good ending now with a few more words from Corot's lips: "Do we know how to render the sky, a tree, or water? No; we can only try to give its appearance, try to translate it by an artifice which we must always seek to perfect. For this reason, although I do not know my craft so very badly, I am always trying to go further. Sometimes some one says: 'You know your business and don't need to study more.' But none of that, I say; we always need to learn. . . . Try to conquer the qualities you do not possess, but above all obey your own instinct, your own way of seeing. This is what I call conscience and sincerity. Do not trouble yourself about anything else, and you will have a good chance of being happy and of doing well."

M. G. van Rensselaer.

GENERAL LEE AFTER THE WAR.



It would not be easy, for one who had not been in the midst of it, to realize the enthusiasm that existed among the Southern people for General Lee at the conclusion of the war. Nothing could exceed the veneration and love, the trust and absolute loyalty, which people and soldiery alike had manifested towards him through the struggle. But it was after the war had closed that the affection of the people seemed more than ever a consecrated one. The name given to him universally in the army, "Ole Mars' Robert," is an evidence of the peculiar tenderness with which he was regarded. But after defeat came, all this feeling was intensified by the added one of sympathy. Nowhere could he move abroad without being greeted with such demonstrations of love and interest as always touched his generous and gracious heart.

Living near General Lee as I did, from

1865 till his death, in 1870, I was cognizant of many little instances and scenes which illustrate this feeling, and also serve to bring out some of the finer points of his character in a way no stately biography would condescend to do. It may be worth while to focalize some of these minute side-lights, in order to indicate the less known characteristics of that inner life which shrunk from manifesting itself to the world at large.

A brief period only had passed after the surrender at Appomattox when offers of homes began to be pressed upon him. His family was originally English, and he had many relatives among titled people in the old country, who insisted upon his coming and sharing, for a time, the ease and luxury of their homes. But he positively declined to expatriate himself. "No," he said, "I will never forsake my people in their extremity; what they endure, I will endure, and I am ready to break my

last crust with them." And he refused to leave Virginia. Nothing ever gave him greater pleasure than to witness personal, strenuous effort to overcome the disasters of the war. To see a small farmer attempting to fence his fields with green saplings was to him a sight that made his eyes brighten.

Many homes were urged upon him in his native State; but as my sister, Mrs. E. R. Cocke, of Cumberland, said when he accepted her offer of a vacant plantation adjoining her own, which was a part of her estate, "He chose among these homes one of the most unpretending." With furniture from her own house, she fitted up for him and his family a comfortable abode at "Derwent," Powhatan County; and here he gathered together, for the first time since they had left Arlington, his wife and children around him. "Never shall I forget," she said, "his unaffected gratitude, and his gracious acceptance of this simple home I and my sons had prepared for him. The plantation of Derwent was only two miles from my own, and our great country gardens readily met the wants of the new residents. As I saw the beautiful simplicity with which these trifling supplies were received, it seemed impossible for me to realize that this was the man upon whom the fate of the South had hung; that this was the man for whom thousands were ready to rush to death; that this was the man before whom the hearts of all the Southern Confederacy bowed in reverence. One day, shortly after he came to Derwent, he rode over on Traveler¹ (his famous war-horse) to a neighboring country-store, which was also the post-office. The desire of the people, black as well as white, to see the General was intense, for this was but a few weeks after the surrender. He walked quietly into the store, and was engaged with its proprietor in talk about the prospects of the crops, and such like things, when the place began to be crowded by the country people, intent upon catching a glimpse of the great commander. He seemed not to observe them at first; but turning round, and noticing the press about him, he said, in an apologetic way, 'Ah, Mr. Palmer, pardon me for keeping you talking about corn and tobacco so long; for I see I am detaining you from your many customers.' There was nothing whatever to indicate the slightest consciousness that the crowd had pressed in to see him.

"Another incident," she went on to say, "I recall of General Lee, which seems to me worth relating. My head dining-room servant, who had occupied his post for twenty-five years, and whose ancestors for more than a hundred years had been born on the plantation, had

determined to avail himself of his sudden freedom. We were all sitting at dinner—for it was before the General and his family had taken possession of Derwent—when Shepherd, the man in question, all ready for departure, entered the dining-room, to take leave of the assembled family. I well remember the kindness with which the General rose from his seat, and, shaking the old servant cordially by the hand, gave him some good advice and asked Heaven to bless him. There was no feeling of bitterness towards him because he was leaving his mistress to much distraction and care from which he might have saved her; instead of this, a benediction and a Godspeed."

When homes were being offered to him, both abroad and from one end of the late Confederacy to the other, his eldest daughter, who was visiting in our neighborhood, said one day, in the hearing of a trustee of Washington College, "Why don't they propose to my father some place in which he can work? For he never will accept the *gratuity* of a home." The remark was caught up, and conveyed to the board of trustees. This college, situated in the very heart of Virginia, was founded before the American Revolution; and after it had received a large endowment from Washington himself its name was changed from Liberty Hall to Washington College—the first institution of any kind whatever that bore the name of the great patriot. Thenceforth this college was the educator of a large number of the prominent men of Virginia. Its buildings had been injured, its professors and students scattered, and its resources crippled by the war. An offer of its presidency was made to General Lee with scarcely a hope that he would accept it; but accept it he did, without hesitation, saying, "I may thus influence my young countrymen."

I once heard it said by Professor White, the professor of Greek in our college, who had himself been a Confederate officer: "The first appearance of the General in our streets was thoroughly characteristic. As I passed up our main street one day in the summer of 1865 I was suddenly confronted by General Lee on his fine war-horse Traveler, dressed in white linen from head to foot, wholly unattended, even by his black groom. Nobody in the town knew he was coming. This was as he wished it, for it was his desire to shun every demonstration. Here was the man who for four years had never moved abroad without being attended by a military staff composed of some of the most brilliant younger men of the South, and who never appeared anywhere without being received with enthusiastic shouts from all beholders—now with only one person to greet him, and an old Confederate to hold his

¹ For portrait of General Lee on Traveler, see THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for July, 1886.

stirrup! But as every man in the town had been a soldier, it was not long before the street rang with cheers."

I will remember the first visit I paid to Mrs. Lee on the General's taking possession of the house of the college president. There were many visitors present, who all came, with a sort of exalted reverence, to pay their formal respects to the General and Mrs. Lee. When we rose to take leave, my little son, who accompanied me, could not find his cap. What was my surprise to hear Mrs. Lee interrupt her husband in his animated talk with some distinguished gentlemen present—not to ask him to summon a servant to do her errand, but to say:

"Robert, Herbert Preston has lost his cap; will you go into the back parlor and see if he has left it there?"

We were not used then to hear the leader of our armies bidden to wait on a child!

At one of the first Commencements—I think the very first—at which General Lee presided after he became president of the college, the hall was filled with an immense crowd to whom he was the central object of interest. During the progress of the speeches, a little boy four years old became separated from his parents and went wandering up one of the aisles in frightened search of them. The General noticed the child's confusion, and, gaining his eye, beckoned him to come to him on the platform, where he sat surrounded by many of the brilliant officers of the late Confederacy. The tender signal was irresistible to the child. He instantly made his way to the feet of the General, sat down there, and leaned his head against his knee, looking up in his face with the utmost trust, apparently thoroughly comforted. Thus resting, he fell asleep, with his protector's arm around him, and when the time came for the General to take his part in the prescribed ceremonies we who were looking on were touched in no little degree as we saw him carefully rise from his seat and adjust the little head softly upon the sofa so as not to waken the confiding little sleeper.

His love for children was one of his most marked traits. He possessed the royal attribute of never forgetting faces or names; and not a boy in our streets ever took off his cap to salute him as he passed by on Traveler, nor a little girl courtesied to him on the sidewalk, that he did not for a moment check his rein to give an answering salute, invariably naming them, and perhaps the pleasure of a ride on the saddle before him. We found him early one Christmas morning at our door. He had come to bring some Christmas presents to my little boys; and I discovered that he had done the same for all the children of his friends. He told me once of an amusing scene he encountered, in which chil-

dren played a part, from which he laughingly said he retreated, ignominiously defeated. A few miles out of the town he was overtaken in his ride by a thunder-storm, and sought refuge in the house of a gentleman whom he knew. Mr. W—— and his wife were absent, but a group of children who were playing marbles on the parlor carpet came forward at once and made him welcome. But the attractions of the game were too powerful for their politeness and that of the little visitors they had with them; and as the General begged them not to stop their playing, they took him at his word and went on with their game. In a little while an altercation arose.

"Now, Mary," said Tom, "I call that cheating! You did n't do that thing fairly!"

"Take that back, Tom!" broke out Charlie. "You sha'n't say my sister cheats!"

"But she did," cried Tom, with sullen persistence, "and I'll say it again!" With that Charlie rose in his wrath and collared Tom; and Mary, trying to separate the combatants, burst into tears and cried out, "O General Lee, please don't let them fight!"

"My good fellows," said the General, grasping each boy by the shoulder, "there 's some better way to settle your quarrels than with your fists." But in vain he tried to separate the little wrestlers. "I argued, I remonstrated, I commanded; but they were like two young mastiffs, and never in all my military service had I to own myself so perfectly powerless. I retired beaten from the field, and let the little fellows fight it out."

His ability to recall a name, after he had once heard it, was peculiar. One of the college professors told me that in riding out with him one day they passed an old mill, at the door of which stood the dusty German miller, with the most barbarous of German names, waiting with the hope of receiving a handshake from the leader under whom his sons had served. His wish was gratified, and the old man was made proud and happy. Not long after, the same professor was passing the same mill, when at the door the miller again presented himself. By no effort of memory could the queer German name be recalled by the professor; but before he had time to speak, the General rode straight to the door, and, with a cheerful "Good-morning," named the old man at once.

He had the gentlest way possible of giving counsel and administering rebuke. I remember hearing him say, in a presence where such testimony was worth more than a dozen temperance lectures: "Men need no stimulant; it is something, I am persuaded, that they can do without. When I went into the field, at the beginning of the war, a good lady

friend of mine gave me two sealed bottles of very superb French brandy. I carried them with me through the entire campaign; and when I met my friend again, after all was over, I gave her back both her bottles of brandy, with the seals unbroken. It may have been some comfort to me to know that I had them in case of sudden emergency, but the moment never came when I needed to use them."

His skill and wisdom in managing the young men who crowded to the college after his accession as president was extraordinary. Owing to the closing of so many of the Southern schools of learning, the number of students was very large, reaching five hundred in the earlier sessions; but a case of discipline rarely occurred. He was accustomed to say to the students when they presented themselves in his office, on their entrance at college, "Now, my friends, I have a way of estimating young men which does not often fail me. I cannot note the conduct of any one, for even a brief period, without finding out what sort of a mother he had. You all honor your mothers: need I tell you that I know you will have that honor in reverent keeping?" So tender an appeal as this went straight to the heart of many a youth as no formal advice could have done.

He told me that once at Arlington, when he was on a visit home from one of the frontier posts, he went out one wintry morning, after a slight fall of snow, and strolled down one of the graveled walks. Hearing some one behind him, he turned and saw his eldest son fitting his little feet into the distinct tracks he had left in the snow, and making great strides in order to do this effectually. "I learned a lesson, then and there," he said, "which I never afterwards forgot. My good man, I said to myself, you must be careful how you walk, and where you go, for there are those following you who will set their feet where you set yours." Something similar to this has been told of another, but I had this from General Lee himself.

Few men were more skilled in the avoidance of everything that could wound the feelings of others. On the occasion of General Lee's being summoned to Washington to give testimony, an incident occurred which illustrates this characteristic. A connection of my own, who attended him as one of his complimentary staff, told me that when in Washington there were multitudes of persons—and among them many of the most distinguished in the land, North and South—seeking audience with General Lee; evening after evening was occupied with these interviews. Again and again had my friend been beset by a person who had no claim to be presented, and as often had he been waived aside on the plea that the number of gentlemen coming to be

introduced was so great as to embarrass his provisional staff. But this persistent Confederate watched his opportunity and made the best of it. Coming up to Colonel M—— when he was a little off his guard he whispered, "Take me up now; there is nobody being introduced at this moment."

"But don't you see that the General is surrounded by a group of officers and congressmen, and that it won't do to break in upon their conversations?"

But the old soldier would not be shaken off. So Colonel M—— thought the best way to end the matter would be to lead him up to the General, and thus in a moment put a stop to his pertinacity. Taking him, accordingly, by the arm, he drew him forward. The large circle opened and allowed a pathway, and the man was presented in due form and received with as much courtesy as if he had been a prince of the blood. Colonel M—— was about to lead him instantly away, when he suddenly stepped into the open space where the group had made way for him, and in a rather loud voice said:

"General, I have always thought that if I ever had the honor of meeting you face to face, and there was an opportunity allowed me, I would like to ask you a question which nobody but you can answer. I seem to have that opportunity now. This is what I want to know: *What was the reason that you failed to gain the victory at the battle of Gettysburg?*"

To have such an ill-timed question dropped like a bomb-shell in such a presence was, to say the least of it, embarrassing, and some curt rejoinder would have been natural and to the purpose; but General Lee's kind-heartedness would not permit a rude dismissal even to so unwarrantable a questioner. Advancing and gently taking him by the hand, while all the listening group stood round amazed at the man's presumption, the General quietly said:

"My dear sir, that would be a long story, and would require more time than you see I can possibly command at present; so we will have to defer the matter to another occasion."

This same friend gave me an instance of a similar encounter that concerned Mrs. Lee, whose simplicity and kindness of heart rivaled that of her husband.

The General and his wife were at the Virginia White Sulphur Springs, occupying one of the pretty cottages that had been set apart for them. The crowd of visitors was great, and everybody who had the least show for so doing was asking for introductions, for the war had not long been over.

"I encountered a good-natured but absurd man from the far South," said Colonel M——, "whose enthusiasm for the Lee family was at

fever heat. His pompous way of talking was a constant amusement to me; and when he asked that I should intrude upon the gay group that always filled the piazza of the General's cottage and introduce him, I naturally hesitated somewhat, fearing lest he should overpower them by one of his magniloquent apostrophes. He joined me one evening just as we were passing the cottage door, where a party of visitors were being entertained by the General and his wife. 'Now is your time,' he whispered; and he forthwith drew me to the steps, where, as in duty bound, I presented him. Withdrawing a little, he assumed a Hamlet-like pose, and lifting his hand with a most dramatic air, he began:

"Do I behold the honored roof that shelters the head of him before whose name the luster of Napoleon's pales into a shadow? Do I see the walls within which sits the most adored of men? Dare I tread the floor which she who is a scion of the patriotic house of the revered Washington condescends to hallow with her presence? Is this the portico that trails its vines over the noble pair—"

"I stumbled back aghast," said Colonel M——, "at my own blunder, as I listened to this ridiculous speech, which I really believed was gotten up and conned for the occasion. But I was relieved in a moment when Mrs. Lee, quietly laying down her knitting and interrupting the rhetorical effort, with a kind look upon her face replied:

"Yes, this is our cabin; will you take a seat upon the bench?"

General Lee's considerate courtesy never failed him. He used to be overpowered with letters from every part of the South, on every imaginable subject, written by the wives and mothers of his old soldiers, asking questions which it was impossible for him to answer, and seeking aid which it was impossible for him to give. Indigent women would write, begging him to find places where their boys and girls might support themselves. Crippled soldiers by scores sought for help from him; and multitudes whose only claim was that they had fought for the Confederacy entreated his counsel and petitioned for his advice in every sort of emergency.

I once said to him, "I hope you do not feel obliged to reply to all these letters."

"I certainly do," was his reply. "Think of these poor people! It is a great deal of trouble for them to write: why should I not be willing to take the trouble to answer them? And as that is all I can give most of them, I give it ungrudgingly." And yet at this time he had five hundred young men under his management, and a corps of twenty-five professors; and this in a line of work totally novel to him.

His humility was as conspicuous as anything about him. His religious character was pronounced and openly shown. But he arrogated nothing to himself as a religious man. I was present once when my husband informed him of an effort just being made to supply our county with Bibles, of which it had been stripped to meet the wants of the army during the war. The Bible Society was being reorganized, and the General was pressed to accept the post of president—"For the sake of the cause; for the sake of the testimony his name would bear; for the sake of the example it would be to his five hundred students." My husband was called out before he had finished his plea, and I was left in the library for a few moments alone with the General. I shall not easily forget the expression of profound humility on his face, as with a subdued voice he turned to me and said:

"Ah, my dear madam, I feel myself such a poor sinner in the sight of God that I cannot consent to be set up as a Christian example to any one. This is the real reason why I decline to do what the colonel urges so strongly."

He was in the act of saying grace at his own dinner-table when the fatal stroke fell which terminated his life.

It was not in General Lee's nature to entertain feelings of bitterness against any human being. As was the case with Stonewall Jackson, he never used the word "Yankee"—the term so generally applied through the South to the soldiers of the Northern army. He always spoke of them as the "Federals" or the "enemy." On the occasion of Mr. Greeley, Mr. O'Connor, and others coming to Richmond to offer bail for ex-President Davis, I heard him, with something more approaching to acrimony than I had ever been witness of, speak of some of the expressions used by Southern editors. "I condemn," he said, "such bitterness wholly. Is it any wonder the Northern journals should retort upon us as they do, when we allow ourselves to use such language as I found in some of our papers yesterday?"

As to the immediate personality of the man, we people of the South naturally enough think that, take him for all in all, physically, intellectually, socially, and morally, we never saw his equal. He was a superb specimen of manly grace and elegance. He had escaped that preciseness of manner which a whole life spent in military service is apt to give. There was about him a stately dignity, calm poise, absolute self-possession, entire absence of self-consciousness, and gracious consideration for all about him that made a combination of character not to be surpassed. His tall, erect figure, his bright color, his brilliant hazel eyes, his perfect white teeth (for he had never used tobacco), his at-

tractive smile, his chivalry of bearing, the musical sweetness of his pure voice, were attributes never to be forgotten by those who had once met him.

His domestic life was idyllic in its beautiful simplicity. His devotion to his invalid wife, who for many years was a martyr to rheumatic gout, was pathetic to see. He had her often conveyed to our various medicinal springs in Virginia, himself riding on horseback beside her carriage. I recall one instance in which he preceded her by a few days in order that he might have an apparatus prepared, under his skillful engineering, by means of which her invalid-chair was placed upon a little platform and carefully lowered into the bath, in order that the descent and ascent of steps might be avoided. His tenderness to his children, especially his daughters, was mingled with a delicate courtesy which belonged to an older day than ours — a courtesy which recalls the *preux chevalier* of knightly times. He had a pretty way of addressing his daughters, in the presence of other people, with a prefix which would seem to belong to the age of lace ruffles and side-swords.

"Where is my little Miss Mildred?" he would say on coming in from his ride or walk at dusk. "She is my light-bearer; the house is never dark if she is in it."

He was passionately fond of nature, and never wearied of riding about on Traveler among our beautiful Virginia hills and mountains, with one of his daughters invariably at his side. His delight in the early flush of the spring, in the rich glow of the summer, and in the superb coloring of our autumn landscape, was wonderfully fine and keen. "No words can express," says one of his daughters, "the intense enjoyment he would get out of a brilliant sunset."

He was fond of literature, and indulged all his life in a wide range of reading quite apart from the bearings of his profession. When at home he was always in the habit of reading aloud to his family. "My first and most intimate acquaintance with Sir Walter Scott's metrical romances," one of his daughters says, "came through papa. He read them to us when we were children, till we almost knew them by heart, and the best English classics were always within reach of his hand. One of the last winters of his life he read aloud to the family group the latest translation of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*."

General Lee possessed one quality which only those who came into close intimacy with him were much aware of — he had a delicious sense of humor. Many a student was turned aside from some perilous course by a sly shaft, feathered with his keen wit, or by some humor-

ous question which conveyed a gentle reproof, of which only he for whom the reproof was intended could understand the bearings. He could be very stern when it was necessary, but somehow his sternness never embittered.

When he became president of the college he immediately had morning prayers established in the chapel; and never during his incumbency was he known to be absent from them, if he was well and at home. The only things with which he ever grew impatient were self-indulgence and failure in duty. The voice of duty was to him the voice of God. Under no circumstances was he willing to disobey it, nor could he understand how others could be. This was something he continually impressed upon his students. What is duty to God and man, and how to do that duty, were the two leading questions of his life. His persistent assiduity in giving himself up to every detail of college discipline and life was so scrupulous as sometimes to lead to the suggestion on the part of professors of a little more indulgence towards himself, but they never succeeded in getting him to relax the rigid rules by which he governed every action.

One of the last acts of his life was a filial one. Accompanied by his daughter Agnes he went to Florida to visit the grave of his father, "Light-Horse Harry Lee." This journey — his last earthly one — was a sort of sacred pilgrimage. As he returned from Florida he sought out, in North Carolina, the final resting-place of his lovely daughter Annie, who had died in that State in the early freshness of her beautiful girlhood, just at the moment when her father was winning his most brilliant successes. Agnes told me, when she came home, of her father's extreme unwillingness to be made a hero of anywhere, and of the reluctance he manifested, which it took many pleas to overcome, to show himself to the crowds assembled at every station along his route who pressed to catch a sight of him.

"Why should they care to see me," he would say, when urged to appear on the platform of the train — "why should they care to see me? I am only a poor old Confederate." This feeling he carried with him to the latest hour of his life.

One who had been a member of his staff, and who was present in the death-chamber most of the time during his last illness, told me how impressed he was with the General's unwillingness to give any expression to his thought. "Not," he said, "that he was incapable of speaking; but a supreme reticence, that was to me very noble, held him back. He seemed averse to any utterance of the sacred secrets of his soul, lest they should afterwards be spoken aloud in the ear of the world."

Margaret J. Preston.

CAN THE EMPEROR FORGET?

RUMBLE of drums in the flashing and crashing of battle,
Rushing of horses, with foam upon nostrils and flanks;
Clashing of bayonets, striking of swords, and the rattle
Of wrath in the standing, of death in the fast-falling ranks.

Trample the blood in the turf till the earth is afire,
Burning in gore: be it English or French, it is blood.
Profligate waste of it, spendthrift contempt of it! Dire
The flow of it, thus making crimson the Waterloo mud!

“Death to the enemy!” Children may suffer and languish;
Wives may speak softly of one who is baring his heart.
“Death to the enemy! Forward!” No thought of the anguish
Of wounds, with the cannon-wheels pressing their red sides apart.

What of the Emperor? Austerlitz, Jena, Marengo?
Can he foresee that the conquering eagle must fall,
Beating his wings on the traitor wind? Forward the men go—
“Viva Napoleon! Death to the enemy, all!”

Falling like rain come the bullets, and falling like flowers
Drop the French musketry, rising no more from the plain.
See the firm brow of Napoleon: massive it lowers.
Shout for his victory! Never, ah, never again!

Back from the mud that is crimson, and back from the corpses
That lie by the cannon with eyes that can stare at the sun
Without shrinking. “Awake! They are leaving you, dumb-gazing forces!”
Aye, shout in their ears, but they move not. Their battle is done.

Done. And the Emperor? Exiled. Napoleon defeated?
He who has conquered the world? Say that rather the sun
Fell from his course and was chained by the earth. Fate has meted
His portion. March back what is left of you, soldiers! 'T is done.

Far in that isle he is ceaselessly walking his prison,
As a lion his cage, who is thinking of night-dews that wet
His mane, and the servient sun that to dry it had risen.
Monarch then, prisoner now. Can the lion forget?

Hark to the guns, that are greeting with long detonation
Him who is back from the stranger; is home again—home!
“Vive l'Empereur!” Hush! What mean you, fool? This coronation
Is dust crowned with dust, and the sky is the Invalides' dome.

“Vive l'Empereur!” Will they cease in their idiot babble?
Never more “Vive l'Empereur!” Men, he lies on his shield,
Broad-browed and yellow. Those hands are so white; did they dabble
In men's blood? And hold,—did those thin lips cry “Fire!” on the field?

Hark to the resonant guns! Remember, my brothers,
Thundering Waterloo's cannon and bright bayonets!
Oh, how they rattled! To him they were once as a mother's
Lullaby. “Vive l'Empereur!” Silence. Ah, he forgets!

Louise Morgan Smith.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

THE POMEROY CIRCULAR — THE CLEVELAND CONVENTION — THE RESIGNATION OF CHASE.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE POMEROY CIRCULAR.



BEFORE the close of the year 1863 the public mind became greatly preoccupied with the subject of the next presidential election. Though the general drift of opinion was altogether in favor of intrusting to Mr. Lincoln the continuation of the work which he had thus far so well conducted, this feeling was by no means unanimous. It will seem strange to future students of the events of this time that the opposition in the Republican party to Mr. Lincoln, whose name will stand in history as the liberator of the slaves, came almost entirely from the radical antislavery element. The origins of this opposition have been so fully stated in other portions of this work, that it is not worth while to set them forth at any length in this place. They were principally the action of the President in regard to the administration of affairs in Missouri; the conflict between General Frémont and the Missouri conservatives, and between General Schofield and the Missouri radicals; the retention in command of various generals, who, from the radical point of view, had "no heart in the cause"; the deliberation with which the great antislavery acts of the President were performed; and, in general, the dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the war, of eager and ardent spirits imperfectly informed as to the processes of the Government and the facts of the situation. At the end of the year 1863 and the beginning of the following year all these elements of discord were seeking a rallying-point. This it was not easy to find. Every one sufficiently acquainted with practical politics to note the drift of public opinion saw the hopelessness of contending against the popularity of the President. There was not a Republican general in the field, of sufficient prominence to be thought of, who would give the least encouragement for the use of his name against Mr. Lincoln. In neither House of Congress was there a statesman who for a moment would enter into such a contest; and in the higher circles of the Administration there was only one man so short-sighted as not to perceive the expediency of the President's

renomination and the impossibility of preventing it. Mr. Chase alone had the indiscretion to encourage the overtures of the malcontents, and the folly to imagine that he could lead them to success. Pure and disinterested as he was, and devoted with all his energies and powers to the cause of the country, he was always singularly ignorant of the current of public thought and absolutely incapable of judging men in their true relations. He was surrounded by sycophants who constantly assured him of his own strength with the people, and who convinced him at last that all manifestations to the contrary were the result of mystifications set on foot by his enemies. He regarded himself as the friend of Mr. Lincoln; to him and to others he made strong protestations of friendly feeling, which he undoubtedly thought were sincere; but he held so poor an opinion of the President's intellect and character in comparison with his own, that he could not believe the people so blind as deliberately to prefer the President to himself. In November, 1863, he wrote to his son-in-law, Governor Sprague: "If I were controlled by merely personal sentiments, I should prefer the reelection of Mr. Lincoln to that of any other man; but I doubt the expediency of reëlecting anybody, and I think a man of different qualities from those the President has will be needed for the next four years." Of course, he adds, "I am not anxious to be regarded as that man; and I am quite willing to leave that question to the decision of those who agree in thinking that some such man should be chosen." To another he wrote early in December: "I have not the slightest wish to press any claims upon the consideration of friends or the public. There is certainly a purpose, however, to use my name, and I do not feel bound to object to it."² He never admitted to himself that he had any personal desire for the place, and in this letter he continued: "Were the post in which these friends desire to place me as low as it is high, I should feel bound to render in it all the service possible to our common country." Yet he always felt that he could render better service in the higher places than in the lower, and when it was once in contemplation

² Chase to Spencer, Dec. 4, 1863.

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to offer him a seat on the Supreme Bench he distinctly intimated he would accept no place there but that of Chief-Justice. There never was a man who found it so easy to delude himself. He believed that he was indifferent to advancement and anxious only for the public good; yet in the midst of his enormous labors he found time to write interminable letters to every part of the country, all protesting his indifference to the Presidency but indicating his willingness to accept it, and painting pictures so dark of the chaotic state of affairs among his colleagues that the irresistible inference was that only he could save the country. For instance, he wrote to the editor of a religious newspaper, saying:

Had there been here an Administration in the true sense of the word — a President conferring with his Cabinet and taking their united judgments, and with their aid enforcing activity, economy, and energy in all departments of public service—we could have spoken boldly and defied the world. But our condition here has always been very different. I preside over the funnel; everybody else, and especially the Secretaries of War and the Navy, over the spigots—and keep them well open, too. Mr. Seward conducts the foreign relations with very little let or help from anybody. There is no unity and no system, except so far as it is departmental. There is progress, but it is slow and involuntary; just what is coerced by the irresistible pressure of the vast force of the people. How, under such circumstances, can anybody announce a policy which can only be made respectable by union, wisdom, and courage?¹

A few days later he wrote to another:

The Administration cannot be continued as it is. There is, in fact, no Administration, properly speaking. There are departments and there is a President. The latter leaves administration substantially to the heads of the former, deciding himself comparatively few questions. These heads act with almost absolute independence of each other.²

He could not bring himself to feel that the universal demonstrations in favor of the reelection of Mr. Lincoln were genuine. He regarded himself all the while as the serious candidate, and the opposition to him as knavish and insincere. To one of his adherents he wrote:

It is impossible to reform and investigate without stirring up slanderers and revilers, both among those whose wrong-doings are exposed and unrighteous profits taken away, and among those, too, who think they see a good chance to take advantage of clamor to the injury of a public man, who, they fear, stands too well with the people.³

To another adherent in Ohio he wrote:

I cannot help being gratified by the preference expressed for me in some quarters, for those who express it are generally men of great weight, and high character, and independent judgment. . . . They think there will be a change in the current, which, so far as it is not spontaneous, is chiefly managed by the Blairs.⁴

He said that he should be glad to have Ohio decidedly on his side, and that if Ohio should express a preference for any other person he would not allow his name to be used. This was quite an unnecessary engagement, as no candidate could possibly be nominated without the support of his own State.

Indifferent as he claimed to be in regard to his personal prospects, he yet wrote on the 6th of February⁵ promising to try to find a place for a man recommended by the editor of the "Evening Post," and complaining with some bitterness that that paper had not uttered a kind word in reference to him for some months past. There was, in fact, no limit to these overtures of the Secretary in every direction which he thought might be serviceable to him. A few days after the death of Archbishop Hughes, we find him writing to Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati, reporting the efforts which he is making in every quarter to have the Western prelate appointed the successor of the dead archbishop.⁶ On the 18th of January he wrote to a friend of his in Toledo, Ohio, Mr. James C. Hall, formally announcing his candidacy for the Presidency. He told him that a committee of prominent senators, representatives, and citizens had been organized to promote his election; that a sub-committee had conferred with him, and he had consented to their wishes. He then went on to say:

If I know my own heart, I desire nothing so much as the suppression of this rebellion and the establishment of union, order, and prosperity on sure and safe foundations; and I should despise myself if I felt capable of allowing any personal objects to influence me to any action which would affect, by one jot or tittle, injuriously, the accomplishment of those objects. And it is a source of real gratification to believe that those who desire my nomination desire it on public grounds alone, and will not hesitate in any matter which may concern me to act upon such grounds and on such grounds only.

He added that he desired the support of Ohio, and that if he did not receive it he would cheerfully acquiesce.

All through the winter this quasi-candidacy continued. It seemed of the utmost importance to the Secretary and his few adherents, though

¹ Chase to the Rev. J. Leavitt, Jan. 24, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 562.

² Chase to Dickson, Jan. 27, 1864. *Ibid.*, p. 564.

³ Chase to Gilbert, Jan. 30, 1864. *Ibid.*, p. 567.

⁴ Chase to Flamen Ball, Feb. 2, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 570.

⁵ Chase to Bailey. *Ibid.*, p. 571.

⁶ Chase to Purcell, Feb. 1, 1864. *Ibid.*, p. 568.

it really formed an imperceptible eddy beside the vast current in which the will of the people was sweeping forward to its purpose. Being confined exclusively to politicians, it had, of course, its principal manifestation in the city of Washington. It played its little part in the election of Speaker of the House of Representatives. An attempt was made to identify Mr. Colfax, the most popular candidate for that office, with the adherents of Mr. Chase; but upon hearing of this he at once sought an audience with the President and positively repudiated any such connection. When Congress had organized, the message of the President was received with an enthusiasm which for the moment swept out of sight every trace of opposing opinion. From that moment there was no further question in regard to the Republican nomination.

There was at one time an effort on the part of some of the leading spirits in the Union League, a secret Republican organization which had been very zealous and effective in political work throughout the Union, to commit it to some measure hostile to Mr. Lincoln. This had alarmed even so experienced and astute an observer as Thurlow Weed, who sent to Mr. Seward in the autumn of 1863 a warning that "loyal leagues, into which Odd Fellows and Know Nothings rush, are fixing to control delegate appointments for Mr. Chase."¹ Mr. Seward accepted this warning somewhat too readily, induced by his inveterate anti-masonic prejudices; these fears had no substantial foundation. Some of the leaders of the League, sympathizing strongly with the radicals of Missouri, had indeed from time to time made efforts to commit the order against the President; but such attempts failed there, as elsewhere, on account of the overwhelming tide of contrary opinion, and when the principal chapter of the order met in Washington on the 10th of December, they elected a list of officers who were almost all either friends of Mr. Lincoln or men of sufficient sagacity not to oppose him.

From the beginning Mr. Lincoln had been fully aware of Mr. Chase's candidacy and of everything that was done for its promotion. It was impossible for him to remain unconscious of it; and although he discouraged all conversation on the subject and refused to read letters relating to it, he could not entirely shut the matter out from his cognizance. He had his own opinion of the taste and judgment displayed by Mr. Chase in his criticisms of himself and of his colleagues in the Cabinet; but he took no notice of them.

I have determined [he said] to shut my eyes, so far as possible, to everything of the sort. Mr. Chase

¹ MS.

makes a good Secretary, and I shall keep him where he is. If he becomes President, all right. I hope we may never have a worse man. I have observed with regret his plan of strengthening himself. Whenever he sees that an important matter is troubling me, if I am compelled to decide in a way to give offense to a man of some influence, he always ranges himself in opposition to me and persuades the victim that he has been hardly dealt with, and that he would have arranged it very differently. It was so with General Frémont, with General Hunter when I annulled his hasty proclamation, with General Butler when he was recalled from New Orleans, with these Missouri people when they called the other day. I am entirely indifferent as to his success or failure in these schemes so long as he does his duty at the head of the Treasury Department.²

When Rosecrans was removed from the command of the Army of the Cumberland, Mr. Chase pursued the same course. His spiteful comments on that act were reported to the President, who simply laughed at the zealous friend who brought him the news. When told that such tactics might give Mr. Chase the nomination, he said he hoped the country would never do worse. He regretted, however, that the thing had begun, because although it did not annoy him, his friends thought it ought to. He went on appointing by the dozen Mr. Chase's partisans and adherents to places in the Government. He knew perfectly what he was doing, and allowed himself the luxury of a quiet smile as he signed their commissions. He heard more of such gossip than was amusing or agreeable to him. He said on one occasion, "I wish they would stop thrusting that subject of the Presidency into my face. I do not want to hear anything about it."

Of course one reason for the magnanimity with which Mr. Lincoln endured this rivalry of his able and ambitious minister of finance was his consciousness of the inequality of the match between them. Although his renomination was a matter in regard to which he refused to converse much, even with intimate friends, he was perfectly aware of the drift of things. In capacity of appreciating popular currents and in judgment of individual character Mr. Chase was as a child beside him; and he allowed the opposition to himself in his own Cabinet to continue, without question or remark, with all the more patience and forbearance because he knew how feeble it was.

The movement in favor of Mr. Chase culminated in the month of February in a secret circular signed by Senator Pomeroy of Kansas, and widely circulated through the Union. It is admitted by Mr. Chase's sincerest admirers that the weak point of his character was the incapacity shown in his judgment of men and

² J. H., Diary, Oct. 16, 1863.

his choice of intimates; and in no instance was this defect more glaringly exhibited than in the selection of such a man as Senator Pomeroy to conduct his canvass for the Presidency. The two Kansas senators, Lane and Pomeroy, hated each other intensely, and as long as they were in office together wrangled persistently over the patronage of their State. The President once wrote to Pomeroy, after declining an interview with him :

I wish you and Lane would make a sincere effort to get out of the mood you are in. It does neither of you any good; it gives you the means of tormenting my life out of me, and nothing else.¹

Each thought the other got the advantage of him, each abused the President roundly behind his back; but Lane, being the more subtle and adroit politician of the two, never allowed himself to be put in an attitude of open hostility to the Administration. Pomeroy's resentment drove him at last into a mood of sullen animosity towards the President, and it was under his weak leadership that the elements of opposition to Mr. Lincoln at last came together. As the confidential circular issued by the committee of which Pomeroy was the head was the most considerable effort made within the Republican party to defeat the renomination of Mr. Lincoln, we give the document, to show upon how slender a foundation this opposition was based.

The movements recently made throughout the country to secure the renomination of President Lincoln render necessary counter-action on the part of those unconditional friends of the Union who differ from the policy of the Administration.

So long as no efforts were made to forestall the political action of the people, it was both wise and patriotic for all true friends of the Government to devote their influence to the suppression of the rebellion; but when it becomes evident that party and the machinery of official influence are being used to secure the perpetuation of the present Administration, those who conscientiously believe that the interests of the country and of freedom demand a change in favor of vigor and purity and nationality, have no choice but to appeal at once to the people before it is too late to secure a fair discussion of principles.

Those in behalf of whom this appeal is made have thoughtfully surveyed the political field, and have arrived at the following conclusions: *First*, that even were the reelection of Mr. Lincoln desirable, it is practically impossible against the union of influences which will oppose him. *Second*, that should he be reelected, his manifest tendency towards compromises and temporary expedients of policy will become stronger during a second term than it has been in the first, and the cause of human liberty, and the dignity of the nation, suffer proportionately, while the war may continue to languish

during his whole Administration, till the public debt shall become a burden too great to be borne. *Third*, that the patronage of the Government through the necessities of the war has been so rapidly increased, and to such an enormous extent, and so loosely placed, as to render the application of the one-term principle absolutely essential to the certain safety of our republican institutions. *Fourth*, that we find united in Hon. Salmon P. Chase more of the qualities needed in a President during the next four years than are combined in any other available candidate. His record is clear and unimpeachable, showing him to be a statesman of rare ability and an administrator of the highest order, while his private character furnishes the surest available guarantee of economy and purity in the management of public affairs. *Fifth*, that the discussion of the Presidential question, already commenced by the friends of Mr. Lincoln, has developed a popularity and strength in Mr. Chase unexpected even to his warmest admirers; and while we are aware that its strength is at present unorganized, and in no condition to manifest its real magnitude, we are satisfied that it only needs a systematic and faithful effort to develop it to an extent sufficient to overcome all opposing obstacles. For these reasons the friends of Mr. Chase have determined on measures which shall present his claims fairly and at once to the country. A central organization has been effected, which already has its connections in all the States, and the object of which is to enable his friends everywhere most effectually to promote his elevation to the Presidency. We wish the hearty cooperation of all those who are in favor of the speedy restoration of the Union on the basis of universal freedom, and who desire an administration of the Government during the first period of its new life which shall to the fullest extent develop the capacity of free institutions, enlarge the resources of the country, diminish the burdens of taxation, elevate the standard of public and private morality, vindicate the honor of the Republic before the world, and in all things make our American nationality the fairest example for imitation which human progress has ever achieved. If these objects meet your approval, you can render efficient aid by exerting yourself at once to organize your section of the country, and by corresponding with the chairman of the National Executive Committee for the purpose either of receiving or imparting information.

Of this circular, sent broadcast over the country, many copies of course fell into the hands of the President's friends, and they soon began to come to the Executive Mansion. The President, who was absolutely without curiosity in regard to attacks upon himself, refused to look at them, and they accumulated unread in the desk of his secretary. At last, however, the circular got into print, and it appeared in the "National Intelligencer" of Washington on the morning of the 22d of February. Mr. Chase at once wrote to the President to assure him that he had no knowledge of the existence of the letter before seeing it in print. He gave a brief account of the solicitations of his friends, in compliance with which he had

¹ Lincoln to Pomeroy, May 12, 1864. MS.

consented to be a candidate for the Presidency, adding, with his usual nobility of phrase :

I have never wished that my name should have a moment's thought in comparison with the common cause of enfranchisement and restoration, or be continued before the public a moment after the indication of a preference by the friends of that cause for another. I have thought this explanation due to you as well as to myself. If there is anything in my action or position which in your judgment will prejudice the public interests under my charge, I beg you to say so. I do not wish to administer the Treasury Department one day without your entire confidence. For yourself I cherish sincere respect and esteem, and, permit me to add, affection. Differences of opinion as to administrative action have not changed these sentiments, nor have they been changed by assaults upon me by persons who profess themselves the special representatives of your views and policy. You are not responsible for acts not your own; nor will you hold me responsible except for what I do or say myself. Great numbers now desire your reelection. Should their wishes be fulfilled by the suffrage of the people, I hope to carry with me into private life the sentiments I now cherish, whole and unimpaired.

The President next day acknowledged the receipt of this letter, and promised to answer it more fully when he could find time to do so. The next week he wrote at greater length :¹

I would have taken time to answer yours of the 22d sooner, only that I did not suppose any evil could result from the delay, especially as, by a note, I promptly acknowledged the receipt of yours, and promised a fuller answer. Now, on consideration I find there is really very little to say. My knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's letter having been made public came to me only the day you wrote, but I had, in spite of myself, known of its existence several days before. I have not yet read it, and I think I shall not. I was not shocked or surprised by the appearance of the letter, because I had had knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's committee and of secret issues which, I supposed, came from it and of secret agents who, I supposed, were sent out by it, for several weeks. I have known just as little of these things as my friends have allowed me to know. They bring the documents to me, but I do not read them; they tell me what they think fit to tell me, but I do not inquire for more. I fully concur with you that neither of us can be justly held responsible for what our respective friends may do without our instigation or countenance; and I assure you, as you have assured me, that no assault has been made upon you by my instigation or with my countenance. Whether you shall remain at the head of the Treasury Department is a question which I do not allow myself to consider from any standpoint other than my judgment of the public service, and, in that view, I do not perceive occasion for a change.²

¹ Lincoln to Chase, Feb. 29, 1864. MS.

² After this correspondence had passed, Mr. Pomeroy, who, whatever his defects of character, did not lack courage, rose in his place in the Senate (March 10), reiterated with added energy his criticisms of the

Before the President wrote this letter the candidacy of Mr. Chase had already passed completely out of sight. In fact, it never could have been said to exist except in the imagination of Mr. Chase and a narrow circle of adherents. He was by no means the choice even of the great body of the radicals who were discontented with Mr. Lincoln. So early as the 17th of December, 1863, Mr. Medill, the editor of the "Chicago Tribune," who represented the most vehement Republican sentiment of the North-west, wrote:

I presume it is true that Mr. Chase's friends are working for his nomination, but it is all lost labor; Old Abe has the inside track so completely that he will be nominated by acclamation when the convention meets. . . . The people will say to Chase: "You stick to finance and be content until after 1868"; and to Grant, "Give the rebels no rest; put them through; your reward will come in due time"; but Uncle Abe must be allowed to boss the reconstruction of the Union.

And from the opening of the year 1864 the feeling in favor of the renomination of Lincoln grew so ardent and so restless that it was almost impossible for the most discreet of the Republican leaders to hold the manifestations of the popular preference in check. An attempt was made by the Treasury officials in Indiana to prevent the State convention which met in February from declaring for Lincoln, but it was all in vain. Wherever any assembly of Republicans came together fresh from the people the only struggle was as to who should get first on the floor to demand the President's renomination. Mr. Chase's principal hope was, of course, founded upon the adhesion of his friends in Ohio; but the result there, as elsewhere, proved how blind he was to the course of politics. The governor of the State wrote to the President³ that he was mortified to hear that he had been set down as a Chase man.

The fact that Mr. Chase has been laboring, for the past year at least, with an eye single to promoting his own selfish purposes, totally regardless of the consequences to the Government, as I believe has been the case, is alone sufficient to induce me to oppose him; but aside from this, the policy inaugurated under your lead must be maintained, and it would be suicidal to change leaders in the midst of the contest.

This is only a specimen of dozens of letters which came from the leading men of the State, who had been relied upon by Mr. Chase to promote his canvass; and finally the feeling grew so strong in Ohio that although no au-

President and his eulogy of Mr. Chase, and claimed that the latter had nothing to do with the circular, but had been "drafted into the service" without his consent.

³ Tod to Lincoln, Feb. 24, 1864.

thorized convention of Republicans was to meet at that time, the Union members of the legislature took the matter in hand and gave, on the 25th of February, the *coup de grâce* to the Secretary's candidacy. They held a full caucus, and nominated Mr. Lincoln for reelection, at the demand, as they said, of the people and the soldiers of Ohio. The State of Rhode Island, which Mr. Chase had expected the personal influence of his son-in-law, Governor Sprague, to secure for him, also made haste to range itself with the other States of the North; and as more than a month before the great State of Pennsylvania had by the unanimous expression of the Union members of its legislature declared for Lincoln, the Secretary at last concluded that the contest was hopeless, and wrote another letter to Mr. Hall, referring to his former statement that should his friends in Ohio manifest a preference for another he would acquiesce in that decision, and adding:

The recent action of the Union members of our legislature indicates such a preference. It becomes my duty, therefore,—and I count it more a privilege than a duty,—to ask that no further consideration be given to my name. It was never more important than now that all our efforts and all our energies should be devoted to the suppression of the rebellion, and to the restoration of order and prosperity, on solid and sure foundations of union, freedom, and impartial justice; and I earnestly urge all with whom my counsels may have weight to allow nothing to divide them while this great work, in comparison with which persons and even parties are nothing, remains unaccomplished.

In the closing line of this letter occurs the first intimation of that feeling of revolt against the Republican party which afterwards led Mr. Chase to seek the nomination of the Democrats. In numerous letters written during the spring he reiterated his absolute withdrawal from the contest, but indulged in sneers and insinuations against the President, which show how deeply he was wounded by his discomfiture.¹

THE CLEVELAND CONVENTION.

BEFORE the snows melted, it had become evident to the most narrow and malignant of Mr. Lincoln's opponents that nothing could

prevent his renomination by the Republican convention which was to meet at Baltimore in June. There was no voice of opposition to him in any organized Republican assembly, except in Missouri, and even there the large majority of radical Republicans were willing to accept the universal verdict of their party; but there were a few earnest spirits scattered throughout the country to whom opposition to the Administration had become the habit of a lifetime. There were others not so honest, who had personal reasons for disliking the President. To these it was impossible to stand quietly by and see Mr. Lincoln made his own successor without one last effort to prevent it. The result of informal consultations among them was the publication of a number of independent calls for a mass convention of the people to meet at Cleveland, Ohio, on the 31st of May, a week before the assembling of the Republican convention at Baltimore.

The two centers of this disaffection were in St. Louis and New York. In the former city it was composed of a small fraction of a faction. The large majority of those radical politicians who had been for two years engaged in the bitter struggle with Blair and his associates still retained their connection with the Republican party, and had no intention of breaking off their relations with the Union party of the nation. It was a small fraction of their number which issued its call to the disaffected throughout the nation. Harking back to the original cause of quarrel, they had attached themselves blindly to the personal fortunes of General Frémont; they now put themselves in communication with a small club of like-minded enthusiasts in New York called the "Central Frémont Club," and invited their radical fellow-citizens to meet them in convention at Cleveland. They made no pretense of any purpose of consultation or of independent individual action. The object stated in their call was "in order then and there to recommend the nomination of John C. Frémont for the Presidency of the United States, and to assist in organizing for his election." They denounced "the imbecile and vacillating policy of the present Administration in the con-

¹ In an article published in "The Galaxy," July, 1873, by Mr. J. M. Winchell, whom Mr. Schuckers in his "Life of Chase" calls the author of the Pomeroy circular (see Schuckers' "Life of Chase," p. 500), occurs this singular passage: "The movement in favor of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase, had culminated in disaster; that gentleman's chief supporters, including his senatorial son-in-law, having manifested a plentiful lack of nerve or zeal, when the critical question became public, of arraying him against his official chief, and made haste to take him at his word of declination, diplomatically spoken, in order to rouse their flagging

spirits." In a letter of the 7th of May (Chase to Riddle, Warden, p. 576) Mr. Chase said: "I am trying to keep all Presidential aspiration out of my head. I fancy that as President I could take care of the Treasury better with the help of a Secretary than I can as Secretary without the help of a President. But our Ohio folks don't want me enough, if they want me at all, to make it proper for me to allow my name to be used. I hope the time is not distant when I can honorably separate myself from political affairs altogether, leaving the new era to the new men whom God may raise up for it."

duct of the war, . . . its treachery to justice, freedom, and genuine democratic principles in its plan of reconstruction, whereby the honor and dignity of the nation have been sacrificed to conciliate the still existing and arrogant slave power and to further the ends of an unscrupulous partisan ambition"; they demanded the immediate extinction of slavery throughout the whole United States by congressional action, the absolute equality of all men before the law, and a vigorous execution of the laws confiscating the property of the rebels. This circular was stronger in its epithets than in its signatures; the names of the signers were, as a rule, unknown to fame. One column was headed by the name of the Rev. George B. Cheever, another by the apparently farcical signature of "Pantaleon Candidus." Perhaps the most important name affixed to this document was that of Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who wrote desiring to sign her name to the call, "taking it for granted," she said, "that you use 'men' in its largest sense." She informed the committee that they had "lifted politics into the sphere of morals and religion, and made it the duty of all true men and women to unite with them in building up the New Nation." She spelled "new nation" with capital letters, and gave occasion for a malicious accusation that her letter was merely an advertisement of a radical Frémont paper of that name which was then leading a precarious existence in New York. Mr. Samuel Bowles inferred from her letter that the convention was to be composed of "the gentler sex of both genders."

Another call was issued by the People's Committee of St. Louis, though signed by individuals from several other States. These gentlemen felt themselves

impelled on their own responsibility to declare to the people that the time had come for all independent men, jealous of their liberties and of the national greatness, to confer together and unite to resist the swelling invasion of an open, shameless, and unrestrained patronage which threatens to engulf under its destructive wave the rights of the people, the liberty and dignity of the nation;

declaring that they did not recognize in the Baltimore convention the essential conditions of a truly national convention: it was to be held, they thought, too near Washington and too far from the center of the country, its mode of convocation giving no guarantee of wise or honest deliberation. This circular was signed by B. Gratz Brown of Missouri and by a number of old-time abolitionists in the East, though its principal signers were from the ranks of the most vehement German radicals of St. Louis. Still another call was drawn up and issued by Lucius Robinson, Controller of the

State of New York. The terms of this address were properly applicable to all the Administration Republicans. It called upon the

citizens of the United States who mean to uphold the Union, who believe that the rebellion can be suppressed without infringing the rights of individuals or of States, who regard the extinction of slavery as among the practical effects of the war for the Union, and favor an amendment of the Federal Constitution for the exclusion of slavery, and who demand integrity and economy in the administration of government.

The signers of this call approached the question from an entirely different point of view from that of the radical Germans of St. Louis. In their view Mr. Lincoln, instead of being a craven and a laggard, was going entirely too fast and too far. Their favorite candidate was General Grant. Mr. Wendell Phillips, the stormy petrel of all our political disturbances, found enjoyment even in this teapot tempest. He strongly approved the convention at Cleveland, and constructed beforehand a brief platform for it.

Subdue the South as rapidly as possible. The moment territory comes under our flag reconstruct States thus: confiscate and divide the lands of rebels; extend the right of suffrage broadly as possible to whites and blacks; let the Federal Constitution prohibit slavery throughout the Union, and forbid the States to make any distinction among their citizens on account of color or race.¹

He also advised the nomination "for the Presidency of a statesman and a patriot"; by which terms he intended to exclude Mr. Lincoln.

The convention might have met, deliberated, and adjourned for all the people of the United States cared about it, had it not been for the violent and enthusiastic admiration it excited in Democratic newspapers and the wide publicity they gave to its proceedings. They described it as a gathering of the utmost dignity and importance; they pretended to discern in it a distinct line of cleavage through the middle of the Republican party. For several days before it assembled they published imaginary dispatches from Cleveland representing the streets and hotels as crowded with a throng of earnest patriots determined on the destruction of the tyrant Lincoln. The papers of Cleveland tell another story. There was no sign of political upheaval in the streets or hotels of that beautiful and thriving city. Up to the very day of the meeting of the convention there was no place provided for it, and when the first stragglers began to arrive they found no preparation made to receive them. All the public halls of any consequence were

¹ Phillips to Stallo, April 21.

engaged, and the convention at last took shelter in a small room called "Chapin's Hall." Its utmost capacity was five or six hundred persons, and it was much too large for the convention; delegates and spectators together were never numerous enough to fill it. The delegates were for the most part Germans from St. Louis. They held a preliminary meeting the night before the convention opened, and passed vigorous and loyal resolutions of the usual character. To the resolution that the rebellion must be put down, some one moved to amend by adding the words, "with God's assistance," which was voted down with boisterous demonstrations. *Non tali auxilio* was the sentiment of these materialist Missourians.

The convention met at 10 o'clock in a hall only half filled. Hoping for later arrivals, they delayed organization until nearly noon. The leaders who had been expected to give character and direction to the movement did not appear. It was hoped until the last moment that Mr. Greeley would be present, though he had never given any authority for such an expectation. He said, in answer to an inquiry, that "the only convention he took any interest in was that one Grant was holding before Richmond." Mr. Gratz Brown, the real head of the movement, was also absent. Emil Pretorius and Mr. Cheever, who, from the two extremities of the country, had talked most loudly in favor of the convention, staid away. The only persons present whose names were at all known were General John Cochrane of New York; Colonel Moss, a noisy politician from Missouri; Caspar Butz of Illinois; two or three of the old-school abolitionists; and several (not the weightiest) members of the staff of General Frémont. The delegates from the German Workingmen's Union of Chicago were discredited in advance by the publication of a card from the majority of the association they pretended to represent, declaring their intention to support the nominees of the Baltimore convention. Some one moved, as usual, the appointment of a committee on credentials; but as no one had any valid credentials, it was resolved instead to appoint a committee to enroll the names of the delegates. No action was taken even upon this proposition, because the act of enrollment would have been too fatal a confession of weakness. The committee on organization reported the name of General Cochrane for president of the convention, who made a discreet and moderate speech. He was a man of too much native amiability of character to feel personal bitterness towards any one, and too adroit and experienced a politician to commit himself irrevocably against any contingency. He had, in fact, thrown an anchor to windward by visiting the President

before the convention met and assuring him of his continued friendship. A delegate from Iowa, who seemed to have taken the convention seriously, then offered a resolution that no member of it should hold, or apply for, office under the next Administration—a proposition which was incontinently smothered. While waiting for the report of the committee on the platform, speeches were made by several delegates. Mr. Plumb attacked Mr. Lincoln as a pro-slavery politician. Colonel Moss of Missouri denounced him as the principal obstacle to freedom in America. A debate now arose on the proposition of the committee on rules that in voting for President the vote should be by States according to their representation in Congress. This was in the interest of the Grant delegates and was violently opposed by the Missourians, who formed a large majority of the convention, and had come for no purpose but to nominate Frémont. In the course of this debate the somewhat dreary proceedings were enlivened by a comic incident. A middle-aged man, who gave his name as Carr, addressed the chair, saying that he had come from Illinois as a delegate under the last call and did not want to be favored "a single mite." His ideas not flowing readily, he repeated this declaration three times in a voice continually rising in shrillness with his excitement. Something in his tone stirred the risibles of the convention, and loud laughter saluted the Illinoisan. As soon as he could make himself heard he cried out, "These are solemn times." This statement was greeted with another laugh, and the delegate now shouted at the top of his voice, "I believe there is a God who holds the universe in his hands as you would hold an egg." This comprehensive scheme of theocracy was too much for the Missouri agnostics, and the convention broke out in a tumult of jeers and roars. The rural delegate, amazed at the reception of his confession of faith, and apparently in doubt whether he had not stumbled by accident into a lunatic asylum, paused, and asked the chairman in a tone of great seriousness whether he believed in a God. The wildest merriment now took possession of the assembly, in the midst of which the Illinois theist solemnly marched down the aisle and out of the house, shaking from his feet the dust of that unbelieving convention. As soon as the laughing died away the committee on resolutions reported a set of judicious and, on the whole, undeniable propositions, such as, the Union must and shall be preserved, the constitutional laws of the United States must be obeyed, the rebellion must be suppressed by force of arms and without compromise. The platform did not greatly differ from that of Baltimore, except that it spoke in favor of one

Presidential term, declared that to Congress instead of the President belonged the question of reconstruction, and advocated the confiscation of the property of the rebels and its distribution among the soldiers.

The platform was adopted after brief debate, and a letter from Mr. Wendell Phillips was read to the convention, full of the vehement unreason which distinguished all the attempts of this matchless orator to apply his mind to the practical affairs of life. He predicted the direst results from four more years of Lincoln's administration.

Unless the South is recognized [which he apparently thought not improbable under Lincoln's nerveless policy], the war will continue; the taxation needed to sustain our immense debt, doubled by that time, will grind the laboring man of the North down to the level of the pauper labor of Europe; and we shall have a government accustomed to despotic power for eight years—a fearful peril to democratic institutions.

He denounced Mr. Lincoln's plan of reconstruction, and drew this comical parallel between him and Frémont:

The Administration, therefore, I regard as a civil and military failure, and its avowed policy ruinous to the North in every point of view. Mr. Lincoln may wish the end peace and freedom, but he is wholly unwilling to use the means which can secure that end. If Mr. Lincoln is reëlected I do not expect to see the Union reconstructed in my day, unless on terms more disastrous to liberty than even disunion would be. If I turn to General Frémont, I see a man whose first act was to use the freedom of the negro as his weapon; I see one whose thorough loyalty to democratic institutions, without regard to race, whose earnest and decisive character, whose clear-sighted statesmanship and rare military ability, justify my confidence that in his hands all will be done to save the state that foresight, skill, decision, and statesmanship can do.

With characteristic reliance on his own freedom from prejudice, he continued:

This is an hour of such peril to the Republic that I think men should surrender all party and personal partiality, and support any man able and willing to save the state.

This was, in fact, the attitude of mind of the vast majority of the people of the country; but all it meant in Mr. Phillips's case was that he was willing to vote for either Frémont or Butler to defeat Lincoln.

A feeble attempt was now made by the delegates from New York, who called themselves "War Democrats," to induce the convention to nominate General Grant. Mr. Colvin read a letter from Mr. Lucius Robinson of New York—afterwards governor of that State—attacking the errors and blunders "of the weak Executive and Cabinet," and claiming that the

hope of the people throughout the country rested upon General Grant as a candidate. Although Mr. Colvin supplemented the reading of this letter by promising a majority of one hundred thousand for Grant in the State of New York, the Missourians cheered only the louder for Frémont; and when a last effort was made by Mr. Demers of Albany to nominate Grant, he was promptly denounced as a Lincoln hireling. Colonel Moss, in the uniform of a general of the Missouri militia, arose and put a stop to the profitless discussion by moving in a stentorian voice the nomination of General Frémont by acclamation, which was at once done; and the assembly completed its work by placing John Cochrane on the ticket as its candidate for Vice-President. No one present seemed to have any recollection of the provision of the Constitution which forbids both of these officers being taken from the same State.

The convention met again in the evening and listened to dispirited and discouraging speeches of ratification. The committee appointed in the afternoon to give a name to the new party brought in that of the "Radical Democracy," and in this style it was formally christened. An executive committee was appointed, of men destitute of executive capacity, and the convention adjourned.

Its work met with no response from the country. On the day of its meeting the German press of Cleveland expressed its profound disappointment at the smallness and insignificance of the gathering, and with a few unimportant exceptions the newspapers of the country greeted the work of the convention with an unbroken chorus of ridicule. Its absurdities and inconsistencies were indeed too glaring for serious consideration. Its movers had denounced the Baltimore convention as being held too early for an expression of the deliberate judgment of the people, and now they had made their own nominations a week earlier; they had claimed that Baltimore was not sufficiently central in situation, and they had held their convention on the northern frontier of the country; they had claimed that the Baltimore delegates were not properly elected, and they had assumed to make nominations by delegates not elected at all; they had denounced the Baltimore convention as a close corporation and invited the people to assemble in mass, and when they came together they were so few they never dared to count themselves; they had pretended to desire a stronger candidate than Mr. Lincoln, and had selected the most conspicuous failure of the war; they clamored loudly against corruption in office, and one of the leading personages in the convention was a member of Frémont's staff who had been

dismissed the service for dishonesty in Government contracts.

The whole proceeding, though it excited some indignation among the friends of Mr. Lincoln, was regarded by the President himself only with amusement. On the morning after the convention a friend, giving him an account of it, said that, instead of the many thousands who had been expected, there were present at no time more than four hundred men. The President, struck by the number mentioned, reached for the Bible which commonly lay on his desk, and after a moment's search, read these words:

And every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented, gathered themselves unto him; and he became a captain over them: and there were with him about four hundred men.¹

It was only among the Democratic papers that the Cleveland convention met with any support or applause. They gave it solemn and unmeasured eulogies for its independence, its patriotism, its sagacity, and even its numbers. The Copperhead papers in New York urged the radicals not to give up their attitude of uncompromising hostility to Lincoln, and predicted a formidable schism in the Republican party as a consequence of their action. But the motive of this support was so evident that it deceived nobody; and it was compared by a sarcastic observer to the conduct of the Spanish urchins accompanying a condemned Jew to an *auto-da-fé*, and shouting, in the fear that he might recant and rob them of their holiday, "Stand fast, Moses." The ticket of the two New Yorkers met with a gust of ridicule which would have destroyed more robust chances than theirs. "The New York Major-General John C. and the New York Brigadier-General John C." formed a matched ticket fated to laughter.

But if no one else took them seriously, the two generals at least saw in the circumstances no occasion for smiling. General Frémont promptly accepted his nomination.² He said:

This is not an ordinary election. It is a contest for the right even to have candidates, and not merely, as usual, for the choice among them. . . . The ordinary rights secured under the Constitution and the laws of the country have been violated, and extraordinary powers have been usurped by the Executive. It is directly before the people now to say whether or not the principles established by the Revolution are worth maintaining. . . . To-day we have in the country the abuses of a military dictation without its unity of action and vigor of execution—an Administration marked at home by disregard of constitutional rights, by its violation of

personal liberty and the liberty of the press, and, as a crowning shame, by its abandonment of the right of asylum.

The feebleness and want of principle of the Administration, its incapacity and selfishness, were roundly denounced by General Frémont, but he repudiated the cry of the Cleveland convention for confiscating the property of rebels. In conclusion he said:

If the convention at Baltimore will nominate any man whose past life justifies a well-grounded confidence in his fidelity to our cardinal principles, there is no reason why there should be any division among the really patriotic men of the country. To any such I shall be most happy to give a cordial and active support. . . . But if Mr. Lincoln should be nominated—as I believe it would be fatal to the country to indorse a policy and renew a power which has cost us the lives of thousands of men, and needlessly put the country on the road to bankruptcy—there will remain no other alternative but to organize against him every element of conscientious opposition with the view to prevent the misfortune of his reelection.

He therefore accepted the nomination, and informed the committee that he had resigned his commission in the army. General Cochrane accepted in briefer and more judicious language, holding the same views as his chief on the subject of confiscation. Later in the summer some of the partisans of Frémont, seeing that there was positively no response in the country to his candidacy, wrote to him suggesting that the candidates nominated at Cleveland and Baltimore should withdraw, and leave the field entirely free for a united effort for "a new convention which should represent the patriotism of all parties." They asked him whether in case Mr. Lincoln would withdraw he would do so.³ Although the contingency referred to was more than sufficiently remote, General Frémont with unbroken dignity refused to accede to this proposition.

Having now definitely accepted the Cleveland nomination [he said], I have not the right to act independently of the truly patriotic and earnest party who conferred that honor upon me. . . . It might, beside, have only the effect still further to unsettle the public mind and defeat the object you have in view if we should disorganize before first proceeding to organize something better.⁴

But a month later⁵ he seemed to have regarded the public mind as beyond the risk of unsettling, and he then wrote to his committee, withdrawing his name from the list of candidates. He could not, however, withhold a parting demonstration against the President.

¹ This, it will be remembered, was several years in advance of the famous reference to the Cave of Adulam in the British Parliament.

² June 4, 1864. ³ August 20. ⁴ August 25.

⁵ September 21.

In respect to Mr. Lincoln [he said] I continue to hold exactly the sentiments contained in my letter of acceptance. I consider that his administration has been politically, militarily, and financially a failure, and that its necessary continuance is a cause of regret for the country. There never was a greater unanimity in a country than was exhibited here at the fall of Sumter, and the South was powerless in the face of it; but Mr. Lincoln completely paralyzed this generous feeling. He destroyed the strength of the position and divided the North when he declared to the South that slavery should be protected. He has built up for the South a strength which otherwise they could have never attained, and this has given them an advocate on the Chicago platform.

With a final denunciation of the leading men whose reticence had "established for Mr. Lincoln a character among the people which leaves now no choice," General Frémont at last subsided into silence. General Cochrane on the same day withdrew his name from the Cleveland ticket, which had already passed into swift oblivion. His letter had none of the asperity which characterized that of his chief. He genially attacked the Chicago resolutions, and, while regretting the omissions of the Baltimore platform, he approved it in substance.

We stand within view [he said] of a rebellion suppressed, within hail of a country reunited and saved. War lifts the curtain and discloses the prospect. War has given to us Atlanta, and war offers to us Richmond. . . . Peace and division, or war and the Union. Other alternative there is none.

Two incidents which occurred in the spring of 1864 caused unusual excitement among both wings of the opposition to Mr. Lincoln. The one was the delivery of Arguelles to the Spanish authorities; the other was the seizure of two New York newspapers for publishing a forged proclamation. It was altogether natural that the pro-slavery Democrats and peace men should have objected to these acts, as one of the injured parties was a slave trader, and the others opponents of the war; but it was not the least of the absurdities of the Cleveland protestants that they also, in their anxiety to find a weapon against the President, at the very moment that they were assailing him for not overriding all law and precedent in obedience to their demand, still belabored him for these instances of energetic action in the very direction in which they demanded that he should proceed.

The case of Arguelles was a perfectly clear one; and if the surrender of a criminal is ever justified as an exercise of international comity in the absence of treaty stipulations, no objections could reasonably be made in this instance. He was a colonel in the Spanish army and lieutenant-governor of the district of Colon in Cuba. He had captured a cargo of African slaves in his official capacity, and had received

much credit for his efficiency and a considerable sum of money as his share of the prize. He went to New York immediately afterwards and purchased a Spanish newspaper which was published there; but after his departure from Cuba it was ascertained that in beginning so expensive a business in New York he did not rely exclusively upon the money he had received from the Government, but that in concert with a curate of Colon he had sold one hundred and forty-one of the recaptured Africans, had put the money in his own pocket, and had officially reported them as having died of small-pox. The Cuban Government laid these facts before the State Department at Washington, and represented that the return of this miscreant to Cuba was necessary to secure the liberation of the unfortunate victims of his cruelty and greed. It was impossible to bring the matter before the courts, as no extradition treaty existed at that period between Spain and the United States, and the American authorities could not by any legal procedure take cognizance of the crime. The President and Mr. Seward at once assumed the responsibility of acting in the only way indicated by the laws of common humanity and international courtesy. Arguelles was arrested in New York by the United States marshal, put in charge of a Spanish officer commissioned for the purpose, and by him taken to Havana. The action of the Government was furiously attacked by all the pro-slavery organs. A resolution was introduced by Mr. Johnson in the Senate demanding an explanation of the circumstances.¹ Mr. Seward answered,² basing the action of the Government upon the stipulations of the ninth article of the treaty of 1842 with Great Britain, by which the two countries agreed to use all the measures in their power to close the market for slaves throughout the world, and added:

Although there is a conflict of authorities concerning the expediency of exercising comity towards a foreign government by surrendering, at its request, one of its own subjects charged with the commission of crime within its territory, and although it may be conceded that there is no obligation to make such a surrender upon a demand therefor, unless it is acknowledged by treaty or by statute law, yet a nation is never bound to furnish asylum to dangerous criminals who are offenders against the human race; and it is believed that if in any case the comity could with propriety be practiced, the one which is understood to have called forth the resolution furnished a just occasion for its exercise.

The Captain-General of Cuba, on the arrival of Arguelles, sent his thanks to Mr. Seward³

¹ "Congressional Globe," May 26, 1864.

² May 30, 1864.

³ McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 355.

for the service which he had rendered to humanity by furnishing the medium through which a great number of human beings will obtain their freedom whom the desertion of the person referred to would have reduced to slavery. His presence alone in this island a very few hours has given liberty to eighty-six.

The grand jury of New York nevertheless indicted Marshal Murray for the arrest of Arguelles on the charge of kidnapping. The marshal pleaded the orders of the President as the authority for his action, and based upon this a petition that the case be transferred to the United States court; and although the judges before whom he was taken, who happened to be Democrats, denied this petition, the indictment was finally quashed, and the only result of the President's action was the denunciation which he received in the Democratic newspapers, combined with the shrill treble of the clamor from the Cleveland convention.

The momentary suppression of the two New York newspapers, of which mention has been made, was a less defensible act, and arose from an error which was, after all, sufficiently natural on the part of the Secretary of War. On the 19th of May the "Journal of Commerce" and the "World," two newspapers which had especially distinguished themselves by the violence of their opposition to the Administration, published a forged proclamation signed with the President's name calling in terms of exaggerated depression not far from desperation for four hundred thousand troops. It was a scheme devised by two young Bohemians of the press, probably with no other purpose than that of making money by stock-jobbing. In the tremulous state of the public mind which then prevailed, in the midst of the terrible slaughter of Grant's opening campaign, the country was painfully sensitive to such news, and the forged proclamation, telegraphed far and wide, accomplished for the moment the purpose for which it was doubtless intended. It excited everywhere a feeling of consternation; the price of gold rose rapidly during the morning hours, and the Stock Exchange was thrown into violent fever. The details of the mystification were managed with some skill, the paper on which the document was written being that employed by the Associated Press in delivering its news to the journals, and it was left at all the newspaper offices in New York just before the moment of going to press. If all the newspapers had printed it the guiltlessness of each would have been equally evident; but unfortunately for the victims of the trick, the only two papers which published the forgery were those whose previous conduct had rendered them liable to the suspicion of bad faith. The fiery Secretary

of War immediately issued orders for the suppression of the "World" and "Journal of Commerce," and the arrest of their editors. The editors were never incarcerated; after a short detention, they were released. The publication of the papers was resumed after two days of interruption. These prompt measures and the announcement of the imposture sent over the country by telegraph soon quieted the excitement, and the quick detection of the guilty persons reduced the incident to its true rank in the annals of vulgar misdemeanors.

But in the memories of the Democrats of New York the incident survived, and was vigorously employed during the summer months as a means of attack upon the Administration. Governor Seymour interested himself in the matter and wrote a long and vehement letter to the district attorney of New York, denouncing the action of the Government. "These things," he said in his exclamatory style, "are more hurtful to the national honor and strength than the loss of battles. The world will confound such acts with the principles of our Government, and the folly and crimes of officials will be looked upon as the natural results of the spirit of our institutions. Our State and local authorities must repel this ruinous inference." He predicted the most dreadful consequences to the city of New York if this were not done. The harbor would be sealed up, the commerce of New York paralyzed, the world would withdraw from the keeping of New York merchants its treasures and its commerce if they did not unite in this demand for the security of persons and of property. In obedience to these frantic orders Mr. Oakey Hall, the district attorney, did his best, and was energetically seconded by Judge Russell, who charged the grand jury that the officers who took possession of these newspaper establishments were "liable as for riot"; but the grand jury, who seem to have kept their heads more successfully than either the governor or the judge, resolved that it was "inexpedient to examine into the subject." The governor could not rest quiet under this contemptuous refusal of the grand jury to do his bidding. He wrote again to the district attorney, saying, "As the grand jury have refused to do their duty, the subject of the seizure of these journals should at once be brought before some proper magistrate." He promised him all the assistance he required in the prosecution of the investigations. Thus egged on by the chief executive of the State, Mr. Hall proceeded to do the work required of him. Upon warrants issued at his instance by City Judge Russell, General Dix and several officers of his staff were arrested.¹ They

¹ July 1.

submitted with perfect courtesy to the behest of the civil authorities, and appeared before Judge Russell to answer for their acts. The judge held them over on their own recognizance to await the action of another grand jury, which, it was hoped, might be more subservient to the wishes of the governor than the last; but no further action was ever taken in the matter.

During the same week which witnessed the radical fiasco at Cleveland, an attempt was made in New York to put General Grant before the country as a Presidential candidate. The committee having the matter in charge made no public avowal of their intentions; they merely called a meeting to express the gratitude of the country to the general for his signal services. They even invited the President to take part in the proceedings, an invitation which he said it was impossible for him to accept.

I approve [he wrote], nevertheless, whatever may tend to strengthen and sustain General Grant and the noble armies now under his direction. My previous high estimate of General Grant has been maintained and heightened by what has occurred in the remarkable campaign he is now conducting, while the magnitude and difficulty of the task before him do not prove less than I expected. He and his brave soldiers are now in the midst of their great trial, and I trust that at your meeting you will so shape your good words that they may turn to men and guns, moving to his and their support.¹

With such a gracious approval of the movement, the meeting naturally fell into the hands of the Lincoln men. General Grant, neither at this time nor at any other, gave the least countenance to the efforts which were made to array him in political opposition to the President.

THE RESIGNATION OF MR. CHASE.

AFTER Mr. Chase's withdrawal from his hopeless contest for the Presidency, his sentiments toward Mr. Lincoln, as exhibited in his letters and his diary, took on a tinge of bitterness which gradually increased until their friendly association in the public service became no longer possible. There was something almost comic in the sudden collapse of his candidacy; and the American people, who are quick to detect the ludicrous in any event, could not help smiling when the States of Rhode Island and Ohio ranged themselves among the first on the side of the President. This was intolerable to Mr. Chase, who, with all his great and noble qualities, was deficient in humor. His wounded self-love could find

no balm in these circumstances except in the preposterous fiction which he constructed for himself, that through "the systematic operations of the Postmaster-General and those holding office under him a preference for the reelection of Mr. Lincoln was created."² Absurd as this fancy was, he appears firmly to have believed it; and the Blairs, whom he never liked, now appeared to him in the light of powerful enemies. An incident which occurred in Congress in April increased this impression to a degree which was almost maddening to the Secretary. The quarrel between General Frank Blair and the radicals in Missouri had been transferred to Washington; and one of the Missouri members having made charges against him of corrupt operations in trade permits, he demanded an investigation, which resulted, of course, in his complete exoneration from such imputations. It was a striking instance of the bewildering power of factious hatred that such charges should ever have been brought. Any one who knew Blair, however slightly, should have known that personal dishonesty could never have offered him the least temptation. In defending himself on the floor of Congress the natural pugnacity of his disposition led him to what soldiers call an offensive return,—in fact, Frank Blair always preferred to do his fighting within the enemy's lines,—and believing the Secretary of the Treasury to be in sympathy, at least, with the assault which had been made upon his character, he attacked him with equal vigor and injustice by way of retaliation. As we have seen in another chapter, before this investigation was begun the President had promised when Blair should resign his seat in the House to restore him to the command in the Western army which he had relinquished on coming to Washington. Although he greatly disapproved of General Blair's attack upon Mr. Chase, the President did not think that he was justified on this account in breaking his word; and doubtless reasoned that sending Blair back to the army would not only enable him to do good service in the field, but would quiet an element of discord in Congress. The result, however, was most unfortunate in its effect on the feelings of Mr. Chase. He was stung to the bitterest resentment by the attack of Blair; and he held that restoring Blair to his command made the President an accomplice in his offense. From that time he took a continually darkened view both of the President's character and of his chances for reelection. "No good could come," he said, "of the probable identification of the next Administration with the Blair family." His first thought was to resign his place in the Cabinet; but on consulting his friends and finding them unani-

¹ Lincoln to F. A. Conkling, June 3, 1864.

² Chase to General Blunt, May 4, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 583.

mous against such a course, he gave it up.¹ But his letters during this month are full of ill-will to the President. To his niece he wrote: "If Congress gives me the measures I want, and Uncle Abe will stop spending so fast," he, Chase, would bring about resumption within a year. To another, he blamed the President for the slaughter at Fort Pillow.² To Governor Buckingham, who had written him a sympathetic note, he said:³ "My chief concern in the attacks made on me springs from the conviction that the influence of the men who make them must necessarily divide the friends of the Union and freedom, unless the President shall cast it off, of which I have little hope. I am willing to be myself its victim, but grieve to think our country may be also"; and adds this compliment to his correspondent at the expense of his colleagues in the Government: "How strikingly the economy and prudence shown by the narration of your excellent message contrasts with the extravagance and recklessness which mark the disbursement of national treasure." Writing to another friend, he indulges in this lumbering pleasantry: "It seems as if there were no limit to expense. . . . The spigot in Uncle Abe's barrel is made twice as big as the bung-hole. He may have been a good flatboatman and rail-splitter, but he certainly never learned the true science of cooperating." This was a dark month to him; his only fortress of refuge was his self-esteem: secure in this, he lavished on every side his criticisms and his animadversions upon his associates. "Congress," he said,⁴ "is unwilling to take the decisive steps which are indispensable to the highest degree of public credit; and the Executive does not, I fear, sufficiently realize the importance of an energetic and comprehensive policy in all departments of administration." Smarting as he did under the attack of the Blairs, he pretended to treat them with contempt. "Do not trouble yourself about the Blairs," he wrote to an adherent. "Dogs will bark at the moon, but I have never heard that the moon stopped on that account." By constantly dwelling on the imaginary coalition of Lincoln with the Blairs against him, he began at last to take heart again and to think that against adversaries so weak and so wicked there might still be a chance of victory. Only a fortnight before the gathering of the Republican convention at Baltimore he began to look beyond the already certain event of that convention, and to contemplate the possibility of defeating Mr. Lincoln after he should be nominated.

It has become quite apparent now [he said] that the impertunity of Mr. Lincoln's special friends for an early convention, in order to make his nomination sure, was a mistake both for him and for the country. The convention will not be regarded as a Union convention, but simply as a Blair-Lincoln convention, by a great body of citizens whose support is essential to success. Few except those already committed to Mr. Lincoln will consider themselves bound by a predetermined nomination. Very many who may ultimately vote for Mr. Lincoln will wait the course of events hoping that some popular movement for Grant, or some other successful general, will offer a better hope of saving the country. Others, and the number seems to be increasing, will not support his nomination in any event; believing that our ill-success thus far in the suppression of the rebellion is due mainly to his course of action and inaction, and that no change can be for the worse. But these are speculations merely from my standpoint.⁵

The Secretary's relations with the President and his colleagues while he was in this frame of mind were naturally subject to much friction, and this frame of mind had lasted with little variation for more than a year. It was impossible to get on with him except by constant agreement to all his demands. He chose in his letters and his diaries to represent himself as the one just and patriotic man in the Government, who was striving with desperate energy, but with little hope, to preserve the Administration from corrupt influences. It cannot be doubted that his motives were pure, his ability and industry unusual, his integrity, of course, beyond question. He held, and justly held, that, being responsible for the proper conduct of affairs in his department, he should not be compelled to make appointments contrary to his convictions of duty. He was unquestionably right in insisting that appointments should be made on public grounds, and that only men of ability and character should be chosen to fill them; but he had an exasperating habit of assuming that nobody agreed with him in this view, and that all differences of opinion in regard to persons necessarily sprung from corrupt or improper motives on the part of those who differed with him. At the slightest word of disagreement he immediately put on his full armor of noble sentiments and phrases, appealed to Heaven for the rectitude of his intentions, and threatened to resign his commission if thwarted in his purpose. When he was not opposed he made his recommendations, as his colleagues did, on grounds of political expediency as well as of personal fitness. One day, for instance, he recommended the appointment of Rheinhold Solger as Assistant Register of

¹ Chase to Jay Cooke, May 5, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 584.

² Chase to D. T. Smith, May 9, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 537.

³ May 9, 1864. *Ibid.*

⁴ Chase to Hamilton, May 15, 1864. *Ibid.*, p. 590.

⁵ Chase to Brough, May 19, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 593.

the Treasury on the ground that "the German supporters of the Administration have had no considerable appointment in the department." He frequently gave in support of his nominees the recommendation of senators and representatives of the States where the appointments were to be made. But he always sturdily resented any suggestions from the President that an appointment proposed by him would have a bad effect politically. He had the faculty of making himself believe that his obstinacy in such matters arose purely from devotion to principle. He would not only weary the President with unending oral discussions, but, returning to the department, would write him letters filled with high and irrelevant morality, and at evening would enter in his diary meditations upon his own purity and the perversity of those he chose to call his enemies. It would hardly be wise for the ablest man of affairs to assume such an attitude. To justify it at all one should be infallible in his judgment of men. With the Secretary of the Treasury this was far from being the case. He was not a good judge of character; he gave his confidence freely to any one who came flattering him and criticizing the President, and after having given it, it was almost impossible to make him believe that the man who talked so judiciously could be a knave. His chosen biographer, Judge Warden, says: "He was indeed sought less by strong men and by good men than by weak men and by bad men."¹ A much better authority, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, while giving him unmeasured praise for other qualities calls him "profoundly ignorant of men," and says, "The baldest charlatan might deceive him into trusting his personal worth."²

Early in the year 1864 the Federal appointments in New York City began to be the subject of frequent conversation between the President and the Secretary of the Treasury. So many complaints of irregularity and inefficiency in the conduct of affairs in the New York custom house had reached Mr. Lincoln that he began to think a change in the officers there would be of advantage to the public service. Every suggestion of this sort, however, was met by Mr. Chase with passionate opposition. Mr. Lincoln had not lost confidence in the integrity or the high character of Mr. Barney, the collector of customs; he was even willing to give him an important appointment abroad in testimony of his continued esteem; but he was not satisfied with what he heard of the conduct of his office. Several of his subordinates had been detected in improper and corrupt practices, and after being defended by Mr. Chase until defense was impossible, they had been

dismissed, and in some cases punished. In the month of February, while the conduct of the custom house was under investigation in Congress, a special agent of the Treasury Department named Joshua F. Bailey came to Washington, having been summoned as a witness to testify before the committee of the House of Representatives in charge of the matter. He called on the chairman in advance, and endeavored to smother the investigation by saying, among other things, that, whatever might be developed, the President would in no case take any action. The chairman of the committee reported this impudent statement to the President, who at once communicated the fact to the Secretary of the Treasury, saying, "The public interest cannot fail to suffer in the hands of this irresponsible and unscrupulous man"; and he proposed at the same time to send Mr. Barney as minister to Portugal.³ Mr. Chase defended Bailey, and resisted with such energy the displacement of Mr. Barney that midsummer came with matters in the custom house unchanged. Mr. Chase, in his diary, gives a full account of a conversation between himself and the President⁴ in regard to this matter, in which the Secretary reiterates his assurances of confidence in the conduct of the custom house, and gives especially warm expression to his regard for Bailey, meeting the positive assertion of the chairman of the committee of the House of Representatives by saying, "I think Mr. Bailey is not the fool to have made such a suggestion." So long as he remained in office he gave this blind confidence to Bailey, who finally showed how ill he deserved it by the embezzlement of a large sum of public money, and by his flight in ruin and disgrace from the country.

In February, 1863, the Senate rejected the nomination of Mr. Mark Howard as collector of internal revenue for the district of Connecticut. Mr. Chase, hearing that this rejection was made at the instance of Senator Dixon, immediately wrote a letter demanding the re-nomination of Howard; or, if the President should not agree with him in this, of some one not recommended by Senator Dixon. A few days later the President wrote to Mr. Chase that after much reflection and with a great deal of pain that it was adverse to his wish, he had concluded that it was not best to renominate Mr. Howard. He recognized the constitutional right of the Senate to reject his nominations without being called to account; and to take the ground in advance that he would nominate no one for the vacant place who was favored by a senator so eminent in character and ability as Mr. Dixon seemed to him pre-

¹ Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 530.

² Reid, "Ohio in the War," Vol. I., p. 18.

³ Lincoln to Chase, Feb. 12, 1864.

⁴ June 6.

posterous. The only person from Connecticut recommended for the vacancy was Mr. Goodman, in favor of whom Senator Dixon and Mr. Loomis, the Representative in the House, cordially united. The President therefore asked Mr. Chase to send him a nomination for Goodman.¹ Immediately on the receipt of this letter Mr. Chase wrote out his resignation as Secretary of the Treasury in these words:

Finding myself unable to approve the manner in which selections for appointment to important trusts in this department have been recently made, and being unwilling to remain responsible for its administration, under existing circumstances, I respectfully resign the office of Secretary of the Treasury.²

This letter, however, never reached the President, as Senator Dixon came in before it was dispatched and discussed the matter in a spirit so entirely different from that of the Secretary that no quarrel was possible with him; and after he left, Mr. Chase wrote a letter to the President, in which he said:

I do not insist on the renomination of Mr. Howard; and Mr. Dixon and Mr. Loomis, as I understand, do not claim the nomination of his successor. . . . My only object—and I think you so understand it—is to secure fit men for responsible places, without admitting the rights of senators or representatives to control appointments, for which the President, and the Secretary, as his presumed adviser, must be responsible. Unless this principle can be practically established, I feel that I cannot be useful to you or the country in my present position.³

It is possible that the Secretary may have thought that this implied threat to resign brought both the President and the senator to reason, for the matter ended at this time by their allowing him to have absolutely his own way. Mr. Dixon wrote to the President,⁴ saying that he “preferred to leave the whole matter to the Secretary of the Treasury, believing his choice would be such as to advance the interests of the country and the Administration”; and the President, who heartily detested these squabbles over office, was glad of this arrangement. There was not a shade of difference between him and Mr. Chase as to the duty of the Administration to appoint only fit men to office, but the President always preferred to effect this object without needlessly offending the men upon whom the Government depended for its support in the war.

¹ March 2, 1863. Warden, “Life of S. P. Chase,” p. 524.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 524, 525.

³ March 3, 1863. Warden, “Life of S. P. Chase,” p. 525.

⁴ Dixon to Lincoln, March 5, 1863. MS.

⁵ Mr. Schuckers was private secretary to Mr. Chase and author of a biography of him, q. v., p. 423.

⁶ Lincoln to Chase, May 8, 1863; MS. Warden, “Life of S. P. Chase,” p. 527.

A few months later Mr. Lincoln was subjected to great trouble and inconvenience by the constant complaints which came to him by every mail from Puget Sound against the collector for that district, one Victor Smith, from Ohio, a friend and appointee of Mr. Chase. This Smith is described by Schuckers⁵ as

a man not very likely to become popular on the Pacific coast—or anywhere else. He believed in spirit rappings and was an avowed abolitionist; he whined a great deal about “progress”; was somewhat arrogant in manner and intolerant in speech, and speedily made himself thoroughly unpopular in his office.

No attention was paid by the Secretary to these complaints, which were from time to time referred to him by the President; but at last the clamor by letter and by deputations from across the continent became intolerable, and the President, during a somewhat protracted absence of the Secretary from Washington, ordered a change to be made in the office. In a private note to Mr. Chase, wishing to avoid giving him personal offense, he said:

My mind is made up to remove Victor Smith as collector of the customs at the Puget Sound district. Yet in doing this I do not decide that the charges against him are true. I only decide that the degree of dissatisfaction with him there is too great for him to be retained. But I believe he is your personal acquaintance and friend, and if you desire it, I will try to find some other place for him.⁶

Three days later the Secretary, having returned to Washington, answered in his usual manner, protesting once more his ardent desire to serve the country faithfully, and claiming that he had a right to be consulted in matters of appointment. He sent a blank commission for the person whom the President had concluded to appoint, but protested against the precedent, and tendered his resignation. This time again the President gave way. He drove to the Secretary’s house, handed his petulant letter back to him, and begged him to think no more of the matter.⁷ Two days afterward, in a letter assenting to other recommendations for office which had come to him from the Treasury Department, he said, “Please send me over the commission for Louis C. Gunn, as you recommend, for collector of customs at Puget Sound.”⁸

Any statesman possessing a sense of humor

⁷ Mr. Maunsell B. Field, in his “Memories of Many Men and Some Women,” p. 303, quotes Mr. Lincoln as saying: “I went directly up to him with the resignation in my hand, and, putting my arm around his neck, said to him, ‘Chase, here is a paper with which I wish to have nothing to do; take it back and be reasonable.’ It was difficult to bring him to terms. I had to plead with him a long time; but I finally succeeded, and heard nothing more of that resignation.”

⁸ Warden, “Life of S. P. Chase,” p. 528.

would have hesitated before repeating this identical proceeding; but, as we have said, Mr. Chase was deficient in this saving sense, and he apparently saw no reason why it should not be repeated indefinitely.

Mr. John J. Cisco, the assistant treasurer at New York, who had served the Government with remarkable ability and efficiency through three administrations, resigned his commission in May, to take effect at the close of the fiscal year, the 30th of June, 1864. It was a post of great importance in a financial point of view, and not insignificant in the way of political influence. Up to this time, Mr. Chase had made all the important appointments in New York from his own wing of the supporters of the Union—the men who had formerly been connected with the Democratic party, and who now belonged to what was called the radical wing of the Republican. This matter was the source of constant complaint from those who were sometimes called the Conservative Republicans of New York, or those who had in great part formerly belonged to the Whig party, and who in later years acknowledged the leadership of Mr. Seward. The President was anxious that in an appointment so important as that which was now about to be made both sections of the party in New York should, if possible, be satisfied; and especially that no nominations should be made which should be positively objectionable to Senator Morgan, who was considered to represent more especially the city of New York and its great commercial interests. To this Mr. Chase at first interposed no objection; and it was upon full and friendly consultation and conference between him and Senator Morgan that the appointment was offered successively to Mr. Denning Duer and to Mr. John A. Stewart, both of them gentlemen of the highest standing. But both declined the office tendered them; upon which Mr. Chase suddenly resolved to appoint Mr. Maunsell B. Field, who was at that time an assistant secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Field was a gentleman of excellent social position, of fine literary culture, to whom the Secretary was sincerely attached, but who was entirely destitute of such standing in either the political or the financial circles of New York as was required by so important a place. Senator Morgan at once protested vigorously against such an appointment, which only served to confirm the Secretary in his insistence upon it. Besides his objections to Mr. Field, whom he thought in no way competent to hold such a place, Mr. Morgan urged that the political result of his appointment would be extremely unfavorable to the Union party in New York. He became thoroughly alarmed, and begged the Secretary and the President successively to make their

choice among three of the most eminent citizens of New York whose names he presented; but the Secretary's mind was made up. Without further consultation with the President, he sent him the nomination for Mr. Field on the 27th of June. The next day the President replied:

I cannot, without much embarrassment, make this appointment; principally, because of Senator Morgan's very firm opposition to it. Senator Harris has not yet spoken to me on the subject, though I understand he is not averse to the appointment of Mr. Field, nor yet to any one of the three named by Senator Morgan. . . . Governor Morgan tells me he has mentioned three names to you, to wit: R. M. Blatchford, Dudley S. Gregory, and Thomas Hillhouse. It will really oblige me if you will make choice among those three, or any other man that Senators Morgan and Harris will be satisfied with, and send me a nomination for him.¹

There have been few ministers who would have refused so reasonable and considerate a request as this, but it did not for a moment shake Mr. Chase's determination to have his own way in the matter. He sent a note to the President asking for an interview, and telegraphed to Mr. Cisco,² begging him most earnestly to withdraw his resignation and give the country the benefit of his services at least one quarter longer. He was determined, in one way or another, that neither the President nor the senators of New York should have anything to say in regard to this appointment; and conscious of his own blamelessness in all the controversy, he went home and wrote in his diary: "Oh, for more faith and clearer sight! How stable is the city of God! How disordered is the city of man!" Later in the day the President wrote him:

When I received your note this forenoon suggesting a conversation—a verbal conversation—in relation to the appointment of a successor to Mr. Cisco, I hesitated, because the difference does not, in the main part, lie within the range of a conversation between you and me. As the proverb goes, no man knows so well where the shoe pinches as he who wears it. I do not think Mr. Field a very proper man for the place, but I would trust your judgment and forego this were the greater difficulty out of the way. Much as I personally like Mr. Barney, it has been a great burden to me to retain him in his place when nearly all our friends in New York were directly or indirectly urging his removal. Then the appointment of Hogeboom to be general appraiser brought me to, and has ever since kept me at, the verge of open revolt. Now the appointment of Mr. Field would precipitate it, unless Senator Morgan, and those feeling as he does, could be brought to concur in it. Strained as I

¹ Lincoln to Chase, June 28, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 611.

² Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 506.

already am at this point, I do not think that I can make this appointment in the direction of still greater strain.¹

In the evening the extremely tense situation was relieved by a telegram from Mr. Cisco complying with the request of the Secretary to remain another quarter. But it was not in the nature of Mr. Chase to accept this simple dénouement. He felt that the President had acted badly, and must be subjected to some discipline; and he naturally resorted to those measures which had hitherto proved so effective. He wrote to him:

The withdrawal of Mr. Cisco's resignation, which I inclose, relieves the present difficulty; but I cannot help feeling that my position here is not altogether agreeable to you, and it is certainly too full of embarrassment and difficulty and painful responsibility to allow in me the least desire to retain it. I think it my duty, therefore, to inclose to you my resignation. I shall regard it as a real relief if you think proper to accept it, and will most cheerfully render to my successor any aid he may find useful in entering upon his duties.²

In this letter Mr. Chase inclosed his formal resignation. The President received this note while very much occupied with other affairs. The first paper which met his eye was the telegram from Mr. Cisco withdrawing his resignation. Glad that the affair was so happily terminated, he laid the packet aside for some hours, without looking at the other papers contained in it. The next morning, wishing to write a congratulatory note to Mr. Chase upon this welcome termination of the crisis, he found, to his bitter chagrin and disappointment, that the Secretary had once more tendered his resignation. He took it to mean precisely what the Secretary had intended—that if he were to retain Mr. Chase as Secretary of the Treasury, it should not be hereafter as a subordinate; to refuse this resignation, to go once more to the Secretary and urge him to remain, would amount to an abdication of his constitutional powers. He therefore, without hesitation, sent him this letter:

Your resignation of the office of Secretary of the Treasury, sent me yesterday, is accepted. Of all I have said in commendation of your ability and fidelity I have nothing to unsay, and yet you and I have reached a point of mutual embarrassment in our official relations which it seems cannot be overcome or longer sustained consistently with the public service.³

At the same time he sent to the Senate the nomination of David Tod of Ohio as Secretary of the Treasury. Most people have chosen to consider this a singular selection. Yet

David Tod was by no means an unknown man. He had gained an honorable position at the bar; had been the Democratic candidate for governor in 1843; had served with credit as minister to Brazil; was first vice-president of the Charleston convention and became its president at Baltimore on the secession of Caleb Cushing; was one of the most prominent men in Ohio in railroad and mining enterprises; had been the most eminent and efficient of the war Democrats of the State; and as governor had shown executive capacity of high order.⁴ There were some superficial points of resemblance between Mr. Chase and Governor Tod that doubtless caught the attention of the President in choosing a successor to the former in such haste. Tod was a citizen of the same State with Chase, of which both had been governor; he had come into the Union party from the Democrats; he was a man of unusually dignified and impressive presence; but it is safe to say that no one had ever thought of him for the place now vacant. The nomination was presented to the Senate at its opening and was received with amazement. Not the least surprised of the statesmen in the Capitol was Mr. Chase himself, who was busy at the moment in one of the committee rooms of the Senate arranging some legislation which he needed for his department. There are many indications which go to show that his resignation of the evening before was intended, like those which had preceded it, as a means of discipline for the President. After sending it he wrote to Mr. Cisco expressing his thanks for the withdrawal of his resignation, and saying:

It relieves me from a very painful embarrassment. . . . I could not remain here and see your office made parcel of the machinery of party, or even feel serious apprehension that it might be.

Even on the morning of the 30th of June, Mr. Chase wrote to the President recommending a considerable increase of taxation, saying that there would be a deficit by existing laws of about eighty millions.

On the other hand, there is nothing to show, up to the instant that he was informed of the nomination of Tod, that he expected his official career to end on that day. The news for that moment created something like consternation in political circles at the capital. Mr. Washburne hurried to the White House, saying the change was disastrous; that at this time of military unsuccess, financial weakness, congressional hesitation on questions of conscription, and imminent famine in the West, it was

¹ Lincoln to Chase, June 28, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 613.

² Chase to Lincoln, June 29, 1864.

³ Lincoln to Chase, June 30, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 614.

⁴ Reid, "Ohio in the War."

ruinous. The Senate Committee on Finance, to which the nomination of Tod had been referred, came down in a body to talk with the President about it. The President gave this account of the interview: "Fessenden was frightened, Conness was angry, Sherman thought we could not have gotten on together much longer anyhow, Cowan and Van Winkle were indifferent."¹ They not only objected to any change, but specially protested against the nomination of Tod as too little known and too inexperienced for the place. The President replied that he had little personal acquaintance with Tod, that he had nominated him on account of the high opinion he had formed of him as governor of Ohio; but that the Senate had the duty and responsibility of passing upon the question of fitness, in which it must be entirely untrammelled; he could not, in justice to himself or to Tod, withdraw the nomination. The impression of the undesirability of the change rather deepened during the day. Mr. Hooper of Massachusetts, an intimate friend of both the President and Mr. Chase, and the man upon whom both principally relied for the conduct of financial legislation in the House, spoke of the crisis in deep depression. He said he had been for some time of the opinion that Mr. Chase did not see his way entirely clear to raising the funds which were necessary; that his supplementary demand for money sent in at the close of the session after everything had been granted which he asked, looked like an intention to throw an anchor to windward in case he was refused. Mr. Hooper said he had waked this morning feeling a little vexed that Chase had done this, that he thought it was an attempt to throw an unfair responsibility upon Congress; but now this resignation came to relieve him of all responsibility; his successor would have an enormous work to do; the future was troubled; there remained the great practical problem, regularly recurring, to raise one hundred millions a month.

I do not clearly see [he said] how it is to be done; the talent of finance in its national aspect is something entirely different from banking. Most bankers criticize Mr. Chase, but he has a faculty of using the knowledge and experience of others to the best advantage; that has sufficed him hitherto; a point has been reached where he does not clearly see what comes next, and at this point the President allows him to step from under his load.¹

This view of the case has a color of confirmation in a passage of the diary of Mr. Chase of the 30th of June, which goes to show at least a mixed motive in his resignation. After his resignation had been accepted, Mr. Hooper

¹ J. H., Diary.

² Chase, Diary. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 618.

had called upon him and, evidently hoping that some reconciliation was still possible, told him that, several days before, the President had spoken to him in terms of high esteem, indicating his purpose of making him Chief-Justice in the event of a vacancy, a post which Mr. Chase had long before told the President was the one he most desired. Mr. Chase answered that had such expression of good-will reached him in time it might have prevented the present misunderstanding, but that now he could not change his position. "Besides," he adds, "I did not see how I could carry on the department without more means than Congress was likely to supply, and amid the embarrassment created by factious hostility within, and both factious and party hostility without the department."²

At night the President received a dispatch from Mr. Tod declining the appointment on the ground of ill-health. The President's secretary went immediately to the Capitol to communicate this information to the senators, so that no vote might be taken on the nomination. Early the next morning the President sent to the Senate the nomination of William Pitt Fessenden, senator from Maine. When he gave the nomination to his secretary, the latter informed him that Mr. Fessenden was then in the ante-room waiting to see him. He answered, "Start at once for the Senate, and then let Fessenden come in." The senator, who was chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, began immediately to discuss the question of the vacant place in the Treasury, suggesting the name of Mr. McCulloch. The President listened to him for a moment with a smile of amusement, and then told him that he had already sent *his* nomination to the Senate. Fessenden leaped to his feet, exclaiming, "You must withdraw it. I cannot accept." "If you decline," said the President, "you must do it in open day, for I shall not recall the nomination." "We talked about it for some time," said the President, "and he went away less decided in his refusal."

The nomination was instantly confirmed, the executive session lasting no more than a minute. It gave immediate and widespread satisfaction. There seemed to be no difference of opinion in regard to Mr. Fessenden; the only fear was that he would not accept. His first impulse was to decline; but being besieged all day by the flattering solicitations of his friends, it was impossible for him to persist in refusing. The President was equally surprised and gratified at the enthusiastic and general approval the nomination had met with. He said:¹

It is very singular, considering that this appointment is so popular when made, that no one ever



WILLIAM PITT FESSENDEN.
(AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

mentioned his name to me for that place. Thinking over the matter, two or three points occurred to me: first, his thorough acquaintance with the business; as chairman of the Senate Committee of Finance he knows as much of this special subject as Mr. Chase; he possesses a national reputation and the confidence of the country; he is a radical without the petulant and vicious fretfulness of many radicals. There are reasons why this appointment ought to be very agreeable to him. For some time past he has been running in rather a pocket of bad luck; the failure to renominate Mr. Hamlin makes possible a contest between him and the Vice-President, the most popular man in Maine, for the election which is now imminent. A little while ago in the Senate you know Trumbull told him his ill-temper had left him no friends, but this sudden and most gratifying manifestation of good feeling over his appointment, his instantaneous confirmation, the earnest entreaties of everybody that he should accept, cannot but be very grateful to his feelings.

Mr. Chase left a full record in his diaries and letters of the sense of injury and wrong done him by the President. He especially resented the President's reference to the "embarrassment in our official relations." "I had found a good deal of embarrassment from him," he said; "but what he had found from me I could not imagine, unless it has been caused by my unwillingness to have offices distributed as spoils or benefits. . . . He has never given me the active and earnest support I was entitled to." After Mr. Fessenden was appointed, the ex-Secretary entered in his diary his approval of the selection:

He has the confidence of the country, and many who have become inimical to me will give their

confidence to him and their support. Perhaps they will do more than they otherwise would to sustain him, in order to show how much better a Secretary he is than I was.

Before Mr. Fessenden accepted his appointment he called on Mr. Chase and conversed fully with him on the subject. Mr. Chase frankly and cordially advised him to accept, telling him that all the great work of the Department was now fairly blocked out and in progress, that the organization was all planned and in many ways complete, and all in a state which admitted of completion. His most difficult task would be to provide money. "But he would have advantages," said Mr. Chase, "which I had not. Those to whom I had given offense would have no cause of ill-will against my successor, and would very probably come to his support with zeal increased by their ill-will to me; so that my damage would be to his advantage, especially with a certain class of capitalists and bankers."

The entries in Mr. Chase's diary continue for several days in the same strain. He congratulates himself on his own integrity; he speaks with severity of the machinations of imaginary enemies. On the 2d of July he remarks the passage of the bill giving the Secretary of the Treasury control over trade in the rebel States and authority to lease abandoned property and to care for the freedmen, and adds: "How much good I expected to accomplish under this bill! Will my successor do this work? I fear not. He had not the same heart for this measure that I had." On the Fourth of July the ringing of bells, the firing of cannon, and the snapping of crackers awoke him to the reflection that "if the Government had been willing to do justice, and had used its vast powers with equal energy and wisdom, the struggle might have been happily terminated long ago." Later in the same day Mr. Fessenden came to see him, and informed him that he had been discussing with the President the subject of appointments in the Treasury Department, and that Mr. Lincoln had requested him not to remove any friends of Governor Chase unless there should be a real necessity for it. Mr. Chase persuaded himself that if the President had spoken to him in that tone he would have withdrawn his resignation.

Why did he not? [he mused.] I can see but one reason—that I am too earnest, too antislavery, and say too radical, to make him willing to have me connected with the Administration: just as my opinion that he is not earnest enough, not antislavery enough, not radical enough, but goes naturally with those hostile to me, rather than with me, makes me willing and glad to be disconnected from it.

How far his animosity against the President had misled this able, honest, pure, and otherwise sagacious man may be seen in one single phrase. Referring to the President's refusal to sign the reconstruction bill, he put down his deliberate opinion that neither the President nor his chief advisers had abandoned the idea of possible reconstruction with slavery; and this in spite of the President's categorical statement, "While I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation or by any of the acts of Congress," and of his declaration that such action

would be "a cruel and an astounding breach of faith." But after all these expressions of that petulant injustice which was only a foible in a noble character, the greatest financial Secretary which the country had known since Hamilton had a perfect right, in laying down the high office he had borne with such integrity and such signal success, to indulge in the meditation which we find in his diary of June 30:

So my official life closes. I have laid broad foundations. Nothing but wise legislation and especially bold yet judicious provision of taxes, with fair economy in administration, and energetic yet prudent military action, . . . seems necessary to insure complete success.

THE WATER-SEEKER.

WHO makes a road through regions rough and lone,
Who plants and rears a tree where shade is none,
Who scores the furrow in a soil untamed,
Is fit in song heroic to be named.

Nor scanter praise be his whose patient force
Gives to an arid land a water-course,
Gradual, but grateful as the jet that broke
From forth the ledge that felt the prophet's stroke.

ON THE INDIAN RESERVATIONS.



APACHE SOLDIER, OR SCOUT.

I WAS camping with a couple of prospectors one night some years ago on the south side of the Pinal Range in Arizona Territory. We were seated beside our little cooking fire about 9 o'clock in the evening engaged in smoking and drowsily discussing the celerity of movement displayed by Geronimo, who had at last been heard of down in Sonora, and might

and puffing our pipes and lying on our backs: we looked up into the dark branches of the trees above. I think I was making a sluggish calculation of the time necessary for the passage of a far-off star behind the black trunk of an adjacent tree when I felt moved to sit up. My breath went with the look I gave, for, to my unbounded astonishment and consternation, there sat three Apaches on the opposite side of our fire with their rifles across their laps. My comrades also saw them, and, old, hardened frontiersmen as they were, they positively gasped in amazement.

"Heap hungry," ejaculated one of the savage apparitions, and again relapsed into silence.

As we were not familiar with Mr. Geronimo's countenance we thought we could see the old villain's features in our interlocutor's, and we began to get our artillery into shape.



APACHE.

be already far away from there, even in our neighborhood. Conversation lapsed at last,



YUMA APACHE.

The savages, in order to allay the disturbance which they had very plainly created, now explained.

"We White Mountain. No want fight — want flour."

They got the flour in generous quantities, it is needless to add, and although we had previously been very sleepy, we now sat up and entertained our guests until they stretched themselves out and went to sleep. We pretended to do the same. During that night I never closed my eyes, but watched, momentarily expecting to see more visitors come gliding out of the darkness. I should not have been surprised even to see an Apache drop from a branch above me.

They left us in the morning, with a blessing couched in the style of forcible speech that my Rocky Mountain friends affected on unusual occasions. I mused over the occurrence; for while it brought no more serious consequences than the loss of some odd pounds of bacon and flour, yet there was a warning in the way those Apaches could usurp the prerogatives of ghosts, and ever after that I used

to mingle undue proportions of discretion with my valor.

Apaches are wont to lurk about in the rocks and *chaparral* with the stealth of coyotes, and they have always been the most dangerous of all the Indians of the Western country. They are not at all valorous in their methods of war, but are none the less effective. In the hot desert and vast rocky ranges of their country no white man can ever catch them by direct pursuit. Since railroads and the telegraph have entered their territory, and military posts have been thoroughly established, a very rigorous military system has kept them in the confines of the San Carlos reservation, and there is no longer the same fear that the next dispatches may bring news of another outbreak. But the troopers under General Miles always had their cartridge-belts filled and their saddle-pockets packed, ready at any hour of the day to jump out on a hostile trail.

The affairs of the San Carlos agency are administered at present by an army officer, Captain Bullis of the Twenty-fourth Infantry. As I have observed him in the discharge of



APACHE WOMAN WITH RATIONS.

his duties I have had no doubt that he pays high life insurance premiums. He does not seem to fear the beetle-browed pack of murderers with whom he has to deal, for he has spent his life in command of Indian scouts, and not only understands their character, but has gotten out of the habit of fearing anything. If the deeds of this officer had been done on civilized battlefields instead of in silently leading a pack of savages over the desert waste of the Rio Grande or the Staked Plain, they would have gotten him his niche in the temple of fame. Alas! they are locked up in the gossip of the army mess-room, and end in the soldiers' matter-of-fact joke about how Bullis used to eat his provisions in the field, opening one can a day from the packs, and, whether it was peaches or corned-beef, making it suffice. The Indians regard him as almost supernatural, and speak of the "Whirlwind" with many grunts of admiration as they narrate his wonderful achievements.

The San Carlos reservation, over which he has supervision, is a vast tract of desert and mountain, and near the center of it, on the Gila River, is a great flat plain where the long, low adobe buildings of the agency are built. Lines of white tents belonging to the cantonment form a square to the north. I arrived at this

place one evening, after a hot and tiresome march, in company with a cavalry command. I found a good bunk in the tent of an army officer whose heart went out to the man in search of the picturesque, and I was invited to destroy my rations that evening at the long table of the officers' mess, wondering much at the culinary miracles performed by the Chinamen who presided over its destinies. The San Carlos is a hotter place than I ever intend to visit again. A man who is used to breathing the fresh air of New York Bay is in no condition to enjoy at one and the same time the dinner and the Turkish bath which accompanies it. However, army officers are as entertaining in their way as poets, and I managed to be both stoical and appreciative.


On the following morning I got out my sketching book, and taking my host into my confidence, I explained my plans for action. The captain discontinued brushing his hair and looked me over with a humorous twinkle in his eyes. "Young man," he said, "if you desire to wear a long, gray beard you must make away with the idea that you are in Venice."

I remembered that the year before a Black-foot upon the Bow River had shown a desire to tomahawk me because I was endeavoring to immortalize him. After a long and tedious course of diplomacy it is at times possible to get one of these people to gaze in a defiant and fearful way down the mouth of a camera; but to stand still until a man draws his picture on paper or canvas is a proposition which no Apache will entertain for a moment. With the help of two officers, who stood up close to me, I was enabled to make rapid sketches of the scenes and people; but my manner at last aroused suspicion, and my game would vanish like a covey of quail. From the parade in front of our tent I could see the long lines of horses, mules, and burros trooping into the agency from all quarters. Here was my feast. Ordinarily the Indians are scattered for forty miles in every direction; but this was ration-day, and they all were together. After breakfast

we walked down. Hundreds of ponies, caparisoned in all sorts of fantastic ways, were standing around. Young girls of the San Carlos tribe flitted about, attracting my attention by the queer ornaments which, in token of their virginity, they wear in their hair. Tall Yuma bucks galloped past with their long hair flying out behind. The squaws crowded around the exit and received the great chunks of beef which a native butcher threw to them. Indian scouts in military coats and armed with rifles stood about to preserve order. Groups of old women sat on the hot ground and gossiped. An old chief, with a very respectable amount of adipose under his cartridge-belt, galloped up to our group and was introduced as Esquimezeu. We shook hands.

to the guard-house, granted absolute divorces, and probated wills with a bewildering rapidity. The interpreter struggled with his English; the parties at law eyed one another with villainous hate, and knives and rifles glistened about in a manner suggestive of the fact that the court of last resort was always in session. Among these people men are constantly killing one another, women are carried off, and feuds are active at all times. Few of these cases come before the agent if the parties think they can better adjust their own difficulties by the blood-atonement process, but the weak and the helpless often appeal.

After leaving the office and going some distance we were startled by a gun-shot from the direction of the room we had just left. We



DISTRIBUTION OF BEEF AT SAN CARLOS AGENCY.

These Indians have natural dignity, and it takes very little knowledge of manners for them to appear well. The Apaches have no expression for a good-bye or a greeting, and they never shake hands among themselves; but they consider handshaking an important ceremony among white men, and in their intercourse with them attach great importance to it. I heard an officer say that he had once seen an Apache come home after an absence of months: he simply stepped into the jicail, sat down without a word, and began rolling a cigarette.

The day was very hot, and we retired to the shade of Captain Bullis's office. He sat there with a big sombrero pulled over his eyes and listened to the complaints of the Indians against one another. He relegated certain offenders

started back. The negro soldiers of the guard came running past; the Indians became excited; and every one was armed in a minute. A giant officer of infantry, with a white helmet on his head, towered above the throng as he forced his way through the gathering mass of Indians. Every voice was hushed, and every one expected anything imaginable to happen. The Indians began to come out of the room, the smoke eddying over their heads, and presently the big red face and white helmet of the infantry officer appeared. "It's nothing, boys — only an accidental discharge of a gun." In three minutes things were going on as quietly as before.


Captain Bullis sauntered up to us, and tipping his hat on one side meditatively scratched

his head as he pointed to an old wretch who sat wrapped in a sheet against the mud wall of the agency.

"There's a problem. That old fellow's people won't take care of him any longer, and they steal his rations. He's blind and old and can't take care of himself." We walked up and regarded the aged being, whose parchment skin reminded us of a mummy. We recoiled at the filth, we shuddered at his helplessness, and we pitied this savage old man so steeped in misery; but we could do nothing. I know not how the captain solved his problem. Physical suffering and the anguish of cast-off old age are the compensations for the self-reliant savage warrior who dozes and dreams away his younger days and relegates the toil to those within his power.

We strolled among the horses and mules. They would let me sketch them, though I thought the half-wild beasts also shrunk away from the baleful gaze of the white man with his bit of paper. Broncos, mules, and burros stood about, with bags of flour tied on their saddles and great chunks of meat dripping blood over their unkempt sides. These woe-begone beasts find scant pasture in their desert home, and are banged about by their savage masters until ever-present evils triumph over equine philosophy. Fine navy blankets and articles of Mexican manufacture were stretched over some of the saddles, the latter probably obtained in a manner not countenanced by international law.

The Apaches have very little native manufacture. They rely on their foraging into Mexico for saddlery, serapes, and many other things; but their squaws make wicker-work, some of which I have never seen surpassed. *Allas*, or water-jars, of beautiful mold and unique design, are sold




Remin, Calv.

METHOD OF SKETCHING AT SAN CARLOS.

to any one who desires to buy them at a price which seems absurdly mean when the great labor expended on them is considered. But Apache labor is cheap when Apaches will work at all. The women bring into the cantonment great loads of hay on their backs, which is sold to the cavalry. It is all cut with a knife from bunches which grow about six inches apart, and is then bound up like wheat and carried for miles.

By evening all the Indians had betaken themselves to their own rancherias, and the agency was comparatively deserted for another week.

I paused for a day on the Gila, some miles from the agency, to observe the methods of agriculture practiced by the San Carlos Indian tribe. The Gila River bottoms are bounded on each side by bluffs, and on these the Indians build their brush jicails. High above the stifling heat of the low ground the hot winds from the desert blow through the leafy bowers which they inhabit. As they wear no clothing except breech-cloth and moccasins, they enjoy comparative comfort. The squaws go back and forth between their



John Remin, Calv.

WICHITAS SMOKING THEIR MEDICINE.

jicails and the river carrying wicker allas filled with muddy water, and the whole people seek the river and the system of irrigating ditches at evening time to turn the water over the parched ground and nourish the corn, wheat, and vegetables which grow there. Far up the valley the distant *stump* of a musket-shot reaches our ears; then another comes from a nearer point, and still another. Two or three women begin to take away the boards of an acequia dam near as the water rises to their knees, and with a final tug the deepening water rushes through. "Bang!" goes the Springfield carbine of an Indian standing at my elbow, and after some moments another gun-shot comes to our ears from below. As the minutes pass the reports come fainter and fainter, until we are

I bethink ourselves to go back to the camps of these people to spend an evening; so, leaving the troopers about their fires, we take our way in company with an old Government Indian scout to his own jicail. The frugal evening meal was soon disposed of, and taking our cigarettes we sat on the bluffs and smoked. A traveler in the valley looking up at the squatting forms of men against the sky would have remembered the great strength of chiaroscuro in some of Doré's drawings and to himself have said that this was very like it.

I doubt if he would have discerned the difference between the two white men who came from the bustling world so far away and the dark-skinned savages who seemed a sympathetic part of nature there, as mute as any of



INDIAN TERRITORY APACHES PLAYING MONTE.

just conscious of the sounds far off down the valley.

The pile of straw round which a mounted Indian has been driving half a dozen horses all day in order to stamp out the grain has lowered now until he will have but an hour's work more in the morning. He stops his beasts and herds them off to the hills to graze. The procession of barefooted men and of women bearing jars comes winding over the fields towards their humble habitations on the bluffs. The sun sinks behind the distant Sierras, and the beautiful quiet tones of the afterglow spread over the fields and the water. As I stand there watching the scene I can almost imagine that I see Millet's peasants; but, alas! I know too well the difference.

My companion, a lieutenant of cavalry, and

its rocks and as incomprehensible to the white man's mind as any beast which roams its barren wastes.

It grew dark, and we forbore to talk. Presently, as though to complete the strangeness of the situation, the measured "thump, thump, thump" of the tom-tom came from the vicinity of a fire some short distance away. One wild voice raised itself in strange discordant sounds, dropped low, and then rose again, swelling into shrill yelps, in which others joined. We listened, and the wild sounds to our accustomed ears became almost tuneful and harmonious. We drew nearer, and by the little flickering light of the fire discerned half-naked forms huddled with uplifted faces in a small circle around the tom-tom. The fire cut queer lights on their rugged outlines, the waves of sound

rose and fell, and the "thump, thump, thump, thump" of the tom-tom kept a binding time. We grew in sympathy with the strange concert, and sat down some distance off and listened for hours. It was more enjoyable in its way than any trained chorus I have ever heard.

The performers were engaged in making medicine for the growing crops, and the concert was a religious rite, which, however crude to us, was entered into with a faith that was attested by the vigor of the performance. All savages seem imbued with the religious feeling, and everything in nature that they do not comprehend is supernatural. Yet they know so much about her that one often wonders why they cannot reason further.

The one thing about our aborigines which interests me most is their peculiar method of thought. With all due deference to much scientific investigation which has been lavished upon them, I believe that no white man can ever penetrate the mystery of their mind or explain the reason of their acts.

The red man is a mass of glaring incongruities. He loves and hates in such strange fashions, and is constant and inconstant at such unusual times, that I often think he has no mental process, but is the creature of impulse. The searching of the ethnologist must not penetrate his thoughts too rapidly, or he will find that he is reasoning for the Indian, and not with him.

THE COMANCHES.



COMANCHE.

AFTER coming from the burning sands of Arizona the green stretches of grass and the cloud-flecked sky of northern Texas were very agreeable. At a little town called Henrietta I had entered into negotiations with a Texas cowboy to drive me over certain parts of the Indian Territory. He rattled up to my quarters in the early morning with a covered spring-wagon drawn by two broncos so thin and small and ugly that my sympathies were aroused, and I protested that they were not able to do the work.

The driver, a smart young fellow with his hat brim knocked jauntily back in front, assured me that "They can pull your freight, and you can bet on it." I have learned not to trust to appearances regarding Western ponies, and so I clambered in and we took up our way.

The country was a beautiful rolling plain, covered with rank, green grass and dotted with dried flowers. Heavily timbered creeks interlaced the view and lessened its monotony. The sun was hot, and the driver would nod, go fast asleep, and nearly fall out of the wagon. The broncos would quiet down to a walk, when he would suddenly awake, get out his black snake whip, and roar "mule language" at the lazy creatures. He was a good fellow and full of interest, had made the Montana trail three times with the Hash Knife outfit, and was full of the quaint expressions and pointed methods of reasoning peculiar to Western Americans. He gave me volumes of information concerning Comanches and Indians in general; and while his point of view was too close for a philosophical treatment of the case, he had a knowledge of details which carried him through. Speaking of their diet, he "allowed anything 's grub to an Injun, jus' so it hain't pisen."

We came at last to the Red River, and I then appreciated why it was called red, for its water is absolutely the reddest thing I ever saw in nature. The soil thereabouts is red, and the water is colored by it. We forded the river, and the little horses came so near sticking fast in the middle that my cowboy jumped out up to his waist and calmly requested me to do the same. I did, but to the ruin of a pair of white corduroys. We got through, however, and were in the Territory. Great quantities of plums, which the Indians gather, grow near the river.

In due course of time we came in sight of Fort Sill, which is built of stone, in a square around a parade of grass, and perched on rising ground. The plains about were dotted with the skulls of cattle killed for ration day. Sheds of poles covered with branches dotted the plains, and on our right the "big timber" of Catch Creek looked invitingly cool.

At Fort Sill I became acquainted with Mr. Horace P. Jones the Comanche interpreter, who has lived with that tribe for thirty-one years. He is an authority on the subject of Indians, and I tried to profit by his knowledge. He spoke of one strange characteristic of the Comanche language which makes their speech almost impossible to acquire. Nearly all Comanches are named after some object in nature, and when one dies the name of the object after which he was named is changed and the old word is never spoken again. Mr. Jones often uses one of the words which a recent death has made obsolete, and is met with muttered protestations from his Indian hearers. He therefore has to skirmish round and find the substitute for the outlawed word.

The Comanches are great travelers, and



A COMANCHE.

wander more than any other tribe. Mr. Jones has known Comanches to go to California, and as far south as Central America, on trips extending over years. They are a jolly, round-faced people, who speak Spanish, and often have Mexican blood in their veins—the result of stolen Mexican women, who have been ingrafted into the tribe.

The Comanches are less superstitious than Indians are generally. They apply an amount of good sense to their handling of horses which I have never seen among Indians elsewhere. They breed intelligently, and produce some of the most beautiful “painted” ponies imaginable. They take very good care of them, and in buying and selling have no lessons to learn from Yankee horse-traders. They still live in lodges, but will occupy a good house if they can obtain one. About this thing they reason rather well; for in their visits to the Caddoes and the Shawnees they observe the squalid

huts in the damp woods, with razor-back hogs contesting the rights of occupancy with their masters, and they say that the tepee is cleaner, and argue that if the Shawnees represent civilization, their own barbarism is the better condition of the two. However, they see the good in civilization and purchase umbrellas, baby-carriages, and hats, and of late years leave the Winchester at home; although, like the Texan, a Comanche does not feel well dressed without a large Colt strapped about his waist. Personal effects are all sacrificed at the death of their owners, though these Indians no longer destroy the horses, and they question whether the houses which are built for them by the Government should be burned upon the death of the tenant. Three or four have been allowed to stand, and if no dire results follow the matter will regulate itself.


The usual corps of Indian scouts is camped under the walls of Fort Sill, and is equally di-

vided between the Comanches and the Kiowas. They are paid, rationed, and armed by the Government, and are used to hunt up stray Government horses, carry messages, make arrests among their own people, and follow the predatory Texas cowboy who comes into the Territory to build up his fortunes by driving off horses and selling corn-juice to the Indians.

The Comanches are beginning to submit to arrests without the regulation exchange of fusillade; but they have got the worst of Texas law so long that one cannot blame them for being suspicious of the magistracy. The first question a Comanche asks of a white stranger is, "Maybe so you Texas cowboy?" to which I always assure them that I am a Kansas man, which makes our relations easy. To a Co-

for the race, and the throng moves to some level plain near, where a large ring is formed by the Indians on horseback.

An elderly Indian of great dignity of presence steps into the ring, and with a graceful movement throws his long red blanket to the ground and drops on his knees before it, to receive the wagers of such as desire to make them. Men walk up and throw in silver dollars and every sort of personal property imaginable. A Winchester rifle and a large nickel-plated Colt's revolver are laid on the grass near me by a cowboy and an Indian, and then each goes away. It was a wager, and I thought they might well have confidence in their stakeholder—mother earth. Two ponies, tied head and head, were led aside and left, horse against



IN THE BETTING-RING.

manche all bad men are "Texas cowboys," and all good people are "Kansas men."

At the scout camp I was allowed to sketch to my heart's content, and the people displayed great interest in the proceedings.

The morning of the Fourth of July found Mr. Jones and me in the saddle and on the way to the regulation celebration at the agency below the post. The Fourth of July and Christmas are the "white man's big Sundays" to the Indians, and they always expect the regular horse-race appropriations. The cavalymen contribute purses and the Indians run their ponies. Extra beeves are killed, and the red men have always a great regard for the "big Sundays."

As we approach the agency it is the hour

horse. No excitement seemed to prevail. Near me a little half-Mexican Comanche boy began to disrobe until he stood clad only in shirt and breech-cloth. His father addressed some whispered admonition and then led up a roan pony, prancing with impatience and evidently fully conscious of the work cut out for him that day. With a bound the little fellow landed on the neck of the pony only half way up; but his toes caught on the upper muscles of the pony's leg, and like a monkey he clambered up and was in his seat. The pony was as bare as a wild horse except for a bridle, and loped away with his graceful little rider sitting like a rock. No, not like a rock, but limp and unconcerned, and as full of the motion of the horse as the horse's tail or any other part of him.



KIOWA BUCK STARTING A RACE.

A Kiowa with loose hair and great coarse face broke away from the group and galloped up the prairie until he stopped at what was to be the starting-point, at the usual distance of "two arrow flights and a pitch." He was followed by half a dozen ponies at an easy lope, bearing their half-naked jockeys. The Indian spectators sat about on their ponies, as unmoved in countenance as oysters, being natural gamblers, and stoical as such should be, while the cowboys whispered among themselves.

"That 's the bay stallion there," said one man to me, as he pointed to a racer, "and he 's never been beaten. It 's his walk-over, and I 've got my gun up on him with an Injun."

It was to be a flying start, and they jockeyed a good deal and could not seem to get off. But presently a puff of smoke came from the rifle held aloft by the Kiowa starter, and his horse reared. The report reached us, and with a scurry the five ponies came away from the scratch, followed by a cloud of dust. The *quirts* flew through the air at every jump. The ponies bunched and pattered away at a nameless rate, for the quarter-race pony is quick of stride. Nearer and nearer they came, the riders lying low on their horses' necks, whipping and ki-yi-yi-ing. The dust in their wake

swept backward and upward, and with a rush they came over the scratch, with the roan pony ahead and my little Mexican fellow holding his quirt aloft, and his little eyes snapping with the nervous excitement of the great event. He had beaten the invincible bay stallion, the pride of this Comanche tribe, and as he rode back to his father his face had the settled calm which nothing could penetrate, and which befitted his dignity as a young runner.

Far be it from these quaint people ever to lose their blankets, their horses, their heroism, in order to stalk behind a plow in a pair of canvas overalls and a battered silk hat. Now they are great in their way; but then, how miserable! But I have confidence that they will not retrograde. They can live and be successful as a pastoral people, but not as sheep herders, as some great Indian department reformer once thought when he placed some thousands of these woolly idiots at their disposal.

The Comanches travel about too much and move too fast for sheep; but horses and cattle they do have and can have so long as they retain possession of their lands. But if the Government sees fit to consecrate their lands to the "man with the hoe," then, alas! good-bye to all their greatness.

Bidding adieu to my friends at Fort Sill, I



REMINGTON.

INDIAN HORSE-RACE — COMING OVER THE SCRATCH.


“pulled out” for Anadarko on the Washita, where the head agency of the Comanches, Kiowas, and Wichitas is located. The little ponies made bad work of the sandy roads. Kiowa houses became more numerous along the road, and there is evidence that they farm more than the brother tribe, but they are not so attractive a people. Of course the tepee is pitched in the front yard and the house is used as a kind of out-building. The medicine-bags were hanging from the tripod of poles near by, and an occasional buck was lying on his back “smoking his medicine” — a very comfortable form of devotion.

We saw the grass houses of the Wichitas, which might be taken for ordinary haystacks. As they stand out on the prairie surrounded by wagons, agricultural implements, and cattle, one is caught wondering where is the remainder of the farm which goes with this farm-yard.

These Territory Apaches are very different from their brothers of the mountains. They are good-looking, but are regarded contemptuously by other Indians and also by the traders. They are treacherous, violent, and most cunning liars and thieves. I spent an evening in one of their tepees watching a game of monte and the gambling passion was developed almost to insanity. They sat and glared at the cards their dark faces gleaming with avarice, cunning, and excitement. I thought then that the good white men who would undertake to make Christian gentlemen and honest tillers of the soil out of this material would contract for a job to subvert the process of nature.

Our little ponies, recuperated by some grain and rest, were once more hooked up, and the cowboy and I started for Fort Reno to see the Arrapahoes and the Cheyennes, hoping to meet them far along on “the white man’s road.”¹

Frederic Remington.



CASCO BAY.

IF e'er you sail on Casco Bay
 When fields are green and skies are sweet,
 And watch the foam-capped waves at play
 Where land and sea touch hands and greet,
 As friend with friend, in rude delight,
 Your soul, like birds at break of day,
 Will rise for many a joyous flight
 Midst summer isles of Casco Bay:
 Of Casco Bay! Sweet Casco Bay!
 Where life is joy and love at play
 Midst summer isles of Casco Bay.

Oh, wild and glad and circling far,
 The ripples sparkle from your prow
 As silvery laugher from a star
 When Venus decks the evening's brow;
 And where the islands stand apart
 The ocean waves roll in to pay
 Some tribute from the sea's great heart
 To gentle, queenly Casco Bay:
 To Casco Bay! Dear Casco Bay!
 Your soul imbibes the salt-sea spray
 And sings with lovely Casco Bay.

Down smiling channels shadows run
 And shimmer on the green-blue tides;
 And, booming like a far-off gun,
 Where Harpswell sea from sea divides,
 You hear the breakers' sullen roar
 And watch the waves ascend in spray
 While all around, behind, before,
 The white sails swell on Casco Bay:
 On Casco Bay! Fair Casco Bay!
 The white sails fill and bear away
 The happy ships on Casco Bay.

Benjamin S. Parker.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

LINCOLN RENOMINATED—THE WADE-DAVIS MANIFESTO— HORACE GREELEY'S PEACE MISSION.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

LINCOLN RENOMINATED.



IN other chapters we have mentioned the unavailing efforts made by a few politicians to defeat the will of the people which everywhere demanded the renomination of Mr. Lincoln. These efforts were worth studying as manifestations of eccentric human nature, but they never had the least effect upon the great currents of public opinion. Death alone could have prevented the choice of Mr. Lincoln by the Union convention. So absolute and universal was this tendency that most of the politicians made no effort to direct or guide it; they simply exerted themselves to keep in the van and not be overwhelmed. The convention was to meet on the 7th of June, but the irregular nominations of the President began at the feast of the Epiphany. The first convention of the year was held in New Hampshire on the 6th of January—for the nomination of State officers. It had properly no concern with the National nominations. The convention consisted in great part of the friends of Mr. Chase, and those employees of the Treasury Department whose homes were in New Hampshire had come together determined to smother any mistimed demonstration for the President; but the first mention of his name set the assembly on fire, and before the chairman knew what he was doing the convention had declared in favor of the renomination of Lincoln. The same day a far more important demonstration came to the surface in Pennsylvania. The State legislature met on the 5th of January, and the following day a paper, prepared in advance, addressed to the President, requesting him to accept a second term of the Presidency, began to be circulated among the Union members. Not one to whom it was presented declined to sign it. Within a day or two it received the signature of every Union member of the Senate and the House of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Simon Cameron, transmitting it to the President on the 14th of January, could say:

You are now fairly launched on your second voyage, and of its success I am as confident as ever

I was of anything in my life. Providence has decreed your reelection, and no combination of the wicked can prevent it.²

This remarkable address began by congratulating the President upon the successes of the recent election, which were generously ascribed to the policy of his Administration. Referring to the Republican victory in their own State, the members of the legislature said:

If the voice of Pennsylvania became thus potential in indorsing the policy of your Administration, we consider that, as the representatives of those who have so completely indorsed your official course, we are only responding to their demands when we thus publicly announce our unshaken preference for your reelection to the Presidency in 1864.

This preference is justified by them purely on public grounds.

To make a change in the Administration until its authority has been fully reestablished in the revolted States would be to give the enemies of the Government abroad a pretext for asserting that the Government had failed at home. To change the policy in operation to crush rebellion and restore the land to peace would be to afford the traitors in arms time to gather new strength—if not for immediate victory, at least for ultimate success in their efforts permanently to dissolve the Union. . . . We do not make this communication at this time to elicit from you any expression of opinion on this subject. Having confidence in your patriotism, we believe that you will abide the decision of the friends of the Union, and yield consent to any honorable use which they may deem proper to make of your name in order to secure the greatest good to the country and the speediest success to our arms. . . . Expressing what we feel to be the language not only of our own constituents, but also of the people of all the loyal States, we claim to indulge the expectation that you will yield to the preference which has already made you the people's candidate for the Presidency in 1864.

In every gathering of the supporters of the Union the same irrepressible sentiment broke forth. The "New York Times" on the 15th of January clearly expressed the general feeling:

The same wise policy which would forbid a man of business in troublous times to change his agent of proved efficiency, impels the loyal people of our

² Cameron to Lincoln, Jan. 14, 1864. MS.

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country to continue President Lincoln in his responsible position; and against the confirmed will of the people politicians are powerless.

The sentiment was so potent in its pressure upon the politicians that they everywhere gave way and broke into premature indorsement of the nomination. The Union Central Committee of New York held a special meeting and unanimously recommended the renomination of the President. Senator Morgan, sending this news to Mr. Lincoln, added:

It is going to be difficult to restrain the boys, and there is not much use in trying to do so.¹

At a local election some of the ward tickets were headed, with an irrelevancy which showed the spirit of the hour, "For President of the United States in 1864, Abraham Lincoln." From one end to the other of the country these spontaneous nominations joyously echoed one another. Towards the close of January the radical legislature of Kansas, with but one dissenting voice, passed through both its Houses a resolution renominating Lincoln. All through the next month these demonstrations continued. The Union members of the New Jersey legislature united in an address to the President, saying:

Without any disparagement of the true men who surround you, and whose counsels you have shared, believing that you are the choice of the people, whose servants we are, and firmly satisfied that they desire and intend to give you four years for a policy of peace, we present your name as the candidate for President of the American people in 1864.²

Connecticut instructed her delegates by resolutions on the 17th of February; Maryland, Minnesota, and Colorado expressed in the same way the sentiment of their people. Wisconsin and Indiana made haste to range themselves with the other Northern States; and Ohio seized the opportunity to put a stop to the restless ambition of her favorite son by a resolution of the Republican members of the legislature declaring that "the people of Ohio, and her soldiers in the army, demand the renomination of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency"—the members rising to their feet and cheering with uncontrollable clamor when the resolution passed. The State of Maine, on the extreme eastern border, spoke next: early in March, the President received this dispatch, signed by a name afterwards illustrious in our political annals:

Both branches of the Maine legislature have this day adopted resolutions cordially recommending your renomination. Every Union member voted in favor of them. Maine is a unit for you.

JAMES G. BLAINE.

¹ Jan. 4, 1864. MS.

² Feb. 18, 1864.

Nowhere except in the State of Missouri was the name of Mr. Lincoln mentioned without overwhelming adhesion, and even in the Missouri Assembly the resolution in favor of his renomination was laid upon the table by a majority of only eight. There had been some anxiety on the part of Mr. Lincoln's friends lest the powerful secret organization called the Union League, which represented the most ardent and vehement Republican sentiment of the country, should fall into the hands of his opponents; but it was speedily seen that out of Missouri these apprehensions were groundless. The Union Leagues of New York, Illinois, and even Vicksburg, where the victory of Grant had allowed the development of a robust Union sentiment, were among the first to declare for the President. The organization in Philadelphia, powerful in wealth, intelligence, and personal influence, so early as the 11th of January had resolved that to the "prudence, sagacity, comprehension, and perseverance of Mr. Lincoln, under the guidance of a benign Providence, the nation is more indebted for the grand results of the war, which Southern rebels have wickedly waged against liberty and the Union, than to any other single instrumentality, and that he is justly entitled to whatever reward it is in the power of the nation to bestow." They declared also:

That as Mr. Lincoln has had to endure the largest share of the labor required to suppress the rebellion, now rapidly verging to its close, he should also enjoy the largest share of the honors which await those who have contended for the right. They therefore recognize with pleasure the unmistakable indications of the popular will in all the loyal States, and heartily join with their fellow-citizens, without any distinction of party, here and elsewhere, in presenting him as the people's candidate for the Presidency.

The current swept on irresistibly throughout the months of spring. A few opponents of Mr. Lincoln, seeing that he was already nominated the moment the convention should meet, made one last effort to postpone the meeting of the convention until September, knowing that their only reliance was in some possible accident of the summer. So earnest and important a Republican as William Cullen Bryant united with a self-constituted committee of others equally earnest, but not so important, to induce the National Committee to postpone the convention. In their opinion "the country was not now in a position to enter into a Presidential contest; it was clear to them that no nomination could be made with any unanimity so early as June. They thought it best to see what the result of the summer campaign would be, as the wish of the people to continue their present leaders in power would depend very much upon this." The committee, of

course, took no notice of this appeal, though it was favored by so strong a Republican authority as the "New York Tribune."¹ The National Committee wisely thought that they might with as much reason take into consideration the request of a committee of prominent citizens to check an impending thunderstorm. All the movements in opposition to Mr. Lincoln were marked with the same naïveté and futility. The secret circular of Senator Pomeroy, the farcical Cleveland convention, the attempt of Mr. Bryant's committee to postpone the convention, were all equally feeble and nugatory in their effect.

Mr. Lincoln took no measures whatever to promote his candidacy. It is true he did not, like other candidates, assume airs of reluctance or bashfulness. While he discouraged on the part of strangers any suggestions as to his reelection, among his friends he made no secret of his readiness to continue the work he was engaged in, if such should seem to be the general wish. In a private letter to Mr. E. B. Washburne he said: "A second term would be a great honor and a great labor, which together perhaps I would not decline if tendered."² To another congressman he is reported to have said: "I do not desire a renomination except for the reason that such action on the part of the Republican party would be the most emphatic indorsement which could be given to the policy of my Administration." We have already mentioned the equanimity with which he treated the efforts of a leading member of his Cabinet to supplant him, and he received in the same manner the frequent suggestions of apprehensive friends that he would do well to beware of Grant. His usual reply was, "If he takes Richmond, let him have it." In reality General Grant was never at any time a competitor for the nomination. Of course, after the battle of Missionary Ridge there was no lack of such suggestions on the part of those who surrounded the victorious general; but he positively refused to put himself in the lists or to give any sanction to the use of his name. The President constantly discouraged on the part of officeholders of the Government, civil or military, any especial eagerness in his behalf. General Schurz wrote, late in February, asking permission to take an active part in the Presidential canvass, to which Mr. Lincoln replied:

¹ April 26, 1864.

² Oct. 26, 1863. MS.

³ Lincoln to Schurz, March 13, 1864. MS.

⁴ Lincoln to Schurz, March 23, 1864. Autograph MS.

⁵ General John A. Logan, in a letter addressed to General W. T. Sherman and published after General Logan's death, said that when he left the army to make speeches in Illinois he did this at the request of the President. We have been unable to find any communication in this sense among Mr. Lincoln's papers.

Allow me to suggest that if you wish to remain in the military service, it is very dangerous for you to get temporarily out of it; because, with a major-general once out, it is next to impossible for even the President to get him in again. With my appreciation of your ability and correct principle, of course I would be very glad to have your service for the country in the approaching political canvass; but I fear we cannot properly have it without separating you from the military.³

And in a subsequent letter addressed to the same general he said:⁴

I perceive no objection to your making a political speech when you are where one is to be made; but quite surely speaking in the North and fighting in the South at the same time are not possible; nor could I be justified to detail any officer to the political campaign during its continuance and then return him to the army.⁵

The experience of a hundred years of our politics has shown what perils environ a Presidential candidate who makes speeches. The temptation to flatter the immediate audience, without regard to the ultimate effect of the words spoken, has often proved too strong for the wariest politician to resist. Especially is a candidate in danger when confronting an audience belonging to a special race or class. Mr. Lincoln made no mistake either in 1860 or in 1864. Even when exposed to the strongest possible temptation, the reception of an address from a deputation of a workingmen's association, he preserved his mental balance undisturbed. To such a committee, who approached him on the 21st of March, 1864, he replied by repeating to them the passage from his message of December, 1861, in which the relations of labor and capital are set down with mathematical and logical precision, illuminated by the light of a broad humanity; and he only added to the views thus expressed the following words, than which nothing wiser or more humane has ever been said by social economists:

None are so deeply interested to resist the present rebellion as the working people. Let them beware of prejudices working division and hostility among themselves. The most notable feature of a disturbance in your city last summer was the hanging of some working people by other working people. It should never be so. The strongest bond of human sympathy, outside of the family relation, should be one uniting all working people, of all nations and

We applied to General Logan's family for the evidence on which the assertion was founded, but received no answer. There is no question that General Logan's statement was made in good faith, and that he believed that in taking a leave and assisting in the political canvass he was acting in accordance with the President's wishes. But Mr. Lincoln's action in other cases was so consistently opposed to this hypothesis, that we can only conclude that General Logan got his impression of what the President desired from some other person than the President himself.

tongues and kindreds. Nor should this lead to a war upon property or the owners of property. Property is the fruit of labor, property is desirable, is a positive good in the world. That some should be rich shows that others may become rich, and, hence, is just encouragement to industry and enterprise. Let not him who is houseless pull down the house of another, but let him labor diligently and build one for himself, thus by example asserting that his own shall be safe from violence when built.

The politicians who opposed Mr. Lincoln, whether from pure motives or from motives not so pure, met with one common fate: they were almost universally beaten in their own districts by men who, whatever their other incentives, were sufficiently adroit to perceive the sign in which they should conquer. It gave a man all this year a quite unfair advantage in his district to be known as a friend of the President, when his opponent was not equally outspoken; and many of the most radical politicians, seeing in which direction their advantage lay, suddenly turned upon their opponents and vanquished them in the President's name. General Lane, for example, who had been engaged in a bitter controversy with Pomeroy in regard to local interests in Kansas, saw his opportunity in the anti-Lincoln circular of his colleague; and although before this it would have been hard to say which of the two had been most free in his criticisms of the President, General Lane instantly trimmed his sails to catch the favoring breeze and elected himself and a full list of delegates to the Baltimore convention, whom he called, in his characteristic language, "all vindictive friends of the President." Other members of Congress, equally radical and more sincere and honest, made haste to range themselves on the side of the President against those with whom they had been more intimately associated. William D. Kelley of Philadelphia publicly proclaimed him "the wisest radical of us all"; Mr. Ashley of Ohio, to whom one of his abolitionist constituents had objected that he wanted no more of a President who had not crushed a rebellion in four years, replied that this was unreasonable, as the Lord had not crushed the devil in a much longer time.

As the day for the meeting at Baltimore drew near, and its unanimous verdict became more and more evident, the President was besieged from every quarter of the Union with solicitations to make known his wishes in regard to the work of the convention. To all such inquiries he returned an energetic refusal to give any word of counsel or to express any personal desire. During a few days preceding the convention a great many delegates took the road to Washington, either to get some intimation of the President's wishes or

to impress their own faces and names on his expectant mind. They were all welcomed with genial and cordial courtesy, but received not the slightest intimation of what would be agreeable to him. The most powerful politicians from New York and Pennsylvania were listened to with no more confidential consideration than the shy and awkward representatives of the rebellious States, who had elected themselves in sutlers' tents and in the shadow of department headquarters. "What is that crowd of people in the hall?" he said one day to his secretary. "It is a delegation from South Carolina. They are a swindle." "Let them in," said Lincoln; "they will not swindle me."

When at last the convention came together, on the 7th of June, 1864, it had less to do than any other convention in our political history. The delegates were bound by a peremptory mandate. Mr. Forney, in an article printed the day before the meeting,¹ put forth with unusual candor the attitude of the convention towards its constituents. The permanent policy of the Republican party of the nation was already absolutely established by the acts of the President and accepted and ratified by Congress and the people.

For this reason [said Mr. Forney] it is less important as a political body, as it cannot originate but will simply republish a policy. Yet for this reason it is transcendently the more imposing in its expression of the national will. Nor has the convention a candidate to choose. Choice is forbidden it by the previous action of the people. It is a body which almost beyond parallel is directly responsible to the people, and little more than the instrument of their will. Mr. Lincoln is already renominate, and the convention will but formally announce the decision of the people. If this absence of independence lessens the mere political interest of the convention in one respect, the fact that it will thoroughly and unquestionably obey national instructions gives it higher importance.

These words represented the well-nigh universal sentiment among Republicans. There were, of course, those to whom such a sentiment was not agreeable. Horace Greeley found it hard to accept an opinion which ran counter to his personal views. In an article of the same date as that last quoted, although he admitted the predestined action of the convention, he still protested vehemently against the impolicy of such action. He quoted the message sent by Mr. Lincoln to Governor Seymour in the dark winter of 1862-63, "that if he wants to be President of the United States, he must take care that there shall be a United States."

We could wish [said Greeley] the Presidency utterly forgotten or ignored for the next two months,

¹ Philadelphia "Press," June 6.

while every impulse, every effort of the loyal millions should be directed towards the overthrow of the armed hosts of the rebellion. That effected, or its speedy accomplishment proved impossible, we should be ready to enter clear-sightedly on the Presidential canvass. Now we are not. We feel that the expected nomination, if made at this time, exposes the Union party to a dangerous "flank movement" — possibly a successful one.

Among the Democratic newspapers a still more blind and obstinate disinclination to accept the existing facts is seen up to the hour of the meeting of the convention. They still insisted that the nomination of Lincoln was in the highest degree doubtful; some pretended that the delegates were equally divided between Lincoln and Grant; others insisted that the nomination of Frémont at Cleveland had electrified the country and would probably carry the convention by storm.

The convention was opened by a brief speech from Senator Morgan of New York, who was chairman of the executive committee. It contained one significant sentence. He said the party of which they were the delegates and honored representatives would fall short of accomplishing its great mission unless among its other resolves it should declare for such amendment of the Constitution as would positively prohibit African slavery in the United States. The sentence was greeted with prolonged applause, which burst at last into three cheers, in the midst of which Governor Morgan announced the choice by the National Committee of Robert J. Breckinridge of Kentucky as temporary chairman of the convention. The venerable Kentuckian on taking the chair made a speech which, though entirely extemporaneous, was delivered with great ease and dignity, and profoundly impressed his auditors.

Disregarding the etiquette which assumes that a convention is a deliberative assembly and that its choice cannot be foretold until it is made, he calmly took it for granted at the very beginning of his remarks that the Union candidate for the Presidency was already nominated, and as soon as the tumultuous cheers which greeted his mention of the name of Abraham Lincoln had died away he turned at once to the discussion of what he considered the real business of the day — the declaration of principles. Coming from a section of the country where the Constitution had been especially revered in words and vehemently assailed in action, he declared that with all the outcry about our violations of the Constitution this present living generation and this present Union party are more thoroughly devoted to that Constitution than any generation that ever lived under it; but he contended also that

sacred as was the Constitution the nation was not its slave.

We ought to have it distinctly understood by friends and enemies that while we love that instrument, while we will maintain it, and will with undoubted certainty put to death friend or foe who undertakes to trample it under foot; yet, beyond a doubt, we will reserve the right to alter it to suit ourselves from time to time and from generation to generation.

This speech was full of brief and powerful apothegms, some of which were startling as coming from an aged theologian of an aspect equally strong and benignant.

The only enduring, the only imperishable cement of all free institutions [he said], has been the blood of traitors. . . . It is a fearful truth, but we had as well avow it at once; and every blow you strike, and every rebel you kill, every battle you win, dreadful as it is to do it, you are adding, it may be a year, it may be ten years, it may be a century, it may be ten centuries, to the life of the Government and the freedom of your children.¹

Though presiding over a political convention, he declared himself absolutely detached from politics. "As an Abolition party, as a Republican party, as a Whig party, as a Democratic party, as an American party, I will not follow you one foot. As a Union party I will follow you to the ends of the earth, and to the gates of death." He echoed the brief speech in which Governor Morgan had struck the keynote. He said:

I unite myself with those who believe that slavery is contrary to the brightest interests of all men and of all governments, contrary to the spirit of the Christian religion, and incompatible with the natural rights of man. I join myself with those who say, Away with it forever; and I fervently pray God that the day may come when throughout the whole land every man may be as free as you are, and as capable of enjoying regulated liberty. . . . I know very well that the sentiments which I am uttering will cause me great odium in the State in which I was born, which I love, where the bones of two generations of my ancestors and some of my children are, and where very soon I shall lay my own. . . . But we have put our faces towards the way in which we intend to go, and we will go in it to the end.

In the evening the permanent organization of the convention was effected, William Dennison of Ohio being made chairman. He, also, in a brief and eloquent speech took for granted the unanimous nomination for the Presidency of the United States "of the wise and good man whose unselfish devotion to the country, in the administration of the Government, has secured to him not only the admiration but the warmest affection of every friend of constitutional liberty"; and

¹ McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 404.

also, in the tone of both the speakers who had preceded him, said that the loyal people of the country expected the convention

to declare the cause and the support of the rebellion to be slavery, which, as well for its treasonable offenses against the Government as for its incompatibility with the rights of humanity and the permanent peace of the country, must, with the termination of the war, and as much speedier as possible, be made to cease forever in every State and Territory of the Union.

There were in fact but three tasks before the convention. The first was to settle the status of contesting delegations from the States and Territories; the second, to agree upon the usual platform; and the third, to nominate a candidate for the Vice-Presidency. All of these questions were handled skillfully, and with a spirit of moderation which led to the most successful result in the canvass.

There were no questions of consequence in regard to the delegations of any of the Northern States, nor did any questions arise in regard to those from Kentucky and West Virginia, Delaware and Maryland. There were two delegations from Missouri, both making special claims of loyalty and of regularity of election. The committee on credentials decided that those styling themselves the "Radical Union" delegates should be awarded the seats. As this was the only delegation which had presented itself opposed to the nomination of Lincoln, and as a large majority, not only of the convention, but of the committee on credentials, were of the contrary opinion, their action in admitting the recalcitrant Missourians was sagacious. It quieted at once the beginnings of what might have been a dangerous schism. The question as to admitting the delegates from Tennessee also raised some discussion, but was decided in their favor by more than a two-thirds vote. The delegates from Louisiana and Arkansas were also admitted by a vote nearly as large. The delegates from Nevada, Colorado, and Nebraska were admitted with the right to vote; those from the States of Virginia and Florida, and the remaining Territories, were admitted to the privileges of the floor without the right to vote; and those from South Carolina were rejected altogether.

The same wise spirit of compromise was shown in the platform, reported by Henry J. Raymond of New York. The first resolution declared it the highest duty of every citizen to maintain the integrity of the Union and to quell the rebellion by force of arms; the second approved the determination of the Government to enter into no compromise with the rebels; the third, while approving all the acts hitherto done against slavery, declared in favor of an

amendment to the Constitution terminating and forever prohibiting the existence of slavery in the United States. This resolution was received with an outburst of spontaneous and thunderous applause. The fourth resolution gave thanks to the soldiers and sailors; the fifth applauded the practical wisdom, unselfish patriotism, and unswerving fidelity with which Abraham Lincoln had discharged, under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty, the great duties and responsibilities of the Presidential office, and it enumerated and approved the acts of his Administration. The sixth resolution was of sufficient significance to be given entire:

Resolved, That we deem it essential to the general welfare that harmony should prevail in the national councils, and we regard as worthy of public confidence and official trust those only who cordially indorse the principles proclaimed in these resolutions and which should characterize the administration of the Government.

This resolution, like the admission of the Missouri radicals, was intended in general to win the support and heal the dissatisfaction of the so-called radicals throughout the Union. Its specific meaning, however, was not entirely clear. There were not many of the delegates who voted for it who would have agreed upon all the details of a scheme for reorganizing the Cabinet. If measures for ostracizing all the objectionable members of the Government had been set on foot in the hall of the convention, it is probable that the name of every member of the Cabinet would have been found on some of the shells. It is altogether likely, however, that the name of the Postmaster-General would have occurred more frequently than that of any other minister. The controversy between his brother and the radicals of Missouri, in which he had, in accordance with his habit and temperament, taken an energetic part, had embittered against him the feelings of the radical Republicans, not only in the West but throughout the North, and his habit of candid and trenchant criticism had raised for him enemies in all political circles.

The seventh resolution claimed for the colored troops the full protection of the laws of war. The eighth declared that foreign emigration should be fostered and encouraged. The ninth spoke in favor of the speedy construction of a railroad to the Pacific coast. The tenth declared that the national faith pledged for the redemption of the public debt must be kept inviolate; and the eleventh declared against the efforts of any European power to establish monarchical governments sustained by foreign military forces in near proximity to the United States.

This last resolution showed the result of an adroit and sagacious compromise. The radicals in the convention desired to make it a censure upon the action of the President and the Secretary of State; but the friends of the Administration, while accepting to its utmost results the declaration in favor of the Monroe doctrine, assumed that the President and his Cabinet were of the same mind, and therefore headed the resolution with the declaration:

That we approve the decision taken by the Government that the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud the institutions of any republican government on the Western continent.

There was nothing more before the convention but the nominations, and one of those was in fact already made. The only delay in registering the will of the convention occurred as a consequence of the impatience of members to do it by irregular and summary methods. Mr. Delano of Ohio made the customary motion to proceed to the nomination; Simon Cameron moved as a substitute the renomination of Lincoln and Hamlin by acclamation. A long wrangle ensued on the motion to lay this substitute on the table, which was brought to a close by a brief speech from Henry J. Raymond, representing the cooler heads, who were determined that whatever opposition there might be should have the fullest opportunity of expression; and by a motion, which was adopted, to nominate in the usual way, by the call of States. The interminable nominating speeches of recent years had not come into fashion: Mr. Cook, the chairman of the Illinois delegation, merely said, "The State of Illinois again presents to the loyal people of this nation, for President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln—God bless him!" and those who seconded the nomination were equally brief. Every State gave its undivided voice for Lincoln, with the exception of Missouri, which cast its vote, as the chairman stated, under positive instructions, for Grant. But before the result was announced Mr. Hume of Missouri moved that the nomination of Lincoln be declared unanimous. This could not be done until the result of the balloting was made known—484 for Lincoln, 22 for Grant. Missouri then changed its vote, and the secretary read the grand total of 506 for Lincoln. This announcement was greeted with a storm of cheering, which during many minutes as often as it died away burst out anew.

The principal names mentioned for the Vice-Presidency were, besides Mr. Hamlin, the actual incumbent, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, and Daniel S. Dickinson of New York; besides these General Rousseau had the vote

of his own State, Kentucky. The radicals of Missouri favored General B. F. Butler, who had a few scattered votes also from New England. But among the three principal candidates the voters were equally enough divided to make the contest exceedingly spirited and interesting. For several days before the convention the President had been besieged by inquiries as to his personal wishes in regard to his associate on the ticket. He had persistently refused to give the slightest intimation of such wish. His private secretary, Mr. Nicolay, was at Baltimore in attendance at the convention; and although he was acquainted with this attitude of the President, at last, overcome by the solicitations of the chairman of the Illinois delegation, who had been perplexed at the advocacy of Joseph Holt by Mr. Swett, one of the President's most intimate friends, Mr. Nicolay wrote a letter to Mr. Hay, who had been left in charge of the Executive office in his absence, containing among other matters this passage:

Cook wants to know confidentially whether Swett is all right; whether in urging Holt for Vice-President he reflects the President's wishes; whether the President has any preference, either personal or on the score of policy; or whether he wishes not even to interfere by a confidential intimation. . . . Please get this information for me if possible.

The letter was shown to the President, who indorsed upon it this memorandum:

Swett is unquestionably all right. Mr. Holt is a good man, but I had not heard or thought of him for V. P. Wish not to interfere about V. P. Cannot interfere about platform. Convention must judge for itself.

This positive and final instruction was sent at once to Mr. Nicolay, and by him communicated to the President's most intimate friends in the convention. It was therefore with minds absolutely untrammelled by even any knowledge of the President's wishes that the convention went about its work of selecting his associate on the ticket.

It is altogether probable that the ticket of 1864 would have been nominated without a contest had it not been for the general impression, in and out of the convention, that it would be advisable to select as a candidate for the Vice-Presidency a war Democrat. Mr. Dickinson, while not putting himself forward as a candidate, had sanctioned the use of his name by his friends on the especial ground that his candidacy might attract to the support of the Union party many Democrats who would have been unwilling to support a ticket avowedly Republican; but these considerations weighed with still greater force in favor of Mr. Johnson, who was not only a Democrat, but

also a citizen of a border slaveholding State, and had rendered distinguished services to the Union cause. At the first show of hands it was at once evident that the Tennessean was stronger than the New Yorker, receiving four more votes than Mr. Dickinson even in the New York delegation. When the votes on the first ballot were counted it was found that Mr. Johnson had received 200, Mr. Hamlin 150, Mr. Dickinson 108; but before the result was announced almost the whole convention turned their votes to Johnson, and on motion of Mr. Tremain of New York his nomination was declared unanimous. The work was quickly done. Mr. Lincoln, walking over to the War Department in the afternoon as usual for military news, received the dispatch announcing the nomination of Andrew Johnson before he was informed of his own. The telegram containing the news of his own nomination had gone to the White House a few minutes before.

In the evening the National Grand Council of the Union League came together. A large proportion of the members had participated in the National Convention, and their action was therefore a foregone conclusion. They adopted a platform similar to that of the convention, with the exception that they declared, as the Cleveland people had done, in favor of the confiscation of the property of rebels. They heartily approved and indorsed the nominations already made, and passed a resolution to the effect that as Lincoln and Johnson were the only candidates who could hope to be elected as loyal men, they regarded it as the imperative duty of the Union League to do all that lay in its power to secure their election. They also earnestly approved and indorsed the platform and principles adopted by the convention, and pledged themselves, as individuals and as members of the League, to do all in their power to elect the candidates. The seal of secrecy was removed from this action and a copy of the resolution transmitted to the President by W. R. Erwin, the Grand Recording Secretary.¹

A committee, headed by Governor Dennison, came on the next day² to notify the President of his nomination.

I need not say to you, sir [said Mr. Dennison], that the convention, in thus unanimously nominating you for reelection, but gives utterance to the almost universal voice of the loyal people of the country. To doubt of your triumphant election would be little short of abandoning the hope of the final suppression of the rebellion and the restoration of the authority of the Government over the insurgent States.

The President answered:

I will neither conceal my gratification nor restrain the expression of my gratitude that the Union people,
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through their convention, in the continued effort to save and advance the nation, have deemed me not unworthy to remain in my present position. I know no reason to doubt that I shall accept the nomination tendered; and yet perhaps I should not declare definitely before reading and considering what is called the platform. I will say now, however, I approve the declaration in favor of so amending the Constitution as to prohibit slavery throughout the nation. When the people in revolt, with a hundred days of explicit notice that they could within those days resume their allegiance without the overthrow of their institutions and that they could not so resume it afterwards, elected to stand out, such amendment to the Constitution as is now proposed became a fitting and necessary conclusion to the final success of the Union cause. Such alone can meet and cover all cavils. Now the unconditional Union men, North and South, perceive its importance and embrace it. In the joint names of Liberty and Union, let us labor to give it legal form and practical effect.

On the same day a committee of the Union League presented themselves to inform him of the action taken the night before. The President answered them more informally, saying that he did not allow himself to suppose that either the convention or the League had concluded that he was either the greatest or the best man in America, but rather that they had decided that it was not best "to swap horses while swimming the stream." All day the throngs of shouting and congratulating delegates filled all the approaches to the Executive Mansion. In a brief speech at night, in answer to a serenade from citizens of Ohio, the President said:

What we want, more than Baltimore conventions or Presidential elections, is success under General Grant. I propose that you constantly bear in mind that the support you owe to the brave officers and soldiers in the field is of the very first importance, and we should therefore bend all our energies to that point.

He then proposed three cheers for General Grant and the officers and soldiers with him, and, swinging his own hat, led off in the cheering.

The more formal notification of the convention was made in a letter written by George William Curtis of New York, in which he paraphrased the platform and expressed the sentiment of the convention and of the people of the country with his usual elegance and force.

They have watched your official course, therefore, with unflagging attention; and amid the bitter taunts of eager friends and the fierce denunciation of enemies, now moving too fast for some, now too slowly for others, they have seen you throughout this tremendous contest patient, sagacious, faithful, just; leaning upon the heart of the great mass of the people, and satisfied to be moved by

1 MS. 2 Thursday, June 9.

its mighty pulsations. It is for this reason that, long before the convention met, the popular instinct had plainly indicated you as its candidate, and the convention therefore merely recorded the popular will. Your character and career prove your unswerving fidelity to the cardinal principles of American liberty and of the American Constitution. In the name of that liberty and Constitution, sir, we earnestly request your acceptance of this nomination, reverently commending our beloved country and you, its Chief Magistrate, with all its brave sons who, on sea and land, are faithfully defending the good old American cause of equal rights, to the blessing of Almighty God.

In accepting the nomination the President observed the same wise rule of brevity which he had followed four years before. He made but one specific reference to any subject of discussion. While he accepted the resolution in regard to the supplanting of republican government upon the Western continent, he gave the convention and the country distinctly to understand that he stood by the action already adopted by himself and the Secretary of State.

There might be misunderstanding [he said] were I not to say that the position of the Government in relation to the action of France in Mexico, as assumed through the State Department and indorsed by the convention among the measures and acts of the Executive, will be faithfully maintained so long as the state of facts shall leave that position pertinent and applicable.

THE WADE-DAVIS MANIFESTO.

In his message to Congress of the 8th of December, 1863, Mr. Lincoln gave expression to his ideas on the subject of reconstruction more fully and clearly than ever before. He appended to that message a proclamation of the same date guaranteeing a full pardon to all who had been implicated in the rebellion, with certain specified exceptions, on the condition of taking and maintaining an oath to support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Union of the States thereunder; to abide by and support all acts of Congress and proclamations of the President made during the rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by Congress or by decision of the Supreme Court. The exceptions to this general amnesty were of those who, having held places of honor and trust under the Government of the United States, had betrayed this trust and entered the service of the Confederacy, and of those who had been guilty of treatment of colored troops not justified by the laws of war. The proclamation further promised that when in any of the States in rebellion a number of citizens equal to one-tenth of the voters in the year 1860 should



HENRY WINTER DAVIS.
(AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY POLLOCK.)

reestablish a State government republican in form, and not contravening the oath above mentioned, that such should be recognized as the true government of the State, and should receive the benefits of the constitutional provision that "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence." The President also engaged by this proclamation not to object to any provision which might be adopted by such State governments in relation to the freed people of the States which should recognize and declare their permanent freedom and provide for their education, "and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class." He suggested that in reconstructing the loyal State governments, the names, the boundaries, the subdivisions, the constitutions, and the general codes of laws of the States should be preserved. He stated distinctly that his proclamation had no reference to States where the loyal State governments had all the while been maintained; he took care to make it clear that the respective Houses, and not the Executive, had the constitutional power to decide whether members sent to Congress from any State should be admitted to seats; and he concluded by saying:

This proclamation is intended to present the people of the States wherein the national authority has been suspended, and loyal State governments have been subverted, a mode in and by which the national authority and loyal State governments may be reestablished within said States, or in any of them. And while the mode presented is the

best the Executive can suggest, with his present impressions, it must not be understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable.¹

The message contained an unusually forcible and luminous expression of the principles embraced in the proclamation. The President referred to the dark and doubtful days which followed the announcement of the policy of emancipation and of the employment of black soldiers; the gradual justification of those acts by the successes which the national arms had since achieved; of the change of the public spirit of the border States in favor of emancipation; the enlistment of black soldiers, and their efficient and creditable behavior in arms; the absence of any tendency to servile insurrection or to violence and cruelty among the negroes; the sensible improvement in the public opinion of Europe and of America. He then explained the purpose and spirit of his proclamation. Nothing had been attempted beyond what was amply justified by the Constitution; the form of an oath had been given, but no man was coerced to take it; the Constitution authorized the Executive to grant or withhold a pardon at his own absolute discretion, and this includes the power to grant on terms, as is fully established by judicial authority. He therefore referred to the provision of the Constitution guaranteeing to the States a republican form of government as providing precisely for the case now under treatment; where the element within a State favorable to republican government in the Union might "be too feeble for an opposite and hostile element external to or even within the State."

An attempt [said the President] to guaranty and protect a revived State government, constructed in whole or in preponderating part from the very element against whose hostility and violence it is to be protected, is simply absurd. There must be a test by which to separate the opposing elements, so as to build only from the sound; and that test is a sufficiently liberal one which accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his former unsoundness.

In justification of his requiring in the oath of amnesty a submission to and support of the antislavery laws and proclamations, he said:

Those laws and proclamations were enacted and put forth for the purpose of aiding in the suppression of the rebellion. To give them their fullest effects, there had to be a pledge for their mainte-

¹ In some instances this proclamation was misunderstood by generals and commanders of departments, so that prisoners of war were allowed on their voluntary application to take the amnesty oath. This was not the President's intention, and would have led to serious embarrassment in the matter of the exchange of prisoners.

He therefore, on the 26th of March, 1864, issued a supplementary proclamation declaring that the pro-

clamation applied only to those persons who, being yet at large and free from any arrest, confinement, or duress, should voluntarily come forward and take the said oath with the purpose of restoring peace and establishing the national authority; and that persons excluded from the amnesty offered in the proclamation might apply to the President for clemency, like all other offenders, and that their application would receive due consideration.

In my judgment they have aided and will further aid the cause for which they were intended. To now abandon them would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith. I may add, at this point, that while I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress.

The President called attention to the fact that this part of the oath is subject to the modifying and abrogating power of legislation and supreme judicial decision; that the whole purpose and spirit of the proclamation is permissive and not mandatory.

The proposed acquiescence [he said] of the National Executive in any reasonable temporary State arrangement for the freed people is made with the view of possibly modifying the confusion and destitution which must at best attend all classes by a total revolution of labor throughout whole States. It is hoped that the already deeply afflicted people in those States may be somewhat more ready to give up the cause of their affliction if, to this extent, this vital matter be left to themselves, while no power of the National Executive to prevent an abuse is abridged by the proposition.

He had taken the utmost pains to avoid the danger of committal on points which could be more safely left to further developments. "Saying that on certain terms certain classes will be pardoned with rights restored, it is not said that other classes or other terms will never be included; saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specified way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way." The President expressed his profound congratulation at the movement towards emancipation by the several States, and urged once more upon Congress the importance of aiding these steps to the great consummation.

It is rare that so important a state paper has been received with such unanimous tokens of enthusiastic adhesion. However the leading Republicans in Congress may have been led later in the session to differ with the President, there was apparently no voice of discord raised on the day the message was read to both Houses. For a moment all factions in Congress seemed to be of one mind. One who spent the morning on the floor of Congress wrote on the same day: "Men acted as though the millennium had come. Chandler

acted as though the millennium had come. Chandler

was delighted, Sumner was joyous, apparently forgetting for the moment his doctrine of State suicide,¹ while at the other political pole Dixon and Reverdy Johnson said the message was highly satisfactory."² Henry Wilson said to the President's secretary: "He has struck another great blow. Tell him for me, God bless him." The effect was similar in the House of Representatives. Mr. Boutwell, who represented the extreme antislavery element of New England, said: "It is a very able and shrewd paper. It has great points of popularity, and it is right." Lovejoy, the leading abolitionist of the West, seemed to see on the mountain the feet of one bringing good tidings. "I shall live," he said, "to see slavery ended in America." Garfield gave his unreserved approval; Kellogg of Michigan went shouting about the lobby: "The President is the only man. There is none like him in the world. He sees more widely and more clearly than any of us." Mr. Henry T. Blow, the radical member from St. Louis (who six months later was denouncing Mr. Lincoln as a traitor to freedom), said: "God bless old Abe! I am one of the radicals who have always believed in him." Mr. Greeley, who was on the floor of the House, went so far as to say the message was "devilish good." The Executive Mansion was filled all day by a rush of congressmen, congratulating the President and assuring him of their support in his wise and humane policy. The conservatives and radicals vied with each other in claiming that the message represented their own views of the crisis. Mr. Judd of Illinois said to the President: "The opinion of people who read your message to-day is, that on that platform two of your ministers must walk the plank—Blair and Bates." To which the President answered: "Both of these men acquiesced in it without objection; the only member of the Cabinet who objected was Mr. Chase." For a moment the most prejudiced Democrats found little to say against the message; they called it "very ingenious and cunning, admirably calculated to deceive." This reception of the message was extremely pleasing to the President. A solution of the most important problem of the time which conservatives like Dixon and Reverdy Johnson thoroughly approved, and to which Mr. Sumner made no objection, was of course a source of profound gratification. He took it as a proof of what he had often said, that there was no essential contest between loyal men on this subject if they would consider it reasonably. He said in conversation on the 10th of December: "The only



BENJAMIN F. WADE.
(FROM A DAGUERRETYPE.)

question is, Who constitute the State? When that is decided, the solution of subsequent questions is easy."³ He wrote in his original draft of the message that he considered "the discussion as to whether a State had been at any time out of the Union as vain and profitless. We know they were, we trust they shall be, in the Union. It does not greatly matter whether in the meantime they shall be considered to have been in or out." But afterwards, considering that the Constitution empowered him to grant protection to States "in the Union," he saw that it would not answer to admit that the States had at any time been out of it; he erased that sentence as possibly suggestive of evil. He preferred, he said, "to stand firmly based on the Constitution rather than to work in the air." He was specially gratified by reports which came to him of the adhesion of the Missourians in Congress to his view.

I know [he said] these radical men have in them the stuff which must save the state and on which we must mainly rely. They are absolutely incorrosive by the virus of secession. It cannot touch or taint them; while the conservatives, in casting about for votes to carry through their plans, are attempting to affiliate with those whose record is not clear. If one side must be crushed out and the other cherished, there cannot be any doubt which side we must choose as fuller of hope for the future; but just there [he continued] is where their wrong begins. They insist that I shall hold and treat Governor Gamble and his supporters, men appointed by the loyal people of Missouri as representatives of Missouri loyalty, and who have done their whole duty in the war faithfully and promptly, who when they have disagreed with me have been silent and

¹ See resolutions introduced in Senate Feb. 11, 1862.

² J. H., Diary.

³ J. H., Diary.

kept about the good work — that I shall treat these men as copperheads and enemies of the Government. This is simply monstrous.

For the first few days there was no hint of any hostile feeling in Congress. There was, in fact, no just reason why the legislative body should regard its prerogative as invaded. The President had not only kept clearly within his constitutional powers, but his action had been expressly authorized by Congress. The act of July 17, 1862, had provided that the President might thereafter at any time, by proclamation, extend pardon and amnesty to persons participating in the rebellion, "with such exceptions and on such conditions as he might deem expedient for the public welfare." Of course a general amnesty required general conditions; and the most important of these was one which should provide for the protection of the freedmen who had been liberated by the war.

It soon enough appeared, however, that the millennium had not arrived; that in a Congress composed of men of such positive convictions and vehement character there were many who would not submit permanently to the leadership of any man, least of all to that of one so gentle, so reasonable, so devoid of malice as the President. Mr. Henry Winter Davis at once moved that that part of the message relating to reconstruction should be referred to a special committee, of which he was made chairman, and on the 15th of February he reported "a bill to guarantee to certain States whose governments have been usurped or overthrown a republican form of government." Mr. Davis was a man of too much integrity and elevation of character to allow the imputation that his action on public matters was dictated entirely by personal feeling or prejudice; but at the same time it cannot be denied that he maintained towards the President from beginning to end of his administration an attitude of consistent hostility. This was a source of chagrin and disappointment to Mr. Lincoln. He came to Washington with a high opinion of the ability and the character of Mr. Davis, and expected to maintain with him relations of intimate friendship. He was cousin to one of the President's closest friends in Illinois, Judge David Davis, and his attitude in the Congress which preceded the rebellion was such as to arouse in the mind of Mr. Lincoln the highest admiration and regard. But the selection of Mr. Blair of Maryland as a member of the Cabinet estranged the sympathies of Mr. Davis and his friends, and the breach thus made between him and the Administration was never healed, though the President did all in his power to heal it. In the spring of 1863 Mr. Davis, assuming that the President might be inclined to favor unduly the conservative candidate in the election for

the next Congress, sought an interview with him, the result of which the President placed in writing in a letter dated March 18:

There will be in the new House of Representatives, as there were in the old, some members openly opposing the war, some supporting it unconditionally, and some supporting it with "buts" and "ifs" and "ands." They will divide on the organization of the House — on the election of a speaker. As you ask my opinion, I give it, that the supporters of the war should send no man to Congress who will not pledge himself to go into caucus with the unconditional supporters of the war, and to abide the action of such caucus and vote for the person therein nominated for speaker. Let the friends of the Government first save the Government, and then administer it to their own liking.

Mr. Davis answered:

Your favor of the 18th is all that could be desired, and will greatly aid us in bringing our friends to a conclusion such as the interests of the country require.

In spite of all the efforts which the President made to be on friendly terms with Mr. Davis, the difference between them constantly widened. Mr. Davis grew continually more confirmed in his attitude of hostility to every proposition of the President. He became one of the most severe and least generous critics of the Administration in Congress. He came at last to consider the President as unworthy of even respectful treatment; and Mr. Seward, in the midst of his energetic and aggressive campaign against European unfriendliness, was continually attacked by him as a truckler to foreign powers and little less than a traitor to his country. The President, however, was a man so persistently and incorrigibly just, that even in the face of this provocation he never lost his high opinion of Mr. Davis's ability nor his confidence in his inherent good intentions. He refused, in spite of the solicitations of most of his personal friends in Maryland, to discriminate against the faction headed by Mr. Davis in making appointments to office in that State; and when, during an important campaign, a deputation of prominent supporters of the Administration in Maryland came to Washington to denounce Mr. Davis for his outspoken hostility to the President, saying that such a course, if it continued unchecked, would lose Mr. Lincoln the electoral vote of the State, he replied:

I understood that Mr. Davis is doing all in his power to secure the success of the emancipation ticket in Maryland. If he does this, I care nothing about the electoral vote.

In the preamble to his bill Mr. Davis expressed, with his habitual boldness and lucidity, his fundamental thesis that the rebellious States were out of the Union.

Whereas [he said], the so-called Confederate States are a public enemy, waging an unjust war, whose injustice is so glaring that they have no right to claim the mitigation of the extreme rights of war which are accorded by modern usage to an enemy who has the right to consider the war a just one; and.

Whereas, none of the States which, by a regularly recorded majority of its citizens, have joined the so-called Southern Confederacy can be considered and treated as entitled to be represented in Congress or to take any part in the political government of the Union.

This seemed to Congress too trenchant a solution of a constitutional knot which was puzzling the best minds of the commonwealth, and the preamble was rejected; but the spirit of it breathed in every section of the bill. Mr. Davis's design was to put a stop to the work which the President had already begun in Tennessee and Louisiana, and to prevent the extension of that policy to other Southern States. The bill authorized the appointment of a provisional governor in each of the States in rebellion, and provided that, after the military resistance to the United States should have been suppressed and the people sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and laws, the white male citizens of the State should be enrolled, and when a majority of them should have taken the oath of allegiance the loyal people of the State should be entitled to elect delegates to a convention to reestablish a State government. The convention was required to insert in the constitution three provisions: First, to prevent prominent civil or military officers of the Confederates to vote for or to be members of the legislature or governor; second, that involuntary servitude is forever prohibited, and the freedom of all persons guaranteed in said States; third, no debt, State or Confederate, created by or under the sanction of the usurping power shall be recognized or paid by the State. Upon the adoption of the constitution by the convention, and its ratification by the electors of the State, the provisional government shall so certify to the President, who, after obtaining the assent of Congress, shall by proclamation recognize the government so established, and none other, as the constitutional government of the State; and from the date of such recognition, and not before, congressmen and Presidential electors may be elected in such State. Pending the reorganization, the provisional governor shall enforce the laws of the Union and of the State before rebellion. Another section of the bill emancipated all slaves in those States, with their posterity, and made it the duty of the United States courts to discharge them on habeas corpus if restrained of their liberty on pretense of any claim to service or

labor as slaves, and to inflict a penalty of fine or imprisonment upon the persons claiming them. Another section declared any person hereafter holding any important office, civil or military, in the rebel service not to be a citizen of the United States.

This bill was supported by Mr. Davis in a speech of extraordinary energy. Without hesitation he declared it a test and standard of antislavery orthodoxy; he asserted boldly that Congress, and Congress alone, had the power to revive the reign of law in all that territory which through rebellion had put itself outside of the law. "Until," he said, "Congress recognizes a State government organized under its auspices, there is no government in the rebel States except the authority of Congress." The duty is imposed on Congress to administer civil government until the people shall, under its guidance, submit to the Constitution of the United States, and, under the laws which it shall impose and on the conditions Congress may require, reorganize a republican government for themselves and Congress shall recognize that government. He declared there was no indication which came from the South, from the darkness of that bottomless pit, that there was a willingness to accept any terms that even the Democrats were willing to offer; he believed that no beginning of legal and orderly government could be made till military opposition was absolutely annihilated; that there were only three ways of bringing about a reorganization of civil governments. One was to remove the cause of the war by an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting slavery everywhere within its limits: that, he said, "goes to the root of the matter, and should consecrate the nation's triumph"; but this measure he thought involved infinite difficulty and delay. Though it met his hearty approval, it was not a remedy for the evils to be dealt with. The next plan he considered was that of the President's amnesty proclamation. This he denounced as utterly lacking in all the guarantees required:

If, in any manner [he said], by the toleration of martial law, lately proclaimed the fundamental law, under the dictation of any military authority, or under the prescriptions of a provost-marshal, something in the form of a government shall be presented, represented to rest on the votes of one-tenth of the population, the President will recognize that, provided it does not contravene the proclamation of freedom and the laws of Congress.

Having dismissed both of these plans with brief censure, he then made a powerful plea for the bill he had reported. He called upon Congress to take the responsibility of saying:

In the face of those who clamor for speedy recognition of governments tolerating slavery, that the

safety of the people of the United States is the supreme law; that their will is the supreme rule of law, and that we are authorized to pronounce their will on this subject; take the responsibility to say that we will revise the judgments of our ancestors; that we have experience written in blood which they had not; that we find now, what they darkly doubted, that slavery is really, radically inconsistent with the permanence of republican governments, and that being charged by the supreme law of the land on our conscience and judgment to guarantee, that is, to continue, maintain, and enforce, if it exists, to institute and restore when overthrown, republican governments throughout the broad limits of the Republic, we will weed out every element of their policy which we think incompatible with its permanence and endurance.

The bill was extensively debated. It was not opposed to any extent by the Republicans of the House; the Democrats were left to make a purely partisan opposition to it. The President declined to exercise any influence on the debate, and the bill was passed by a vote of seventy-four to sixty-six. It was called up in the Senate by Mr. Wade of Ohio, who, in supporting it, followed very much the same line of argument as that adopted by Mr. Davis in the House. Mr. B. Gratz Brown of Missouri, believing that as the session was drawing near its close there was no time to discuss a measure of such transcendent importance, offered an amendment simply forbidding the States in insurrection to cast any vote for electors of President or Vice-President of the United States, or to elect members of Congress until the insurrection in such State was suppressed or abandoned, and its inhabitants had returned to their obedience to the Government of the United States; such returning to obedience being declared by proclamation of the President, issued by virtue of an act of Congress hereafter to be passed authorizing the same. The amendment of Mr. Brown was adopted by a bare majority, seventeen voting in favor of it and sixteen against it. Mr. Sumner tried to have the Proclamation of Emancipation adopted and enacted as a statute of the United States, but this proposition was lost by a considerable majority. The House declined to concur in the amendment of the Senate and asked for a committee of conference, in which the Senate receded from its amendment and the bill went to the President for his approval in the closing moments of the session.

Congress was to adjourn at noon on the Fourth of July; the President was in his room at the Capitol signing bills, which were laid before him as they were brought from the two Houses. When this important bill was placed before him he laid it aside and went on with the other work of the moment. Several prominent members entered in a state of intense anxiety over the fate of the bill. Mr. Sumner and Mr. Bout-

well, while their nervousness was evident, refrained from any comment. Mr. Chandler, who was unabashed in any mortal presence, roundly asked the President if he intended to sign the bill.¹ The President replied: "This bill has been placed before me a few moments before Congress adjourns. It is a matter of too much importance to be swallowed in that way." "If it is vetoed," cried Mr. Chandler, "it will damage us fearfully in the North-west. The important point is that one prohibiting slavery in the reconstructed States." Mr. Lincoln said: "That is the point on which I doubt the authority of Congress to act." "It is no more than you have done yourself," said the senator. The President answered: "I conceive that I may in an emergency do things on military grounds which cannot be done constitutionally by Congress." Mr. Chandler, expressing his deep chagrin, went out, and the President, addressing the members of the Cabinet who were seated with him, said: "I do not see how any of us now can deny and contradict what we have always said, that Congress has no constitutional power over slavery in the States." Mr. Fessenden expressed his entire agreement with this view.

I have even had my doubts [he said] as to the constitutional efficacy of your own decree of emancipation, in such cases where it has not been carried into effect by the actual advance of the army.

The President said:

This bill and the position of these gentlemen seem to me, in asserting that the insurrectionary States are no longer in the Union, to make the fatal admission that States, whenever they please, may of their own motion dissolve their connection with the Union. Now we cannot survive that admission, I am convinced. If that be true, I am not President; these gentlemen are not Congress. I have laboriously endeavored to avoid that question ever since it first began to be mooted, and thus to avoid confusion and disturbance in our own councils. It was to obviate this question that I earnestly favored the movement for an amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery, which passed the Senate and failed in the House. I thought it much better, if it were possible, to restore the Union without the necessity of a violent quarrel among its friends as to whether certain States have been in or out of the Union during the war—a merely metaphysical question, and one unnecessary to be forced into discussion.

Although every member of the Cabinet agreed with the President, when, a few minutes later, he entered his carriage to go home, he foresaw the importance of the step he had resolved to take and its possibly disastrous consequences to himself. When some one said to him that the threats made by the extreme radicals had no foundation, and that people

¹ J. H., Diary.

would not bolt their ticket on a question of metaphysics, he answered: "If they choose to make a point upon this, I do not doubt that they can do harm. They have never been friendly to me. At all events, I must keep some consciousness of being somewhere near right. I must keep some standard or principle fixed within myself."

After the fullest deliberation the President remained by his first impression that the bill was too rigid and too restrictive in its provisions to accomplish the work desired. He had all his life hated formulas in government, and he believed that the will of an intelligent people, acting freely under democratic institutions, could best give shape to the special machinery under which it was to be governed; and, in the wide variety of circumstances and conditions prevailing throughout the South, he held it unwise for either Congress or himself to prescribe any fixed and formal method by which the several States should resume their practical legal relations with the Union. Thinking in this way, and feeling himself unable to accept the bill of Congress as the last word of reconstruction, and yet unwilling to reject whatever of practical good might be accomplished by it, he resolved, a few days after Congress had adjourned, to remit the matter to the people themselves and to allow them their choice of all the methods proposed of returning to their allegiance. He issued, on the 8th of July, a proclamation giving a copy of the bill of Congress, reciting the circumstances under which it was passed, and going on to say:

Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known that while I am—as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan of restoration—unprepared by a formal approval of this bill to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration, and while I am also unprepared to declare that the free State constitutions and governments, already adopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana, shall be set aside and held for naught, thereby repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same as to further effort, or to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish slavery in the States, but am at the same time sincerely hoping and expecting that a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout the nation may be adopted, nevertheless, I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it; and that I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people, so soon as military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in any such State, and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, in which cases military governors will be appointed, with directions to proceed according to the bill.

The refusal of the President to sign the reconstruction bill caused a great effervescence at the adjournment of Congress. Mr. Chase, who had resigned from the Cabinet, made this entry in his diary:

The President pocketed the great bill providing for the reorganization of the rebel States as loyal States. He did not venture to veto, and so put it in his pocket. It was a condemnation of his amnesty proclamation and of his general policy of reconstruction, rejecting the idea of possible reconstruction with slavery, which neither the President nor his chief advisers have, in my opinion, abandoned.

This entry, made by Mr. Chase in the bitterness of his anger, places the basest construction upon the President's action; but this sentiment was shared by not a few of those who claimed the title of extreme radicals in Congress. Mr. Sumner reported a feeling of intense indignation against the President. Two days later the ex-Secretary gleefully reported, on the authority of Senator Pomeroy, that there was great dissatisfaction with Mr. Lincoln, which had been much exasperated by the pocketing of the reconstruction bill.

When Mr. Lincoln, disregarding precedents, and acting on his lifelong rule of taking the people into his confidence, issued his proclamation of the 8th of July, it was received by each division of the loyal people of the country as might have been expected. The great mass of Republican voters, who cared little for the metaphysics of the case, accepted his proclamation, as they had accepted that issued six months before, as the wisest and most practicable method of handling the question; but among those already hostile to the President, and those whose devotion to the cause of freedom was so ardent as to make them look upon him as lukewarm, the exasperation which was already excited increased. The indignation of Mr. Davis and Mr. Wade at seeing their work of the last session thus brought to nothing could not be restrained. Mr. Davis prepared, and both of them signed and published on the 5th of August, a manifesto, the most vigorous in attack that was ever directed against the President from his own party during his term. The grim beginning of this document, which is addressed "To the Supporters of the Government," is in these terms:

We have read without surprise, but not without indignation, the proclamation of the President of the 8th of July, 1864. The supporters of the Administration are responsible to the country for its conduct; and it is their right and duty to check the encroachments of the Executive on the authority of Congress, and to require it to confine itself to its proper sphere.

The paper went on to narrate the history of the reconstruction bill, and to claim that its treatment indicated a persistent though un-

avowed purpose of the President to defeat the will of the people by the Executive perversion of the Constitution. They insinuated that only the lowest personal motives could have dictated this action :

The President [they said], by preventing this bill from becoming a law, holds the electoral votes of the rebel States at the dictation of his personal ambition. . . . If electors for President be allowed to be chosen in either of those States, a sinister light will be cast on the motives which induced the President to "hold for naught" the will of Congress rather than his governments in Louisiana and Arkansas.

They ridiculed the President's earnestly expressed hope that the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery might be adopted :

We curiously inquire on what his expectation rests, after the vote of the House of Representatives at the recent session and in the face of the political complexion of more than enough of the States to prevent the possibility of its adoption within any reasonable time; and why he did not indulge his sincere hopes with so large an installment of the blessing as his approval of the bill would have secured?

When we consider that only a few months elapsed before this beneficent amendment was adopted, we can form some idea of the comparative political sagacity of Mr. Lincoln and his critics. The fact that the President gave the bill of Congress his approval as a very proper plan for the loyal people of any States choosing to adopt it seemed to infuriate the authors of the bill: they say, "A more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated." At the close of a long review of the President's proclamation, in which every sentence came in for its share of censure or of ridicule, this manifesto concluded :

Such are the fruits of this rash and fatal act of the President—a blow at the friends of his Administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of republican government. The President has greatly presumed on the forbearance which the supporters of his Administration have so long practiced, in view of the arduous conflict in which we are engaged, and the reckless ferocity of our political opponents. But he must understand that our support is of a cause and not of a man; that the authority of Congress is paramount and must be respected; that the whole body of the Union men of Congress will not submit to be impeached by him of rash and unconstitutional legislation; and if he wishes our support he must confine himself to his executive duties—to obey and to execute, not make the laws—to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave political reorganization to Congress. If the supporters of the Government fail to insist on this they become responsible for the usurpations which they fail to rebuke, and are justly liable to the indignation of the people whose rights and

security, committed to their keeping, they sacrifice. Let them consider the remedy of these usurpations, and, having found it, fearlessly execute it.

HORACE GREELEY'S PEACE MISSION.

NOT least among the troubles and the vexations of the summer of 1864 was the constant criticism of sincere Republicans who were impatient at what they considered the slow progress of the war, and irritated at the deliberation with which Mr. Lincoln weighed every important act before decision. Besides this, a feeling of discouragement had taken possession of some of the more excitable spirits, which induced them to give ready hospitality to any suggestions of peace. Foremost among these was Horace Greeley, who in personal interviews, in private letters, and in the columns of the "Tribune" repeatedly placed before the President, with that vigor of expression in which he was unrivaled, the complaints and the discontents of a considerable body of devoted, if not altogether reasonable, Union men. The attitude of benevolent criticism which he was known to sustain towards the Administration naturally drew around him a certain number of adventurers and busybodies, who fluttered between the two great parties, and were glad to occupy the attention of prominent men on either side with schemes whose only real object was some slight gain or questionable notoriety for themselves. A person who called himself "William Cornell Jewett of Colorado" had gained some sort of intimacy with Mr. Greeley by alleging relations with eminent Northern and Southern statesmen. He was one of those newspaper laughing-stocks who come gradually to be known and talked about. He wrote interminable letters of advice to Mr. Lincoln and to Jefferson Davis, which were never read nor answered, but which, printed with humorous comment in the "New York Herald," were taken seriously by the indiscriminating, and even quoted and discussed in the London papers. He wrote to Mr. Greeley in the early part of July from Niagara Falls, and appears to have convinced the latter that he was an authorized intermediary from the Confederate authorities to make propositions for peace. He wrote that he had just left George N. Sanders of Kentucky on the Canada side.

I am authorized to state to you [he continued], for our use only, not the public, that two ambassadors of Davis & Co. are now in Canada with full and complete powers for a peace, and Mr. Sanders requests that you come on immediately to me at Cataract House to have a private interview; or, if you will send the President's protection for him and two friends, they will come and meet you. He says the

whole matter can be consummated by me, you, them, and President Lincoln.

This letter was followed the next day by a telegram saying :

Will you come here? Parties have full power.

Mr. Greeley was greatly impressed by this communication. The inherent improbabilities of it did not seem to strike him, though the antecedents of Sanders were scarcely more reputable than those of Jewett. He sent the letter and the telegram to the President, inclosed in a letter of his own, the perfervid vehemence of which shows the state of excitement he was laboring under. He refers to his correspondent as "our irrepressible friend Colorado Jewett." He admits some doubt as to the "full powers," but insists upon the Confederate desire for peace.

And therefore [he says] I venture to remind you that our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country also longs for peace; shudders at the prospect of fresh conscriptions, of further wholesale devastations, and of new rivers of human blood. And a widespread conviction that the Government and its prominent supporters are not anxious for peace, and do not improve proffered opportunities to achieve it, is doing great harm now, and is morally certain, unless removed, to do far greater in the approaching elections.

He then rebukes Mr. Lincoln for not having received the Stephens embassy, disapproves the warlike tone of the Baltimore platform, urges the President to make overtures for peace in time to affect the North Carolina elections, and suggests the following plan of adjustment: 1. The Union is restored and declared perpetual. 2. Slavery is utterly and forever abolished throughout the same. 3. A complete amnesty for all political offenses. 4. Payment of \$400,000,000 to the slave States pro rata for their slaves. 5. The slave States to be represented in proportion to their total population. 6. A National convention to be called at once.

The letter closes with this impassioned appeal:

Mr. President, I fear you do not realize how intently the people desire any peace consistent with the national integrity and honor, and how joyously they would hail its achievement and bless its authors. With United States stocks worth but forty cents in gold per dollar, and drafting about to commence on the third million of Union soldiers, can this be wondered at? I do not say that a just peace is now attainable, though I believe it to be so. But I do say that a frank offer by you to the insurgents of terms which the impartial will say ought to be accepted will, at the worst, prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the national cause; it may save us from a Northern insurrection.

In a postscript Mr. Greeley again urges the President to invite "those at Niagara to ex-

hibit their credentials and submit their ultimatum."

Mr. Lincoln determined at once to take action upon this letter. He had no faith in Jewett's story. He doubted whether the embassy had any existence except in the imagination of Sanders and Jewett. But he felt the unreasonableness and injustice of Mr. Greeley's letter, while he did not doubt his good faith; and he resolved to convince him at least, and perhaps others of his way of thinking, that there was no foundation for the reproaches they were casting upon the Government for refusing to treat with the rebels. That there might be no opportunity for dispute in relation to the facts of the case, he arranged that the witness of his willingness to listen to any overtures which might come from the South should be Mr. Greeley himself. He answered his letter at once, on the 9th of July, saying:

If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition from Jefferson Davis, in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union, and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you, and that if he really brings such proposition he shall at the least have safe conduct with the paper (and without publicity, if he chooses) to the point where you shall have met with him. The same if there be two or more persons.

Mr. Greeley answered this letter the next day in evident embarrassment. The President had surprised him by his frank and prompt acquiescence in his suggestions. He had accepted the first two points of Mr. Greeley's plan of adjustment—the restoration of the Union, and the abandonment of slavery—as the only preliminary conditions of negotiations upon which he would insist, and requested this vehement advocate of peace to bring forward his ambassadors. Mr. Greeley's reply of the 10th seems somewhat lacking both in temper and in candor. He thought the negotiators would not "open their budget" to him; repeated his reproaches at the "rude repulse" of Stephens; referred again to the importance of doing something in time for the North Carolina elections; and said at least he would try to get a look into the hand of the men at Niagara, though he had "little heart for it." But on the 13th he wrote in a much more positive manner. He said:

I have now information, on which I can rely, that two persons, duly commissioned and empowered to negotiate for peace, are at this moment not far from Niagara Falls in Canada, and are desirous of conferring with yourself, or with such persons as you may appoint and empower to treat with them. Their names (only given in confidence) are Hon. Clement C. Clay of Alabama, and Hon. Jacob Thompson of Mississippi.

He added that he knew nothing and had proposed nothing as to terms; that it seemed to him high time an effort should be made to terminate the wholesale slaughter. He hoped to hear that the President had concluded to act in the premises, and to act so promptly as to do some good in the North Carolina elections.

On the receipt of this letter, which was written four days after Mr. Greeley had been fully authorized to bring to Washington any one he could find empowered to treat for peace, and which yet was based on the assumption of the President's unwillingness to do the very thing he had already done, Mr. Lincoln resolved to put an end to a correspondence which promised to be indefinitely prolonged, by sending an aide-de-camp to New York to arrange in a personal interview what it seemed impossible to conclude by mail. On the 15th he sent Mr. Greeley a brief telegram expressing his disappointment, saying, "I was not expecting you to send me a letter, but to bring me a man or men," and announced the departure of a messenger with a letter. The letter was of the briefest. It merely said:

Yours of the 13th is just received, and I am disappointed that you have not already reached here with those commissioners, if they would consent to come, on being shown my letter to you of the 9th inst. Show that and this to them, and if they will come on the terms stated in former, bring them. I not only intend a sincere effort for peace, but I intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made.

This curt and peremptory missive was delivered to Mr. Greeley by Major John Hay early on the morning of the 16th. He was still somewhat reluctant to go; he thought some one not so well known would be less embarrassed by public curiosity; but said finally that he would start at once if he could be given a safe conduct for four persons, to be named by him. Major Hay communicated this to the President and received the required order in reply. "If there is or is not anything in the affair," he said, "I wish to know it without unnecessary delay."

The safe conduct was immediately written and given to Mr. Greeley, who started at once for Niagara. It provided that Clement C. Clay, Jacob Thompson, James P. Holcombe, and George N. Sanders should have safe conduct to Washington in company with Horace Greeley, and should be exempt from arrest or annoyance of any kind from any officer of the United States during their journey. Nothing was said by Mr. Greeley or by Major Hay to the effect that this safe conduct modified in any respect the conditions imposed by the President's letter of the 9th. It merely carried into effect the proposition made in that letter. On arriving at Niagara, Mr. Greeley placed

himself at once in the hands of Jewett, who was waiting to receive him, and sent by him a letter addressed to Clay, Thompson, and Holcombe, in which he said:

I am informed that you are duly accredited from Richmond as the bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace; that you desire to visit Washington in the fulfillment of your mission; and that you further desire that Mr. George N. Sanders shall accompany you. If my information be thus far substantially correct, I am authorized by the President of the United States to tender you his safe conduct on the journey proposed, and to accompany you at the earliest time that will be agreeable to you.

No clearer proof can be given than is afforded in this letter that Mr. Greeley was absolutely ignorant of all the essential facts appertaining to the negotiation in which he was engaged. As it turned out, he had been misinformed even as to the personnel of the embassy, Jacob Thompson not being, and not having been, in company with the others; none of them had any authority to act in the capacity attributed to them; and, worse than all this, Mr. Greeley kept out of view, in his missive thus shot at a venture, the very conditions which Mr. Lincoln had imposed in his letter of the 9th and repeated in that of the 15th. Yet, with all the advantages thus afforded them, Clay and Holcombe felt themselves too bare and naked of credentials to accept Mr. Greeley's offer, and were therefore compelled to answer that they had not been accredited from Richmond, as assumed in his note. They made haste to say, however, that they were acquainted with the views of their Government, and could easily get credentials, or other agents could be accredited in their place, if they could be sent to Richmond armed with "the circumstances disclosed in this correspondence." It is incomprehensible that a man of Mr. Greeley's experience should not have recognized at once the purport of this proposal. It simply meant that Mr. Lincoln should take the initiative in suing the Richmond authorities for peace, on terms to be proposed by them. The essential impossibility of these terms was not apparent to Mr. Greeley; he merely saw that the situation was somewhat different from what he had expected, and therefore acknowledged the receipt of the letter, promised to report to Washington and solicit fresh instructions, and then telegraphed to Mr. Lincoln the substance of what Clay and Holcombe had written. The President, with unwearied patience, drew up a final paper, which he sent by Major Hay to Niagara, informing Mr. Greeley by telegraph that it was on the way. This information Mr. Greeley at once sent over the border, with many apologies for the delay.

Major Hay arrived at Niagara on the 20th

of July with a paper in the President's own handwriting, expressed in these words:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1864.

To whom it may concern: Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Mr. Greeley had already begun to have some impression of the unfortunate position in which he had placed himself, and the reading of this straightforward document still further nettled and perplexed him. He proposed to bring Jewett into conference; this Major Hay declined. He then refused to cross the river to Clifton unless Major Hay would accompany him, and himself deliver the paper to the Confederate emissaries. They therefore went together and met Mr. Holcombe in a private room of the Clifton House (Mr. Clay being absent for a day), and handed him the President's letter. After a few moments' conversation they separated, Mr. Greeley returning to New York and Major Hay remaining at Niagara to receive any answer that might be given to the letter. Before taking the train Mr. Greeley had an interview with Jewett, unknown to Major Hay, in which he seems to have authorized Jewett to continue to act as his representative. Jewett lost no time in acquainting the emissaries with this fact, informing them of the departure of Mr. Greeley, of "his regret at the sad termination of the initiatory steps taken for peace, in consequence of the change made by the President in his instructions to convey commissioners to Washington for negotiations, unconditionally, and that Mr. Greeley would be pleased to receive their answer" through him (Jewett). They replied to Jewett with mutual compliments, inclosing a long letter to Mr. Greeley, arraigning the President for his alleged breach of faith, which Jewett promptly communicated to the newspapers of the country without notice to Major Hay, informing him afterwards in a note that he did this by way of revenging the slight of the preceding day.

In giving the letter of the rebel emissaries to the press instead of sending it to its proper destination, Jewett accomplished the purpose for which it was written. It formed a not ineffective document in a heated political campaign. It would be difficult to ascertain, at this day, whether Mr. Greeley ever communi-

cated to Jewett or Sanders, and whether they, in their constant flittings to and fro over the Suspension Bridge, ever made known to Clay and Holcombe the conditions of negotiation laid down by Mr. Lincoln in his letters of the 9th and 15th of July. At all events they pretended to be ignorant of any such conditions, and assumed that the President had sent Mr. Greeley to invite them to Washington without credentials and without conditions, to convey to Richmond his overtures of peace. They did not say with any certainty that even in that event his overtures would have been accepted, but expressed the hope that in case the war must continue there might "have been infused into its conduct something more of the spirit which softens and partially redeems its brutalities." They then went on to accuse the President of a "sudden and entire change of views," of a "rude withdrawal of a courteous overture," of "fresh blasts of war to the bitter end"; attributing this supposed change to some "mysteries of his cabinet" or some "caprice of his imperial will." They plainly intimated that while the South desired peace, it would not accept any arrangement which bartered away its self-government; and in conclusion they called upon their fellow-Confederates to strip from their "eyes the last film of delusion" that peace is possible, and "if there were any patriots or Christians" in the North, they implored them "to recall the abused authority and vindicate the outraged civilization of their country."

Even this impudent and uncandid manifesto did not convince Mr. Greeley that he had committed an error. On the contrary, he adopted the point of view of the rebel emissaries, and contended after his return to New York that he regarded the safe conduct given him on the 16th of July as a waiver by the President of all the conditions of his former letters. Being attacked by his colleagues of the press for his action at Niagara, he could only defend himself by implied censure of the President, and the discussion grew so warm that both he and his assailants at last joined in a request to Mr. Lincoln to permit the publication of the correspondence between them. This was an excellent opportunity for Mr. Lincoln to vindicate his own proceeding. But he rarely looked at such matters from the point of view of personal advantage, and he feared that the passionate, almost despairing appeals of the most prominent Republican editor in the North for peace at any cost would deepen the gloom in the public mind and have an injurious effect upon the Union cause. He therefore proposed to Mr. Greeley, in case the correspondence should be published, to omit some of the most vehement

phrases of his letters and those in which he advocated peace negotiations solely for political effect; at the same time he invited him to come to Washington and talk with him freely. Mr. Greeley, writing on the 8th of August, accepted both suggestions in principle, but he querulously declined going to Washington at that time, on the ground that the President was surrounded by his "bitterest personal enemies," and that his going would only result in further mischief, as at Niagara. "I will gladly go," he continued, "whenever I feel a hope that their influence has waned." Then, unable to restrain himself, he broke out in new and severe reproaches against the President for not having received Mr. Stephens, for not having sent a deputation to Richmond to ask for peace after Vicksburg, for not having taken the Democrats in Congress at their word, and sent "three of the biggest of them as commissioners to see what kind of a peace they could get." He referred once more to Niagara, and said magnanimously, "Let the past go"; but added the stern admonition, "Do not let this month pass without an earnest effort for peace." He held out a hope that if the President would turn from the error of his ways he would still help him make peace; but for the time being, "knowing who are nearest you," he gave him up. The only meaning this can have is simply, Dismiss Seward from your Cabinet and do as I tell you, and then perhaps I can save your Administration.

The next day, having received another telegram from the President, who, regardless of his own dignity, was still endeavoring to conciliate and convince him, Mr. Greeley wrote another letter, which we shall give more fully than the rest, to show in what a dangerous frame of mind was the editor of the most important organ of public opinion in the North. He begins by refusing to telegraph, "since I learned by sad experience at Niagara that my dispatches go to the War Department before reaching you."

I fear that my chance for usefulness has passed. I know that nine-tenths of the whole American people, North and South, are anxious for peace — peace on almost any terms — and utterly sick of human slaughter and devastation. I know that, to the general eye, it now seems that the rebels are anxious to negotiate and that we refuse their advances. I know that if this impression be not removed we shall be beaten out of sight next November. I firmly believe that, were the election to take place to-morrow, the Democratic majority in this State and Pennsylvania would amount to 100,000, and that we should lose Connecticut also. Now if the rebellion can be crushed before November it will do to go on; if not, we are rushing to certain ruin.

What, then, can I do in Washington? Your trusted

advisers nearly all think I ought to go to Fort Lafayette for what I have done already. Seward wanted me sent there for my brief conference with M. Mercier. The cry has steadily been, No truce! No armistice! No negotiation! No mediation! Nothing but surrender at discretion! I never heard of such fatuity before. There is nothing like it in history. It *must* result in disaster, or all experience is delusive.

Now I do not know that a tolerable peace could be had, but I believe it might have been last month; and, at all events, I know that an honest, sincere effort for it would have done us immense good. And I think no Government fighting a rebellion should ever close its ears to any proposition the rebels may make.

I beg you, implore you, to inaugurate or invite proposals for peace forthwith. And in case peace cannot now be made consent to an *armistice for one year*, each party to retain unmolested all it now holds, but the rebel ports to be opened. Meantime let a national convention be held, and there will surely be no more war at all events.

In a letter of the 11th of August, Mr. Greeley closed this extraordinary correspondence by insisting that if his letters were published they should be printed entire. This was accepted by Mr. Lincoln as a veto upon their publication. He could not afford, for the sake of vindicating his own action, to reveal to the country the despondency — one might almost say the desperation — of one so prominent in Republican councils as the editor of the "Tribune." The spectacle of this veteran journalist, who was justly regarded as the leading controversial writer on the antislavery side, ready to sacrifice everything for peace, and frantically denouncing the Government for refusing to surrender the contest, would have been, in its effect upon public opinion, a disaster equal to the loss of a great battle. The President had a sincere regard for Mr. Greeley also, and was unwilling to injure him and his great capacities for usefulness by publishing these ill-considered and discouraging utterances. His magnanimity was hardly appreciated. Mr. Greeley, in this letter of the 11th of August, and afterwards, insisted that the President had in his letter and his dispatch of the 15th of July changed his ground from that held in his letter of the 9th, which ground, he asserted, was again shifted in his paper "To whom it may concern." This was of course wholly without foundation. The letter of the 9th authorized Mr. Greeley to bring to Washington any one "professing to have any proposition from Jefferson Davis, in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union, and abandonment of slavery"; the letter of the 15th repeats the offer contained in that of the 9th, saying, "Show that and this to them, and if they will come on the terms

stated in former, bring them." The next day Major Hay gave Mr. Greeley a formal safe conduct for himself and party, and neither of them thought of it as nullifying the President's letters. Indeed, Mr. Greeley's sole preposterous justification for his claim that his safe conduct superseded the President's instructions was that Major Hay did not say that it did not.

It was characteristic of Mr. Lincoln that, seeing the temper in which Mr. Greeley regarded the transaction, he dropped the matter and submitted in silence to the misrepresentations to which he was subjected by reason of it. The correspondence preceding the Niagara conference was not published until after the President's death; that subsequent to it sees the light for the first time in these pages. The public, having nothing of the record except the impudent manifesto of Clay and Holcombe, the foolish chatter of Jewett, and such half-statements as Mr. Greeley chose to make in answer to the assaults of his confrères of the press, judged Mr. Lincoln unjustly. Some thought

he erred in giving any hearing to the rebels; some criticized his choice of a commissioner; and the opposition naturally made the most of his conditions of negotiation, and accused him of embarking in a war of extermination in the interest of the negro.¹ So that this well-meant effort of the President to ascertain what were the possibilities of peace through negotiation, or, failing that, to convince the representative of a large body of Republicans of his willingness to do all he could in that direction, resulted only in putting a keener edge upon the criticisms of his supporters, and in arming his adversaries with a weapon which they used, after their manner, among the rebels of the border States and their sympathizers in the North. Nevertheless, surveying the whole transaction after the lapse of twenty-five years, it is not easy to see how any act of his in relation to it was lacking in wisdom, or how it could have been changed for the better. Certainly every step of the proceeding was marked with his usual unselfish sincerity and magnanimity to friend and to foe.



Drawn by Jacques Reich

THE HON. JAMES A. McDOUGALL
 THE HON. O. H. BROWNING
 THE HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL
 MAJ.-GEN. JOHN A. McCLERNAND

diers; but at some of the irksome tasks, like standing sentry, they do not come out strong. They are not often used for that purpose, however, it being found that Indians do not appreciate military forms and ceremonies.

Having seen all that I desired, I procured passage in the stage to a station on the Santa

Fe Railroad. In the far distance the train came rushing up the track, and as it stopped I boarded it. As I settled back in the soft cushions of the sleeping-car I looked at my dirty clothes and did not blame the negro porter for regarding me with the haughty spirit of his class.

Frederic Remington.

SOMETHING WRONG.

OLD, old Earth! what have *you* to do
 With a June in your heart ever fresh and new?
 The poets sing, as of very truth,
 That June dwells alone in the heart of youth,
 And here you are in your eons, Earth,
 With as sweet a June as you had at birth.
 And God! He is ages and ages older!
 And the love of age is paler, colder —
 The poets sing, as of very truth —
 Than the love that springs in the heart of youth;
 So he cannot love, if the songs run true,
 As he did when he shaped and fashioned you,
 Yet here you are, with your June as fair
 As the first that gladdened our parent pair!
 Ah! there 's something wrong with the poets' song,
 Or the hearts that to God and his earth belong.

Julia G. Skinner.

ACROSS THE FIELDS TO ANNE.

From Stratford-on-Avon a lane runs westward through the fields a mile to the little village of Shottery, in which is the cottage of Anne Hathaway, Shakspeare's sweetheart and wife.

HOW often in the summer-tide,
 His graver business set aside,
 Has stripling Will, the thoughtful-eyed,
 As to the pipe of Pan
 Stepped blithesomely with lover's pride
 Across the fields to Anne!

It must have been a merry mile,
 This summer stroll by hedge and stile,
 With sweet foreknowledge all the while
 How sure the pathway ran
 To dear delights of kiss and smile,
 Across the fields to Anne.

The silly sheep that graze to-day,
 I wot, they let him go his way,
 Nor once looked up, as who should say:
 "It is a seemly man."
 For many lads went wooing aye
 Across the fields to Anne.

The oaks, they have a wiser look;
 Mayhap they whispered to the brook:
 "The world by him shall yet be shook,
 It is in nature's plan;
 Though now he fleets like any rook
 Across the fields to Anne."

And I am sure, that on some hour
 Coquetting soft 'twixt sun and shower,
 He stooped and broke a daisy-flower
 With heart of tiny span,
 And bore it as a lover's dower
 Across the fields to Anne.

While from her cottage garden-bed
 She plucked a jasmine's goodlihed,
 To scent his jerkin's brown instead;
 Now since that love began,
 What luckier swain than he who sped
 Across the fields to Anne?

The winding path whereon I pace,
 The hedgerows green, the summer's grace,
 Are still before me face to face;
 Methinks I almost can
 Turn poet and join the singing race
 Across the fields to Anne!

Richard E. Burton.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

THE CHICAGO SURRENDER—CONSPIRACIES IN THE NORTH— LINCOLN AND THE CHURCHES.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE CHICAGO SURRENDER.



THE Democratic managers had called the National Convention of their party to meet on the Fourth of July, 1864, but after the nomination of Frémont at Cleveland and of Lincoln at Baltimore it was thought prudent to postpone it to a later date, in the hope that something in the chapter of accidents might arise to the advantage of the opposition. It appeared for awhile as if this manœuvre were to be successful. As a vessel shows its finest sailing qualities against a head wind, so the best political work is always done in the face of severe opposition; and as the Republican party had as yet no enemy before it, the canvass, during its first months, seemed stricken with languor and apathy. The military situation was far from satisfactory. The terrible fighting in the Wilderness, succeeded by Grant's flank movement to the left, and the culmination of the campaign in the horrible slaughter at Cold Harbor, had profoundly shocked and depressed the country. The movement upon Petersburg, so far without decisive results, had contributed little of hope or encouragement; the campaign of Sherman in Georgia gave as yet no positive assurance of the brilliant result it afterwards attained; the Confederate raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, in July, was the cause of great annoyance and exasperation.

This untoward state of things in the field of military operations found its exact counterpart in the political campaign. Several circumstances contributed to divide and discourage the Administration party. The resignation of Mr. Chase, on the last day of June, had seemed, to not a few leading Republicans at the North, as a presage of disintegration in the Government; Mr. Greeley's mission to Niagara Falls, in spite of the wise and resolute attitude taken by the President in relation to peace negotiations, had unsettled and troubled the minds of many. The Democratic party, not having as yet appointed a candidate nor formulated a platform, were free to devote all their leisure

to attacks upon the Administration; and the political fusillade continued with great energy through the summer months. The Republicans were everywhere on the defensive, having no objective point of attack in the opposite lines. The rebel emissaries in Canada, being in thorough concert with the leading peace men of the North, redoubled their efforts to disturb the public tranquillity, and not without success. Mr. Davis says of this period:

Political developments at the North favored the adoption of some action that might influence popular sentiment in the hostile section. The aspect of the peace party was quite encouraging, and it seemed that the real issue to be decided in the Presidential election in that year was the continuance or cessation of the war.²

There is a remarkable concurrence between this view of Mr. Davis and that of Mr. Lincoln in a letter to a friend which we have quoted in another place. Referring to the emissaries at Niagara Falls and their interest in the Chicago convention, and also to the expressions used by the Confederate authorities in their conversation with Jaquess, Mr. Lincoln said, "The Presidential contest is between a Union and a Disunion candidate, disunion certainly following the success of the latter!"³

Mr. Thompson, in his report of the operations of the rebel commission in Canada, claims that the results of the Niagara Falls conference were the source of such encouragement to the peace party as to lead them to give up their half-formed project of insurrection in the North-west in the hope of defeating Lincoln at the polls. In the midst of these discouraging circumstances the manifesto of Wade and Davis came to add its depressing influence to the general gloom. It seemed for a time as if this action of two of the most prominent Republicans in either house of Congress would result in a serious defection from the Republican party, though in the end the effect of the demonstration proved inconsiderable.

General McClellan had before this time become the acknowledged leader of the Democratic party in the North. It is true he was

² Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate States," Vol. II., p. 611.

³ Lincoln to Wakeman, July 25, 1864. Unpublished MS.

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not the favorite candidate of the Democracy in most of the Western States, but in the powerful States of the seaboard, and especially in the large cities, he was the only person indicated by popular consent among the opposition as the antagonist of Lincoln in the Presidential canvass. His attitude was therefore a matter of grave preoccupation, not only to most of the leading Republicans, but even to the President himself. There have been, in the last twenty years, many conflicting stories in regard to the overtures made to him during this summer; but, so far as can be ascertained, they were all the voluntary acts of over-anxious friends of the President, and made without his knowledge or consent. As early as the month of June, 1863, Mr. Thurlow Weed conceived the idea that it would be of great advantage to the Union cause if General McClellan would take a prominent part in a great war meeting to be held in New York. With the knowledge and approval of the President he approached the general with this purpose; he even suggested to him that the result might be the organization of a movement to make him the Union candidate for the Presidency. We learn from Mr. Weed that General McClellan at first gave a favorable hearing to the proposition, but at the last moment withdrew his consent to preside at the meeting in a letter in which he said: "I am clear in the conviction that the policy governing the conduct of the war should be one looking not only to military success, but also to ultimate reunion, and that it should consequently be such as to preserve the rights of all Union-loving citizens, wherever they may be, as far as compatible with military necessity."¹ The chance of identifying himself with the Union party thus passed away; later in the season he came out in favor of the candidates of the peace faction in Pennsylvania.

An attempt made in July, 1864, by Mr. Francis P. Blair, the elder, to induce McClellan to withdraw from the canvass caused a great deal of gossip at the time, and led to such misstatements and exaggerations that Mr. Blair afterwards published a full and detailed account of his action.² This venerable gentleman, sharing in the apprehension entertained by many as to the divisions and consequent weakness of the Union party, went to New York in the latter part of July "to make an effort at conciliation." "I went on this errand," said Mr. Blair, "without consulting the President, without giving him, directly or indirectly, the slightest intimation of my object, and, of course, without his authority. I apprised no one but my son." He first called upon the leading

editors of the city. Mr. Bryant, though discontented with the Administration, considered Mr. Lincoln, with all his abatements, the only man who could be relied upon for the defense of the Union. Mr. Greeley assured Mr. Blair that "his best efforts would not be wanting to secure the peace of the country through the reelection of the President"; Mr. Bennett of the "Herald" gave his ultimatum in a "raucous Scotch accent"—"Tell him to restore McClellan to the army and he will carry the election by default." Through Mr. S. L. M. Barlow, Mr. Blair had a long and intimate conversation with General McClellan. He began by stating distinctly to him that he had not come from Mr. Lincoln; that he had no authority or even consent from him to make representations or overtures of any sort. He then urged him, with the privilege of age and long friendship, to have nothing to do with the Chicago convention, saying that if he accepted their nomination he would be defeated. He pictured to him the dismal fate that awaits defeated candidates; he urged him to make himself the inspiring center and representative of the loyal Democrats of the North by writing a letter to Lincoln asking to be restored to service in the army, declaring at the same time that he did not seek it with a view to recommend himself to the Presidential nomination. "In case the President should refuse this request," said Mr. Blair, "he would then be responsible for the consequences." General McClellan received this well-meant advice in his customary manner. It is altogether probable that he did not believe a word of Mr. Blair's opening statement that this overture was without the approval or privity of the President. It no doubt seemed to him a political trick to induce him to decline the nomination of which he was already certain. He listened with his habitual courtesy and answered with his habitual indecision. He disclaimed any desire for the Presidential candidacy; he thanked Mr. Blair for his friendly suggestions; he said he would give them deep consideration; that he was called to the country to see a sick child and regretted that he could not talk with him again. Mr. Blair came back from his useless mission and repeated to Mr. Lincoln what he had done, adding that he thought it probable that General McClellan would write to him. The President "neither expressed approval nor disapprobation," says Mr. Blair in his letter, "but his manner was as courteous and kind as General McClellan's had been."

The political situation grew darker throughout the summer. At last, towards the end of August, the general gloom and depression

¹ T. W. Barnes, "The Life of Thurlow Weed," Vol. II., p. 429.

² Letter of F. P. Blair, dated Oct. 5, 1864, in the "National Intelligencer."

enveloped the President himself. The Democrats had not yet selected their candidate nor opened their campaign. As in the field of theology there is no militant virtue unless there is an active evil to oppose, so in that of politics a party without an organized opposition appears to drop to pieces by its own weight. To use Mr. Lincoln's words: "At this period we had no adversary and seemed to have no friends." For a moment he despaired of the success of the Union party in the coming election. He was not alone in this impression. It was shared by his leading friends and counselors. So experienced and astute a politician as Mr. Thurlow Weed wrote on the 22d of August:

When, ten days since, I told Mr. Lincoln that his reelection was an impossibility, I also told him that the information would soon come to him through other channels. It has doubtless ere this reached him. At any rate nobody here doubts it, nor do I see anybody from other States who authorizes the slightest hope of success. Mr. Raymond, who has just left me, says that unless some prompt and bold step be taken all is lost. The people are wild for peace. They are told that the President will only listen to terms of peace on condition that slavery be abandoned. . . . Mr. Raymond thinks that commissioners should be immediately sent to Richmond offering to treat for peace on the basis of Union. That something should be done and promptly done to give the Administration a chance for its life is certain.¹

Mr. Lincoln's action in this conjuncture was most original and characteristic. Feeling that the campaign was going against him, he made up his mind deliberately as to the course he should pursue, and unwilling to leave his resolution to the chances of the changed mood which might follow in the natural exasperation of defeat, he resolved to lay down for himself the course of action demanded by his present conviction of duty. He wrote on the 23d of August the following memorandum:

This morning, as for several days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be reelected. Then it will be my duty to so cooperate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration;

¹ Weed to Seward, August 22. MS.

² Copied from the MS.

³ We copy from the MS. diary of one of the President's secretaries under date of November 11, 1864, the following passage relating to this incident: "At the meeting of the Cabinet to-day the President took out a paper from his desk and said: 'Gentlemen, do you remember last summer I asked you all to sign your names to the back of a paper of which I did not show you the inside? This is it. Now, Mr. Hay, see if you can open this without tearing it.' He had pasted it up in so singular a style that it required some cutting to get it open. He then read this memorandum [given in the text above]. The President said: 'You will remember that this was written at the time, six days before the Chicago nominating convention, when as yet we had no adversary and seemed to have no friends. I then solemnly resolved on the course of action indicated in

as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards."²

He then folded and pasted the sheet in such manner that its contents could not be read, and as the Cabinet came together he handed this paper to each member successively, requesting them to write their names across the back of it. In this peculiar fashion he pledged himself and the Administration to accept loyally the anticipated verdict of the people against him, and to do the utmost to save the Union in the brief remainder of his term of office. He gave no intimation to any member of the Cabinet of the nature of the paper they had signed until after his triumphant reelection.³

The Democratic convention was finally called to meet in Chicago on the 29th of August. Much was expected from the strength and the audacity which the peace party in the North-west had recently displayed, and the day of the meeting of the convention was actually chosen by rebel emissaries in Canada and their agents in the Western States for an outbreak which should effect that revolution in the North-west which was the vague and chimerical dream that had been so long cherished and caressed in Richmond and Toronto.

About the time of the adjournment of Congress the Democratic members of that body issued an address to their party, which, when read after twenty-five years, shows how blinded by partisan passion these intelligent and well-meaning gentlemen, neither better nor worse in most respects than the rest of their fellow-citizens, had become. They charged in effect that there were only two classes of people supporting the Government—those who were making money out of the war, and the Radical abolitionists; and they called upon the indefinite abstraction which they named "the country" to throw out of office the administration of a Government under favor of which these two classes of men "nestle in power and gratify their unholy greed and their detestable passions." The party of the Union—that is to say, the majority of the people of the country—is

this paper. I resolved in case of the election of General McClellan, being certain that he would be the candidate, that I would see him and talk matters over with him. I would say, "General, the election has demonstrated that you are stronger, have more influence with the American people, than I. Now let us together, you with your influence and I with all the executive power of the Government, try to save the country. You raise as many troops as you possibly can for this final trial, and I will devote all my energies to assist and finish the war."

"Seward said, 'And the general would have answered you, "Yes, yes"; and the next day when you saw him again and pressed these views upon him he would have said, "Yes, yes," and so on forever, and would have done nothing at all.'

"'At least,' said Lincoln, 'I should have done my duty and have stood clear before my own conscience.'"

called in this address "a nightmare of corruption and fanaticism which is pressing out its very existence." The most remarkable feature of this singular document is its assumption that the people who were trying to save the Union and to reestablish its authority were influenced only by sentimental doctrines and the wild passions of fury and vengeance. "We do not decry theory," these congressmen gravely said; "but we assert that statesmanship is concerned mainly in the domain of the practical, and that in the present imperfect condition of human affairs it is obliged to modify general ideas and adapt them to existing conditions." They called upon the country to sustain this calm and philosophic view of the functions of statesmanship, "to bring the sound elements of society to the surface," to "purge the body politic of its unhealthy elements," and to substitute in places of public trust "just and broad-minded, pure and liberal men, in the place of radicals and corruptionists." This being done, they promised the millennium.

The Democratic National Convention came together at the time appointed, but it is by no means sure that any real and permanent advantage had been gained by the delay. The scheme of the American Knights to inaugurate on that day their counter-revolution had, by the usual treachery of some of its members, been discovered and guarded against by a strong show of force in the city of Chicago, and its execution was postponed until the day of the November election. No great approach to harmony, on the subject of peace or war, had been made in the two months of observation and skirmishing which the managers had allowed themselves. The only manner in which the peace men and the war Democrats could arrive at an agreement was by mutual deception. The war Democrats, led by the delegation from New York, were working for a military candidate; and the peace Democrats, under the redoubtable leadership of Mr. Vallandigham, who had returned from Canada and was allowed to remain at large by the half-contemptuous and half-calculated lenity of the Government he defied, bent all their energies to a clear statement of their principles in the platform.

Mr. August Belmont, a German by birth and the representative of the Rothschilds' banking-house, called the delegates to order, informing them that the future of the Republic rested in their hands. "Four years of misrule," he said, "by a sectional, fanatical, and corrupt party have brought our country to the very verge of ruin." He gravely stated, expecting it to be believed, and apparently believing it himself, that the "results of such a calamity as the reelection of Mr. Lincoln must be the

utter disintegration of our whole political and social system amidst bloodshed and anarchy." This German banker promised the convention that the American people would rush to the support of their candidate and platform, "provided you will offer to their suffrage a tried patriot." This vague reference to McClellan was greeted with applause from the Eastern delegates. Mr. Belmont said: "We are here, not as war Democrats nor as peace Democrats, but as citizens of the great Republic"; and he named as temporary chairman Mr. William Bigler, formerly governor of Pennsylvania. Mr. Bigler made a brief speech charging upon the Republicans all the woes of the country, and saying that "the men now in authority, because of the feud which they have so long maintained with violent and unwise men of the South, and because of a blind fanaticism about an institution of some of the States in relation to which they have no duties to perform and no responsibilities to bear, are rendered incapable of adopting the proper means to rescue our country from its present lamentable condition."

The usual committees were appointed, and Mr. Vallandigham was presented by his State delegation as a member of the committee on platform. Several resolutions were offered in open convention—one by Washington Hunt of New York suggesting a convention of the States; one by Mr. Price of Missouri for a demonstration in favor of the freedom and purity of the elective franchise; and one by Mr. Long of Ohio, a furious advocate of peace, who had attained the honor of censure by the Congress of the United States, suggested that a committee proceed forthwith to Washington to demand of Mr. Lincoln the suspension of the draft until after the election.

Governor Seymour of New York was chosen permanent chairman of the convention. He made a long and eloquent speech full of abstract devotion to the Union and of denunciation of all the measures that had hitherto been taken to save it. "This Administration," he said, "cannot save this Union if it would. It has, by its proclamations, by vindictive legislation, by displays of hate and passion, placed obstacles in its own pathway which it cannot overcome, and has hampered its own freedom of action by unconstitutional acts." But Mr. Seymour did not mourn as one without hope. He continued: "If the Administration cannot save this Union, we can. Mr. Lincoln values many things above the Union; we put it first of all. He thinks a proclamation worth more than peace; we think the blood of our people more precious than the edicts of the President. . . . We demand no conditions for the restoration of our Union. We are shackled

with no hates, no prejudices, no passions." And so,—as he imagined,—without prejudices, without hatred, and without passion, he went on denouncing his Government and the majority of his fellow-citizens with eloquent fury to the end of his speech. His address was greeted at its close with loud applause, not unmingled with calls on the part of the peace men for Vallandigham. He did not respond at that moment, but the most weighty utterance of the convention was his, nevertheless—the second resolution of the platform, reported by the chairman, Mr. Guthrie of Kentucky. There had been on the organization of the committee a contest between Guthrie and Vallandigham for the chairmanship. "Through the artifices of Cassidy, Tilden, and other New York politicians,"¹ Mr. Guthrie of Kentucky received twelve votes to eight for Vallandigham; but whatever managers may accomplish, the strongest man with the strongest force behind him generally has his way, and when the committee got to work Vallandigham carried too many guns for Guthrie. He wrote, to use his own words,

the material resolution of the Chicago platform, and carried it through the sub-committee and the general committee in spite of the most desperate and persistent opposition on the part of Cassidy and his friends, Mr. Cassidy himself in an adjoining room laboring to defeat it.

This Vallandigham resolution is the only one in the platform worth quoting. All the rest was a string of mere commonplaces declaring devotion to the Union, denouncing interference of the military in elections, enumerating the illegal and arbitrary acts of the Government, expressing the sympathy of the convention with soldiers and sailors and prisoners of war. But the resolution written by Mr. Vallandigham and by him forced upon his party—

Resolved, That this convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of a military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.

It is altogether probable that this distinct proposition of surrender to the Confederates

¹ Letter of Vallandigham to the New York "News," Oct. 22, 1864.

might have been modified or defeated in full convention if the war Democrats had had the courage of their convictions; but they were so intent upon the nomination of McClellan that they considered the question of platform as of secondary importance, and these fatal resolutions were therefore adopted without debate, and the convention passed to the nomination of candidates. General McClellan was nominated by Mr. Stockton of New Jersey, followed by S. S. Cox of Ohio; Mr. Saulsbury of Delaware nominated Mr. Powell of Kentucky, who with compliments declined; Mr. Stuart, in behalf of the peace faction from Ohio, nominated Mr. Seymour of Connecticut; and Mr. Wickliffe of Kentucky raised the specter of the old-fashioned Democracy in the convention by nominating ex-President Pierce in a speech more amusing than effective. McClellan received 174 votes, but before the result was declared the vote was raised upon revision to 202; Seymour received a little more than one-tenth of that number. Mr. Vallandigham, who had taken possession of the convention through his platform, now adopted the candidate also, and put the seal of his sinister approval upon General McClellan by moving that his nomination be made unanimous, which was done with great cheering. Mr. Wickliffe, the comic old man of the convention, then offered a resolution that General McClellan, immediately after his inauguration in March next, should "open Abraham Lincoln's prison doors and let the captives free." Mr. Guthrie and Mr. Pendleton were the principal names mentioned in the first ballot for Vice-President, but on the second New York changed from Guthrie to Pendleton, and, all the other candidates being withdrawn, he was nominated, unanimously. Pendleton came to the stand and briefly addressed the convention, accepting the nomination and promising to continue "faithful to those principles which lay at the very bottom of the organization of the Democratic party." The convention did not adjourn as usual *sine die*. On the motion of Mr. Wickliffe, who said that "the delegates from the West were of the opinion that circumstances might occur between now and the 4th of March next which would make it proper for the Democracy of the country to meet in convention again," the convention resolved to "remain as organized, subject to be called at any time and place that the Executive National Committee shall designate." The motives of this action were not avowed. It was taken as a significant warning that the leaders of the Democratic party held themselves ready for any extraordinary measures which the exigencies of the time might provoke or invite.

The New Yorkers had, however, the last

word. Mr. Seymour, as Chairman of the Convention, was chairman of the committee to inform McClellan of his nomination, and before he wrote the letter Atlanta had fallen, the tide had turned, and the winds of popular opinion, which had seemed stagnant throughout the midsummer, now began to blow favorably to the national cause. The committee, in their letter dated a week after the convention adjourned, said :

Be assured that those for whom we speak were animated with the most earnest, devoted, prayerful desire for the salvation of the American Union, and preservation of the Constitution of the United States, and that the accomplishment of these objects was the guiding and impelling motive in every mind; and we may be permitted to add that their purpose to maintain the Union is manifested in their selection, as their candidate, of one whose life has been devoted to its cause, while it is their earnest hope and confident belief that your election will restore to our country Union, Peace, and Constitutional Liberty.

The general answered on the same date.¹ He also felt with the New York politicians that the poison of death was in the platform of the convention; that if he accepted it pure and simple the campaign was hopeless; his only possible chance for success was in his war record; his position as a candidate on a platform of dishonorable peace was no less desperate than ridiculous. He, therefore, in his letter of acceptance renewed his assurances of devotion to the Union, the Constitution, the laws, and the flag of his country.

The reëstablishment of the Union [he said] in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practiced by civilized nations and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, reëstablish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace. We ask no more. Let me add, what I doubt not was, although unexpressed, the sentiment of the convention, as it is of the people they represent, that when any one State is willing to return to the Union it should be received at once, with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights. . . . But the Union must be preserved at all hazards. I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy, who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain, that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often periled our lives. A vast majority of our people, whether in the army and navy or at home, would, as I would, hail with un-

bounded joy the permanent restoration of peace, on the basis of the Union under the Constitution without the effusion of another drop of blood. But no peace can be permanent without union.

Having thus absolutely repudiated the platform upon which he was nominated, he coolly concluded, "Believing that the views here expressed are those of the convention and the people you represent, I accept the nomination."

Upon this contradictory body of doctrine McClellan began his campaign. The platform of the convention was the law, his letter was the gospel, and the orators of the party might reconcile the two according to their sympathies or their ingenuity. The Ohio wing had no hesitation in taking its stand. "The Chicago platform," said Mr. Vallandigham, speaking from the same platform with Mr. Pendleton on the 17th of September, "enunciated its policy and principles by authority and was binding upon every Democrat, and by them the Democratic Administration must and should be governed. It was the only authorized exposition of the Democratic creed, and he repudiated all others." And a week afterwards² he went still further and specifically contradicted General McClellan.

The two principal points in his letter of acceptance to which I object were brought before the committee. The one containing the threat of future war was unanimously rejected. The other, to the effect that until the States and people of the South had returned to the Union we would not exhaust these arts of statesmanship, as they are called, received but three votes in that committee, though presented almost in the very words of the letter itself.

CONSPIRACIES IN THE NORTH.

OPPOSITION to the Government by constitutional means was not enough to gratify the vehement and resentful feelings of those Democrats in the North whose zeal for slavery seemed completely to have destroyed in their hearts every impulse of patriotism. They were ready to do the work of the Southern Confederacy in the North, and were alone prevented by their fear of the law. To evade the restraints of justice and the sharp measures of the military administration, they formed throughout the country secret associations for the purpose of resisting the laws, of embarrassing in every way the action of the Government, of communicating information to the rebels in arms, and in many cases of inflicting serious damage on the lives and property of the Unionists. They adopted various names in different parts of the country, but the designation adopted by the society having the largest number of lodges in the different States was the "Knights of the Golden Circle." As fast as one name was discovered and pub-

¹ Sept. 8, 1864.

² At Sidney, Ohio, Sept. 24.

lished it was cast aside and another adopted, and the same organization with the same membership appeared successively under the name we have mentioned and that of "The Order of American Knights," "The Order of the Star," and the "Sons of Liberty." These secret organizations possessed a singular charm to uneducated men, independent of their political sympathies; and this attraction, combined with the fact that they could not in plain daylight inflict any injury upon the Government, drove many thousands of the lower class of Democrats into these furtive lodges. It is impossible to ascertain, with any degree of exactness, the numbers of those who became affiliated with the orders. The numbers claimed by the adepts vary widely. A million was not infrequently the membership of which they boasted. Mr. Vallandigham asserted, in a public speech, that the organized body numbered half a million. Judge Holt, in his official report, accepted this aggregate as being something near the truth. The heaviest force was in Illinois and in Indiana; in Ohio they were also very numerous, and in the border States of Kentucky and Missouri. Their organization was entirely military; the State lodges were commanded by major-generals, the congressional districts by brigadiers, the counties by colonels, and the townships by captains. They drilled as much as was possible under the limitations of secrecy; they made large purchases of arms. General Carrington estimated that 30,000 guns and revolvers were brought into Indiana alone, and the adherents of the order in the State of Illinois were also fully armed. In the month of March, 1864, it was estimated that the entire armed force of the order capable of being mobilized for active service was 340,000 men.¹ It is altogether probable that this estimate was greatly exaggerated; and even if so large a number had been initiated into the order, their lack of drill, discipline, and moral character rendered them incapable at any time of acting as an army. The order was large enough at least to offer the fullest hospitality to detectives and to Union men who volunteered to join with the purpose of reporting what they could to the authorities; so that the Government was speedily put in possession of the entire scheme of organization, with the names of the prominent officers of the order and written copies of their constitutions, oaths, and books of ritual. The constitutions of secret societies are generally valuable only as illustrations of human stupidity, and these were no exception to the rule. Their declaration of principles begins with this lucid proposition: "All men are endowed by the Creator with certain rights; equal

as far as there is equality in the capacity for the appreciation, enjoyment, and exercise of those rights." The institution of slavery receives the approval of this band of midnight traitors in the following muddled and brutal sentences:

In the divine economy no individual of the human race must be permitted to encumber the earth, to mar its aspects of transcendent beauty, nor to impede the progress of the physical or intellectual man, neither in himself nor in the race to which he belongs. Hence a people . . . whom neither the divinity within them nor the inspirations of divine and beautiful nature around them can impel to virtuous action and progress onward and upward, should be subjected to a just and humane servitude and tutelage to the superior race until they shall be able to appreciate the benefits and advantages of civilization.

They also declare in favor of something they imagine to be the theory of State rights, and also the duty of the people to expel their rulers from the Government by force of arms when they see good reason. "This is not revolution," they say, "but solely the assertion of State rights." Had they been content to meet in their lodges at stated times and bewilder themselves by such rhetoric as this there would have been no harm done; but there is plenty of evidence that the measures they adopted to bring what they called their principles into action were of positive injury to the national welfare. One of their chief objects was the exciting of discontent in the army and the encouraging of desertion; members of the order enlisted with the express purpose of inciting soldiers to desert with them; money and citizens' clothing were furnished them for this purpose; lawyers were hired to advise soldiers on leave not to go back and to promise them the requisite defense in the courts if they got into trouble by desertion. The adjutant-general of Indiana, in his report for 1863, says that the number of deserters and absentees returned to the army through the post of Indianapolis alone, during the last month of 1862, was about 2600. The squads of soldiers sent to arrest deserters were frequently attacked in rural districts by these organized bodies; the most violent resistance was made to the enrollment and the draft. Several enrolling officers were shot in Indiana and in Illinois; about sixty persons were tried and convicted in Indiana for conspiracy to resist the draft.² A constant system of communication with the rebels in arms was kept up across the border; arms, ammunition, and, in some instances, recruits, were sent to aid the Confederates; secret murders and assassinations were not unknown; the plan of establishing a North-western Confederacy in hostility to the East and in alliance with the Southern Confederacy was the favor-

¹ Report of Judge-Advocate General Holt.

² *Ibid.*

ite dream of the malignant and narrow minds controlling the order. The Government wisely took little notice of the proceedings of this organization. It was constantly informed of its general plans and purposes; the Grand Secretary of the order in Missouri made a full confession of his connection with it. In August a large number of copies of the ritual of the order of American Knights was seized in the office of D. W. Voorhees, a prominent Democratic member of Congress at Terre Haute.¹ A private soldier in the Union army, named Stidger, had himself initiated into the order, and with infinite skill and success rose to a high position in it, becoming Grand Secretary for the State of Kentucky. Thus thoroughly informed of the composition and the purposes of the society, the Government was constantly able to guard against any serious disturbances of the public peace; and whenever the arrest of any of the ringleaders was determined upon, the evidence for their conviction was always overwhelming.

The fullest light was thrown upon the organization and plans of these treasonable orders by the trials of certain conspirators in Indiana in the autumn of 1864. We will make no reference to the testimony of Government detectives who joined the conspiracy with the purpose of revealing its secrets. It is sufficient to quote the unwilling and unquestionably truthful statements of members of the order, brought into court by subpoena. William Clayton,² a farmer of Warren County, Illinois, testified that he was initiated a member of the order of American Knights "at a congregation formed in the timber"; he took a long and bombastic oath, the only significant part of which was the pledge to take up arms if required, in the cause of the oppressed against usurpers waging war against a people endeavoring to establish a government for themselves in accordance with the eternal principles of truth; this, he testified, bound him to assist the South in its struggle for independence. He said he understood the purpose of the order was primarily to beat the Republicans at the polls, and that force of arms was to be resorted to in case of necessity; that they contemplated a rebel invasion in support of these objects; that the understanding was that in case the rebels came into Illinois, they and the brethren of this organization were to shake hands and be friends; that they were to give aid and assistance to the invaders; that death was the penalty for divulging the secrets of the order. Other members testified that they took an oath providing that in case of treachery

they were to be drawn and quartered, their mangled remains to be cast out at the four gates. When these dwellers in prairie villages were asked what they meant by "the four gates," they said they did not know. Clayton further said their objects were "to resist the conscription or anything else that pushed them too hard."³ Another farmer said he joined "because he had been a Democrat all his life"; another, that he "went in out of curiosity"—and this was doubtless a motive with many. In communities where there is little to interest an idle mind these secret mummeries possess a singular attraction. The grips, the passwords, the emblems, formed a great part of whatever temptation the order offered to the rural conspirators. Their favorite cognizance was the oak; not on account of any civic association, but because the word was formed of the initials of the name, "Order of American Knights." Their grand hailing cry of distress was "Oak-houn," the last syllable taken from the name of the South Carolina statesman whose principles they imagined they were putting in operation.

By far the most important witness for the Government was Horace Heffren, a lawyer of Salem, Indiana, a man high in the councils of the order. He was indicted for treasonable practices, and concluded to make a clean breast of it.⁴ He gave an apparently truthful account; detailed the scheme for forming a North-western Confederacy, or, if that failed, for joining the Southern army; the State Government of Indiana was to be seized, Governor Morton was to be held for a hostage or killed. He confirmed the story of the general uprising which was to have taken place on the 16th of August in conjunction with a rebel raid from Cumberland Gap, the great feature of which was the liberation of the Confederate prisoners in Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana. But when the time came the rebels did not, and the conspirators lacked heart for the fight. Vallandigham, the supreme head of the order, was too far away for intelligent and efficient direction. The whole conspiracy was shabby and puerile, although it included many editors and politicians of local standing. They were not all cravens; some of them stood up stoutly before the military commission and defended the cause of the South. "I assert," said one, "that the South has been fighting for their rights as defined in the Dred Scott decision."⁵ But there was very little display of heroism when the time of trial arrived. There was much that was ignoble and sordid; a scramble for the salaried places, a rush to handle the money provided for arms; one man intriguing for a place on the staff "because he had a sore leg"; a cloud of small politicians, who hardly knew whether

¹ Report of Judge-Advocate General.

² Treason trials at Indianapolis, p. 39.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 45. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 125. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

they were members or not; "they had heard a ritual read, but paid little attention to it"; they were anxious to be members if the scheme succeeded, and to avoid the law if it failed.

The President's attitude in regard to this organization was one of good-humored contempt rather than anything else. Most of the officers commanding departments, however, regarded the machinations of these dark-lantern knights as a matter of the deepest import. Governor Morton was greatly disquieted by their work in his State, and sent a telegram to the President in January, 1863,¹ expressing his fear that the legislature, when it met, would pass a joint resolution to acknowledge the Southern Confederacy and urge the North-west to dissolve all constitutional relation with the New England States. But when the legislature came together, although it evinced a hearty good-will in giving the governor all the worry and annoyance possible, it took no such overt step of treason as he feared.

His action was, indeed, sufficiently violent and contumacious. The House of Representatives insolently returned his message to him and passed a resolution accepting in its stead that of the Democratic governor of New York. Measures were introduced to take the military power of the State away from the governor and to confer it upon the Democratic State officers. To defeat these unconstitutional proceedings the Republicans adopted the equally irregular course of abandoning the legislature and leaving it without a quorum; in consequence of which no appropriation bills were passed, and the governor had to appeal to the people of the State for means to carry on the government. These were furnished in part by the voluntary offerings of banks, private corporations, and individuals; but needing a quarter of a million dollars for an emergency, he came to Washington and obtained it from the General Government, by virtue of a statute of July 31, 1861, which set aside two millions for the purchase of munitions of war to be used in States in rebellion or "in which rebellion is or may be threatened." In view of the revolutionary attitude of the legislature, and the known treasonable organization and purposes of the Sons of Liberty, the Secretary of War decided that Indiana was so "threatened," and made Governor Morton a disbursing officer to the amount of 250,000 dollars. It is related that Morton remarked, as he took the warrant, "If the cause failed, they would be called heavily to account for this"; to which Stanton replied, "If the cause fails, I do not wish to live."²

¹ Morton to Stanton, Jan. 3, 1863.

² Henry Wilson. Article E. M. Stanton, "Atlantic Monthly," February, 1870.

³ Rosecrans to Lincoln, June 22, 1864. MS.

General Rosecrans, commanding in Missouri, was thrown into something like panic by the doings of the Knights, and Governor Yates of Illinois shared fully in his trepidation. In June, 1864, the governor and the general joined in an earnest demand that the President should order Colonel Sanderson, of Rosecrans's staff, to Washington for a personal interview upon matters of overwhelming importance. The President was unwilling that either Rosecrans or his subordinate should come to Washington upon this errand, under the temptation to magnify his office by alarming reports. He therefore concluded to send one of his own private secretaries to St. Louis to see precisely what were the facts which had thrown the general commanding into such a state of consternation. Rosecrans then repeated the entire story of the organization of the order of American Knights and the Golden Circle, facts which were already well known to the President and the Secretary of War; but the immediate cause of his excitement was the expected return of Vallandigham, which, he said, was in accordance with the resolution adopted by the order at the convocation held in Windsor, Canada. General Rosecrans thought that his return would be the signal for the rising of the Knights throughout the North-west, and for serious public disorders.

The President, on receiving his secretary's report, declined to order Sanderson to Washington; and in reference to Rosecrans's strict injunctions of secrecy he said that a secret confided on the one side to half a million Democrats, and on the other to five governors and their staffs, was hardly worth keeping. He said the Northern section of the conspiracy merited no special attention, being about an equal mixture of puerility and malice.

General Rosecrans, after he was convinced that the President would not overrule the Secretary of War by ordering Colonel Sanderson to Washington, concluded at last to send his voluminous report in manuscript, accompanying it with the following letter, which we copy as giving in few words the results of his researches: ³

Since Major Hay's departure, bearing my letter about the secret conspiracy we have been tracing out, we have added much information of its Southern connexions, operations, uses, and intentions.

We have also found a new element in its workings under the name of McClellan minute men.

The evident extent and anti-national purposes of this great conspiracy compel me to urge the consideration of what ought to be done to anticipate its workings and prevent the mischief it is capable of producing again upon your attention.

Therefore, I have sent the report of Colonel Sanderson with the details of evidence covering a thousand pages of foolscap, by himself, to be carried or forwarded to you by safe hands.

That report and its accompanying papers show,

1. That there exists an oath-bound secret society, under various names but forming one brotherhood both in the rebel and loyal States, the objects of which are the overthrow of the existing national Government and the dismemberment of this nation.

2. That the secret oaths bind these conspirators to revolution and all its consequences of murder, arson, pillage, and an untold train of crimes, including assassination and perjury, under the penalty of death to the disobedient or recusant.

3. That they intend to operate in conjunction with rebel movements this summer to revolutionize the loyal States, if they can.

4. That Vallandigham is the Supreme Commander of the Northern wing of this society, and General Price, of the rebel army, the Supreme Commander of the Southern wing of the organization. And that Vallandigham's return was a part of the programme well understood both North and South, by which the revolution they propose was to be inaugurated.

5. That this association is now and has been the principal agency by which spying and supplying rebels with means of war are carried on, between the loyal and rebel States, and that even some of our officers are engaged in it.

6. That they claim to have 25,000 members in Missouri, 140,000 in Illinois, 100,000 in Indiana, 80,000 in Ohio, 70,000 in Kentucky, and that they are extending through New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland.

Besides which prominent and general facts, the names of members, mode of operating, and other details appear fully, showing what a formidable power and what agencies for mischief we have to deal with.

With this synopsis of the report it is respectfully submitted with the single remark—that whatever orders you may deem best to give, it must be obvious to your Excellency that leading conspirators like Chas. L. Hunt and Dr. Shore of St. Louis, arrested for being implicated in the association, cannot be released without serious hazard to the public welfare and safety.

From first to last these organizations were singularly lacking in energy and initiative. The only substantial harm they did was in encouraging desertions and embarrassing and resisting the officers concerned in the enrollment and the draft. The toleration with which the President regarded them, and the immunity which he allowed them in their passive treason, arose from the fact that he never could be made to believe that there was as much crime as folly in their acts and purposes. Senator McDonald reports that the President once said to him when he was asking the pardon of some of these conspirators condemned by military commission, "Nothing can make me believe that one hundred thousand Indiana Democrats are disloyal." They were sufficiently disloyal to take all manner of oaths against the Government; to be ready in their secret councils to declare they were ready to shed the last drop

of their blood to abolish it; to express their ardent sympathy with its enemies and their detestation of its officers and supporters. But this was the limit of their criminal courage. Shedding the last drop of one's blood is a comparatively easy sacrifice—it is shedding the first drop that costs; and these rural Catalines were never quite ready to risk their skins for their so-called principles. All the attempts against the public peace in the free States and on the Northern border proceeded not from the resident conspirators, but from desperate Southern emissaries and their aiders and abettors in the British provinces, and even these rarely rose above the level of ordinary arson and highway robbery.

The case of the *Chesapeake* was one of the most noteworthy of these incidents. Two Canadians named Braine and Parr resolved, in the latter part of 1863, to start on a privateering enterprise on their own account. Parr, though born in Canada, had lived for several years in Tennessee; and Braine, who had been arrested and confined in Fort Warren, had been released from that prison on his claim, presented by the British minister, that he was a British subject. Their sole pretension to Confederate nationality was the possession of commissions in the Confederate navy prepared *ad hoc*. They enlisted a dozen men, all British subjects, and purchased in New York the arms and equipment they required for their enterprise, and took passage on board the United States merchant steamer *Chesapeake*, which left New York on the 5th of December, bound for Portland, Maine. On the morning of the 8th they assaulted the officers and crew of the *Chesapeake*, capturing her after a struggle of only a few minutes' duration, killing one and wounding two of her officers.¹ They took the *Chesapeake* into the Bay of Fundy and there delivered her into the hands of a man calling himself Captain Parker of the Confederate navy, who afterwards turned out to be an Englishman whose name was Vernon Locke, and who had come out in a pilot boat to meet her. Feeling now secure in the possession of her new nationality, she went to Sambro Harbor, Nova Scotia, to receive the fuel and supplies necessary to enable her to prosecute her voyage to the Confederate States. While she lay there, the United States gun-boat *Ella and Annie* entered the harbor; and, says Mr. Benjamin, whose righteous indignation was evidently aroused by the proceedings, "with that habitual contempt of the territorial sovereignty of Great Britain and of her neutral rights which characterizes our enemies," recaptured the prize and left the British port with the

¹ Benjamin to Holcombe, Feb. 15, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

purpose of taking the *Chesapeake* to the United States; but meeting on the way a superior officer of the United States navy, the captain of the *Ella and Annie* was ordered by him to return to Halifax to restore the *Chesapeake* to the jurisdiction of Great Britain. This was done, and the few pirates who had been captured in the *Chesapeake* were delivered up. The case was taken at once into the courts and was promptly and properly decided, so far as the vessel was concerned, by her delivery to her rightful owners; but before this decision was made known at Richmond, the Confederate Government, seeing in the case a possibility of profit to their cause, dispatched to Halifax Professor J. P. Holcombe, said to be the most accomplished international lawyer in the Confederacy, to take charge of the case. During the professor's transit, however, by way of Wilmington and Bermuda, the case had come to its natural close, and on arriving at Halifax he found his occupation gone. He was compelled to report to the department that every man concerned in the capture of the *Chesapeake*, with the single exception of the Canadian-Tennessean just mentioned, was a British subject.¹ He also found that the captors had been guilty of stealing and peddling the cargo and pocketing the proceeds, and that the antecedents of the so-called Confederate officers involved were most disreputable. He seemed greatly disappointed to find that this gang of murderers and thieves were not high-minded and honorable gentlemen, and therefore concluded to make no demand upon the British authorities for the restitution of the stolen ship. He remained for some time in Halifax enjoying the hospitality of the colonial sympathizers with the South, and then proceeded to join the other secession emissaries in Canada who were engaged in equally congenial enterprises.

The principal agent of the Confederates in Canada was Jacob Thompson, late Secretary of the Interior in the administration of Buchanan, whose dishonorable administration of that important office has already been mentioned. He had sunk into appropriate insignificance, even among his own associates, after the war began; had been captured by General Grant on the Mississippi River in a ridiculous attempt at playing the spy under a flag of truce,² and, after being released with contemptuous forbearance, had gone to Canada, under instructions from the rebel Government, to do what damage he could in connection with the refugees and escaped prisoners who fringed the Northern frontier during the last two years of the war. He immediately placed himself in communication with the disloyal Democrats of the Northern States, and through them and a band of refugees who at once gathered about

him in Canada for employment began a series of operations which, for their folly no less than their malignity, would be incredible if they were not recorded in the report which Thompson himself, with amazing moral obtuseness, wrote of his mission on the 3d of December, 1864.³ He states that immediately on his arrival in Canada he put himself in communication with the leading spirits of the Sons of Liberty. He was received among them with cordiality, and the greatest confidence was extended to him. They became convinced, during the summer of 1864, that their efforts to defeat the election of Mr. Lincoln were hopeless. "Lincoln had the power," he said, "and would certainly reëlect himself," and there was no hope but in force. The belief was entertained and freely expressed that by a bold, vigorous, and concerted movement the three great North-western States of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio could be seized and held. This would naturally involve the accession of Missouri and Kentucky to the Confederacy, and this, in sixty days, would end the war. It was resolved to hold a series of peace meetings in Illinois for the purpose of preparing the public mind for such a revolt. The first of these meetings was to be held at Peoria, and "to make it a success," says Thompson, "I agreed that so much money as was necessary would be furnished by me." It was held, and was decidedly successful. But he pretends that the Niagara Falls conference and Lincoln's letter, "To whom it may concern," shook the country to such an extent that the leading politicians conceived the idea that Lincoln might be beaten at the ballot box on such an issue. "The nerves of the leaders," he says, "thereupon began to relax." The seizure of arms at Indianapolis, the arrests of leading supporters at Louisville, the unsympathetic attitude of Mr. McDonald, the Democratic candidate for governor of Indiana, all tended to discourage the ringleaders; and the day fixed for the revolt, which was to have been the 16th of August, passed by with no demonstration. "The necessity of pandering to the military feeling which resulted in the nomination of McClellan totally demoralized," says Thompson, "the Sons of Liberty."

Convinced that there was nothing to be expected from the coöperation of Northern Democrats, Thompson fell back once more upon his gang of escaped prisoners and other loose fish in Canada. The next scheme adopted by him was ingenious and audacious and not without possibilities of success. He determined to cap-

¹ Holcombe to Benjamin, April 1, 1864.

² "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," I., p. 462.

³ Thompson to Benjamin, Dec. 3, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

ture the war steamer *Michigan*, plying on Lake Erie, and with her to liberate the rebel prisoners on Johnson's Island; the prisoners were then to march upon Cleveland, attacking that town by land and by water, and thence march through Ohio to gain Virginia. A man named Cole, formerly one of Forrest's troopers, was sent round the lakes as a deck passenger to inform himself thoroughly of the approaches to the harbors, the depositories of coal, the stations and habits of the *Michigan*. He performed his duty with energy and efficiency and with great satisfaction and amusement to himself. He invented an oil corporation of which he was president and board of directors, opened an office in Buffalo, and used a good deal of Thompson's money in making the acquaintance of the officers of the *Michigan*. The 19th of September was the day fixed for the attempt upon the *Michigan*, Cole having contrived to have himself invited to dine with the officers of the vessel on that day. A Virginian named John Yates Beall was assigned the more difficult and dangerous part of the enterprise. He, with twenty-five Confederates, took passage from Sandwich, in Canada, on board the *Philo Parsons*, an unarmed merchant vessel plying between Detroit and Sandusky; they were all armed with revolvers, and had no trouble in taking possession of the steamer and robbing the clerk of what money he had. They soon afterwards fell in with another unarmed steamer, the *Island Queen*, scuttled her, and then steered for Sandusky Bay to join Cole and the boats he had prepared in an attack upon the *Michigan*. But the plan miscarried. The military, aware of Cole's intentions, had captured him; and Beall, missing the signals which had been agreed upon, did not dare to proceed in the enterprise alone. He therefore returned to Sandwich, and his crew scattered through Canada. Beall was not content with the failure of this enterprise, and later in the season, in the middle of December, he was caught in the State of New York near the Suspension Bridge in an attempt to throw a passenger train from the West off the railroad track for the purpose of robbing the express company.¹ This was the third attempt which he had made to accomplish this purpose. He was in citizen's dress, engaged in an act of simple murder and robbery, yet he imagined that the fact that he had a Confederate commission in his pocket would secure him against punishment in case of capture. He was tried by court martial and sentenced to death. Mr. Jefferson Davis took the same view of the talismanic character of the Confederate commission upon which Beall had relied, and issued a manifesto assuming

the responsibility of the act and declaring that it was done by his authority. There was great clamor in regard to the case, and many people of all parties pleaded with Mr. Lincoln to commute the sentence of Beall. A petition in this cause was signed by most of the Democratic members of the House of Representatives and by many Republicans. But the Judge-Advocate General reported that "Beall, convicted upon indubitable proof as a spy, guerrillero, outlaw, and would-be murderer of hundreds of innocent persons traveling in supposed security upon one of our great thoroughfares, fully deserved to die a felon's death, and the summary enforcement of that penalty was a duty which government owed to society."

Loath as Mr. Lincoln was at all times to approve a capital sentence, he felt that in this case he could not permit himself to yield to the promptings of his kindly heart. He sent a private message to General Dix, saying he would be glad if he would allow Beall a respite of a few days to prepare himself for death, but positively declined to interfere with the sentence, and Beall was hung in the latter part of February. The Virginia Senate made his case their own, and recommended, by resolutions of the 3d of March, the adoption of such steps as might be necessary in retaliation for the offense committed by the authorities of the United States.

Under Thompson's orders the large prison camps in the North had been thoroughly examined with a view of effecting the release of the Confederate prisoners confined in them. But the attempts at different places were given up for one reason or another, and it was resolved to concentrate all the efforts of the conspirators upon Camp Douglas at Chicago. A large number of rebels and their sympathizers were gathered together in that city, and the plan for taking the prison camp with its ten thousand Confederate prisoners was matured, and was to have been put into execution on the night of election day, taking advantage of the excitement and the crowds of people in the streets to surprise the camp, release and arm the prisoners of war, cut the telegraph wires, burn the railway stations, and seize the banks and stores containing arms and ammunition. It was hoped that this would excite a simultaneous rising of the Sons of Liberty throughout the State, and result in the release of the Confederate prisoners in other camps. But the plot, as usual, was betrayed by repentant rebels who were in the most secret councils of the conspirators. Shortly after midnight on the 7th of November, Colonel Sweet, commanding Camp Douglas, trapped in their various hiding-places and took prisoners all the leaders of the contemplated attack, among them Morgan's ad-

¹ General Orders No. 17, Feb. 21, 1865. Case of J. Y. Beall.

jutant-general, St. Leger Grenfell, Colonel Marmaduke, a brother of the rebel general, the commanding officer of the Sons of Liberty in the State, and several other officers of the rebel army who were escaped prisoners. In one house they found two cartloads of revolvers loaded and capped, two hundred stands of muskets loaded, and a large amount of ammunition.¹

Mr. Thompson hesitated at nothing which he thought might injure the people of the United States. Any villain who approached him with a project of murder and arson was sure of a kindly reception. "Soon after I reached Canada," he says, "a Mr. Minor Major visited me and represented himself as an accredited agent from the Confederate States to destroy steamboats on the Mississippi River, and that his operations were suspended for want of means. I advanced to him \$2000 in Federal currency, and soon afterwards several boats were burned at St. Louis, involving an immense loss of property to the enemy. . . . Money has been advanced to a Mr. Churchill of Cincinnati to organize a corps for the purpose of incendiarism in that city. I consider him a true man; and although as yet he has effected but little, I am in constant expectation of hearing of effective work in that quarter." Another miscreant of the same type, named Colonel Martin, who brought an unsigned letter from Jefferson Davis to Thompson, expressed a wish to organize a corps to burn New York City. "He was allowed to do so," says Mr. Thompson, "and a most daring attempt has been made to fire that city, but their reliance on the Greek fire has proved a misfortune. It cannot be depended on as an agent in such work. I have no faith whatever in it, and no attempt shall hereafter be made under my general directions with any such material." A party of eight persons, mostly escaped prisoners, were sent to New York to destroy that city by fire. One of them named Kennedy was captured, tried, and hung. Before his execution he confessed that he had set fire to four places: Barnum's Museum, Lovejoy's Hotel, Tammany Hotel, and the New England House; "the others," he said, with a certain sense of wrong, "only started fires where each was lodging, and then ran off. Had they all done as I did, we would have had thirty-two fires and played a huge joke on the fire department." This stupid tool of baser men escaped to Canada; but relying, as Beall did, on his commission as a captain in the Confederate army, he started once more for the Confederacy by way of Detroit, and was arrested by detectives in the railway station. He had taken on a new name and a new

character; and in his trial, among the evidence he brought forward which he thought would insure his immunity, was a pledge given to the transportation agent in Canada to return with all due diligence to the Confederacy. Even after his sentence he had no realization of the crime he had committed. He wrote to the President arguing, as a matter of law, that death was too severe a penalty for arson, and suggesting that there was no need of punishing him as an example, since the execution of Beall had already served that purpose.

If Mr. Thompson is to be believed it would appear that his adherents in Canada were not altogether under discipline, and that they sometimes took the opportunity to indulge in occasional burglaries and murders on their own account. He said in his official report that he knew nothing of the St. Albans affair until after it was over. This was a crime of unusual atrocity, and bade fair, for the moment, to involve the most serious consequences. A party of Confederate thieves, some twenty or thirty strong, came over the border from Canada on the 19th of October, and entering the village of St. Albans in Vermont, they robbed the banks of some fifty thousand dollars, accompanying this crime with entirely uncalled for cruelty, firing upon the unarmed citizens, killing one man and wounding three; they also burned one of the hotels in the place. The *razzia* was over in less than an hour, and the band, who had stolen horses enough in the vicinity to mount them all, immediately returned to Canada. It seemed at first as if the Canadian authorities intended to arrest the criminals and hold them for punishment, and Mr. Seward, two days afterwards, expressed his gratification to the British legation at Washington for this prompt and apparently satisfactory proceeding. As it turned out, however, he spoke too quickly, for Judge Coursol discharged the criminals from custody and restored to them the money they had stolen. As soon as this intelligence reached New York, General Dix, outraged beyond endurance by the iniquity of the act, without consultation with the Government issued an order directing all military commanders on the frontier in case of further acts of depredation and murder to shoot down the murderers, or the persons acting under commissions from the rebel authorities at Richmond; and further instructing them that if it should be necessary, with a view to their capture, to cross the border between the United States and Canada, to pursue them wherever they might take refuge, and on no account to surrender them to the local authorities, but to send them to the headquarters of the Department of the East for trial and punishment by martial law. The

¹ Colonel Sweet's report to General Cook, Nov. 7, 1864.

President, who felt no less keenly than General Dix the wrong and outrage committed by these rebel murderers and the Canadian authorities who seemed to be protecting them, nevertheless declined to allow any subordinate to embroil the country with a foreign nation in this way;¹ and in spite of General Dix's vehement defense of what he called "the right of hot pursuit," the President required him to revoke the instructions quoted. The British Government directed Lord Monck, the Governor-General of Canada, to be guided by the decision of the proper legal authorities in the provinces whether persons in custody ought or ought not to be delivered up under the treaty of extradition, saying that in case the decision should have been that they ought to be delivered, the Government would approve Lord Monck's acting on this decision; and in case of the contrary decision, the Government suggested that they should be put upon trial on the charge of misprision and violation of the royal prerogative by levying war from her Majesty's dominions against a friendly power. The criminals whom Judge Coursol had released were again captured; the Canadian Parliament reproved the action of Coursol and suspended him from office. The prisoners having been again arrested, the matter was heard before Mr. Justice Smith of Montreal, who again discharged them, on the ground that Young, the ringleader of the party, bore a commission in the Confederate army;² that Mr. Clement C. Clay, an associate of Thompson's as Confederate commissioner, was aware of Young's purpose and gave him a check for four hundred dollars for his expenses. "The attack on St. Albans," he said, "must therefore be regarded as a hostile expedition, undertaken and carried out under the authority of the so-called Confederate States by one of the officers of their army." The prisoners, he held, had not acquired any domicile in Canada nor lost their national character by their residence there. The Government of Canada was not satisfied with this pettifogging plea and again arrested the prisoners; but the war having now come to an end, the case was languidly prosecuted and the criminals received no punishment. The Canadian authorities, however, desiring to maintain amicable relations with the United States and to do substantial justice in the case in spite of the courts, refunded the fifty thousand dollars stolen by the raiders, and an attempt

was made in the provincial legislature to pass a law which should prevent the setting on foot of such unlawful expeditions from Canadian soil in the future.

LINCOLN AND THE CHURCHES.

In a conflict which was founded upon the quickened moral sense of the people it was not strange that the Government received the most earnest support from the churches. From one end of the loyal States to the other all the religious organizations, with few exceptions, moved by the double forces of patriotism and religion, ranged themselves upon the side of the Government against the rebellion. A large number of pulpits in the North had already taken their places as tribunes for the defense of popular freedom, and it was from them that, at the menace of war, the first cry of danger and of defiance rang out. Those ministers who had for years been denouncing the encroachments of slavery did not wait for any organized action on the part of their colleagues, but proclaimed at once in a thousand varying tones that peace was "a blessing worth fighting for." The more conservative churches were but little in the rear of the more advanced. Those who had counseled moderation and patience with the South on account of the divided responsibility for slavery which rested on both halves of the nation speedily felt the sense of release from the obligations of brotherhood when the South had repudiated and renounced them, and rallied to the support of the insulted flag with an earnestness not less ardent, and more steadily trustworthy, than that of the original antislavery clergy. As the war went on, and as every stage of it gave a clearer presage of the coming destruction of slavery, the deliverances of the churches became every day more and more decided in favor of the national cause and the downfall of human bondage. To detail the thousand ways in which the churches testified their support of the national cause, to give even an abstract of the countless expressions of loyalty which came from the different religious bodies of the country, would occupy many volumes; we can only refer briefly to a few of the more important utterances of some of the great religious societies.

In all the church conventions which met after the President's preliminary proclamation of the 22d of September, 1862, that act of liber-

¹ This order of General Dix gave great satisfaction at Richmond. An official of the Confederate War Department entered in his diary December 19: "General Dix orders his military subordinates to pursue any rebel raiders even into Canada and bring them over. So light may come from that quarter. A war with England would be our peace."

² There is an entry in "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary,"

December 15, which would indicate that Young's commission was spurious or prepared after the fact: "A letter from G. N. Sanders . . . asks copies of orders, to be certified by Secretary of War, commanding the raid into Vermont, the burning, pillaging, etc., to save Lieutenant Young's life. I doubt if such written orders are in existence—but no matter."

ation was greeted with the heartiest expressions of approval and support. The Baptist Convention of New York declared that "While we see with the profoundest sorrow thousands of husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons falling on the battlefield, considering the interests to be preserved and transmitted to future generations we cannot regard the sacrifice of treasure and of life too much for the object to be secured." They denounced "human slavery as the procuring cause of the rebellion now raging among us"; they declared that "the spirit of the age, the safety of the country, and the laws of God require its entire removal." The American Baptist Missionary Union had, in the spring of 1862, adopted with unanimity resolutions characterizing "the war now waged by the National Government to put down the unprovoked and wicked rebellion that has risen against us, and to establish anew the reign of order and of law, as a most righteous and holy one, sanctioned alike by God and all right-thinking men"; expressing their opinion that "the principal cause and origin of this attempt to destroy the Government has been the institution of slavery," and that a safe, solid, and lasting peace could not be expected short of its complete overthrow. The next year they declared that the developments of the past year had only tended to deepen their conviction of these truths, which they solemnly reiterated and affirmed. They referred to the "fatal and suicidal blows" inflicted upon slavery by the slaveholders' rebellion, and said that "for thus overruling what appeared at first to be a terrible national calamity, to the production of results so unexpected and glorious, their gratitude and adoration are due to that wonder-working God who still maketh the wrath of men to praise him, while the remainder of wrath he restrains." They approved the President's proclamation and the acts of Congress abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia and the Territories, and hailed the dawn of that glorious day when "liberty shall be proclaimed throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof." In severe and dignified language they expressed their gratitude for whatever measure of sympathy they had received from abroad, but at the same time declared that the United States asked no assistance from other nations, and would brook no intervention or interference. In October, 1864, at a meeting of the American Board of Foreign Missions, in Worcester, Massachusetts, the venerable Albert Barnes was granted leave to introduce, without reference to a committee, a series of resolutions expressing the hearty sympathy of the Board in the efforts to suppress the rebellion; hoping for the deliverance of the world from the oppression of slavery; and

gratefully acknowledging "the divine interposition in the success which has attended the arms of the nation as an indication that we shall again be one people, united under one glorious Constitution, united in our efforts to spread the Gospel around the world." These resolutions were adopted unanimously with great enthusiasm, the audience rising to their feet and singing the national anthem.

The State conferences of the Congregational churches passed similar resolutions from time to time. As a specimen of all we give an abstract of the resolutions of the Conference of Massachusetts in 1864. "The chief hope of rebellion is in the sympathy and distraction of a divided North, and the surest and shortest way to peace is not to recall our armies and to relax our grasp upon the enemy, but to present a united and loyal front and an unconquerable determination to prosecute the war till the power of the Government meets no longer armed resistance." They disclaim any feeling of despondency or of impatience, "believing that God is on our side," and interpret hopefully the divine delays which have "led to more and more radical and precious resolutions and deliverances," and assert roundly and with undaunted courage that "there can be no effectual reestablishment of the national authority by any negotiation which confesses the inability of the Government to subdue rebellion by force of arms and proposes terms of peace to rebels still flying the flag of defiance."

It was not only in New England that the Congregational churches maintained this stern and patriotic attitude. The General Association of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania came boldly forward in the autumn of 1864, and, discarding all pretenses of non-partisanship or neutrality, declared for the reelection of Mr. Lincoln in these unqualified words:

As the momentous issues of this long and deadly contest are approaching their solution in a combined struggle in the field and at the polls, we will sustain with our votes the brave and noble men who are defending our liberties with their lives, and will animate our fellow-citizens by every consideration of religious hope and duty, of devotion to country and to liberty, to make the decision of the people on the 8th of November final and fatal to the hopes of traitors in arms and conspirators in political councils. Our hopes for the preservation of our liberties as a nation, and for the complete emancipation of the African race in the South, depend, under God, upon sustaining the Government in upholding the integrity of the Union throughout all the trials and doubts of the war, and in that policy which looks to the abandonment of slavery as the condition of permanent union and peace.

The German Reformed Synod passed ear-

nest resolutions urging upon their clergy and laity to continue to labor and pray for the success of the Government in its efforts to suppress the rebellion, and to restore peace and union. These resolutions were reiterated from year to year in every State where this church had an organization in existence. The Lutheran General Synod which met at York in 1864 passed resolutions denouncing slavery, setting forth "the necessity of its forcible suppression, the righteousness of the war which is waged by the Government of the United States for the maintenance of the national life, and the duty of every Christian to support it by the whole weight of his influence, his prayers, and his efforts." The Moravian Synod also denounced slavery and considered an earnest support of the Constitution and the laws a religious duty, and expressed its willingness "to render all the aid in its power to subdue unrighteous rebellion, and extend the rightful authority of the Government over every portion of our country."

One of the most weighty utterances of any religious organization during the war was that of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States, which met at Columbus, Ohio, in the spring of 1862. Important as was this deliverance from the sanction which it carried, as the utterance of one of the most considerable religious organizations in the country, it was no less significant as the work of the Rev. R. J. Breckinridge of Kentucky, who held a position second to none in the border States in character, in political influence, and in social connections. This remarkable paper began with the praise of peace, but, in striking contrast to the many craven pleas based upon this theme during the war, it threw the blame of the violation of peace upon the disloyal and traitorous attempt to overthrow the National Government by military force.

This whole treason [the report continues], rebellion, anarchy, fraud, and violence, is utterly contrary to the dictates of natural religion and morality, and is plainly condemned by the revealed will of God. It is the clear and solemn duty of the National Government to preserve, at whatever cost, the National Union and Constitution, to maintain the laws in their supremacy, to crush force by force, and to restore the reign of public order and peace to the entire nation by whatever lawful means are necessary thereunto. And it is the bounden duty of the people who compose this great nation, each one in his several place and degree, to uphold the Federal Government and every State Government and all persons in authority, whether civil or military, in all their lawful and proper acts, unto the end hereinbefore set forth.

The report denounces treason, rebellion, and anarchy as sinful, and gravely deprecates the

conduct of the Southern synods in encouraging them. The concluding section says:

We record our gratitude to God for the prevailing unity of sentiment and general internal peace which have characterized the Church in the States that have not revolted, embracing a great majority of ministers, congregations, and people under our care. It may still be called with emphasis a loyal, orthodox, and pious church, and all its acts and works indicate its right to a title so noble. Let a spirit of quietness, of mutual forbearance, and of ready obedience to authority, both civil and ecclesiastical, illustrate the loyalty, the orthodoxy, and the piety of the Church. . . . In the name and by the authority of the Lord Jesus we earnestly exhort all who love God or fear his wrath to turn a deaf ear to all counsels and suggestions that lead toward a reaction favorable to disloyalty, schism, or disturbance, either in the Church or in the country. In all these respects we must give account to God in that great day, and it is in view of our own dread responsibility to the Judge of quick and dead that we now make this deliverance.

This austere and unqualified declaration of loyalty, this denunciation of a treason which was at that hour lifting a defiant and almost triumphant head through a great part of the Union, was adopted by a majority which, under the circumstances, is surprising. Two hundred and six ministers and ruling elders voted for it; only twenty voted against it; less than one in ten failed to rise to that height of moral and political duty. The keynote thus early set governed this powerful Church throughout the war. Its General Assembly, meeting at Newark, New Jersey, in 1864, adopted a long and most energetic report, declaring that

the time has at length come, in the providence of God, when it is his will that every vestige of human slavery among us should be effaced, and that every Christian man should address himself with industry and earnestness to his appropriate part in the performance of this great duty. . . . Under the influence of the most incomprehensible infatuation of wickedness, those who are most deeply interested in the perpetuation of slavery have taken away every motive for its further toleration.

An attempt was made at the meeting of the Synod of New York to censure this action of the General Assembly of the Church, but it was voted down by a majority of six to one. The General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church passed equally strong and uncompromising resolutions:

Believing it to be a duty especially incumbent on the Church to let her light shine, we trust that all the preachers of the Gospel, of every denomination, will hear and obey God's voice, now calling upon them louder than ever before to open their mouth in behalf of the dumb.

The Reformed Presbyterian Church, commonly called the "Scotch Covenanters," ad-

dressed the President by committee in 1862, beginning with the proud boast that "this Church, true to its high lineage and ancient spirit, does not hold within its pale a single secessionist or sympathizer with rebellion in these United States." They congratulated him upon the antislavery measures of the Government and urged him,

by every consideration drawn from the Word of God and the present condition of our bleeding country, not to be moved from the path of duty on which he has so auspiciously entered, either by the threats or blandishments of the enemies of human progress, nor the fears of timid friends.

Two years later they met and declared that—

It is the duty of the Church of Christ to encourage and sustain the Government of the country in all that they do for the honor of God, the freedom of the enslaved, the mitigation of the inevitable evils of war, and the preservation, at all hazards, of the national life, integrity, and power.

The New School Presbyterians also lifted their voice with equal energy and clearness against the rebellion and in favor of the Government. At their General Assembly each year during the war they adopted resolutions of the most uncompromising loyalty, and on several occasions addressed the President personally with messages full of ardent devotion and high encouragement. They said:

Since the day of your inauguration, the thousands of our membership have followed you with unceasing prayer, besieging the throne of grace in your behalf. . . . When we look at the history of your administration hitherto, and at the wonderful way in which the people have been led under your guidance, we glorify God in you.¹

A year later² they embodied their sentiments of loyalty to the Union and opposition to slavery in a forcible series of resolutions, which were brought to Washington and presented to the President by a committee of which Mr. John A. Foote, a brother of the admiral, was chairman. The President replied:

It has been my happiness to receive testimonies of a similar nature from, I believe, all denominations of Christians. . . . This to me is most gratifying, because from the beginning I saw that the issues of our great struggle depended on the divine interposition and favor. . . . As a pilot, I have used my best exertions to keep afloat our Ship of

¹ Cincinnati, May 22, 1862. McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 469.

² Philadelphia, May 27, 1863.

³ In an address delivered by Dr. J. P. Newman in New Orleans, March 23, 1864, he makes this well-founded claim: "The Methodist Church has been unanimous and zealous in the defense of the Union. Her bishops, her ministers, and her laity have nobly responded to the call of their country in this hour of her peril. The voice of Simpson has been heard pleading

State, and shall be glad to resign my trust at the appointed time to another pilot more skillful and successful than I may prove. In every case and at all hazards, the Government must be perpetuated. Relying as I do upon the Almighty Power, and encouraged as I am by these resolutions which you have just read, with the support which I receive from Christian men, I shall not hesitate to use all the means at my control to secure the termination of this rebellion, and will hope for success.

Of the firm and loyal attitude of the Protestant Episcopal Church this resolution of the Convention of the Diocese of Pennsylvania may serve as an example:

We hereby declare our unflinching allegiance to the Government of the United States, and we pledge it our willing devotion and service; and as a body of Christians we will pray that, in God's own time and way, this rebellion may be put down; that oppression and slavery in all its forms may be done away; that freedom of body and mind, political and religious, may everywhere prevail; that the emancipated negroes, whom God in his providence is committing to our care, may be the objects of our liberal and Christian regard and instruction; that war may soon cease throughout all our borders, and that our now lacerated country may again be so united that from the lakes on the North to the Gulf on the South, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific, there shall be one Union, one Government, one flag, one Constitution, the whole culminating in that higher glory which shall make this nation Emmanuel's land—a mountain of holiness and a dwelling-place of righteousness.

No church was more ready or powerful in its support of the Government than the widespread Methodist Episcopal Church. From the beginning it took ground firmly and unanimously for the national cause; the Western armies especially were filled with the young and vigorous fighting men of that connection. To a committee of the General Conference of 1864, the President said:

Nobly sustained as the Government has been by all the churches, I would utter nothing which might in the least appear invidious against any. Yet, without this, it may fairly be said that the Methodist Episcopal Church, not less devoted than the best, is, by its greatest numbers, the most important of all. It is no fault in others that the Methodist Church sends more soldiers to the field, more nurses to the hospitals, and more prayers to heaven than any other. God bless the Methodist Church. Bless all the churches, and blessed be God, who in this our great trial giveth us the churches.³

eloquently for the union of the country. Ames, as patriotic as wise, has not hesitated to lend his aid to our unfortunate prisoners in Richmond and to give his sons to the army. James has found no narrow field for his philanthropic heart in the labors of the Christian Commission. All our church papers and periodicals have given an uncompromising, zealous, persistent support to the Government, and have thrown the whole weight of their influence, intelligent as it was potent, on the side of the Union."

These energetic expressions of loyalty were not confined to the Protestant churches alone. Archbishop Hughes in New York gave his great personal and ecclesiastical influence to the support of the Government, and Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati took occasion, in recommending the observance of Thanksgiving Day, 1864, to his people, to urge upon them the cause of the country.

We confess [he says] that it has greatly pained us to hear that certain rash, irreverent, and thoughtless men of our communion have denounced and abused the Government, the Administration, and their abettors. Now God commands us to bless, and curse not. And when bad men cursed the supporters of the Government, did they not reflect that they cursed the more than hundreds of thousands of Catholic voters and Catholic soldiers of our army who defend that Government in the field? Did they not reflect that its downfall would be hailed with acclamation by our own hereditary oppressors across the ocean? Did they reflect that if political salvation is ever to reach a far-distant and beloved island, it must come to it from these United States which they would sever?

"The Administration did not commence this war," the archbishop said, and went on in his address to contrast the conduct of the National Government with that of the rebellion.

It is time [he said, in conclusion] that all should rally around the powers which the Apostle commanded us to obey, and thus, presenting an undivided front to the enemy, reestablish the Union, without which there can be no panacea, present or prospective, for the ills we suffer.

The Society of Friends occupied a peculiar relation to the war. By the two leading tenets of their religion they were drawn in different ways; they were intensely opposed both to slavery and to war. While, therefore, they were ready to favor every act of Mr. Lincoln's administration which promised to abridge the power and shorten the duration of slavery, they were placed in a cruel dilemma when called upon to take part in the only measures by which the country could be preserved, and the predominance of a government based upon slavery prevented. The result was as might readily be imagined. Human nature asserted itself in the midst of that serious and tranquil communion as everywhere else, and the Friends acted each according to his individual bent. In the words of the address of the Yearly Meeting of 1864:

Many of our young men, overcome by the spirit of war, rushed into the conflict where some of them found an early death, some purchased their release from the draft by the payment of money; others remained steadfast to their faith in the hour of trial, thereby subjecting themselves to the penalty for desertion.

Those who entered the army illustrated in their plain speech and quiet courage the virtues of their lineage no less than those who, refusing to bear arms, bore uncomplainingly all that the law could inflict upon them by way of punishment for their contumacy. But the Society, as a body, remained outwardly true to both articles of its creed and protested constantly against both slavery and the war which it caused. The Yearly Meeting of 1862 greeted with hearty approval the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, while praying that the effusion of blood might be stayed; and that of 1864, while "appreciating the difficulties that surround those upon whom rests the responsibility of guiding the nation through the awful perils of civil war," and declining to "enter into judgment with those who differed" from them, still persisted in their dignified petition to the President and to Congress that they might not be compelled to offend their own consciences by complying with the law requiring military service.

Mr. Lincoln's attitude in relation to this question was especially delicate. Himself of Quaker ancestry, he felt a peculiar sympathy with their scruples, and yet he could not legally relieve them from their liabilities, and he clearly perceived the impolicy of recommending to Congress any specific measure of relief. He heard and answered their addresses with the greatest patience and respect, and intervened with his prerogative on occasions of peculiar hardship. We owe to these complications two or three letters, which strikingly exhibit his quick sympathies, his keen sense of justice, and his profound religious feeling. To the Quakers of Iowa, who had sent him an address through Senator Harlan, he wrote:

It is most cheering and encouraging for me to know that in the efforts which I have made, and am making, for the restoration of a righteous peace to our country, I am upheld and sustained by the good wishes and prayers of God's people. No one is more deeply than myself aware that without his favor our highest wisdom is but as foolishness, and that our most strenuous efforts would avail nothing in the shadow of his displeasure. It seems to me that if there be one subject upon which all good men may entirely agree, it is in imploring the gracious favor of the God of nations upon the struggle our people are making for the preservation of their precious birthright of civil and religious liberty.¹

To the Quakers of Rhode Island, in answer to a letter, he said:

Engaged as I am, in a great war, I fear it will be difficult for the world to understand how fully I appreciate the principles of peace inculcated in this letter and everywhere by the Society of Friends.²

¹ Lincoln to Iowa Quakers, Jan. 5, 1862. Unpub. MS.

² Letter to Dr. S. B. Toby, March 19, 1862. Lincoln, Unpublished MS.

But one of the most significant of the President's letters, in which he expresses with less than his usual reserve his idea of the moral and religious bearings of the great conflict, was written to Mrs. Gurney, the wife of the eminent English preacher of the Society of Friends, in the autumn of 1864. It shows in a singularly touching and instructive way how the ancestral faith of the Quaker survived in this son of a pioneer, commander-in-chief of a million of men engaged in one of the most destructive wars of modern times :

MY ESTEEMED FRIEND: I have not forgotten — probably never shall forget — the very impressive occasion when yourself and friends visited me on a Sabbath forenoon, two years ago; nor has your kind letter, written nearly a year later, ever been forgotten. In all, it has been your purpose to strengthen my reliance on God. I am much indebted to the good Christian people of this country for their constant prayers and consolations, and to no one of them more than to yourself. The purposes of the Almighty are perfect, and must prevail, though we erring mortals may fail to accurately perceive them in advance. We hoped for a happy termination of this terrible war long before this; but God knows best, and has ruled otherwise. We shall yet acknowledge his wisdom, and our own error therein. Meanwhile we must work earnestly in the best lights he gives us, trusting that so working still conduces to the great ends he ordains. Surely he intends some great good to follow this mighty convulsion, which no mortal could make, and no mortal could stay. Your people, the Friends, have had, and are having, a very great trial. On principle and faith, opposed to both war and oppression, they can only practically oppose oppression by war. In this hard dilemma, some have chosen one horn, and some the other. For those appealing to me on conscientious grounds, I have done, and shall do, the best I could and can, in my own conscience, under my oath to the law. That you believe this I doubt not, and believing it I shall still receive for our country and myself your earnest prayers to our Father in heaven. Your sincere friend,

A. LINCOLN.

The most important agencies through which the mingled patriotism and religion of the country lent their assistance to the armies of the Union were the Sanitary Commissions and the Christian Commission. The former collected and disbursed not less than \$5,000,000 in cash and \$9,000,000 in supplies for the benefit of the armies in the field and the sick and wounded in the hospitals, while the Christian Commission raised some \$4,500,000, not only for this purpose, but also to extend to the soldiers the benefits and consolations of religion in cases where the overworked army chaplains found the complete fulfillment of these offices beyond their powers. The Sanitary Fairs throughout the country were remarkable exhibitions of the patriotism and philanthropy of the people. They were carried on to a great

extent by the women of the country, and the quickening of the national spirit by these concerted efforts was of more importance to the Union cause than even the vast sums of money which were produced; though these were unprecedented in the annals of charity. The fair at New York realized \$1,300,000, nearly all of which was clear profit. On every great battlefield of the war, even before the thunder of the artillery was silenced, the trains of these great organizations were upon the field and their members were engaged caring for the wounded, bearing away the sick, praying with the dying, and receiving their last messages; while in every village of the North gentle and patriotic women were constantly employed making ready the stores of luxuries and delicacies dispensed by charitable agents at the front.

In the work of these beneficent agencies the President took a profound interest. He frequently consulted with Dr. Bellows and Mr. Stuart as to the best means of carrying on their work. Being requested to preside at a meeting of the Christian Commission held in Washington on the 22d of February, 1863, he wrote:

While for reasons that I deem sufficient I must decline to preside, I cannot withhold my approval of the meeting and its worthy objects. Whatever shall be, sincerely and in God's name, devised for the good of the soldiers and seamen in their hard spheres of duty can hardly fail to be blessed. And whatever shall tend to turn our thoughts from the unreasoning and uncharitable passions, prejudices, and jealousies incident to a great national trouble such as ours, and to fix them on the vast and long-enduring consequences, for weal or for woe, which are to result from the struggle, and especially to strengthen our reliance on the Supreme Being for the final triumph of the right, cannot but be well for us all. The birthday of Washington and the Christian Sabbath coinciding this year, and suggesting together the highest interests of this life and of that to come, is most propitious for the meeting proposed.

The cause of the rebellion was adopted and carried on by the churches in the South, if not with more zeal and determination, at least with greater vehemence at the beginning than was shown by the religious organizations of the North. Even before the war began the State Convention of Baptists in Alabama¹ made haste to rush into secession, saying that "the Union had failed in important particulars to answer the purpose for which it was created," and that they held themselves "subject to the call of proper authority in defense of the sovereignty of Alabama, and of her right as a sovereignty to withdraw from the Union." Several of the Presbyterian Synods of the South went headlong into the rebellion before the close of the

¹ November, 1860.

year 1860, and others followed their example in the autumn meeting of 1861. They formed their General Assembly of the Southern Confederacy on the 4th of December of that year. Even before the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln the Protestant Episcopal Convention of several States formally withdrew from the Union, and that fiery soldier-priest Leonidas Polk, Bishop of Louisiana, commanded the clergy to shift their public prayers from the President of the United States to that of the Confederate States, and announced in a pastoral letter that "Our separation from our brethren of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States has been effected because we must follow our nationality. . . . Our relations to each other hereafter will be the relations we now both hold to the men of our mother church in England." Unable to restrain his ardor within the limits of the church militant, he exchanged his crozier for a sword and died by a cannon shot on the Georgia hills.

At the session of the first General Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church at Augusta an address was adopted congratulating the Church in the Confederate States upon the unity which existed in its councils, upon its promise of growth and expansion, and upon the fact that the leading minds of the new republic were of their own communion; they called upon the Church to make strenuous efforts in behalf of the slaves of the South, and gently advocated such an arrangement of their peculiar institution as not to violate the right of marriage among the blacks. "Hitherto," they say, "we have been hindered by the pressure of Abolitionists; now that we have thrown off from us that hateful and infidel pestilence, we should prove to the world that we are faithful to our trust, and the Church should lead the hosts of the Lord in this work of justice and mercy." Feeble efforts in this direction were made by churches in other communions in the South, but strong opposition was at once developed. In the Transylvania Presbytery it was argued that "Though the matter presented was one of undoubted grievance, involving a sin which ought to be purged away, yet, to prevent agitation in the Church at such a time of intense political strife, there must be no intermeddling," and a resolution in favor of the solemnization of matrimony among slaves was

laid upon the table, nearly every member of the Presbytery voting against it.¹

The Methodist Church in the South had separated from their brethren in the North fifteen years before the war on the question of slavery, and a portion of their clergy and laity when the war broke out naturally engaged in it with their accustomed zeal; but they were by no means unanimous, even within the seceding States, and the organization was virtually wrecked by the war.²

As the national authority began to be re-established throughout the States in rebellion, not the least embarrassing of the questions which generals in command were called upon to decide was that of the treatment of churches whose pastors were openly or covertly disloyal to the Union. There was no general plan adopted by the Government for such cases; in fact, it was impossible to formulate a policy which should meet so vast a variety of circumstances as presented themselves in the different regions of the South. The Board of Missions of the Methodist Church sent down some of their ablest ministers, with general authority to take charge of abandoned churches, and to establish in them their interrupted worship. The mission boards of other denominations took similar action, and the Secretary of War³ gave general orders to the officers commanding the different departments to permit ministers of the gospel bearing the commission of these mission boards to exercise the functions of their office and to give them all the aid, countenance, and support which might be practicable. But before and after these orders there was much clashing between the military and the ecclesiastical authorities, which had its rise generally in the individual temperaments of the respective generals and priests. There was an instance in one place where a young officer rose in his pew and requested an Episcopal minister to read the prayer for the President of the United States, which he had omitted. Upon the minister's refusal the soldier advanced to the pulpit and led the preacher, loudly protesting, to the door, and then quietly returning to the altar himself read the prayer—not much, it is to be feared, to the edification of the congregation. General Butler arrested a clergyman in Norfolk, and placed him at hard labor on the public works for disloyalty

¹ McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 548.

² At a convention of loyal ministers and laymen of the Methodist Episcopal Church held at Knoxville, August, 1864, it was resolved that the loyal members of the conference have a just claim to all the church property; that they really constitute the Southern Methodist Episcopal Church, within the bounds of the Holston Conference; that they propose, at the earliest day practicable, to transfer the same to the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States; and

that the ministers be instructed to propose to their congregations to unite *en masse* with that church. Their report states "that there are in the bounds of the Holston Conference 120 preachers known to be loyal, and 40 others supposed to be true to the Union; and it is thought, therefore, that the work of reconstruction will be easily accomplished." [McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 546.]

³ March 10, 1864. McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 522.

in belief and action; but the President reversed this sentence and changed it to one of exclusion from the Union lines.¹ The Catholic Bishop of Natchez having refused to read the prescribed form of prayer for the President, and having protested in an able and temperate paper against the orders of the commanding general in this regard, the latter ordered him to be expelled from the Union lines, although the order was almost immediately rescinded. General Rosecrans issued an order² in Missouri requiring the members of religious convocations to give satisfactory evidence of their loyalty to the Government of the United States as a condition precedent to their assemblage and protection. In answer to the protestations which naturally resulted from this mandate he replied that it was given at the request of many loyal church members, both lay and clerical; that if he should permit all bodies claiming to be religious to meet without question, a convocation of Price's army, under the garb of religion, might assemble with impunity and plot treason. He claimed that there was no hardship in compelling the members of such assemblages to establish their loyalty by oath and certificate, and insisted that his order, while providing against public danger, really protected the purity and the freedom of religion.

In the course of these controversies between secessionist ministers and commanding generals an incident occurred which deserves a moment's notice, as it led to a clear and vigorous statement from Mr. Lincoln of his attitude in regard to these matters. During the year 1862 a somewhat bitter discussion arose between the Rev. Dr. McPheeters of the Vine Street Church in St. Louis and some of his congregation in regard to his supposed sympathies with the rebellion. Looking back upon the controversy from this distance of time it seems that rather hard measure was dealt to the parson; for although, from all the circumstances of the case, there appears little doubt that his feelings were strongly enlisted in the cause of the rebellion, he behaved with so much discretion that the principal offenses charged against him by his zealous parishioners were that he once baptized a small rebel by the name of Sterling Price, and that he would not declare himself in favor of the Union. The difference in his church grew continually more flagrant and was entertained by interminable letters and statements on both sides, until at last the provost-marshal intervened, ordering the arrest of Dr. McPheeters, excluding him from his pulpit, and taking the control of his church out of the hands of its trustees. This action gave rise to extended comment, not

only in Missouri, but throughout the Union. The President, being informed of it, wrote³ to General Curtis disapproving the act of the provost-marshal, saying, in a terse and vigorous phrase, which immediately obtained wide currency, "The United States Government must not, as by this order, undertake to run the churches. When an individual in a church, or out of it, becomes dangerous to the public interest he must be checked; but let the churches, as such, take care of themselves." But even this peremptory and unmistakable command did not put an end to the discussion. Taking the hands of the government away from the preacher did not quench the dissensions in the church, nor restore the pastor to the position which he occupied before the war; and almost a year later some of the friends of Dr. McPheeters considered it necessary and proper to ask the intervention of the President to restore to him all his ecclesiastical privileges in addition to the civil rights which they admitted he already enjoyed. This the President, in a letter⁴ of equal clearness and vigor, refused to do. "I have never interfered," he said, "nor thought of interfering, as to who shall, or shall not, preach in any church; nor have I knowingly or believably tolerated any one else to so interfere by my authority"; but he continues, "If, after all, what is now sought is to have me put Dr. McPheeters back over the heads of a majority of his own congregation, that too will be declined. I will not have control of any church on any side." The case finally ended by the exclusion of Dr. McPheeters from his pulpit by the order of the presbytery having ecclesiastical authority in the case.

In this wise and salutary abstention from any interference with the churches, which was dictated by his own convictions as well as enjoined by the Constitution, the President did not always have the support of his subordinates. He had not only, as we have seen, to administer occasional rebukes to his over-zealous generals, but even in his own Cabinet he was sometimes compelled to overrule a disposition to abuse of authority in things spiritual. Several weeks after he had so clearly expressed himself in the McPheeters case, he found, to his amazement, that the Secretary of War had been giving orders virtually placing the army in certain places at the disposition of a Methodist bishop for the enforcement of his ecclesiastical decrees. He addressed to Mr. Stanton a note of measured censure,⁵ which was followed by an order from the War Department explaining and modifying the more objectionable features of the

¹ Report of Judge-Advocate General, April 30, 1864.

² March 7, 1864. ³ Jan. 2, 1863. ⁴ Dec. 22, 1863.

⁵ "After having made these declarations in good faith and in writing, you can conceive of my embar-

former document. The Secretary explained that his action had no other intention than to furnish "a means of rallying the Methodist people in favor of the Union, in localities where the rebellion had disorganized and scattered them."¹ This explanation was not entirely satisfactory to the President, but he thought best to make no further public reference to the matter. Scarcely was this affair disposed of when a complaint was received from Memphis of some interference by the military with a church edifice there. Mr. Lincoln made upon the paper this peremptory indorsement: "If the military have military need of the church building, let them keep it; otherwise, let them get out of it, and leave it and its owners alone, except for the causes that justify the arrest of any one."² Two months later the President, hearing of further complications in the case, made still another order, which even at the risk of wearying the reader we will give, from his own manuscript, as illustrating not only his conscientious desire that justice should be done, but also the exasperating obstacles he was continually compelled to surmount, in those troubled times, to accomplish, with all the vast powers at his disposition, this reasonable desire.

I am now told that the military were not in possession of the building; and yet that in pretended execution of the above they, the military, put one set of men out of and another set into the building. This, if true, is most extraordinary. I say again, if there be no military need for the building, leave it alone, neither putting any one in or out of it, except on finding some one preaching or practicing treason, in which case lay hands upon him, just as if he were doing the same thing in any other building, or in the streets or highways.³

He at last made himself understood and his orders respected; yet so widespread was the tendency of generals to meddle with matters beyond their jurisdiction, that it took three years of such vehement injunctions as these to teach them to keep their hands away from the clergy and the churches.

Lincoln had a profound respect for every form of sincere religious belief. He steadily refused to show favor to any particular denomination of Christians; and when General Grant issued an unjust and injurious order against the Jews, expelling them from his department, the President ordered it to be revoked the moment it was brought to his notice.⁴

He was a man of profound and intense religious feeling. We have no purpose of arraignment at now having brought to me what purported to be a formal order of the War Department, bearing date November 30, 1863, giving Bishop Ames control and possession of all the Methodist churches in certain Southern military departments whose pastors have not been appointed by a loyal bishop or bishops, and ordering the military to aid him against any resistance

tempting to formulate his creed; we question if he himself ever did so. There have been swift witnesses who, judging from expressions uttered in his callow youth, have called him an atheist, and others who, with the most laudable intentions, have remembered improbable conversations which they bring forward to prove at once his orthodoxy and their own intimacy with him. But leaving aside these apocryphal evidences, we have only to look at his authentic public and private utterances to see how deep and strong in all the latter part of his life was the current of his religious thought and emotion. He continually invited and appreciated, at their highest value, the prayers of good people. The pressure of the tremendous problems by which he was surrounded; the awful moral significance of the conflict in which he was the chief combatant; the overwhelming sense of personal responsibility, which never left him for an hour—all contributed to produce, in a temperament naturally serious and predisposed to a spiritual view of life and conduct, a sense of reverent acceptance of the guidance of a Superior Power. From that morning when, standing amid the falling snowflakes on the railway car at Springfield, he asked the prayers of his neighbors in those touching phrases whose echo rose that night in invocations from thousands of family altars, to that memorable hour when on the steps of the Capitol he humbled himself before his Creator in the sublime words of the second inaugural, there is not an expression known to have come from his lips or his pen but proves that he held himself answerable in every act of his career to a more august tribunal than any on earth. The fact that he was not a communicant of any church, and that he was singularly reserved in regard to his personal religious life, gives only the greater force to these striking proofs of his profound reverence and faith.

In final substantiation of this assertion, we subjoin two papers from the hand of the President, one official and the other private, which bear within themselves the imprint of a sincere devotion and a steadfast reliance upon the power and benignity of an overruling Providence. The first is an order which he issued on the 16th of November, 1864, on the observance of Sunday:

The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, desires and enjoins the orderly observ-

which may be made to his taking such possession and control. What is to be done about it?" [Lincoln to Stanton, MS., Feb. 11, 1864.]

¹ Lincoln to Hogan, Feb. 13, 1864.

² Lincoln MS., March 4, 1864.

³ Lincoln MS., May 13, 1864.

⁴ War Records, Vol. XVII., pp. 424, 530.

ance of the Sabbath by the officers and men in the military and naval service. The importance for man and beast of the prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and sailors, a becoming deference to the best sentiment of Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine will, demand that Sunday labor in the Army and Navy be reduced to the measure of strict necessity. The discipline and character of the national forces should not suffer, nor the cause they defend be imperiled, by the profanation of the day or name of the Most High. "At this time of public distress [adopting the words of Washington in 1776] men may find enough to do in the service of their God and their country without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality." The first General Order issued by the Father of his Country after the Declaration of Independence indicated the spirit in which our institutions were founded and should ever be defended. "The General hopes and trusts that every officer and man will endeavor to live and act as becomes a Christian soldier, defending the dearest rights and liberties of his country."¹

The date of this remarkable order leaves no possibility for the insinuation that it sprung from any political purpose or intention. Mr. Lincoln had just been reelected by an overwhelming majority; his party was everywhere triumphant; his own personal popularity was unbounded; there was no temptation to hypocrisy or deceit. There is no explanation of the order except that it was the offspring of sincere conviction. But if it may be said that this was, after all, an exoteric utterance, spring-

¹ General McDowell used to tell a story which illustrates Mr. Lincoln's Sabbatarian feeling. The President had ordered a movement which required dispatch, and in his anxiety rode to McDowell's headquarters to inquire how soon he could start. "On Monday morning," said McDowell; "or, by pushing things, perhaps Sunday afternoon." Lincoln, after a moment's thought, said, "McDowell, get a good ready and start Monday." [Herman Haupt, MS. Memoirs.]

ing from those relations of religion and good government which the wisest rulers have always recognized in their intercourse with the people, we will give one other document, of which nothing of the sort can be said. It is a paper which Mr. Lincoln wrote in September, 1862, while his mind was burdened with the weightiest question of his life, the weightiest with which this century has had to grapple. Wearied with all the considerations of law and of expediency with which he had been struggling for two years, he retired within himself and tried to bring some order into his thoughts by rising above the wrangling of men and of parties, and pondering the relations of human government to the Divine. In this frame of mind, absolutely detached from any earthly considerations, he wrote this meditation. It has never been published. It was not written to be seen of men. It was penned in the awful sincerity of a perfectly honest soul trying to bring itself into closer communion with its Maker.

The will of God prevails. In great contests each party claims to act in accordance with the will of God. Both *may* be and one *must* be wrong. God cannot be *for* and *against* the same thing at the same time. In the present civil war it is quite possible that God's purpose is something different from the purpose of either party; and yet the human instrumentalities, working just as they do, are of the best adaptation to effect his purpose. I am almost ready to say that this is probably true; that God wills this contest, and wills that it shall not end yet. By his mere great power on the minds of the now contestants, he could have either *saved* or *destroyed* the Union without a human contest. Yet the contest began. And having begun, he could give the final victory to either side any day. Yet the contest proceeds.

TO A PAINTER. (J. A. B.)

POET, whose golden songs in silence sung
 Thrill from the canvas to the hearts of men,—
 Sweet harmonies that speak without a tongue,
 Melodious numbers writ without a pen,—
 The great gods gifted thee and hold thee dear;
 Placed in thy hand the torch which genius lit,
 Touched thee with genial sunshine, and good cheer,
 And swift heat lightnings of a charming wit
 Whose shafts are ever harmless, though so bright;
 Gave thee of all life's blessings this, the best,—
 The true love of thy kind,—for thy delight.
 So be thou happy, poet-painter blest,
 Whose gentle eyes look out, all unaware,
 Beneath the brow of Keats, soft-crowned with shadowy hair.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

CABINET CHANGES—LINCOLN REELECTED—CHASE AS CHIEF-JUSTICE.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

CABINET CHANGES.



THE principal concession in the Baltimore platform made by the friends of the Administration to its opponents was the resolution which called for harmony in the Cabinet; and although no method was specified by which such harmony could be attained, it was no secret that the convention requested, and, so far as its authority went, required, that the Cabinet should be rendered homogeneous by the dismissal of those members who were stigmatized as conservatives. The President at first took no notice, either publicly or privately, of this resolution, and it was with something akin to consternation that the radical body of his supporters heard of the first change which occurred in his Cabinet after the convention adjourned. The resignation of Mr. Chase, whom the extreme radicals regarded as in some sort their special representative in the Government, took them entirely by surprise. The demonstration made by Mr. Wade and Mr. Davis some weeks later increased the feeling of restlessness among them, and brought upon the President a powerful pressure from every quarter to induce him to give satisfaction to the radical demand by the dismissal from the Cabinet of Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster-General, who had gradually attracted to himself the hostility of all the radical Republicans in the country. The unpopularity into which Mr. Blair had fallen among the radicals was one of those incidents that recall the oft-repeated simile that compares political revolutions to Saturn devouring his offspring. Mr. Blair was one of the founders of the Republican party. After graduating at West Point and serving for a year in the Seminole war, he resigned his commission in the army and began to practice law in St. Louis. He immediately gained high distinction in his profession, and became, while yet a young man, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas. He returned to Maryland, and in 1855 was appointed solicitor of the United States in the Court of Claims. The repeal of

the Missouri Compromise made a Republican of him. President Buchanan removed him from office in 1858 on account of his zealous antislavery attitude. He was counsel for the plaintiff in the famous Dred Scott case, and presided over the Republican convention of Maryland in 1860. With the exception of his brother Frank in Missouri, and Cassius M. Clay in Kentucky, he was beyond question the most prominent opponent of the extension of slavery in all the Southern States. The immediate cause which occasioned his loss of caste among the radical antislavery men was the quarrel which sprung up between his family and General Frémont in Missouri. In this also he had the mortification of feeling that he had nursed the pinion that impelled the steel. The reputation of General Frémont was the creation of the Blairs. It was at their solicitation that the President appointed the Pathfinder a major-general in the regular army, and gave him command of the important department of Missouri. So late as the 24th of August, 1861, General Frémont relied upon Montgomery Blair for all the support and assistance he required in Washington. The Postmaster-General, writing to him on that date, spoke of the President and his colleagues with the indiscreet frankness of confidential friendship. "Chase," he said, "has more horror of seeing treasury notes below par than of seeing soldiers killed, and therefore has held back too much, I think. I do not believe at all in that style of managing the Treasury." He goes on lamenting his lack of influence in the Government in a style which reminds us of Mr. Chase himself.

This, I can see [he says], is partly my own fault. I have been too obstreperous, perhaps, in my position, and men do not like those who have exposed their mistakes beforehand and dun them with them afterwards. The main difficulty is, however, with Lincoln himself. He is of the Whig school, and that brings him naturally not only to incline to the feeble policy of the Whigs, but to give his confidence to such advisers. It costs me a great deal of labor to get anything done, because of this inclination in the mind of the President, or leading members of the Cabinet, including Chase, who never voted a Democratic ticket in his life. But you have got the people at your back, and I am doing all I

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can to cut red tape and get things done. I will be more civil and patient than heretofore, and see if that will work.

No man can be sufficiently sure of friends to write them such letters as this. A few months later Frémont was Blair's deadliest enemy, and these letters, being printed, came up like impertinent ghosts between the Postmaster-General and his colleagues at the Cabinet table.

In the beginning of this quarrel the Blairs were unquestionably right; but being unjustly assailed by the radicals, the natural pugnacity of their dispositions would not permit them to rest firmly planted on their own ground. They entered upon a course of hostility that was at first confined to their factious enemies, but which gradually broadened and extended till it landed them both in the Democratic party. Montgomery Blair was doubtless unconscious of his progress in that direction. He thought himself the most zealous of Republicans until the moment that he declared himself the most zealous of Democrats. Every admonition he received but increased the heat and energy with which he defended himself. The Union League of Philadelphia, towards the close of 1863, left out his name in the resolutions by which they elected all the rest of the Cabinet honorary members of the League. He chose to consider Mr. Winter Davis responsible for some attacks made upon him, and desired to defeat him in Maryland. The President, who had certainly no cause to show personal favor to Mr. Davis, said that as he was the choice of the Union men of Maryland he merited and should receive what friendly support the Administration could give him. Mr. Blair made a speech in Rockville touching upon the subject of reconstruction, and indulged in vigorous and somewhat acrid allusions to some of his leading Republican assailants. This brought upon him, and upon Mr. Lincoln, over his shoulders, much vehement criticism. It was in relation to this speech that the President said:

The controversy between the two sets of men represented by Blair and by Sumner is one of mere form and little else. I do not think Mr. Blair would agree that the States in rebellion are to be permitted to come at once into the political family and renew their performances, which have already so bedeviled us, and I do not think Mr. Sumner would insist that when the loyal people of a State obtain supremacy in their councils and are ready to assume the direction of their own affairs they should be excluded. I do not understand Mr. Blair to admit that Jefferson Davis may take his seat in Congress again as a representative of his people. I do not understand Mr. Sumner to assert that John Minor Botts may not. So far as I understand Mr. Sumner, he seems in favor of Congress taking from the Executive the power it at present exercises over

insurrectionary districts and assuming it to itself; but when the vital question arises as to the right and privilege of the people of these States to govern themselves, I apprehend there will be little difference among loyal men. The question at once is presented, in whom is this power vested? and the practical matter for discussion is how to keep the rebellious population from overwhelming and outvoting the loyal minority.¹

It was about this time that the President wrote the letter of kindly and sensible advice to General Frank Blair which we have given in another place; a letter which, when published many months afterwards, gave great and lasting offense to the enemies of Blair in Congress and in the country. Although General Blair at this time retired from the contest for the speakership, the Postmaster-General continued, with equally bad taste and judgment, to oppose the nomination of Mr. Colfax for that place. Upon Colfax going to him in person and demanding the motive of his hostility, Mr. Blair was so indiscreet as to give as a reason for his opposition that Colfax was running as a Chase candidate.²

The opposition to Blair was not confined to the radical demonstrations in the Baltimore convention and out of it. Some of the most judicious Republicans in the country, who were not personally unfriendly to Blair, urged upon the President the necessity of freeing himself from such a source of weakness and discord. Even in the bosom of the Government itself a strong hostility to Mr. Blair made itself felt. While Mr. Chase remained in the Cabinet there was always a condition of smoldering hostility between the two men. Mr. Blair's enmity to Mr. Seward also became more and more violent in its expression, and his relations with Mr. Stanton were subject to a strain which was hardly endurable. There was still, however, so much in his character and antecedents that was estimable, the President had so deep a regard for both the Blairs, and especially for their father, that he had great reluctance to take any action against the Postmaster-General. In the middle of July, after the termination of Early's raid upon Washington, General Halleck, exasperated by the report of stringent and sarcastic remarks which Mr. Blair, under the provocation of the destruction by rebels of his property in the suburbs of Washington, had made, in reference to the laxity or poltroonery of the defenders of the capital, addressed an angry note to the Secretary of War, saying that he wished to know "whether such wholesale denouncement and accusation by a member of the Cabinet receives the sanction and approbation of the President of the United States.

1 J. II., Diary, Nov. 1.

2 J. II., Diary, Nov. 21.

If so," said General Halleck, "the names of the officers accused should be stricken from the rolls of the army; if not, it is due to the honor of the accused that the slanderer should be dismissed from the Cabinet." Mr. Stanton sent this letter of Halleck's to the President without comment. The President, on the same day, replied in his most masterful manner. After summarizing Halleck's letter, he said:

Whether the remarks were really made I do not know, nor do I suppose such knowledge is necessary to a correct response. If they were made, I do not approve them; and yet, under the circumstances, I would not dismiss a member of the Cabinet therefor. I do not consider what may have been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss is sufficient ground for so grave a step. Besides this, truth is generally the best vindication against slander. I propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when a member of the Cabinet shall be dismissed.¹

Not satisfied with this, the President, when the Cabinet came together, made them this impressive and oracular little speech:

I must myself be the judge how long to retain in and when to remove any of you from his position. It would greatly pain me to discover any of you endeavoring to procure another's removal, or in any way to prejudice him before the public. Such endeavor would be a wrong to me, and, much worse, a wrong to the country. My wish is that on this subject no remark be made nor question asked by any of you, here or elsewhere, now or hereafter.²

This, we are inclined to think, is one of the most remarkable speeches ever made by a President. The tone of authority is unmistakable. Washington was never more dignified; Jackson was never more peremptory.

The feeling against Mr. Blair and the pressure upon the President to remove him increased throughout the summer. Henry Wilson wrote on the 5th of September, "Blair every one hates. Tens of thousands of men will be lost to you or will give a reluctant vote on account of the Blairs." The President's mail was filled with such appeals as this; but through the gloom and discouragement of midsummer he declined to act. There was a moment, as we have seen, when he lost heart in the campaign, and believed that the verdict of the country would be against him. Yet even then he refused to make the concession to the radical spirit which he was assured from every quarter would result so greatly to his advantage; but with the victories which came later in the season, and with the response of the country to the infamy of the surrender of the Chicago convention, there came a great and inspiring change of public opinion, and before the

month of September ended the assured triumph of the Union cause became evident to one so capable as was Mr. Lincoln to discern and appreciate the signs of the times. He felt that it was his duty no longer to retain in his Cabinet a member who, whatever his personal merits, had lost the confidence of the great body of Republicans. He had learned also during the long controversy more than he had ever known before of the violent and unruly candor of the Postmaster-General. Exasperated by the attacks made upon him, there were no limits to Mr. Blair's jealousy and suspicion. He wearied the President by insisting upon it that all the leading Republicans were Lincoln's enemies. After Chase left the Cabinet he insisted that Seward and Stanton were in league against Lincoln; that Stanton went into the Cabinet to break down the Administration by thwarting McClellan, and that Seward was coquetting with the Copperheads. Mr. Lincoln listened to these denunciations with growing fatigue and impatience. He protested against them. He said once to Mr. Blair, in the presence of another, "It is much better not to be led from the region of reason into that of hot blood by imputing to public men motives which they do not avow."³ Towards the end of September the President, reasonably sure of his reelection, and feeling that he ought not any longer to delay complying with the demand of a party which was giving him so earnest and loyal a support, wrote this letter to the Postmaster-General:

You have generously said to me more than once that whenever your resignation could be a relief to me it was at my disposal. The time is come. You very well know that this proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally or officially. Your uniform kindness has been unsurpassed by that of any other friend; and while it is true that the war does not so greatly add to the difficulties of your department as to those of some others, it is yet much to say, as I most truly can, that in the three years and a half during which you have administered the General Post-office, I remember no single complaint against you in connection therewith.⁴

Mr. Blair accepted his dismissal in a manner which was to have been expected from his manly and generous character. He called upon the President at once, not pretending to be pleased at what had happened, but assuming that the President had good reasons for his action, and refraining from any demand for explanation. He went immediately to Maryland and busied himself in speaking and working for the Union cause, and for the reelection of Mr. Lincoln. He made a

¹ Lincoln to Stanton, July 14, 1864. MS.

² Lincoln. MS.

³ J. H., Diary.

⁴ Lincoln to Blair, September 23, 1864.

speech a few days later in New York, at a great war meeting, in which he said that the action of the President in asking his resignation was suggested by his own father. All the family received this serious reverse in the temper of fighting men ready for all the chances of battle, and of bold players whose traditional rule of conduct when the cards go against them is, "Pay and look pleasant." General Blair wrote to his father that he was sure in advance that his brother had acted for the good of the country, and in the interest of the reelection of Mr. Lincoln, in which he says "the safety of the country is involved."

I believe [he continued] that the failure to elect Mr. Lincoln would be the greatest disaster that could befall the country, and the sacrifice made by the judge to prevent this is so incomparably small that I feel it would not cost him a pang to make. . . . He leaves the Cabinet with an untarnished name, and a reputation of having administered the department with the greatest ability and success; and so far as worldly considerations go, it is better for him to go out than to remain in the Cabinet. As to the future I have no fear. If Mr. Lincoln's reelection is secured, no matter what his personal disposition may be towards us, or what his political necessities may compel him to do, if the country is saved and restored, those who have served it in its trials will some day be rewarded for the patriotism they have shown by a higher power than that of the President.

After the death of Judge Taney, Mr. Blair for a while indulged the hope that he might be appointed Chief-Justice, a position for which his natural abilities, his legal learning, his former judicial service, and his large acquaintance with the more important matters which would come before the court eminently fitted him; but the competition of Mr. Chase was too strong for any rival, however worthy, and he was chosen, to the bitter disappointment of the Blairs. Even this did not shake their steadfast loyalty to the Union cause, nor their personal fidelity and friendship to the President. Immediately after his second inauguration Mr. Lincoln offered Montgomery Blair his choice of the Spanish or the Austrian mission, an offer which was peremptorily though respectfully declined.¹

Mr. Blair's successor in the Cabinet, ex-Governor William Dennison of Ohio, had been selected beforehand. The President informed him of his appointment in a curt telegram, and directed him to proceed to Washington as soon as possible. Mr. Dennison had rendered admirable service to the Government as governor of Ohio at the outbreak of the war. He was a gentleman of the highest character, of great ability and perfect integrity, and of peculiarly winning and gracious manners. We find

¹ Seward to Lincoln, March 9, 1865. MS.

among the President's papers a letter written by his intimate friend, David Davis, on the 2d of June, suggesting Governor Dennison as a proper person to preside over the Baltimore convention. Judge Davis says: "He is a pure, upright man, one of your most devoted friends. If, during this or your subsequent administration, you think it your duty to modify your Cabinet, in my judgment you could not get a wiser counselor than Governor Dennison." This, so far as we know, was the first, perhaps the only, suggestion made to the President in favor of Mr. Dennison for a place in the Cabinet. The claim of localities always had a disproportionate weight in his mind. When Mr. Chase resigned Mr. Lincoln appointed Governor Tod in his place, and after Tod had declined he was glad to find an opportunity to call another Ohio statesman into his Cabinet.

The reconstruction of the Cabinet went on by gradual disintegration rather than by any brusque or even voluntary action of the President. Mr. Bates, the Attorney-General, before the end of the year 1864 grew weary, not only of the labors of his official position, but also of the rapid progress of the revolution of which he had been one of the earliest advocates. Although heartily devoted to the cause of freedom and emancipation, he was wedded, by constitutional temperament and lifelong habit, to the strictest rules of law and precedent. Every deviation from tradition pained him inexpressibly. The natural and unavoidable triumph of the radical party in St. Louis politics, and to a certain extent in those of the nation, seemed to him the herald of the trump of doom. He grew tired of it all, and expressed to the President his desire for retirement. If he had not himself wished to retire, the President would probably not have suggested it; he was greatly displeased at an announcement made by Simon Cameron, as if upon his authority, that in the event of reelection he would call around him fresh and earnest antislavery men. Mr. Lincoln, on hearing of this indiscreet and injurious statement, said, "They need not be so savage about a change in the Government. There are now only three left of the original Cabinet." He put a vacant judgeship at the disposition of the Attorney-General; but Mr. Bates declined it, not without some petulant remarks about the "uselessness of a legal system in a State dominated by the revolutionary spirit which then ruled in Missouri." He said he could not work in harmony with the radicals, whom he regarded as enemies of law and order; there was no such thing as a patriotic and honest American radical; some of the transcendental Republican Germans were honest enough in their moon-struck theorizing, but the

Americans impudently and dishonestly arrogated to themselves the title of unconditional loyalty, when the whole spirit of their faction was contempt of and opposition to the law. "While the present state of things continues in Missouri there is no need of a court; so says Judge Treat, and I agree with him." Considering the subject of a successor to Mr. Bates, the President, his mind still hampered by the consideration of locality, weighed for several days the names of all the leading men of Missouri who were in any way fitted for the place, but found good reasons for rejecting them all. One of his secretaries said to him, "Why confine yourself to Missouri? Why not go to the adjoining State and take Judge Holt?" The President looked up with some surprise and said: "Why, that would be an excellent appointment. I question if I could do better. I had always intended, though I had never mentioned it to any one, that if a vacancy should occur on the Supreme Bench in any Southern district I would appoint him; but giving him a place in the Cabinet would not hinder that."

Mr. Bates tendered his resignation at last on the 24th of November.

Heretofore [he said], it has not been compatible with my ideas of duty to the public and fidelity to you to leave my post of service for any private considerations, however urgent. Then the fate of the nation hung in doubt and gloom; even your own fate, as identified with that of the nation, was a source of much anxiety. Now, on the contrary, the affairs of the Government display a brighter aspect; and to you, as head and leader of the Government, all the honor and good fortune that we hoped for has come. And it seems to me, under these altered circumstances, that the time has come when I may, without dereliction of duty, ask leave to retire to private life. In tendering the resignation of my office of Attorney-General of the United States (which I now do) I gladly seize the occasion to repeat the expression of my gratitude, not only for your good opinion which led to my appointment, but also for your uniform and unvarying courtesy and kindness during the whole time in which we have been associated in the public service. The memory of that kindness and personal favor I shall bear with me into private life, and hope to retain it in my heart as long as I live. Pray let my resignation take effect on the last day of November.

A few days before the end of November the President offered the place of Attorney-General to Joseph Holt; but Mr. Holt, with that modesty and conscientiousness which formed the most striking trait of his noble character, believed that the length of time which had elapsed since he had retired from active service at the bar had rendered him unfit for the preparation and presentation of cases in an adequate manner before the Supreme Court, and therefore declined the appointment. The President was

not at first inclined to accept this as a sufficient reason for declination; but on the 30th of November Mr. Holt wrote a letter formally reiterating his refusal to accept the appointment.

After the most careful reflection [he said] I have not been able to overcome the embarrassments referred to at our last interview, and which then disinclined me to accept, as they must now determine me respectfully to decline, the appointment tendered in terms at once so generous and so full of encouragement. In view of all the circumstances, I am satisfied that I can serve you better in the position which I now hold at your hands than in the more elevated one to which I have been invited. I have reached this conclusion with extreme reluctance and regret; but having reached it, and with decided convictions, no other course is open to me than that which has been taken. I beg you will be assured that I am and shall ever be most grateful for this distinguished token of your confidence and good-will. In it I cannot fail to find renewed incentives to the faithful and zealous performance of the public duties with which you have already charged me.

Failing to secure Mr. Holt, the mind of the President turned naturally enough to another Kentuckian, Mr. James Speed, an able and accomplished lawyer, a man of high professional and social standing in his State, and the brother of the most intimate friend of the President's youth, Joshua F. Speed. Mr. Holt warmly recommended Mr. Speed. He said:

I can recall no public man in the State, of uncompromising loyalty, who unites in the same degree the qualifications of professional attainments, fervent devotion to the Union and to the principles of your administration, and spotless purity of personal character. To these he adds—what I should deem indispensable—a warm and hearty friendship for yourself, personally and officially.

Soon after the opening of the new year Mr. Fessenden was again elected to the Senate from Maine, and resigned his office as Secretary of the Treasury. In his letter of resignation he said:

I carry with me great and increased respect for your personal character and for the policy which has marked your administration of the Government at a period requiring the most devoted patriotism and the highest intellectual and moral qualities for a place so exalted as yours. Allow me also to congratulate you upon the greatly improved aspect of our national affairs, to which, and to the auspicious result of our prolonged struggle for national life, now, as I sincerely believe, so near at hand, no one can claim to have so largely contributed as the chosen Chief Magistrate of this great people.

The place thus vacated instantly excited a wide and spirited competition of recommendations. The principal bankers of Chicago joined in recommending Hugh McCulloch of Indiana, who had made a remarkably favorable official record as Comptroller of the Currency

in the supervision of the national banks; Governor Morgan was strongly presented by nearly the entire State of New York, though a few of the so-called radicals of that State joined with the great mass of the people of New England in recommending Governor Andrew, whose splendid executive qualities no less than his fiery zeal and patriotism had endeared him to the earnest antislavery people throughout the country. Both branches of the Maine legislature recommended ex-Vice-President Hamlin to take the place vacated by his distinguished colleague. Mr. Jay Cooke, who was carrying on with such remarkable success at that time the great funding operations of the Treasury Department, reënforced with his recommendation the demand of the Western politicians and bankers for Mr. McCulloch. Mr. Montgomery Blair, who still retained his friendly and confidential relations with the President, wrote to him on the 22d of February, saying that Mr. Hamlin did not wish his claim to be appointed Secretary of the Treasury urged upon the President; that Mr. Morgan positively refused the appointment. He supplemented these two important bits of information with the characteristic and irrelevant suggestion that Mr. Seward should leave the Cabinet, that Sumner should take his place, and that Governor Andrew might then succeed Sumner in the Senate. He also added that it would be a good thing to encourage Garibaldi to drive the French from Mexico. The President concluded to nominate Governor Morgan, who declined the honor. Mr. McCulloch was then appointed; upon which Mr. Usher, on the 8th of March, desiring, as he said, to relieve the President from any possible embarrassment which might arise from the fact that two members of the Cabinet were from the same State, resigned his place as Secretary of the Interior. The President indorsed the resignation, "Accepted, to take effect May 15, 1865." Before that date should arrive tremendous changes were to take place in the Government of the United States.

LINCOLN REELECTED.

FROM the moment the Democratic convention named its candidates the stars in their courses seemed to fight against them. During the very hours when the streets of Chicago were blazing with torches, and the air was filled with the perfervid rhetoric of the peace men rejoicing over their work, Hood was preparing for the evacuation of Atlanta; and the

¹ The Rev. Dr. Thompson, calling on the President soon after this, congratulated him on the improved aspect of politics, and asked him whether he attributed it in greater part to the Chicago platform or

same newspapers which laid before their readers the craven utterances of the Vallandigham platform announced the entry of Sherman into the great manufacturing metropolis of Georgia—so close together came bane and antidote. The convention had declared the war was a failure, and demanded that the Government should sue for terms of peace. Lincoln's reply three days afterwards was a proclamation announcing to the country "the signal successes that Divine Providence has recently vouchsafed" the people at Mobile and Atlanta, and calling for "devout acknowledgment to the Supreme Being in whose hands are the destinies of nations." He also tendered, by proclamation, the national thanks to Farragut, Canby, and Granger, and to General Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of their respective commands, and ordered that national salutes of one hundred guns should be fired on successive days from all the arsenals and navy yards in the United States in honor of these glorious victories. Thus, amid the prayers and thanksgivings of a grateful people, and the thunder and smoke of great guns uttering from their iron throats the general joy, the presidential campaign began. The darkest hour had come just before the dawn, and the light broadened on the political campaign from beginning to end.¹

One of the earliest speeches of the autumn was made by Mr. Seward at his home in Auburn, New York.² He spoke avowedly without authority from the President, yet, as well from his intimacy with Mr. Lincoln as from his commanding place in the Administration, his speech demanded and received great attention. He said:

While the rebels continue to wage war against the Government of the United States, the military measures affecting slavery, which have been adopted from necessity to bring the war to a speedy and successful end, will be continued, except so far as practical experience shall show that they can be modified advantageously, with a view to the same end. When the insurgents shall have disbanded their armies and laid down their arms the war will instantly cease; and all the war measures then existing, including those which affect slavery, will cease also; and all the moral, economical, and political questions, as well questions affecting slavery as others, which shall then be existing between individuals and States and the Federal Government, whether they arose before the civil war began, or whether they grew out of it, will, by force of the Constitution, pass over to the arbitration of courts of law and to the councils of legislation.

Referring to the Chicago declaration in favor of the immediate cessation of hostilities, and

to the victory at Atlanta. "I should say the victory," Mr. Lincoln answered; "at least, I should prefer to have that repeated."

² September 3, 1864.

the paralyzing effect on the action of the Government which would follow the success of the Democrats upon such a platform, he asked, in that contingency, "Who can vouch for the safety of the country against the rebels during the interval which must elapse before the new Administration can constitutionally come into power?"¹ The opposition journalists immediately seized upon this as a threat that the Administration was determined to keep itself in power whatever might be the verdict of the people, and this clamor went on until the President, as we shall show, put an effectual quietus upon it.

Mr. Lincoln himself took little part in the contest. He was forced, from time to time, to assist with his presence charitable demonstrations in favor of the sick and wounded soldiers; and being always obliged on these occasions to say a few words, he acquitted himself of these necessary tasks with dignity and discretion. He made no personal reference to his opponents, and spoke of his enemies North and South with unflinching charity and moderation. Regiments of soldiers returning to their homes after their term of service was over sometimes called upon him, and in brief and pithy speeches he thanked them for calling, and always added a word or two of wise or witty political thought. Speaking to an Ohio regiment, he defined in one phrase the essential character of our republican government with more accuracy and clearness than ever Jefferson had done:

I wish it might be more generally and universally understood what the country is now engaged in. We have, as all will agree, a free government, where every man has a right to be equal with every other man. In this great struggle this form of government, and every form of human rights, is endangered if our enemies succeed. . . . There is involved in this struggle the question whether your children and my children shall enjoy the privileges we have enjoyed. . . . When you return to your homes, rise up to the height of a generation of men worthy of a free government, and we will carry out the great work we have commenced.

To another regiment he said:

I happen, temporarily, to occupy this house. I am a living witness that any one of your children may look to come here as my father's child has done. It is in order that each one of you may have, through this free government which we have enjoyed, an open field and a fair chance for your industry, enterprise, and intelligence—that you

¹ Ten days later, when Mr. Seward had returned to Washington, he said, in answer to a serenade: "The Democracy of Chicago, after waiting six weeks to see whether this war for the Union is to succeed or fail, finally concluded that it would fail, and therefore went in for a nomination and platform to make it a sure thing by a cessation of hostilities and an abandonment of the contest. At Baltimore, on the contrary, we

may all have equal privileges in the race of life with all its desirable human aspirations—it is for this that the struggle should be maintained, that we may not lose our birthright. . . . The nation is worth fighting for to secure such an inestimable jewel.

Being invited to attend a Union mass meeting at Buffalo, the President at first thought of writing a letter, and we find among his papers the following fragment in his own manuscript:

Yours inviting me to attend a Union mass meeting at Buffalo is received. Much is being said about peace, and no man desires peace more ardently than I. Still I am yet unprepared to give up the Union for a peace which, so achieved, could not be of much duration. The preservation of our Union was *not* the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced. It was commenced for precisely the reverse object—to *destroy our Union*. The insurgents commenced it by firing upon the *Star of the West* and on Fort Sumter, and by other similar acts. It is true, however, that the Administration accepted the war thus commenced for the sole avowed object of preserving our Union; and it is not true that it has since been, or will be, prosecuted by this Administration for any other object. In declaring this I only declare what I can know, and do know, to be true, and what no other man can know to be false.

In taking the various steps which have led to my present position in relation to the war, the public interest and my private interest have been perfectly parallel, because in no other way could I serve myself so well as by truly serving the Union. The whole field has been open to me where to choose. No place-hunting necessity has been upon me urging me to seek a position of antagonism to some other man, irrespective of whether such position might be favorable or unfavorable to the Union.

Of course, I may err in judgment; but my present position in reference to the rebellion is the result of my best judgment, and, according to that best judgment, it is the only position upon which any executive can or could save the Union. Any substantial departure from it insures the success of the rebellion. An armistice—a cessation of hostilities—is the end of the struggle, and the insurgents would be in peaceable possession of all that has been struggled for. Any different policy in regard to the colored man deprives us of his help, and this is more than we can bear. We cannot spare the hundred and forty or fifty thousand now serving us as soldiers, seamen, and laborers. This is not a question of sentiment or taste, but one of physical force, which may be measured and estimated as horsepower and steam-power are measured and estimated. Keep it, and you can save the Union. Throw it away, and the Union goes with it. Nor is it possible for any administration to retain the services of these

determined that there should be no such thing as failure, and therefore we went in to save the Union by battle to the last. Sherman and Farragut have knocked the bottom out of the Chicago nominations, and the elections in Vermont and Maine prove the Baltimore nominations stanch and sound. The issue is thus squarely made up—McClellan and disunion, or Lincoln and Union."

people with the express or implied understanding that upon the first convenient occasion they are to be reenslaved. It cannot be, and it ought not to be.

After he had written thus far he seems to have changed his mind as to the good taste or the expediency of aiding even thus far in his own canvass. He therefore laid his letter aside and wrote a brief note¹ declining to address the meeting, on the ground, first, that it would be a breach of precedent, and, secondly, that if he once began to write letters it would be difficult to discriminate between meetings having equal claims.

Although the dignity and self-control with which Mr. Lincoln held himself aloof from the work of the canvass has been generally acknowledged, there is one incident of the campaign which was the object of severe criticism at the time. Governor Johnson, in accordance with the request of the State convention of Tennessee, had issued a proclamation² specifying the manner in which the vote for presidential electors should be taken, the qualification of voters, and the oath which they should be required to take. The Democratic candidates on the electoral ticket of that State, regarding themselves aggrieved by these requirements of the convention and the governor, united in a protest against this proceeding, and one of their number, a Mr. Lelleyet, was sent to present the protest in person.³ In the account of his interview with the President, which he published in the newspapers, Mr. Lelleyet said that the President told him "he would manage his side of this contest in his own way, and the friends of General McClellan could manage their side in theirs." It is not impossible that, in a moment of irritation at the presentation of a petition which was in itself an insinuation that he was making a selfish and corrupt use of his power, the President may have treated Mr. Lelleyet with scant courtesy; but he took the protest, nevertheless, and told him he would answer it at his convenience. There is certainly nothing of malice or of petulance in the grave and serious tone of the reply which the President sent a few days later to the McClellan electors of Tennessee. He informed them that he had had no communication whatever with Governor Johnson on the subject of his proclamation; that he had given to the subject such consideration as was in his power in the midst of so many pressing public duties.

My conclusion is [he said] that I can have nothing to do with the matter, either to sustain the plan as the convention and Governor Johnson have initiated it, or to revoke or modify it as you demand. By the Constitution and laws the President is charged

with no duty in the conduct of a presidential election in any State; nor do I, in this case, perceive any military reason for his interference in the matter.

The movement set on foot by the convention and Governor Johnson does not, as seems to be assumed by you, emanate from the National Executive. In no proper sense can it be considered other than as an independent movement of at least a portion of the loyal people of Tennessee.

I do not perceive in the plan any menace of violence or coercion towards any one. Governor Johnson, like any other loyal citizen of Tennessee, has the right to favor any political plan he chooses, and, as military governor, it is his duty to keep the peace among and for the loyal people of the State. I cannot discern that by this plan he purposes any more.

But you object to the plan. Leaving it alone will be your perfect security against it. Do as you please on your own account, peacefully and loyally, and Governor Johnson will not molest you, but will protect you against violence so far as in his power.

I presume the conducting of a presidential election in Tennessee in strict accordance with the old code of the State is not now a possibility.

It is scarcely necessary to add that if any election shall be held, and any vote shall be cast in the State of Tennessee for President and Vice-President of the United States, it will belong not to the military agents, nor yet to the Executive Department, but exclusively to another department of the Government, to determine whether they are entitled to be counted in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Except it be to give protection against violence, I decline to interfere in any way with any presidential election.⁴

The McClellan electors thereupon withdrew from the contest; Lincoln and Johnson electors were chosen, but their votes were not counted by Congress.

The most important utterance of the President during the campaign was a speech which he made on the evening of the 10th of October, in which he referred to the construction which had been placed on the remarks of the Secretary of State at Auburn, already quoted. He thought the distorted and unjust conclusions which had been drawn from Seward's remarks had gone far enough and that the time had come to put an end to them, and he seized, for that purpose, the occasion of a serenade from a party of loyal Marylanders who were celebrating in Washington the victory which the party of emancipation had gained in the elections in their State. He said a few words of congratulation upon that auspicious event, and then added:

A word upon another subject. Something said by the Secretary of State, in his recent speech at Auburn, has been construed by some into a threat that if I shall be beaten at the election I will, between then and the end of my constitutional term, do what I may be able to ruin the Government. Others regard the fact that the Chicago convention

¹ Lincoln to Schermerhorn, Sept. 12, 1864. MS.

² Sept. 30, 1864.

³ Oct. 16, 1864.

⁴ Lincoln to William B. Campbell *et al.*, Oct. 22, 1864.

adjourned, not *sine die*, but to meet again, if called to do so by a particular individual, as the intimation of a purpose that if their nominee shall be elected he will at once seize control of the Government. I hope the good people will permit themselves to suffer no uneasiness on either point.

I am struggling to maintain government, not to overthrow it. I am struggling especially to prevent others from overthrowing it. I therefore say that if I shall live I shall remain President until the 4th of next March; and that whoever shall be constitutionally elected therefor, in November, shall be duly installed as President on the 4th of March; and that, in the interval, I shall do my utmost that whoever is to hold the helm for the next voyage shall start with the best possible chance to save the ship.

This is due to the people both on principle and under the Constitution. Their will, constitutionally expressed, is the ultimate law for all. If they should deliberately resolve to have immediate peace, even at the loss of their country and their liberty, I know not the power or the right to resist them. It is their own business, and they must do as they please with their own. I believe, however, they are still resolved to preserve their country and their liberty; and in this, in office or out of it, I am resolved to stand by them.¹

During the progress of the campaign Mr. Lincoln was frequently called upon to assist his friends, to oppose his enemies, and to exercise his powerful influence in appeasing discords in different States and districts. He interfered as little as possible, and always in the interests of the party at large, rather than in those of individuals. He took no account of the personal attitude of candidates towards himself. In the case of those who were among his intimate friends he would go no further than to demand that Government officers should not work against them. When Mr. Arnold of Chicago, who had incurred the hostility of Mr. Scripps, the postmaster at that place, complained of the opposition of that official and called upon the President to put a stop to it, the President would do nothing more than to order the offending postmaster to content himself with the exercise of his own rights as a citizen and a voter and to allow his subordinates to do the same. The postmaster answered, as was natural, that this was precisely what he had been doing, and that this was the source of Mr. Arnold's complaint; that the congressman wanted his active official assistance, and would be satisfied with nothing less. Although Arnold was an intimate and valued friend of the President, he declined to exercise any further pressure upon the postmaster, and Mr. Arnold soon afterwards withdrew from the contest. After candidates had been regularly

and fairly nominated, the President had no hesitation in doing all in his power to conciliate hostilities and to unite the party in support of them. He tolerated in these cases no factious or malicious opposition on the part of his office-holders, and he laid his hands most heavily upon those injudicious friends of his own who attempted to defeat the reelection of Republican congressmen who had not been especially friendly to him. A large number of the leading Republicans in Roscoe Conkling's district had declared their intention to oppose him. Mr. Conkling's friends appealed to the President, claiming that the Republican opposition to him had its rise and origin among friends of the Secretary of State. The President commended their complaint to the attention of Mr. Seward, and answered for himself: "I am for the regular nominee in all cases, and no one could be more satisfactory to me as the nominee in that district than Mr. [Roscoe] Conkling. I do not mean to say there are not others as good as he in the district, but I think I know him to be at least good enough."² Being informed of some hostility on the part of the custom-house officials in New York against Frederick A. Conkling, he wrote similar admonitions to them. The postmaster of Philadelphia being accused of interference against William D. Kelley, the President sent for him, and following his custom in grave matters, he read to him a reprimand which he had committed to paper in the following words:

Complaint is made to me that you are using your official power to defeat Judge Kelley's renomination to Congress. I am well satisfied with Judge Kelley as a member of Congress, and I do not know that the man who might supplant him would be as satisfactory; but the correct principle, I think, is that all our friends should have absolute freedom of choice among our friends. My wish, therefore, is that you will do just as you think fit with your own suffrage in the case, and not constrain any of your subordinates to do other than as he thinks fit with his. This is precisely the rule I inculcated and adhered to on my part when a certain other nomination now recently made was being canvassed for.³

The reform of the civil service had not at that time been formulated by its friends, nor even adopted in principle by the country at large, yet it would be difficult even in the light of this day to improve upon this statement of its essential principle as applied to the conduct of office-holders. The postmaster, of course, promised exact obedience; but later in the summer the President was informed, on authority that he credited, that of the two or three hundred employees in the post-office not one of them was openly in favor of the renomination of Judge Kelley. Upon learning

¹ Autograph MS.

² Lincoln to Ward Hunt, Aug. 16, 1864. MS.

³ June 20, 1864. MS.

this, Mr. Lincoln wrote to an influential friend in Philadelphia, stating these facts and adding:

This, if true, is not accidental. Left to their free choice, there can be no doubt that a large number of them, probably as much or more than half, would be for Kelley. And if they are for him and are not restrained they can put it beyond question by publicly saying so. Please tell the postmaster he must find a way to relieve me from the suspicion that he is not keeping his promise to me in good faith.¹

The postmaster felt at last the hand of iron under the velvet glove, and Kelley was renominated and reelected, as he has been ever since — to the honor and advantage of his district and State.

The summer was full of brief panics and flurries among the politicians, and they were continually rushing to Mr. Lincoln to urge him to action or inaction in the interests of the canvass. We believe there is no instance in which he yielded to these solicitations. A matter of especial difficulty was the draft for half a million of men which had been issued on the 18th of July. Leading Republicans all over the country, fearing the effect of the draft upon the elections, begged the President to withdraw the call or suspend operations under it. Mr. Cameron, so late as the 19th of October, after the State elections had been secured, advised against the draft in Philadelphia. Mr. Chase on the same day telegraphed from Ohio, which had been carried triumphantly by the Republicans a few days before, recommending the suspension of the draft for three weeks — Chief-Justice Taney having died a week before. Judge Johnston of Ohio reports that he was with the President when a committee came from Ohio to request him to suspend the draft until after the elections, and that Mr. Lincoln quietly answered, "What is the Presidency worth to me if I have no country?" But these solicitations were not all in the same direction. General Sherman telegraphed from the field, "If the President modifies the draft to the extent of one man, or wavers in its execution, he is gone forever; the army would vote against him." The politicians and the general probably exaggerated in equal measure; the army would not have rejected him if he had seen fit to suspend the draft; and the people stood by him in his refusal to do it. He went so far in compliance with the earnest request of the Union people in Indiana as to write to Sherman expressing his sense of the importance of allowing as many of the Indiana soldiers as possible to go home to vote. Most of the other States which voted in October allowed their soldiers to vote in the field. Indiana had not

passed the necessary legislation for this purpose. The draft was steadily proceeding in that State, and, in the opinion of the leading men there, was endangering the success of the Union party in the elections. "Anything you can safely do," Mr. Lincoln wrote, "to let her soldiers, or any part of them, go home and vote at the State election will be greatly in point. They need not remain for the presidential elections, but may return to you at once."² He was careful, however, not to urge General Sherman to any course of action which he might consider injurious. "This is," he added, "in no sense an order, but is merely intended to impress you with the importance, to the army itself, of your doing all you safely can, yourself being the judge of what you can safely do." There were also reports from Missouri that Rosecrans was inclined to deny the soldiers the right of attending the elections, on the assumed ground that they would get drunk and make disturbance. The President, on being informed of this, quoted to Rosecrans the following words from the letter which he had written to Schofield: "'At elections see that those, and only those, are allowed to vote who are entitled to do so by the laws of Missouri, including as of those laws the restrictions laid by the Missouri convention upon those who may have participated in the rebellion.' This," said Lincoln, "I thought right then and think right now, and I may add I do not remember that either party complained after the election of General Schofield's action under it. Wherever the law allows soldiers to vote, their officers must also allow it."³

The opposition to Mr. Lincoln within the ranks of his own party did not entirely die away, even after the Chicago nomination and the changed political prospect which immediately followed it. So late as the 20th of September Thurlow Weed wrote to Mr. Seward that

The conspiracy against Mr. Lincoln collapsed on Monday last. It was equally formidable and vicious, embracing a larger number of leading men than I had supposed possible. Knowing that I was not satisfied with the President, they came to me for coöperation; but my objection to Mr. Lincoln is that he has done too much for those who now seek to drive him out of the field. Their last meeting was early last week at the house of Dudley Field, which was attended by Greeley, George Wilkes, Tilton, Opdyke, Noyes, and twenty-five others of the same stripe.

He also stated that a circular had been sent to leading Republicans in other States inquiring as to the feasibility of making another nomination for President at that time; that the malcontents, finding themselves in solitude, had concluded to break up operations and try to control the regular State convention.

¹ Lincoln to McMichael, Aug. 5, 1864. MS.

² Lincoln to Sherman, Sept. 19, 1864. MS.

³ Lincoln to Rosecrans, Sept. 26, 1864. MS.

After every semblance of open hostility had disappeared everywhere else in the country the fire of faction still kept it alive in Missouri. A singular state of things existed there. The radical party had almost entirely absorbed the Union sentiment of the State; the conservative party, the President's friends, had almost ceased to exist. The incumbents of the Government offices, a few of the intimate personal friends of Blair, still stood out against the radicals; and so long as this attitude was maintained the radicals, while working vigorously for their State and local tickets, refused to avow themselves in favor of Lincoln. So far as can be ascertained the only reason for this absurd position was that the "Clay Banks," as the conservatives were called, wished the radicals to declare for Lincoln as a pretext by which they could join the vast majority of their party, and the radicals spitefully refused to allow them this accommodation. Mr. Fletcher, the radical candidate for governor, refused during the greater part of the campaign to make any public statement that he would vote for Lincoln. His reason for this, privately given, was that he feared such an announcement would alienate from his support a large number of the more furious anti-Lincoln Germans. At last, however, he concluded to declare for the regular Republican presidential ticket, and a meeting was appointed for the purpose; but, to the astonishment of the moderate Union men, he went no further at this meeting than to say he would not vote for McClellan, and in explanation of this singular performance he told the President's private secretary¹ that he had found at the hotel where his speech was made a letter of the "Clay Bank" committee offering their support on condition of his declaring for Lincoln, and that he would not be coerced into it. The President sent messages to the moderate Unionists expressing his desire that the absurd and futile quarrel should come to an end, and they, to do them justice, desired nothing more. The only condition of their support which they made was that candidates should declare themselves for Lincoln, which they in turn would have been willing to do if it were not that the "Clay Banks" requested it.

So far as practical results went the party was united enough [Mr. Nicolay reported]; it seems to be well understood that, with the exception of very few impracticables, the Union men will cast their votes for you, for the radical congressmen, for the emancipation candidates, for the State legislature and the State convention, so that in practice nearly everybody is right and united, while in profession everybody is wrong or at cross purposes.

This was surmised while the clatter of factious fighting was going on, and was abundantly

proved by the result. While the radical candidate for governor only claimed that he would be elected by a majority of ten thousand, which claim by many of his party was considered sanguine, when the votes were counted it was found that Lincoln had carried the State by the immense majority of forty thousand.

The electoral contest began with the picket firing in Vermont and Maine in September, was continued in what might be called the grand guard fighting in October, in the great States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana, and the final battle all along the line took place in November. Vermont and Maine were carried by good Republican majorities, the canvass in the latter State having been managed by James G. Blaine with a dash and energy which gave a presage of his future career. Before the October elections came on, auguries of Republican success had become so significant and universal that there was little doubt in the best-informed political circles of the result. The President, however, was too old a politician to be sure of anything until the votes were counted, and it was not without some natural trepidation that on the evening of the 11th of October he walked over to the War Department to get from the telegraphic instruments the earliest intimations of the course of the contest. The first dispatch he received contained the welcome intelligence of the election of Rutherford B. Hayes and his Republican colleague from the hard-fought Cincinnati districts. Next came dispatches announcing a Republican majority in Philadelphia and indicating a similar result in the State of Pennsylvania. The news continued very much in the same strain during the evening, and the President in the lull of dispatches read aloud to Stanton and Dana selected chapters of the Nasby papers. As the votes of the soldiers in the different camps in the vicinity of Washington began to be reported they were found to be nearly unanimous in favor of the Republican candidate, the proportion among Western troops being generally that of ten to one: among the Eastern troops, although there was everywhere a majority, it was not so large. Carver Hospital, by which Lincoln and Stanton passed every day on their way to the country, gave the heaviest opposition vote reported—about one out of three. Lincoln turned to the Secretary and said, "That's hard on us, Stanton! They know us better than the others." The sum of the day's work was of enormous importance. Indiana indicated a gain of thirty thousand in two years. Governor Morton and the entire Republican ticket were elected by twenty thousand majority, with the gain of four congressmen. Pennsylvania, whose representatives in

¹ Nicolay to Lincoln, Oct. 18, 1864. MS.

Congress had been equally divided, now changed their proportion to fifteen against nine, and made her legislature strongly Republican in both branches, with popular majorities ranging from ten to fifteen thousand. The Unionists carried Ohio by a majority of over fifty-four thousand and effected a complete revolution in her representation in Congress: for while in 1862 she had elected fourteen Democrats and five Republicans, she now sent to Washington seventeen Republicans and two Democrats. But the success of the day which lay nearest to the heart of the President was the adoption in Maryland of the new State constitution abolishing slavery forever on her soil. The majority was a very slender one, the vote of the soldiers in the field being necessary to save emancipation: but it served, and the next month the Union majority was greatly increased.

It would seem strange that after this decisive victory there should have been any room left for hope or confidence on the side of the opposition or for anxiety and panic among Republican politicians; but alternating fits of confidence and despondency are inseparable from all long-continued political campaigns, and even after these overwhelming successes we find the Democratic speeches and papers full of boasting, and the private correspondence of the most experienced Republican leaders full of tremor and apprehension. The President, however, had passed through his moment of despondency, and from this time to the end entertained no shadow of doubt of the result. Mr. Washburne wrote to him on the 17th of October from Galena: "It is no use to deceive ourselves about this State. Everything is at sixes and sevens; no head or tail to anything. There is imminent danger of our losing the State"; and more in the same strain. The President laid away the letter, writing on the envelope the single word, "Stamped." Ten days later Washburne had recovered his spirits, and wrote, "John Logan is carrying everything before him in Egypt." Earlier in the campaign Mr. Washburne, desiring to do all in his power to forward the Union cause, had written to Grant asking permission to print a letter from him in favor of Lincoln. Grant replied that he had no objection to this, but he thought that "for the President to answer all the charges the opposition would bring against him would be like setting a maiden to work to prove her chastity." A friend of Mr. Seward communicated to him about the same time an astonishing mare's nest, in which he claimed to have discovered that the opposition policy for the presidential campaign would be to abstain from voting. The Secretary submitted this letter to the

President. To Mr. Lincoln, with his life-long observation of politics, this idea of abstention from voting seemed more amusing than threatening. He returned the letter to the Secretary with this indorsement: "More likely to abstain from stopping when once they get at it."

As the time drew near for the election in November a flight of rumors of intended secessionist demonstrations in the principal States of the North covered the land. The points of danger which were most clearly indicated were the cities of Chicago and New York. We have related in another place the efficient measures taken to prevent any outbreak in Chicago, with the arrest and punishment of the conspirators. The precautionary measures in other States prevented any attempt at disorder. To preserve the public peace in the city of New York and to secure the guarantee of a fair and orderly election there, General Butler was sent with a considerable force of troops to that city. He issued an order on the 5th of November declaring that troops had been detailed for duty in that district sufficient to preserve the peace of the United States, to protect public property, to prevent disorder, and to insure calm and quiet. He referred to the charge made by the opposition that the presence of Union troops might possibly have an effect upon the free exercise of the duty of voting at the ensuing election. He hotly repudiated this accusation.

The armies of the United States [he said] are ministers of good and not of evil. . . . Those who fear them are accused by their own consciences. Let every citizen having the right to vote act according to the inspiration of his own judgment freely. He will be protected in that right by the whole power of the Government if it shall become necessary.

He denounced energetically the crime of fraudulent voting, but did not assume to himself the duty of separating the tares from the wheat. He simply warned the evil-intentioned that fraudulent voting would be detected and punished after the election was over. Governor Seymour had been, as usual, much exercised for fear of executive usurpation at the polls, and had issued a proclamation on the 2d of November urging the avoidance of all measures which would tend to strife or disorder. He called upon sheriffs of counties to take care that every voter should have a free ballot in the manner secured to him by the constitutional laws, and to exercise the full force of the law and call forth, if need be, the power of their districts against the interference of the military in the vicinity of the polling-places.

There was by no means a unanimous agreement among even the supporters of the Administration as to the expediency of sending

General Butler to New York at this time. The action was taken by Mr. Stanton on his own responsibility. Thurlow Weed disapproved of it, and up to the day of election thought, on the whole, the proceeding was injurious, in spite of Butler's admirable general order; but Butler acted under the circumstances with remarkable judgment and discretion. He devoted the days which elapsed between his arrival and the election to making himself thoroughly acquainted with the city, with its police arrangements, and the means at his disposal to preserve order. Every hour was occupied with a careful study of maps, of police arrangements, of telegraphic communication between his headquarters and every region of the city, and in consultations with general officers, the creation of an improvised engineer department, and the planning of a system of barricades in case of a widespread insurrection. But the object to which he gave special attention, and in which he most thoroughly succeeded, was the avoidance of any pretext for any charge of interference with the rights of citizens at the polls. On the morning of the 8th of November, although the city was absolutely in the hands of the disciplined military force which had been sent to guard it, not a soldier was visible to the thousands of voters who thronged the streets; but everybody knew that they were there, and the result was, as Butler telegraphed to Lincoln at noon on election day, "the quietest city ever seen."

To Mr. Lincoln this was one of the most solemn days of his life. Assured of his personal success, and devoutly confident that the day of peace and the reestablishment of the Union was not far off, he felt no elation and no sense of triumph over his opponents. His mind seemed filled with mingled feelings of deep and humble gratitude to the vast majority of his fellow-citizens who were this day testifying to him their heartfelt confidence and affection, and of a keen and somewhat surprised regret that he should be an object in so many quarters of so bitter and vindictive an opposition. He said to one of his secretaries: "It is singular that I, who am not a vindictive man, should always, except once, have been before the people for election in canvasses marked for their bitterness. When I came to Congress it was a quiet time; but always, except that, the contests in which I have been prominent have been marked with great rancor."¹

In the evening he went over, as was his custom, to the War Department. The night was rainy and dark. As he entered the telegraph room he was handed a dispatch from Mr. Forney claiming 10,000 Union majority in Philadelphia. The figures were so far above his estimate that he said, "Forney is a little ex-

citable." A moment after a dispatch came from Mr. Felton in Baltimore, "15,000 in the city, 5000 in the State. All hail, free Maryland!" A moment after there came messages from Boston announcing majorities for Mr. Hooper and Mr. Rice of something like 4000 each. The President, astonished, asked if this was not a clerical error for 400, but the larger figures were soon confirmed. Mr. Rice afterwards, in speaking of these astounding majorities in districts where there was never the least charge made of irregularity at the polls, quoted an explanation made by a constituent of his, with no irreverent intention, "The Almighty must have stuffed the ballot boxes."

The entrance of General Eckert, who came in covered with mud from a fall in crossing the street, reminded the President of an incident of his defeat by Douglas. He said: "For such an awkward fellow, I am pretty sure-footed. It used to take a rather dexterous man to throw me. I remember the evening of the day in 1858 that decided the contest for the Senate between Mr. Douglas and myself was something like this—dark, raining, and gloomy. I had been reading the returns and had ascertained that we had lost the legislature, and started to go home. The path had been worn hog-backed and was slippery. Both my feet slipped from under me, but I recovered myself and lit clear; and I said to myself, 'It is a slip, and not a fall.'"

Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, indulged in some not unnatural exultation over the complete effacement of Henry Winter Davis from Maryland politics. Mr. Davis had assailed the navy with a peculiarly malicious opposition for two years for no cause that Mr. Fox could assign except that he was a brother-in-law of Montgomery Blair. The President would not agree with him. "You have more of that feeling of personal resentment than I," he said. "Perhaps I have too little of it; but I never thought it paid. A man has no time to spend half his life in quarrels. If any man ceases to attack me I never remember the past against him." All the evening the dispatches kept the same tenor of widespread success—in almost all cases above the estimates. The October States showed increased majorities, and long before midnight the indications were that the State of New York had cast her ponderous vote for Lincoln, and made the verdict of the North almost unanimous in his favor, leaving General McClellan but 21 electoral votes, derived from New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky, 212 being cast for Lincoln and Johnson.

It was two o'clock in the morning before the President left the War Department. At the

door he met a party of serenaders with a brass band who saluted him with music and cheers, and, in the American fashion, demanded a speech. He made a brief response, saying that he did not pretend that those who had thought the best interests of the nation were to be subserved by the support of the present Administration embraced all the patriotism and loyalty of the country. He continued:

I do believe, and I trust without personal interest, that the welfare of the country does require that such support and indorsement be given.

I earnestly believe that the consequence of this day's work (if it be as you assume, and as now seems probable) will be to the lasting advantage, if not to the very salvation, of the country. I cannot at this hour say what has been the result of the election. But, whatever it may be, I have no desire to modify this opinion, that all who have labored to-day in behalf of the Union organization have wrought for the best interest of their country and the world, not only for the present, but for all future ages.

I am thankful to God for this approval of the people; but, while deeply grateful for this mark of their confidence in me, if I know my heart, my gratitude is free from any taint of personal triumph. I do not impugn the motives of any one opposed to me. It is no pleasure to me to triumph over any one; but I give thanks to the Almighty for this evidence of the people's resolution to stand by free government and the rights of humanity.

For several days the torrent of congratulations came pouring in. Frank Blair wrote from Georgia, where he was leading an army corps under Sherman to the sea: "The vote in this army to-day is almost unanimous for Lincoln. Give Uncle Abe my compliments and congratulations." Grant paused for a moment in his labors in the investment of Richmond to express his sense of the vast importance and significance of the election. He thought a tremendous crisis in the history of the country had been met and triumphantly passed by the quiet and orderly conduct of the American people on the 8th of November.

The manner in which the President received these tumultuous demonstrations of good-will was so characteristic that it seems to us worthy of special attention. He was absolutely free from elation or self-congratulation. He seemed to deprecate his own triumph and to sympathize rather with the beaten than the victorious party. He received notice that on the night of the 10th of November the various Republican clubs in the District of Columbia would serenade him. Not wishing to speak extempore on an occasion where his words would receive so wide a publication, he sat down and hastily wrote a speech which, while it has not received the world-wide fame of certain other of his utterances, is one of the weightiest and wisest of all

his discourses. He read it at the window which opens on the north portico of the Executive Mansion, a secretary standing beside him lighting the page with a candle. "Not very graceful," he said, "but I am growing old enough not to care much for the manner of doing things."¹ There was certainly never an equal compliment paid to a serenading crowd. The inmost philosophy of republican government was in the President's little speech.

It has long been a grave question [he said] whether any government not too strong for the liberties of its people can be strong enough to maintain its existence in great emergencies. On this point the present rebellion has brought our republic to a severe test, and a presidential election occurring in regular course during the rebellion has added not a little to the strain. If the loyal people united were put to the utmost of their strength by the rebellion, must they not fail when divided and partially paralyzed by a political war among themselves? But the election was a necessity. We cannot have a free government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forego or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us. The strife of the election is but human nature practically applied to the facts of the case. What has occurred in this case must ever recur in similar cases. Human nature will not change. In any future great national trial, compared with the men who have passed through this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good. Let us, therefore, study the incidents of this as philosophy to learn wisdom from, and none of them as wrongs to be revenged. But the election, along with its incidental and undesired strife, has done good, too. It has demonstrated that a people's government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war. Until now, it has not been known to the world that this was a possibility. It shows, also, how sound and how strong we still are. It shows that, even among candidates of the same party, he who is most devoted to the Union and most opposed to treason can receive most of the people's vote. It shows, also, to an extent yet unknown, that we have more men now than we had when the war began. Gold is good in its place; but living, brave, patriotic men are better than gold.

But the rebellion continues; and, now that the election is over, may not all having a common interest reunite in a common effort to save our common country? For my own part, I have striven and shall strive to avoid placing any obstacle in the way. So long as I have been here, I have not willingly planted a thorn in any man's bosom. While I am duly sensible to the high compliment of a reelection, and duly grateful, as I trust, to Almighty God for having directed my countrymen to a right conclusion, as I think, for their own good, it adds nothing to my satisfaction that any other man may be disappointed or pained by the result.

May I ask those who have not differed with me to join with me in this same spirit towards those who have? And now let me close by asking three

hearty cheers for our brave soldiers and seamen, and their gallant and skillful commanders.¹

In this lofty and magnanimous spirit he received all the addresses of congratulation that came in upon him in these days. To a delegation from Maryland who ascribed it to his rare discretion that Maryland was then a free State he replied with deep appreciation of their courtesy, and he added: "Those who differ from and oppose us will yet see that defeat was better for their own good than if they had been successful." He not only had no feeling of malicious triumph himself, he had no patience with it in others. When Mr. Raymond, who represented his special friends in New York, wrote a letter breathing fire and vengeance against the officials of the custom-house, who, he said, had come near defeating him in the race for Congress, the President merely observed that it was "the spirit of such letters as that which created the factious malignity of which Mr. Raymond complained." To all those who begged for a rigorous and exemplary course of punishment for political derelictions in the late canvass his favorite expression was, "I am in favor of short statutes of limitation in politics." He rejected peremptorily some suggestions of General Butler and the War Department having in view the punishment of flagrant offenders in New York: "We must not sully victory with harshness." His thoughtful and chivalrous consideration for the beaten party did not, however, prevent him from feeling the deepest gratitude for those who had labored on his side. He felt that the humblest citizen who had done his duty had claims upon him. Hearing that Deacon John Phillips of Sturbridge, Massachusetts, a man who had already completed his 104th year, and had voted at every presidential election since the foundation of the Government, had taken the pains to go to the polls to vote for him, the President wrote him a grateful letter of thanks.

The example [he said] of such devotion to civic duties in one whose days have already been extended an average life-time beyond the Psalmist's limit cannot but be valuable and fruitful. It is not for myself only, but for the country which you have in your sphere served so long and so well, that I thank you.

The venerable man, who had attained his majority in the midst of the war of the Revolution, and who had arrived at middle age before this century opened, answered in a note which greatly pleased and moved the President, as coming from one of the oldest men living on the earth.

¹ Autograph MS.

I feel that I have no desire to live [he said] but to see the conclusion of this wicked rebellion and the power of God displayed in the conversion of the nations. I believe, by the help of God, you will finish the first, and also be the means of establishing universal freedom and restoring peace to the Union. That the God of mercy will bless you in this great work, and through life, is the prayer of your unworthy servant,
JOHN PHILLIPS.

There is one phrase of the President's speech of the 10th of November which we have quoted which is singularly illustrative, not only of the quick apprehension with which he seized upon facts of importance, but also of the accuracy and method with which he ascertained and established them. Within a few hours after the voting had closed he was able to say that the election had shown that "we have more men now than we had when the war began." A great bundle of papers which lies before us as we write, filled with telegrams from every quarter annotated in his own neat handwriting, with a mass of figures which would have dismayed an ordinary accountant, shows the importance which he attached to this fact and the industry with which he investigated it. In his message to Congress a few weeks later he elaborated this statement with the utmost care. He showed from the comparative votes in 1860 and in 1864 a net increase of votes during the three years and a half of war of 145,551. The accomplished statisticians of "The Tribune" almanac in the following month, after the closest study of the official returns, expressed their surprise "at the singular accuracy of the President's figures."

An extract from his annual message to Congress gives the best summing up of the results of the election that has ever been written.

The purpose of the people within the loyal States to maintain the integrity of the Union was never more firm nor more nearly unanimous than now. The extraordinary calmness and good order with which the millions of voters met and mingled at the polls give strong assurance of this. Not only all those who supported the Union ticket so called, but a great majority of the opposing party also, may be fairly claimed to entertain and to be actuated by the same purpose. It is an unanswerable argument to this effect, that no candidate for any office whatever, high or low, has ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the Union. There have been much impugning of motives, and much heated controversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the Union cause; but on the distinct issue of Union or no Union the politicians have shown their instinctive knowledge that there is no diversity among the people. In affording the people the fair opportunity of showing one to another and to the world this firmness and unanimity of purpose, the election has been of vast value to the national cause.

On the day of election General McClellan

resigned his commission in the army, and the place thus made vacant was filled by the appointment of General Philip H. Sheridan, a fit type and illustration of the turn in the tide of affairs, which was to sweep from that time rapidly onward to the great and decisive national triumph.

CHASE AS CHIEF-JUSTICE.

CHIEF-JUSTICE TANEY died on the 12th day of October, 1864, during the public rejoicings that hailed the success of the Union party at the autumnal elections. He was a man of amiable character, of blameless life, of great learning, of stainless integrity; yet such is the indiscriminating cruelty with which public opinion executes its decrees, that this aged and upright judge was borne to his grave with few expressions of regret, and even with a feeling not wholly suppressed that his removal formed a part of the good news which the autumn had brought to the upholders of the Union. Toil-some and irreproachable as his life had been, so far as purity of intentions were concerned, it was marked by one of those mistakes which are never forgiven. In a critical hour of history he had made a decision contrary to the spirit of the age, contrary to the best hopes and aspirations of the nation at large. Before he had assumed the grave responsibilities of Chief-Justice he had not been insensible to those emotions and sympathies which animated the majority of his countrymen in later years. So early as 1818 he had spoken of slavery as a blot on our national character, and expressed the confident hope that it would effectually though gradually be wiped away. "Until it shall be accomplished, until the time shall come when we can point without a blush to the language held in the Declaration of Independence," he said, "every friend of humanity will seek to lighten the galling chain of slavery and better to the utmost of his power the wretched condition of the slave." But when he assumed public office he became a part of the machinery of his party. He accepted its tenets and carried them unflinchingly to their logical result, so that to a mind so upright and straightforward in its operations there seemed nothing revolting in the enunciation of the dismal and inhuman propositions of the Dred Scott decision. His whole life was therefore read in the light of that one act, and when he died, the nation he had so faithfully served according to his lights looked upon his death as the removal of a barrier to human progress. The general feeling found expression in the grim and profane witticism of Senator Wade, uttered some months before, when it seemed likely that the Chief-Justice would survive the ad-

ministration of Mr. Lincoln: "No man ever prayed as I did that Taney might outlive James Buchanan's term, and now I am afraid I have overdone it."

The friends of Mr. Chase immediately claimed that the place thus vacated belonged to him. They not only insisted that he was best fitted of all the public men in the country for the duties of that high office; that the great issues of the war would be safest in his hands; that the rights of the freedmen would be most secure with an ardent and consistent abolitionist; that the national currency would be best cared for by its parent; they also claimed that the place had been promised him by the President, and this claim, though not wholly true, was not without foundation. Several times during the last year or two the President had intimated in conversation with various friends of Mr. Chase that he thought favorably of appointing him Chief-Justice if a vacancy should occur. These expressions had been faithfully reported to the Secretary, and promptly entered by him in his diary at the time.¹ When Mr. Curtin was a candidate for reelection as governor of Pennsylvania, John Covode came to Mr. Chase and told him if Curtin was elected governor he would shape matters in Pennsylvania so as to secure its delegates in the presidential convention, but that the majority of the loyal men in Pennsylvania preferred Mr. Chase. Mr. Chase replied that no speculations as to Governor Curtin's future course could excuse the loyal men from supporting him now; that the future must take care of itself; that he, Mr. Chase, was not anxious for the Presidency; that there was but one position in the Government which he would really like to have, if it were possible to have it without any sacrifice of principle or public interest, and that was the chief-justiceship. At this Mr. Covode expressed himself satisfied, and went away resolved to permit the renomination of Curtin, which, it may be said in passing, he could have done nothing to prevent. Mr. Chase's eyes seemed pretty constantly fixed upon the bench in the intervals of his presidential aspirations. For a few days after his resignation his feelings against the President were of such bitterness that he seems to have given up that prospect. He was on the verge of open revolt from the party with which he had been so long associated. In his diary of the 6th of July he says:

Pomeroy says he means to go on a buffalo hunt and then to Europe. He cannot support Lincoln, but won't desert his principles. I am much of the same sentiments, though not willing now to decide what duty may demand next fall. Pomeroy remarked that on the news of my resignation reaching

1 August 30, 1863.

the Senate, several of the Democratic senators came to him and said, "We'll go with you now for Chase." This meant nothing but a vehement desire to overthrow the existing Administration, but might mean much if the Democrats would only cut loose from slavery, and go for freedom and the protection of labor by a national currency. If they would do that I would cheerfully go for any man they might nominate.

A few days later he wrote recounting his efforts for the public good, and added :

My efforts were stoutly resisted outside, and had not earnest sympathy inside of the Administration. They were steadily prevailing, however, when a sense of duty to myself and the country also compelled me to resign.

A few malignant opponents of Mr. Lincoln still continued to write to Mr. Chase and keep alive in his mind the fancy of a possible nomination to the Presidency. His weakness before the people had been signally shown by an ill-judged attempt to secure him the nomination for Congress in Cincinnati, but in spite of this he still responded readily to suggestions from factious partisans. To one writing from Michigan he replied that he was now a private citizen and expected to remain such.

No one [he said] has been authorized to use my name in any political connection, except that I said I should not feel at liberty to refuse my services to the citizens of my congressional district if spontaneously and unanimously demanded. I think now that I erred in saying this; but it seemed right at the time. No such movement as the one you suggest seems to me expedient so far as I am concerned. Whether it would be expedient or patriotic in reference to some other name, I am not able to judge. I see only, as all see, that there is a deplorable lack of harmony, caused chiefly, in my judgment, by the injudicious course of some of Mr. Lincoln's chief advisers, and his own action on their advice.¹

Even to comparative strangers he could not write without speaking slightly of the President. To one he said: "I fear our good President is so anxious for the restoration of the Union that he will not care sufficiently about the basis of representation." To another, with a singular and unusual lack of dignity, he said: "Some seem to think that a man who has handled millions must be rich, and so I should be if I could have retained for myself even one per cent. of what I saved to the people; but I would not exchange the consciousness of having kept my hands free from the touch of one cent of public treasure for all the riches in the world." Mr. Chase

was, of course, absolutely and unquestionably honest, but that virtue is not so rare in public men that one should celebrate it in himself. He passed the heat of the midsummer in the White Mountains. During his absence his tone of bitter and sullen comment towards the President and his associates in the Cabinet continued,² but after the fall of Atlanta, and the evident response of the country to the Chicago nominations, his tone underwent a sudden change. He announced himself at last in favor of the election of Mr. Lincoln. In his diary of the 17th of September, after he had returned to Washington, he said :

I have seen the President twice. . . . His manner was cordial and so were his words; and I hear of nothing but good-will from him. But he is not at all demonstrative, either in speech or manner. I feel that I do not know him, and I found no action on what he says or does. . . . It is my conviction that the cause I love and the general interests of the country will be best promoted by his reelection, and I have resolved to join my efforts to those of almost the whole body of my friends in securing it.

He continues in his usual tone of self-portraiture :

I have been told that the President said he and I could not get along together in the Cabinet. Doubtless there was a difference of temperament, and on some points of judgment I may have been too earnest and eager, while I thought him not earnest enough and too slow. On some occasions, indeed, I found that it was so. But I never desired anything else than his complete success, and never indulged a personal feeling incompatible with absolute fidelity to his administration.

He repeats over and again in his letters and diaries that he never really desired the Presidency; that he seized the first opportunity of withdrawing from the canvass. From Washington he went to Ohio, where he brought himself at last to make an open declaration of his preference for Mr. Lincoln as against McClellan; he voted for the Republican ticket at the election in October, and sent a telegram to the President that the result was "all right in Ohio and Indiana."

The death of Chief-Justice Taney occurred immediately afterwards, and the canvass for a successor on the part of the friends of Mr. Chase began without a moment's delay. Mr. Sumner was particularly ardent and pressing. "A Chief-Justice is needed," he wrote to the President, "whose position on the slavery question is already fixed and will not need argument of counsel to convert him." A mass

¹ Chase to Charles S. May, August 31, 1864.

² Samuel Bowles wrote September 4, 1864: "Do you notice that the 'Antislavery Standard' and the 'Liberator,' the representatives of the old abolitionists, are both earnest for Lincoln? Yet a new crop of rad-

icals have sprung up, who are resisting the President and making mischief. Chase is going around, peddling his griefs in private ears and sowing dissatisfaction about Lincoln. Oh, how little great men can be!" ["Life and Times of Samuel Bowles," Vol. I., p. 413.]

of solicitations of the same character came in upon the President, and they were reënforced inside the Cabinet by the earnest influence of Mr. Fessenden and Mr. Stanton; and although these and other friends of Mr. Chase were so strongly encouraged by Mr. Lincoln's response that they had no hesitation in assuring him that he would without doubt be made Chief-Justice, the President gave no decided intimation of his purpose. It is altogether probable that he intended from the first to appoint him, but he resolved at the same time to say nothing about it until he was ready to act. He said to his secretary, "I shall be very 'shut pan' about this matter." When one day his secretary brought him a letter from Mr. Chase in Ohio, he said, "What is it about?" "Simply a kind and friendly letter," the secretary answered. Mr. Lincoln, without reading it, replied, with his shrewd smile, "File it with his other recommendations."

So reticent was Mr. Lincoln in regard to his purpose that the enemies of Mr. Chase, who were especially abundant and active in Ohio, endeavored to prevent his nomination by the presentation of strong and numerous signed protests against it. The President received them not too affably, and while he listened respectfully to all they had to say in regard to the merits of the case, he sternly checked them when they began to repeat instances of Mr. Chase's personal hostility to himself. He treated with the same contempt a more serious statement which he received from New York that Mr. Cisco, who had personally declared for McClellan, gave as his reason for such a course that Secretary Chase had told him that Mr. Lincoln was incompetent and unfit for the position he held, though he added that Mr. Chase on his return to Washington had informed him that he then considered it his public duty to support Mr. Lincoln for the Presidency. Strangely enough from the Treasury Department itself came an earnest protest against the late Secretary. The venerable Judge Lewis, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, protested that he was not a man of large legal or financial knowledge; that his selfishness had gradually narrowed and contracted his views of things in general; that he was amazingly ignorant of men; that it was the opinion in the department that he really desired towards the end of his term of office to injure and as far as possible to destroy the influence and popularity of the Administration. By his constant denunciation of the extravagance of disbursements, and his tone of malevolent comment against every act of the President, he clearly indicated his desire to excite popular discontent and grumbling against the Government. Judge Lewis said that with the exception of a

few sycophants the entire department was relieved by the change. Even Mr. Field, for whose sake he gave up his place, expressed himself as gratified by it. To all these representations Mr. Lincoln made no reply. He was equally silent as to the merits of other distinguished jurists whose names were mentioned to him. He had the highest esteem and regard for Mr. Evarts; he had great confidence in the legal learning and weight of character of Judge Swayne; he had a feeling of hearty friendship for Mr. Montgomery Blair, and although he had thought proper in the preceding autumn to ask for his resignation, the intimate and even affectionate relations which he maintained towards the ex-Postmaster-General encouraged him and his friends to believe that he would receive the appointment. The late Vice-President Wilson, shortly before his death,¹ said that Blair met him one day near the War Department and solicited his good word, saying that Chase would certainly not be nominated. Wilson was startled by Blair's confident tone and went at once to the President, to whom he reiterated the arguments already used in favor of Mr. Chase's nomination, saying that the President could well afford to overlook the harsh and indecorous things which Chase had said of him during the summer. "Oh! as to that," replied Lincoln, "I care nothing. Of Mr. Chase's ability and of his soundness on the general issues of the war there is, of course, no question. I have only one doubt about his appointment. He is a man of unbounded ambition, and has been working all his life to become President. That he can never be; and I fear that if I make him Chief-Justice he will simply become more restless and uneasy and neglect the place in his strife and intrigue to make himself President. If I were sure that he would go on the bench and give up his aspirations and do nothing but make himself a great judge, I would not hesitate a moment."

So strong was this impression upon Mr. Lincoln's mind that he half formed the intention of sending for Mr. Chase and saying frankly to him that the way was open to him to become the greatest Chief-Justice the Supreme Court had ever had if he would dismiss at once and forever the subject of the Presidency from his mind. But speaking on the subject with Senator Sumner, he saw in a moment's conversation how liable to misconstruction and misapprehension such action would be. In his eagerness to do what he thought best for the interests of both Mr. Chase and the country, he lost sight for an instant of the construction which Mr. Chase would inevitably place upon such a proposition coming from his twice-successful rival. Convinced as he was of Chase's

¹ April, 1874. Conversation with J. G. N.

great powers, and hoping rather against his own convictions that once upon the bench he would see in what direction his best prospects of usefulness and fame rested, he concluded to take all risks, and on the 6th of December nominated him to the Senate for Chief-Justice. He communicated his intention to no one, and wrote out the nomination in full with his own hand. It was confirmed at once without reference to a committee. Mr. Chase on reaching home the night of the same day was saluted at his door under his new title by his daughter, Mrs. Sprague. He at once sent the President a note, saying:

Before I sleep I must thank you for this mark of your confidence, and especially for the manner in which the nomination was made. I will never forget either, and trust you will never regret either. Be assured that I prize your confidence and goodwill more than any nomination to office.

The appointment was received with the greatest satisfaction throughout the Union. Although the name of Mr. Chase had been especially pressed upon the President by the public men who represented the most advanced antislavery sentiment of the North, the appointment when once made met with little opposition from any quarter. Mr. Chase, in a long life of political prominence and constant controversy, had won the universal respect of the country, not only for his abilities, but also for his courage, his integrity, and a certain solid weight of character of which his great head and massive person seemed a fitting embodiment. He had placed his portrait on the lower denominations of the legal-tender notes, saying with his customary heavy pleasantry, "I had put the President's head on the higher priced notes, and my own, as was becoming, on the smaller ones." His handsome face and features had thus become more familiar in the eyes of the people than those of any other man in America; and though neither then nor at any other period of his life did he become what could be called universally popular, the image of him became fixed in the general instinct as a person of serious importance in the national life. The people who gave themselves the trouble to reason about the matter said it was impossible that an original abolitionist should be untrue to the principles of freedom, or that the father of the national currency should ever disown his own offspring; while those who thought and spoke on impulse took it for granted that such a man as Mr. Chase should never for any length of time be out of the highest employment.

After all, the fears of the President in regard to the Chief-Justice were better founded than his hopes. Mr. Chase took his place on the

bench with a conscientious desire to do his whole duty in his great office, to devote his undoubted powers and his prodigious industry to making himself a worthy successor of the great jurists who before him had illustrated the bench, but he could not discharge the political affairs of the country from his mind. He still considered himself called upon to counteract the mischievous tendencies of the President towards conciliation and hasty reconstruction. His slighting references to him in his letters and diaries continued from the hour he took his place on the bench. When the fighting had ended around Richmond, and on the capitulation of Lee the fabric of the Southern Confederacy had fallen about the ears of its framers like a house of cards, the Chief-Justice felt himself called on to come at once to the front, and he wrote from Baltimore to the President:

I am very anxious about the future, and most about the principles which are to govern reconstruction, for as these principles are sound or unsound so will be the work and its results. You have no time to read a long letter nor have I time to write one, so I will be brief. And first as to Virginia.¹

He advised the President to stand by the Peirpoint government. As to the other rebel States, he suggested the enrollment of the loyal citizens without regard to complexion.

This, you know [he said], has long been my opinion. . . . The application of this principle to Louisiana is made somewhat difficult by the organization which has already taken place, but happily the Constitution authorizes the legislature to extend the right of suffrage. . . . What reaches me of the condition of things in Louisiana impresses me strongly with the belief that this extension will be of the greatest benefit to the whole population.

He advised, as to Arkansas, an amendment of the Constitution, or a new convention, the members to be elected by the loyal citizens, without distinction of color. "To all the other States," he said, "the general principle may be easily applied." He closed by saying: "I most respectfully, but most earnestly, commend these matters to your attention. God gives you a great place and a great opportunity. May he guide you in the use of them." But the same day the President delivered from a window of the White House that final speech to the people which he had prepared without waiting for the instructions of the Chief-Justice, and the day after Mr. Chase wrote again from Baltimore reviewing the record of both, reminding the President of his former errors from which Mr. Chase had tried to save him, discussing

¹ Chase to Lincoln, April 11, 1865.

in full the Louisiana case, of which the President had made so masterly and luminous a presentation in his speech, insinuating that if the President were only as well informed as he was he would see things very differently.¹ Almost before the ink was dry on this unasked and superfluous sermon the President was dead. The Chief-Justice, writing to a friend in Ohio, said: "The schemes of politicians will now adjust themselves to the new conditions. I want no part in them."² He retained his attitude at the head of the extreme Republicans until about the time of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. Over this famous trial he presided with the greatest dignity and impartiality; with a knowledge of law which was never at fault, and with a courage which rose superior to all the threats and all the entreaties of his friends. But his action during the trial and its result alienated him at once from the great body of those who had been his strongest supporters, while it created a momentary appearance of popularity among his life-long opponents. His friends began to persuade him, and he began to think, that he might be the candidate of the Democratic party for the Presidency. He commenced writing voluminous letters to leading Democrats expressing his indifference to the nomination, but at the same time saying he had always been a Democrat, was a Democrat still, and that the course which the Democracy ought to adopt would be to embrace true Democratic principles and declare for universal suffrage in the reconstruction of the Union. He did not flinch for an instant from his position on this important question. He said: "I believe I could refuse the throne of the world if it were offered me at the price of abandoning the cause of equal rights and exact justice to all men."³ Following his inveterate habit of taking a subjective view of the world of politics, he thought it possible that the Democratic party might be converted in the twinkling of an eye by virtue of his broad and liberal views. He cherished this pleasant delusion for several months. Whenever an obscure politician called upon him or wrote to him from some remote corner of the country, expressing a desire that he should be the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, he would say, "Such indications . . . afford ground for hope that a change is going on in the views and policy of the Democratic party which warrants good hopes for the future."⁴ There was for a moment a vague

impression among the leading Democrats that as it was hopeless to make a campaign with one of their own party against the overwhelming popularity of General Grant, it might be worth while to try the experiment of nominating the Chief-Justice with the hope of diverting a portion of the Republican vote, and a correspondence took place between August Belmont and Mr. Chase in relation to that subject. Mr. Chase wrote:

For more than a quarter of a century I have been, in my political views and sentiments, a Democrat, and I still think that upon questions of finance, commerce, and administration generally, the old Democratic principles afford the best guidance.⁵

But he stoutly asserted, even in the face of this temptation, his belief in universal suffrage, though he coupled it with universal amnesty, and said:

If the white citizens hitherto prominent in affairs will simply recognize their [the negroes'] right of suffrage, and assure them against future attempts to take it from them, I am sure that those citizens will be welcomed back to their old lead with joy and acclamation, . . . and a majority, if not all, the Southern States may be carried for the Democratic candidates at the next election.

He repeated this sanguine statement in his correspondence with other leading Democrats, but the negotiation came to nothing; the Democratic convention met in New York, and Mr. Chase's name, mentioned by accident, gained a roar of cheers from the assembly and one-half of one vote from a California delegate. He professed his entire indifference to the result, and took no further interest in the canvass. An injudicious Republican politician in New York asked him to address a Grant meeting. He declined, of course, stating that he could not unreservedly support the Republican ticket, and that this was not the time for discrimination in a public address. "The action of the two parties has obliged me to resume with my old faith my old position, . . . that of Democrat, by the grace of God, free and independent." When his old enemy, General Blair, came to the front in the progress of the canvass and rather overshadowed the more conservative Seymour, the Chief-Justice intimated⁶ that men of his way of thinking would be constrained to the support of General Grant.

But if the political attitude of Mr. Chase in his later years was a subject of amazement

¹ "I most earnestly wish you could have read the New Orleans papers for the past few months. Your duties have not allowed it. I have read them a good deal; quite enough to be certain that if you had read what I have your feelings of humanity and justice would not let you rest till all loyalists are made equal

in the right of self-protection by suffrage." [Chase to Lincoln, April 12, 1865.]

² Chase to Ashley, April 16, 1865.

³ Chase to Barney, May 29, 1868.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Chase to Belmont, May 30, 1868.

⁶ In a letter to Col. Brown of Kentucky, Sept. 29, 1868.

and sorrow to his ardent supporters, his decisions upon the bench were a no less startling surprise to those who had insisted upon his appointment as the surest means of conserving all the victories of the war. He who had sustained Mr. Stanton in his most energetic and daring acts during the war now declared such acts illegal; he who had continually criticized, not always loyally, the conduct of the President for what he considered his weak reverence for the rights of States, now became the earnest champion of State rights; and finally the man to whose personal solicitations a majority of Congress had yielded in passing the legal-tender act, without which he said that the war could not have been successfully carried on, from his place on the bench declared the act unconstitutional. But so firm

was the impression in the minds of the people of the United States of the great powers and perfect integrity, the high courage, the exalted patriotism of this man, that when he died, worn out by his tireless devotion to the public welfare, he was mourned and praised as, in spite of all errors and infirmities, he deserved to be. Although his appointment had not accomplished all the good which Mr. Lincoln hoped for when he made it, it cannot be called a mistake. Mr. Chase had deserved well of the Republic. He was entitled to any reward the Republic could give him; and the President, in giving to his most powerful and most distinguished rival the greatest place which a President ever has it in his power to bestow, gave an exemplary proof of the magnanimity and generosity of his own spirit.

LIFE.

I AM o'er-weary picturing the strife;
 This is a solemn fate — to ride to death
 Lashed through the hurrying fatal lists of life,
 Strengthless to cease, begging for one short breath,
 Yet spurned for answer by a Power that thrusts
 Its spurs into the soul. Upon the brow
 Stand beads of blood; the very javelin rusts
 From tears; the drooping form can scarce but bow
 To earth. "One moment, Power, one resting-space,
 Have mercy!" "On, on, on!" the stern reply.
 I urge, "I once have triumphed, is not grace
 For victory?" "Have on! Thy grace am I!"
 "Is there no pause, no rest, however brief?"
 "On to the fight! Thy death is thy relief."

Louise Morgan-Smith.

TO GEORGE KENNAN.

UNFLINCHING Dante of a later day,
 Thou who hast wandered through the realms of pain
 And seen with aching breast and whirling brain
 Woes which thou wert unable to allay,
 What frightful visions hast thou brought away:
 Of torments, passions, agonies, struggles vain
 To break the prison walls, to rend the chain—
 Of hopeless hearts too desperate to pray!
 Men are the devils of that pitiless hell!
 Men guard the labyrinth of that ninefold curse!
 Marvel of marvels! Thou hast lived to tell,
 In prose more sorrowful than Dante's verse,
 Of pangs more grievous, sufferings more fell,
 Than Dante or his master dared rehearse!

Nathan Haskell Dole.

“ALBEMARLE” CUSHING.

JOY in rebel Plymouth town, in the spring of 'sixty-four,
When the *Albemarle* down on the Yankee frigates bore,
With the saucy Stars and Bars at her main;
When she smote the *Southfield* dead, and the stout *Miami* quailed,
And the fleet in terror fled when their mighty cannon hailed
Shot and shell on her iron back in vain,
Till she slowly steamed away to her berth at Plymouth pier,
And their quick eyes saw her sway with her great beak out of gear,
And the color of their courage rose again.

All the summer lay the ram,
Like a wounded beast at bay,
While the watchful squadron swam
In the harbor night and day,
Till the broken beak was mended, and the weary vigil ended,
And her time was come again to smite and slay.

Must they die, and die in vain,
Like a flock of shambled sheep?
Then the Yankee grit and brain
Must be dead or gone to sleep,
And our sailors' gallant story of a hundred years of glory
Let us sell for a song, selling cheap!

Cushing, scarce a man in years,
But a sailor thoroughbred,
“With a dozen volunteers
I will sink the ram,” he said.
“At the worst 't is only dying.” And the old commander, sighing,
“'T is to save the fleet and flag — go ahead!”

Bright the rebel beacons blazed
On the river left and right;
Wide awake their sentries gazed
Through the watches of the night;
Sharp their challenge rang and fiery came the rifle's quick inquiry,
As the little launch swung into the light.

Listening ears afar had heard;
Ready hands to quarters sprung
The *Albemarle* awoke and stirred,
And her howitzers gave tongue;
Till the river and the shore echoed back the mighty roar,
When the portals of her hundred-pounders swung.

Will the swordfish brave the whale,
Doubly girt with boom and chain?
Face the shrapnel's iron hail?
Dare the livid leaden rain?
Ah! that shell has done its duty; it has spoiled the Yankee's beauty
See her turn and fly with half her madmen slain!


High the victors' taunting yell
 Rings above the battle roar,
 And they bid her mock farewell
 As she seeks the farther shore,
 Till they see her sudden swinging, crouching for the leap and springing
 Back to boom and chain and bloody fray once more.

Now the Southron captain, stirred
 By the spirit of his race,
 Stops the firing with a word,
 Bids them yield, and offers grace.
 Cushing, laughing, answers, "No! we are here to fight!" and so
 Swings the dread torpedo spar to its place.

Then the great ship shook and reeled
 With a wounded, gaping side,
 But her steady cannon pealed
 Ere she settled in the tide,
 And the Roanoke's dull flood ran full red with Yankee blood,
 When the fighting *Albemarle* sunk and died.

Woe in rebel Plymouth town when the *Albemarle* fell,
 And the saucy flag went down that had floated long and well,
 Nevermore from her stricken deck to wave.
 For the fallen flag a sigh, for the fallen foe a tear!
 Never shall their glory die while we hold our glory dear,
 And the hero's laurels live on his grave.
 Link their Cooke's with Cushing's name; proudly call them both our own;
 Claim their valor and their fame for America alone —
 Joyful mother of the bravest of the brave!

James Jeffrey Roche.



THE POET.

HE 's not alone an artist weak and white
 O'er-bending scented paper, toying there
 With languid fancies fashioned deft and fair,
 Mere sops to time between the day and night.
 He is a poor torn soul who sees aright
 How far he fails of living out of the rare
 Night-visions God vouchsafes along the air;
 Until the pain burns hot, beyond his might.
 The heart-beat of the universal will
 He hears, and, spite of blindness and disproof,
 Can sense amidst the jar a singing fine.
 Grief-smitten that his lyre should lack the skill
 To speak it plain, he plays in paths aloof,
 And knows the trend is starward, life divine.

Richard E. Burton.

"It is not bashfulness, sister," said Underwood, coloring a little. "It is consideration. How could I explain matters to this poor girl? How could I prevail on her to come here without giving her an inkling of the situation, and thus frighten her, perhaps unnecessarily?"

"Perhaps you are right," said Miss Sophie, who, as an experienced spinster, was not always ready to make concessions of this kind. "At any rate I'll go for Miss Bascom, and I think I can manage it without alarming her; but the matter troubles me. I hope the poor old Judge will not be a dangerous guest."

"There is not the slightest fear of that," said

Francis Underwood. "He is too feeble for that. When I placed my hand on his shoulder just now he was all of a tremble. He is no stronger than a little child, and no more dangerous. Besides, the doctor is with him."

"Well," said Miss Sophie with a sigh, "I'll go. Women are compelled to do most of the odd jobs that men are afraid to take up; but I shiver to think of it. I shall surely break down when I see that poor child."

"No," said her brother, "you will not. I know you too well for that. We must humor this old man, and that will be for me to do; his daughter must be left to you."

(To be concluded in the next number.)

Joel Chandler Harris.

SAINT-MÉMIN'S PORTRAIT OF MARSHALL.¹



THE fine engraving of Chief-Justice Marshall's portrait which embellishes the present number of this magazine is made from a crayon by Saint-Mémin taken in March, 1808, when the Chief-Justice was at the zenith of his powers, in the fifty-third year of his age. It is probably the most exact presentation of his face and bust that was ever made. Saint-Mémin was peculiarly gifted in the art of making accurate likenesses. He was a native of Dijon, the capital of ancient Burgundy, and was the last male descendant of a distinguished and honorable family named Févret, the ordinary surname of Saint-Mémin being undoubtedly taken from some family estate, as was the custom in France. His full name was Charles Balthazar Julien Févret de Saint-Mémin. He was born March

12, 1770, his father being a counselor of the Parliament of Dijon, and his mother a beautiful and wealthy creole of San Domingo. He had a natural genius for design and the finer mechanic arts; and though bred at a military school in Paris and destined for the army, he could not resist the temptation to cultivate his favorite pursuits. His regiment (of the Guards) being re-formed on the breaking out of the Revolution, he with the other officers was discharged from service, and soon after the family was obliged to seek safety by retiring to Switzerland. Saint-Mémin, however, joined the army of the princes, which was hovering on the Rhine, and while there still employed himself in making sketches of its beautiful scenery. After the disbandment of this army, he and his father conceived the project of going to San Domingo in order to look after Madame Saint-Mémin's property, and to avoid the accusation of being emigrants from the territory

¹ The other portraits of Chief-Justice Marshall which have come to my knowledge are the following:

1. A silhouette by Saint-Mémin in possession of Mrs. M. L. Smith, residing near the Alexandria Seminary.

2. An elaborate half-length portrait was taken by Rembrandt Peale in 1825, and was presented to Chief-Justice Chase by the New York Bar Association, and by him bequeathed to the Supreme Court of the United States, and is now in the robing-room of the court at the Capitol. Although a fine painting, this portrait has not been recognized as a good likeness by those who knew the Chief-Justice.

3. A full-length portrait was taken by Hubard, a French artist, at Richmond, 1830, and is considered by the Marshall family as an excellent likeness. It is now in Washington and Lee University at Lexington, Va.

4. A full-length miniature in a sitting posture by the same artist is at Markham, Va., in possession of the family of the late Edward C. Marshall, and a replica at Leedstown, Va., belongs to the family of James K. Marshall.

5. A portrait taken by Henry Inman at Washington in 1831, from which many copies have been taken and engravings made — among others, the bank-note engraving made by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. The original is in possession of the Philadelphia Law Association.

6. A very fine portrait by Jarvis, formerly owned by Hon. I. E. Morse of New Orleans, now by Mr. Justice Gray of the United States Supreme Court.

7. A full-length portrait by Harding, owned by the Boston Athenæum, a replica of which is in the Harvard Law School.

8. A large painting, representing the Chief-Justice at full length, seated, was made some years since by a Mr. Washington, not from life, but as an eclectic portrait from several others, and is now in the court-house at Warrenton, Va. A copy of it made ten or twelve years since by Mr. Brooke of Washington was purchased by Congress, and is now in the robing-room of the Supreme Court. Of course it cannot have much value as a portrait, whatever may be its merits as a painting.

of France. They went by way of Holland, England, Canada, and the United States, and arrived at New York in 1793. There they found many fugitives from San Domingo, whose reports rendered aid from that quarter very doubtful — although the father finally sailed for the island, but took the fever immediately upon landing and died. Young Saint-Mémin was thus thrown upon his own resources, and for a while boarded with a fellow-countryman who had sought an asylum in America. Struck with the beauty of New York and its harbor and the surrounding scenery, he made a most accurate sketch of it, which was greatly admired, and he was advised to have it engraved and offered to the public. He obtained an introduction to the public library, where by the aid of the encyclopedia he mastered the principles of engraving and made a highly finished copper-plate of his sketch. So successful was this his first effort in that line that he was advised to devote himself to the art of making and engraving portraits. Chrétien, in 1786, had invented an instrument which he denominated the "physionotrace," by which the profile outline of a face could be taken with mathematical precision, both as to figure and dimensions. Saint-Mémin constructed such an instrument for himself and employed it with great success, filling in the outline with crayon, generally black on a pink ground. His portraits were greatly admired for their faithfulness, and became very much in vogue. He executed no less than 818 from 1793 to 1810, visiting for the purpose most of the Atlantic cities from New York to Charleston. For the moderate sum of thirty-three dollars he furnished to each sitter a full-sized portrait of the bust, a copper-plate of the same engraved in miniature (reduced from the portrait by another instrument called a "pantograph"), and twelve proofs.

These miniatures were of medallion size, circular in form and about two inches in diameter, with the face nearly the size of a quarter-dollar. He kept two or three proofs for his own portfolio, and after his return to France in 1814 he made up two complete sets, which after his death (which occurred in 1852) were sent to this country for sale. One of them is in the possession of the Corcoran Art Gallery in Washington; the other was purchased by Mr. Elias Dexter of New York, who photographed the engravings and published them with an introduction containing a memoir of Saint-Mémin and a short biographical sketch of the persons whose portraits are contained in the collection. The memoir is merely a translation of an address before the Academy of Dijon made by M. Guignard after Saint-Mémin's decease. During the latter portion of

his life, from 1817 to 1852, he was Director of the Museum of Dijon, one of the most valuable depositories of works of art in France.

The original portrait of Chief-Justice Marshall of which the accompanying engraving is a copy is owned by Mr. Thomas Marshall Smith of Baltimore, whose mother was a daughter of the Chief-Justice's eldest son, and the portrait has always remained in the family. It is regarded by them as the very best likeness ever taken of their honored ancestor. Mr. Smith has recently allowed a full-sized photograph of it to be taken by Rice of Washington for the Supreme Court, reserving the copyright. The engraving in *THE CENTURY* is made from this excellent photograph, and, with the exception of the dozen miniatures struck off by Saint-Mémin, is the only engraving ever made from the portrait.

John Marshall is one of those purely American characters of whom we may well be proud. Born on the 24th of September, 1755, in Fauquier County, Va., a region then comparatively new, he enjoyed few of the educational facilities which existed in the older portions of the State. This was made up, however, in great degree, by one of the happiest and most intellectual of homes. His father, Colonel Thomas Marshall, was an intimate friend and old schoolmate of Washington, and was associated with him in the surveys of the Fairfax estates, which embraced a large portion of northern and north-western Virginia. His mother was Mary Keith, daughter of the Episcopal clergyman of the parish, and educated in the choicest English literature of that day. The home was a constant and regularly organized school. The best English poets and historians were made as familiar as household words, and the mathematical and other sciences were not neglected. Mr. Justice Story, who probably had it from the Chief-Justice himself, relates that at the age of twelve John, who was the eldest of the children, had transcribed the whole of Pope's "Essay on Man" and some of his "Moral Essays," and had committed to memory many of the most interesting passages of that poet. When he had become sufficiently advanced a private tutor was procured to initiate him into the mysteries of classical lore. Rev. James Thompson, an Episcopal clergyman from Scotland, was employed for this duty. At fourteen John was sent to Westmoreland County to attend the school of Rev. Mr. Campbell, where his father and Washington had been students and where he staid for a year. He then returned home and continued his classical studies under Mr. Thompson. His outdoor recreations were hunting and fishing, of which he was exceedingly fond. At eighteen he began the study of law by reading Blackstone's Com-

mentaries, then a new book. But soon the Revolution broke out and Thomas Marshall and his son John joined the troops raised by Virginia, the former as colonel of a regiment, the latter as lieutenant in a different regiment, and both served in the field the greater portion of the war, John being promoted to a captaincy in 1777. He was at the battles of Trenton, Germantown, Monmouth, Stony Point, and nearly all the important engagements of the army of Washington's immediate command. Though so young, being only twenty when the war began, he became exceedingly popular with his brother officers, as well as with his men, and his sound common sense and good judgment led to his often being selected to decide disputes between them and also to act as judge-advocate. He was thus brought into personal contact with General Washington and Colonel Hamilton, who afterwards became his warmest friends. At this time he is described as being the picture of health, six feet high, straight, slender, of dark complexion, with a round face and piercing black eye, and a countenance beaming with intelligence and good nature. He had an upright but not high forehead, terminated in a horizontal line by a mass of raven-black hair, and his temples were fully developed, indicating strong memory and great power of combination.

Being sent home at the close of 1779 to aid in raising new recruits, he had an opportunity, of which he availed himself, to attend the law lectures of George Wythe (afterwards Chancellor) and those of Professor (afterwards Bishop) Madison on natural philosophy. This was all the collegiate education he ever enjoyed. When the courts were opened, after the capture of Cornwallis, he began the practice of law, and in January, 1783, married Mary Willis Ambler, with whom he lived in devoted affection for nearly fifty years. He now took up his permanent residence in Richmond, where he continued to reside the remainder of his life. It was not long before he became a leader of the Virginia bar. His wonderful strength of logic and clearness of statement made him almost irresistible in argument, and his industry and faithfulness in the discharge of his duties secured him a very large practice. He was frequently sent to the legislature, which, as he lived at the capital, he could attend without material prejudice to his business; and he was as eminent in debate on important political questions as he was at the bar. In the latter sphere his services were sought in all the important causes of the day, many of which involved public questions growing out of the war and its attendant consequences. Among other clients he was employed by the celebrated Beaumarchais to sue the State of Virginia for

supplies furnished during the war, and obtained a large judgment against the State under a law at that time existing which allowed such suits. He was one of the leading counsel in the great case of the debts due to British subjects which had been paid to the State during the war under a statute authorizing such payments to be made. In the department of public law he became especially proficient, and probably had no superior in the country.

In his political views Marshall was firm and decided. He was always in favor of a Federal Government clothed with adequate power to maintain itself and the national dignity and credit, and when the new Constitution was proposed he was one of its most ardent supporters. Being elected to the State convention which met in 1788 to consider its adoption, his calm and powerful arguments interposed a successful resistance to the fiery eloquence of Patrick Henry, who was opposed to the Constitution. His services in finally securing its ratification were second only to those of Madison himself. After the Federal Government was organized he was ever the powerful champion of Washington's administration, both in the legislature and in popular assemblies. He sustained the financial and other measures of the first Congress, by which the Government was made a reality and set in motion. He defended Jay's treaty, and compelled its opponents to abandon the charge of unconstitutionality. In 1797 General Marshall, as he was then called, was sent by President Adams, with Gerry and Pinckney, to France, and in the diplomatic contest with the corrupt and insolent Directory of that day he defended the dignity of his country in one of the ablest of state papers. On his return, in 1798, he was received with the enthusiastic approbation of all parties. His progress from New York to Richmond was an ovation.

Marshall hoped now to be permitted to devote himself to his profession. But this could not be. He had become too important a personage to be allowed to retire from public life. At the earnest personal entreaty of Washington, who was deeply interested in the success of the Federal or Constitutional party, Marshall consented to run for Congress, and was elected, though his district (Richmond) was anti-Federal in its sympathies. In the session of 1799-1800 he made that memorable speech in which he so ably sustained the action of the Executive in delivering up to the British Government, under the treaty of 1794, Nash (*alias* Robbins), who was charged with piracy and murder committed on a British vessel. It was confessed by the Republican leaders that this speech could not be answered. It is still referred to as a conclusive exposition of the

public law on the subject of international obligations in regard to the extradition of criminals.

On the disruption of Mr. Adams's Cabinet, in May, 1800, General Marshall was nominated, first as Secretary of War, and then as Secretary of State. He served in the latter office during the remainder of Adams's administration, and his state papers are characterized by all his wonted clearness and power of argument. In November, 1800, Chief-Justice Ellsworth, then in Europe, resigned, and Marshall, though still holding the office of Secretary of State, was appointed in his place. It was to him an unsolicited and unexpected honor. The President first offered the place to Mr. Jay, its former occupant, but then near the close of his term as governor of New York. Mr. Jay declined the offer, desiring to retire from public life. The President meeting Marshall, who had suggested some name for the office, announced his determination to appoint a plain Virginia lawyer named John Marshall. The latter was so surprised and confused by this announcement that for a moment he could not utter a word.

The great office to which Marshall was now elevated was held until his death, which occurred on the sixth day of July, 1835, in the eightieth year of his age. He believed himself to be better fitted for the judicial function than for any other vocation. It was the great object of his ambition. He told his son that when President Adams told him that he had decided to nominate him as Chief-Justice it was the happiest moment of his life. He felt his power. He was conscious of the spirit that was in him. And yet he was one of the most modest of men. A consciousness of power is not inconsistent with true modesty. "Let me repeat it," says Lavater, "he only is great who has the habits of greatness; who, after performing what none in ten thousand could accomplish, passes on, like Samson, and *tells neither father nor mother of it.*" Quiet, simple, and unassuming, Marshall was inherently great; and though conscious of his power, he did not regard it as exceptional, but as all in the ordinary course.

It is needless to say that Marshall's reputation as a great constitutional judge is peerless. The character of his mind and his previous


training were such as to enable him to handle the momentous questions to which the conflicting views upon the Constitution gave rise with the soundest logic, the greatest breadth of view, and the most far-seeing statesmanship. He came to the bench with a reputation already established — the reputation not only of a great lawyer, but of an eminent statesman and publicist; and under his lead the Supreme Court lost none of the prestige which it had enjoyed under Jay and Ellsworth. This was a matter of consequence at a period when so much depended upon the public confidence in the decisions of this tribunal upon the questions of constitutional construction which agitated the public mind. The result answered the requirements of the situation. It may truly be said that the Constitution received its final and permanent form from the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court during the period in which Marshall was at its head.

With a few modifications, superinduced by the somewhat differing views on two or three points of his great successor, and aside from the new questions growing out of the late civil war and the recent constitutional amendments, the decisions made since Marshall's time have been little more than the application of the principles established by him and his venerated associates. It must be confessed that the business of the Supreme Court at that period allowed more time for elaborate argument and judicial deliberation than at present. It has increased since Marshall's time more than sevenfold. Against forty-two cases reported in January term, 1835, more than three hundred were reported in October term, 1887. Another advantage enjoyed by the old court was the selectness and distinguished ability of its bar. Dexter, Webster, Pinckney, Ogden, Wood, Binney, Sergeant, Ingersoll, Taney, Livingston, and many others of almost equal fame are frequently named as counsel. The system of railroads and the consequent ease of communication with all parts of the country now enable the local counsel to argue their own cases, and have had the effect of lessening the elevated and eclectic character of the arguments made before the Supreme Court of the United States.

Joseph P. Bradley.



TELEGRAPHING IN BATTLE.



BEFORE 1861 the value of the military telegraph had not been demonstrated. Crude experiments had been made, with poorly equipped lines, in the Crimea, in India, and by France, Spain, and Italy in different campaigns, while the Germans possessed a distinct military telegraph organization as yet untested; but it was on the very route where Morse's first message, "What hath God wrought!" announced the benefits of his invention to the

arts of peace that the telegraph was to begin its first practical use in war. The outbreak of the mob in Baltimore on the 19th of April, 1861, culminated in the destruction of railroads, bridges, and telegraphs, and for a time Washington was isolated from the North. In this emergency the Administration called upon Thomas A. Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad to aid the military operations of General Butler in re-opening communication. Taking with him Andrew Carnegie and four of his best telegraphers, Mr. Scott attacked the problem with amazing energy. Rails were relaid, bridges rebuilt, wires restrung, as if by magic; and as the nation poured its defenders towards Washington, the genius of Scott, aided by the sagacity of these assistants, guided the long trains of volunteers safely to their destination. Reaching Washington after the accomplishment of this mission, the telegraph corps was enlarged to connect important stations, as the navy yard and the arsenal, with the War Department, and to run lines to Arlington, Chain Bridge, and other outposts. The names of the four pioneers of the service were David Strouse, D. Homer Bates, Samuel Brown, and Richard O'Brien. Strouse soon succumbed to the hardships of the new service, and went home to die: he sleeps by the Juniata. Of the three others, Bates served at the War Department and Brown and O'Brien at the front throughout the war. Thus informally began the career of the corps, which grew to number

more than 1000 experts, which constructed 15,000 miles of line in the field, transmitted millions of important dispatches, regulated the movements of distant armies, as those of Grant, Sherman, and Thomas, and, in short, made it possible to move vast forces as a unit over a wide territory. It will be remembered that in 1861 telegraphy was not twenty years old, and that the art of rapid operating by sound was still younger. Most of those who responded to the call for operators to serve in the field were in their teens, but they were enthusiastic, already trained to the faithful performance of duty, and ready to face danger when necessary. At Great Falls, an outpost on the Maryland side of the Potomac, the pickets were one day withdrawn, and simultaneously the Confederates began to shell the telegraph office. As steps, porch, and roof were successively shot away, the operator, Ed. Conway, reported progress to the War Department, adding that his office would "now close for repairs," and withdrew with his instrument as the enemy crossed the river.

With McDowell's advance to Bull Run, in 1861, lines were extended to Alexandria, Fairfax Station, and Fairfax Court House. Aided by a line of couriers, the progress of the first battle of Bull Run was reported to the War Department by operators at the front, who were among the last to leave the field.

They soon became veterans. A gorgeous uniform which had marked the gilt-edged, brass-button period of the telegraph service, and which had not sufficiently distinguished the operators from major-generals, was discarded, and the corps settled down to the exigencies of its novel situation, sharing the dangers and privations of the troops, keeping up communication night and day, and faithfully guarding the important military secrets intrusted for transmission.

It might be supposed that Southern sympathizers would have endeavored to interrupt Government communication by telegraph when it could so easily be done by cutting wires and cables, or by connecting them with each other or with the ground. As a matter of fact, lines in Washington were interrupted by cross connections made with fine copper wire which could not be seen from the ground; but these were so quickly detected by electrical tests and the lines were so well guarded that such attempts became too dangerous and ceased.

As we advanced southward whole sections

of wire would sometimes be torn down at night by bushwhackers and carried into the woods, and the work of repair often proved extremely hazardous. A favorite point for such exploits on the part of the Confederates was the line between Fort Monroe and Newport News. They being camped at Yorktown, and our videttes, after the Big Bethel affair, only extending to Hampton, they could strike the exposed line anywhere from there to Newport News. This they usually did at night. On one occasion, early in 1862, the chief operator at Fort Monroe went out to repair such a break, accompanied by an escort of infantry. Being well mounted he left the troops out of sight, found the wire torn down near Newport News, repaired it, and returned rapidly towards Hampton. As he passed the New Market road he received simultaneously a bullet through his coat and an order to halt from a party of cavalry charging down upon him from the direction of Yorktown. Disregarding both bullet and order, he spurred his horse forward and succeeded in reaching his escort, who poured a volley into his pursuers which caused them to wheel and retreat as rapidly as they had come.

It was on this line that the operator at Newport News reported from his point of view the phases of the fight between the *Merrimac* and our wooden ships, while shells from the former and her consorts burst around him at short range. Amid the reverberations of the heavy broadsides from our ships, which shook the massive ramparts of Fort Monroe, the writer read to the assembled officers, from the click of the instrument, this terse description: "The *Merrimac* steers straight for the *Cumberland*." "The *Cumberland* gives her a broadside." "The *Merrimac* keels over." "She seems to be sinking." A pause. "No; she comes on again." "She has struck the *Cumberland* and poured a broadside into her." "God! the *Cumberland* is sinking." Another pause and then: "The *Cumberland* has fired her last broadside." Next day the historic combat of the iron-clads occurred, and though largely within view from our ramparts, it was similarly bulletined by the same steady hand from Newport News.

Telegraphic operations began in West Virginia almost contemporaneously with those about Washington, and materially aided General McClellan in his campaign in that quarter. Operations in other States will be noted further on. By the close of the first year of the war over a thousand miles of line had been built with the armies in the different departments; the telegraph having proved itself invaluable in the strategic movement of troops in the field, and equally essential to the efficiency of

the commissariat and the prompt transportation of quartermasters' supplies.

A new era was now begun by the appointment of Colonel Anson Stager as general superintendent of all military telegraphs, with Thomas T. Eckert, afterwards Assistant Secretary of War, in immediate charge of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, and later with other competent telegraphers in charge of the departments of West Virginia, Ohio, the Cumberland, Missouri, Tennessee, the South, and the Gulf. In these several departments material was accumulated, operators employed, and construction corps organized to build and operate lines in the field with efficiency and dispatch, so that every army, whether moving or fighting, should act in harmony with the rest.

Preparatory to McClellan's peninsular campaign a line was carried from Washington via Wilmington along the eastern shore of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia to Cape Charles and Cherrystone Inlet, whence communication was completed to Fort Monroe, first by dispatch-boats and afterwards by cable. The first attempt to lay this cable resulted in the wreck of the vessel containing it on Cape Henry, where the whole party narrowly escaped capture. A second attempt proved successful and placed McClellan in direct communication with the War Department, by a line of about two hundred miles in length. On this single wire, during McClellan's campaign, throbbed and pulsed the hurried orders for supplies, entreaties for reënforcements, fateful lists of killed and wounded, news of victory and defeat — all the tidings of glory and of horror which pertain to war.

At Cherrystone, Eastville, Cape Charles, and northward the military telegraphers enjoyed a holiday, faring on luscious oysters, shooting wild ducks, lazily riding with a cavalry escort over the line, wherein was just sufficient danger from guerrillas to give zest to life; while across the bay at the front the boys were working their instruments under fire in the trenches around Yorktown, keeping McClellan in constant communication with his generals and with Fort Monroe and Washington.

The telegraph not only worked through sea and land, but sought to establish communication in cloud-land, carrying a light wire skyward by balloon near Washington, at Pohick Church, Va., and several times on the Peninsula. Before Yorktown the operator in the clouds telegraphed to headquarters the position of Confederate intrenchments and the effect of our fire, assisting to regulate the range of our guns.

One of the first of our army to enter York-

town was operator Lathrop, who hurried to the Confederate telegraph tent to try the Richmond wire, and was blown to pieces by an ingeniously placed torpedo of the enemy. After Yorktown the construction party always kept the main line up with the troops as they marched, and the branches to corps headquarters when they halted, stringing the wire on poles or trees as the needs of the march required. The Count of Paris attests that the generals were surprised and delighted to find the telegraph at hand at the end of each day's march, giving them communication with one another and with the base of operations. The instruments of slight resistance and currents of small electro-motive force employed on the well-insulated lines of to-day would not have recorded signals, nor have overcome the "escapes" of our field lines of that time. We used "relays" of great resistance, and nitric acid batteries of the strongest kind. The operators at the front, too, were experts. Seated under fire, on a stump or a cracker-box, while troops and artillery swept by, they would send or take thousands of words of military orders, at the rate of forty words per minute, without an error. From the battle of Williamsburg to that of Fair Oaks and in the Seven Days' fighting the telegraph assisted largely in handling the several corps of the Army of the Potomac. At Gaines's Mill, Porter obtained reinforcements at the critical juncture through the promptness of his operator, who tapped the wire as our line of battle receded, and transmitted the necessary dispatches under a heavy fire which killed several of his mounted messengers.

The inner history of this campaign can best be read in the pregnant telegrams of McClellan and the Administration, found in the Official Records. These dispatches, and all succeeding ones of importance throughout the war, were transmitted over the wires in cipher, the keys of which were held only by confidential telegraph operators and were not permitted to be revealed even to commanding generals. The principle of the cipher consisted in writing a message with an equal number of words in each line, then copying the words up and down the columns by various routes, throwing in an extra word at the end of each column, and substituting other words for important names and verbs. This code was frequently changed to insure secrecy, as when a cipher operator was captured. The reader who may be curious on this subject is referred to Plum's "History of the Military Telegraph," which contains a full exposé of both the Union and the Confederate cryptographs. The Confederate ciphers were always easily solved by our experts, sharing, as they did, the faults of all ciphers constructed on an alphabetical system, while it is

believed that no instance is known of the enemy having been able to decipher a telegram in one of our ciphers. When the Army of the Potomac was recalled from the James, our lines were taken down as far back as Williamsburg. South of the James we had communication with Norfolk by cable from Fort Monroe, through Hampton Roads and thence to Suffolk, on the Nansemond. At Norfolk, in 1862, the chief operator was offered by a committee twenty thousand dollars in gold, the freedom of the Confederacy, and passage to England by blockade runner if he would anticipate a telegram expected from Mr. Lincoln granting a reprieve to a citizen condemned for shooting a Union officer. The offer was made on the day preceding that fixed for the execution and was indignantly rejected.

During 1862 nearly four thousand miles of line was built over the wide territory occupied by our forces. Of this nearly half was taken down or abandoned as the necessities of the conflict dictated; over a million important telegrams were transmitted. As much more line was constructed in the field in 1863, and again 1500 miles was abandoned, while about 2,000,000 dispatches were transmitted; and from 1863 to the close more than 6000 miles of line was built and about 5,000,000 dispatches were forwarded. While the Army of the Potomac was engaged on the Peninsula the telegraphic situation nearer Washington consisted of three principal lines radiating thence to McDowell at Fredericksburg, to Manassas Junction, extended via the Manassas Gap road to Strasburg, and a line via Harper's Ferry to Winchester, following Banks to Strasburg.¹

In the retreat of Banks from Strasburg, Jackson captured both his telegraphers. One of them, while detained at Winchester to send important messages after our rear-guard had passed, finding himself surrounded, destroyed his dispatches, broke his instruments, and surrendered. Three other operators, while pushing forward a reconnaissance by locomotive on the Manassas Gap route, were captured by Jackson's men, who obstructed the track in their front and rear.

In Pope's Virginia campaign of three weeks his essential telegraph lines formed a triangle, its base extending from Washington along the Virginia side of the Potomac to Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg, its sides from the latter point to Culpeper Court House, and from Washington via the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to the same point, whence a single wire accompanied him to the battlefield of Cedar Mountain and beyond. In the retro-

¹ This was exclusive of the Fort Monroe line, the civil lines northward, and a network of short wires connecting fortifications and outposts.

grade movement as soon as he uncovered the apex of the telegraph triangle at Culpeper he lost the Fredericksburg wire, which became more inaccessible the farther he receded on the Orange and Alexandria route, while "Jeb" Stuart rode in and cut the line in his rear at Manassas Junction, capturing our operator, who was shot while attempting to escape. Thus was Pope entirely isolated, while Washington seemed as completely cut off from knowledge of his movements or of Jackson's as it was from the North on the 20th of April, 1861. Again the telegraphers plunged into the work of re-opening communication, this time at far greater hazard. Pushing out on the Orange and Alexandria and Manassas Gap roads, by locomotive or by hand-car, they concealed themselves in woods and cliffs, observing the movements of the enemy's forces and of our own, and giving all the definite information which reached the Administration at that time. The field operators

with Pope, too, finding their usual occupation gone, became independent scouts, reconnoitering the country and tapping the wires wherever reached to obtain information of the enemy or to communicate news to the War Department. The earliest advices of the second battle of Bull Run, like those of the first, were given by the operators, two of them riding direct from the battlefield to the nearest line and telegraphing their own description of it to the President, who personally thanked them by telegraph. In such hazardous work a number were wounded or captured.

On one occasion an operator started out from Fairfax Station on a hand-car propelled by three contrabands to attempt to restore the line so that Pope's operators could communicate his whereabouts. Finding the line cut beyond Pohick Bridge, he spliced it and got signals from both directions. While so engaged a party of guerrillas emerged from the woods to the track and surrounded him. Bidding the negroes stand fast, he dictated a swift message over the line, which was being repeated back to him and copied as the Confederate leader leaned over his shoulder and read the significant words: "Buford has sent back a regiment of cavalry to meet the one from here and guard the line. If you are molested we will hang

every citizen on the route." The instrument ceased ticking as the operator firmly replied, ". . . —" (O. K.). A painful pause ensued. The Confederate might have suspected a ruse if at the moment a gleam of sabers had not shone in the direction of Fairfax Court House. Hastily starting for the woods, the leader ex-



TELEGRAPH CAMP, BRANDY STATION, ORANGE AND ALEXANDRIA RAILROAD (ON THE LINE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND CULPEPER).

claimed, "Come home, boys; these yere ain't our niggers"; and they disappeared, while the hand-car, as if driven by forty contraband power, sped rapidly rearward. Pope's wires were not well guarded at any time.

Later in the war, in attempting to re-open this line for Sheridan, via the Manassas Gap road to Front Royal, a railroad and telegraph party while proceeding by locomotive were ambushed and five of them killed.

In the Antietam campaign McClellan had a line to Hagerstown looped via Poolesville to Point of Rocks, whence a branch extended to Harper's Ferry. Stuart cut this loop as Lee advanced, and an attempt to restore it proving disastrous to the telegraph party, Harper's Ferry remained isolated until captured. Five military operators surrendered with the troops at that point, but they escaped and at Antietam joined their comrades, who had pushed the line to the battlefield of South Mountain and on through Boonesboro' and Keedysville.

The electric tongue which had aided him on the Peninsula and in Maryland now proclaimed McClellan's victory at Antietam and again became the messenger of his humiliation. The telegraph corps revered "Little Mac," both in person and in military genius. Perhaps

none knew better than some of its members the extent and scope of his plans or had more confidence in their success. The orders for his withdrawal from the James were reluctantly transmitted, and on his removal from the command of the Army of the Potomac, in November, his chief operator telegraphed, "We are all grieved at McClellan's removal. The whole army, from major-generals down to foot orderlies, feel it. Old soldiers of the regulars wept like boys when he left."

Burnside's lines in the Fredericksburg campaign were the same as Pope's had been in August, but were less extended and less exposed. Three of the operators were captured at their posts, one of whom escaped by his wits and the others joined the considerable dele-

phone, he would have succeeded. It will undoubtedly be used with Morse telegraphy in future wars;¹ but the antiquated system introduced, and expected to be worked by officers unfamiliar with electricity, resulted in disastrous failure. Had the telegraphic field not been thus divided, and had General Hooker ordered the necessary lines, he would probably have had better control of his forces, particularly of Sedgwick's corps.

A swift glance southward and westward, without regard to chronological order, may indicate the value of the telegraph in other fields than the Potomac.

Military lines were not required in North Carolina until 1863, when they connected Morehead City, New Berne, Bachelor's Creek,



A FIELD EXPEDIENT.

gation of the corps already in captivity, where they suffered the usual horrors of Libby, Belle Isle, and Andersonville, and whence they communicated by many ingenious devices with their friends. A brass button by the hands of an exchanged prisoner would contain a cipher dispatch on tissue paper. A ring carved from bone and marked with a few Morse characters told us of our captured comrades.

From the beginning of the war there had been some friction between the telegraph and the signal corps. Early in 1861 the chief signal officer assumed control of the telegraph in Butler's department, from which he was immediately relieved by the Secretary of War. In 1863 he was again in the field with thirty cumbersome "magneto" machines, intended to operate a dial telegraph. The system was operated by the signal officers in the Chancellorsville campaign, and, proving inefficient, it was turned over to the telegraphers, who discarded the machines and worked with Morse instruments the short lines laid by the signal corps. Had Major Myer then had the tele-

graph and outposts. General Palmer credited the telegraph with having apprised him of the approach of Pickett's force against New Berne in February, 1864, and with enabling him promptly to concentrate his forces to meet the attack.

Three of his operators died of yellow fever. Plum says: "On the pay-rolls, which alone indicate that these men were in the service of their country, is written opposite their names, 'Discharged.' An eternal discharge, indeed."² Yet that epitaph comprises all of rank, reward, or pension ever tendered an operator of the military telegraph, or his family, by the United States.

In the same region, in March, 1865, the writer ran the line along with the troops in General Schofield's advance on Kinston and Goldsboro', lying in Gum Swamp—where the enemy struck us—two days and nights with the relay to his ear, transmitting dispatches. The signal corps co-operated handsomely, and ten picked cavalry-


¹ The hand 'phone is a sensitive instrument for Morse telegraphy.

² "History of the Military Telegraph."

men rode right and left under fire with the dispatches. A whole regiment of ours was captured almost beside us.

The morning after this affair General J. D. Cox called at our post and courteously said that he wished "personally to thank the chief operator for the service rendered at the front." He seemed astonished at finding only a boy of fifteen, muddy and haggard, lying on the ground and too exhausted to care even if the President called.

The military telegraph service in South Carolina was peculiar in the preponderance of submarine cables connecting the sea islands, and in the exposure of the operators on Morris Island and vicinity to the fire of the Confederate batteries during the long siege of Charleston. On one occasion two of our men were up alternate poles stringing a wire which had just been cut by a shell when another well-aimed shot struck the pole between them and brought poles, wire, and men in a tangle to the soft sand.



Generals Gillmore and Terry which enabled them to foil a concerted attack by the enemy. Forster was captured on the third day and died in prison.

Not pausing to detail the movements of the telegraph with expeditions in Florida, we note in the Gulf Department seven military lines radiating from New Orleans under Butler and Banks, one of them reaching Baton Rouge, after its occupation, another accompanying the Red River expedition, and one connecting New Orleans and Port Hudson with field lines at the latter point during the siege. Experiments by the telegraphers in exploding powder by electricity, such as had been made at Fort Sumter and elsewhere, resulted in that department in the successful clearing of obstructions from Bayou Teche. At the close of the war about three thousand miles of military lines in the Department of Mississippi, including Texas, were turned over to commercial use.

In Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas military lines connected St. Louis with Fort Leavenworth and Fort Scott, and by February, 1864, with Fort Smith and Little Rock,

"INSULATED."

In September, 1863, a Union operator named Forster tapped the Charleston and Savannah line near Pocotaligo and sent information to

from which point three wires radiated to important posts. In March, 1864, three of our builders were killed by guerrillas on the Fort

Smith line. By 1865 these lines aggregated seventeen hundred miles.


In Tennessee about a thousand miles of lines were constructed for Halleck's and Grant's operations. These, in 1862, connected St. Louis with Forts Henry and Donelson when captured, thence reaching to Nashville and on to Bowling Green, Kentucky. Nashville was connected with Decatur, Alabama, and other points. In the Shiloh campaign Buell carried a line from Nashville with him, meeting midway one from Grant, who was at Pittsburg Landing, so that Grant, Buell, and Halleck were in telegraphic communication on the eve of the unexpected battle of Shiloh. This must have been a source of reliance to Grant when the fight actually opened. During the siege of Vicksburg field lines connected Grant with all his forces, and the telegraph gave timely notice of Johnston's movements.

When Rosecrans was defeated at Chickamauga and retreated to Chattanooga, where Grant sent him timely aid; and in the concentration of Sherman and Hooker with Thomas, which culminated in the victory of Chattanooga, the telegraph was of incalculable service.

About this time Longstreet besieged Burnside at Knoxville and Grant sent Sherman swiftly to the rescue. Plum says: "After Grant had driven Bragg from Missionary Ridge he received dispatches from the advance office at Tazewell, notifying him that Burnside could not hold out longer than December 1. Secretary Stanton telegraphed for Colonel Stager to 'come to the key.' Stager had retired, but an instrument by his bedside awakened him. Stanton in Washington asked Stager, who was in his bed-chamber in Cleve-

land, Ohio, to forward news to Burnside by the most trusty means. The colonel instantly called up the chief operator in Louisville, Kentucky, and the latter the operators at four separate points nearest to Burnside. Thus it happened that in the dead of night four telegraphers, each with a cipher message notifying Burnside of the approach of Union troops, started on their perilous journey from four separate points." Some of them reached Burnside, and he held out until his army was saved. The episode has not been immortalized nor its heroes rewarded.

While Sherman was preparing his army to start from Chattanooga in the Atlanta campaign the military telegraph spread a network of additional wires in Tennessee for his use, some of them extending into Alabama and Georgia and accompanying him to Atlanta. In his "Memoirs" he says: "There was perfect concert of action between the armies in Virginia and Georgia in all 1864; hardly a day intervened when General Grant did not know the exact state of facts with me, more than fifteen hundred miles off, as the wires ran." The operations of Sherman's telegraph in the advance on Atlanta were similar to those with the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula. For instance, in front of Kenesaw, when about to hurl his whole force on Johnston's center, he says: "In order to oversee the whole and be in close communication with all parts of the army, I had a space cleared on top of a hill to the rear of Thomas's center, and had the telegraph wires laid to it." Sherman further says, speaking of the telegraph on the battlefield, "This is better far than the signal flags and torches." November 12, 1864, the line north from Atlanta was severed as the last message passed, and Sherman went out of the region of the knowable, so far as the telegraph and the North were concerned. He was accompanied by telegraphers, however, who busied themselves in tapping the Southern wires, and who carried the cipher keys. The first use of the latter was on the march north from Savannah in exchanging dispatches with Schofield,



TAPPING A WIRE.



LIGHT FIELD SERVICE.

who on the taking of Wilmington sent his dispatches in cipher by Lieutenant Cushing of the navy, who had already distinguished himself for reckless bravery. Cushing, going up the Cape Fear River in a steam launch, met Sherman's scouts near Fayetteville. Thus Sherman was informed of successful coöperation in North Carolina, and the cipher code permitted full explanation of plans of campaign between Grant, Schofield, and Sherman.

It also enabled us later, at Raleigh, to communicate over the Confederate wires with General James H. Wilson at Macon, Georgia, pending the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston.

Meantime the telegraph served Thomas in retreat and defense—covering his front during

the siege of Nashville with watchful sentinels, reporting his condition daily to Grant, and bringing constant messages from City Point and Washington.¹

Taking up the electric thread with the Army of the Potomac, in 1864, Badeau attests that when Grant crossed the Rapidan in the final campaign he moved synchronously by telegraph Sherman in Georgia, Crook in the Valley, and Butler on the Peninsula, and received responses from each before night, while all the remaining forces of the Union were placed on the alert by the same agency. In addition to

¹ For an account of the Western service the reader is referred to Plum's History, already quoted, to which the writer is much indebted for details of the Western departments.



UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH CONSTRUCTION CORPS.

the main line, via the Orange and Alexandria road, accompanying Grant, keeping him in direct communication with Washington, General Eckert had at this time perfected a field telegraph system somewhat on the mountain howitzer plan. Reels of insulated cable, strong enough to resist cannon-wheels, were carried on the backs of mules paying out the wire over the field, where it was raised on lances or on trees, while compact portable electric batteries were transported in ambulances constructed for the purpose. This system was found efficient on the battlefield and at Spotsylvania Court House, where at one time operators and cable were within the enemy's lines, and in subsequent battles it was thoroughly tested. Throughout the remainder of the war General Grant received almost daily reports by telegraph from all the armies in the field, and issued his orders, in cipher, over our wires to all his lieutenants in pursuance of one comprehensive plan. With Butler's coöperative move up the Peninsula went the telegraph to Gloucester Point, West Point, and White House on the Pamunkey; and when this feint on the York was followed by the real attack on the other side of the Peninsula, the telegraph was pushed up the James as rapidly as possible; so that when Grant swung around Richmond he was met at White House and at City Point by these electric nerves. Before Grant's arrival wires were run from Bermuda Hundred to Point of Rocks, on the left bank of the Appomattox, under fire from the enemy's batteries on the right bank, to Butler's headquarters, midway between that point and Broadway Landing,

and to W. F. Smith's and Gillmore's corps. A line was run down the south bank of the James from City Point to Fort Powhatan, and another was pushed across from Jamestown Island to Yorktown, whence it completed connection by McClellan's old wire to Fort Monroe and Washington. These links were then united by a submarine cable from Jamestown Island to Fort Powhatan, some nineteen miles in the James River, and a short one across the Appomattox. The James River cable was necessitated by the incursions of guerrillas on both banks. Facilities for the manufacture of telegraph cable in this country being then deficient, a portion of the original Atlantic cable was used. It never worked well, and in September, William Mackintosh, with a construction party of ten men and an infantry escort of one hundred, made an attempt to replace the cable by a land line on the south bank, which resulted in the capture of all but two of the party, six six-mule teams, and twenty miles of wire. The party had camped at night on a tidal creek below City Point, expecting to start out in the morning, all but "Mack" and the colored cook preferring the right bank on account of its being higher ground. About day-break the contraband heard firing and roused Mack, who thought it was only his escort killing pigs for breakfast. The old cook started to make a fire and fry some bacon, but a bullet whistling near his head demoralized him and he took to the woods. Mack then saw the raiders on the opposite bank of the creek and heard them shouting to him to surrender. Fortunately the tide was in, and while they


were crossing he secured his horse and set off amid a shower of bullets, closely pursued by the Confederates.¹ The chase was kept up for a mile by augmenting parties of cavalry who had forded the creek higher up, and was stopped only when the pursuers were confronted by a regiment of our men, who poured a volley into them and emptied a number of saddles. Mackintosh thus escaped a third term in Libby prison, he having been twice before captured and exchanged. A week after the capture of the telegraph party a "climber," barefoot and tattered, found his way back to our lines. When asked where his shoes were, he replied, "The ribils schkarred me out of me boots."

In Butler's advance on the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, 7th of May, a line was carried along with the column to within sight of that road, and worked until Beauregard struck us at Drewry's Bluff, on the 16th, when General Butler ordered his chief operator to "bring the line within the intrenchments." In these trenches, one night, Maynard Huyck was awakened from sleep, not by the familiar voice of his instrument, but by the shriek of a Whitworth bolt, a six-pound steel shell, which passed through the few clothes he had doffed, then ricocheted, and exploded beyond. Congratulating himself that he was not in his "duds" at the moment, the boy turned over and slept through the infernal turmoil of an awakening cannonade until aroused by the gentle tick of the telegraph relay. We used no "sounders" in those days at the front.

In illustration of the sensibility of hearing acquired by the military operators for this one sound, the writer may be pardoned another personal incident. At Norfolk, in April, 1863, he happened to be alone in charge of the telegraph when Longstreet with a large force laid siege to Suffolk. In the emergency he remained on duty, without sleep, for three days and nights, repeating orders between Fort Monroe and the front. Towards morning on the third night he fell asleep, but was roused by the

strenuous calls of the fort and asked why he had not given "O. K." for the messages just sent. He replied that none had been received. "We called you," said the operator at the fort; "you answered, and we sent you two messages, but you failed to acknowledge them." The dispatches were repeated and forwarded, when on taking up a volume of Scott's novels, with which he had previously endeavored to keep awake, the writer was astonished to find the missing telegrams scrawled across the printed page in his own writing, some sentences omitted, and some repeated. It was a curious instance of somnambulism.

During the siege of Petersburg every salient point on the front of the armies of the Potomac and James was covered with the wires radiating from Grant's headquarters at City Point. One circuit, crossing the Appomattox, took in the intrenchments on the Bermuda Hundred front, the Tenth Corps' headquarters. Later it crossed the James at Deep Bottom by cable, included the "Crow's Nest," Dutch Gap, headquarters Army of the James, Fort Harrison when captured, and eventually Weitzel's headquarters and Kautz's cavalry on our extreme right. The second circuit followed up the south bank of the Appomattox to our advanced works, and running to the left connected Smith, Hancock, Burnside, and Warren, Sheridan on his arrival, and other commands as they arrived or were shifted on this important field as the tide of



FIELD TELEGRAPH—BATTERY WAGON.


battle ebbed and flowed, pushing farther to the left as Grant, throughout the winter and spring, deployed his forces to envelop Lee's

¹ This proved to be Hampton's famous "cattle raid," than which there stands nothing bolder or more curious in the annals of such exploits. It originated in a telegraphic episode, General Hampton's operator, Gaston, having lain six weeks in the woods, with his instrument connected by fine wire to our line. All that he heard of importance was in cipher, except one message

mentioning that 2586 beeves, to feed our army, would be landed at Coggin's Point for pasture. Hampton got them all but one lame steer. Doubtless the hungry "Johnnies" blessed the operator who neglected to put that message in cipher. The other dispatches which Gaston copied were sent to Richmond, but were never deciphered.

right, until the line reached the Weldon railroad and beyond. Thus all our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg—a semicircle of thirty miles of intrenchments—were manipulated in concert by the hand of General Grant.

Parke in command, gave him three corps and empowered him to assault, while its repair restored Meade, regulated the assault, enabling Grant to use his whole force as a unit, and secured an advance by our forces, all within the space of a few hours. Thus were forts lost and retaken, and thus were battles won by the aid of the telegraph! Its success in this emergency was due to the field system. But for the portable batteries the cutting of the City



GENERAL GRANT AND HIS OPERATOR.

The result of battles sometimes hung on the continuity of a slender wire, as when on March 25, 1865, the Confederates under Gordon attacked and carried Fort Stedman and cut the wire to City Point. The capture occurred about 5 A. M. According to General Humphreys, who has described this campaign, General Parke, then commanding the Ninth Corps, which received the attack, telegraphed at 5:30 A. M. to General Webb the loss of the fort. Webb immediately replied that Meade was at City Point, and he (Parke) in command. At 6:15 Humphreys, commanding the Second Corps, on Parke's left, received the news also by telegraph that the enemy had "broken our right, taken Stedman, and were moving on City Point." Parke ordered Warren up with the Fifth Corps, the Ninth assaulted, and the fort was recaptured by eight o'clock. Promptly the telegraph was repaired and flashed the news to Grant and Meade, who as quickly projected the Second and the Ninth Corps against the enemy, capturing his intrenched picket line, a position of immense subsequent advantage, inflicting a loss of 4000 men, and losing 2000 in the whole operation. Thus the cutting of the wire by Gordon removed Meade from control, placed

Point current would have rendered the rest of the circuit useless.

In the final pursuit and capture of Lee's army all authorities unite in attesting the efficiency of the telegraph corps. In the rush of fifty miles from Petersburg to Appomattox, Grant, Meade, and all the corps of both the Potomac and James armies, except Sheridan's, were kept connected. Our men found poles standing on the South-side road, which materially facilitated our advance with the army. Where the retreat of the Confederates had been too rapid to destroy wires these were spliced to ours and used, turning the enemy's telegraph against himself, an operation which we were able to make on an extended scale in the North Carolina campaign.

The President at this time was at City Point, and later in Petersburg and Richmond, and to him Grant telegraphed the phases of the conflict, beginning with Sheridan's victory at Five Forks and ending with Lee's surrender. Meantime, over the wire pushed forward north of the James sped the message, "Richmond is fallen."

Sherman had reached Goldsboro'; and Schofield, advancing by two routes from the coast,

overcoming all obstacles, had built railroads and telegraphs to meet and supply him, and now he was advancing to Raleigh. Johnston surrendered, and at last over the military line which has been traced began to flow a tide of commercial dispatches, transmitted by the military telegraphers, Schofield's operators at Raleigh taking the business from Columbia and the south, rushing it over the Raleigh and Gaston wire, sixty messages an hour to Petersburg, whence northward flew the silent harbingers of peace. It was the first link to bind the North and the South together again.

It may surprise the reader to learn that, beyond the commendation of Lincoln, Stanton, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and all the higher officers, the military telegraphers — except a few heads of departments, who were commissioned and promoted from captains up to brigadier-generals — have never received any recognition for their great services. Though suffering captivity, wounds, and all of the hardships of the troops, the members of the corps cannot tell their children that they were soldiers, nor hail their brother veterans of the Grand Army of

the Republic as comrades. They were merely "civilians" who faithfully performed dangerous and harassing military duty with boyish enthusiasm, and some of whom have survived to learn that republics are ungrateful, or at least forgetful. Uncle Sam, who has been more generous to his veterans than any potentate of history, has forgotten them. Their widows and orphans receive no pensions.

Once a year the survivors of the corps from all parts of the Union meet to renew old acquaintance, cemented by the electric spark over leagues of wire. Many of them never met in the field, but they knew each other well by telegraph, and can still recognize the touch of a comrade's hand on the "key" a thousand miles away.

The experience of this country, which demonstrated the value of a military telegraph, induced the immediate organization of such corps, but on a more strictly military basis, in all European armies.¹

¹ See Lieutenant Von Treuenfeldt's "Kriegs-Telegraphie," and "Die Kriegstelegraphie" of Captain Bucholtz.

J. Emmet O'Brien.



JOHN C. FRÉMONT. (FROM A DAGUERRETYPE TAKEN ABOUT 1850; LENT BY GENERAL FRÉMONT.)

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

BLAIR'S MEXICAN PROJECT—THE HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE—THE XIIIITH AMENDMENT.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

BLAIR'S MEXICAN PROJECT.



HE triumphant reëlection of Mr. Lincoln in November, 1864, greatly simplified the political conditions as well as the military prospects of the country. Decisive popular majorities had pointedly rebuked the individuals who proclaimed, and the party which had resolved, that the war was a failure. The verdict of the ballot-box not only decided the continuance of a war administration and a war policy, but renewed the assurance of a public sentiment to sustain its prosecution. When Congress convened on the 6th of December, and the President transmitted to that body his annual message, he included in his comprehensive review of public affairs a temperate but strong and terse statement of this fact and its potent significance. Inspired by this majestic manifestation of the popular will to preserve the Union and maintain the Constitution, he was able to speak of the future with hope and confidence. But, with characteristic prudence and good taste, he uttered no word of boasting and indulged in no syllable of acrimony; on the contrary, in terms of fatherly kindness, he again offered the rebellious States the generous conditions he had previously tendered them by various acts and declarations, and specifically in his amnesty proclamation of December 8, 1863. The statement of the whole situation with its alternative issues was so admirably compressed into the closing paragraphs of his message as to leave no room for ignorance or misunderstanding.

The national resources, then [he said], are exhausted, and, as we believe, inexhaustible. The public purpose to reëstablish and maintain the national authority is unchanged, and, as we believe, unchangeable. The manner of continuing the effort remains to choose. On careful consideration of all the evidence accessible, it seems to me that no attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in any good. He would accept nothing short

of severance of the Union—precisely what we will not and cannot give. His declarations to this effect are explicit and oft-repeated. He does not attempt to deceive us. He affords us no excuse to deceive ourselves. He cannot voluntarily re-accept the Union; we cannot voluntarily yield it. Between him and us the issue is distinct, simple, and inflexible. It is an issue which can only be tried by war, and decided by victory. If we yield, we are beaten; if the Southern people fail him, he is beaten. Either way, it would be the victory and defeat following war. What is true, however, of him who heads the insurgent cause is not necessarily true of those who follow. Although he cannot re-accept the Union, they can. Some of them, we know, already desire peace and reunion. The number of such may increase. They can, at any moment, have peace simply by laying down their arms, and submitting to the national authority under the Constitution. After so much, the Government could not, if it would, maintain war against them. The loyal people would not sustain or allow it. If questions should remain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of legislation, conference, courts, and votes, operating only in constitutional and lawful channels. Some certain, and other possible, questions are, and would be, beyond the Executive power to adjust; as, for instance, the admission of members into Congress, and whatever might require the appropriation of money. The Executive power itself would be greatly diminished by the cessation of actual war. Pardons and remissions of forfeitures, however, would still be within Executive control. In what spirit and temper this control would be exercised can be fairly judged of by the past. A year ago general pardon and amnesty, upon specified terms, were offered to all, except certain designated classes; and it was, at the same time, made known that the excepted classes were still within contemplation of special clemency. . . . In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the national authority, on the part of the insurgents, as the only indispensable condition to ending the war on the part of the Government, I retract nothing heretofore said as to slavery. I repeat the declaration made a year ago, that "While I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress." If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an Executive duty to reënslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument

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to perform it. In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say that the war will cease on the part of the Government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it.¹

The country was about to enter upon the fifth year of actual war; but at length all the indications were pointing unmistakably to a speedy collapse of the rebellion. This foreshadowed disaster to the Confederate armies gave rise to another volunteer peace project and negotiation, which, from the boldness of its animating thought and the official prominence of its actors, assumes a special historical importance.

The veteran politician Francis P. Blair, senior, who as a young journalist, thirty-five years before, had helped President Jackson throttle the South Carolina nullification; who, from his long political and personal experience at Washington, perhaps knew better than almost any one else the individual characters and tempers of Southern leaders; and who, moreover, was ambitious to crown his remarkable career with another dazzling chapter of political intrigue, conceived that the time had arrived when he might perhaps take up the rôle of a successful mediator between the North and the South. He gave various hints of his desire to President Lincoln, but received neither encouragement nor opportunity to unfold his plans. "Come to me after Savannah falls," was Lincoln's evasive reply; and when, on the 22d of December, Sherman announced the surrender of that city as a national Christmas gift, Mr. Blair hastened to put his design into execution. Three days after Christmas the President gave him a simple card bearing the words:

Allow the bearer, F. P. Blair, Sr., to pass our lines, go south, and return.
December 28, 1864.²

A. LINCOLN.

With this single credential he went to the camp of General Grant, from which he forwarded, by the usual flags of truce, the following letters to Jefferson Davis at Richmond:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
December 30, 1864.

JEFFERSON DAVIS, President, etc., etc.

MY DEAR SIR: The loss of some papers of importance (title papers), which I suppose may have been taken by some persons who had access to my house when Genl. Early's army were in possession of my place, induces me to ask the privilege of visiting Richmond and beg the favor of you to facilitate my inquiries in regard to them.

Your mo. ob. st.
F. P. BLAIR.³

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

Dec'r 30, 1864.

JEFFERSON DAVIS, President, etc., etc.

MY DEAR SIR: The fact stated in the inclosed note may serve to answer inquiries as to the object of my visit, which, if allowed by you, I would not communicate fully to any one but yourself. The main purpose I have in seeing you is to explain the views I entertain in reference to the state of the affairs of our country, and to submit to your consideration ideas which in my opinion you may turn to good and possibly bring to practical results—that may not only repair all the ruin the war has brought upon the nation, but contribute to promote the welfare of other nations that have suffered from it. In candor I must say to you in advance that I come to you wholly unaccredited except in so far as I may be by having permission to pass our lines and to offer to you my own suggestions—suggestions which I have submitted to no one in authority on this side the lines, and will not, without my conversation with you may lead me to suppose they may lead to something practicable. With the hope of such result, if allowed, I will confidentially unbosom my heart frankly and without reserve. You will of course hold in reserve all that is not proper to be said to one coming, as I do, merely as a private citizen and addressing one clothed with the highest responsibilities. Unless the great interests now at stake induce you to attribute more importance to my application than it would otherwise command I could not expect that you would invite the intrusion. I venture however to submit the matter to your judgment.

Your most obedient servant,
F. P. BLAIR.⁴

Mr. Davis returned a reply with permission to make the visit; but by some mischance it did not reach Mr. Blair till after his patience had become exhausted by waiting and he had returned to Washington. Proceeding then to Richmond he was received by Jefferson Davis in a confidential interview on the 12th of January, 1865,⁵ which he so thoroughly described in a written report that it is quoted in full:

"I introduced the subject to Mr. Davis by giving him an account of the mode in which I obtained leave to go through the lines, telling him that the President stopped me when I told him 'I had kindly relations with Mr. Davis, and at the proper time I might do something towards peace,' and said, 'Come to me when Savannah falls'—how after that event he shunned an interview with me, until I perceived he did not wish to hear me, but desired I should go without explanation of my object. I then told Mr. Davis that I wanted to know, if he thought fit to communicate it, whether he had any commitments with European powers which would control his conduct in making arrangements with the Government of the United States. He said in the most de-

¹ Message, Dec. 6, 1864.

² MS.

³ Unpublished MS.

⁴ Unpublished MS.

⁵ Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 612.

cisive manner that there were none, that he had no commitments; and expressed himself with some vehemence that he was absolutely free and would die a freeman in all respects. This is pretty much his language; it was his sentiment and manner certainly. I told him that that was an all-important point, for if it were otherwise I would not have another word to say. I then prefaced the reading of the paper—which I had intended to embody in a letter to him, or present in some form if I could not reach him, or if I were prevented from seeing him personally—by saying that it was somewhat after the manner of an editorial and was not of a diplomatic character, and that I was like a shoemaker who sticks to his last, and could not change my mode of expressing my thoughts; moreover, I had become an old man, and what I was about to submit to him might be the dreams of an old man, but that I depended upon his practical good sense to assure me whether they were dreams that could be realized or not; that I had no doubt that he would deal with me with the utmost frankness, and give me credit for the like candor; that he knew that every drop of my blood and that of my children flowed from a Southern source; that I loved my whole country, but could not help feeling the force of the affections which my native instincts, enforced by habit, had attached me to the South. He replied that he gave me his full confidence, knew that I was an earnest man, and believed I was an honest man, and said he reciprocated the attachment which I had expressed for him and his family; that he was under great obligations to my family for kindnesses rendered to his, that he would never forget them, and that even when dying they would be remembered in his prayers. I then read the paper to him.¹

“ Suggestions submitted to Jefferson Davis, President, etc., etc.”

“The amnesty proclamation of President Lincoln in connection with his last message to Congress, referring to the termination of the rebellion, presents a basis on which I think permanent peace and union between the warring sections of our country may be reëstablished. The amnesty offered would doubtless be enlarged to secure these objects and made to embrace all who sincerely desired to renew and confirm their allegiance to the Government of the United States by the extinction of the institution which originated the war against the National Republic. The proposition of the message is, that the war should be no longer waged by the United States against those who began it, after it had been relinquished by

¹ Unpublished MS.

them, with the designs it was meant to accomplish. This, simply as the first step to peace, is a proposal of an armistice, that, with proper conditions arranged to accommodate it to the feelings, the wishes, the interests of all concerned, might facilitate a restoration of perfect harmony among the parties to the war and lead on again the prosperity which has been so unhappily interrupted.

“Slavery no longer remains an insurmountable obstruction to pacification. You propose to use the slaves in some mode to conquer a peace for the South. If this race be employed to secure the independence of the Southern States by risking their lives in the service, the achievement is certainly to be crowned with their deliverance from bondage. But why should blacks or whites, the slaves or the free, be offered as victims to slaughter to acquire freedom and independence, when both objects are now attainable without such sacrifice? The white race of the South for almost a century have justly considered themselves, both as individuals and States, free and independent. If that proud eminence can again be reached, with the addition of all the material prosperity which has distinguished the free States, without making hecatombs of either whites or blacks, merely by the manumission of the latter, why should the atonement by blood be further insisted on? Slavery, “the cause of all our woes,” is admitted now on all sides to be doomed. As an institution all the world condemns it.

“This expiation made, what remains to distract our country? It now seems a free-will offering on the part of the South as essential to its own safety. Being made, nothing but military force can keep the North and South asunder. The people are one people, speak a common language, are educated in the same common law, are brought up in one common habitude,—the growth of republican representative institutions,—all fixed in freeholds rooted in the soil of a great luxuriant continent bound as one body by backbone mountains, pervaded in every member with gigantic streams running in every direction to give animation and strength like arteries and veins in the human system. Such an embodiment, in such a country, cannot be divided. The instruction of all ages appealing to the intelligence of the race brings conviction that union is strength—strength to build up the grandeur of the Republic; strength essential to secure the peace, the safety, the prosperity and glory of a great Republic. At the birth of the Government the necessities of commerce and the influence of social relations among a people of the same origin overcame the repugnance generated between the Northern and Southern States by the presence of negro slavery in the latter, and

brought them together as one people under a general government in spite of the revolting principle of slavery incorporated into the free system, which made liberty its essential element. Now that the ingredient, adverse to union, which produced disruption is removed, there is nothing left to counteract the powerful attraction that even as colonies brought our people together as a nation and which still resists victoriously the frenzy of revolution. The instincts of kindred, the bonds of commerce delineated on our maps, rivers, railroads, canals, which mark its transit, are circulating the life's blood of a gigantic race which claims the continent for its pedestal. The love of liberty nurtured by popular institutions, so dear to the Anglo-Saxon race, makes its attachments indestructible on this continent. We see them coming together again, after momentary rupture, along the Ohio, the Mississippi, upon the Gulf, the Potomac, and gradually in the interior wherever defense is assured from the military power that at first overthrew the Government. It is now plain to every sense that nothing but the interposition of the soldiery of foreign tyrannies can prevent all the States from resuming their places in the Union, casting from them the demon of discord. The few States remaining in arms that made the war for slavery as the *sine qua non* now propose to surrender it, and even the independence which was coveted to support it, as a price for foreign aid.

“Slavery abandoned, the issue is changed, and war against the Union becomes a war for monarchy; and the cry for independence of a government that assured the independence of the Southern States of all foreign powers and their equality in the Union, is converted into an appeal for succor to European potentates, to whom they offer, in return, homage as dependencies! And this is the price they propose to pay for success in breaking up the National Government! But will the people who have consented to wage this war for an institution once considered a property, now that they have abandoned it, continue the war to enslave themselves? Would they abandon slavery to commend themselves to the protection of European monarchies, and thus escape the embrace of that national Republic as a part of which they have enjoyed almost a century of prosperity and renown? The whole aspect of the controversy upon this view is changed. The patriarchal domestic institution given up and the idea of independence and ‘being let alone’ in happy isolation surrendered to obtain the boon of foreign protection under the rule of monarchy! The most modern exemplification of this programme for discontented republican States defeating their popular in-

stitution by intestine hostilities is found in the French emperor's Austrian deputy, Maximilian, sent to prescribe for their disorders. Certainly a better choice for a vice-royalty under the auspices of France and Germany could not have been made. This scion of the house of Hapsburg must have inherited from a line of ancestors extending to the Dark Ages the very innate instincts of that despotism which has manacled the little republics of Italy and the little principalities of Germany, and subjected them to the will of the Kaiser for more than a thousand years. With the blessing of Heaven, the great American Republic will foil this design of the central despotism of Europe to destroy all that remains of liberty on the civilized continents of the earth. Great Britain's jealousy and apprehension of her ancient enemy, and the ambition of Russia, looking to the South for aggrandizement, will unite in arresting the strides to power of this new Holy Alliance in the heart of Europe. England, for her wars in Europe, draws her armies from India and America. She will never consent to see France, which is a laboratory of soldiers, add to her means of creating armies by making military colonies of Mexico and the Southern States of this Union for the purpose.

“The design of Louis Napoleon in reference to conquest on this continent is not left to conjecture. With extraordinary frankness he made a public declaration that his object was to make the Latin race supreme in the southern section of the North American continent. This is a Napoleonic idea. The great Napoleon, in a letter or one of his dictations at St. Helena, states that it had been his purpose to embody an army of negroes in San Domingo, to be landed in the slave States with French support to instigate the blacks there to insurrection, and through revolution effect conquest. Louis Napoleon saw revolution involving the struggle of races and sections on the question of slavery made to his hand, when he instantly recurred to his uncle's ideas of establishing colonies to create commerce and a navy for France and to breed the material for armies to maintain his European empire. The moment he perceived our frenzied people engaged in perpetrating a national suicide he invaded Mexico to take up a position on the southern flank of this Republic, to avail himself of its distractions as well as those of Mexico, to give effect to the darling scheme of the Bonapartist dynasty to make for the Latin race in all our regions on the Gulf a seat of power under the auspices of France. His phrase “Supremacy of the Latin race” was to conciliate to his object the whole Spanish as well as the French and the mixed populations which originally founded and built up the colonies that introduced civ-

ilization around the Gulf of Mexico and on the streams of its wilderness interior. Jefferson Davis is the fortunate man who now holds the commanding position to encounter this formidable scheme of conquest, and whose fiat can at the same time deliver his country from the bloody agony now covering it in mourning. He can drive Maximilian from his American throne, and baffle the designs of Napoleon to subject our Southern people to the "Latin race." With a breath he can blow away all pretense for proscription, conscription, or confiscation in the Southern States, restore their fields to luxuriant cultivation, their ports to the commerce of the world, their constitutions and their rights under them as essentially a part of the Constitution of the United States to that strong guaranty under which they flourished for nearly a century not only as equals, but down to the hour of conflict the prevalent power on the continent. All this may be achieved by means which, so far from subjecting the weaker section of our Republic to humiliation or those asserting its cause by secession to dishonor, will add to the glory of both.

"To accomplish this great good for our common country President Lincoln has opened the way in his amnesty proclamation and the message which looks to armistice. Suppose the first enlarged to embrace all engaged in the war; suppose secret preliminaries to armistice enable President Davis to transfer such portions of his army as he may deem proper for his purpose to Texas, held out to it as the land of promise; suppose this force on the banks of the Rio Grande, armed, equipped, and provided, and Juarez propitiated and rallying the Liberals of Mexico to give it welcome and support — could it not enter Mexico in full confidence of expelling the invaders, who, taking advantage of the distractions of our own Republic, have overthrown that of Mexico and established a foreign despotism to rule that land and spread its power over ours? I know Romero, the able, patriotic minister who represents the Republic of Mexico near our Government. He is intimate with my son Montgomery, who is persuaded that he could induce Juarez to devolve all the power he can command on President Davis — a dictatorship, if necessary — to restore the rights of Mexico and her people and provide for the stability of its government. With such hopes inspiring and a veteran army of invincibles to rally on, such a force of Mexicans might be embodied as would make the conquest of the country the work of its own people under able leading. But if more force were wanted than these Mexican recruits and the army of the South would supply, would not multitudes of the army of the North, officers and men, be found ready to embark in an

enterprise vital to the interests of our whole Republic? The Republican party has staked itself on the assertion of the Monroe doctrine proposed by Canning and sanctioned by a British cabinet. The Democrats of the North have proclaimed their adhesion to it, and I doubt not from the spirit exhibited by the Congress now in session, however unwilling to declare war, it would countenance all legitimate efforts short of such result to restore the Mexican Republic. I think I could venture to pledge my son General Blair, now commanding a corps against the Confederacy, to resign his commission, expatriate himself, and join all the force he could draw to the standard borne on a crusade for the expulsion of the European despotism now threatening our confines. There is no cause so dear to the soul of American patriotism as that which embodies resistance to the intrusion of a foreign tyranny. Its infancy, nurtured in the sternest trials of a war against dictation from potentates of another hemisphere, has grown to a manhood that will never permit its approaches. He who expels the Bonaparte-Hapsburg dynasty from our southern flank, which General Jackson in one of his letters warned me was the vulnerable point through which foreign invasion would come, will ally his name with those of Washington and Jackson as a defender of the liberty of the country. If in delivering Mexico he should model its States in form and principle to adapt them to our Union and add a new Southern constellation to its benignant sky while rounding off our possession on the continent at the Isthmus, and opening the way to blending the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific, thus embracing our Republic in the arms of the ocean, he would complete the work of Jefferson, who first set one foot of our colossal government on the Pacific by a stride from the Gulf of Mexico. Such achievement would be more highly appreciated in the South, inasmuch as it would restore the equipoise between the Northern and Southern States — if indeed such sectional distinctions could be recognized after the peculiar institution which created them had ceased to exist."

It is of course possible that the hard mental processes in political metaphysics through which Jefferson Davis had forced his intellect in pursuing the ambitious hallucinations which led him from loyalty to treason, had blighted all generous sentiment and healthy imagination. But if his heart was yet capable of a single patriotic memory and impulse, strange emotions must have troubled him as he sat listening to the reading of this paper by the man who had been the familiar friend, the trusted adviser, it might almost be said the confidential voice, of Andrew Jackson. It was as

though the ghost of the great President had come from his grave in Tennessee to draw him a sad and solemn picture of the ruin and shame to which he was bringing, and had almost brought, the American Republic, especially "his people" of the Southern States—nationality squandered, slavery doomed, and his Confederacy a supplicant for life at the hands of European despotisms. If he did not correctly realize the scene and hour in all its impressiveness, he seems at least to have tacitly acknowledged that his sanguinary adventure in statesmanship was moribund, and that it was high time to listen earnestly to any scheme which might give hope of averting from himself and his adherents the catastrophe to whose near approach he could no longer shut his eyes. Mr. Blair's report thus narrates the remainder of the interview :

"I then said to him, 'There is my problem, Mr. Davis; do you think it possible to be solved?' After consideration he said, 'I think so.' I then said, 'You see that I make the great point of this matter that the war is no longer made for slavery, but monarchy. You know that if the war is kept up and the Union divided, armies must be kept afoot on both sides, and this state of things has never continued long without resulting in monarchy on one side or the other, and on both generally.' He assented to this, and with great emphasis remarked that he was like Lucius Junius Brutus, and uttered the sentiment ascribed to him in Shakspeare, without exactly quoting it :

There was a Brutus once that would have brooked
The eternal devil to keep his state in Rome
As easily as a king.

Then he said that he was thoroughly for popular government, that this feeling had been born and bred in him. Touching the project, he said, of bringing the sections together again, the great difficulty was the excessive vindictiveness produced by outrages perpetrated in the invaded States during the war. He said reconciliation must depend, he thought, upon time and events, which he hoped would restore better feelings, but that he was certain that no circumstance would have a greater effect than to see the arms of our countrymen from the North and the South united in a war upon a foreign power assailing principles of government common to both sections and threatening their destruction. And he said he was convinced that all the powers of Europe felt it their interest that our people in this quarrel should exhaust all their energies in destroying each other, and thus make them a prey to the potentates of Europe, who felt that the destruction of our Government was necessary to the maintenance of the monarchical

principles on which their own were founded. I told him that I was encouraged by finding him holding these views, and believed that our country, if impressed with them, as I thought it might be universally, would soon resume its happy unity. He said I ought to know with what reluctance he had been drawn out of the Union; that he labored to the last moment to avoid it; that he had followed the old flag longer and with more devotion than anything else on earth; that at Bull Run when he saw the flag he supposed it was his own hanging on the staff,—they were more alike than now,—and when the flag of the United States unfurled itself in the breeze he saw it with a sigh, but he had to choose between it and his own, and he had to look to it as that of an enemy. He felt now that it was laid up, but the circumstances to which he had adverted might restore it and reconciliation be easier. With regard to Mexico, if the foreign power was driven out, it would have to depend on the events there to make it possible to connect that country with this and restore the equipoise to which I looked; nobody could foresee how things would shape themselves.

"In relation to the vindictiveness produced by the war, I said I thought he was mistaken in supposing it would be attended with great difficulty in producing reconciliation between the States and people; I told him I had spent four hours on the picket line and perceived that kind feeling existed, instead of estrangement, between the men on both sides who stood armed to shoot each other. There was nothing to prevent the immediate indulgence of hostile feelings if they felt them. But they manifested a friendly feeling. A Boston Captain Deacon, who carried me through the lines to deliver me over to Captain Davis of South Carolina, drew his bottle from his bag and proposed to drink his health. They drank together with mutual good-will and gave each other their hands. This spirit of magnanimity exists in the soldiery on both sides. It is only the politicians and those who profit, or hope to profit, by the disasters of the war who indulge in acrimony. Mr. Davis said that what I remarked was very just in the main. He admitted that it was for the most part the people at home, who brooded over the disasters of the war, who indulged in bitterness.

"Touching the matter of arrangement for reconciliation proposed by me, he remarked that all depended upon well-founded confidence, and, looking at me with very significant expression, he said, 'What, Mr. Blair, do you think of Mr. Seward?' I replied: 'Mr. Seward is a very pleasant companion; he has good social feelings, but I have no doubt that where his ambition is concerned his selfish

feelings prevail over all principle. I have no doubt he would betray any man, no matter what his obligations to him, if he stood in the way of his selfish and ambitious schemes. But,' I said, 'this matter, if entered upon at all, must be with Mr. Lincoln himself. The transaction is a military transaction, and depends entirely upon the Commander-in-Chief of our armies. If he goes into it he will certainly consider it as the affair of the military head of the Government. Now I know that Mr. Lincoln is capable of great personal sacrifices—of sacrificing the strongest feelings of his heart, of sacrificing a friend when he thinks it necessary for the good of the country; and you may rely upon it, if he plights his faith to any man in a transaction for which he is responsible as an officer or a man, he will maintain his word inviolably.' Mr. Davis said he was glad to hear me say so. He did not know Mr. Lincoln; but he was sure I did, and therefore my declaration gave him the highest satisfaction. As to Mr. Seward, he had no confidence in him himself, and he did not know any man or party in the South that had any.

"In relation to the mode of effecting the object about which we had been talking, he said we ought soon to have some understanding, because things to be done or omitted will depend upon it; that he was willing to appoint persons to have conferences, without regard to forms; that there must be some medium of communication; that he would appoint a person or persons who could be implicitly relied on by Mr. Lincoln; that he had on a former occasion indicated Judge Campbell, of the Supreme Court, as a person who could be relied on. I told him he was a person in whom I had unbounded confidence, both as regarded talents and fidelity.

"In reply to some remarks that I made as to the fame he would acquire in relieving the country from all its disasters, restoring its harmony, and extending its dominion to the Isthmus, he said what his name might be in history he cared not. If he could restore the prosperity and happiness of his country, that was the end and aim of his being. For himself, death would end his cares, and that was very easy to be accomplished.

"The next day after my first interview he sent me a note, saying he thought I might desire to have something in writing in regard to his conclusion, and therefore he made a brief statement which I brought away."¹

The substantial accuracy of Mr. Blair's re-

port is confirmed by the memorandum of the same interview which Jefferson Davis wrote at the time and has since printed.² In this conversation the rebel leader took little pains to disguise his entire willingness to enter upon the wild scheme of military conquest and annexation which could easily be read between the lines of a political crusade to rescue the Monroe doctrine from its present peril. If Mr. Blair felt elated at having so quickly made a convert of the Confederate President, he was still further gratified at discovering yet more favorable symptoms in his official surrounding at Richmond. In the three or four days he spent at the rebel capital he found nearly every prominent personage convinced of the hopeless condition of the rebellion, and even eager to seize upon any contrivance to help them out of their direful prospects. The letter which he bore from Jefferson Davis to be shown to President Lincoln was in the following language:

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, JANUARY 12, 1865.

F. P. BLAIR, Esq.

SIR: I have deemed it proper, and probably desirable to you, to give you, in this form, the substance of remarks made by me, to be repeated by you to President Lincoln, etc., etc. I have no disposition to find obstacles in forms, and am willing now, as heretofore, to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace; and am ready to send a commission whenever I have reason to suppose it will be received, or to receive a commission, if the United States Government shall choose to send one. That, notwithstanding the rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise that a commissioner, minister, or other agent would be received, appoint one immediately, and renew the effort to enter into conference, with a view to secure peace to the two countries.

Yours, etc.,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.³

But the Government councils at Washington were not ruled by the spirit of political adventure. Abraham Lincoln had a loftier conception of patriotic duty and a higher ideal of national ethics. The proposal to divert his nation, "conceived in Liberty," from its grand task of preserving for humanity "government of the people, by the people, for the people," and degrade its heroic struggle and sacrifice to the low level of a joint filibustering foray, which, instead of crowning his work of emancipation, might perhaps eventuate in a renewal, extension, and perpetuation of slavery, did not receive from him an instant's consideration. His whole interest in Mr. Blair's mission was in the despondency of the rebel leaders which it disclosed, and the possibility of bringing them to an acknowledgment of their despair and the abandonment of their resistance. His only response to the overture thus half officially brought to his notice was to open the door of negotiation a little wider than he had done

¹ Unpublished MS.

² Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 612 et seq.

³ "House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 229.

before, but for the specific and exclusive objects of union and peace. As an answer to Jefferson Davis's note he therefore wrote Mr. Blair the following :

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1865.

F. P. BLAIR, Esq.

SIR: You having shown me Mr. Davis's letter to you of the 12th instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he, or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may informally send to me, with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country.

Yours, etc.,

A. LINCOLN.¹

With this note Mr. Blair returned to Richmond, giving Mr. Davis such feeble excuses as he could hastily frame why Mr. Lincoln had rejected his overture for a joint invasion of Mexico,² alleging that Mr. Lincoln was embarrassed by radical politicians and could not use "political agencies." Mr. Blair then, but again without authority, proposed a new project, namely, that Grant and Lee should enter into negotiations, the scope and object of which, however, he seems to have left altogether vague. The simple truth is evident that Mr. Blair was, as best he might, covering his retreat from an abortive intrigue. He soon reported to Davis that military negotiation was out of the question.

Jefferson Davis therefore had only two alternatives before him—either to repeat his stubborn ultimatum of separation and independence, or frankly to accept Lincoln's ultimatum of reunion. The principal Richmond authorities knew, and some of them had tacitly admitted, that their Confederacy was nearly in collapse. Vice-President Stephens, in a secret speech to the rebel Senate, had pointed out that "we could not match our opponents in numbers, and should not attempt to cope with them in direct physical power," and advocated a Fabian policy which involved the abandonment of Richmond.³ Judge Campbell, rebel Assistant Secretary of War, had collected facts and figures, which a few weeks later he embodied in a formal report, showing the South to be in practical exhaustion.⁴ Lee sent

a dispatch saying he had not two days' rations for his army.⁵ Richmond was already in a panic at rumors of evacuation. Flour was selling at a thousand dollars a barrel in Confederate currency. The recent fall of Fort Fisher had closed the last avenue through which blockade runners could bring their foreign supplies. Governor Brown of Georgia was refusing to obey orders from Richmond and characterizing them as "usurping" and "despotic."⁶ Under such circumstances a defiant cry of independence would not reassure anybody; nor, on the other hand, was it longer possible to remain silent. Mr. Blair's first visit to Richmond had created general interest. Old friends plied him with eager questions and laid his truthful answers concerning their gloomy prospects solemnly to heart. The fact of his secret consultation with Davis transpired. When Mr. Blair came a second time and held a second secret consultation with the rebel President wonder and rumor rose to fever heat.

Impelled to take action, Mr. Davis had not the courage to be frank. He called, first, Vice-President Stephens, and afterward his cabinet, to a discussion of the project. A peace commission of three was appointed, consisting of Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President; R. M. T. Hunter, senator and ex-Secretary of State; and John A. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War—all of them convinced that the rebellion was hopeless, and yet unwilling to admit the logical consequences and necessities. The drafting of instructions for the guidance of the commissioners was a difficult problem, since the explicit condition prescribed by Mr. Lincoln's note was that he would only receive an agent sent him "with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country." The astute Mr. Benjamin, rebel Secretary of State, in order to make the instructions "as vague and general as possible," proposed the simple direction to confer "upon the subject to which it relates."⁷ His action and language were broad enough to carry the inference that in his secret heart he too was sick of rebellion and ready to make terms. Whether it was so meant or not, his chief refused to receive the delicate suggestion.

¹ "House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 229.

² "He [Blair] then unfolded to me [writes Davis] the embarrassment of Mr. Lincoln on account of the extreme men, in Congress and elsewhere, who wished to drive him into harsher measures than he was inclined to adopt; whence it would not be feasible for him to enter into any arrangement with us by the use of political agencies; that if anything beneficial could be effected it must be done without the intervention of the politicians. He therefore suggested that Generals Lee and Grant might enter into an arrangement by which hostilities would be suspended, and a way paved for the restoration of peace. I responded that I would

willingly intrust to General Lee such negotiation as was indicated." [Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., pp. 616, 617.]

³ Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., pp. 587-589.

⁴ See "Open Letters" of this number of the magazine, for a letter from Judge Campbell to Judge Curtis entitled, "A View of the Confederacy from the Inside."—EDITOR.

⁵ J. B. Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 384.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 395.

⁷ Benjamin to Davis, May 17, 1877. "Southern Historical Papers," Vol. IV., pp. 212-214.

With the ruin and defeat of the Confederate cause staring him full in the face Davis could bring himself neither to a dignified refusal nor to a resigned acceptance of the form of negotiation as Mr. Lincoln had tendered it. Even in this gulf of war and destitution into which he had led his people he could not forego the vanity of masquerading as a champion. He was unwilling, says Mr. Benjamin, to appear to betray his trust as Confederate President. "You thought, from regard to your personal honor, that your language ought to be such as to render impossible any malignant comment on your actions."¹ But if so, why not adopt the heroic alternative and refuse to negotiate? Why resort to the yet more humiliating absurdity of sending a commission on terms which he knew Mr. Lincoln had pointedly rejected?² With greater sacrifice of personal dignity the Confederate President adopted the devious alternative—a continuation of the narrow, unmanly, pettifogging misrepresentation with which Southern leaders had deluded the Southern people. Instead of Mr. Benjamin's phraseology, Jefferson Davis wrote the following instruction to the commissioners, which carried a palpable contradiction on its face:

RICHMOND, January 28, 1865.

In conformity with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, of which the foregoing is a copy, you are requested to proceed to Washington City for informal conference with him upon the issues involved in the existing war, and for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries. Your obedient servant,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.³

THE HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE.

WITH this double-meaning credential the commissioners presented themselves at the Union lines near Richmond on the evening of January 29, 1865, and, instead of frankly showing their authority, asked admission "in accordance with an understanding claimed to exist with Lieutenant-General Grant, on their way to Washington as peace commissioners."⁴ The application being telegraphed to Washington, Mr. Stanton answered that no one should be admitted under such character or profession until the President's instructions were received.⁵ Mr. Lincoln, being apprised of the application, promptly dispatched a

special messenger with written directions to admit the commissioners under safe conduct if they would say in writing that they came for the purpose of an informal conference on the basis of his note of January 18 to Mr. Blair, "with a view of securing peace to the people of our one common country."⁶ Before this messenger arrived, however, the commissioners reconsidered the form of their application and addressed a new one to General Grant, asking permission "to proceed to Washington to hold a conference with President Lincoln upon the subject of the existing war, and with a view of ascertaining upon what terms it may be terminated, in pursuance of the course indicated by him in his letter to Mr. Blair of January 18, 1865."⁷

Pursuant to this request, they were provisionally conveyed to Grant's headquarters. One of them records with evident surprise the unostentatious surroundings of the General-in-Chief.

I was instantly struck with the great simplicity and perfect naturalness of his manners, and the entire absence of everything like affectation, show, or even the usual military air or *mien* of men in his position. He was plainly attired, sitting in a log-cabin, busily writing on a small table, by a kerosene lamp. It was night when we arrived. There was nothing in his appearance or surroundings which indicated his official rank. There were neither guards nor aids about him. . . . He furnished us with comfortable quarters on board one of his dispatch boats. The more I became acquainted with him, the more I became thoroughly impressed with the very extraordinary combination of rare elements of character which he exhibited. During the time he met us frequently and conversed freely upon various subjects, not much upon our mission. I saw, however, very clearly that he was very anxious for the proposed conference to take place.⁸

The commissioners' note to Grant had been a substantial compliance with the requirements of President Lincoln; and so accepting it, he, on the 31st of January, sent Secretary Seward to meet them, giving him for this purpose the following written instructions:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1865.

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State:

You will proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, there to meet and informally confer with Messrs.

'the two countries,' to which Mr. Davis replied that he so understood it.

A. LINCOLN."

¹ ["House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 229.]

² "Southern Historical Papers," Vol. IV., p. 214.

³ Wilcox to Parke, Jan. 29, 1865. "House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 230.

⁴ Stanton to Ord, Jan. 29, 1865, 10 P. M. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

⁵ Lincoln to Eckert, Jan. 30, 1865. *Ibid.*, p. 231.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

⁷ Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., p. 597.

¹ Benjamin to Davis, May 17, 1877. "Southern Historical Papers," Vol. IV., p. 213.

² [ENDORSEMENT BY MR. LINCOLN.]

"To-day [January 28] Mr. Blair tells me that on the 21st instant he delivered to Mr. Davis the original, of which the within is a copy, and left it with him; that at the time of delivering it Mr. Davis read it over twice in Mr. Blair's presence, at the close of which he (Mr. Blair) remarked that the part about 'our one common country' related to the part of Mr. Davis's letter about

Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, on the basis of my letter to F. P. Blair, Esq., of January 18, 1865, a copy of which you have. You will make known to them that three things are indispensable, to wit: *First*, the restoration of the national authority throughout all the States. *Second*, no receding by the Executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress, and in preceding documents. *Third*, no cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government. You will inform them that all propositions of theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they may choose to say, and report to me. You will not assume to definitely consummate anything.

Yours, etc.,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.¹

Mr. Seward started on the morning of February 1, and simultaneously with his departure the President repeated to General Grant the monition which the Secretary of War had already sent him two days before through the special messenger, "Let nothing which is inspiring change, hinder, or delay your military movements or plans."² Grant responded to the order, promising that no armistice should ensue, adding, "The troops are kept in readiness to move at the shortest notice, if occasion should justify it."³ The special messenger, Major Thomas J. Eckert, arrived while Mr. Seward was yet on his way. On informing the commissioners of the President's exact requirement, they replied by presenting Jefferson Davis's instruction. This was receding from the terms contained in their note to Grant, and Major Eckert promptly notified them that they could not proceed further unless they complied strictly with President Lincoln's terms. Thus at half-past nine on the night of February 1 the mission of Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell was practically at an end. It was never explained why they took this course, for the next day they again changed their minds. The only conjecture which seems plausible is that they hoped to persuade General Grant to take some extraordinary and dictatorial step. One of them hints as much in a newspaper article written long after the war. "We had tried," he wrote, "to intimate to General Grant, before we reached Old Point, that a settlement generally satisfactory to both sides could be more easily effected through him and General Lee by an armistice than in any other way. The attempt was in vain."⁴ The general had indeed

listened to them, with great interest; and in their eagerness to convert him they had probably indulged in stronger phrases of repentance than they felt. About an hour after the commissioners refused Major Eckert's ultimatum General Grant telegraphed the following to Secretary Stanton, from which it will be seen that at least two of the commissioners had declared to him their personal willingness "to restore peace and union."

February 1, 10.30 P. M., 1865.

HON. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Now that the interview between Major Eckert, under his written instructions, and Mr. Stephens and party has ended, I will state confidentially, but not officially, to become a matter of record, that I am convinced, upon conversation with Messrs. Stephens and Hunter, that their intentions are good and their desire sincere to restore peace and union. I have not felt myself at liberty to express even views of my own, or to account for my reticency. This has placed me in an awkward position, which I could have avoided by not seeing them in the first instance. I fear now their going back without any expression from any one in authority will have a bad influence. At the same time I recognize the difficulties in the way of receiving these informal commissioners at this time, and do not know what to recommend. I am sorry, however, that Mr. Lincoln cannot have an interview with the two named in this dispatch, if not all three now within our lines. Their letter to me was all that the President's instructions contemplated to secure their safe conduct, if they had used the same language to Major Eckert.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.⁵

On the morning of February 2, President Lincoln went to the War Department, and, reading Major Eckert's report, was about to recall Mr. Seward by telegraph, when Grant's dispatch was placed in his hands. The communication served to change his purpose. Resolving not to neglect the indications of sincerity here described, he immediately telegraphed in reply, "Say to the gentlemen I will meet them personally at Fortress Monroe as soon as I can get there."⁶ The commissioners by this time had decided to accept Mr. Lincoln's terms, which they did in writing to both Major Eckert and General Grant, and thereupon were at once conveyed from General Grant's headquarters at City Point to Fort Monroe, where Mr. Lincoln joined Secretary Seward on the same night.

On the morning of February 3, 1865, the rebel commissioners were conducted on board the *River Queen*, lying at anchor near Fort Monroe, where President Lincoln and Secretary Seward awaited them; and in the saloon of that steamer an informal conference of four hours' duration ensued. It was agreed beforehand that no writing or memorandum should be made at the time, so that the record of the interview remains only in the separate accounts

¹ "House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 233.

² *Ibid.*, p. 233.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

⁴ "Southern Historical Papers," Vol. III., p. 175 (April, 1877).

⁵ "House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 235.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

which each of the rebel commissioners afterward wrote out from memory, neither Mr. Seward nor President Lincoln ever having made any report in detail. Former personal acquaintance made the beginning easy and cordial, through pleasant reminiscences of the past and mutual inquiries after friends. In a careful analysis of these reports, thus furnished by the Confederates themselves, the first striking feature is the difference of intention between the parties. It is apparent that Mr. Lincoln went, honestly and frankly in all friendliness, to offer them the best terms he could to secure peace and reunion, but to abate no jot of official duty and personal dignity; while the main thought of the commissioners was to evade the express condition on which they had been admitted to conference; to seek to postpone the vital issue; and to propose an armistice, by debating a mere juggling expedient, against which they had in a private agreement with one another already committed themselves.

Mr. Stephens began the discussion by asking whether there was no way of restoring the harmony and happiness of former days; to which Mr. Lincoln replied, "There was but one way that he knew of, and that was, for those who were resisting the laws of the Union to cease that resistance." Mr. Stephens rejoined that they had been induced to believe that both parties might for a while leave their present strife in abeyance and occupy themselves with some continental question till their anger should cool and accommodation become possible.

Here Mr. Lincoln interposed promptly and frankly: "I suppose you refer to something that Mr. Blair has said. Now it is proper to state at the beginning that whatever he said was of his own accord, and without the least authority from me. When he applied for a passport to go to Richmond, with certain ideas which he wished to make known to me, I told him flatly that I did not want to hear them. If he desired to go to Richmond of his own accord, I would give him a passport; but he had no authority to speak for me in any way whatever. When he returned and brought me Mr. Davis's letter, I gave him the one to which you alluded in your application for leave to cross the lines. I was always willing to hear propositions for peace on the conditions of this letter, and on no other. The restoration of the Union is a *sine qua non* with me, and hence my instructions that no conference was to be held except upon that basis."

Despite this express disavowal Mr. Stephens persisted in believing that Mr. Lincoln had come with ulterior designs, and went on at considerable length to elaborate his idea of a

joint Mexican expedition, to be undertaken during an armistice and without a prior pledge of ultimate reunion. Such an expedition, he argued, would establish the "right of self-government to all peoples on this continent against the dominion or control of any European power." Establishing this principle of the right of peoples to self-government would necessarily also establish, by logical sequence, the right of States to self-government; and, present passions being cooled, there would ensue "an Ocean-bound Federal Republic, under the operation of this *Continental Regulator*—the ultimate absolute sovereignty of each State." His idea was that "All the States might reasonably be expected, very soon, to return, of their own accord, to their former relations to the Union, just as they came together at first by their own consent, and for their mutual interests. Others, too, would continue to join it in the future, as they had in the past. This great law of the system would effect the same certain results in its organization as the law of gravitation in the material world."¹

Mr. Stephens does not seem to have realized how comically absurd was his effort to convert President Lincoln to the doctrine of secession by this very transparent bit of cunning, and the others listened with considerate and patient gravity. Mr. Seward at length punctured the bubble with a few well-directed sentences, when Mr. Hunter also intervened to express his entire dissent from Mr. Stephens's proposal. "In this view," reports Mr. Stephens naively, "he expressed the joint opinion of the commissioners; indeed, we had determined not to enter into any agreement that would require the Confederate arms to join in any invasion of Mexico."² But the rebel Vice-President fails to record why, under these circumstances, he had opened this useless branch of the discussion.

At this stage President Lincoln brought back the conversation pointedly to the original object of the conference:

He repeated that he could not entertain a proposition for an armistice on any terms while the great and vital question of reunion was undisposed of. That was the first question to be settled. He could enter into no treaty, convention, or stipulation, or agreement with the Confederate States, jointly or separately, upon that or any other subject, but upon the basis first settled that the Union was to be restored. Any such agreement, or stipulation, would be a *quasi* recognition of the States then in arms against the National Government, as a separate power. That he never could do.³

¹ Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., pp. 600-604.

² *Ibid.*, p. 608.

³ Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., p. 608.

This branch of the discussion [also reports Judge Campbell] was closed by Mr. Lincoln, who answered that it could not be entertained; that there could be no war without the consent of Congress, and no treaty without the consent of the Senate of the United States; that he could make no treaty with the Confederate States, because that would be a recognition of those States, and that this could not be done under any circumstances; that unless a settlement were made there would be danger that the quarrel would break out in the midst of the joint operations; that one party might unite with the common enemy to destroy the other; that he was determined to do nothing to suspend the operations for bringing the existing struggle to a close to attain any collateral end. Mr. Lincoln in this part of the conversation admitted that he had power to make a military convention, and that his arrangements under that might extend to settle several of the points mentioned, but others it could not.¹

The sophistical theory of secession as a conservative principle, and the filibustering bait of a joint expedition to steal Mexico under guise of enforcing the Monroe doctrine, being thus effectually cleared away, the discussion at length turned to the only reasonable inquiry which remained. Judge Campbell asked how restoration could be brought about if the Confederate States would consent, mentioning important questions, such as the disbandment of the army, confiscation acts on both sides, the effect of the Emancipation Proclamation, representation in Congress, the division of Virginia, and so on, which would inevitably arise and require immediate adjustment. On these various topics much conversation ensued, which, even as briefly reported, is too long to be quoted entire. It will be more useful to condense, under specific headings, the substantial declarations and offers which the commissioners report Mr. Lincoln to have made.

I. RECONSTRUCTION.—The shortest way the insurgents could effect this, he said, was “by disbanding their armies and permitting the national authorities to resume their functions.” Mr. Seward called attention to that phrase of his annual message where he had declared, “In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say that the war will cease on the part of the Government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it.” As to the rebel States being admitted to representation in Congress, “Mr. Lincoln very promptly replied that his own individual opinion was they ought to be. He also thought they would be; but he could not enter into any stipulation upon the subject. His own opinion was that when the resistance ceased and the national authority was recognized the States would be immediately restored to their practical relations to the Union.”

II. CONFISCATION ACTS.—“Mr. Lincoln said that so far as the confiscation acts and other penal acts were concerned, their enforcement was left entirely with him, and on that point he was perfectly willing to be full and explicit, and on his assurance perfect reliance might be placed. He should exercise the power of the Executive with the utmost liberality.”² “As to all questions,” says Judge Campbell’s report, “involving rights of property, the courts could determine them, and that Congress would no doubt be liberal in making restitution of confiscated property, or by indemnity, after the passions that had been excited by the war had been composed.”³

III. THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION.—“Mr. Lincoln said that was a judicial question. How the courts would decide it he did not know, and could give no answer. His own opinion was, that as the proclamation was a war measure, and would have effect only from its being an exercise of the war power, as soon as the war ceased it would be inoperative for the future. It would be held to apply only to such slaves as had come under its operation while it was in active exercise. This was his individual opinion, but the courts might decide the other way, and hold that it effectually emancipated all the slaves in the States to which it applied at the time. So far as he was concerned, he should leave it to the courts to decide. He never would change or modify the terms of the proclamation in the slightest particular.”

At another point in the conversation “He said it was not his intention in the beginning to interfere with slavery in the States; that he never would have done it if he had not been compelled by necessity to do it to maintain the Union; that the subject presented many difficult and perplexing questions to him; that he had hesitated for some time, and had resorted to this measure only when driven to it by public necessity; that he had been in favor of the General Government prohibiting the extension of slavery into the Territories, but did not think that that Government possessed power over the subject in the States, except as a war measure; and that he had always himself been in favor of emancipation, but not immediate emancipation, even by the States. Many evils attending this appeared to him.”

Recurring once more to the subject of emancipation, “He went on to say that he would be willing to be taxed to remunerate the South-

¹ Campbell in “Southern Magazine,” December, 1874, p. 191.

² Stephens, “War between the States,” Vol. II., pp. 609, 612, and 617.

³ Campbell in “Southern Magazine,” December, 1874, p. 192.

ern people for their slaves. He believed the people of the North were as responsible for slavery as the people of the South; and if the war should then cease, with the voluntary abolition of slavery by the States, he should be in favor, individually, of the Government paying a fair indemnity for the loss to the owners. He said he believed this feeling had an extensive existence at the North. He knew some who were in favor of an appropriation as high as four hundred millions of dollars for this purpose. I could mention persons, said he, whose names would astonish you, who are willing to do this if the war shall now cease without further expense, and with the abolition of slavery as stated. But on this subject, he said, he could give no assurance—enter into no stipulation. He barely expressed his own feelings and views, and what he believed to be the views of others upon the subject."

IV. THE DIVISION OF VIRGINIA.—"Mr. Lincoln said he could only give an individual opinion, which was, that Western Virginia would be continued to be recognized as a separate State in the Union."

V. THE XIIITH AMENDMENT.—Mr. Seward brought to the notice of the commissioners one topic which to them was new; namely, that only a few days before, on the 31ST of January, Congress had passed the XIIITH Amendment to the Constitution, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the States, would effect an immediate abolition of slavery throughout the entire Union. The reports of the commissioners represent Mr. Seward as saying that if the South would submit and agree to immediate restoration, the restored States might yet defeat the ratification of this amendment, intimating that Congress had passed it "under the predominance of revolutionary passion," which would abate on the cessation of the war. It may well be doubted whether Mr. Seward stated the case as strongly as the commissioners intimate, since he himself, like Mr. Lincoln and his entire cabinet, had favored the measure. It is probable that the commissioners allowed their own feelings and wishes to color too strongly the hypothesis he stated, and to interpret as a probability what he mentioned as only among the possible events of the future.

It will be seen that in what he said upon these various propositions Mr. Lincoln was always extremely careful to discriminate between what he was under the Constitution authorized to do as Executive, and what would devolve upon coördinate branches of the Government under their own powers and limitations. With the utmost circumspection he pointed out the distinctions between his personal opinions and wishes and his official authority. More especially, however, did he repeat and emphasize

the declaration that he would do none of the things mentioned or promised without a previous pledge of reunion and cessation of resistance. "Even in case the Confederate States should entertain the proposition of a return to the Union," says Mr. Stephens's narrative, "he persisted in asserting that he could not enter into any agreement upon this subject [reconstruction], or upon any other matters of that sort, with parties in arms against the Government." Mr. Hunter interposed, and in illustration of the propriety of the Executive entering into agreements with persons in arms against the acknowledged rightful public authority referred to repeated instances of this character between Charles I. of England and the people in arms against him. Mr. Lincoln in reply to this said: "I do not profess to be posted in history. On all such matters I will turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I. is that he lost his head." The pertinent retort reduced Mr. Hunter to his last rhetorical resource—a wail of protest, in the very worst tone of sectional egotism, that the Confederate States and their people were by these terms forced to unconditional surrender and submission. To this Mr. Seward replied with patience and dignity "That no words like unconditional submission had been used, or any importing or justly implying degradation, or humiliation even, to the people of the Confederate States. . . . Nor did he think that in yielding to the execution of the laws under the Constitution of the United States, with all its guarantees and securities for personal and political rights, as they might be declared to be by the courts, could be properly considered as unconditional submission to conquerors, or as having anything humiliating in it. The Southern people and the Southern States would be under the Constitution of the United States, with all their rights secured thereby, in the same way, and through the same instrumentalities, as the similar rights of the people of the other States were."

The reader will recall that in his last annual message President Lincoln declared his belief, based "on careful consideration of all the evidence accessible," that it was useless to attempt to negotiate with Jefferson Davis, but that the prospect would be better with his followers. Mr. Lincoln had evidently gone to Fort Monroe in hope of making some direct impression upon Stephens and Hunter, whom Grant represented as having such good intentions "to restore peace and union." He did not neglect to try this joint of the rebel commissioners' armor. Seizing the proper opportunity, he pressed upon Stephens the suggestion of separate State action to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Addressing him, he said:

If I resided in Georgia, with my present sentiments, I'll tell you what I would do if I were in your place. I would go home and get the governor of the State to call the legislature together, and get them to recall all the State troops from the war; elect senators and members to Congress, and ratify this constitutional amendment prospectively, so as to take effect — say in five years. Such a ratification would be valid, in my opinion. I have looked into the subject, and think such a prospective ratification would be valid. Whatever may have been the views of your people before the war, they must be convinced now that slavery is doomed. It cannot last long in any event, and the best course, it seems to me, for your public men to pursue would be to adopt such a policy as will avoid, as far as possible, the evils of immediate emancipation. This would be my course, if I were in your place.

The salutary advice was wasted. Mr. Stephens was a very incarnation of political paradoxes. Perhaps in all the South there was not another man whose personal desires were so moderate and correct, and whose political theories were so radical and wrong. At the beginning he had opposed secession as premature and foolish, war as desperate and ruinous; yet, against his better judgment, he had followed his "corner-stone" theory of slavery and his "supremacy" theory of States rights to the war and the ruin he foretold. Now, at the end of four years' experiment, he still clung obstinately to his new theory of secession as a "continental regulator," and the vain hope that Mr. Lincoln would yet adopt it. When at last the parties were separating, with friendly handshakings, he asked Mr. Lincoln to reconsider the plan of an armistice on the basis of a Mexican expedition. "Well, Stephens," replied Mr. Lincoln, "I will reconsider it; but I do not think my mind will change." And so ended the Hampton Roads conference.¹

The commissioners returned to Richmond in great disappointment, and communicated the failure of their efforts to Jefferson Davis, whose chagrin was as great as their own. They had all caught eagerly at the hope that this negotiation would somehow extricate them from the dilemmas and dangers whose crushing portent they realized, but had no power to

avert except by surrender; and now, when this last hope failed them, they were doubly cast down. Campbell says he "favored negotiations for peace"² — doubtless meaning by this language that he advocated the acceptance of the proffered terms. Stephens yet believed that Mr. Lincoln would be tempted by the Mexican scheme and would reconsider his decision. He therefore advised that the results of the meeting should be kept secret; and when the other commissioners and Davis refused to follow this advice, he gave up the Confederate cause as hopeless, withdrew from Richmond, abandoned the rebellion, and went into retirement.³ His signature to the brief public report of the commissioners stating the result of the Hampton Roads conference was his last participation in the ill-starred enterprise.

Davis took the only course open to him after refusing the honorable peace which Mr. Lincoln had tendered. He transmitted the commissioners' report to the rebel Congress with a brief and dry message, stating that the enemy refused any terms except those the conqueror may grant; and then arranged as vigorous an effort as the circumstances permitted, once more to "fire the Southern heart." A public meeting was called, and on the evening of February 6 Jefferson Davis and others made speeches at the African Church,⁴ which, judging from the meager reports that were printed, were as denunciatory and bellicose as the bitterest Confederate could have wished. Davis, particularly, is represented to have excelled himself in that lurid flow of partisan passion and vaunting prophecy which he so effectively used upon Southern listeners for many years. "Sooner than we should ever be united again," he said, "he would be willing to yield up everything he had on earth — if it were possible he would sacrifice a thousand lives"; and further announced his confidence that they would yet "compel the Yankees, in less than twelve months, to petition us for peace on our own terms."⁵ He denounced President Lincoln as "His Majesty Abraham the First," and said "before the campaign was over he

aters, and swelled the eloquence of this last grand appeal to the people and armies of the South. . . . It was an extraordinary day in Richmond; vast crowds huddled around the stands of the speakers or lined the streets; and the air was vocal with the efforts of the orator and the responses of his audience. It appeared indeed that the blood of the people had again been kindled. But it was only the sickly glare of an expiring flame; there was no steadiness in the excitement; there was no virtue in the huzzas; the inspiration ended with the voices and ceremonies that invoked it; and it was found that the spirit of the people of the Confederacy was too weak, too much broken, to react with effect or assume the position of erect and desperate defiance." [Pollard, "The Lost Cause," pp. 684, 685.]

⁵ "Richmond Dispatch," Feb. 7, 1865.

¹ Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., pp. 610-618.

² Campbell, "Recollections," etc. Pamphlet.

³ Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., pp. 224-226.

⁴ This meeting at the African Church was supplemented, a few days later, by a grand concerted effort at public speech-making at different places in Richmond, intended to electrify the South. Pollard, the Southern historian, thus describes it: "All business was suspended in Richmond; at high noon processions were formed to the different places of meeting; and no less than twenty different orators, composed of the most effective speakers in Congress and the cabinet, and the most eloquent divines of Richmond, took their stands in the halls of legislation, in the churches and the the-

and Seward might find 'they had been speaking to their masters.'"¹

This extravagance of impotent anger, this rage of baffled ambition, would seem merely pitifully grotesque were it not rendered ghastly by the reflection that it was the signal which carried many additional thousands of brave soldiers to bloody graves in continuing a palpably hopeless military struggle.

THE XIIIITH AMENDMENT.

WE have enumerated with some detail the series of radical antislavery measures enacted at the second session of the Thirty-seventh Congress, which ended July 17, 1862—the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia; the prohibition of slavery in the national Territories; the practical repeal of the fugitive slave law; and the sweeping measures of confiscation which in different forms decreed forfeiture of slave property for the crimes of treason and rebellion. When this wholesale legislation was supplemented by the President's preliminary Emancipation Proclamation of September 22, 1862, and his final edict of freedom of January 1, 1863, the institution had clearly received its *coup de grâce* in all except the loyal border States. Consequently the third session of the Thirty-seventh Congress ending March 4, 1863, occupied itself with this phase of the slavery question only to the extent of an effort to put into operation the President's plan of compensated abolishment. That effort took practical shape in a bill to give the State of Missouri fifteen millions on condition that she would emancipate her slaves; but the proposition failed, largely through the opposition of a few conservative members from Missouri, and the session adjourned without having by its legislation advanced the destruction of slavery.

When Congress met again in December, 1863, and organized by the election of Schuyler Colfax of Indiana as Speaker, the whole situation had undergone further change. The Union arms had been triumphant—Gettysburg had been won and Vicksburg had capitulated; Lincoln's edict of freedom had become an accepted fact; fifty regiments of negro soldiers carried bayonets in the Union armies; Vandalism had been beaten for governor in Ohio by a hundred thousand majority; the draft had been successfully enforced in every district of every loyal State in the Union. Under these brightening prospects, military and political, the more progressive spirits in Con-

gress took up anew the suspended battle with slavery which the institution had itself invited by its unprovoked assault on the life of the Government.

The President's reference to the subject in his annual message was very brief:

The movements [said he] by State action for emancipation in several of the States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation are matters of profound gratulation. And while I do not repeat in detail what I have heretofore so earnestly urged upon this subject, my general views and feelings remain unchanged; and I trust that Congress will omit no fair opportunity of aiding these important steps to a great consummation.²

His language had reference to Maryland, where during the autumn of 1863 the question of emancipation had been actively discussed by political parties, and where at the election of November 4, 1863, a legislature had been chosen containing a considerable majority pledged to emancipation.

More especially did it refer to Missouri, where, notwithstanding the failure of the fifteen-million compensation bill at the previous session, a State convention had actually passed an ordinance of emancipation, though with such limitations as rendered it unacceptable to the more advanced public opinion of the State. Prudence was the very essence of Mr. Lincoln's statesmanship, and he doubtless felt it was not safe for the Executive to venture farther at that time. "We are like whalers," he said to Governor Morgan one day, "who have been on a long chase: we have at last got the harpoon into the monster, but we must now look how we steer, or with one 'flop' of his tail he will yet send us all into eternity."³

Senators and members of the House, especially those representing antislavery States or districts, did not need to be so circumspect. It was doubtless with this consciousness that J. M. Ashley, a Republican representative from Ohio, and James F. Wilson, a Republican representative from Iowa, on the 14th of December, 1863,—that being the earliest opportunity after the House was organized,—introduced, the former a bill and the latter a joint resolution to propose to the several States an amendment of the Constitution prohibiting slavery throughout the United States. Both the propositions were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, of which Mr. Wilson was chairman; but before he made any report on the subject it had been brought before the Senate, where its discussion attracted marked public attention.

Senator John B. Henderson, who with rare courage and skill had, as a progressive conservative, made himself one of the leading champions of Missouri emancipation, on the 11th of January, 1864, introduced into the

¹ Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 411.

² Message, Dec. 8, 1863.

³ Carpenter in Raymond, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," p. 752.

Senate a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution that slavery shall not exist in the United States.¹ It is not probable that either he or the Senate saw any near hope of success in such a measure. The resolution went to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, where it caused some discussion, but apparently without being treated as a matter of pressing importance. Nearly a month had elapsed when Mr. Sumner also introduced a joint resolution, proposing an amendment that "Everywhere within the limits of the United States, and of each State or Territory thereof, all persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave."² He asked its reference to the select committee on slavery, of which he was chairman; but several senators argued that such an amendment properly belonged to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in this reference Mr. Sumner finally acquiesced. It is possible that this slight and courteously worded rivalry between the two committees induced earlier action than would otherwise have happened, for two days later — February 10 — Mr. Trumbull, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, reported back a substitute in the following language, differing from the phraseology of both Mr. Sumner and Mr. Henderson :

ARTICLE XIII.

SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

SECT. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.³

Even after the Committee on the Judiciary by this report had adopted the measure, it was evidently thought to be merely in an experimental or trial stage, for more than six weeks elapsed before the Senate again took it up for action. On the 28th of March, however, Mr. Trumbull formally opened debate upon it in an elaborate speech. The discussion was continued from time to time until April 8. As the Republicans had almost unanimous control of the Senate, their speeches, though able and eloquent, seemed perfunctory and devoted to a foregone conclusion. Those which attracted most attention were the arguments of Reverdy Johnson of Maryland and Mr. Henderson of Missouri,—senators representing slave States,—advocating the amendment. Senator Sumner, whose pride of

erudition amounted almost to vanity, pleaded earnestly for his phrase, "All persons are equal before the law," copied from the Constitution of revolutionary France. But Mr. Howard of Michigan, one of the soundest lawyers and clearest thinkers of the Senate, pointed out the inapplicability of the words, and declared it safer to follow the Ordinance of 1787, with its historical associations and its well-adjudicated meaning.

There was, of course, from the first no doubt whatever that the Senate would pass the constitutional amendment, the political classification of that body being thirty-six Republicans, five Conditional Unionists, and nine Democrats. Not only was the whole Republican strength, thirty-six votes, cast in its favor, but two Democrats,—Reverdy Johnson of Maryland and James W. Nesmith of Oregon,—with a political wisdom far in advance of their party, also voted for it, giving more than the two-thirds required by the Constitution.

When, however, the joint resolution went to the House of Representatives there was such a formidable party strength arrayed against it as to foreshadow its failure. The party classification of the House stood one hundred and two Republicans, seventy-five Democrats, and nine from the border States, leaving but little chance of obtaining the required two-thirds in favor of the measure. Nevertheless there was sufficient Republican strength to secure its discussion; and when it came up on the 31st of May the first vote showed seventy-six to fifty-five against rejecting the joint resolution.

We may infer that the conviction of the present hopelessness of the measure greatly shortened the debate upon it. The question occupied the House only on three different days — the 31st of May, when it was taken up, and the 14th and 15th of June. The speeches in opposition all came from Democrats; the speeches in its favor all came from Republicans, except one. From its adoption the former predicted the direst evils to the Constitution and the Republic; the latter the most beneficial results in the restoration of the country to peace and the fulfillment of the high destiny intended for it by its founders. Upon the final question of its passage the vote stood: yeas, ninety-three; nays, sixty-five; absent or not voting, twenty-three. Of those voting in favor of the resolution eighty-seven were Republicans and four were Democrats.⁴ Those voting against it were all Democrats. The resolution, not having secured a two-thirds vote, was

¹ Henry Wilson, "Antislavery Measures in Congress," p. 251.

² "Globe," Feb. 8, 1864, p. 521.

³ "Globe," March 28, 1864, p. 1313.

⁴ The Democrats voting for the joint resolution

were Moses F. Odell and John A. Griswold of New York, Joseph Baily of Pennsylvania, and Ezra Wheeler of Wisconsin, the latter having also made the only speech in its favor from the Democratic side.

thus lost; seeing which Mr. Ashley, Republican, who had the measure in charge, changed his vote so that he might, if occasion arose, move its reconsideration.

The ever-vigilant public opinion of the loyal States, intensified by the burdens and anxieties of the war, took up this far-reaching question of abolishing slavery by constitutional amendment with an interest fully as deep as that manifested by Congress. Before the joint resolution had failed in the House of Representatives the issue was already transferred to discussion and prospective decision in a new forum.

When on the 7th of June, 1864, the National Republican Convention met in Baltimore, the two most vital thoughts which animated its members were the renomination of Mr. Lincoln and the success of the constitutional amendment. The first was recognized as a popular decision needing only the formality of an announcement by the convention; and the full emphasis of speech and resolution was therefore centered on the latter, as the dominant and aggressive reform upon which the party would stake its political fortunes in the coming campaign.

It is not among the least of the evidences of President Lincoln's political sagacity and political courage that it was he himself who supplied the spark that fired this train of popular action. The editor of the "New York Independent," who attended the convention, and who with others visited Mr. Lincoln immediately after the nomination, printed the following in his paper of June 16, 1864: "When one of us mentioned the great enthusiasm at the convention, after Senator E. D. Morgan's proposition to amend the Constitution, abolishing slavery, Mr. Lincoln instantly said, 'It was I who suggested to Mr. Morgan that he should put that idea into his opening speech.'" The declaration of Morgan, who was chairman of the National Republican Committee, and as such called the convention to order, immediately found an echo in the speech of the temporary chairman, the Rev. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge. The indorsement of the principle by the eminent Kentucky divine, not on the ground of party, but on the high philosophy of true universal government and of genuine Christian religion, gave the announcement an interest and significance accorded to few planks in party platforms. Permanent chairman Dennison reaffirmed the doctrine of Morgan and Breckinridge, and the thunderous applause of the whole convention greeted the formal proclamation of the new dogma of political faith in the third resolution of the platform:

Resolved, That as slavery was the cause and now constitutes the strength of this rebellion, and as it must be always and everywhere hostile to the prin-

ciples of republican government, justice and the national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the Republic; and that while we uphold and maintain the acts and proclamations by which the Government in its own defense has aimed a death blow at this gigantic evil, we are in favor, furthermore, of such an amendment to the Constitution, to be made by the people, in conformity with its provisions, as shall terminate and forever prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits or the jurisdiction of the United States.

We have related elsewhere how upon this and the other declarations of the platform the Republican party went to battle and gained an overwhelming victory—a popular majority of 411,281, an electoral majority of 191, and a House of Representatives of 138 Unionists to 35 Democrats. In view of this result the President was able to take up the question with confidence among his official recommendations; and in the annual message which he transmitted to Congress on the 6th of December, 1864, he urged upon the members whose terms were about to expire the propriety of at once carrying into effect the clearly expressed popular will. Said he:

At the last session of Congress a proposed amendment of the Constitution, abolishing slavery throughout the United States, passed the Senate, but failed, for lack of the requisite two-thirds vote, in the House of Representatives. Although the present is the same Congress, and nearly the same members, and without questioning the wisdom or patriotism of those who stood in opposition, I venture to recommend the reconsideration and passage of the measure at the present session. Of course the abstract question is not changed; but an intervening election shows, almost certainly, that the next Congress will pass the measure if this does not. Hence there is only a question of *time* as to when the proposed amendment will go to the States for their action. And as it is to go to all the States, may we not agree that the sooner the better? It is not claimed that the election has imposed a duty on members to change their views or their votes any further than, as an additional element to be considered, their judgment may be affected by it. It is the voice of the people, now for the first time heard upon the question. In a great national crisis like ours unanimity of action among those seeking a common end is very desirable—almost indispensable. And yet no approach to unanimity is attainable unless some deference shall be paid to the will of the majority, simply because it is the will of the majority. In this case the common end is the maintenance of the Union; and, among the means to secure that end, such will, through the election, is most clearly declared in favor of such constitutional amendment.¹

On the 15th of December Mr. Ashley gave notice that he would on the 6th of January, 1865, call up the constitutional amendment for reconsideration;² and accordingly on the

¹ Lincoln, Annual Message, Dec. 6, 1864.

² "Globe, Dec. 15, 1864, p. 53.

day appointed he opened the new debate upon it in an earnest speech. General discussion followed from time to time, occupying perhaps half the days of the month of January. As at the previous session, the Republicans all favored, while the Democrats mainly opposed it, but the important exceptions among the latter showed what immense gains the proposition had made in popular opinion and in congressional willingness to recognize and embody it. The logic of events had become more powerful than party creed or strategy. For fifteen years the Democratic party had stood as sentinel and bulwark to slavery; and yet, despite its alliance and championship, the peculiar institution was being consumed like dry leaves in the fire of war. For a whole decade it had been defeated in every great contest of congressional debate and legislation. It had withered in popular elections, been paralyzed by confiscation laws, crushed by Executive decrees, trampled upon by marching Union armies. More notable than all, the agony of dissolution had come upon it in its final stronghold—the constitutions of the slave States. Local public opinion had throttled it in West Virginia, in Missouri, in Arkansas, in Louisiana, in Maryland; and the same spirit of change was upon Tennessee, and even showing itself in Kentucky. Here was a great revolution of ideas, a mighty sweep of sentiment, which could not be explained away by the stale charge of sectional fanaticism, or by alleging technical irregularities of political procedure. Here was a mighty flood of public opinion, overleaping old barriers and rushing into new channels. The Democratic party did not and could not shut its eyes to the accomplished facts. "In my judgment," said Mr. Holman of Indiana, "the fate of slavery is sealed. It dies by the rebellious hand of its votaries, untouched by the law. Its fate is determined by the war; by the measures of the war; by the results of the war. These, sir, must determine it, even if the Constitution were amended."¹ He opposed the amendment, he declared, simply because it was unnecessary. Though few other Democrats were so frank, all their speeches were weighed down by the same consciousness of a losing fight, a hopeless cause. The Democratic leader of the House, and lately defeated Democratic candidate for Vice-President, Mr. Pendleton, opposed the amendment, as he had done at the previous session, by asserting that three-fourths of the States did not possess constitutional power to pass it, this being—if the paradox be excused—at the same time the weakest and the strongest argument: weakest, because the Constitution in terms contradicted the assertion; strongest, because under the circumstances nothing less than unconstitutionality could jus-

tify opposition. But while the Democrats as a party thus persisted in a false attitude, more progressive members had the courage to take independent and wiser action. Not only did the four Democrats—Moses F. Odell and John A. Griswold, of New York; Joseph Baily, of Pennsylvania; and Ezra Wheeler, of Wisconsin—who supported the amendment at the first session again record their votes in its favor, but they were now joined by thirteen others of their party associates, namely: Augustus C. Baldwin, of Michigan; Alexander H. Coffroth and Archibald McAllister, of Pennsylvania; James E. English, of Connecticut; John Ganson, Anson Herrick, Homer A. Nelson, William Radford, and John B. Steele, of New York; Wells A. Hutchins, of Ohio; Austin A. King and James S. Rollins, of Missouri; and George H. Yeaman, of Kentucky; and by their help the favorable two-thirds vote was secured. But special credit for the result must not be accorded to these alone. Even more than of Northern Democrats must be recognized the courage and progressive liberality of members from the border slave States—one from Delaware, four from Maryland, three from West Virginia, four from Kentucky, and seven from Missouri, whose speeches and votes aided the consummation of the great act; and, finally, something is due to those Democrats, eight in number, who were absent without pairs, and thus, perhaps not altogether by accident, reduced somewhat the two-thirds vote necessary to the passage of the joint resolution.

Mingled with these influences of a public and moral nature it is not unlikely that others of more selfish interest, operating both for and against the amendment, were not entirely wanting. One, who was a member of the House, writes:

The success of the measure had been considered very doubtful, and depended upon certain negotiations the result of which was not fully assured, and the particulars of which never reached the public.²

So also one of the President's secretaries wrote on the 18th of January:

I went to the President this afternoon at the request of Mr. Ashley, on a matter connecting itself with the pending amendment of the Constitution. The Camden and Amboy railroad interest promised Mr. Ashley that if he would help postpone the Raritan railroad bill over this session they would in return make the New Jersey Democrats help about the amendment, either by their votes or absence. Sumner being the Senate champion of the Raritan bill, Ashley went to him to ask him to drop it for this session. Sumner, however, showed reluctance to adopt Mr. Ashley's suggestion, saying that he hoped the amendment would pass anyhow,

¹ "Globe," Jan. 11, 1865, p. 219.

² George W. Julian, "Political Recollections," p. 250.

etc. Ashley thought he discerned in Sumner's manner two reasons: (1) That if the present Senate resolution were not adopted by the House, the Senate would send them another in which they would most likely adopt Sumner's own phraseology and thereby gratify his ambition; and (2) that Sumner thinks the defeat of the Camden and Amboy monopoly would establish a principle by legislative enactment which would effectually crush out the last lingering relics of the States rights dogma. Ashley therefore desired the President to send for Sumner, and urge him to be practical and secure the passage of the amendment in the manner suggested by Mr. Ashley. I stated these points to the President, who replied at once: "I can do nothing with Mr. Sumner in these matters. While Mr. Sumner is very cordial with me, he is making his history in an issue with me on this very point. He hopes to succeed in beating the President so as to change this Government from its original form and make it a strong centralized power." Then calling Mr. Ashley into the room, the President said to him, "I think I understand Mr. Sumner; and I think he would be all the more resolute in his persistence on the points which Mr. Nicolay has mentioned to me if he supposed I were at all watching his course on this matter."¹

The issue was decided in the afternoon of the 31st of January, 1865. The scene was one of unusual interest. The galleries were filled to overflowing; the members watched the proceedings with unconcealed solicitude. "Up to noon," said a contemporaneous formal report, "the pro-slavery party are said to have been confident of defeating the amendment, and after that time had passed, one of the most earnest advocates of the measure said, 'T is the toss of a copper.'"² There were the usual pleas for postponement and for permission to offer amendments or substitutes, but at four o'clock the House came to a final vote, and the roll-call showed, yeas, 119; nays, 56; not voting, 8. Scattering murmurs of applause had followed the announcement of affirmative votes from several of the Democratic members. This was renewed when by direction of the Speaker the clerk called his name and he voted aye. But when the Speaker finally announced, "The constitutional majority of two-thirds having voted in the affirmative, the joint resolution is passed," "the announcement" — so continues the official report printed in the "Globe" — "was received by the House and by the spectators with an outburst of enthusiasm. The members on the Republican side of the House instantly sprung to their feet, and, regardless of parliamentary rules, applauded with cheers and clapping of hands. The example was followed by the male spectators in the gal-

leries, which were crowded to excess, who waved their hats and cheered loud and long, while the ladies, hundreds of whom were present, rose in their seats and waved their handkerchiefs, participating in and adding to the general excitement and intense interest of the scene. This lasted for several minutes."³ "In honor of this immortal and sublime event," cried Mr. Ingersoll of Illinois, "I move that the House do now adjourn," and against the objection of a Maryland Democrat the motion was carried by a yea and nay vote. A salute of one hundred guns soon made the occasion the subject of comment and congratulation throughout the city. On the following night a considerable procession marched with music to the Executive Mansion to carry popular greetings to the President. In response to their calls, Mr. Lincoln appeared at a window and made a brief speech, of which only an abstract report was preserved, but which is nevertheless important as showing the searching analysis of cause and effect which this question had undergone in his mind, the deep interest he felt, and the far-reaching consequences he attached to the measure and its success.

He supposed [he said] the passage through Congress of the constitutional amendment for the abolishment of slavery throughout the United States was the occasion to which he was indebted for the honor of this call. The occasion was one of congratulation to the country and to the whole world. But there is a task yet before us—to go forward and have consummated by the votes of the States that which Congress had so nobly begun yesterday. He had the honor to inform those present that Illinois had to-day already done the work. Maryland was about half through, but he felt proud that Illinois was a little ahead. He thought this measure was a very fitting if not an indispensable adjunct to the winding up of the great difficulty. He wished the reunion of all the States perfected, and so effected as to remove all causes of disturbance in the future; and to attain this end, it was necessary that the original disturbing cause should, if possible, be rooted out. He thought all would bear him witness that he had never shrunk from doing all that he could to eradicate slavery, by issuing an Emancipation Proclamation. But that proclamation falls far short of what the amendment will be when fully consummated. A question might be raised whether the proclamation was legally valid. It might be urged, that it only aided those that came into our lines, and that it was inoperative as to those who did not give themselves up; or that it would have no effect upon the children of slaves born hereafter; in fact, it would be urged that it did not meet the evil. But this amendment is a king's cure-all for all the evils. It winds the whole thing up. He would repeat, that it was the fitting if not the indispensable adjunct to the consummation of the great game we are playing. He could not but congratulate all present — himself, the country, and the whole world — upon this great moral victory.

¹ J. G. N., "Personal Memoranda." MS.

² Report of Special Committee of the Union League Club of New York. Pamphlet.

³ "Globe," Jan. 31, 1865, p. 531.

WAR DIARY OF A UNION WOMAN IN THE SOUTH.

EDITED BY G. W. CABLE.

[The following diary was originally written in lead pencil and in a book the leaves of which were too soft to take ink legibly. I have it direct from the hands of its writer, a lady whom I have had the honor to know for nearly thirty years. For good reasons the author's name is omitted, and the initials of people and the names of places are sometimes fictitiously given. Many of the persons mentioned were my own acquaintances and friends. When some twenty years afterwards she first resolved to publish it, she brought me a clear, complete copy in ink. It had cost much trouble, she said, for much of the pencil writing had been made under such disadvantages and was so faint that at times she could decipher it only under direct sunlight. She had succeeded, however, in making a copy, *verbatim* except for occasional improvement in the grammatical form of a sentence, or now and then the omission, for brevity's sake, of something unessential. The narrative has since been severely abridged to bring it within magazine limits.

In reading this diary one is much charmed with its constant understatement of romantic and perilous incidents and conditions. But the original penciled pages show that, even in copying, the strong bent of the writer to be brief has often led to the exclusion of facts that enhance the interest of exciting situations, and sometimes the omission robs her own heroism of due emphasis. I have restored one example of this in a footnote following the perilous voyage down the Mississippi.—G. W. CABLE.]

I.

SECESSION.

New Orleans, Dec. 1, 1860.—I understand it now. Keeping journals is for those who can not, or dare not, speak out. So I shall set up a journal, being only a rather lonely young girl in a very small and hated minority. On my return here in November, after a foreign voyage and absence of many months, I found myself behind in knowledge of the political conflict, but heard the dread sounds of disunion and war muttered in threatening tones. Surely no native-born woman loves her country better than I love America. The blood of one of its revolutionary patriots flows in my veins, and it is the Union for which he pledged his "life, fortune, and sacred honor" that I love, not any divided or special section of it. So I have been reading attentively and seeking light from foreigners and natives on all questions at issue. Living from birth in slave countries, both foreign and American, and passing through one slave insurrection in early childhood, the saddest and also the pleasantest features of slavery have been familiar. If the South goes to war for slavery, slavery is doomed in this country. To say so is like opposing one drop to a roaring torrent.

Sunday, Dec. —, 1860.—In this season for peace I had hoped for a lull in the excitement, yet this day has been full of bitterness. "Come, G.," said Mrs. — at breakfast, "leave *your* church for to-day and come with us to hear Dr. — on the situation. He will convince you." "It is good to be convinced," I said; "I will go." The church was crowded to suf-

focation with the élite of New Orleans. The preacher's text was, "Shall we have fellowship with the stool of iniquity which frameth mischief as a law?" . . . The sermon was over at last and then followed a prayer. . . . Forever blessed be the fathers of the Episcopal Church for giving us a fixed liturgy! When we met at dinner Mrs. F. exclaimed, "Now G., you heard him prove from the Bible that slavery is right and that therefore secession is. Were you not convinced?" I said, "I was so busy thinking how completely it proved too that Brigham Young is right about polygamy that it quite weakened the force of the argument for me." This raised a laugh, and covered my retreat.

Jan. 26, 1861.—The solemn boom of cannon to-day announced that the convention have passed the ordinance of secession. We must take a reef in our patriotism and narrow it down to State limits. Mine still sticks out all around the borders of the State. It will be bad if New Orleans should secede from Louisiana and set up for herself. Then indeed I would be "cabined, cribbed, confined." The faces in the house are jubilant to-day. Why is it so easy for them and not for me to "ring out the old, ring in the new"? I am out of place.

Jan. 28, Monday.—Sunday has now got to be a day of special excitement. The gentlemen save all the sensational papers to regale us with at the late Sunday breakfast. Rob opened the battle yesterday morning by saying to me in his most aggressive manner, "G., I believe these are your sentiments"; and then he read aloud an article from the "Journal des Debats" expressing in rather contemptuous terms the fact that France will follow the policy of non-

intervention. When I answered: "Well, what do you expect? This is not their quarrel," he raved at me, ending by a declaration that he would willingly pay my passage to foreign parts if I would like to go. "Rob," said his father, "keep cool: don't let that threat excite you. Cotton is king. Just wait till they feel the pinch a little; their tone will change." I went to Trinity Church. Some Union people who are not Episcopalians go there now because the pastor has not so much chance to rail at the Lord when things are not going to suit; but yesterday was a marked Sunday. The usual prayer for the President and Congress was changed to the "governor and people of this commonwealth and their representatives in convention assembled."

The city was very lively and noisy this evening with rockets and lights in honor of secession. Mrs. F., in common with the neighbors, illuminated. We walked out to see the houses of others gleaming amid the dark shrubbery like a fairy scene. The perfect stillness added to the effect, while the moon rose slowly with calm splendor. We hastened home to dress for a soirée, but on the stairs Edith said, "G., first come and help me dress Phoebe and Chloe (the negro servants). There is a ball to-night in aristocratic colored society. This is Chloe's first introduction to New Orleans circles, and Henry Judson, Phoebe's husband, gave five dollars for a ticket for her." Chloe is a recent purchase from Georgia. We superintended their very stylish toilets, and Edith said, "G., run into your room, please, and write a pass for Henry. Put Mr. D.'s name to it." "Why, Henry is free," I said. "That makes no difference; all colored people must have a pass if out late. They choose a master for protection and always carry his pass. Henry chose Mr. D., but he's lost the pass he had."

II.

THE VOLUNTEERS.—FORT SUMTER.

Feb. 24, 1861.—The toil of the week is ended. Nearly a month has passed since I wrote here. Events have crowded upon one another. On the 4th the cannon boomed in honor of Jefferson Davis's election, and day before yesterday Washington's Birthday was made the occasion of another grand display and illumination, in honor of the birth of a new nation and the breaking of that Union which he labored to cement. We drove to the race-course to see the review of troops. A flag was presented to the Washington Artillery by ladies. Senator Judah Benjamin made an impassioned speech. The banner was orange satin on one side, crimson silk on the other, the pelican and brood embroidered in pale green and gold.

Silver crossed cannon surmounted it, orange-colored fringe surrounded it, and crimson tassels drooped from it. It was a brilliant, unreal scene; with military bands clashing triumphant music, elegant vehicles, high-stepping horses, and lovely women richly apparelled.

Wedding cards have been pouring in till the contagion has reached us; Edith will be married next Thursday. The wedding dress is being fashioned, and the bridesmaids and groomsmen have arrived. Edith has requested me to be special mistress of ceremonies on Thursday evening, and I have told this terrible little rebel, who talks nothing but blood and thunder, yet faints at the sight of a worm, that if I fill that office no one shall mention war or politics during the whole evening, on pain of expulsion.

March 10, 1861.—The excitement in this house has risen to fever heat during the past week. The four gentlemen have each a different plan for saving the country, and now that the bridal bouquets have faded, the three ladies have again turned to public affairs; Lincoln's inauguration and the story of the disguise in which he traveled to Washington is a never-ending source of gossip. The family board being the common forum, each gentleman as he appears first unloads his pockets of papers from all the Southern States, and then his overflowing heart to his eager female listeners, who in turn relate, inquire, sympathize, or cheer. If I dare express a doubt that the path to victory will be a flowery one, eyes flash, cheeks burn, and tongues clatter, till all are checked up suddenly by a warning rap for "Order, order!" from the amiable lady presiding. Thus we swallow politics with every meal. We take a mouthful and read a telegram, one eye on table, the other on the paper. One must be made of cool stuff to keep calm and collected, but I say but little. This war fever has banished small talk. Through all the black servants move about quietly, never seeming to notice that this is all about them.

"How can you speak so plainly before them?" I say.

"Why, what matter? They know that we shall keep the whip-handle."

April 13, 1861.—More than a month has passed since the last date here. This afternoon I was seated on the floor covered with loveliest flowers, arranging a floral offering for the fair, when the gentlemen arrived and with papers bearing news of the fall of Fort Sumter, which, at her request, I read to Mrs. F.

April 20.—The last few days have glided away in a halo of beauty. But nobody has time or will to enjoy it. War, war! is the one idea. The children play only with toy cannons and soldiers; the oldest inhabitant goes by every

day with his rifle to practice; the public squares are full of companies drilling, and are now the fashionable resorts. We have been told that it is best for women to learn how to shoot too, so as to protect themselves when the men have all gone to battle. Every evening after dinner we adjourn to the back lot and fire at a target with pistols. Yesterday I dined at Uncle Ralph's. Some members of the bar were present and were jubilant about their brand-new Confederacy. It would soon be the grandest government ever known. Uncle Ralph said solemnly, "No, gentlemen; the day we seceded the star of our glory set." The words sunk into my mind like a knell, and made me wonder at the mind that could recognize that and yet adhere to the doctrine of secession.

In the evening I attended a farewell gathering at a friend's whose brothers are to leave this week for Richmond. There was music. No minor chord was permitted.

III.

TRIBULATION.

April 25.—Yesterday I went with Cousin E. to have her picture taken. The picture-galleries are doing a thriving business. Many companies are ordered off to take possession of Fort Pickens (Florida), and all seem to be leaving sweethearts behind them. The crowd was in high spirits; they don't dream that any destinies will be spoiled. When I got home Edith was reading from the daily paper of the dismissal of Miss G. from her place as teacher for expressing abolition sentiments, and that she would be ordered to leave the city. Soon a lady came with a paper setting forth that she has established a "company"—we are nothing if not military — for making lint and getting stores of linen to supply the hospitals.

My name went down. If it had n't, my spirit would have been wounded as with sharp spears before night. Next came a little girl with a subscription paper to get a flag for a certain company. The little girls, especially the pretty ones, are kept busy trotting around with subscription lists. Latest of all came little Guy, Mr. F.'s youngest clerk, the pet of the firm as well as of his home, a mere boy of sixteen. Such senseless sacrifices seem a sin. He chattered brightly, but lingered about, saying good-bye. He got through it bravely until Edith's husband incautiously said, "You did n't kiss your little sweetheart," as he always called Ellie, who had been allowed to sit up. He turned and suddenly broke into agonizing sobs and then ran down the steps.

May 10.—I am tired and ashamed of myself. Last week I attended a meeting of the

lint society to hand in the small contribution of linen I had been able to gather. We scraped lint till it was dark. A paper was shown, entitled the "Volunteer's Friend," started by the girls of the high school, and I was asked to help the girls with it. I positively declined. To-day I was pressed into service to make red flannel cartridge-bags for ten-inch columbiads. I basted while Mrs. S. sewed, and I felt ashamed to think that I had not the moral courage to say, "I don't approve of your war and won't help you, particularly in the murderous part of it."

May 27.—This has been a scenic Sabbath. Various companies about to depart for Virginia occupied the prominent churches to have their flags consecrated. The streets were resonant with the clangor of drums and trumpets. E. and myself went to Christ Church because the Washington Artillery were to be there.

June 13.—To-day has been appointed a Fast Day. I spent the morning writing a letter on which I put my first Confederate postage-stamp. It is of a brown color and has a large 5 in the center. To-morrow must be devoted to all my foreign correspondents before the expected blockade cuts us off.

June 29.—I attended a fine luncheon yesterday at one of the public schools. A lady remarked to a school official that the cost of provisions in the Confederacy was getting very high, butter, especially, being scarce and costly. "Never fear, my dear madam," he replied. "Texas alone can furnish butter enough to supply the whole Confederacy; we'll soon be getting it from there." It's just as well to have this sublime confidence.

July 15.—The quiet of midsummer reigns, but ripples of excitement break around us as the papers tell of skirmishes and attacks here and there in Virginia. "Rich Mountain" and "Carrick's Ford" were the last. "You see," said Mrs. D. at breakfast to-day, "my prophecy is coming true that Virginia will be the seat of war." "Indeed," I burst out, forgetting my resolution not to argue, "you may think yourselves lucky if this war turns out to have any seat in particular."

So far, no one especially connected with me has gone to fight. How glad I am for his mother's sake that Rob's lameness will keep him at home. Mr. F., Mr. S., and Uncle Ralph are beyond the age for active service, and Edith says Mr. D. can't go now. She is very enthusiastic about other people's husbands being enrolled, and regrets that her Alex is not strong enough to defend his country and his rights.

July 22.—What a day! I feel like one who has been out in a high wind, and cannot get my breath. The news-boys are still shouting with their extras, "Battlè of Bull's Run!

List of the killed! Battle of Manassas! List of the wounded!" Tender-hearted Mrs. F. was sobbing so she could not serve the tea; but nobody cared for tea. "O G.!" she said, "three thousand of our own, dear Southern boys are lying out there." "My dear Fannie," spoke Mr. F., "they are heroes now. They died in a glorious cause, and it is not in vain. This will end it. The sacrifice had to be made, but those killed have gained immortal names." Then Rob rushed in with a new extra, reading of the spoils captured, and grief was forgotten. Words cannot paint the excitement. Rob capered about and cheered; Edith danced around ringing the dinner bell and shouting, "Victory!" Mrs. F. waved a small Confederate flag, while she wiped her eyes, and Mr. D. hastened to the piano and in his most brilliant style struck up "Dixie," followed by "My Maryland" and the "Bonnie Blue Flag."

"Do not look so gloomy, G.," whispered Mr. S. "You should be happy to-night; for, as Mr. F. says, now we shall have peace."

"And is that the way you think of the men of your own blood and race?" I replied. But an utter scorn came over me and choked me, and I walked out of the room. What proof is there in this dark hour that they are not right? Only the emphatic answer of my own soul. To-morrow I will pack my trunk and accept the invitation to visit at Uncle Ralph's country-house.

Sept. 25.—When I opened the door of Mrs. F.'s room on my return, the rattle of two sewing-machines and a blaze of color met me.

"Ah! G., you are just in time to help us; these are coats for Jeff Thompson's men. All the cloth in the city is exhausted; these flannel-lined oilcloth table-covers are all we could obtain to make overcoats for Thompson's poor boys. They will be very warm and serviceable."

"Serviceable, yes! The Federal army will fly when they see those coats! I only wish I could be with the regiment when these are shared around." Yet I helped make them.

Seriously, I wonder if any soldiers will ever wear these remarkable coats. The most bewildering combination of brilliant, intense reds, greens, yellows, and blues in big flowers meandering over as vivid grounds; and as no table-cover was large enough to make a coat, the sleeves of each were of a different color and pattern. However, the coats were duly finished. Then we set to work on gray pantaloons, and I have just carried a bundle to an ardent young lady who wishes to assist. A slight gloom is settling down, and the inmates here are not quite so cheerfully confident as in July.

IV.

A BELEAGUERED CITY.

Oct. 22.—When I came to breakfast this morning Rob was capering over another victory — Ball's Bluff. He would read me, "We pitched the Yankees over the bluff," and ask me in the next breath to go to the theater this evening. I turned on the poor fellow: "Don't tell me about your victories. You vowed by all your idols that the blockade would be raised by October 1, and I notice the ships are still serenely anchored below the city."

"G., you are just as pertinacious yourself in championing your opinions. What sustains you when nobody agrees with you?"

Oct. 28.—When I dropped in at Uncle Ralph's last evening to welcome them back, the whole family were busy at a great center-table copying sequestration acts for the Confederate Government. The property of all Northerners and Unionists is to be sequestered, and Uncle Ralph can hardly get the work done fast enough. My aunt apologized for the rooms looking chilly; she feared to put the carpets down, as the city might be taken and burned by the Federals. "We are living as much packed up as possible. A signal has been agreed upon, and the instant the army approaches we shall be off to the country again."

Great preparations are being made for defense. At several other places where I called the women were almost hysterical. They seemed to look forward to being blown up with shot and shell, finished with cold steel, or whisked off to some Northern prison. When I got home Edith and Mr. D. had just returned also.

"Alex.," said Edith, "I was up at your orange-lots to-day and the sour oranges are dropping to the ground, while they cannot get lemons for our sick soldiers."

"That's my kind, considerate wife," replied Mr. D. "Why did n't I think of that before? Jim shall fill some barrels to-morrow and take them to the hospitals as a present from you."

Nov. 10.—Surely this year will ever be memorable to me for its perfection of natural beauty. Never was sunshine such pure gold, or moonlight such transparent silver. The beautiful custom prevalent here of decking the graves with flowers on All Saints' day was well fulfilled, so profuse and rich were the blossoms. On All-hallow eve Mrs. S. and myself visited a large cemetery. The chrysanthemums lay like great masses of snow and flame and gold in every garden we passed, and were piled on every costly tomb and lowly grave. The battle of Manassas robed many of our women in mourning, and some of those who had no

graves to deck were weeping silently as they walked through the scented avenues.

A few days ago Mrs. E. arrived here. She is a widow, of Natchez, a friend of Mrs. F.'s, and is traveling home with the dead body of her eldest son, killed at Manassas. She stopped two days waiting for a boat, and begged me to share her room and read her to sleep, saying she could n't be alone since he was killed; she feared her mind would give way. So I read all the comforting chapters to be found till she dropped into forgetfulness, but the recollection of those weeping mothers in the cemetery banished sleep for me.

Nov. 26.—The lingering summer is passing into those misty autumn days I love so well, when there is gold and fire above and around us. But the glory of the natural and the gloom of the moral world agree not well together. This morning Mrs. F. came to my room in dire distress. "You see," she said, "cold weather is coming on fast, and our poor fellows are lying out at night with nothing to cover them. There is a wail for blankets, but there is not a blanket in town. I have gathered up all the spare bed-clothing, and now want every available rug or table-cover in the house. Can't I have yours, G.? We must make these small sacrifices of comfort and elegance, you know, to secure independence and freedom."

"Very well," I said, denuding the table. "This may do for a drummer boy."

Dec. 26, 1861.—The foul weather cleared off bright and cool in time for Christmas. There is a midwinter lull in the movement of troops. In the evening we went to the grand bazaar in the St. Louis Hotel, got up to clothe the soldiers. This bazaar has furnished the gayest, most fashionable war-work yet, and has kept social circles in a flutter of pleasant, heroic excitement all through December. Everything beautiful or rare garnered in the homes of the rich was given for exhibition, and in some cases for raffle and sale. There were many fine paintings, statues, bronzes, engravings, gems, laces—in fact, heirlooms and bric-à-brac of all sorts. There were many lovely Creole girls present, in exquisite toilets, passing to and fro through the decorated rooms, listening to the band clash out the Anvil Chorus.

Jan. 2, 1862.—I am glad enough to bid '61 good-bye. Most miserable year of my life! What ages of thought and experience have I not lived in it.

The city authorities have been searching houses for fire-arms. It is a good way to get more guns, and the homes of those men suspected of being Unionists were searched first. Of course, they went to Dr. B.'s. He met them with his own delightful courtesy. "Wish to search for arms? Certainly, gentlemen."

He conducted them all through the house with smiling readiness, and after what seemed a very thorough search bowed them politely out. His gun was all the time safely reposing between the canvas folds of a cot-bed which leaned folded up together against the wall, in the very room where they had ransacked the closets. Queerly, the rebel families have been the ones most anxious to conceal all weapons. They have dug graves quietly at night in the back yards, and carefully wrapping the weapons, buried them out of sight. Every man seems to think he will have some private fighting to do to protect his family.

V.

MARRIED.

Friday, Jan. 24, 1862. (*On steamboat W., Mississippi River.*)—With a changed name I open you once more, my journal. It was a sad time to wed, when one knew not how long the expected conscription would spare the bridegroom. The women-folk knew how to sympathize with a girl expected to prepare for her wedding in three days, in a blockaded city, and about to go far from any base of supplies. They all rallied round me with tokens of love and consideration, and sewed, shopped, mended, and packed, as if sewing soldier clothes. And they decked the whole house and the church with flowers. Music breathed, wine sparkled, friends came and went. It seemed a dream, and comes up now again out of the afternoon sunshine where I sit on deck. The steamboat slowly plows its way through lumps of floating ice,—a novel sight to me,—and I look forward wondering whether the new people I shall meet will be as fierce about the war as those in New Orleans. That past is to be all forgotten and forgiven; I understood thus the kindly acts that sought to brighten the threshold of a new life.

Feb. 15. (*Village of X.*)—We reached Arkansas Landing at nightfall. Mr. Y., the planter who owns the landing, took us right up to his residence. He ushered me into a large room where a couple of candles gave a dim light, and close to them, and sewing as if on a race with Time, sat Mrs. Y. and a little negro girl, who was so black and sat so stiff and straight she looked like an ebony image. This was a large plantation; the Y.'s knew H. very well, and were very kind and cordial in their welcome and congratulations. Mrs. Y. apologized for continuing her work; the war had pushed them this year in getting the negroes clothed, and she had to sew by dim candles, as they could obtain no more oil. She asked if there were any new fashions in New Orleans.

Next morning we drove over to our home

in this village. It is the county-seat, and was, till now, a good place for the practice of H.'s profession. It lies on the edge of a lovely lake. The adjacent planters count their slaves by the hundreds. Some of them live with a good deal of magnificence, using service of plate, having smoking-rooms for the gentlemen built off the house, and entertaining with great hospitality. The Baptists, Episcopalians, and Methodists hold services on alternate Sundays in the court-house. All the planters and many others, near the lake shore, keep a boat at their landing, and a raft for crossing vehicles and horses. It seemed very piquant at first, this taking our boat to go visiting, and on moonlight nights it was charming. The woods around are lovelier than those in Louisiana, though one misses the moaning of the pines. There is fine fishing and hunting, but these cotton estates are not so pleasant to visit as sugar plantations.

But nothing else has been so delightful as, one morning, my first sight of snow and a wonderful, new, white world.

Feb. 27.—The people here have hardly felt the war yet. There are but two classes. The planters and the professional men form one; the very poor villagers the other. There is no middle class. Ducks and partridges, squirrels and fish, are to be had. H. has bought me a nice pony, and cantering along the shore of the lake in the sunset is a panacea for mental worry.

VI.

HOW IT WAS IN ARKANSAS.

March 11, 1862.—The serpent has entered our Eden. The rancor and excitement of New Orleans have invaded this place. If an incautious word betrays any want of sympathy with popular plans, one is "traitorous," "ungrateful," "crazy." If one remains silent and controlled, then one is "phlegmatic," "cool-blooded," "unpatriotic." Cool-blooded! Heavens! if they only knew. It is very painful to see lovable and intelligent women rave till the blood mounts to face and brain. The immediate cause of this access of war fever has been the battle of Pea Ridge. They scold the idea that Price and Van Dorn have been completely worsted. Those who brought the news were speedily told what they ought to say. "No, it is only a serious check; they must have more men sent forward at once. This country must do its duty." So the women say another company *must* be raised.

We were guests at a dinner-party yesterday. Mrs. A. was very talkative. "Now, ladies, you must all join in with a vim and help equip another company."

"Mrs. L.," she said, turning to me, "are you

not going to send your husband? Now use a young bride's influence and persuade him; he would be elected one of the officers." "Mrs. A.," I replied, longing to spring up and throttle her, "the Bible says, 'When a man hath married a new wife, he shall not go to war for one year, but remain at home and cheer up his wife.'" . . .

"Well, H.," I questioned, as we walked home after crossing the lake, "can you stand the pressure, or shall you be forced into volunteering?" "Indeed," he replied, "I will not be bullied into enlisting by women, or by men. I will sooner take my chance of conscription and feel honest about it. You know my attachments, my interests are here; these are my people. I could never fight against them; but my judgment disapproves their course, and the result will inevitably be against us."

This morning the only Irishman left in the village presented himself to H. He has been our wood-sawyer, gardener, and factotum, but having joined the new company, his time recently has been taken up with drilling. H. and Mr. R. feel that an extensive vegetable garden must be prepared while he is here to assist or we shall be short of food, and they sent for him yesterday.

"So, Mike, you are really going to be a soldier?"

"Yes, sor; but faith, Mr. L., I don't see the use of me going to shtop a bullet when sure an' I'm willin' for it to go where it plazes."

March 18, 1862.—There has been unusual gaiety in this little village the past few days. The ladies from the surrounding plantations went to work to get up a festival to equip the new company. As Annie and myself are both brides recently from the city, requisition was made upon us for engravings, costumes, music, garlands, and so forth. Annie's heart was in the work; not so with me. Nevertheless, my pretty things were captured, and shone with just as good a grace last evening as if willingly lent. The ball was a merry one. One of the songs sung was "Nellie Gray," in which the most distressing feature of slavery is bewailed so pitifully. To sing this at a festival for raising money to clothe the soldiers fighting to perpetuate that very thing was strange.

March 20, 1862.—A man professing to act by General Hindman's orders is going through the country impressing horses and mules. The overseer of a certain estate came to inquire of H. if he had not a legal right to protect the property from seizure. Mr. L. said yes, unless the agent could show some better credentials than his bare word. This answer soon spread about, and the overseer returned to report that it excited great indignation, espe-

cially among the company of new volunteers. H. was pronounced a traitor, and they declared that no one so untrue to the Confederacy should live there. When H. related the circumstance at dinner, his partner, Mr. R., became very angry, being ignorant of H.'s real opinions. He jumped up in a rage and marched away to the village thoroughfare. There he met a batch of the volunteers, and said, "We know what you have said of us, and I have come to tell you that you are liars, and you know where to find us."

Of course I expected a difficulty; but the evening passed, and we retired undisturbed. Not long afterward a series of indescribable sounds broke the stillness of the night, and the tramp of feet was heard outside the house. Mr. R. called out, "It's a serenade, H. Get up and bring out all the wine you have." Annie and I peeped through the parlor window, and lo! it was the company of volunteers and a diabolical band composed of bones and broken-winded brass instruments. They piped and clattered and whined for some time, and then swarmed in, while we ladies retreated and listened to the clink of glasses.

March 22.—H., Mr. R., and Mike have been very busy the last few days getting the acre of kitchen-garden plowed and planted. The stay-law has stopped all legal business, and they have welcomed this work. But today a thunderbolt fell in our household. Mr. R. came in and announced that he has agreed to join the company of volunteers. Annie's Confederate principles would not permit her to make much resistance, and she has been sewing and mending as fast as possible to get his clothes ready, stopping now and then to wipe her eyes. Poor Annie! She and Max have been married only a few months longer than we have; but a noble sense of duty animates and sustains her.

VII.

THE FIGHT FOR FOOD AND CLOTHING.

April 1.—The last ten days have brought changes in the house. Max R. left with the company to be mustered in, leaving with us his weeping Annie. Hardly were her spirits somewhat composed when her brother arrived from Natchez to take her home. This morning he, Annie, and Reeney, the black handmaiden, posted off. Out of seven of us only H., myself, and Aunt Judy are left. The absence of Reeney will be not the least noted. She was as precious an imp as any Topsy ever was. Her tricks were endless and her innocence of them amazing. When sent out to bring in eggs she would take them from nests where hens were hatching, and embryo chickens would be served up at breakfast, while Reeney stood by grinning to see them

opened; but when accused she was imperturbable. "Laws, Mis' L., I nebber dun bin nigh dem hens. Mis' Annie, you can go count dem dere eggs." That when counted they were found minus the number she had brought had no effect on her stolid denial. H. has plenty to do finishing the garden all by himself, but the time rather drags for me.

April 13, 1862.—This morning I was sewing up a rent in H.'s garden-coat, when Aunt Judy rushed in.

"Laws! Mis' L., here's Mr. Max and Mis' Annie done come back!" A buggy was coming up with Max, Annie, and Reeney.

"Well, is the war over?" I asked.

"Oh, I got sick!" replied our returned soldier, getting slowly out of the buggy.

He was very thin and pale, and explained that he took a severe cold almost at once, had a mild attack of pneumonia, and the surgeon got him his discharge as unfit for service. He succeeded in reaching Annie, and a few days of good care made him strong enough to travel back home.

"I suppose, H., you've heard that Island No. 10 is gone?"

Yes, we had heard that much, but Max had the particulars, and an exciting talk followed. At night H. said to me, "G., New Orleans will be the next to go, you'll see, and I want to get there first; this stagnation here will kill me."

April 28.—This evening has been very lovely, but full of a sad disappointment. H. invited me to drive. As we turned homeward he said:

"Well, my arrangements are completed. You can begin to pack your trunks to-morrow, and I shall have a talk with Max."

Mr. R. and Annie were sitting on the gallery as I ran up the steps.

"Heard the news?" they cried.

"No! What news?"

"New Orleans is taken! All the boats have been run up the river to save them. No more mails."

How little they knew what plans of ours this dashed away. But our disappointment is truly an infinitesimal drop in the great waves of triumph and despair surging to-night in thousands of hearts.

April 30.—The last two weeks have glided quietly away without incident except the arrival of new neighbors—Dr. Y., his wife, two children, and servants. That a professional man prospering in Vicksburg should come now to settle in this retired place looks queer. Max said:

"H., that man has come here to hide from the conscript officers. He has brought no end of provisions, and is here for the war. He has chosen well, for this county is so cleaned of men it won't pay to send the conscript officers here."

Our stores are diminishing and cannot be

replenished from without; ingenuity and labor must evoke them. We have a fine garden in growth, plenty of chickens, and hives of bees to furnish honey in lieu of sugar. A good deal of salt meat has been stored in the smoke-house, and, with fish from the lake, we expect to keep the wolf from the door. The season for game is about over, but an occasional squirrel or duck comes to the larder, though the question of ammunition has to be considered. What we have may be all we can have, if the war lasts five years longer; and they say they are prepared to hold out till the crack of doom. Food, however, is not the only want. I never realized before the varied needs of civilization. Every day something is *out*. Last week but two bars of soap remained, so we began to save bones and ashes. Annie said: "Now, if we only had some china-berry trees here we should n't need any other grease. They are making splendid soap at Vicksburg with china-balls. They just put the berries into the lye and it eats them right up and makes a fine soap." I did long for some china-berries to make this experiment. H. had laid in what seemed a good supply of kerosene, but it is nearly gone, and we are down to two candles kept for an emergency. Annie brought a receipt from Natchez for making candles of rosin and wax, and with great forethought brought also the wick and rosin. So yesterday we tried making candles. We had no molds, but Annie said the latest style in Natchez was to make a waxen rope by dipping, then wrap it round a corn-cob. But H. cut smooth blocks of wood about four inches square, into which he set a polished cylinder about four inches high. The waxen ropes were coiled round the cylinder like a serpent, with the head raised about two inches; as the light burned down to the cylinder, more of the rope was unwound. To-day the vinegar was found to be all gone and we have started to make some. For tyros we succeed pretty well.

VIII.

DROWNED OUT AND STARVED OUT.

May 9.—A great misfortune has come upon us all. For several days every one has been uneasy about the unusual rise of the Mississippi and about a rumor that the Federal forces had cut levees above to swamp the country. There is a slight levee back of the village, and H. went yesterday to examine it. It looked strong and we hoped for the best. About dawn this morning a strange gurgle woke me. It had a pleasing, lulling effect. I could not fully rouse at first, but curiosity conquered at last, and I called H.

"Listen to that running water; what is it?"

He sprung up, listened a second, and shouted:

"Max, get up! The water is on us!" They both rushed off to the lake for the skiff. The levee had not broken. The water was running clean over it and through the garden fence so rapidly that by the time I dressed and got outside Max was paddling the pirogue they had brought in among the pea-vines, gathering all the ripe peas left above the water. We had enjoyed one mess and he vowed we should have another.

H. was busy nailing a raft together while he had a dry place to stand on. Annie and I, with Reaney, had to secure the chickens, and the back piazza was given up to them. By the time a hasty breakfast was eaten the water was in the kitchen. The stove and everything there had to be put up in the dining-room. Aunt Judy and Reaney had likewise to move into the house, their floor also being covered with water. The raft had to be floated to the store-house and a platform built, on which everything was elevated. At evening we looked round and counted the cost. The garden was utterly gone. Last evening we had walked round the strawberry beds that fringed the whole acre and tasted a few just ripe. The hives were swamped. Many of the chickens were drowned. Sancho had been sent to high ground where he could get grass. In the village every green thing was swept away. Yet we were better off than many others; for this house, being raised, we have escaped the water indoors. It just laves the edge of the galleries.

May 26.—During the past week we have lived somewhat like Venetians, with a boat at front steps and a raft at the back. Sunday H. and I took skiff to church. The clergyman, who is also tutor at a planter's across the lake, preached to the few who had arrived in skiffs. We shall not try it again, it is so troublesome getting in and out at the court-house steps. The imprisonment is hard to endure. It threatened to make me really ill, so every evening H. lays a thick wrap in the pirogue, I sit on it and we row off to the ridge of dry land running along the lake-shore and branching off to a strip of woods also out of water. Here we disembark and march up and down till dusk. A great deal of the wood got wet and has to be laid out to dry on the galleries, with clothing, and everything that must be dried. One's own trials are intensified by the worse suffering around that we can do nothing to relieve.

Max has a puppy named after General Price. The gentlemen had both gone up town yesterday in the skiff when Annie and I heard little Price's despairing cries from under the house, and we got on the raft to find and save him. We wore light morning dresses and slippers, for shoes are becoming precious. Annie donned a Shaker and I a broad hat. We got the raft

pushed out to the center of the grounds opposite the house and could see Price clinging to a post; the next move must be to navigate the raft up to the side of the house and reach for Price. It sounds easy; but poke around with our poles as wildly or as scientifically as we might, the raft would not budge. The noonday sun was blazing right overhead and the muddy water running all over slipped feet and dainty dresses. How long we staid praying for rescue, yet wincing already at the laugh that would come with it, I shall never know. It seemed like a day before the welcome boat and the "Ha, ha!" of H. and Max were heard. The confinement tells severely on all the animal life about us. Half the chickens are dead and the other half sick.

The days drag slowly. We have to depend mainly on books to relieve the tedium, for we have no piano; none of us like cards; we are very poor chess-players, and the chess-set is incomplete. When we gather round the one lamp—we dare not light any more—each one exchanges the gems of thought or mirthful ideas he finds. Frequently the gnats and the mosquitoes are so bad we cannot read at all. This evening, till a strong breeze blew them away, they were intolerable. Aunt Judy goes about in a dignified silence, too full for words, only asking two or three times, "W'at I dun tole you fum de fust?" The food is a trial. This evening the snaky candles lighted the glass and silver on the supper-table with a pale gleam and disclosed a frugal supper indeed—tea without milk (for all the cows are gone), honey, and bread. A faint ray twinkled on the water swishing against the house and stretching away into the dark woods. It looked like civilization and barbarism met together. Just as we sat down to it, some one passing in a boat shouted that Confederates and Federals were fighting at Vicksburg.

Monday, June 2.—On last Friday morning, just three weeks from the day the water rose, signs of its falling began. Yesterday the ground appeared, and a hard rain coming down at the same time washed off much of the unwholesome débris. To-day is fine, and we went out without a boat for a long walk.

June 13.—Since the water ran off, we have, of course, been attacked by swamp fever. H. succumbed first, then Annie, Max next, and then I. Luckily, the new Dr. Y. had brought quinine with him, and we took heroic doses. Such fever never burned in my veins before or sapped strength so rapidly, though probably the want of good food was a factor. The two or three other professional men have left. Dr. Y. alone remains. The roads now being dry enough, H. and Max started on horseback, in different directions, to make an

exhaustive search for food supplies. H. got back this evening with no supplies.

June 15.—Max got back to-day. He started right off again to cross the lake and interview the planters on that side, for they had not suffered from overflow.

June 16.—Max got back this morning. H. and he were in the parlor talking and examining maps together till dinner-time. When that was over they laid the matter before us. To buy provisions had proved impossible. The planters across the lake had decided to issue rations of corn-meal and pease to the villagers whose men had all gone to war, but they utterly refused to sell anything. "They told me," said Max, "'We will not see your family starve, Mr. R.; but with such numbers of slaves and the village poor to feed, we can spare nothing for sale.'" "Well, of course," said H., "we do not purpose to stay here and live on charity rations. We must leave the place at all hazards. We have studied out every route and made inquiries everywhere we went. We shall have to go down the Mississippi in an open boat as far as Fetler's Landing (on the eastern bank). There we can cross by land and put the boat into Steele's Bayou, pass thence to the Yazoo River, from there to Chickasaw Bayou, into McNutt's Lake, and land near my uncle's in Warren County."

June 20.—As soon as our intended departure was announced, we were besieged by requests for all sorts of things wanted in every family—pins, matches, gunpowder, and ink. One of the last cases H. and Max had before the stay-law stopped legal business was the settlement of an estate that included a country store. The heirs had paid in chattels of the store. These had remained packed in the office. The main contents of the cases were hardware; but we found treasure indeed—a keg of powder, a case of matches, a paper of pins, a bottle of ink. Red ink is now made out of poke-berries. Pins are made by capping thorns with sealing-wax, or using them as nature made them. These were articles money could not get for us. We would give our friends a few matches to save for the hour of tribulation. The paper of pins we divided evenly, and filled a bank-box each with the matches. H. filled a tight tin case apiece with powder for Max and himself and sold the rest, as we could not carry any more on such a trip. Those who did not hear of this in time offered fabulous prices afterwards for a single pound. But money has not its old attractions. Our preparations were delayed by Aunt Judy falling sick of swamp fever.

Friday, June 27.—As soon as the cook was up again, we resumed preparations. We put all the clothing in order and had it nicely done

up with the last of the soap and starch. "I wonder," said Annie, "when I shall ever have nicely starched clothes after these? They had no starch in Natchez or Vicksburg when I was there." We are now furbishing up dresses suitable for such rough summer travel. While we sat at work yesterday the quiet of the clear, calm noon was broken by a low, continuous roar like distant thunder. To-day we are told it was probably cannon at Vicksburg. This is a great distance, I think, to have heard it—over a hundred miles.

H. and Max have bought a large yawl and are busy on the lake bank repairing it and fitting it with lockers. Aunt Judy's master has been notified when to send for her; a home for the cat Jeff has been engaged; Price is dead, and Sancho sold. Nearly all the furniture is disposed of, except things valued from association, which will be packed in H.'s office and left with some one likely to stay through the war. It is hardest to leave the books.

Tuesday, July 8.—We start to-morrow. Packing the trunks was a problem. Annie and I are allowed one large trunk apiece, the gentlemen a smaller one each, and we a light carpet-sack apiece for toilet articles. I arrived with six trunks and leave with one! We went over everything carefully twice, rejecting, trying to shake off the bonds of custom and get down to primitive needs. At last we made a judicious selection. Everything old or worn was left; everything merely ornamental, except good lace, which was light. Gossamer evening dresses were all left. I calculated on taking two or three books that would bear the most reading if we were again shut up where none could be had, and so, of course, took Shakspeare first. Here I was interrupted to go and pay a farewell visit, and when we returned Max had packed and nailed the cases of books to be left. Chance thus limited my choice to those that happened to be in my room—"Paradise Lost," the "Arabian Nights," a volume of Macaulay's History I was reading, and my prayer-book. To-day the provisions for the trip were cooked: the last of the flour was made into large loaves of bread; a ham and several dozen eggs were boiled; the few chickens that have survived the overflow were fried; the last of the coffee was parched and ground; and the modicum of the tea was well corked up. Our friends across the lake added a jar of butter and two of preserves. H. rode off to X. after dinner to conclude some business there, and I sat down before a table to tie bundles of things to be left. The sunset glowed and faded and the quiet evening came on calm and starry. I sat by the window till evening deepened into night, and as the moon rose I still looked a reluctant farewell to the

lovely lake and the grand woods, till the sound of H.'s horse at the gate broke the spell.

IX.

HOMELESS AND SHELTERLESS.

Thursday, July 10. (— *Plantation.*)—Yesterday about four o'clock we walked to the lake and embarked. Provisions and utensils were packed in the lockers, and a large trunk was stowed at each end. The blankets and cushions were placed against one of them, and Annie and I sat on them Turkish fashion. Near the center the two smaller trunks made a place for Reeney. Max and H. were to take turns at the rudder and oars. The last word was a fervent God-speed from Mr. E., who is left in charge of all our affairs. We believe him to be a Union man, but have never spoken of it to him. We were gloomy enough crossing the lake, for it was evident the heavily laden boat would be difficult to manage. Last night we staid at this plantation, and from the window of my room I see the men unloading the boat to place it on the cart, which a team of oxen will haul to the river. These hospitable people are kindness itself, till you mention the war.

Saturday, July 12. (*Under a cotton-shed on the bank of the Mississippi River.*)—Thursday was a lovely day, and the sight of the broad river exhilarating. The negroes launched and reloaded the boat, and when we had paid them and spoken good-bye to them we felt we were really off. Every one had said that if we kept in the current the boat would almost go of itself, but in fact the current seemed to throw it about, and hard pulling was necessary. The heat of the sun was very severe, and it proved impossible to use an umbrella or any kind of shade, as it made steering more difficult. Snags and floating timbers were very troublesome. Twice we hurried up to the bank out of the way of passing gunboats, but they took no notice of us. When we got thirsty, it was found that Max had set the jug of water in the shade of a tree and left it there. We must dip up the river water or go without. When it got too dark to travel safely we disembarked. Reeney gathered wood, made a fire and some tea, and we had a good supper. We then divided, H. and I remaining to watch the boat, Max and Annie on shore. She hung up a mosquito-bar to the trees and went to bed comfortably. In the boat the mosquitoes were horrible, but I fell asleep and slept till voices on the bank woke me. Annie was wandering disconsolate round her bed, and when I asked the trouble, said, "Oh, I can't sleep there! I found a toad and a lizard in the bed." When dropping off again, H. woke me to say he was very sick; he thought it was from drinking the river

water. With difficulty I got a trunk opened to find some medicine. While doing so a gunboat loomed up vast and gloomy, and we gave each other a good fright. Our voices doubtless reached her, for instantly every one of her lights disappeared and she ran for a few minutes along the opposite bank. We momentarily expected a shell as a feeler.

At dawn next morning we made coffee and a hasty breakfast, fixed up as well as we could in our sylvan dressing-rooms, and pushed on, for it is settled that traveling between eleven and two will have to be given up unless we want to be roasted alive. H. grew worse. He suffered terribly, and the rest of us as much to see him pulling in such a state of exhaustion. Max would not trust either of us to steer. About eleven we reached the landing of a plantation. Max walked up to the house and returned with the owner, an old gentleman living alone with his slaves. The housekeeper, a young colored girl, could not be surpassed in her graceful efforts to make us comfortable and anticipate every want. I was so anxious about H. that I remember nothing except that the cold drinking-water taken from a cistern beneath the building, into which only the winter rains were allowed to fall, was like an elixir. They offered luscious peaches that, with such water, were nectar and ambrosia to our parched lips. At night the housekeeper said she was sorry they had no mosquito-bars ready and hoped the mosquitoes would not be thick, but they came out in legions. I knew that on sleep that night depended recovery or illness for H. and all possibility of proceeding next day. So I sat up fanning away mosquitoes that he might sleep, toppling over now and then on the pillows till roused by his stirring. I contrived to keep this up till, as the chill before dawn came, they abated and I got a short sleep. Then, with the aid of cold water, a fresh toilet, and a good breakfast, I braced up for another day's baking in the boat.

If I had been well and strong as usual the discomforts of such a journey would not have seemed so much to me; but I was still weak from the effects of the fever, and annoyed by a worrying toothache which there had been no dentist to rid me of in our village.

Having paid and dismissed the boat's watchman, we started and traveled till eleven today, when we stopped at this cotton-shed. When our dais was spread and lunch laid out in the cool breeze, it seemed a blessed spot. A good many negroes came offering chickens and milk in exchange for tobacco, which we had not. We bought some milk with money.

A United States transport just now steamed by and the men on the guards cheered and waved to us. We all replied but Annie. Even

Max was surprised into an answering cheer, and I waved my handkerchief with a very full heart as the dear old flag we have not seen for so long floated by; but Annie turned her back.

Sunday, July 13. (*Under a tree on the east bank of the Mississippi.*)—Late on Saturday evening we reached a plantation whose owner invited us to spend the night at his house. What a delightful thing is courtesy! The first tone of our host's welcome indicated the true gentleman. We never leave the oars with the watchman; Max takes those, Annie and I each take a band-box, H. takes my carpet-sack, and Reeney brings up the rear with Annie's. It is a funny procession. Mr. B.'s family were absent, and as we sat on the gallery talking it needed only a few minutes to show this was a "Union man." His home was elegant and tasteful, but even here there was neither tea nor coffee.

About eleven we stopped here in this shady place. While eating lunch the negroes again came imploring for tobacco. Soon an invitation came from the house for us to come and rest. We gratefully accepted, but found their idea of rest for warm, tired travelers was to sit in the parlor on stiff chairs while the whole family trooped in, cool and clean in fresh toilets, to stare and question. We soon returned to the trees; however they kindly offered corn-meal pound-cake and beer, which were excellent.

Eight gunboats and one transport have passed us. Getting out of their way has been troublesome. Our gentlemen's hands are badly blistered.

Tuesday, July 15.—Sunday night about ten we reached the place where, according to our map, Steele's Bayou comes nearest to the Mississippi, and where the landing should be, but when we climbed the steep bank there was no sign of habitation. Max walked off into the woods on a search, and was gone so long we feared he had lost his way. He could find no road. H. suggested shouting and both began. At last a distant halloo replied, and by cries the answerer was guided to us. A negro came forward and said that was the right place, his master kept the landing, and he would watch the boat for five dollars. He showed the road, and said his master's house was one mile off and another house two miles. We mistook, and went to the one two miles off. At one o'clock we reached Mr. Fetler's, who was pleasant, and said we should have the best he had. The bed into whose grateful softness I sank was piled with mattresses to within two or three feet of the ceiling, and with no step-ladder getting in and out was a problem. This morning we noticed the high-water mark, four feet above the lower floor. Mrs. Fetler said they had lived upstairs several weeks.

X.

FRIGHTS AND PERILS IN STEELE'S BAYOU.

Wednesday, July 16. (Under a tree on the bank of Steele's Bayou.)—Early this morning our boat was taken out of the Mississippi and put on Mr. Fetler's ox-cart. After breakfast we followed on foot. The walk in the woods was so delightful that all were disappointed when a silvery gleam through the trees showed the bayou sweeping along, full to the banks, with dense forest trees almost meeting over it. The boat was launched, calked, and reloaded, and we were off again. Towards noon the sound of distant cannon began to echo around, probably from Vicksburg again. About the same time we began to encounter rafts. To get around them required us to push through brush so thick that we had to lie down in the boat. The banks were steep and the land on each side a bog. About one o'clock we reached this clear space with dry shelving banks and disembarked to eat lunch. To our surprise a neatly dressed woman came tripping down the declivity bringing a basket. She said she lived above and had seen our boat. Her husband was in the army, and we were the first white people she had talked to for a long while. She offered some corn-meal pound-cake and beer, and as she climbed back told us to "look out for the rapids." H. is putting the boat in order for our start and says she is waving good-bye from the bluff above.

Thursday, July 17. (On a raft in Steele's Bayou.)—Yesterday we went on nicely awhile and at afternoon came to a strange region of rafts, extending about three miles, on which persons were living. Many saluted us, saying they had run away from Vicksburg at the first attempt of the fleet to shell it. On one of these rafts, about twelve feet square,¹ bagging had been hung up to form three sides of a tent. A bed was in one corner, and on a low chair, with her provisions in jars and boxes grouped round her, sat an old woman feeding a lot of chickens.

Having moonlight, we had intended to travel till late. But about ten o'clock, the boat beginning to go with great speed, H., who was steering, called to Max:

"Don't row so fast; we may run against something."

"I'm hardly pulling at all."

"Then we're in what she called the rapids!"

The stream seemed indeed to slope downward, and in a minute a dark line was visible ahead. Max tried to turn, but could not, and in a second more we dashed against this immense raft, only saved from breaking up by the men's quickness. We got out upon it and ate supper. Then, as the boat was leaking and the

current swinging it against the raft, H. and Max thought it safer to watch all night, but told us to go to sleep. It was a strange spot to sleep in—a raft in the middle of a boiling stream, with a wilderness stretching on either side. The moon made ghostly shadows and showed H., sitting still as a ghost, in the stern of the boat, while mingled with the gurgle of the water round the raft beneath was the boom of cannon in the air, solemnly breaking the silence of night. It drizzled now and then, and the mosquitoes swarmed over us. My fan and umbrella had been knocked overboard, so I had no weapon against them. Fatigue, however, overcomes everything, and I contrived to sleep.

H. roused us at dawn. Reeney found light-wood enough on the raft to make a good fire for coffee, which never tasted better. Then all hands assisted in unloading; a rope was fastened to the boat, Max got in, H. held the rope on the raft, and, by much pulling and pushing, it was forced through a narrow passage to the farther side. Here it had to be calked, and while that was being done we improvised a dressing-room in the shadow of our big trunks. During the trip I had to keep the time, therefore properly to secure belt and watch was always an anxious part of my toilet. The boat is now repacked, and while Annie and Reeney are washing cups I have scribbled, wishing much that mine were the hand of an artist.

Friday morn, July 18. (House of Colonel K., on Yazoo River.)—After leaving the raft yesterday all went well till noon, when we came to a narrow place where an immense tree lay clear across the stream. It seemed the insurmountable obstacle at last. We sat despairing what to do, when a man appeared beside us in a pirogue. So sudden, so silent was his arrival that we were thrilled with surprise. He said if we had a hatchet he could help us. His fairy bark floated in among the branches like a bubble, and he soon chopped a path for us, and was delighted to get some matches in return. He said the cannon we heard yesterday were in an engagement with the ram *Arkansas*, which ran out of the Yazoo that morning. We did not stop for dinner to-day, but ate a hasty lunch in the boat, after which nothing but a small piece of bread was left. About two we reached the forks, one of which ran to the Yazoo, the other to the Old River. Max said the right fork was our road; H. said the left, that there was an error in Max's map; but Max steered into the right fork. After pulling about three miles he admitted his mistake and turned back; but I shall never forget Old River. It was the vision of a drowned world, an illimitable waste of dead waters, stretching into a great, silent, desolate forest.

¹ More likely twelve yards.—G. W. C.

Just as we turned into the right way, down came the rain so hard and fast we had to stop on the bank. It defied trees or umbrellas and nearly took away the breath. The boat began to fill, and all five of us had to bail as fast as possible for the half-hour the sheet of water was pouring down. As it abated a cold breeze sprung up that, striking our wet clothes, chilled us to the bone. All were shivering and blue—no, I was green. Before leaving Mr. Fetler's Wednesday morning I had donned a dark-green calico. I wiped my face with a handkerchief out of my pocket, and face and hands were all dyed a deep green. When Annie turned round and looked at me she screamed and I realized how I looked; but she was not much better, for of all dejected things wet feathers are the worst, and the plumes in her hat were painful.

About five we reached Colonel K.'s house, right where Steele's Bayou empties into the Yazoo. We had both to be fairly dragged out of the boat, so cramped and weighted were we by wet skirts. The family were absent, and the house was headquarters for a squad of Confederate cavalry, which was also absent. The old colored housekeeper received us kindly and lighted fires in our rooms to dry the clothing. My trunk had got cracked on top, and all the clothing to be got at was wet. H. had dropped his in the river while lifting it out, and his clothes were wet. A spoonful of brandy apiece was left in the little flask, and I felt that mine saved me from being ill. Warm blankets and the brandy revived us, and by supper-time we got into some dry clothes.

Just then the squad of cavalry returned; they were only a dozen, but they made much uproar, being in great excitement. Some of them were known to Max and H., who learned from them that a gunboat was coming to shell them out of this house. Then ensued a clatter such as twelve men surely never made before—rattling about the halls and galleries in heavy boots and spurs, feeding horses, calling for supper, clanking swords, buckling and unbuckling belts and pistols. At last supper was dispatched, and they mounted and were gone like the wind. We had a quiet supper and good night's rest in spite of the expected shells, and did not wake till ten to-day to realize we were not killed. About eleven breakfast was furnished. Now we are waiting till the rest of our things are dried to start on our last day of travel by water.

Sunday, July 20.—A little way down the Yazoo on Friday we ran into McNutt's Lake, thence into Chickasaw Bayou, and at dark landed at Mrs. C.'s farm, the nearest neighbors of H.'s uncle. The house was full of Confederate sick, friends from Vicksburg, and while

we ate supper all present poured out the story of the shelling and all that was to be done at Vicksburg. Then our stuff was taken from the boat, and we finally abandoned the stanch little craft that had carried us for over one hundred and twenty-five miles in a trip occupying nine days. The luggage in a wagon, and ourselves packed in a buggy, were driven for four or five miles, over the roughest road I ever traveled, to the farm of Mr. B., H.'s uncle, where we arrived at midnight and hastened to hide in bed the utter exhaustion of mind and body. Yesterday we were too tired to think, or to do anything but eat peaches.

XI.

WILD TIMES IN MISSISSIPPI.

THIS morning there was a most painful scene. Annie's father came into Vicksburg, ten miles from here, and learned of our arrival from Mrs. C.'s messenger. He sent out a carriage to bring Annie and Max to town that they might go home with him, and with it came a letter for me from friends on the Jackson Railroad, written many weeks before. They had heard that our village home was under water, and invited us to visit them. The letter had been sent to Annie's people to forward, and thus had reached us. This decided H., as the place was near New Orleans, to go there and wait the chance of getting into that city. Max, when he heard this from H., lost all self-control and cried like a baby. He stalked about the garden in the most tragic manner, exclaiming:

"Oh! my soul's brother from youth up is a traitor! A traitor to his country!"

Then H. got angry and said, "Max, don't be a fool."

"Who has done this?" bawled Max. "You felt with the South at first; who has changed you?"

"Of course I feel *for* the South now, and nobody has changed me but the logic of events, though the twenty-negro law has intensified my opinions. I can't see why I, who have no slaves, must go to fight for them, while every man who has twenty may stay at home."

I, also, tried to reason with Max and pour oil on his wound. "Max, what interest has a man like you, without slaves, in a war for slavery? Even if you had them, they would not be your best property. That lies in your country and its resources. Nearly all the world has given up slavery; why can't the South do the same and end the struggle. It has shown you what the South needs, and if all went to work with united hands the South would soon be the greatest country on earth. You have no right to call H. a traitor; it is we who are the true patriots and lovers of the South."

This had to come, but it has upset us both. H. is deeply attached to Max, and I can't bear to see a cloud between them. Max, with Annie and Reeney, drove off an hour ago, Annie so glad at the prospect of again seeing her mother that nothing could cloud her day. And so the close companionship of six months, and of dangers, trials, and pleasures shared together, is over.

Oak Ridge, July 26, Saturday.—It was not till Wednesday that H. could get into Vicksburg, ten miles distant, for a passport, without which we could not go on the cars. We started Thursday morning. I had to ride seven miles on a hard-trotting horse to the nearest station. The day was burning at white heat. When the station was reached my hair was down, my hat on my neck, and my feelings were indescribable.

On the train one seemed to be right in the stream of war, among officers, soldiers, sick men and cripples, adieus, tears, laughter, constant chatter, and, strangest of all, sentinels posted at the locked car-doors demanding passports. There was no train south from Jackson that day, so we put up at the Bowman House. The excitement was indescribable. All the world appeared to be traveling through Jackson. People were besieging the two hotels, offering enormous prices for the privilege of sleeping anywhere under a roof. There were many refugees from New Orleans, among them some acquaintances of mine. The peculiar styles of [women's] dress necessitated by the exigencies of war gave the crowd a very striking appearance. In single suits I saw sleeves of one color, the waist of another, the skirt of another; scarlet jackets and gray skirts; black waists and blue skirts; black skirts and gray waists; the trimming chiefly gold braid and buttons, to give a military air. The gray and gold uniforms of the officers, glittering between, made up a carnival of color. Every moment we saw strange meetings and partings of people from all over the South. Conditions of time, space, locality, and estate were all loosened; everybody seemed floating he knew not whither, but determined to be jolly, and keep up an excitement. At supper we had tough steak, heavy, dirty-looking bread, Confederate coffee. The coffee was made of either parched rye or corn-meal, or of sweet potatoes cut in small cubes and roasted. This was the favorite. When flavored with "coffee essence," sweetened with sorghum, and tintured with chalky milk, it made a curious beverage, which, after tasting, I preferred not to drink. Every one else was drinking it, and an acquaintance said, "Oh, you 'll get bravely over that. I used to be a Jewess about pork, but now we just kill a hog and eat it, and kill another and do the same. It 's all we have."

Friday morning we took the down train for the station near my friend's house. At every station we had to go through the examination of passes, as if in a foreign country.

The conscript camp was at Brookhaven, and every man had been ordered to report there or to be treated as a deserter. At every station I shivered mentally, expecting H. to be dragged off. Brookhaven was also the station for dinner. I choked mine down, feeling the sword hanging over me by a single hair. At sunset we reached our station. The landlady was pouring tea when we took our seats and I expected a treat, but when I tasted it was sassafras tea, the very odor of which sickens me. There was a general surprise when I asked to exchange it for a glass of water; every one was drinking it as if it were nectar. This morning we drove out here.

My friend's little nest is calm in contrast to the tumult not far off. Yet the trials of war are here too. Having no matches, they keep fire, carefully covering it at night, for Mr. G. has no powder, and cannot flash the gun into combustibles as some do. One day they had to go with the children to the village, and the servant let the fire go out. When they returned at nightfall, wet and hungry, there was neither fire nor food. Mr. G. had to saddle the tired mule and ride three miles for a pan of coals, and blow them, all the way back, to keep them alight. Crockery has gradually been broken and tin-cups rusted out, and a visitor told me they had made tumblers out of clear glass bottles by cutting them smooth with a heated wire, and that they had nothing else to drink from.

Aug. 11.—We cannot get to New Orleans. A special passport must be shown, and we are told that to apply for it would render H. very likely to be conscripted. I begged him not to try; and as we hear that active hostilities have ceased at Vicksburg, he left me this morning to return to his uncle's and see what the prospects are there. I shall be in misery about conscription till he returns.

Sunday, Sept. 7. (Vicksburg, Washington Hotel.)—H. did not return for three weeks. An epidemic disease broke out in his uncle's family and two children died. He staid to assist them in their trouble. Tuesday evening he returned for me and we reached Vicksburg yesterday. It was my first sight of the "Gibraltar of the South." Looking at it from a slight elevation suggests the idea that the fragments left from world-building had tumbled into a confused mass of hills, hollows, hillocks, banks, ditches, and ravines, and that the houses had rained down afterwards. Over all there was dust impossible to conceive. The bombardment has done little injury. People have returned and resumed business. A gentleman asked H. if he knew of a nice girl for sale. I

asked if he did not think it impolitic to buy slaves now.

"Oh, not young ones. Old ones might run off when the enemy's lines approach ours, but with young ones there is no danger."

We had not been many hours in town before a position was offered to H. which seemed providential. The chief of a certain department was in ill-health and wanted a deputy. It secures him from conscription, requires no oath, and pays a good salary. A mountain seemed lifted off my heart.

Thursday, Sept. 18. (Thanksgiving Day.)—We staid three days at the Washington Hotel; then a friend of H.'s called and told him to come to his house till he could find a home. Boarding-houses have all been broken up, and the army has occupied the few houses that were for rent. To-day H. secured a vacant room for two weeks in the only boarding-house.

Oak Haven, Oct. 3.—To get a house in V. proved impossible, so we agreed to part for a time till H. could find one. A friend recommended this quiet farm, six miles from — [a station on the Jackson Railroad]. On last Saturday H. came with me as far as Jackson and put me on the other train for the station.

On my way hither a lady, whom I judged to be a Confederate "blockade runner," told me of the tricks resorted to to get things out of New Orleans, including this: A very large doll was emptied of its bran, filled with quinine, and elaborately dressed. When the owner's trunk was opened, she declared with tears that the doll was for a poor crippled girl, and it was passed.

This farm of Mr. W.'s¹ is kept with about forty negroes. Mr. W., nearly sixty, is the only white man on it. He seems to have been wiser in the beginning than most others, and curtailed his cotton to make room for rye, rice, and corn. There is a large vegetable garden and orchard; he has bought plenty of stock for beef and mutton, and laid in a large supply of sugar. He must also have plenty of ammunition, for a man is kept hunting and supplies the table with delicious wild turkeys and other game. There is abundance of milk and butter, hives for honey, and no end of pigs. Chickens seem to be kept like game in parks, for I never see any, but the hunter shoots them, and eggs are plentiful. We have chicken for breakfast, dinner, and supper, fried, stewed, broiled, and in soup, and there is a family of ten. Luckily I never tire of it. They make starch out of corn-meal by washing the

meal repeatedly, pouring off the water and drying the sediment. Truly the uses of corn in the Confederacy are varied. It makes coffee, beer, whisky, starch, cake, bread. The only privations here are the lack of coffee, tea, salt, matches, and good candles. Mr. W. is now having the dirt-floor of his smoke-house dug up and boiling from it the salt that has dripped into it for years. To-day Mrs. W. made tea out of dried blackberry leaves, but no one liked it. The beds, made out of equal parts of cotton and corn-shucks, are the most elastic I ever slept in. The servants are dressed in gray homespun. Hester, the chambermaid, has a gray gown so pretty that I covet one like it. Mrs. W. is now arranging dyes for the thread to be woven into dresses for herself and the girls. Sometimes her hands are a curiosity.

The school at the nearest town is broken up and Mrs. W. says the children are growing up heathens. Mr. W. has offered me a liberal price to give the children lessons in English and French, and I have accepted transiently.

Oct. 28.—It is a month to-day since I came here. I only wish H. could share these benefits—the nourishing food, the pure aromatic air, the sound sleep away from the fevered life of Vicksburg. He sends me all the papers he can get hold of, and we both watch carefully the movements reported lest an army should get between us. The days are full of useful work, and in the lovely afternoons I take long walks with a big dog for company. The girls do not care for walking. In the evening Mr. W. begs me to read aloud all the war news. He is fond of the "Memphis Appeal," which has moved from town to town so much that they call it the "Moving Appeal." I sit in a low chair by the fire, as we have no other light to read by. Sometimes traveling soldiers stop here, but that is rare.

Oct. 31.—Mr. W. said last night the farmers felt uneasy about the "Emancipation Proclamation" to take effect in December. The slaves have found it out, though it had been carefully kept from them.

"Do yours know it?" I asked.

"Oh, yes. Finding it to be known elsewhere. I told it to mine with fair warning what to expect if they tried to run away. The hounds are not far off."

The need of clothing for their armies is worrying them too. I never saw Mrs. W. so excited as on last evening. She said the provost-marshal at the next town had ordered the women to knit so many pairs of socks.

"Just let him try to enforce it and they will cow-hide him. He'll get none from me. I'll take care of my own friends without an order from him."

"Well," said Mr. W., "if the South is de-

¹ On this plantation, and in this domestic circle, I myself afterward sojourned, and from them enlisted in the army. The initials are fictitious, but the description is perfect.—G. W. C.

feated and the slaves set free, the Southern people will all become atheists, for the Bible justifies slavery and says it shall be perpetual."

"You mean, if the Lord does not agree with you, you'll repudiate him."

"Well, we'll feel it's no use to believe in anything."

At night the large sitting-room makes a striking picture. Mr. W., spare, erect, gray-headed, patriarchal, sits in his big chair by the odorous fire of pine logs and knots roaring up the vast fireplace. His driver brings to him the report of the day's picking and a basket of snowy cotton for the spinning. The hunter brings in the game. I sit on the other side to read. The great spinning wheels stand at the other end of the room, and Mrs. W. and her black satellites, the elderly women their heads in bright bandanas, are hard at work. Slender and auburn-haired, she steps back and forth out of shadow into shine following the thread with graceful movements. Some card the cotton, some reel it into hanks. Over all the fire-light glances, now touching the golden curls of little John toddling about, now the brown heads of the girls stooping over their books, now the shadowy figure of little Jule, the girl whose duty it is to supply the fire with rich pine to keep up the vivid light. If they would only let the child sit down! But that is not allowed, and she gets sleepy and stumbles and knocks her head against the wall and then straightens up again. When that happens often it drives me off. Sometimes while I read the bright room fades and a vision rises of figures clad in gray and blue lying pale and stiff on the blood-spinkled ground.

Nov. 15.—Yesterday a letter was handed me from H. Grant's army was moving, he wrote, steadily down the Mississippi Central and might cut the road at Jackson. He has a house and will meet me in Jackson to-morrow.

Nov. 20. (Vicksburg.)—A fair morning for my journey back to Vicksburg. On the train was the gentleman who in New Orleans had told us we should have all the butter we wanted from Texas. On the cars, as elsewhere, the question of food alternated with news of the war.

When we ran into the Jackson station H. was on the platform, and I gladly learned that we could go right on. A runaway negro, an old man, ashy colored from fright and exhaustion, with his hands chained, was being dragged along by a common-looking man. Just as we started out of Jackson the conductor led in a young woman sobbing in a heart-broken manner. Her grief seemed so overpowering, and she was so young and helpless, that every one was interested. Her husband went into the army in the opening of the war, just after their

marriage, and she had never heard from him since. After months of weary searching she learned he had been heard of at Jackson, and came full of hope, but found no clue. The sudden breaking down of her hope was terrible. The conductor placed her in care of a gentleman going her way and left her sobbing. At the next station the conductor came to ask her about her baggage. She raised her head to try and answer. "Don't cry so, you'll find him yet." She gave a start, jumped from her seat with arms flung out and eyes staring. "There he is now!" she cried. Her husband stood before her.

The gentleman beside her yielded his seat, and as hand grasped hand a hysterical gurgle gave place to a look like Heaven's peace. The low murmur of their talk began, and when I looked round at the next station they had bought pies and were eating them together like happy children.

Midway between Jackson and Vicksburg we reached the station near where Annie's parents were staying. I looked out, and there stood Annie with a little sister on each side of her, brightly smiling at us. Max had written to H., but we had not seen them since our parting. There was only time for a word and the train flashed away.

XII.

VICKSBURG.

[Here follow in the manuscript the writer's thrilling experiences in and throughout the siege of Vicksburg, as already printed in this magazine for September, 1885. It is just after the fall of Vicksburg that she resumes.]

Aug. 20.—Sitting in my easy chair to-day, looking out upon a grassy slope of the hill in the rear of this house, I have looked over this journal as if in a dream; for since the last date sickness and sorrow have been with me. I feel as if an angry wave had passed over me bearing away strength and treasure. For on one day there came to me from New Orleans the news of Mrs. B.'s death, a friend whom no tie of blood could have made nearer. The next day my beautiful boy ended his brief life of ten days and died in my arms. My own illness caused him to perish; the fatal cold in the cave was the last straw that broke down strength. The colonel's sweet wife has come, and I do not lack now for womanly companionship. She says that with such a pre-natal experience perhaps death was the best for him. I try to think so, and to be glad that H. has not been ill, though I see the effects. This book is exhausted, and I wonder whether there will be more adventures by flood and field to cause me to begin another.



JUNI

GENERAL PHILIP H. SHERIDAN
(From the last portrait taken.)

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

THE SECOND INAUGURAL — FIVE FORKS — APPOMATTOX.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE SECOND INAUGURAL.



E have seen what effect the Hampton Roads conference produced upon Jefferson Davis, and to what intemperate and wrathful utterance it provoked him. Its effect upon President Lincoln was almost directly the reverse. His interview with the rebel commissioners doubtless strengthened his former convictions that the rebellion was waning in enthusiasm and resources, and that the Union cause must triumph at no distant day. Secure in his renewal of four years' personal leadership, and hopefully inspired by every sign of early victory in the war, his only thought was to shorten, by generous conciliation, the period of the dreadful conflict. His temper was not one of exultation, but of broad patriotic charity, and of keen, sensitive personal sympathy for the whole country and all its people, South as well as North. His conversation with Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell had probably revealed to him glimpses of the undercurrent of their anxiety that fraternal bloodshed and the destructive ravages of war might somehow come to an end. To every word or tone freighted with this feeling, the sincere, magnanimous, and tender heart of President Lincoln responded with bounding impulses. As a ruler and a statesman, he was clear in his judgment and inflexible in his will to reestablish union and maintain freedom for all who had gained it by the chances of war; but also as a statesman and a ruler, he was ready to lend his individual influence and his official discretion to any measure of mitigation and manifestation of good-will that, without imperiling the union of the States, or the liberty of the citizen, might promote acquiescence in impending political changes, and abatement and reconciliation of hostile sectional feelings. Filled with such thoughts and purposes, he spent the day after his return from Hampton Roads in considering and perfecting a new proposal, designed as a peace-offering to the States in rebellion. On the evening of February 5, 1865, he called his Cabinet together and read to them the following draft of a message and proclamation, which he had

written during the day, and upon which he invited their opinion and advice:

Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives: I respectfully recommend that a joint resolution, substantially as follows, be adopted, so soon as practicable, by your honorable bodies: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is hereby empowered, in his discretion, to pay four hundred millions of dollars to the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia; in the manner and on the conditions following, to wit: The payment to be made in six per cent. Government bonds, and to be distributed among said States *pro rata* on their respective slave populations as shown by the census of 1860, and no part of said sum to be paid unless all resistance to the national authority shall be abandoned and cease, on or before the first day of April next; and upon such abandonment and ceasing of resistance one-half of said sum to be paid, in manner aforesaid, and the remaining half to be paid only upon the amendment of the national Constitution recently proposed by Congress becoming valid law, on or before the first day of July next, by the action thereon of the requisite number of States."

The adoption of such resolution is sought with a view to embody it, with other propositions, in a proclamation looking to peace and reunion.

Whereas, a joint resolution has been adopted by Congress, in the words following, to wit:

Now therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known, that on the conditions therein stated, the power conferred on the Executive in and by said joint resolution will be fully exercised; that war will cease and armies be reduced to a basis of peace; that all political offenses will be pardoned; that all property, except slaves, liable to confiscation or forfeiture, will be released therefrom, except in cases of intervening interests of third parties; and that liberality will be recommended to Congress upon all points not lying within Executive control.²

It may be said with truth that this was going to the verge of magnanimity towards a foe already in the throes and helplessness of overwhelming defeat—a foe that had rebelled without adequate cause and maintained the contest without reasonable hope. But Mr. Lincoln remembered that the rebels, notwithstanding all their offenses and errors, were yet American citizens, members of the same

² Unpublished MS.

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nation, brothers of the same blood. He remembered, too, that the object of the war, equally with peace and freedom, was the maintenance of one government and the perpetuation of one Union. Not only must hostilities cease, but dissension, suspicion, and estrangement be eradicated. As it had been in the past, so it must again become in the future—not merely a nation with the same Constitution and laws, but a people united in feeling, in hope, in aspiration. In his judgment, the liberality that would work reconciliation would be well employed. Whether their complaints for the past were well or ill founded, he would remove even the temptation to complain in the future. He would give them peace, reunion, political pardon, remission of confiscation wherever it was in his power, and securing unquestioned and universal freedom through the constitutional amendment, he would at the same time compensate their loss of slavery by a direct money equivalent.

It turned out that he was more humane than his constitutional advisers. The indorsement of his own handwriting on the manuscript draft of his proposed message records the result of his appeal and suggestion:

“FEBRUARY 5, 1865. To-day these papers, which explain themselves, were drawn up and submitted to the Cabinet and unanimously disapproved by them.—A. LINCOLN.”¹

It would appear that there was but little discussion of the proposition. The President's evident earnestness on the one side, and the unanimous dissent of the Cabinet on the other, probably created an awkward situation which could be best relieved by silence on each hand. The diary of Secretary Welles gives only a brief mention of the important incident, but it reflects the feeling which pervaded the Cabinet chamber:

MONDAY, February 6, 1865.

There was a Cabinet meeting last evening. The President had matured a scheme which he hoped would be successful in promoting peace. It was a proposition for paying the expense of the war for two hundred days, or four hundred millions to the rebel States, to be for the extinguishment of slavery or for such purpose as the States were disposed. This, in few words, was the scheme. It did not meet with favor, but was dropped. The earnest desire of the President to conciliate and effect peace was manifest, but there may be such a thing as so overdoing as to cause a distrust or adverse feeling. In the present temper of Congress the proposed measure, if a wise one, could not be carried through successfully; I do not think the scheme could accomplish any good results. The rebels would misconstrue it if the

offer were made. If attempted and defeated it would do harm.²

The statement of Secretary Usher, written many years afterwards from memory, also records the deep feeling with which the President received the non-concurrence of his Executive Council:

The members of the Cabinet were all opposed. He seemed somewhat surprised at that and asked, “How long will the war last?” No one answered, but he soon said: “A hundred days. We are spending now in carrying on the war three millions a day, which will amount to all this money, besides all the lives.” With a deep sigh he added, “But you are all opposed to me, and I will not send the message.”³

The entry made by Secretary Welles in his diary on the morning after the Cabinet meeting, as to the amount and time, is undoubtedly the correct one, coinciding as it does with the President's manuscript. But the discrepancy in the figures of the two witnesses is of little moment. Both accounts show us that the proposal was not based on sentiment alone, but upon a practical arithmetical calculation. An expenditure of three or four hundred millions was inevitable; but his plan would save many precious lives, would shield homes and hearths from further sorrow and desolation, would dissolve sectional hatred, and plant fraternal goodwill. Though overborne in opinion, clearly he was not convinced. With the words, “You are all opposed to me,” sadly uttered, Mr. Lincoln folded up the paper and ceased the further discussion of what was doubtless the project then nearest his heart. We may surmise, however, that, as he wrote upon it the indorsement we have quoted and laid it away, he looked forward to a not distant day when, in the new term of the Presidency to which he was already elected, the Cabinet, with new and more liberal views, would respond more charitably to his own generous impulses.

Few Cabinet secrets were better kept than this proposal of the President and its discussion. Since the subject was indefinitely postponed, it was, of course, desirable that it should not come to the knowledge of the public. Silence was rendered easier by the fact that popular attention in the North busied itself with rumors concerning the Hampton Roads conference. To satisfy this curiosity, a resolution of the House of Representatives, passed on February 8, requested the President to communicate such information respecting it as he might deem not incompatible with the public interest.⁴ With this request Mr. Lincoln complied on the 10th, by a message in which all the correspondence was printed, followed by a brief report touching the points of conference:

On the morning of the 3d [wrote Mr. Lincoln] the three gentlemen, Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and

¹ Unpublished MS. • ² Unpublished MS.

³ “New York Tribune,” Sept. 13, 1885.

⁴ “Globe,” Feb. 8, 1865, p. 665.

Campbell, came aboard of our steamer, and had an interview with the Secretary of State and myself of several hours' duration. No question of preliminaries to the meeting was then and there made or mentioned. No other person was present; no papers were exchanged or produced; and it was, in advance, agreed that the conversation was to be informal and verbal merely. On our part, the whole substance of the instructions to the Secretary of State, hereinbefore recited, was stated and insisted upon, and nothing was said inconsistent therewith; while, by the other party, it was not said that in any event or on any condition they ever would consent to reunion; and yet they equally omitted to declare that they never would so consent. They seemed to desire a postponement of that question, and the adoption of some other course first, which, as some of them seem to argue, might or might not lead to reunion; but which course, we thought, would amount to an indefinite postponement. The conference ended without result.¹

A short discussion occurred in the House on the motion to print this message, but it did not rise above the ordinary level of a party wrangle. The few Democrats who took part in it complained of the President for refusing an armistice, while the Republicans retorted with Jefferson Davis's condition about the "two countries" and the more recent declarations of his Richmond harangue, announcing his readiness to perish for independence. On the whole, both Congress and the country were gratified that the incident had called out Mr. Lincoln's renewed declaration of an unalterable resolve to maintain the Union. Patriotic hope was quickened and public confidence strengthened by noting once more his singleness of purpose and steadfastness of faith. No act of his could have formed a more fitting prelude to his second inauguration, which was now rapidly approaching, and the preliminary steps of which were at this time being consummated.

A new phase of the reconstruction question was developed in the usual congressional routine of counting the electoral votes of the late presidential election. Former chapters have set forth the President's general views on reconstruction, and shown that though the executive and legislative branches of the Government differed as to the theory and policy of restoring insurrectionary States to their normal federal functions, such difference had not reached the point of troublesome or dangerous antagonism. Over the new question also discussion and conflict were happily avoided. By instruction to his military commanders and in private letters to prominent citizens Mr. Lincoln had strongly advised and actively promoted the formation of loyal State governments in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, and had maintained the restored government of Virginia after the division of that State and the

admission of West Virginia into the Union, and had officially given them the recognition of the Executive Department of the Government. The Legislative Department, however, had latterly withheld its recognition, and refused them representation in Congress. The query now arose whether the popular and electoral votes of some of those States for President should be allowed and counted.

The subject was taken up by the House, which on January 30 passed a joint resolution naming the insurrectionary States, declaring them to have been "in armed rebellion" on the 8th of November, 1864, and not entitled to representation in the electoral college. A searching debate on this resolution arose in the Senate, which called out the best legal talent of that body. It could not very consistently be affirmed that Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, held by Federal troops and controlled by Federal commanders in part at least, were "in armed rebellion" on election day, under whatever constitutional theory of reconstruction. The phraseology was finally amended to read that the rebel States "were in such condition on the 8th day of November, 1864, that no valid election for electors of President and Vice-President of the United States, according to the Constitution and laws thereof, was held therein on said day," and in this form the joint resolution was passed by both houses. Joint resolutions of Congress have all the force and effect of laws, and custom requires the President to approve them in the same manner as regular acts. His signature in this case might therefore be alleged to imply that he consented to or adopted a theory of reconstruction at variance with his former recommendation and action. To avoid the possibility of such misconstruction, Mr. Lincoln sent Congress a short message, in which he said:

The joint resolution, entitled "Joint resolution declaring certain States not entitled to representation in the electoral college," has been signed by the Executive, in deference to the view of Congress implied in its passage and presentation to him. In his own view, however, the two houses of Congress, convened under the twelfth article of the Constitution, have complete power to exclude from counting all electoral votes deemed by them to be illegal; and it is not competent for the Executive to defeat or obstruct that power by a veto, as would be the case if his action were at all essential in the matter. He disclaims all right of the Executive to interfere in any way in the matter of canvassing or counting electoral votes; and he also disclaims that, by signing said resolution, he has expressed any opinion on the recitals of the preamble, or any judgment of his own upon the subject of the resolution.²

¹ "House Journal," Feb. 10, 1865, p. 237.

² Lincoln, Message, Feb. 8, 1865. "House Journal," p. 213.

In anticipation of possible debate and contention on the subject of counting the electoral votes of reconstructed States, Congress had, on February 6, adopted what afterwards became famous as the Twenty-second Joint Rule, which directed in substance that all such questions should be decided, not by the joint convention of the two houses, but by each house for itself without debate, the two houses having temporarily separated for that purpose; and requiring the concurrence of both for any affirmative action, or to count a vote objected to. When the two houses met in joint convention on the eighth day of February, mention was made by the Vice-President, presiding, that "The Chair has in his possession returns from the States of Louisiana and Tennessee; but in obedience to the law of the land, the Chair holds it to be his duty not to present them to the convention."¹ No member insisted on having these returns opened, since they could not possibly change the result. Only the returns therefore from the loyal States, including West Virginia, were counted, showing two hundred and twelve electoral votes for Lincoln, and twenty-one for McClellan. The Vice-President thereupon announced "that Abraham Lincoln of Illinois, having received a majority of the whole number of electoral votes, is duly elected President of the United States for four years, commencing on the fourth day of March, 1865."²

The usual committee was appointed to wait upon Mr. Lincoln and notify him of his second election; and in response to their announcement, he read the following brief address:

With deep gratitude to my countrymen for this mark of their confidence; with a distrust of my own ability to perform the duty required, under the most favorable circumstances, and now rendered doubly difficult by existing national perils; yet with a firm reliance on the strength of our free Government and the eventual loyalty of the people to the just principles upon which it is founded, and, above all, with an unshaken faith in the Supreme Ruler of Nations, I accept this trust. Be pleased to signify this to the respective houses of Congress.³

In the informal friendly conversation which followed, the President said to the committee, in substance:

Having served four years in the depths of a great and yet unended national peril, I can view this call to a second term in nowise more flatteringly to myself than as an expression of the public judgment that I may better finish a difficult work in which I have labored from the first than could any one less severely schooled to the task.⁴

The formal inauguration of Mr. Lincoln for his second presidential term took place at the appointed time, March 4, 1865. There is little variation in the simple but impressive pageantry with which this official ceremony is celebrated. The principal novelty commented upon by the newspapers was the share which the hitherto enslaved race had, for the first time, in this public and political drama. Civic associations of negro citizens joined in the procession, and a battalion of negro soldiers formed part of the military escort. The weather was sufficiently favorable to allow the ceremonies to take place on the eastern portico, in view of a vast throng of spectators. Imaginative beholders, who were prone to draw augury and comfort from symbols, could rejoice that the great bronze statue of Freedom now crowned the dome of the Capitol, and that her guardianship was justified by the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment virtually blotted slavery from the Constitution. The central act of the occasion was President Lincoln's second inaugural address, which enriched the political literature of the Union with another masterpiece, and which deserves to be quoted in full. He said:

FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: At this second appearing to take the oath of the presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then, a statement, somewhat in detail, of a course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured.

On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it—all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it without war—seeking to dissolve the Union, and divide effects, by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came.

One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend

been written out from memory, intermingling an abstract of the formal paper which the President read with the informal conversation that succeeded.

⁴ "Globe," March 1, 1865, pp. 1236 and 1263.

¹ "Globe," Feb. 8, 1865, p. 668.

² *Ibid.*, p. 669.

³ Unpublished MS. The reply reported by the notification committee is incorrect, having apparently

this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the Government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes his aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered—that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes. "Woe unto the world because of offenses! for it must needs be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope—fervently do we pray—that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."

With malice towards none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.¹

The address being concluded, Chief-Justice Chase administered the oath of office; and listeners who heard Abraham Lincoln for the second time repeat, "I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States," went from the impressive scene to their several homes with thankfulness and with confidence that the destiny of the country and the liberty of the citizen

were in safe keeping. "The fiery trial" through which he had hitherto walked showed him possessed of the capacity, the courage, and the will to keep the promise of his oath.

Among the many criticisms passed by writers and thinkers upon the language of the second inaugural, none will so interest the reader as that of Mr. Lincoln himself, written about ten days after its delivery, in the following letter to a friend:

DEAR MR. WEED: Every one likes a compliment. Thank you for yours on my little notification speech and on the recent inaugural address. I expect the latter to wear as well as, perhaps better than, anything I have produced; but I believe it is not immediately popular. Men are not flattered by being shown that there has been a difference of purpose between the Almighty and them. To deny it, however, in this case, is to deny that there is a God governing the world. It is a truth which I thought needed to be told, and, as whatever of humiliation there is in it falls most directly on myself, I thought others might afford for me to tell it.²

A careful student of Mr. Lincoln's character will also find this inaugural address instinct with another meaning, which, very naturally, the President's own comment did not touch. The eternal law of compensation, which it declares and applies to the sin and fall of American slavery, in a diction rivaling the fire and the dignity of the old Hebrew prophecies,³ may, without violent inference, be interpreted to foreshadow an intention to renew at a fitting moment the brotherly good-will gift to the South which has been treated of in the first part of this chapter. Such an inference finds strong corroboration in the phrases which closed the last public address he ever made. On Tuesday evening, April 11, a considerable assemblage of citizens of Washington gathered at the Executive Mansion to celebrate the victory of Grant over Lee. The rather long and careful speech which Mr. Lincoln made on that occasion was, however, less about the past than the future. It discussed the subject of reconstruction, as illustrated in the case of Louisiana, showing also how that issue was related to the questions of emancipation, the condition of the freedmen, the welfare of the South, and the ratification of the constitutional amendment. "So new and unprecedented is the whole case," he concluded, "that no ex-

jour lorsque l'union des âmes se fera là, dans la vraie et parfaite lumière de l'Évangile. Mais quel beau jour déjà lorsque le chef deux fois élu d'un grand peuple tient un langage chrétien, trop absent, dans notre Europe, du langage officiel des grandes affaires, annonce la fin de l'esclavage, et prépare les embrassements de la justice et de la miséricorde dont l'Écriture Sainte a parlé. Je vous remercie de m'avoir fait lire cette belle page de l'histoire des grands hommes." . . .

¹ "Globe," March 4, 1865, pp. 1424, 1425.

² Weed, "Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 449.

³ Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orléans, in a letter, 2d April, 1865, to Mr. Auguste Cochin, acknowledging the receipt of Lincoln's second inaugural, said:

"J'ai lu ce document avec la plus religieuse émotion, avec l'admiration la plus sympathique. . . . M. Lincoln exprime, avec une solennelle et touchante gravité, les sentiments qui, j'en suis sûr, envahissent les âmes d'élite, au Nord comme au Sud. Quel beau

clusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as to details and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan would surely become a new entanglement. Important principles may and must be inflexible. In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied that action will be proper."¹ Can any one doubt that this "new announcement" which was taking shape in his mind would again have embraced and combined justice to the blacks and generosity to the whites of the South, with union and liberty for the whole country? It will remain a perpetual sorrow to the nation, and especially to the South, that the lingering madness of rebellion tragically thwarted the possibility of such a consummation.

FIVE FORKS.

FROM the hour of Mr. Lincoln's reelection the Confederate cause was doomed. The cheering of the troops which greeted the news from the North was heard within the lines at Richmond and at Petersburg, and although the leaders maintained to the end their attitude of defiance, the impression rapidly gained ground among the people that the end was not far off. The stimulus of hope being gone, they began to feel the pinch of increasing want. Their currency had become almost worthless. In October a dollar in gold was worth thirty-five dollars in Confederate money; a month later it brought fifty dollars; with the opening of the new year the price rose to sixty dollars, and soon after to seventy; and despite the efforts of the Confederate treasury, which would occasionally rush into the market and beat down the price of gold ten or twenty per cent. in a day, the currency gradually depreciated until a hundred for one was offered and not taken. As a result of this vanishing value of their money a portentous rise took place in the prices of all the necessaries of life. It is hard for a people to recognize that their money is good for nothing; to do this is to confess that their Government has failed: it was natural, therefore, for the unhappy citizens of Richmond to think that monstrous prices were being extorted for food, clothing, and fuel, when, in fact, they were paying no more than was reasonable. The journals and diaries of the time are filled with bitter execrations against the extortioners and forestallers; but when we translate their prices into the gold standard, we wonder how the grocers and clothiers lived.

To pay a thousand dollars for a barrel of flour was enough to strike a householder with horror; but ten dollars is not a famine price. A suit of clothes costs from one thousand to fifteen hundred dollars; but if you divide this sum by seventy-five, there is very little profit left for the tailor. High prices, however, even if paid in dry leaves, are a hardship when dry leaves are not plentiful; and there was scarcity, even of Confederate money, in the South. In Richmond, which lived upon the war, the dearth was especially evident. The clerks in the departments received say four thousand dollars a year, hardly enough for a month's provisions. Skilled mechanics fared somewhat better. They could earn, so long as they kept out of the army, something like six thousand dollars a year. Statesmanship was cheap. A congressman's pay was five thousand five hundred dollars; but most of the civil officers of the Government managed to get their supplies at cost prices from the military stores. It was illegal; but they could not have lived otherwise, and they doubtless considered their lives necessary to their country.

The depreciation of the Confederate currency was an unmistakable symptom of a lack of confidence in the course of affairs, since it did not arise from inflation. On the contrary, Mr. Trenholm, the Secretary of the Treasury, did all he could to check this dangerous tendency, going so far as to incur the reproaches of many who imagined his action enhanced prices. All dealers instinctively felt the money was worthless, and their only object was to get it out of their hands as soon as possible, at whatever prices, in exchange for objects of real value. One Confederate diarist² records with indignation that he saw a Jew buy at auction an old set of table-spoons for five hundred and seventy-five dollars, and makes this a cause of complaint against the Government, which permits men to acquire in this way the means of running away. Anybody who was able to leave the country became the object of the envy and hatred of those who remained behind. They began to treat their own financial system with contempt. When the officer in charge of the Treasury Note Bureau at Columbia, alarmed at the approach of Sherman, asked where he was to go, he could get no attention to his inquiries; one high functionary advising that he go to the devil.³

At every advance of General Grant's lines a new disturbance and alarm was manifested in Richmond, the first proof of which was always a fresh rigor in the enforcement, not only of existing conscription laws, but of the arbitrary orders of the frightened authorities. After the capture of Fort Harrison, on the north side of the James, squads of guards were sent into

¹ Raymond, "Life of Lincoln," p. 687.

² Jones, Vol. II., p. 361.

³ "Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 384.

the streets with directions to arrest every able-bodied man they met. They paid no regard to passes or to certificates of exemption or detail, but hurried the unhappy civilians off to the field, or herded them, pending their assignment to companies, within the railings of the public square. Two members of the Cabinet, Reagan and George Davis, were thus arrested on the streets by the zealous guards in spite of their protestations, though they were, of course, soon recognized and released. The pavements were swept of every class of loiterers; the clerks in the departments with their exemptions in their pockets were carried off, whether able to do duty or not. It is said by one Confederate writer¹ that the medical boards were ordered to exempt no one who seemed capable of bearing arms for ten days, and he mentions an instance where a man died, on the eleventh day of his service, of consumption. Human nature will not endure such a strain as this: a week after this sweeping of Richmond for recruits, General Gardner reported that more than half the men thus dragged to the trenches had deserted. Of those who remained, the members of influential families came, one by one, back to the town on various pretexts, increasing the bitterness of feeling among those too poor or too obscure to rescue their sons and brothers.

Desertion grew too common to punish. Almost every man in the Confederacy was, by statute or decree, liable to military service, and yet hundreds of thousands of them were not in the army. If men were to be shot for deserting, it would have been a question whether there were soldiers enough to shoot them. Mr. Davis acted prudently in remitting the death sentences laid before him, although this occasioned great dissatisfaction in the army. Near the end of the year 1864 Longstreet reported one hundred men of Pickett's division as in the guard-house for desertion, attributing the blame for it to the numerous reprieves which had been granted, no one having been executed for two months. General Lee sent this report to Richmond with his approval, which gave great offense to the Confederate President. He returned the paper, with an indorsement to the effect that the remission of sentences was not a proper subject for the criticism of a military commander.²

As disaster increased, as each day brought its catastrophe, the Confederate Government steadily lost ground in the confidence and respect of the Southern people. It is characteristic of every failing revolt that in the hour of ruin the participators turn upon one another with reproaches, often as causeless and unjust

as those they cast upon their legitimate government. Mr. Davis and his councilors now underwent this natural retribution. They were doing their best, but they no longer got any credit for it. From every part of the Confederacy came complaints for what was done, demands for what it was impossible to do. Some of the States were in a condition near to counter-revolution. Governor Brown of Georgia made no pretense of concealing his contumacy. The march of Sherman across his State seemed to have emancipated him from any obligations to the Confederacy. His letters to Richmond from that moment lost all color of allegiance. The feeling in North Carolina was little better. A slow paralysis was benumbing the limbs of the insurrection, and even at the heart its vitality was plainly declining. The Confederate Congress, which had hitherto been the mere register of the President's will, now turned upon him and gave him wormwood to drink. On the 19th of January they passed a resolution making Lee general-in-chief of the army. This Mr. Davis might have borne with patience, although it was intended as a notification to him that his meddling with military affairs must come to an end. But far worse was the necessity put upon him, as a sequel to this act,—and in conformity with a resolution of the Virginia legislature,—of reappointing General Joseph E. Johnston to the command of the army which was to resist Sherman's victorious march to the North. After this he might say that the bitterness of death was past. The Virginia delegation in Congress passed a vote of want of confidence in the Government's conduct of the war. Mr. Seddon, considering his honor impugned, and not unwilling to lay down a thankless task, resigned his post of Secretary of War. Mr. Davis at first wished him to reconsider his action, claiming that such a declaration from congressmen was beyond their functions and subversive of the President's constitutional jurisdiction; but Mr. Seddon insisted, and General John C. Breckinridge was appointed in his place in February, for the few weeks that remained before the final crash.³ Warnings of serious demoralization came daily from the army; even that firm support to the revolt seemed crumbling. Disaffection was so rife in official circles in Richmond that it was not thought politic to call public attention to it by repression. A detective reported a member of Congress as uttering treasonable language, and for his pains was told at the War Department that matters of that sort were none of his business.⁴

It is a curious and instructive thing to note how the act of emancipation had by this time

¹ Jones, Vol. II., p. 305.

² *Ibid.*, p. 343.

³ Pollard, p. 441.

⁴ "Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 390.

virtually enforced itself in Richmond. The value of slave property was gone. It is true that a slave was still occasionally sold, at a price less than one-tenth of what he would have brought before the war. But servants could be hired of their nominal owners at a barley-corn rate; six dollars in gold would pay the hire of a good cook for a year—merely enough to keep up the show of vassalage. In effect any one could hire a negro for his keeping, which was all that anybody in Richmond got for his work. Even Mr. Davis had at last become docile to the stern teachings of events. In his message of November he had recommended the employment of 40,000 slaves in the army,—not as soldiers it is true, save in the last extremity,—with emancipation to come later.

Lee assumed command of all the Confederate forces on the ninth day of February. His situation was one of unprecedented gloom. The day before, he had reported to Richmond that his troops, who had been in line of battle for two days at Hatcher's Run, exposed to the bitter winter weather, had been without meat for three days. "If some change is not made," he said, "and the commissary department organized, I apprehend dire results; . . . you must not be surprised if calamity befalls us." Mr. Davis indorsed this discouraging dispatch with words of anger and command easy to write: "This is too sad to be patiently considered; . . . criminal neglect or gross incapacity. . . . Let supplies be had by purchase or borrowing." A prodigious effort was made, and the danger of starvation for the moment averted, but no permanent improvement resulted in the situation of affairs. The armies of the Union were closing in from every point of the compass. Grant was every day pushing his formidable left wing nearer the only roads by which Lee could escape; Thomas was threatening the Confederate communications from Tennessee; Sheridan was moving for the last time up the Valley of the Shenandoah to abolish Early; while from the south the redoubtable columns of Sherman—the men who had taken Vicksburg, who had scaled the heights of Chattanooga, and having marched through Georgia had left Savannah loyal and Charleston evacuated—were moving northward with the steady pace and irresistible progress of a tragic fate. It was the approach of this portent which shook the nerves of the Confederate leaders more than the familiar proximity of Grant. Beauregard, and afterwards Johnston, were ordered to "destroy Sherman."¹ Beauregard, after his kind, showed his Government its duty in loud and valiant words. He advised Mr. Davis to send him at

once heavy reinforcements "to give the enemy battle and crush him"; "then to concentrate all forces against Grant, march to Washington and dictate a peace"—a plan of limpid simplicity, which was not adopted. Johnston superseded the brilliant Louisianian the next day, and thereafter did what he could—with the scraps and remnants of an army allowed him—to resist the irresistible.

A singular and significant attempt at negotiations was made at this time by General Lee. He was now so strong in the confidence of the people of the South, and the Government at Richmond was so rapidly becoming discredited, that he could doubtless have obtained the popular support, and compelled the assent of the Executive to any measures he thought proper for the attainment of peace. From this it was easy for him and for others to come to the wholly erroneous conclusion that General Grant held a similar relation to the Government and people of the United States. General Lee seized upon the pretext of a conversation reported to him by General Longstreet, as having been held with General Ord under an ordinary flag of truce for exchange of prisoners, to address a letter to Grant, sanctioned by Mr. Davis, saying he had been informed that General Ord had said that General Grant would not decline an interview with a view "to a satisfactory adjustment of the present unhappy difficulties by means of a military convention," providing Lee had authority to act. He therefore proposed to meet General Grant, "with the hope that upon an interchange of views it might be found practicable to submit the subjects of controversy between the belligerents to a military convention." In such event he said he was "authorized to do whatever the result of the proposed conference may render necessary or advisable." Grant at once telegraphed these overtures to Washington. Stanton received his dispatch at the Capitol, where the President was, according to his custom, passing the last night of the session for the convenience of signing bills. The Secretary handed the telegram to Mr. Lincoln, who read it in silence. He asked no advice or suggestion from any one about him, but, taking a pen, wrote with his usual slowness and precision a dispatch in Stanton's name, which he showed to Seward and then handed to Stanton to be signed, dated, and sent. The language is that of an experienced ruler, perfectly sure of himself and of his duty:

The President directs me to say that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee unless it be for capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matters. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the

¹ Breckinridge to Lee, Feb. 21.

President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meanwhile you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

General Grant, on the receipt of this instruction, wrote, in answer to General Lee, that he had no authority to accede to his proposition — such authority being vested in the President of the United States alone; he further explained that General Ord's language must have been misunderstood. Grant reported to Washington what he had done, adding that he would in no case exceed his authority, or omit to press all advantages to the utmost of his ability. This closed the last avenue of hope to the Confederate authorities of any compromise by which the dread alternative of utter defeat or unconditional surrender might be avoided.¹

Early in March, General Lee came to Richmond and had a conference with Mr. Davis on the measures to be adopted in the crisis which he saw was imminent. The General-in-Chief had not taken his advancement seriously. He had not sympathized in the slight which it involved towards the civil government; he had positively refused to assume the dictatorial powers with which the Richmond Congress had clearly intended to invest him; he had ostentatiously thanked "the President alone" for a promotion which in reality came from the President's enemies and critics. He continued to the end, in accordance with the Constitution of the Confederate States, to treat Mr. Davis as the Commander-in-Chief of the forces. He now laid before him the terrible facts by which the army was environed: Richmond and Petersburg must be evacuated before many days; a new seat for the Confederate Government, a new base of defense for the armies, must be taken up farther south and west. There is a direct contradiction between Mr. Davis and the friends of General Lee as to the manner in which the former received this communication. Mr. Davis says² he suggested an immediate withdrawal, but that General Lee said his horses were too weak for the roads, in their present state, and that he must wait till the ground became firmer. But General Long, who gives General Lee as his authority,³ says that the President overruled the general; that Lee wanted then to withdraw his forces and take up a line behind the Staunton River, from which point he might have indefinitely protracted the war. However this may be, they were both agreed that sooner or later the Richmond lines

must be abandoned; that the next move should be to Danville; that a junction was to be formed with Johnston; Sherman was to be destroyed; a swarm of recruits would come in after this victory; and Grant, being caught away from his base, was to be defeated and Virginia delivered from the invader. Mr. Davis gravely set forth this programme as his own, in his book written sixteen years after the war.

But before he turned his back forever upon those lines he had so stoutly defended, before he gave up to the nation the capital of the State for whose sake he had deserted his flag, Lee resolved to dash once more at the toils by which he was surrounded. He placed half his army under the command of General John B. Gordon with orders to break through the Union lines at Fort Stedman, and to take possession of the high ground behind them. The reticence in which General Lee enveloped himself in his last years has left his closest friends in doubt as to his real object in this apparently desperate enterprise. General Gordon, who takes to himself the greater share of responsibility for the plan, says: "I decided that Fort Stedman could be taken by a night assault, and that it might be possible to throw into the breach thus made in Grant's lines a sufficient force to disorganize and destroy the left wing of his army before he could recover and concentrate his forces."⁴ It is certainly true that any fort can be taken, by day or night, if the assaulting party has men enough and is willing to pay the price; but to take a place which cannot be held is not what we expect from a wise and experienced general. Grant had, with singular prescience, looked for some such movement from Lee a month before. He had ordered⁵ Parke, then in command of the Ninth Corps, to be ready to meet an assault on his center and to let his commanders understand they were to lose no time in bringing all their resources to bear on the point of danger. "With proper alacrity in this respect," he adds, "I would have no objection to seeing the enemy get through." This is one of the most characteristic phrases we have met with in Grant's orders. It throws the strongest light both on his temperament and on his mastery of the business at which he had arrived. A month beforehand he foresaw Gordon's attack, prepared for it, and welcomed the momentary success which attended it. Under such generalship an army's lines are a trap into which entrance is suicide.

remains then for us no choice but to continue this contest to a final issue," etc.

² "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 648.

³ Long, "Memoirs of R. E. Lee," p. 403.

⁴ Letter to Jefferson Davis, "Rise and Fall," Vol. II., p. 650.

⁵ February 22.

¹ Jefferson Davis refers to this incident in his message of March 13 to the Confederate Congress, and says: "It thus appears that neither with the Confederate authorities, nor the authorities of any State, nor through the commanding generals, will the Government of the United States treat or make any terms or agreement whatever for the cessation of hostilities. There

The assault was made with great spirit at half-past four on the morning of the 25th of March. Its initial success was due to a singular cause. The opposing lines at the point chosen were only 150 yards apart; the pickets were only 50 yards from each other; it was therefore a favorite point of departure for those Confederates who were tired of the war. Desertions had of late become very numerous and had naturally been encouraged in every way; orders had been issued allowing deserters to bring their arms with them. When Gordon's skirmishers came stealing through the darkness they were at first mistaken for an unusually large batch of deserters, and they overpowered several picket posts without a shot being fired. The storming party at once followed, took the trenches with a rush, and in a few minutes had possession of the main line on the right of Stedman. Turning on the fort, they soon drove out or made prisoners the garrison. It was the dark hour before dawn, and the defense could not distinguish friends from foes; and for a little while General Parke, who acted with his usual vigor and intelligence, was unable to make headway against the invisible enemy who swarmed on both sides of the breach in the lines. General N. B. McLaughlen, who was posted to the left of Fort Stedman, at once got to work and recaptured an outlying battery with the bayonet, and then hurrying into the fort, in ignorance of its capture, was made prisoner. As soon as it was light, Parke's troops advanced from every direction to mend the breach; Potter on the left, Wilcox on the right, and Hartranft, who had been held in reserve, attacking directly from the high ground in the rear. The last two, between them, first made short work of the Confederate detachments that were moving on the City Point road and telegraph and searching in vain for three forts in the rear of Stedman which they had been ordered to take, and which in reality did not exist. By half-past seven Parke had his task well in hand. He had repulsed the Confederate attack to the right and left of Fort Stedman, recaptured two of the detached batteries, forced the enemy with heavy loss back into the fort, and concentrated upon them a heavy artillery fire from three sides. A few minutes later Hartranft's division carried Fort Stedman by assault, and Gordon withdrew to the Confederate lines what he was able to save of his attacking force. The cross fire of artillery was now so withering that few of the Confederates could get back, and none could come to their assistance. General Parke captured 2000 prisoners, including 71 officers and 9 stands of colors; his own total loss was about 1000.

But this heavy loss was not the only damage the Confederates suffered. Humphreys and Wright, in command of the troops on the Union left, who were to be routed and dispersed according to General Lee's plan, on being informed of the racket in the center, correctly assuming that Parke could take care of himself, instantly searched the lines in their front to see if they had been essentially weakened to support Gordon's attack. They found they had not; but in the process of gaining this information they captured the enemy's intrenched picket lines in front of them, which, in spite of repeated attempts to regain them, were firmly held, and gave inestimable advantage to the Union army in the struggle of the next week. The net results therefore to General Lee of the day's work were a bitter disappointment, a squandering of four thousand of his best troops against half that number on the other side, and the loss of his intrenched picket line, which brought such dangerous neighbors as Wright and Humphreys within arm's-length of him.

For several weeks General Grant's chief anxiety had been lest Lee should abandon his lines. At first he feared a concentration of Lee and Johnston against Sherman; but when the victorious army of the West had arrived at Goldsboro' and formed connection with Schofield his anxiety on that score was at rest, and there only remained a keen eagerness to make an end of the Army of Northern Virginia. "I was afraid," he says, "every morning that I would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line."¹ Still—just as Lee, though feeling every hour of waiting was fraught with danger, was prevented from moving by the bad roads and the Richmond complications—Grant, although burning to attack, was delayed by the same cause of bad roads, and by another. He did not wish to move until Sheridan had completed the work assigned him in the Valley and joined either Sherman or the army at Petersburg. But at last, satisfied with Sheridan's progress and with Sherman's condition, he resolved to wait no longer, and on the 24th of March, at the very moment when Gordon was making his arrangements for the next day's sortie, Grant issued his orders for the great movement to the left which was to finish the war. He intended to begin on the 29th, but Lee's desperate dash of the 25th appeared to the Union commander to indicate an intention to secure a wider opening to the Danville road to facilitate an immediate move of the Confederates westward, and he felt more than ever that not a moment was to be lost. Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th, and Sherman came up from

¹ Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 424.

North Carolina for a brief visit the next day. He said he would be ready to move on the 10th of April, and laid before Grant a plan for a coöperative campaign, which was of course satisfactory, as was always everything that Sherman proposed, but which the swift rush of events soon rendered superfluous. The President was also there, and an interesting conversation took place between these famous brothers-in-arms and Mr. Lincoln, after which Sherman went back to Goldsboro' and Grant began pushing his army to the left with even more than his usual iron energy.

It was a great army: it was the result of all the power and wisdom of the Government, all the devotion of the people, all the intelligence and teachableness of the soldiers themselves, and all the ability and character which the experience of a mighty war had developed in the officers. Few nations have produced better corps commanders than Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, and Parke, taking their names as they come in the vast sweep of the Union lines from Dinwiddie Court House to the James in the last days of March; north of the James was Weitzel, vigilant and capable. Between Grant and the Army of the Potomac was Meade, the incarnation of industry, zeal, and talent; and in command of all was Grant, then in his best days, the most extraordinary military temperament this country has ever seen. When unfriendly criticism has exhausted itself, the fact remains, not to be explained away by any reasoning, subtle or gross, that in this tremendous war he accomplished more with the means given him than any other two, on either side. The means given him were enormous, the support of the Government was intelligent and untiring; but others had received the same means and the same support—and he alone captured three armies. The popular instinct which hails him as our greatest general is correct; and the dilettante critics who write ingenious arguments to prove that one or another of his subordinates or his adversaries was his superior will please for a time their diminishing coteries, and then pass into silence without damaging his robust fame.

The numbers of the respective armies in this last grapple have been the occasion of endless controversy. We take the figures given by General Humphreys—not merely on account of his profound study of the subject and personal acquaintance with it, but because we consider him the most thoroughly candid and impartial man who has written the history of this army. The effective force of infantry of

the Army of the Potomac was 69,000; of field artillery, 6000, with 243 guns. The effective force of infantry of the Army of the James was 32,000; of field artillery, 3000, with 126 guns and 1700 cavalry, though General Ord took with him only about one-half his infantry; Sheridan's cavalymen, present for duty, 13,000; the grand total of all arms was 124,700. Lee's infantry numbered 46,000; his field artillery, 5000; his cavalry, 6000; in all, 57,000.

Grant's plan, as announced in his instructions of March 24,¹ was at first to dispatch Sheridan to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville railroads, at the same time moving a heavy force to the left, primarily to insure the success of Sheridan's raid,² and then to turn Lee's position. But his purpose grew and developed every hour, and before he had been a day away from his winter headquarters he had given up the comparatively narrow scheme with which he started and had adopted the far bolder and more comprehensive plan, which he carried out to his immortal honor. It is probable that to General Sheridan belongs a part of the credit of this change of plan. He informs us that when discretion was given him, in the Valley, either to go south, past Lee's right flank, and join Sherman, or to turn east and unite with the Army of the Potomac, he chose the latter course, because he thought it best that the Eastern army, which had thus far won scanty laurels when compared with the Western, should have the glory of this final victory; and that when he arrived at City Point and found General Grant's plans once more contemplated the possibility of sending his cavalry to Sherman and bringing that commander, after disposing of Johnston, to share in the destruction of Lee, Sheridan urged the General-in-Chief to finish the work immediately with the Army of the Potomac, that had so richly merited the glory which would come of the fruition of their long years of blood and toil. Both commanders were full of the spirit of victory. On the evening of the 29th of March, Sheridan's cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of the moving force of infantry extended to the Quaker road—almost to Lee's right flank on the White Oak Ridge. Grant's purpose had now taken complete shape in his mind. From his tent on Gravelly Creek he wrote to Sheridan, telling him the position of all his corps, and adding in simple words, which will stir the blood of every reader for ages to come, "I now feel like ending the matter . . . before we go back." He ordered Sheridan not to cut loose and go after the railroads, but to push for the

¹ Grant, Report.

² Grant wrote to Sherman on the 22d of March: "I shall start with no distinct view further than hold-

ing Lee's forces from following Sheridan. But I will be along myself, and will take advantage of anything that turns up." [Sherman, "Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 323.]

enemy's right rear. "We will all act together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy."

The next day Sheridan advanced to Five Forks, where he found a heavy force of the enemy. Lee, justly alarmed by Grant's movements, had drawn all his available troops out of the trenches, dispatched a sufficient force under Fitzhugh Lee to Five Forks to hold that important cross-roads, and had taken personal command of the rest on the White Oak Ridge. A heavy storm of rain began the night of the 29th, continuing more than twenty-four hours, and greatly impeded the march of the troops. Warren, on the morning of the 31st, worked his way towards the White Oak road; but before he reached it Lee came out of his lines and attacked Warren's advanced division (Ayers's) with such impetus that it was driven back on the main line at Gravelly Run. There, gallantly supported by General Miles of Humphreys's corps, who made a spirited attack on Lee's left flank, Warren held his own, and in the afternoon moved forward and drove the enemy into his works.

Lee, not satisfied with opposing Sheridan at Five Forks with cavalry, had on the 30th sent Pickett there with some 7000 infantry, which, with nearly an equal force of cavalry, was too much for the Union horse to handle. Sheridan was therefore, on the 31st, forced back to Dinwiddie Court House. "Here," says Grant, "Sheridan displayed great generalship." He fought with obstinate tenacity, disputing every inch of ground, deploying his cavalry on foot, leaving only men enough with his horses to guard them. He gave Pickett and Lee a hard day's work on the way to Dinwiddie, and at night reported his situation to Grant in his usual tone of valorous confidence. Grant, indeed, was far more disturbed than Sheridan. He rained orders and suggestions all night upon Meade, Warren, and Sheridan, the purpose of which was to effect a concentration at daylight on that portion of the enemy in front of Sheridan. Warren, giving his troops, who had been marching and fighting for three days, a few hours' needed rest, came in on Sheridan's right about dawn. But Pickett, seeing that he was out of position, did not wait to be caught between the two Union columns; he withdrew noiselessly during the night¹ and resumed his

strongly intrenched post at Five Forks. Grant, in ignorance of this timely flight of Pickett, was greatly incensed at Warren for not having done what is now seen to have been impossible to do, since Pickett was gone before the hour when Grant wished Warren to attack him. The long-smoldering dislike of Warren, which had been for months increasing in Grant's mind, now blazed out into active hostility, and he sent an aide-de-camp to Sheridan, suggesting that Warren be relieved from his command.²

Sheridan hurried up to Five Forks with his cavalry, leaving Warren to bring up the Fifth Corps. Filled, as Sheridan was all this day, with the most intense martial ardor, his judgment and control of his troops were never more powerful and comprehensive. He pressed with his cavalry the retreating Confederates until they came to Five Forks, and then assigned to Merritt the duty of demonstrating strongly on Pickett's right, while with the infantry of the Fifth Corps he was to strike the left flank, which ran along the White Oak road about three-quarters of a mile east from Five Forks and then made a return of a hundred yards to the north, perpendicular to the road. It was the old tactics of the Valley repeated, with the additional advantage in this case that, if successful, he would drive Pickett westward and cut him off from Lee. To guard against any interruption from the east, Mackenzie had been sent to take possession of the White Oak road, some three miles east of the Forks, a task which he promptly performed, and then came back to take his position on the right of the Fifth Corps.

The battle was fought almost as it was planned: the only difference between conception and execution arose from the fact that it had not been practicable to ascertain the precise position of the enemy's left flank, lest the attempt might put them on their guard. Ayers's division was on the left, Crawford on the right, Griffin behind Crawford, and in this way they moved to the attack about four o'clock. Warren, understanding that the enemy's lines reached farther down the road than was the case, sent Ayers, his smallest division, in a direction which brought it against the angle, and Crawford and Griffin were moving across the road and altogether past the left of the enemy into the woods, when the heavy firing in front

¹ The testimony of the Confederate generals in the Warren court of inquiry shows that Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee, anticipating Warren's arrival at daybreak, resolved to retire at ten o'clock on the night of the 31st of March, and that the movement began at once. "Nearly everything on wheels," Fitzhugh Lee said, "was away by midnight." At daylight the cavalry moved, covering the rear of the infantry. (Warren Court of Inquiry, p. 469.) General W. H. F. Lee's testimony is to the same effect, p. 536.

² Thorough inquiry among the friends of both generals seems to establish the fact that Grant's animosity towards Warren arose from the habit Warren had of discussing his orders, suggesting changes in plans of battle, and movements in support of his own. Grant regarded this habit as lacking in respect to himself, and although Warren was looked upon as one of the ablest and most devoted officers in the army, it was evident that sooner or later Grant's irritation would come to a point which would prove ruinous to Warren.

of Ayers warned Warren of his error, and he immediately bestirred himself to rectify it, sending his aides in every direction, and finally riding off into the woods to bring back Crawford and Griffin to the point where they were so greatly needed. All this occupied considerable time, and in the mean while the brunt of the battle fell upon Ayers's division. They were hardly strong enough for the work thus accidentally assigned them, and there might have been a serious check at that moment but for the providential presence of Sheridan himself, who, with a fury and vehemence founded on the soundest judgment, personally led the troops in their attack on the intrenchments. Those who saw him that day will tell the story to their latest breath, how, holding the colors in his hand, with a face darkened with smoke and anger, and with sharp exhortations that rang like pistol-shots, he gathered up the faltering battalions of Ayers and swept like a spring gust over Pickett's breastworks. Meanwhile Warren was doing similar work on the right. He had at last succeeded in giving his other two divisions the right direction, and came in on the reverse of the enemy's lines. At one moment, finding some hesitation in a part of Crawford's force, "Warren, riding forward," says Humphreys, "with the corps flag in his hand, led his troops across the field." His horse was shot dead in the final charge. The dusk of evening came down on one of the most complete and momentous victories of the war. Pickett was absolutely routed; every man was driven from the field except the killed and wounded, and the prisoners, who were gathered in to the number of some five thousand, with a great quantity of guns and colors. As the battle was ending, Sheridan sent an order to Warren relieving him of his command and directing him to report to General Grant for orders.

It does not come within the compass of this work to review all the circumstances which led General Grant to entertain so rooted a dislike to Warren, and General Sheridan, who had but a slight acquaintance with him,¹ to adopt his chief's opinions. In removing him from command they were perfectly justified. Honestly holding the opinion they held of him, it was their duty to prevent the evils they thought might result from his retention in so important a trust. But it is not improper here to say that a court of inquiry, which General Warren succeeded in obtaining after General Grant had for twelve years denied it to him, decided that the opinions under which Grant and Sheridan acted were erroneous, and that

Warren did his whole duty at Five Forks. Grant never changed his opinion of him. It is true he offered him another command the next day, and soon afterwards he was given an important department to administer; but the General-in-Chief was always implacable towards him. Even on his death-bed, when he forgave all his enemies, and sent forth that touching appeal for human kindness, not only to his friends, but to those who had not hitherto been friends, he kept his feeling of keen dislike for Warren—then sleeping in his honored grave—and wrote it down for future ages in his "Memoirs." A curious instance of his increasing bitterness is seen in one phrase. In his report of 1865 he says Warren was relieved "about the close of this battle"; in his "Memoirs" he says "the troops were brought up and an assault successfully made"—*after* Warren was relieved.

APPOMATTOX.

THE battle of Five Forks ought to have ended the war: Lee's right had been shattered and routed; his line, as he had long predicted, had been stretched westward until it broke: there was no longer any hope of saving Richmond, or even of materially delaying its fall. But General Lee apparently thought that even the gain of a day was of value to the Richmond Government, and what was left of the Army of Northern Virginia was still so perfect in discipline and obedience that it answered with unabated spirit and courage every demand made upon it. It is painful to record or to read the story of the hard fighting of the 2d of April; every drop of blood spent on the lines of Petersburg that day seems to have been shed in vain.

Parke and Wright had been ordered on the 30th of March to examine the enemy's works in their respective fronts with a view to determine whether it was practicable to carry them by assault; they had both reported favorably. After the great victory of Five Forks, Grant, whose anxiety for Sheridan seems excessive, thought that Lee would reënforce against him heavily,² when, in fact, Lee had already sent to his right all the troops that could be spared, and Sheridan had routed them. To relieve Sheridan, and to take advantage of any weakness in Lee's extended front, Grant now ordered an assault all along the lines. The answers came in with electric swiftness and confidence: Wright said he would "make the fur fly"; Ord promised to go into the Confederate lines "like a hot knife into butter." The ground,

¹ "As we had never been thrown much together, I knew but little of him." [Sheridan, "Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 168.]

² Grant to Ord: "I have just heard from Sheridan. . . . Everything the enemy has will probably be pushed against him."

however, in front of Ord was so difficult that Grant gave him no positive orders to assault, but, on the contrary, enjoined upon him great vigilance and caution. Similar instructions were given to Humphreys; Miles, of his corps, was ordered westward on the White Oak road to help Sheridan, and Wright and Parke were directed to attack at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. Grant's principal anxiety was lest Lee should get away from Petersburg and overwhelm Sheridan on the White Oak road. Lee was thinking of nothing of the kind. The terrible blow his right had received seemed to have stunned him. He waited, with a fortitude not far from despair, for the attack which the morning was sure to bring, making what hasty preparations were in his power for the coming storm. It came with the first glimmer of dawn. Wright, who had carefully studied the ground in his front, from the safe point of vantage he had gained the day of Gordon's ill-fated sortie, had selected the open space in front of Forts Fisher and Walsh as the weak point in the Confederate harness. Not that it was really weak, except in comparison with the almost impregnable works to right and left: the enemy's front was intersected by marshy rivulets; a heavy *abatis* had to be cut away under musketry fire from the parapets and a rain of artillery from the batteries. It was a quarter to five before there was light enough to guide the storming columns; but at that instant they swarmed forward, rushing over the Confederate pickets with too much momentum to be delayed a minute, and, gaining the main works, made them their own after a brief but murderous conflict. In fifteen minutes Wright lost eleven hundred men. They wasted not an instant after this immense success. Some pushed on in the ardor of the assault across the Boydtown road as far as the South Side Railroad;¹ the gallant Confederate General A. P. Hill rode unawares upon a squad of these skirmishers, and, refusing to surrender, lost his life at their hands. But the main body of the troops wisely improved their victory. A portion of them worked resolutely to the right, meeting strong resistance from the Confederates under Wilcox; the larger part re-formed with the celerity that comes from discipline and experience, and moved down the reverse of the captured lines to Hatcher's Run, where, about seven o'clock, having swept everything before them and made large captures of men and guns, they met their comrades of the Twenty-fourth Corps, whom they joined, facing about and marching over ground cleared of the enemy till the left closed in on the Appomattox River.

¹ Humphreys, p. 365.

² W. H. Taylor, "Four Years with General Lee."

Parke also assaulted at the earliest light, meeting with a success on the outer line equally brilliant and important, capturing four hundred yards of intrenchments with many guns, colors, and prisoners. But there was in front of him an interior line, heavily fortified, and here the enemy, under General Gordon, not only made a stand, but resumed the offensive and assaulted several times during the day, without success, the lines which Parke had seized in the morning and hastily reversed. On the left Humphreys displayed his usual intelligent energy; as soon as he heard of the success of Wright and Parke, on his right, he attacked with Hays's division the Confederate redoubt at Crow's House, capturing the works, the guns, and most of the garrison, while upon his left Mott's division drove the enemy out of their works at Burgess's Mill. Humphreys wanted to concentrate his whole corps against the scattered enemy by the Claibourne road; but General Meade countermanded the movement. Mott and Hays were ordered towards Petersburg, and Miles, who had been holding the White Oak road for Sheridan, was therefore left alone to deal with Heth's division, which had hastily intrenched itself near Sutherland's Station, and here a sharp fight took place. Miles, twice repulsed, stuck obstinately to his task, and about three o'clock whipped and dislodged the enemy, making large captures, and driving him off towards the Appomattox and Amelia Court House.

Two forts—Gregg and Whitworth—on the main line of the Confederate intrenchments west of Petersburg made a stout resistance to the National troops. The former was a very strong work, surrounded by a deep and wide wet ditch, flanked by fire to the right and left. It was an ugly thing to handle, but Foster's and Turner's divisions of Gibbon's corps assaulted with unflinching valor, meeting a desperate resistance. Every advantage, except that of numbers, was on the side of its brave defenders, and they put twice their own number *hors du combat* before they surrendered. Gibbon reports a loss of 714 killed and wounded; 55 Confederate dead were found in the work. After Gregg had fallen, Turner's men made short work of Whitworth, and the Confederates, from the Appomattox to the Weldon road, fell slowly back to their inner line of works near Petersburg, now garrisoned by Longstreet's troops, who had come in from the north side of the James.

The attack of Wright, though it must have been anticipated, came upon General Lee with the stunning effect of lightning. Before the advance of the National army had been reported to Lee or Hill, they saw squads of men in blue scattered about the Boydtown road,² and it was in riding forward to ascer-

tain what the strange apparition meant that General Hill lost his life. General Lee, in full uniform, with his dress sword, which he seldom wore, but which he had put on that morning in honor of the momentous day he saw coming,¹—being determined, with that chivalrous spirit of his, to receive adversity splendidly,—watched from the lawn in front of his headquarters the formidable advance of the National troops before whom his weakened lines were breaking into spray, and then, mounting his iron-gray charger, slowly rode back to his inner line. There his ragged troops received him with shouts and cheers which showed there was plenty of fight left in them; and there he spent the day in making preparations for the evacuation which was now the only resort left him. He sent a dispatch to Richmond, carrying in brief and simple words the message of doom to the Confederate authorities: "I see no prospect of doing more than holding our position here till night. I am not certain I can do that." He succinctly stated the disaster that had befallen him, announced his purpose of concentrating on the Danville road, and advised that all preparations be made for leaving Richmond that night.

Some Confederate writers express surprise that General Grant did not attack and destroy Lee's army on the afternoon of the 2d of April; but this is a view, after the fact, easy to express. Wright's and Humphreys's troops on the Union left had been on foot for eighteen hours; they had fought an important battle, marched and countermarched many miles, and were now confronted by Longstreet's fresh corps, behind formidable works, led by the best of Lee's generals; while the attitude of the force under Gordon, on the south side of the town, was such as to require the close attention of Parke. Grant, anticipating an early retirement of Lee from his citadel, wisely resolved to avoid the waste and bloodshed of an immediate assault on the inner lines at Petersburg. He ordered Sheridan to get upon Lee's line of retreat, sent Humphreys to strengthen him; then, directing a general bombardment for five o'clock the next morning, and an assault at six, he gave himself and his soldiers a little of the rest they had so richly earned, and which they so seriously needed, as a restorative after the labors past and a preparation for the labors to come.

He had telegraphed during the day to President Lincoln, who was at City Point, the great day's news as it developed hour by hour. He was particularly happy at the large captures. "How many prisoners?" was always the first question as an aide-de-camp came galloping in with news of success. Prisoners he regarded as so much net gain: he was weary of slaugh-

ter; he wanted the war ended with the least bloodshed possible. It was with the greatest delight that he was able to telegraph on this Sunday afternoon, "The whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men and probably fifty pieces of artillery."

General Lee, after the first shock of the breaking of his lines, soon recovered his usual *sang-froid*, and bent all his energies to saving his army and leading it out of its untenable position on the James to a point from which he could effect a junction with Johnston in North Carolina. The place selected for this purpose was Burkeville, at the crossing of the South Side and Danville roads, fifty miles from Richmond, whence a short distance would bring him to Danville, where the desired junction might be made. Even in this ruin of the Confederacy, when the organized revolt which he had sustained so long with the bayonets of his soldiers was crashing about his ears, he was able still to cradle himself in the illusion that it was only a campaign that had failed; that he might withdraw his troops, form a junction with Johnston, and continue the war indefinitely in another field. Whatever we may think of his judgment, it is impossible not to admire the coolness of a general who, in the midst of irremediable disaster such as encompassed Lee on the afternoon of the 2d of April, could write such a letter as he wrote to Jefferson Davis under date of three o'clock.² He began it by a quiet and calm discussion of the question of negro recruitment; promised to give his attention to the business of finding suitable officers for the black regiments; hoped the appeal Mr. Davis had made to the governors would have a good effect; and, altogether, wrote as if years of struggle and effort were before him and his chief. He then went on to narrate the story of the day's catastrophe and to give his plans for the future. He closed by apologizing for "writing such a hurried letter to your Excellency," on the ground that he was "in the presence of the enemy, endeavoring to resist his advance."

At nightfall all his preparations were completed. He mounted his horse, and riding out of the town dismounted at the mouth of the road leading to Amelia Court House, the first point of rendezvous, where he had directed supplies to be sent, and standing beside his horse, the bridle reins in his hand, he watched his troops file noiselessly by in the darkness. At three o'clock the town, which had been so long and so stoutly defended, was abandoned; only a thin line of skirmishers was left in front of Parke, and before daybreak he pierced the

¹ J. E. Cooke, "Life of R. E. Lee."

² Davis, "Rise and Fall," Vol. II., p. 660.

line in several places, gathering in the few pickets that were left. The town was formally surrendered to Colonel Ely at half-past four, anticipating the capitulation which some one else offered to General Wright a few minutes later. Meade reported the news to Grant and instantly received the order to march his army immediately up the Appomattox by the river road; and Grant, divining the intentions of Lee, dispatched an officer to Sheridan, directing him to push with all speed to the Danville road with Humphreys and Griffin and all the cavalry.

Thus the flight and the pursuit began almost at the same moment. The swift-footed Army of Northern Virginia was now racing for its life; and Grant, inspired with more than his native tenacity and energy, and thoroughly aroused to the tremendous task of ending the war at once, not only pressed his enemy in the rear, but hung upon his flank, and strained every nerve to get in his front. It is characteristic of him that he did not even allow himself the pleasure of entering Richmond, which, deserted by those who had so often promised to protect it, and wrapped in flames lighted by the reckless hands of Confederate officials, surrendered to Weitzel early on the morning of the 3d.

All that day Lee pushed forward towards Amelia Court House. He seemed in higher spirits than usual. As one who has long been dreading bankruptcy feels a great load taken from his mind when his assignment is made, so the Virginian chief, when he drew out from the ruin and conflagration in which the Confederate dream of independent power was passing away, and marched with his men into the vernal fields and woods of his native State, was filled with a new sense of encouragement and cheer. "I have got my army safe out of its breast-works," he said, "and in order to follow me the enemy must abandon his lines, and can derive no further benefit from his railroads or James River."¹ But he was now dealing with the man who, in Mississippi, had boldly swung loose from his base of supplies in an enemy's country, in face of an army equal to his own, and had won a victory a day without a wagon train.

There was little fighting the first day except among the cavalry. Custer attacked the Confederates at Namozine Church, and later in the day Merritt's cavalry had a sharp contest with Fitzhugh Lee at Deep Creek. On the

4th, Sheridan, who was aware of Lee's intention to concentrate at Amelia Court House, brought his cavalry with great speed to Jetersville, about eight miles southwest of the Court House, where Lee's army was resting. Sheridan intrenched, and sent tidings of his own and the enemy's position to Grant, and on the afternoon of the next day² the Second and Sixth corps came up. A terrible disappointment awaited General Lee on his arrival at Amelia Court House. He had ordered, he says, supplies to be sent there; but when his half-starved troops arrived on the 4th of April they found that no food had been sent to meet them, and nearly twenty-four hours were lost in collecting subsistence for men and horses. "This delay was fatal, and could not be retrieved."³ The whole pursuing force was south and stretching out to the west of him, when he started on the night of the 5th of April to make one more effort to reach a place of temporary safety. Burkeville, the junction of the Lynchburg and Danville roads, was in Grant's possession; the way to Danville was barred, and the supply of provisions from the south cut off. Lee was compelled to change his route to the west; and he now started for Lynchburg, which he was destined never to reach.

It had been Meade's intention to attack Lee at Amelia Court House on the morning of the 6th of April, but before he reached that place he discovered that Lee's westward march had already begun, and that the Confederates were well beyond the Union left. Meade quickly faced his army about and started in pursuit. A running fight ensued for fourteen miles; the enemy, with remarkable quickness and dexterity, halting and partially intrenching themselves from time to time, and the National forces driving them out of every position, moving so swiftly that lines of battle followed closely on the skirmish line. At several points the cavalry, on this and the preceding day, harassed the moving left flank of the Confederates and worked havoc on the trains, on one occasion causing a grievous loss to history by burning Lee's headquarters baggage with all its wealth of returns and reports. Sheridan and Meade pressed so closely at last that Ewell's corps was brought to bay at Sailor's Creek, a rivulet running northward into the Appomattox. Here an important battle, or rather series of battles, took place, with fatal results to Lee's fast vanishing army. The Fifth Corps held the extreme

¹ J. E. Cooke, "Life of R. E. Lee," p. 451.

² April 5.

³ Lee's report of the surrender. Other Confederate writers insist that the train which should have borne these supplies to Lee was directed to Richmond to assist the flight of the Confederate authorities. (Pollard,

"Lost Cause," p. 703.) Jefferson Davis ("Rise and Fall," Vol. II., p. 668) denounces the whole story as a malignant calumny, and gives voluminous statements from Confederate officers to confute it. But there seems no reason to doubt General Lee's statement, made to Mr. Davis in his report at the time.

right and was not engaged. Humphreys, coming to where the roads divided, took the right fork and drove Gordon down towards the mouth of the creek. A sharp battle was fought about dark, which resulted in the total defeat of the Confederates, Humphreys capturing 1700 prisoners, 13 flags, 4 guns, and a large part of the main trains; Gordon making his escape in the night to High Bridge with what was left of his command. Wright, on the left-hand road, had also a keen fight, and won a most valuable victory. With Wheaton's and Seymour's divisions he attacked Ewell's corps, in position on the banks of the creek, enveloping him with the utmost swiftness and vehemence; Sheridan, whose cavalry had intercepted the Confederates, ordered Cook and Merritt to attack on the left, which was done with such vigor—Davies's horsemen riding over the enemy's breastworks at a single rush—that, smitten in front and flank, unable either to stand or to get away, Ewell's whole force was captured on the field. The day's loss was deadly to Lee, not less than eight thousand in all; among them such famous generals as Ewell, Kershaw, Custis Lee, Corse, and others were prisoners.

In the mean time Ord, under Sheridan's orders, had moved rapidly along the Lynchburg road to Rice's Station, where he found Longstreet's corps entrenched, and night came on before he could get into position to attack. General Read, Ord's chief-of-staff, had gone still farther forward with eighty horsemen and five hundred infantry to burn High Bridge, if possible. He passed through Farmville, and was within two miles of the bridge, when he fell in with two divisions of Confederate cavalry under Rosser and Munford. One of the most gallant and pathetic battles of the war took place. General Read, Colonel Washburn, and all the cavalry officers with Read were killed, and the rest captured; the Confederate loss was also heavy. Read's generous self-sacrifice halted the Confederate army for several hours. Longstreet lost the day at Rice's Station waiting for Anderson, Ewell, and Gordon to unite with him. They were engaged in a fruitless attempt to save their trains,¹ which resulted, as we have seen, in the almost total loss of the trains, in the capture of Ewell's entire force, and in the routing and shattering of the other commands. The day's work was of incalculable value to the National arms. Sheridan's unerring eye appreciated the full importance of it; his hasty report ended with the words, "If the thing is pressed, I think that Lee will surrender." Grant sent the dispatch to President Lincoln, who instantly replied, "Let the thing be pressed."²

In fact, after nightfall of the 6th Lee's army could only flutter like a wounded bird with one

wing shattered; there was no longer any possibility of escape. Yet General Lee found it hard to relinquish the illusions of years, and his valiant heart still dreamed of evading the gathering toils and forming somewhere a junction with Johnston and indefinitely prolonging the war. As soon as night had come down on the disastrous field of Sailor's Creek, he again took up his weary march westward. Longstreet marched for Farmville, crossed to the north bank of the Appomattox, and on the 7th moved out on the road which ran through Appomattox Court House to Lynchburg. His famishing troops had found provisions at Farmville, and with this refreshment marched with such celerity that Grant and Sheridan, with all the energy they could breathe into their subordinates, could not head them off, or bring them to decisive battle that day. Nevertheless the advance of the Union army hung close upon the heels of the Confederates. The rear corps under Gordon had burned the railroad bridge, near Farmville, behind them; but General Barlow, sending his men forward at double-quick, saved the wagon bridge, and the Second Corps crossed over without delay and continued the chase, Humphreys taking the northern road, and sending Barlow by the railroad bed along the river. Barlow overtook Gordon's rear, working great destruction among his trains. Humphreys came up with the main body shortly after noon, and pressing them closely held them till evening, expecting Barlow to join him, and Wright and Crook to cross the river and attack from the south, a movement which the swollen water and the destruction of the bridge prevented. General Irwin Gregg's brigade had indeed succeeded in getting over, but was attacked by an overwhelming force of Confederate cavalry,—three divisions,—Gregg being captured, and his brigade driven back. This trivial success in the midst of unspeakable disaster delighted General Lee. He said to his son, W. H. F. Lee, "Keep your command together, General; do not let it think of surrender. I will get you out of this."³

But his inveterate optimism was not shared by his subordinates. A number of his principal officers, selecting General Pendleton as their spokesman, made known to him on the 7th their belief that further resistance was useless, and advised surrender. General Lee replied: "I trust it has not come to that. . . . We have yet too many bold men to think of laying down our arms.' . . . Besides, he feared that if he made the first overtures for capitulation Grant would regard it as a confession of weakness, and demand unconditional sur-

¹ Humphreys, p. 385.

² Badeau, Vol. III., p. 581.

³ J. E. Cooke, "Life of R. E. Lee," p. 455.

render."¹ But General Grant did not wish to drive a gallant antagonist to such extremes. On this same day, seeing how desperate was Lee's condition, and anxious to have an end of the now useless strife, he sent him this courteous and generous summons:²

The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance, on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

This letter was sent at night through Humphreys's lines to Lee, who at once answered: "Though not entertaining the opinion you express of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender." The forlorn remnant of the Confederate army stole away in the night, on the desperate chance of finding food at Appomattox and a way of escape to Lynchburg, and at daybreak the hot pursuit was resumed by the Second and Sixth corps. All this day the flight and chase continued, through a portion of Virginia never as yet wasted by the passage of hostile armies. The air was sweet and pure, scented by opening buds and the breath of spring; the early peach trees were in flower; the sylvan by-paths were slightly shaded by the pale-green foliage of leafing trees. Through these quiet solitudes the fast-diminishing army of Lee plodded on, in the apathetic obedience which is all there is left to brave men when hope is gone, and behind them came the victorious legions of Grant, inspired to the forgetfulness of pain and fatigue by the stimulus of a prodigious success. Sheridan on the extreme left, by unheard-of exertions at last accomplished the important task of placing himself squarely on Lee's line of retreat. His advance, under Custer, captured, about sunset on the evening of the 8th, Appomattox Station with four trains of provisions, then attacked the rebel force advancing from Farmville, and drove it towards the Court House, taking twenty-five guns and many prisoners. A reconnaissance revealed the startling fact that Lee's whole army was coming up the road. Though he had nothing but cavalry, Sheridan with undaunted courage resolved to hold the inestimable advantage he had gained, sending a request to Grant to hurry up the required infantry support, saying that if Gibbon and Griffin could get to him that night "the job might be finished in the morning." He added, with singular prescience, referring to

the negotiations which had been opened, "I do not think Lee means to surrender until compelled to do so."

This was strictly true. When Grant received Lee's first letter he replied on the morning of the 8th, saying: "Peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon; namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified from taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received." But in the course of the day a last hope seemed to have come to Lee that he might yet reach Appomattox in safety and thence make his way to Lynchburg—a hope utterly fallacious, for Stoneman was now on the railroad near Lynchburg. He therefore, while giving orders to his subordinates to press with the utmost energy westward, answered General Grant's letter in a tone more ingenious than candid, reserving, while negotiations were going on, the chance of breaking away.

In my note of yesterday [he said] I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot therefore meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 A. M., to-morrow, on the old stage road to Richmond between the picket lines of the two armies.

Grant was not to be entrapped into a futile negotiation for the restoration of peace. He doubtless had in view the President's peremptory instructions of the 3d of March, forbidding him to entertain any proposition except for the surrender of armies, or to engage in any political discussion or conference. He therefore answered General Lee on the morning of the 9th of April with perfect courtesy, but with unmistakable frankness, saying: "I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace. The meeting proposed for 10 A. M., to-day, could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally desirous for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that

¹ Long, p. 417.

² April 7.

most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself," etc. He dispatched this letter to Lee and then set off to the left, where Sheridan was barring Lee's last avenue of escape.

It appears from General Lee's report, made four days after the surrender, that he had no intention on the night of the 8th of giving up the fight. He ordered Fitz Lee, supported by Gordon, in the morning "to drive the enemy from his front, wheel to the left and cover the passage of the trains, while Longstreet . . . should close up and hold the position." He expected to find only cavalry on the ground, and thought even his remnant of infantry could break through Sheridan's horse while he himself was amusing Grant with platonic discussions in the rear. But he received, on arriving at the rendezvous he had suggested, not only Grant's stern refusal to enter into a political negotiation, but other intelligence which was to him the trump of doom. Ord and Griffin had made an almost incredible march of some thirty miles during the preceding day and night, and had come up at daylight to the post assigned them in support of Sheridan; and when Fitzhugh Lee and Gordon made their advance in the morning and the National cavalry fell slowly back, in obedience to their orders, there suddenly appeared before the amazed Confederates a formidable force of infantry filling the road, covering the adjacent hills and valley, and barring as with an adamant wall the further progress of the army of the revolt. The marching of the Confederate army was over forever. The appalling tidings were instantly carried to Lee. He at once sent orders to cease hostilities, and, suddenly brought to a sense of his real situation, sent a note to Grant, asking an interview in accordance with the offer contained "in Grant's letter of the 8th for the surrender of his army." Grant had created the emergency calling for such action. As Sheridan was about to charge on the huddled mass of astonished horse and foot in front of him a flag of truce was displayed, and the war was at an end. The Army of Northern Virginia was already captured. "I've got 'em, like that!" cried Sheridan, doubling up his fist, fearful of some ruse or evasion in the white flag. The Army of the Potomac on the north and east, Sheridan and Ord on the south and west, completely encircled the demoralized and crumbled army of Lee. There was not another day's fighting in them. That morning at three o'clock Gordon

had sent word to Lee that he "had fought his corps to a frazzle, and could do nothing more unless heavily supported by Longstreet." Lee and his army were prisoners of war before he and Grant met at Appomattox.

The meeting took place at the house of Mr. McLean, in the edge of the village. Lee met Grant at the threshold, and ushered him into a small and barely furnished parlor where were soon assembled the leading officers of the National army. General Lee was accompanied only by his secretary, Colonel Charles Marshall. A short conversation led up to a request from Lee for the terms on which the surrender of his army would be received. Grant briefly stated the terms which would be accorded. Lee acceded to them, and Grant wrote the following letter:

In accordance with the substance of my letter to you on the 8th inst. I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authorities so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

General Grant says in his "Memoirs" that up to the moment when he put pen to paper he had not thought of a word that he should write. The terms he had verbally proposed, and which Lee had accepted, were soon put in writing, and there he might have stopped. But as he wrote, a feeling of sympathy for his gallant antagonist gradually came over him, and he added the extremely liberal terms with which his letter closed. The sight of Lee's sword, an especially fine one, suggested the paragraph allowing officers to retain their side-arms; and he ended with a phrase which he had evidently not thought of and for which he had no authority, which practically pardoned and amnes-tied every man in Lee's army — a thing he had refused to consider the day before, and which had been expressly forbidden him in President Lincoln's order of the 3d of March.¹ Yet so great was the joy over the crowning victory, so

¹ The President in his Amnesty Proclamation of December 8, 1863, expressly excepted officers above the rank of colonel, all who left seats in Congress to aid the rebellion, and all who resigned commissions in

the army or navy of the United States and afterwards participated in the rebellion. The terms granted at Appomattox practically extended amnesty to many persons in these classes.

deep was the gratitude of the Government and the people to Grant and his heroic army, that his terms were accepted as he wrote them, and his exercise of the Executive prerogative of pardon entirely overlooked. It must be noticed here, however, as a few days later it led the greatest of Grant's generals into serious error.

Lee must have read the memorandum of terms with as much surprise as gratification. He said the permission for officers to retain their side-arms would have a happy effect. He then suggested and gained another important concession — that those of the cavalry and artillery who owned their own horses should be allowed to take them home to put in their crops. Lee wrote a brief reply accepting the terms. He then remarked that his army was in a starving condition, and asked Grant to provide them with subsistence and forage, to which he at once assented, and asked for how many men the rations would be wanted. Lee answered, "About twenty-five thousand," and orders were at once given to issue them. The number surrendered turned out to be even larger than this. The paroles signed amounted to 28,231. If we add to this the captures at Five Forks, Petersburg, and Sailor's Creek, the thousands who deserted the failing cause at every by-road leading to their homes, and filled every wood and thicket between Richmond and Lynchburg, we can see how considerable an army Lee commanded when Grant "started out gunning." Yet every Confederate writer, speaker, and singer who refers to the surrender says, and will say forever, that Lee surrendered only seven thousand muskets.

With these brief and simple formalities one of the most momentous transactions of modern times was concluded. The news soon transpired, and the Union gunners prepared to fire a national salute; but Grant would not permit it. He forbade any rejoicing over a fallen enemy, who he hoped would hereafter be an enemy no longer. The next day he rode to the Confederate lines to make a visit of farewell to General Lee. Sitting on horseback between the lines, the two heroes of the war held a friendly conversation. Lee considered the war at an end, slavery dead, the national authority restored; Johnston must now surrender — the sooner the better. Grant urged him to make a public appeal to hasten the return of peace; but Lee, true to his ideas of subordination to a government which had ceased to exist, said he could not do this without consulting the Confederate President. They parted with courteous good wishes, and Grant, without pausing to look at the city he had taken or the enormous system of works which had so long held him at bay, intent only upon reaping the peaceful results of his colossal victory, and putting an end to the waste and the burden of war, hurried away to Washington to do what he could for this practical and beneficent purpose. He had done an inestimable service to the Republic: he had won immortal honor for himself; but neither then nor at any subsequent period of his life was there any sign in his words or his bearing of the least touch of vainglory. The day after Appomattox he was as simple, modest, and unassuming a citizen as he was the day before Sumter.



TELLUS.

WHY here on this third planet from the sun
 Fret we, and smite against our prison-bars?
 Why not in Saturn, Mercury, or Mars
 Mourn we our sins, the things undone and done?
 Where was the soul's bewildering course begun?
 In what sad land among the scattered stars
 Wrought she the ill which now for ever scars
 By bitter consequence each victory won?
 I know not, dearest friend; yet this I see,
 That thou for holier fellowships wast meant;
 Through some strange blunder thou art here; and we,
 Who on the convict-ship were hither sent
 By judgment just, must not be named with thee
 Whose tranquil presence shames our discontent.

William R. Huntington.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

Southern Cadets in Action.

IN his sketch of "The West Point of the Confederacy," published in THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for January, 1889, Mr. John S. Wise says: "At a later period of the war it [the Virginia Military Institute] had, I believe, the exceptional honor of having sent its corps of cadets, as a body, into battle." The cadets of the University of Alabama share with the Virginia Military Institute corps the honor of having received "a baptism of fire" in the closing days of the war.¹ In fact, from the thoroughness of its military organization and equipment, and from the number and quality of the officers it furnished the Southern army, the University of Alabama may fairly contest with the Virginia Institute the honor of having been the "West Point of the Confederacy."

Unlike the Virginia Military Institute, the University of Alabama was not founded as a military school; but the legislature of the State, at its session of 1859-60, probably in anticipation of the "irrepressible conflict" between the sections, took steps towards grafting a military department on the classical and scientific courses of the institution, and in September, 1860, its students for the first time went into camp on the college grounds as a military body under the name of the Alabama Corps of Cadets. Colonel Caleb Huse, now in charge of a training school for West Point at Highland Falls, N. Y., who was then a young army officer, was detailed as commandant of cadets, and under his direction the corps soon reached a high degree of excellence in drill and discipline. At the outbreak of the war Colonel Huse resigned his commission in the army and accepted an important post under the Confederate Government. Colonel J. T. Murfee, an accomplished officer and a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, succeeded Colonel Huse as commandant, and he was aided in perfecting the organization of the military department of the institution by a complement of young officers known as "State Captains," most of whom were also Virginia Military Institute graduates.

As the war became more and more an earnest reality the University of Alabama assumed more and more the aspects of a second West Point. The president, Dr. L. C. Garland, now the venerable chancellor of the Vanderbilt University, donned the regulation gray of a Confederate colonel, and held reviews, inspections, etc., with the soldierly precision of a West Point superintendent. From time to time the young men whom the University had trained to the profession of arms were commissioned as officers in the Southern army, and of these quite a number rose rapidly in rank; one

¹ In a communication published in the "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Lieutenant James Oates, of the 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry, writing of Sherman's march towards Atlanta, says: "It was during the advance that day [May 9, 1864] that we came in contact with the Georgia Cadets from the Military Institute at Marietta, who had come out from the woods at Resaca and formed their line behind a rail fence. After a volley from the Cadets, which killed several of our men, our regiment charged them. . . ."—EDITOR.

of them, the lamented General John C. Saunders, having won the stars of a brigadier before he had reached his majority.

The university, being located at Tuscaloosa, in the interior of the State, was for a long time exempt from danger from the raiders who ravaged the northern borders of Alabama; but as the crisis drew on in the spring of 1865 the Federal troops came nearer and nearer. On the 30th of March, General E. M. McCook, then at Elyton (at present a suburb of the new city of Birmingham), fifty miles northeast of Tuscaloosa, acting under orders from General J. H. Wilson, detached Brigadier-General John T. Croxton and his brigade of fifteen hundred veteran cavalry with orders "to proceed rapidly by the most direct route to Tuscaloosa, to destroy the bridge, factories, mills, university (military school), and whatever else might be of benefit to the rebel cause."

The opportunity was now at hand for the cadet corps to taste the realities of war that it had so often mimicked in the marching and countermarching of the battalion manœuvres. The corps was about three hundred strong and was in fine trim. On the night of the 3d of April "taps" was sounded as usual. The cadets went to bed with little thought that within three miles, just across the Black Warrior River, lay Croxton's raiders, ready to make a dash across the bridge into Tuscaloosa. The Federal general, by his capture of scouts and citizens, had prevented knowledge of his approach. The surprise was complete. For the sake of form, a few of the "home guard"—old men and boys—had been kept at the bridge that night; but no one had an idea that the Federals were near. When their approach was discovered, a courier was at once dispatched to the university. The long roll was sounded, and in a few moments the cadet battalion was formed and hurried away in the darkness to the brow of the hill overlooking the bridge. There a line of battle was formed.

It was too late. Croxton's men had already crossed the bridge and were formed on the river bank. The cadets, however, were eager for the fray, and the two or three volleys that they poured down the hill for a while disconcerted the Federals and checked their advance. There was rapid firing for a short time on both sides; but, owing probably to the darkness of the night, the casualties were few. The officer in charge of the cadets, seeing the hopelessness of an attempt to dislodge a force so superior in numbers, drew off his command, having sustained a loss of only three or four wounded.

General Croxton, in his official report, makes no mention of the losses sustained by the Federals. He says: "They [the militia and cadets] made several unsuccessful attempts to dislodge us, but failed, and morning found us in peaceful possession of the premises, with sixty prisoners and three pieces of artillery." The prisoners referred to were members of the "home guard," and not cadets. The three pieces of artillery

belonged to the cadet battery, but they had not been taken into the action. The Federals found them under a shed, where they had been stored for protection from the weather.

The sequel to this scrap of history is briefly told. The cadets retreated in the direction of Marion, some fifty miles distant, where a few days later they were disbanded. General Croxton carried out faithfully his orders to destroy the university. Its handsome buildings, its extensive libraries, and its valuable chemical and physical apparatus, representing in all nearly a half million dollars, went up in smoke. However, like the Virginia Military Institute, the University of Alabama has been rebuilt, and is growing with equal pace with the prosperous State of which it is the educational center. It still retains the military feature as a means of discipline and physical culture among its students; but it is not probable that its cadet corps will ever again have the brush of real war that the boys of 1865 experienced on that memorable April night.

UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA.

T. C. McCorvey.

"Who ever saw a Dead Cavalryman?"

THE article in *THE CENTURY* for May, 1888, entitled "The Chances of Being Hit in Battle," contains this statement (page 102): "Cavalrymen go into action oftener than infantrymen, and so their losses, being distributed among a larger number of engagements, do not appear remarkable as reported for any one affair. Still, in some of their fights the 'dead cavalryman' could be seen in numbers that answered only too well the famous question of General Hooker, 'Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?'"

The candor and fairness evident in the whole article forbid the thought of a purpose to cast a reflection on this arm of the service, for Colonel Fox at once proceeds to show on indisputable authority a record of 10,596 "dead cavalrymen." The credit given General Hooker of being the author of this interrogatory, as Colonel Fox states it, is open to objection in more than one respect. General Hooker did not ask a question; he did not make an offensive allusion; but he did make a remark from which have grown many phrases, the most frequent being the form now given. The circumstances calling forth the remark are well known to the writer, and are briefly narrated as follows: When Fitzhugh Lee's brigade crossed the Rappahannock in November, 1862, attacking the outposts at Hartwood Church, composed of four companies of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, he inflicted a loss of eighty men, wounded and captured. Soon after this occurrence had been reported to General Hooker, then commanding the Right Grand Division of the Army of the Potomac, he rode over to General Averell's headquarters to confer with him. Of course the matter under consideration was the loss to General Averell's old regiment, whose record of service had given him rank as brigadier-general. As the interview ended, and General Hooker was leaving, he remarked, "Well, General, we have not had many dead cavalrymen lying about lately!" This remark was not intended to be in any sense offensive or derisive, although this is the use

generally made of it. It was no doubt meant in a comparative sense, as the losses in the cavalry up to that time had not attracted any special mention. Standing alone, as it does in Colonel Fox's article, it admits only of a construction which is thoroughly demolished by the force of statement and narration of facts piled on it by the author of the article, and the circumstances connected with it do not sustain the version given.

*Jno. C. Hunterson,
3d Pennsylvania Cavalry.*

Shooting into Libby Prison.

A DENIAL BY ONE OF THE GUARD.

IN an article on "Colonel Rose's Tunnel at Libby Prison," that appeared in *THE CENTURY MAGAZINE* for March, 1888, the author says, on page 780:

A captain of an Ohio regiment was shot through the head and instantly killed while reading a newspaper. He was violating no rule whatever, and when shot was from eight to ten feet inside the window through which the bullet came. This was a wholly unprovoked and wanton murder; the cowardly miscreant had fired the shot while he was off duty, and from the north sidewalk of Carey street. The guards (home guards they were) used, in fact, to gun for prisoners' heads from their posts below pretty much after the fashion of boys after squirrels.

The guard of Libby Prison at that time was the 18th Virginia Heavy Artillery, composed entirely of Virginia troops, and not home guards, and one company (E) was composed of veterans of 1861. This company, formerly known as Kemper's Battery, had been engaged at Vienna on June 17, 1861, and at the first battle of Bull Run, July, 1861.

As to the shooting of prisoners, I was doing guard duty at the prison at that time and very distinctly remember the shooting case referred to. The officer who was shot was Captain Forsythe of the 100th Ohio regiment, and the man who shot him was a private in Company C, 18th Virginia Heavy Artillery, by the name of Charles Weber, and the shooting was accidental. I was standing within three feet of Weber when his gun was discharged, and he was standing in the rear rank of the guard that was just going on duty. Weber was to blame, as he had loaded his gun without orders, and he placed the cap on the nipple and was in the act of letting the hammer down when his thumb slipped and the gun was discharged. He did not have the gun to his shoulder aiming at any one, but it was resting against his right hip in the position of "ready." He had been wounded in the right hand and did not have good use of it, and the morning of the shooting was quite cold, and I suppose these were the causes of his letting the hammer of his gun slip. He was arrested and held until the matter was investigated. The affair cast quite a gloom over our entire command, and Weber was generally blamed for his carelessness.

Since the war I have seen several men who were in the prison at that time, and when I mentioned the shooting of Captain Forsythe they told me that they were satisfied the shooting was purely accidental.

*James M. Germond,
Co. E, 18th Virginia Heavy Artillery.*

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

Prohibition by Law or by Constitution ?

IT can hardly be denied that the cause of prohibition, as that word has hitherto been understood in morals and politics, has been set back materially during the past year. The expectations of its supporters in the Presidential election of 1888 were high, and their disappointment at the meagerness of the results must have been correspondingly intense. That this should be followed by an apparently contemptuous coolness among the politicians, who had so long been used to regard prohibition with profound outward deference, was perhaps disagreeable, but only to be expected; but there was hardly anything to mitigate the tremendous adverse majorities in the popular vote of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island last summer. Such a year in the experience of a war administration or of a mercantile house would lead to a general overhauling of affairs, in order, if possible, to find the root of misfortune.

Opinions as to the moving cause will vary even upon the facts as found. The prevailing belief will undoubtedly be that, after a fair and prolonged comparison between prohibition and high and restricted license, there is a more general and decided inclination to abandon prohibition in favor of its competitor. The belief of the Prohibitionists will be that their calamities are the work of the politicians; and there is probably no doubt that many of those who have been saying to prohibition deferentially and for years, "Is it well with thee, my brother?" have seized this opportunity to drive the dagger deep beneath the fifth rib. There is truth enough in the belief of both Prohibitionists and restrictionists: the unpardonably foolish belief, which can only bring its own punishment, is that the results are due to an increased popular indifference to the evils of drunkenness and of the system under which intoxicants have been sold freely in the past. The people "do care"; but perhaps they have come to see by instinct objections to the recently developed prohibition policy which Prohibitionists would do well to consider frankly.

We have in this country a written Constitution for the United States and similar written constitutions for each of the individual States. We are much in the habit of speaking of these instruments as "organic laws" and of thinking of them as if they were much the same in kind as ordinary laws, differing only in the intensity of their action and the difficulty of repeal. Such a conception entails many errors. The written constitution differs from a law in almost every point of nature and function. A law aims at both coercion and freedom; it helps to furnish tests for the decision of disputes; it makes or secures privileges. A constitution is all this, and more; it makes or unmakes laws and legislation; it is the voice of the underlying sovereignty, whatever it may be, imposing restrictions upon voters, upon non-voters, upon governmental agents, upon every manifestation of the political being called the State. But a constitution has even higher characteristics. It is the ultimate expression, not of some one's desires or hopes, not of what some warmly interested people think ought to be done for the people, but of the inmost political life, nature, and development of the people. It

cannot but be a mistake to use so peculiar an instrument as a constitution for purposes peculiarly appropriate to a law. There is no more real kindred between constitution and law than between the subtle, mysterious vital force and the flesh and bones which it builds up.

True as it is that a law must also express some substantial fact of a people's nature and progress, or else it will fail, this is very far from putting a constitution on a par with a law. There must be some field for experimentation and possible mistake; but this must be in a law, not in a constitution. In a country like Great Britain, which has no written constitution, the real offense of him who advises or commits an "unconstitutional" act is that he is throwing his own minute personality athwart the whole life and development of his people, and is attempting to impose his will as a limitation upon the national career. Where is the difference in the act of him who disobeys a written constitution, unless it be that his offense may usually be stated in more definite terms? Where, in reality, is the difference in the act of him who should assume to force upon a people such a constitution as he thinks they ought to have, but which they would never have made for themselves? Either they will invade or override it, or else he has permanently marred or crippled their whole political development. "An unconstitutional constitution," instead of being a contradiction in terms, may be a definite and true expression for an unnatural constitution.

Has there been the highest wisdom, then, in the new policy of the past few years, of "imbedding prohibition in the constitutions" of the States interested? There are, no doubt, cases in which such a policy is valid, when it indicates just the line and point of a State's own development. But there are cases which are not of this kind, but merely colorable imitations of it: it is possible, as every one knows, to coerce the real will of voters and reach the same result by a skillful use of temporary circumstances, by a strategic balancing of party against party, or by a spasmodic and exciting use of moral forces. Such a process could make at the best only an "unconstitutional constitution"; it would be the worst thing possible for popular government; and yet the temptations to seize upon such a success, and hope for good results, are peculiarly great for earnest men. Was it wise to multiply and intensify such temptations by the adoption of an indiscriminate policy of constitutional amendment?

"Everybody knows more than anybody"; and it may very well be that the disasters of the past year are due to an instinctive popular perception of the dangers of the new policy. It seems clear that, where popular condemnation is fairly to be inferred, it has thus far been provoked mainly along the lines of this policy. But it should not be forgotten that there is an entirely distinct field, that of law, applying either to a whole State, or to part of it by local option. None of the facts available seem to indicate that this is any the less debatable ground than it has always been. At any rate, those who believe that prohibition in this sense is dead would do well not to be too hasty in administering upon its estate.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

THE FALL OF THE REBEL CAPITAL—LINCOLN IN RICHMOND.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE FALL OF THE REBEL CAPITAL.



SINCE the visit of Blair and the return of the rebel commissioners from the Hampton Roads conference, no event of special significance had excited the authorities or people of Richmond. February and March passed away in the routine of war and politics, which at the end of four years had become "familiar and dull. To shrewd observers in that city things were going from bad to worse. Stephens, the Confederate Vice-president, had abandoned the capital and the cause and retired to Georgia to await the end. Judge John A. Campbell, though performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of War, made, among his intimate friends, no concealment of his opinion that the last days of the Confederacy had come.² The members of the rebel Congress, adjourning after their long and fruitless winter session, gave many indications that they never expected to reassemble. A large part of their winter's work had been to demonstrate without direct accusation that it was the Confederate mal-administration which was wrecking the Southern cause. On his part Jefferson Davis prolonged their session a week to send them his last message—a dry lecture to prove that the blame rested entirely on their own shoulders. The most desperate measure of rebel statesmanship, the law to permit masters to put their slaves to the Southern armies to fight for the rebellion, was so palpably illogical and impracticable that both the rebel Congress and the rebel president appear to have treated it as the merest legislative rubbish; or else the latter could scarcely have written in the same message, after stating that "much benefit is anticipated from this measure," that

The people of the Confederacy can be but little wiser than him who supposes it possible they would

² Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., 450.

³ Davis, Message, March 13, 1865. "American Annual Cyclopædia," 1865, pp. 718, 719.

ever consent to purchase, at the cost of degradation and slavery, permission to live in a country garrisoned by their own negroes, and governed by officers sent by the conqueror to rule over them.³

Jefferson Davis was strongly addicted to political contradictions, but we must suppose even his cross-eyed philosophy capable of detecting that a negro willing to fight in slavery in preference to fighting in freedom was not a very safe reliance for Southern independence. The language as he employs it here fitly closes the continuous official Confederate wail about Northern subjugation, Northern despotism, Northern barbarity, Northern atrocity, and Northern inhumanity which rings through his letters, speeches, orders, messages, and proclamations with monotonous dissonance during his whole four years of authority.

Of all the Southern people none were quite so blinded as those of Richmond. Their little bubble of pride at being the Confederate capital was ever iridescent with the brightest hopes. They had no dream that the visible symbols of Confederate government and glory upon which their eyes had nourished their faith would disappear almost as suddenly as if an earthquake had swallowed them. Poverty, distress, and desolation had indeed crept into their homes, but the approach had been slow, and so mitigated by the exaltations of a heroic self-sacrifice that they welcomed the change rather than suffered by it. For the moment nature was their helper. The cheering, healing, revivifying influences of the spring-time were at hand. The warm sunshine lay on the hills, the songs of birds were in the air, buds and blossoms filled the gardens.

All accounts agree that when on Sunday morning, April 2, 1865, the people of Richmond went forth to their places of worship, they had no thought of impending change or public calamity. The ominous signs of such a possibility had escaped their attention. A few days before, Mrs. Jefferson Davis, with her children, had left Richmond for the South and sent some of her furniture to auction. So also some weeks before, the horses remaining in the city had been impressed to collect the tobacco into convenient warehouses where it

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could be readily burned to prevent its falling into Yankee hands.¹

But the significance of these and perhaps other indications could not be measured by the general populace. In fact for some days a rather unusual quiet had prevailed. That morning Jefferson Davis was in his pew in St. Paul's Church when before the sermon was ended an officer walked up the aisle and handed him a telegram from General Lee at Petersburg, dated at half-past ten that morning, in which he read, "My lines are broken in three places; Richmond must be evacuated this evening." He rose and walked out of church; whereupon the officer handed the telegram to the rector, who as speedily as possible brought the services to a close, making the announcement that General Ewell, the commander at Richmond, desired the military forces to assemble at three o'clock in the afternoon. The news seems also to have reached in some form one or two of the other churches, so that though no announcement of the fact was made, the city little by little became aware of the harrowing necessity.

The fact of its being Sunday, with no business going on and rest pervading every household, doubtless served to moderate the shock to the public. Yet very soon the scene was greatly transformed. From the Sabbath stillness of the morning the streets became alive with bustle and activity. Jefferson Davis had called his Cabinet and officials together, and the hurried packing of the Confederate archives for shipment was soon in progress. Citizens who had the means made hasty preparations for flight; the far greater number who were compelled to stay were in a flutter to devise measures of protection or concealment. The banks were opened and depositors flocked thither to withdraw their money and valuables. A remnant of the Virginia legislature gathered in the Representatives' Hall at the Capitol to debate a question of greater urgency than had ever before taxed their wisdom or eloquence. In another room sat the municipal council, for once impressed with the full weight of its responsibility. Meanwhile the streets were full of hurrying people, of loaded wagons, of galloping military officers conveying orders. One striking sketch of that wild hurry-skurry deserves to be recorded.

Lumpkin, who for many years had kept a slave-trader's jail, also had a work of necessity on hand—fifty men, women, and children, who must be saved to the missionary institution for the future enlightenment of Africa. Although it was the Lord's day (perhaps he was comforted by the thought that

"the better the day the better the deed") the coffle-gang was made up in the jail yard, within pistol shot of Davis's parlor window, within a stone's throw of the Monumental Church, and a sad and weeping throng, chained two and two, the last slave-coffle that shall ever tread the streets of Richmond, were hurried to the Danville depot.²

But the "institution," like the Confederacy was already *in extremis*. The account adds that the departing trains could afford no transportation for this last slave cargo, and the gang probably went to pieces like every other Richmond organization, military and political.

Evening had come, and the confusion of the streets found its culmination at the railroad depots. Military authority made room for the fleeing President and his Cabinet, and department officials and their boxes of more important papers. The cars were overcrowded and overloaded long before the clamoring multitude and piles of miscellaneous baggage could be got aboard, and by the occasional light of lanterns flitting hither and thither the wheezing and coughing trains moved out into the darkness. The legislature of Virginia and the governor of the State departed in a canal boat towards Lynchburg. All available vehicles carrying fugitives were leaving the city by various country roads, but the great mass of the population, unable to get away, had to confront the dread certainty that only one night remained before the appearance of a hostile army with the power of death and destruction over them and their homes.

How this power might be exercised, present signs were none too reassuring. Since noon, when the fact of evacuation had become certain, the whole fabric of society seemed to be crumbling to pieces. Military authority was concentrating its energy on only two objects, destruction and departure. The civil authority was lending a hand, for the single hasty precaution which the city council could ordain was, that all the liquors in the city should be emptied out. To order this was one thing, to have it rigorously executed would be asking quite too much of the lower human appetites, and while some of the street gutters ran with alcohol, enough was surreptitiously consumed to produce a frightful state of excitement and drunkenness. No picture need be drawn of the possibilities of violence and crime which must have haunted the timid watchers in Richmond who listened all night to the shouts, the blasphemy, the disorder that rose and fell in the streets, or who furtively noted the signs of pillage already begun. And how shall we follow their imagination, passing from these visible acts of the friends of yesterday to what they might look for from the enemies expected to-morrow? For had not their President offi-

¹ Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 438.

² "Atlantic Monthly," June, 1865.

cially, their statesmen, and their newspapers with frantic rhetoric, warned them against the fanatical, penny-worshipping Yankee invader? And that final horror of horrors, the negro soldiers held up to their dread by the solemn presidential message of Jefferson Davis only two weeks before. What now of the fear of servile insurrection, the terrible specter they had secretly nursed from their very childhood? It is scarcely possible they can have escaped such meditations even though already weary and exhausted with the surprises and labors of the day, with the startling anxieties of the evening, with the absorbing care of burying their household silver and secreting their yet more precious personal ornaments and tokens of affection. In Europe, a thousand wars have rendered such experiences historically commonplace; in America, let us hope that a thousand years of peace may render their repetition impossible.

Full of dangerous portent as had been the night, the morning became yet more ominous. Long before day sleepers and watchers alike were startled by a succession of explosions which shook every building. The military authorities were blowing up the vessels in construction at the river. These were nine in number, three of them iron-clads of four guns each, the others small wooden ships.¹ Next, the arsenal was fired; and, as many thousands of loaded shells were stored here, there succeeded for a period the sounds of a continuous cannonade. Already fire had been set to the warehouses containing the collected tobacco and cotton, among which loaded shells had also been scattered to insure more complete destruction.

There is a conflict of testimony as to who is responsible for the deplorable public calamity which ensued. The rebel Congress had passed a law ordering the Government tobacco and other public property to be burned, and Jefferson Davis states that the general commanding had advised with the mayor and city authori-

¹ "The following is a list of the vessels destroyed: *Virginia*, flag-ship, four guns, iron-clad; *Richmond*, four guns, iron-clad; *Fredericksburg*, four guns, iron-clad; *Nansemond*, two guns, wooden; *Hampton*, two guns, wooden; *Koanoke*, one gun, wooden; *Torpedo*, tender; *Shrapnel*; *Patrick Henry*, school-ship." [Porter, Report, April 5, 1865. Report Sec. Navy, 1865-66.]

² Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 666.

³ Ewell to Lossing, November, 1866. "The Independent," March 11, 1886.

Lossing, writing from both the written statement and verbal explanations of General Ewell, says: "Now General Ewell earnestly warned the city authorities of the danger of acting according to the letter of that resolution; for a brisk wind was blowing from the south which would send the flames of the burning warehouses into the town and imperil the whole city. Early in the evening a deputation of citizens called

ties about precautions against a conflagration.² On the other hand, Lieutenant-General Ewell, the military commander, has authorized the statement that he not only earnestly warned the city authorities of the certain consequences of the measure, but that he took the responsibility of disobeying the law and military orders. "I left the city about seven o'clock in the morning," he writes, "and as yet nothing had been fired by my orders; yet the buildings and depot near the railway bridge were on fire, and the flames were so close as to be disagreeable as I rode by them."³ By this time the spirit of lawlessness and hunger for pillage had gained full headway. The rearguard of the retreating Confederates set the three great bridges in flames, and while the fire started at the four immense warehouses and various points, and soon uniting in an uncontrollable conflagration was beginning to eat out the heart of the city, a miscellaneous mob went from store to store, and with a beam for a battering ram smashed in the doors so that the crowd might freely enter and plunder the contents. This rapacity, first directed towards bread and provision stores, gradually extended itself to all other objects until mere greed of booty rather than need or usefulness became the ruling instinct, and promoted the waste and destruction of that which had been stolen. Into this pandemonium of fire and license there came one additional terror to fill up its dramatic completeness.

About ten o'clock [writes an eye-witness], just before the entrance of the Federal army, a cry of dismay rang all along the streets which were out of the track of the fire, and I saw a crowd of leaping, shouting demons, in parti-colored clothes, and with heads half shaven. It was the convicts from the penitentiary, who had overcome the guard, set fire to the prison, and were now at liberty. Many a heart which had kept its courage to this point quailed at the sight. Fortunately, they were too intent upon securing their freedom to do much damage.⁴

It is quite probable that the magnitude and

upon President Davis and remonstrated against carrying out that order of Congress, because the safety of the city would be jeopardized. He was then in an unamiable state of mind, and curtly replied, "Your statement that the burning of the warehouses will endanger the city is only a cowardly pretext to save your property for the Yankees!" After Davis's departure a committee of the city council, at the suggestion of General Ewell, went to the War Office to remonstrate with whomsoever might represent the department, against the execution of the perilous order. Major Melton rudely replied in language which was almost an echo of that of his superior, and General Ewell, in spite of his earnest remonstrances, was ordered to cause the four warehouses near the river to be set on fire at three o'clock in the morning." [Lossing, in "The Independent" (New York), March 11, 1886.]

⁴ Mary Tucker Magill, in "The Independent" (New York), Jan. 7, 1886.

rapidity of the disaster served in a measure to mitigate its evil results. The burning of seven hundred buildings comprising the entire business portion of Richmond, warehouses, manufacturing, mills, depots, and stores, all within the brief space of a day, was a visitation so sudden, so unexpected, so stupefying as to overawe and terrorize even wrong-doers, and made the harvest of plunder so abundant as to serve to scatter the mob and satisfy its rapacity to quick repletion.

Before a new hunger could arise, assistance, protection, and relief were at hand. The citizens' committee which went forth to surrender Richmond met the vanguard of the Union army under General Weitzel outside the limits of the city in the early forenoon, and after a formal ceremony of submission, a small detachment of white Union cavalry galloped into the late rebel capital, and proceeding directly to the State House raised the national flag over it.¹ Soon afterward there occurred what was to the inhabitants the central incident of the day—the event which engrossed their solicitude even more than the vanished rebel Government, the destroyed city, or the lost cause. This was the arrival of the colored soldiers, the, to them, visible realization of the new political and social heavens and earth to which four years of rebellion and war had brought them. The prejudices of a lifetime cannot be instantly overcome, and the rebels of Richmond doubtless felt that this was the final drop in their cup of misery and that their “subjugation” was complete. General Weitzel had arrived with the first detachment of Union cavalry; and seeing the conflagration and disorder, he sent back an aide in haste to bring into the city the first brigade he could find, to act as a provost guard.

At length they came—a brigade of colored cavalry from the division of General Devens.² It is related that about this time, as by a common impulse, the white people of Richmond disappeared from the streets, and the black population streamed forth with an apparently instinctive recognition that their day of jubilee had at last arrived. To see this compact, organized body of men of their own color, on horseback, in neat uniforms, with flashing sabers, with the gleam of confidence and triumph in their eyes, was a palpable living reality to which their hope and pride, long repressed, gave instant response. They greeted them with expressions of welcome in every form—cheers, shouts, laughter, and a rattle of ex-

clamations as they rushed along the sides of the street to keep pace with the advancing column and feast their eyes on the incredible sight; while the black Union soldiers rose high in their stirrups and with waving swords and deafening huzzas acknowledged the fraternal reception.

But there was little time for holiday enjoyment. The conflagration was roaring, destruction was advancing; fury of fire, blackness of smoke, crash of falling walls, obstruction of debris, confusion, helplessness, danger, seemed everywhere. The great Capitol Square on the hill had become the refuge of women and children and the temporary storing-place of the few household effects they had saved from the burning. From this center, where the Stars and Stripes were first hoisted, there now flowed back upon the stricken city, not the doom and devastation for which its people looked, but the friendly help and protection of a generous army bringing them peace, and the spirit of a benevolent Government tendering them forgiveness and reconciliation. Up to this time it would seem that not an organization had been proposed nor a hand raised to stay the ravages of the flames. The public spirit of Richmond was dead even to that commonest of human impulses, the willingness to help a neighbor in affliction. The advent of the Union army breathed a new life into this social paralysis. The first care of the officers was to organize resistance to fire; and instead of the blood and rapine which the deluded Virginians feared from the Yankee officers and “niggers” in Federal uniforms, they beheld them reestablish order and personal security, and convert the unrestrained mob of whites and blacks into a regulated energy, to save what remained of their city from the needless fire and pillage to which their own friends had devoted it, against remonstrance and against humanity. And this was not all. Beginning that afternoon and continuing many days, these “Yankee invaders” fed the poor of Richmond, and saved them from the starvation to which the law of the Confederate Congress, relentlessly executed by the Confederate President and some of his subordinates, exposed them.

LINCOLN IN RICHMOND.

A LITTLE more than two months before these events, President Lincoln had written the following letter to General Grant:

Please read and answer this letter as though I was not President, but only a friend. My son, now in his twenty-second year, having graduated at Harvard, wishes to see something of the war before it ends. I do not wish to put him in the ranks,

¹ The flag was raised by a young officer named Johnston Livingston de Peyster, who had carried it at his saddle-bow for a week with this purpose.

² Weitzel, testimony; Report of Committee on Conduct of the War. Supplement, Part I., p. 523.

nor yet to give him a commission, to which those who have already served long are better entitled, and better qualified to hold. Could he, without embarrassment to you, or detriment to the service, go into your military family with some nominal rank, I, and not the public, furnishing his necessary means? If no, say so without the least hesitation, because I am as anxious and as deeply interested that you shall not be encumbered as you can be yourself.¹

Grant replied as follows:

Your favor of this date in relation to your son serving in some military capacity is received. I will be most happy to have him in my military family in the manner you propose. The nominal rank given him is immaterial, but I would suggest that of captain, as I have three staff-officers now, of considerable service, in no higher grade. Indeed, I have one officer with only the rank of lieutenant who has been in the service from the beginning of the war. This, however, will make no difference, and I would still say give the rank of captain.—Please excuse my writing on a half-sheet. I have no resource but to take the blank half of your letter.²

The President's son therefore became a member of Grant's staff with the rank of captain, and acquitted himself of the duties of that station with fidelity and honor.

We may assume that it was the anticipated important military events rather than the presence of Captain Robert T. Lincoln at Grant's headquarters which induced the general on the 20th of March, 1865, to invite the President and Mrs. Lincoln to make a visit to his camp near Richmond; and on the 22d they and their younger son Thomas, nicknamed "Tad," proceeded in the steamer *River Queen* from Washington to City Point, where General Grant with his family and staff were "occupying a pretty group of huts on the bank of the James River, overlooking the harbor, which was full of vessels of all classes, both war and merchant, with wharves and warehouses on an extensive scale."³ Here, making his home on the steamer which brought him, the President remained about ten days, enjoying what was probably the most satisfactory relaxation in which he had been able to indulge during his whole presidential service. It was springtime and the weather was moderately steady; his days were occupied visiting the various camps of the great army in company with the general.

"He was a good horseman," records a member of the general's staff, "and made his way through swamps and over corduroy roads as well as the best trooper in the command. The soldiers invariably recognized him and greeted him, wherever he appeared amongst them, with cheers that were no lip service, but came from

the depth of their hearts."⁴ Many evening hours were passed with groups of officers before roaring camp-fires, where Mr. Lincoln was always the magnetic center of genial conversation and lively anecdote. The interest of the visit was further enhanced by the arrival at City Point, on the evening of March 27, of General Sherman, who, having left General Schofield to command in his absence, made a hasty trip to confer with Grant. He was able to gratify the President with a narrative of the leading incidents of his great march from Atlanta to Savannah and from Savannah to Goldsboro', North Carolina. In one or two informal interviews in the after cabin of the *River Queen*, Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, and Rear-Admiral Porter enjoyed a frank interchange of opinion about the favorable prospects of early and final victory, and of the speedy realization of the long-hoped-for peace. Sherman and Porter affirm that the President confided to them certain liberal views on the subject of reconstructing State governments in the conquered States which do not seem compatible with the very guarded language of Mr. Lincoln elsewhere used or recorded by him. It is fair to presume that their own enthusiasm colored their recollection of the President's expressions, though it is no doubt true that he spoke of his willingness to be liberal to the verge of prudence, and that he even gave them to understand that he would not be displeased at the escape from the country of Jefferson Davis and other principal rebel leaders.

On the 29th of March the party separated, Sherman returning to North Carolina, and Grant starting on his final campaign to Appomattox. Five days later Grant informed Mr. Lincoln of the fall of Petersburg, and the President made a flying visit to that town for another brief conference with the general. The capture of Richmond was hourly expected, and that welcome information reached Lincoln soon after his return to City Point.

Between the receipt of this news and the following forenoon, but before any information about the great fire had been received, a visit to Richmond was arranged between President Lincoln and Admiral Porter. Accounts differ as to who suggested it or extended the invitation, and there is great vagueness and even contradiction about the details of the trip. Admiral Porter states⁵ that he carried the President in his flag-ship, the *Malvern*, until she grounded, when he transferred the party to his barge with a tugboat to tow it and a small detachment of marines on board. Another account states that the President proceeded in

¹ Lincoln to Grant, Jan. 19, 1865. Unpublished MS.

² Grant to Lincoln, Jan. 21, 1865. Unpublished MS.

³ Sherman, "Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 324.

⁴ Gen. Horace Porter, in *THE CENTURY*, Oct., 1885.

⁵ "New York Tribune."

the steamer *River Queen* until the transfer to the barge; also that another transport, having a four-horse field wagon and a squadron of cavalry, followed for the service of the President. Still a third account states¹ that the party went in the admiral's barge the whole distance, as affording greater safety against danger from any torpedoes which might not yet have been removed. The various accounts agree that obstructions, consisting of rows of piling, sunken hulks, and the débris of the destroyed Confederate vessels, were encountered, which only the tug and barge were able to pass.

The result therefore was that the party were compelled to make a landing at some distance below the proper place, at the suburb called Rockett's, and that there was neither sentry nor officer nor wagon nor escort to meet and receive them. One cannot help wondering at the manifest imprudence of both Mr. Lincoln and Admiral Porter in the whole proceeding.

Never in the history of the world did the ruler of a mighty nation and the conqueror of a great rebellion enter the captured chief city of the insurgents in such humbleness and simplicity. As they stepped from the barge the street along the river front seemed deserted, and they sent out to find some chance person of whom to inquire their way. The unusual group soon attracted the attention of idlers, and a crowd gathered. Admiral Porter ordered twelve of the marines to fix bayonets to their rifles and to form six in front and six behind the party, which consisted of President Lincoln, holding his son "Tad" by the hand, Admiral Porter, and three officers, all being on foot; and in this order they walked from the landing at Rockett's to the center of Richmond, a distance of nearly two miles. It was a long and fatiguing march, evidently not expected by the President, who during his ten-days' stay with the army had probably always had an officer at his elbow to anticipate his slightest wish for horses or vehicles. There remains no trustworthy account of this strange presidential entry; the printed narratives of it written from memory, after the lapse of years, are so evidently colored by fancy that they do not invite credence. Admiral Porter, writing on the following day, says:

On the 4th of April I accompanied the President up to Richmond, where he was received with the strongest demonstrations of joy.²

This is perhaps the most perfect historical record we shall ever have of the event, and the imagination may easily fill up the picture of a gradually increasing crowd, principally

of negroes, following the little group of marines and officers with the tall form of the President in its center; and, having learned that it was indeed Mr. Lincoln, giving expression to wonder, joy, and gratitude in a variety of picturesque emotional ejaculations peculiar to the colored race, and for which there was ample time while the little procession made its tiresome march, whose route cannot now be traced.

At length the party reached the headquarters of General Weitzel, established in the very house occupied by Jefferson Davis as the presidential mansion of the rebel Confederacy, and from which he had fled less than two days before. Here Mr. Lincoln was glad of a chance to sit down and rest, and a little later to partake of a lunch which the general provided. An informal reception, chiefly of Union officers, naturally followed, and later in the afternoon General Weitzel went with the President and Admiral Porter in a carriage, guarded by an escort of cavalry, to visit the Capitol, the burnt district, Libby Prison, Castle Thunder, and other points of interest about the city; and of this afternoon drive also no trustworthy narrative in detail by an eye-witness appears to have been written at the time.

It was probably before the President went on this drive that there occurred an interview on political topics which forms one of the chief points of interest connected with his visit. Judge John A. Campbell, rebel Assistant Secretary of War, remained in Richmond when on Sunday night the other members of the rebel Government fled, and on Tuesday morning he reported to the Union military governor, General G. F. Shepley, and informed him of his "submission to the military authorities."³ Learning from General Shepley that Mr. Lincoln was at City Point, he asked permission to see him. This application was evidently communicated to Mr. Lincoln, for shortly after his arrival a staff-officer informed Campbell that the requested interview would be granted, and conducted him to the President at the general's headquarters, where it took place. The rebel General J. R. Anderson and others were present as friends of the judge, and General Weitzel as the witness of Mr. Lincoln. Campbell, as spokesman, "told the President that the war was over," and made inquiries about the measures and conditions necessary to secure peace. Speaking for Virginia, he "urged him to consult and counsel with her public men, and her citizens, as to the restoration of peace, civil order, and the renewal of her relations as a member of the Union."⁴

¹ Manuscript narrative of Colonel W. H. Crook.

² Porter, Report, April 5, 1865.

³ Campbell, pamphlet.

⁴ *Ibid.*

In his pamphlet, written from memory long afterwards, Campbell states that Mr. Lincoln replied "that my general principles were right, the trouble was how to apply them"; and no conclusion was reached except to appoint another interview for the following day on board the *Malvern*. This second interview was accordingly held on Wednesday, April 5, Campbell taking with him only a single citizen of Richmond, as the others to whom he sent invitations were either absent from the city or declined to accompany him. General Weitzel was again present as a witness. The conversation apparently took a wide range on the general topic of restoring local governments in the South, in the course of which the President gave Judge Campbell a written memorandum,¹ embracing an outline of conditions of peace which repeated in substance the terms he had proffered the rebel commissioners (of whom Campbell was one) at the Hampton Roads conference on the 3d of February, 1865. The only practical suggestion which was made has been summarized as follows by General Weitzel in a statement written from memory, as the result of the two interviews :

Mr. Campbell and the other gentleman assured Mr. Lincoln that if he would allow the Virginia legislature to meet, it would at once repeal the ordinance of secession, and that then General Robert E. Lee and every other Virginian would submit; that this would amount to the virtual destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia, and eventually to the surrender of all the other rebel armies, and would insure perfect peace in the shortest possible time.²

Out of this second conference, which also ended without result, President Lincoln thought he saw an opportunity to draw an immediate and substantial military benefit. On the next day (April 6) he wrote from City Point, where he had returned, the following letter to General Weitzel, which he im-

mediately transmitted to the general by the hand of Senator Wilkinson, in whose presence he wrote it and who was on his way from City Point to Richmond :

It has been intimated to me that the gentlemen who have acted as the legislature of Virginia in support of the rebellion may now desire to assemble at Richmond, and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government. If they attempt it, give them permission and protection, until, if at all, they attempt some action hostile to the United States, in which case you will notify them, give them reasonable time to leave, and at the end of which time arrest any who remain. Allow Judge Campbell to see this, but do not make it public.³

This document bears upon its face the distinct military object which the President had in view in permitting the rebel legislature to assemble, namely, to withdraw immediately the Virginia troops from the army of Lee, then on his retreat towards Lynchburg. It could not be foreseen that Lee would surrender the whole of that army within the next three days, though it was evident that the withdrawal of the Virginia forces from it, under whatever pretended State authority, would contribute to the ending of the war quite as effectually as the reduction of that army to an equal number by battle or capture. The ground upon which Lincoln believed the rebel legislature might take this action is set forth in his dispatch to Grant of the same date, in which he wrote :

Secretary Seward was thrown from his carriage yesterday and seriously injured. This with other matters will take me to Washington soon. I was at Richmond yesterday and the day before, when and where Judge Campbell, who was with Messrs. Hunter and Stephens in February, called on me, and made such representations as induced me to put in his hands an informal paper repeating the propositions in my letter of instructions to Mr. Seward, which you remember, and adding "that if the war be now further persisted in by the rebels,

1 "As to peace, I have said before, and now repeat, that three things are indispensable :

"1. The restoration of the national authority throughout the United States.

"2. No receding by the Executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message, and in preceding documents.

"3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government. That all propositions coming from those now in hostility to the Government, not inconsistent with the foregoing, will be respectfully considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality.

"I now add that it seems useless to me to be more specific with those who will not say that they are ready for the indispensable terms, even on conditions to be named by themselves. If there be any who are ready for these indispensable terms, on any conditions what-

ever, let them say so, and state their conditions, so that the conditions can be known and considered. It is further added, that the remission of confiscation being within the executive power, if the war be now further persisted in by those opposing the Government, the making of confiscated property at the least to bear the additional cost will be insisted on, but that confiscations (except in case of third party intervening interests) will be remitted to the people of any State which shall now promptly and in good faith withdraw its troops from further resistance to the Government. What is now said as to remission of confiscation has no reference to supposed property in slaves." [President Lincoln's memorandum printed in Campbell, pamphlet, pp. 9, 10.]

² Weitzel, in "Philadelphia Times."

³ Lincoln to Weitzel, April 6, 1865. Weitzel, testimony; Report of Committee on Conduct of the War. Supplement, Part I., p. 521.

confiscated property shall at the least bear the additional cost, and that confiscation shall be remitted to the people of any State which will now promptly and in good faith withdraw its troops and other support from the resistance to the Government." Judge Campbell thought it not impossible that the rebel legislature of Virginia would do the latter, if permitted, and accordingly I addressed a private letter to General Weitzel, with permission for Judge Campbell to see it, telling him (General W.) that if they attempt this to permit and protect them, unless they attempt something hostile to the United States, in which case to give them notice and time to leave, and to arrest any remaining after such time. I do not think it very probable that anything will come of this, but I have thought best to notify you, so that if you should see signs you may understand them. From your recent dispatches, it seems that you are pretty effectually withdrawing the Virginia troops from opposition to the Government. Nothing that I have done, or probably shall do, is to delay, hinder, or interfere with your work.¹

That Mr. Lincoln well understood the temper of leading Virginians when he wrote that he had little hope of any result from the permission he had given is shown by what followed. When, on the morning of April 7, General Weitzel received the President's letter of the 6th, he showed it confidentially to Judge Campbell, who thereupon called together a committee, apparently five in number, of the Virginia rebel legislature, and instead of informing them precisely what Lincoln had authorized, namely, a meeting to "take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government," the judge in a letter to the committee (dated April 7) formulated quite a different line of action.

I have had [he wrote], since the evacuation of Richmond, two conversations with Mr. Lincoln, President of the United States. . . . The conversations had relation to the establishment of a government for Virginia, the requirement of oaths of allegiance from the citizens, and the terms of settlement with the United States. With the concurrence and sanction of General Weitzel, he assented to the application not to require oaths of allegiance from the citizens. He stated that he would send to General Weitzel his decision upon the question of a government for Virginia. This letter was received on Thursday, and was read by me. . . . The object of the invitation is for the government of Virginia to determine whether they will administer the laws in connection with the authorities of the United States. I understand from Mr. Lincoln, if this condition be fulfilled, that no attempt would be made to establish or sustain any other authority.²

The rest of Campbell's long letter relates to safe-conducts, to transportation, and to the

contents of the written memorandum handed by Lincoln to him at the interview on the *Malvern* about general conditions of peace. But this memorandum contained no syllable of reference to the "government of Virginia," and bore no relation of any kind to the President's permission to "take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops," except its promise "that confiscations (except in case of third party intervening interests) will be remitted to the people of any State which shall now promptly and in good faith withdraw its troops from further resistance to the Government." Going a step further, the committee next prepared a call inviting a meeting of the General Assembly, announcing the consent of "the military authorities of the United States to the session of the legislature in Richmond," and stating that "The matters to be submitted to the legislature are the restoration of peace to the State of Virginia, and the adjustment of questions involving life, liberty, and property that have arisen in the States as a consequence of the war."³ When General Weitzel indorsed his approval on the call "for publication in the 'Whig' and in hand-bill form," he does not seem to have read, or if he read to have realized, how completely President Lincoln's permission had been changed and his authority perverted. Instead of permitting them to recall Virginia soldiers, Weitzel was about to allow them authoritatively to sit in judgment on all the political consequences of the war "in the States."

General Weitzel's approval was signed to the call on April 11, and it was published in the "Richmond Whig" on the morning of the 12th. On that day the President, having returned to Washington, was at the War Department writing an answer to a dispatch from General Weitzel, in which the general defended himself against the Secretary's censure for having neglected to require from the churches in Richmond prayers for the President of the United States, similar to those which prior to the fall of the city had been offered up in their religious services in behalf of "the rebel chief, Jefferson Davis, before he was driven from the Capitol." Weitzel contended that the tone of President Lincoln's conversations with him justified the omission. Mr. Lincoln was never punctilious about social or official etiquette towards himself, and he doubtless felt in this instance that neither his moral nor political well-being was seriously dependent upon the prayers of the Richmond rebel churches. To this part of the general's dispatch he therefore answered:

I have seen your dispatches to Colonel Hardie about the matter of prayers. I do not remember hearing prayer spoken of while I was in Richmond,

¹ Lincoln to Grant, April 6, 1865.

² Campbell, pamphlet.

³ *Ibid.*

but I have no doubt you acted in what appeared to you to be the spirit and temper manifested by me while there.¹

Having thus generously assumed responsibility for Weitzel's alleged neglect, the President's next thought was about what the Virginia rebel legislature was doing, of which he had heard nothing since his return from City Point. He therefore included in this same telegram of April 12 the following inquiry and direction:

Is there any sign of the rebel legislature coming together on the understanding of my letter to you? If there is any such sign, inform me what it is. If there is no sign, you may withdraw the offer.

To this question General Weitzel answered briefly, "The passports have gone out for the legislature, and it is common talk that they will come together." It is probable that Mr. Lincoln thought that if after the lapse of five days the proposed meeting had progressed no farther than "common talk," nothing could be expected from it. It would also seem that at this time he must have received, either by telegraph or by mail, copies of the correspondence and call which Weitzel had authorized, and which had been published that morning. The President therefore immediately wrote and sent to General Weitzel a long telegram, in which he explained his course with such clearness that its mere perusal sets at rest all con-

troversy respecting either his original intention of policy or the legal effect of his action and orders, and by a final revocation of the permission he had given brought the incident to its natural and appropriate termination:

I have just seen Judge Campbell's letter to you of the 7th. He assumes, it appears to me, that I have called the insurgent legislature of Virginia together, as the rightful legislature of the State, to settle all differences with the United States. I have done no such thing.² I spoke of them not as a legislature, but as "the gentlemen who have acted as the legislature of Virginia in support of the rebellion." I did this on purpose to exclude the assumption that I was recognizing them as a rightful body. I dealt with them as men having power *de facto* to do a specific thing, to wit: "to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government," for which, in the paper handed to Judge Campbell, I promised a special equivalent, to wit: a remission to the people of the State, except in certain cases, of the confiscation of their property. I meant this and no more. Inasmuch, however, as Judge Campbell misconstrues this, and is still pressing for an armistice, contrary to the explicit statement of the paper I gave him, and particularly as General Grant has since captured the Virginia troops, so that giving a consideration for their withdrawal is no longer applicable, let my letter to you and the paper to Judge Campbell both be withdrawn or countermanded, and he be notified of it. Do not now allow them to assemble, but if any have come allow them safe return to their homes.³

¹ Lincoln to Weitzel, April 12, 1865.

² The account given by Admiral Porter of this transaction, in his "Naval History," p. 799, is evi-

dently written from memory, without consultation of dates or documents, and is wholly inaccurate.

³ Campbell, pamphlet.



WITH A COPY OF SHELLEY.

BEHOLD I send thee to the heights of song,
 My brother! Let thine eyes awake as clear
 As morning dew, within whose glowing sphere
 Is mirrored half a world; and listen long,
 Till in thine ears, famished to keenness, throng
 The bugles of the soul, till far and near
 Silence grows populous, and wind and mere
 Are phantom-choked with voices. Then be strong—
 Then halt not till thou seest the beacons flare
 Souls mad for truth have lit from peak to peak.
 Haste on to breathe the intoxicating air—
 Wine to the brave and poison to the weak—
 Far in the blue where angels' feet have trod,
 Where earth is one with heaven and man with God.

Harriet Monroe.

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

The Foes of Civil Service Reform.

A DETERMINED attempt to overthrow the civil service rules and to restore the spoils system may now at any time be expected. Areas of low pressure are reported in the neighborhood of most of the State capitals; the storm-center, which is now hovering over Kansas, is rapidly moving eastward; high winds and local squalls prevail in portions of Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Maryland, and the cyclone may strike Washington about the first of December. Storm-signals should be displayed upon the Capitol, and over the front portico of the White House.

It may be well to notice that the storm is wholly an artificial product; the Æolus who carries these winds in his carpet-bag is always a local politician. The people at large are not worrying about "the injustice and oppression" of the civil service rules; so far as they know, these rules are working very well. It is the political machinists whose wrath is kindled. Nor is this any unexpected phenomenon. Nobody supposed that the professional politicians would gracefully submit to such a sharp restriction of their power. The distribution of the offices among their friends is the final cause of their existence as politicians; when they were stripped of that function, their occupation was gone. They did not willingly surrender it; when some of them voted to part with it, it was a mere political trick, and they meant to recover it at no distant day. At the time when the civil service measure became a law it was pointed out in these columns that the action of Congress was not sincere. There were a few men in both parties who believed in the reform; but the majority in favor of the bill was gained by the votes of a large number of Republicans who wished to prevent the Democrats, then apparently about to gain possession of the government, from turning out their friends. The civil service rules would be a bulwark against the removal of Republicans from office; as such they were zealously supported by a good many Republican politicians so long as the Democrats were in power, and fiercely opposed, for the same reason, by many Democratic politicians. But as soon as the administration changed the case was bravely altered. The Democrats are now doing most of the denouncing, as witness the Ohio resolutions, anathematizing "the Republican administration for its repeated violation of its pledges in behalf of civil service reform"; while the Republican bosses are cursing themselves for their folly in permitting their own hands to be tied by these measures, and threatening to erase them from the statute books. Not a few prominent Republican leaders are now characterizing civil service reform as a fraud and a sham. These gentlemen must be permitted to speak for themselves. What they have done to promote it was undoubtedly a fraud and a sham. That there has been considerable trickery and evasion in the administration of the law may be admitted. That the resolutions of the political conventions of both parties indorsing this reform have been, as a rule, fraudulent and hypocritical is also probable. If this is what these

gentlemen mean, we must admit that they know what they are talking about. And there is no doubt that great efforts have been made, in various quarters, to make the civil service reform appear to be a fraud and a sham by getting men appointed as heads of departments and chiefs of bureaux and great offices who do not believe in the reform, and who are determined, if possible, to exhibit its methods as inefficient and odious. Much more of this kind of work is likely to be done. The more adroit opponents of civil service reform will refrain from attacking it openly; they will be well content if they can keep its administration in the hands of its foes, who will be sure to prove it a failure.

Against a conspiracy of this nature the public may well be warned. The determination to break down the civil service rules is by many politicians frankly avowed and by many others secretly cherished. The great majority of those persons who manage our politics and who manipulate the party organs may be counted as the open or insidious foes of the merit system. The establishment of this system was extorted from them by public opinion; it must be defended against them. There is need, just now, of a vigorous popular campaign against the spoilsmen. A thorough discussion of the system, its principles and its achievements, would be extremely useful at the present time. The stupid cant of the spoilsmen about the establishment of "an office-holding aristocracy" needs to be exposed, and the fact made plain that the merit system is the only method of distributing appointive offices upon purely democratic principles. The managers of the party machine constitute, in fact, an office-holding "trust" or "combine," which generally manages to monopolize the offices and to shut out all those who do not belong to their clique. No one can hope for an office who has not in some way proved himself subservient to them. The great majority of intelligent, capable, self-respecting young men have no more prospect of obtaining office under the spoils system than if they were inhabitants of some other planet. But the merit system opens the doors freely and equally to all. The applicant for office depends not upon the favor of the local boss or the member of Congress, but solely on his own character and ability. This is the system which the spoilsmen stigmatize as "a relic of European governments." It is easy to show the people the true inwardness of the spoilsman's objection and the hypocrisy of his plea. But it is only by thorough discussion and systematic agitation that the cause will prosper; public opinion must be aroused and invigorated; a powerful interest is arrayed against the reform, and can be baffled only by vigilant and resolute effort on the part of its friends.

The urgency of this reform was never more apparent than at the present time. Great questions of administration seem to be forcing themselves upon the American people. In spite of ourselves we have already been compelled to take hold of the railways. Precisely what shape the problem of supervision or regulation will assume we cannot tell; much depends upon the action of the railways themselves. But it is possible that the

GARFIELD AND CONKLING.



It fell to my lot at one time to be one of a "Committee of Conciliation" which was the outcome of a memorable struggle. Much has been written concerning the origin and merits of the Garfield-Conkling controversy, and no one cares at this day to reopen or reargue it. But there were incidents and interesting features in it which, in the absence of any report of that committee, or of what it brought to light or accomplished, may contribute to a better understanding of the inside history of that most remarkable as well as most unfortunate controversy. It becomes necessary, however, for the better understanding of the part taken by that committee, to restate some things already familiar.

Garfield's nomination for President was due to the Blaine-Conkling quarrel, and many other serious consequences followed not in all respects so evident. There were those who believed that the assassination itself was indirectly due to that fight. Garfield stepped between the combatants in a fierce and bitter struggle for mastery, unremitting for years, and increasing in bitterness and intensity every hour of its continuance. He carried off the prize they fought for, but their weapons passed through his body.

General Grant was brought forward for a third term, to make sure the defeat of Mr. Blaine. Mr. Conkling was then the master spirit in New York politics. His State was entitled to seventy votes in the convention which was to nominate the candidate. They would all be necessary to effect the result upon which Mr. Conkling was bent. Through his influence the New York Republican Convention had instructed the entire delegation to vote as a unit, the choice to be determined by a majority. But nineteen of them, under the lead of William H. Robertson, refused to be bound by these instructions, and cast their votes for Mr. Blaine. This was sufficient to prevent the nomination of General Grant, but not enough to secure that of Mr. Blaine, for Mr. Sherman was receiving a considerable support. The balloting continued in the convention without any material change in relative strength until, after many ineffectual trials, the friends of Blaine and Sherman, under instructions from their leaders in Washington, joined forces and nominated Garfield. Both combatants had been beaten — Conkling had defeated Blaine, and Blaine had defeated Grant. The effect of this discomfiture upon the two

men was totally different in accordance with their different natures. Conkling sulked in his tent, while Blaine sent his congratulations to the successful candidate, and was early and ardent in his support. Before the canvass closed, however, Conkling was persuaded by General Grant himself to enter into the campaign, and did most important and effective work, especially in the State of New York, contributing largely to a result in that State, and thereby in the nation, favorable to Garfield. But he never forgave the nineteen, and swore especial vengeance upon Robertson, their leader.

During the winter preceding the inauguration, and while the excitement always attendant upon cabinet-making was at its height, the rumor got abroad that Mr. Blaine was to be Secretary of State. The mere rumor was enough to kindle anew into fresh flame all the fire of the old hate, and to summon the old foe to arms. This disturbance of that party harmony which is ever essential to administrative success was little heeded, if it was not welcomed; for hot blood begets hot blood, and the old Adam seldom confines his work to one side of an ancient feud. Neither of these men meant harm to the political party in which they were both great leaders, but neither of them could be made to see that their fight was reaching its very heart's blood. Each of them seemed to think that the great and acknowledged services he had rendered the party entitled him to call upon it to crush out his enemy. I do not think that either of them knew himself in this controversy, for each had come to believe that the surrender of the other was essential to the continuance of Republican supremacy.

I first heard of the purpose to call Mr. Blaine to the premiership from Mr. Blaine himself, who, taking me into his confidence, told me that it had been offered him, and proceeded to sound me upon the advisability of his acceptance. This information produced a shiver. Mr. Blaine never had a warmer friend than I had been from the day he entered Congress, nor Mr. Conkling one more true to him; but I had never felt called upon to pass judgment upon the merits of a controversy between these two friends of mine, which I had seen begin in empty trifles and grow by perpetual feeding till it had come to be a menace, and therefore I had refused many opportunities proffered on both sides to listen to or aid in redressing grievances that had arisen out of it. I could not, however, shut my eyes to the direct tendency and probable fatal consequences of its presence. I early saw that it must be buried, or it would itself

bury not only these two men, but also the political party to which they belonged. I warned Mr. Blaine that if he entered the cabinet with the intent or hope of circumventing his rival, it would be fatal to him and to the administration of Garfield, and I expressed the opinion that it would be impossible for him to keep the peace if he took the office. He replied with frankness and, I have no doubt, with entire sincerity that it would be his purpose if he accepted office to ignore all past differences, and so to deport himself in it as to force reconciliation. He said also that he could not agree with me, even if the effect should prove otherwise, that he should for that reason be debarred from the great opportunity, for which he felt himself qualified, to administer the Foreign Office on the broad and grand scale he did afterward undertake, but was not permitted to perfect. I foresaw the rocks all too plainly, and advised him to remain in the Senate. But he determined otherwise, and accepted the position.

After the report got abroad and before the official announcement, and while a change of policy was still possible, nothing was done to smooth the way for this important movement. On the contrary, bitterness of speech on both sides had free course, and the clans, ready for the fray, began to take their places under their respective leaders before Inauguration Day. Conkling refused to consider the proposed appointment of Blaine as other than a premeditated attempt to humiliate him, and those who had been with him in past controversies readily accepted his interpretation of it. Garfield, of whose great brain-power political sagacity formed no part, could not be made to see in the opposition anything but an attempt by dictation to trench upon his constitutional prerogatives in the free choice of his own counselors; and all "Blaine men" agreed with him. All was made worse, and the opposition was both intensified and confirmed in its belief, by the appointment to the cabinet of a Secretary of the Treasury from New York, not only without consultation with the Senator, but against his earnest recommendation of another. The administration was thus organized, not only without recognition of the Conkling "wing," but over it, and, as he and his friends insisted, in defiance of him. It is no part of my purpose to argue the question whether there might not have been right as well as wrong on both sides, nor on which was the preponderance. I am only putting on paper what I saw and heard (and, I might as well admit, part of which I was), and what I knew, of the political blindness which seemed to come over all who had to do with this affair.

After the inauguration and the selection of

the leading places in the cabinet in the manner I have indicated, the Senator made one more attempt to regain that influence in the conduct of affairs, especially in the appointments to office in the State of New York, to which he and his following claimed that he was entitled. It was his claim that such appointments should not only be exclusively from among his friends and those who were with him in the late movement to renominate Grant, but that he should have the naming of them. To this President Garfield would not submit. Politically he considered himself under obligation equally to those who under the lead of Robertson had made his nomination possible, and to Conkling and his following for the great service they had rendered in making his election sure. In short, he believed it to be his duty to keep out of sight the lines of division upon which Mr. Conkling insisted, and furthermore that it was his prerogative to make the selections himself. There is no doubt that in this position he was sustained by Mr. Blaine, and the evidence is equally clear to those who were on the ground and familiar with the different stages of this progressive fight, that in the selection of appointees afterward made, on which the administration foundered, the Secretary had no part. Frequent interviews between the President and Mr. Conkling before the nominations were finally made failed to move either from the position he had taken. Mr. Conkling would listen to no name having any connection with the faction led by Robertson in the ante-election struggle, and insisted upon naming the men, according to a usage then prevalent. The President declared his determination to treat all political friends in New York alike, but indicated his willingness, so far as the public good would in his opinion permit, to accede to the wishes of Mr. Conkling in the selection between individuals. But Mr. Conkling would listen to nothing short of the adoption by the administration of the warfare of extermination which he was waging in New York; and there they parted company, and thereafter during the life of Garfield the New York senator had no further intercourse with the White House. It did not matter that when the New York appointments were made, to Mr. Morton, the warm friend of Mr. Conkling, whom he had presented for the Treasury portfolio, was given the second diplomatic office,—that of minister to France,—so long as Robertson, like Mordecai, sat at the port of New York. Even Morton lost much of the friendship of Conkling by accepting the office thus offered to him.

A declaration of war, if not as formal and high-sounding, yet as positive and as unrelenting as ever opened actual hostilities between

belligerent nations, followed immediately upon the sending of the New York nominations to the Senate. A little preliminary skirmishing formed a prelude to the more serious trial of strength. Friends identified with each side, and those who were friends of both, took the matter up, and strove for peace. Both sides desired peace, but on their own terms or not at all. Each was confident that it could win in the fight — Garfield with the power of a four years' administration before him, and Conkling through his influence with the Senate and with the Republican party of New York, of which he was the acknowledged leader. It was at this stage of the controversy that the Committee of Conciliation already alluded to came into being. Five persons, representing as well as could be all sides of this controversy, were requested to act as that committee; and at the suggestion, I believe, of the Senator himself I acted as its chairman. Mr. Conkling appeared before that committee in behalf of himself and the party grievances he represented, and was heard in one of the committee-rooms of the Senate at great length in recounting wrongs, and insisting upon the drastic remedy of extermination of the hostile faction in New York as the only cure. On that occasion he surpassed himself in all those elements of oratorical power for which he was so distinguished. I had heard him in all his great efforts from the day he entered Congress, more than twenty years before, but I had never heard anything which equaled this effort for flights of oratorical power — genuine eloquence, bitter denunciation, ridicule of the despised faction in New York, and contempt for its leader. He continued for two hours and a half to play with consummate skill upon all the strings known to the orator, and through all the notes, from the lowest to the highest, which the great masters command, and concluded in a lofty apostrophe to the greatness and glory of the Republican party, and his own devotion to its highest welfare. "And," said he, "I trust that the exigency may never arise when I shall be compelled to choose between self-respect and personal honor on the one side, and a temporary discomfiture of that party on the other; but if that time shall ever come, I shall not hesitate in the choice, and I now say to you, and through you to those whom it most concerns, that I have in my pocket an autograph letter of this President who is now for the time being its official head, which I pray God I may never be compelled in self-defense to make public; but if that time shall ever come, I declare to you, his friends, he will bite the dust."

This closed the interview, and the committee was left in a great state of excitement, produced not alone by the remarkable character of the entire speech, but especially by the

concluding sentences, which seemed to imply that he held the life of the administration in his hand, and would not hesitate to take it if frustrated in his purposes in regard to New York politics. It was deemed absolutely necessary to get possession of this letter, or at least to learn the contents of a missive thus held over the head of the President. A time had been fixed to hear the President's side of the controversy, and it was arranged that I should in some way, without violating the confidences of the conference with Conkling, if there were any such, ascertain from the President himself the nature of this mysterious document. I accordingly went to the White House for that purpose a half hour in advance of the committee, and, without disclosing our interview with the Senator, sought to ascertain whether the President was aware of such a use of any such letter. Almost my first inquiry brought out this response: "Oh, you allude to a letter Conkling is saying that he has of mine, and which he represents to be a pretty bad one. I know what it is, and have a copy of it." He treated the whole matter lightly and as of no consequence; and remarking that he had heard of this before, took the letter from his pocket and handed it to me. Upon perusing it, I discovered that it was one of those indiscreet epistles, like the Jay Hubbell letters, which he had written during the Presidential campaign, aiding the efforts to collect from clerks and other government officials subscriptions to campaign expenses. Although by no means a good letter, I was satisfied that its chief harm to Garfield at that late date lay in the ability to create a mystery about its contents by keeping them from the public eye while still talking about it. I therefore advised its immediate publication, thereby doing away as early as possible with any bad impression which the scene before the committee might make when it came to be known, as it was sure to be — if indeed that had not been its design. I urged that he should not permit it to be held over his head as a menace for a single moment, and that whatever harm was possible from its publication would be less if it came from his friends promptly than if it waited on the opportunity of his enemies, after they had made whatever could be made by withholding its contents. I urged him to let me take it to the Associated Press that very night. As he was about to hand it to me for that purpose, Mr. Blaine entered the room. The President, turning to him, remarked: "Here, Blaine, is where I have been slopping over again. Here is a copy of one of my letters which Conkling has got hold of and is threatening to use against me. Dawes advises me to let the Associated Press have it to-night, and forestall him." Blaine read the letter, and shook his head, advising strongly against its publica-

tion. And so the letter never saw the light until such time as Mr. Conkling thought most opportune for his purpose. But he had waited too long, and its effect had been discounted before he used it.

The committee, arriving according to appointment, then proceeded to hear from the President, after the withdrawal of Mr. Blaine, the other side of the story, much of which has been already outlined. He stated his position to be that he could not ignore, much less taboo, either of the parties to this quarrel in New York, and for him to do so would be base ingratitude and the worst of politics. The one of them had been a potent factor in his nomination in spite of the other; while the other at the end of the canvass had caused the scale of popular favor to turn securely to his side. Both had the right to say that their claim to recognition could not be gainsaid in that forum where party fidelity and party service are the test. Equally clear was it to him that sound politics required him to take no share in party divisions which involved no political principle. He then recounted the pains he had taken in his attempt to apply these principles to the case in hand, and his failure to enlist cooperation; and said that, though compelled to take the course he had pursued unaided by those from whom he had hoped for assistance, he had been guided in it strictly by the principles here indicated. And to this course he must adhere. Thus nothing came of this effort at adjustment.

I had one more interview with Mr. Conkling after this, and before his resignation and his appeal from a Republican administration in Washington to the Republicans in New York. It was of his own seeking, and occurred only the Saturday afternoon before the resignation was made public. He hailed me from a carriage as I was turning a corner on the sidewalk, and, leaving his carriage, came to where I was standing "for a few minutes' talk." This interview on the corner of the street lasted nearly an hour. Both of us became very earnest, though with entire good feeling, he in rehearsing his grievances, and presenting them in new dress, and I in an attempt to point out to him a way not only of settlement but of triumph over his enemies—a view I thought most likely to prevail with him. I said to him: "Suppose all you say is true,"—I always believed that more was his due than he had credit for,— "nevertheless this is your opportunity, by a stroke of magnanimity, to win a victory over those who are thus arrayed against you. Go into the Senate on Monday morning, and present your indictment, if you choose—as strong

a case as facts will permit, the stronger the better for the conclusion. And let that conclusion be a declaration to the Senate and the country that there is something higher in the mission of the Republican party than the redress of personal grievances; that the cause must not be jeopardized by dissension, nor any one relieved from duty at his post, however grievous the wrongs and injustice he has encountered in its discharge: and then call on all friends and foes alike to put the past behind them, and close up the ranks with their faces to the future." I assured him of my belief that such a speech on Monday morning, made in sincerity and with his power, would send a thrill of joy through every Republican heart in the country, and that he would be hailed as the deliverer of the party from the perils which threatened its integrity. Such a course, I ventured to say, would, I believed, put him at once in popular favor a hundred miles ahead of those who were wronging him, and would lift the party out of the dangers which beset it.

He turned upon me with a discouraged and disgusted look, remarking: "Your medicine, Dawes, is much easier to prescribe than to take. Suppose I should say to you, 'Go home to Massachusetts, and in the spirit of meekness and peace embrace Ben Butler.' Why, you have no idea of the bitterness of the feeling in New York in condemnation of these men. If I should take the course you suggest, I should myself go under, and should be burned in effigy from Buffalo to Montauk Point, and could not be elected a delegate to a county convention in Oneida County."

And so we parted. On Monday he resigned, and appealed for indorsement to the Republican legislature of New York, then in session. They decided against him, and he went into retirement. But the struggle rent the party in twain, and the wounds have never healed. To it more than all else may be traced the present condition of Republican politics in New York. Bitterness and hate, born of this strife, outlived the actors themselves. Disappointed office-seekers turned in wrath upon the appointing power. In two short months from the retirement of Conkling, the President himself was shot by the madman Guiteau, possessed with the idea that in some way his own failure to get office grew out of this unfortunate and fatal quarrel.

And, as if to make a dramatic climax, it is said, with how much truth I do not know, that Mr. Conkling did afterward actually fail of an election to an Oneida County convention.

the followers of 'Amr. Every temple, every pyramid, every tomb in Lower and Middle Egypt, became at that time a quarry for the architects of palaces, fortresses, and mosques. Limestone buildings were demolished, and granite buildings were wrecked for the sake of their limestone foundations. At Bubastis, as at Tanis, pavements and foundation courses were systematically quarried out; and, as a necessary consequence, the superstructure came down *en masse*.

From the time of El-Makrizi to the advent of the French commission in 1798 the history of Bubastis is again a blank; but with the brief report of M. Malus on "Thal Bastah," in the first volume of the "Mémoires sur l'Égypte," it emerges for a moment from oblivion. Referring to the dividing point of the Pelusiatic and Tanitic arms of the Nile, he says that from thence he first saw the mounds of "Thal Bastah," which he estimates as distant seven leagues from the Nile and half a league from the canal:


We there found many ruins of monuments illustrative of Egyptian architecture. We remarked among other objects a fragment of cornice in a massive style, with the sculptures in good preservation. This block, which measures about eight feet in length and six in height, is of a very hard, brown-colored granite. The work is highly finished, and it is covered with hieroglyphs. . . . Enormous masses of granite, almost all broken, are piled up in an extraordinary way.

It is evident from these words that a considerable part of the ruins was yet above ground ninety years ago, and that all, or nearly all, those "masses of granite" which so impressed the French savant must have disappeared since his time. Following Malus at a distance of some sixty years came Mariette. By a strange oversight, he missed the axis of the temple, sinking his pits in a northeasterly direction, instead of from west to east. Missing the axis, he missed the great discovery so fortunately achieved thirty years later by M. Naville.

Amelia B. Edwards.

THE UNDERTONE.

THY word, O Lord, for evermore is true:
 The deep without calls to the deep within.
 Here on the sunlit crags I lie at ease,
 Whence I behold an endless vast without,
 And dimly know a deeper vast within.
 One with eternal voice of pealing sound,
 And one with ceaseless crying of the soul,
 While each to each a solemn answer gives.
 Hearken! My soul, be still and understand!
 Swept by swift winds and drawn by secret power,
 The waters break in music on the shore,
 And with a speechless yet a meaning voice,
 Not to be heard but by the fortunate ear
 Attuned to high and spiritual sounds,
 These waters cry, behold, they cry aloud,
 Moaning in tender sympathy with pain,
 Shouting anon with fresh and childlike glee,
 Or murmuring low as in love's fond embrace,
 Or like the prayers of saints about to die,
 Then thundering the warrior's battle-shout;
 The market's hum, the gold of eloquence,
 The ever-wearied wrangle of the schools,
 And the vain babble of the idle crowd.
 All these I hear, repeated from the world,
 But underneath them all, in deeper strain,
 Binding the whole in smooth, unbroken rhythm,
 Is one low marvelous voice, as thunder strong,
 Divinely clear, and sweet as heavenly bells,
 That pauses not, nor ever changes tone,
 But speaks unto the soul for evermore
 Its one eternal prophecy of peace.
 That wondrous voice, O God! is surely thine:
 That selfsame voice, Eternal God! is mine.



ANDREW JOHNSON. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

THE FOURTEENTH OF APRIL—THE FATE OF THE ASSASSINS —THE MOURNING PAGEANT.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE FOURTEENTH OF APRIL.



HE 14th of April was a day of deep and tranquil happiness throughout the United States. It was Good Friday, observed by a portion of the people as an occasion of fasting and religious meditation; but even among the most devout the great tidings of the preceding week exerted their joyous influence, and changed this period of traditional mourning into an occasion of

general and profound thanksgiving. Peace, so strenuously fought for, so long sought and prayed for, with prayers uttered and unutterable, was at last near at hand, its dawn visible on the reddening hills. The sermons all day were full of gladness; the Misereres turned of themselves to Te Deums. The country from morning till evening was filled with a solemn joy; but the date was not to lose its awful significance in the calendar: at night it was claimed once more, and forever, by a world-wide sorrow.

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The thanksgiving of the nation found its principal expression at Charleston harbor. A month before, when Sherman had "conquered Charleston by turning his back upon it," the Government resolved that the flag of the Union should receive a conspicuous reparation on the spot where it had first been outraged. It was ordered by the President that General Robert Anderson should, at the hour of noon on the 14th day of April, raise and plant on the ruins of Fort Sumter the identical flag lowered and saluted by him four years before. In the absence of General Sherman the ceremonies were in the charge of General Gillmore. Henry Ward Beecher, the most famous of the anti-slavery preachers of the North, was selected to deliver an oration. The surrender of Lee, the news of which arrived at Charleston on the eve of the ceremonies, gave a more transcendent importance to the celebration, which became at once the occasion of a national thanksgiving over the downfall of the rebellion. On the day fixed, Charleston was filled with a great concourse of distinguished officers and citizens. Its long-deserted streets were crowded with an eager multitude and gay with innumerable flags, while the air was thrilled from an early hour with patriotic strains from the many bands, and shaken with the thunder of Dahlgren's fleet, which opened the day by firing from every vessel a national salute of twenty-one guns. By eleven o'clock a brilliant gathering of boats, ships, and steamers of every sort had assembled around the battered ruin of the fort; the whole bay seemed covered with the vast flotilla, planted with a forest of masts, whose foliage was the triumphant banners of the nation. The same chaplain¹ who had officiated at the raising of the flag over Sumter, at the first scene of the war, now offered a prayer; Dr. Richard S. Storrs and the people read, in alternate verses, a selection of psalms of thanksgiving and victory, beginning with these marvelous words which have preserved for so many ages the very pulse and throb of the joy of redemption:

When the Lord turned again the captivity of Zion, we were like them that dream.

Then was our mouth filled with laughter, and our tongue with singing: then said they among the heathen, The Lord hath done great things for them.

The Lord hath done great things for us; whereof we are glad.

Turn again our captivity, O Lord, as the streams in the south.

They that sow in tears shall reap in joy.

He that goeth forth and weepeth, bearing precious seed, shall doubtless come again with rejoicing, bringing his sheaves with him.

¹ The Rev. Matthias Harris.

² Gen. E. D. Townsend, afterwards Adjutant-General, U. S. A.

And at the close, before the Gloria, the people and the minister read all together, in a voice that seemed to catch the inspiration of the hour:

Some trust in chariots, and some in horses: but we will remember the name of the Lord our God.

We will rejoice in thy salvation, and in the name of our God we will set up our banners.

General Townsend² then read the original dispatch announcing the fall of Sumter, and precisely as the bells of the ships struck the hour of noon, General Anderson, with his own hands seizing the halyards, hoisted to its place the flag which he had seen lowered before the opening guns of rebellion. As the starry banner floated out upon the breeze, which freshened at the moment as if to embrace it, a storm of joyful acclamation burst forth from the vast assembly, mingled with the music of hundreds of instruments, the shouts of the people, and the full-throated roar of great guns from the Union and the captured rebel forts alike, on every side of the harbor, thundering their harmonious salute to the restored banner. General Anderson made a brief and touching speech, the people sang "The Star-Spangled Banner," Mr. Beecher delivered an address in his best and gravest manner, filled with an earnest, sincere, and unboastful spirit of nationality; with a feeling of brotherhood to the South, prophesying for that section the advantages which her defeat has in fact brought her; a speech as brave, as gentle, and as magnanimous as the occasion demanded. In concluding he said, and we quote his words, as they embodied the opinion of all men of good will on this last day of Abraham Lincoln's life:

We offer to the President of these United States our solemn congratulations that God has sustained his life and health under the unparalleled burdens and sufferings of four bloody years, and permitted him to behold this auspicious consummation of that national unity for which he has waited with so much patience and fortitude, and for which he has labored with such disinterested wisdom.

At sunset another national salute was fired; the evening was given up to social festivities; the most distinguished of the visitors were entertained at supper by General Gillmore; a brilliant show of fireworks by Admiral Dahlgren illuminated the bay and the circle of now friendly forts, at the very moment when at the capital of the nation a little group of conspirators were preparing the blackest crime which sullies the record of the century.

In Washington also it was a day, not of exultation, but of deep peace and thankfulness. It was the fifth day after the surrender of Lee; the first effervescence of that intoxicating success had passed away. The President had,

with that ever-present sense of responsibility which distinguished him, given his thoughts instantly to the momentous question of the restoration of the Union and harmony between the lately warring sections. He had, in defiance of precedent and even of his own habit, delivered to the people on the 11th, from the windows of the White House, his well-considered views as to the measures demanded by the times. His whole heart was now enlisted in the work of "binding up the nation's wounds," of doing all which might "achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace." Grant had arrived that morning in Washington and immediately proceeded to the Executive Mansion, where he met the Cabinet, Friday being their regular day of meeting. He expressed some anxiety as to the news from Sherman, which he was expecting hourly. The President answered him in that singular vein of poetic mysticism which, though constantly held in check by his strong common sense, formed a remarkable element in his character. He assured Grant that the news would come soon and come favorably, for he had last night had his usual dream which preceded great events. He seemed to be, he said, in a singular and indescribable vessel, but always the same, moving with great rapidity towards a dark and indefinite shore; he had had this dream before Antietam, Murfreesboro', Gettysburg, and Vicksburg. The Cabinet were greatly impressed by this story; but Grant, the most matter-of-fact of created beings, made the characteristic response that "Murfreesboro' was no victory, and had no important results." The President did not argue this point with him, but repeated that Sherman would beat or had beaten Johnston; that his dream must relate to that, as he knew of no other important event which was likely at present to occur.¹

The subject of the discussion which took place in the Cabinet on that last day of Lincoln's firm and tolerant rule has been preserved for us in the notes of Mr. Welles. They were written out, it is true, seven years afterwards, at a time when Grant was President, seeking reflection, and when Mr. Welles had followed Andrew Johnson into full fellowship with the Democratic party. Making whatever allowance is due for the changed environment of the writer, we still find his account² of the day's conversation candid and trustworthy. The subject of trade between the

States was the first that engaged the attention of the Cabinet. Mr. Stanton wished it to be carried on under somewhat strict military supervision; Mr. Welles was in favor of a more liberal system; Mr. McCulloch, new to the Treasury, and embarrassed by his grave responsibilities, favored the abolition of the Treasury agencies, and above all desired a definite understanding of the purpose of the Government. The President, seeing that in this divergence of views among men equally able and honest there lay the best chance of a judicious arrangement, appointed the three Secretaries as a commission with plenary power to examine the whole subject, announcing himself as content in advance with their conclusions.

The great subject of the reestablishment of civil government in the Southern States was then taken up. Mr. Stanton had, a few days before, drawn up a project for an executive ordinance for the preservation of order and the rehabilitation of legal processes in the States lately in rebellion. The President, using this sketch as his text, not adopting it as a whole, but saying that it was substantially the result of frequent discussions in the Cabinet, spoke at some length on the question of reconstruction, than which none more important could ever engage the attention of the Government. It was providential, he thought, that this matter should have arisen at a time when it could be considered, so far as the Executive was concerned, without interference by Congress. If they were wise and discreet, they should reanimate the States and get their governments in successful operation, with order prevailing and the Union reestablished, before Congress came together in December. The President felt so kindly towards the South, he was so sure of the Cabinet under his guidance, that he was anxious to close the period of strife without overmuch discussion. He was particularly desirous to avoid the shedding of blood, or any vindictiveness of punishment. He gave plain notice that morning that he would have none of it. "No one need expect he would take any part in hanging or killing these men, even the worst of them.³ Frighten them out of the country, open the gates, let down the bars, scare them off," said he, throwing up his hands as if scaring sheep. "Enough lives have been sacrificed; we must extinguish our resentments if we expect harmony and union."⁴ He depre-

¹ This story is told by the Hon. Gideon Welles in an article printed in "The Galaxy" for April, 1872. It was frequently told by Charles Dickens with characteristic amplifications. See also "The Life of George Eliot."

² "The Galaxy," April, 1872.

³ Welles, in "The Galaxy."

⁴ Near the close of the war his old friend, Joseph Gillespie, asked him what was to be done with the

rebels. He answered, after referring to the vehement demand prevalent in certain quarters for exemplary punishment, by quoting the words of David to his nephews, who were asking for vengeance on Shimei because "he cursed the Lord's anointed": "What have I to do with you, ye sons of Zeruiah, that ye should this day be adversaries unto me? Shall there any man be put to death this day in Israel?"

cated the disposition he had seen in some quarters to hector and dictate to the people of the South, who were trying to right themselves. He regretted that suffrage, under proper arrangement, had not been given to negroes in Louisiana, but he held that their constitution was in the main a good one. He was averse to the exercise of arbitrary powers by the Executive or by Congress. Congress had the undoubted right to receive or reject members; the Executive had no control in this; but the Executive could do very much to restore order in the States, and their practical relations with the Government, before Congress came together.

Mr. Stanton then read his plan for the temporary military government of the States of Virginia and North Carolina, which for this purpose were combined in one department. This gave rise at once to extended discussion, Mr. Welles and Mr. Dennison opposing the scheme of uniting two States under one government. The President closed the session by saying the same objection had occurred to him, and by directing Mr. Stanton to revise the document and report separate plans for the government of the two States. He did not wish the autonomy nor the individuality of the States destroyed. He commended the whole subject to the most earnest and careful consideration of the Cabinet; it was to be resumed on the following Tuesday; it was, he said, the great question pending — they must now begin to act in the interest of peace.

These were the last words that Lincoln spoke to his Cabinet. They dispersed with these words of clemency and good-will in their ears, never again to meet under his wise and benignant chairmanship. He had told them that morning a strange story, which made some demand upon their faith, but the circumstances under which they were next to come together were beyond the scope of the wildest fancy. The day was one of unusual enjoyment to Mr. Lincoln. His son Robert had returned from the field with General Grant, and the President spent an hour with the young soldier in delighted conversation over the campaign. He denied himself generally to the throng of visitors, admitting only a few friends.

Schuyler Colfax, who was contemplating a visit overland to the Pacific, came to ask whether the President would probably call an extra session of Congress during the summer. Mr. Lincoln assured him that he had no such intention, and gave him a verbal message to

the mining population of Colorado and the western slope of the mountains concerning the part they were to take in the great conquests of peace which were coming. In the afternoon he went for a long drive with Mrs. Lincoln. His mood, as it had been all day, was singularly happy and tender. He talked much of the past and the future; after four years of trouble and tumult he looked forward to four years of comparative quiet and normal work; after that he expected to go back to Illinois and practice law again. He was never simpler or gentler than on this day of unprecedented triumph; his heart overflowed with sentiments of gratitude to Heaven, which took the shape usual to generous natures, of love and kindness to all men.

From the very beginning of his Presidency Mr. Lincoln had been constantly subject to the threats of his enemies and the warnings of his friends. The threats came in every form; his mail was infested with brutal and vulgar menace, mostly anonymous, the proper expression of vile and cowardly minds. The warnings were not less numerous; the vapors of village bullies, the extravagances of excited secessionist politicians, even the drolling of practical jokers, were faithfully reported to him by zealous or nervous friends. Most of these communications received no notice. In cases where there seemed a ground for inquiry it was made, as carefully as possible, by the President's private secretary and by the War Department, but always without substantial result. Warnings that appeared to be most definite, when they came to be examined proved too vague and confused for further attention. The President was too intelligent not to know he was in some danger. Madmen frequently made their way to the very door of the Executive offices and sometimes into Mr. Lincoln's presence.¹ He had himself so sane a mind, and a heart so kindly even to his enemies, that it was hard for him to believe in a political hatred so deadly as to lead to murder. He would sometimes laughingly say, "Our friends on the other side would make nothing by exchanging me for Hamlin," the Vice-President having the reputation of more radical views than his chief.

He knew indeed that incitements to murder him were not uncommon in the South. An advertisement had appeared in a paper of Selma, Alabama, in December, 1864, opening a subscription for funds to effect the assassination of Lincoln, Seward, and Johnson before the

¹ All Presidents receive the visits of persons more or less demented. Mr. Hayes, when about to retire one day from his working-room, asked his messenger if there was any one waiting to see him. "Only two," the attendant replied, "and one of them is crazy."

"Send in the sane one," said the President. A grave-looking man was introduced, who announced himself as the emperor of the world. The President rang the bell, and told the messenger if that was his idea of sanity to send in the maniac.

inauguration.¹ There was more of this murderous spirit abroad than was suspected. A letter was found in the Confederate Archives² from one Lieutenant Alston, who wrote to Jefferson Davis immediately after Lincoln's reelection offering to "rid his country of some of her deadliest enemies by striking at the very heart's blood of those who seek to enchain her in slavery." This shameless proposal was referred, by Mr. Davis's direction, to the Secretary of War; and by Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, was sent to the Confederate Adjutant-General indorsed "for attention." We can readily imagine what reception an officer would have met with who should have laid before Mr. Lincoln a scheme to assassinate Jefferson Davis. It was the uprightness and the kindness of his own heart that made him slow to believe that any such ignoble fury could find a place in the hearts of men in their right minds. Although he freely discussed with the officials about him the possibilities of danger, he always considered them remote, as is the habit of men constitutionally brave, and positively refused to torment himself with precautions for his own safety. He would sum the matter up by saying that both friends and strangers must have daily access to him in all manner of ways and places; his life was therefore in reach of any one, sane or mad, who was ready to murder and be hanged for it; that he could not possibly guard against all danger unless he were to shut himself up in an iron box, in which condition he could scarcely perform the duties of a President; by the hand of a murderer he could die only once; to go continually in fear would be to die over and over. He therefore went in and out before the people, always unarmed, generally unattended. He would receive hundreds of visitors in a day, his breast bare to pistol or knife. He would walk at midnight, with a single secretary or alone, from the Executive Mansion to the War Department, and back. He would ride through the lonely roads of an uninhabited suburb from the White House to the Soldiers' Home in the dusk of evening, and return to his work in the morning before the town was astir. He was greatly annoyed when, late in the war, it was decided that there must be a guard stationed at the Executive Mansion, and that a squad of cavalry must accompany him on his daily ride—but he was always reasonable and yielded to the best judgment of others.

Four years of threats and boastings, of alarms that were not founded, and of plots

that came to nothing, thus passed away; but precisely at the time when the triumph of the nation over the long insurrection seemed assured, and a feeling of peace and security was diffused over the country, one of the conspiracies, not seemingly more important than the many abortive ones, ripened in the sudden heat of hatred and despair. A little band of malignant secessionists, consisting of John Wilkes Booth, an actor, of a famous family of players, Lewis Powell, alias Payne, a disbanded rebel soldier from Florida, George Atzerodt, formerly a coachmaker, but more recently a spy and blockade runner of the Potomac, David E. Herold, a young druggist's clerk, Samuel Arnold and Michael O'Laughlin, Maryland secessionists and Confederate soldiers, and John H. Surratt, had their ordinary rendezvous at the house of Mrs. Mary E. Surratt,³ the widowed mother of the last named, formerly a woman of some property in Maryland, but reduced by reverses to keeping a small boarding-house in Washington. Booth was the leader of the little coterie. He was a young man of twenty-six, strikingly handsome, with a pale olive face, dark eyes, and that ease and grace of manner which came to him of right from his theatrical ancestors. He had played for several seasons with only indifferent success; his value as an actor lay rather in his romantic beauty of person than in any talent or industry he possessed. He was a fanatical secessionist; had assisted at the capture and execution of John Brown, and had imbibed, at Richmond and other Southern cities where he had played, a furious spirit of partisanship against Lincoln and the Union party. After the reelection of Mr. Lincoln, which rang the knell of the insurrection, Booth, like many of the secessionists North and South, was stung to the quick by disappointment. He visited Canada, consorted with the rebel emissaries there, and at last—whether or not at their instigation cannot certainly be said—conceived a scheme to capture the President and take him to Richmond. He spent a great part of the autumn and winter inducing a small number of loose fish of secession sympathies to join him in this fantastic enterprise. He seemed always well supplied with money, and talked largely of his speculations in oil as a source of income; but his agent afterwards testified⁴ that he never realized a dollar from that source; that his investments, which were inconsiderable, were a total loss. The winter passed away and nothing was accomplished. On the 4th of March, Booth was at the Capitol and created a disturbance by trying to force his way through the line of policemen who guarded the passage through which the President walked to the east front of the building.⁵ His

¹ Pitman, Conspiracy Trial, p. 51.

² Ibid., p. 52.

³ 541 H Street.

⁴ Pitman, p. 45.

⁵ He was seized and held back by John W. Westfall, of the Capitol Police.

intentions at this time are not known; he afterwards said¹ he lost an excellent chance of killing the President that day. There are indications in the evidence given on the trial of the conspirators that they suffered some great disappointment in their schemes in the latter part of March, and a letter from Arnold to Booth,² dated March 27, showed that some of them had grown timid of the consequences of their contemplated enterprise and were ready to give it up. He advised Booth, before going further, "to go and see how it will be taken in R—d." But timid as they might be by nature, the whole group was so completely under the ascendancy of Booth that they did not dare disobey him when in his presence; and after the surrender of Lee, in an access of malice and rage which was akin to madness, he called them together and assigned each his part in the new crime, the purpose of which had arisen suddenly in his mind out of the ruins of the abandoned abduction scheme. This plan was as brief and simple as it was horrible. Powell, alias Payne, the stalwart, brutal, simple-minded boy from Florida, was to murder Seward; Atzerodt, the comic villain of the drama, was assigned to remove Andrew Johnson; Booth reserved for himself the most difficult and most conspicuous rôle of the tragedy; it was Herold's duty to attend him as a page and aid in his escape. Minor parts were assigned to stage carpenters and other hangers-on, who probably did not understand what it all meant. Herold, Atzerodt, and Surratt had previously deposited at a tavern at Surrattsville, Maryland, owned by Mrs. Surratt, but kept by a man named Lloyd, a quantity of ropes, carbines, ammunition, and whisky, which were to be used in the abduction scheme. On the 11th of April Mrs. Surratt, being at the tavern, told Lloyd to have the shooting irons in readiness, and on Friday, the 14th, again visited the place and told him they would probably be called for that night.

The preparations for the final blow were made with feverish haste; it was only about noon of the 14th that Booth learned the President was to go to Ford's Theater that night. It has always been a matter of surprise in Europe that he should have been at a place of amusement on Good Friday; but the day was not kept sacred in America, except by the members of certain churches. It was not, throughout the country, a day of religious observance. The President was fond of the theater; it was one of his few means of recreation. It was natural enough that, on this day of profound national thanksgiving, he

should take advantage of a few hours' relaxation to see a comedy. Besides, the town was thronged with soldiers and officers, all eager to see him; it was represented to him that appearing occasionally in public would gratify many people whom he could not otherwise meet. Mrs. Lincoln had asked General and Mrs. Grant to accompany her; they had accepted, and the announcement that they would be present was made as an advertisement in the evening papers; but they changed their minds and went north by an afternoon train. Mrs. Lincoln then invited in their stead Miss Harris and Major Rathbone, the daughter and the stepson of Senator Harris. The President's carriage called for these young people, and the four went together to the theater. The President had been detained by visitors, and the play had made some progress when he arrived. When he appeared in his box the band struck up "Hail to the Chief," the actors ceased playing, and the audience rose, cheering tumultuously; the President bowed in acknowledgment of this greeting and the play went on.

From the moment Booth ascertained the President's intention to attend the theater in the evening his every action was alert and energetic. He and his confederates, Herold, Surratt, and Atzerodt, were seen on horseback in every part of the city. He had a hurried conference with Mrs. Surratt before she started for Lloyd's tavern. He intrusted to an actor named Matthews a carefully prepared statement of his reasons for committing the murder, which he charged him to give to the publisher of the "National Intelligencer," but which Matthews, in the terror and dismay of the night, burned without showing to any one.³ Booth was perfectly at home in Ford's Theater, where he was greatly liked by all the employees, without other reason than the sufficient one of his youth and good looks. Either by himself or with the aid of his friends he arranged his whole plan of attack and escape during the afternoon. He counted upon address and audacity to gain access to the small passage behind the President's box; once there, he guarded against interference by an arrangement of a wooden bar to be fastened by a simple mortise in the angle of the wall and the door by which he entered, so that the door could not be opened from without. He even provided for the contingency of not gaining entrance to the box by boring a hole in its door, through which he might either observe the occupants or take aim and shoot. He hired at a livery stable a small, fleet horse, which he showed with pride during the day to barkeepers and loafers among his friends.

The moon rose that night at ten o'clock.

¹ Pitman, p. 45.

² *Ibid.*, p. 236.

³ John F. Coyle, MS. Statement.



DIAGRAM OF THE BOX IN FORD'S THEATER.
(COPIED FROM THE DRAWING IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT.)

A few minutes before that hour he called one of the underlings of the theater to the back door and left him there holding his horse. He then went to a saloon near by, took a drink of brandy, and, entering the theater, passed rapidly through the crowd in rear of the dress circle and made his way to the passage leading to the President's box. He showed a card to a servant in attendance and was allowed to pass in. He entered noiselessly, and, turning, fastened the door with the bar he had previously made ready, without disturbing any of the occupants of the box, between whom and himself there yet remained the slight partition and the door through which he had bored the hole. Their eyes were fixed upon the stage; the play was "Our American Cousin," the original version by Tom Taylor, before Sothorn had made a new work of it by his elaboration of the part of *Dundreary*. No one, not even the comedian on the stage, could ever remember the last words of the piece that were uttered that night—the last Abraham Lincoln heard upon earth. The whole performance remains in the memory of those who heard it a vague phantasmagoria, the actors the thinnest of specters. The awful tragedy in the box makes everything else seem pale and unreal. Here were five human beings in a narrow space—the greatest man of his time, in the glory of the most stupendous success in our history, the idolized chief of a nation already mighty, with illimitable vistas of grandeur to come; his beloved wife, proud and

happy; a pair of betrothed lovers, with all the promise of felicity that youth, social position, and wealth could give them; and this young actor, handsome as Endymion upon Latmos, the pet of his little world. The glitter of fame, happiness, and ease was upon the entire group, but in an instant everything was to be changed with the blinding swiftness of enchantment. Quick death was to come on the central figure of that company—the central figure, we believe, of the great and good men of the century. Over all the rest the blackest fates hovered menacingly—fates from which a mother might pray that kindly death would save her children in their infancy. One was to wander with the stain of murder on his soul, with the curses of a world upon his name, with a price set upon his head, in frightful physical pain, till he died a dog's death in a burning barn; the stricken wife was to pass the rest of her days in melancholy and madness; of those two young lovers, one was to slay the other, and then end his life a raving maniac.

The murderer seemed to himself to be taking part in a play. The fumes of brandy and partisan hate had for weeks kept his brain in a morbid state. He felt as if he were playing Brutus off the boards; he posed, expecting applause. Holding a pistol in one hand and a knife in the other, he opened the box door, put the pistol to the President's head, and fired; dropping the weapon, he took the knife in his right hand, and when Major Rathbone sprang to seize him he struck savagely at him. Major Rathbone received the blow on his left arm, suffering a wide and deep wound. Booth, rushing forward, then placed his left hand on the railing of the box and vaulted lightly over to the stage. It was a high leap, but nothing to such a trained athlete. He was in the habit of introducing what actors call sensational leaps in his plays. In "Macbeth," where he met the weird sisters, he leaped from a rock twelve feet high. He would have got safely away but for his spur catching in the folds of the Union flag with which the front of the box was draped. He fell on the stage, the torn flag trailing on his spur, but instantly rose as if he had received no hurt, though in fact the fall had broken his leg, turned to the audience, brandishing his dripping knife and shouting the State motto of Virginia, "Sic Semper Tyrannis,"¹ and fled rapidly across the stage and out of sight. Major Rathbone had shouted, "Stop him!" The cry went out, "He has shot the President." From the audience, at first stupid with surprise

¹ Mr. Leopold de Gaillard, writing on the 29th of April, 1865, refers to these words of Booth, which he calls a "stupid phrase" and not American in char-

acter. "I remember," he adds, "but one assassination adorned with a Latin quotation, but it took place in Florence, and in the sixteenth century. Lorenzo

and afterwards wild with excitement and horror, two or three men jumped upon the stage in pursuit of the flying assassin; but he ran through the familiar passages, leaped upon his horse, which was in waiting in the alley behind, rewarded with a kick and a curse the call-boy who had held him, and rode rapidly away in the light of the just risen moon.

The President scarcely moved; his head drooped forward slightly, his eyes closed. Colonel Rathbone, at first not regarding his own grievous hurt, rushed to the door of the box to summon aid. He found it barred, and on the outside some one was beating and clamoring for entrance. He opened the door; a young officer named Crawford entered; one or two army surgeons soon followed, who hastily examined the wound. It was at once seen to be mortal. It was afterwards ascertained that a large derringer bullet had entered the back of the head on the left side, and, passing through the brain, had lodged just behind the left eye. By direction of Rathbone and Crawford, the President was carried to a house across the street and laid upon a bed in a small room at the rear of the hall, on the ground floor. Mrs. Lincoln followed, half distracted, tenderly cared for by Miss Harris. Rathbone, exhausted by loss of blood, fainted, and was carried home. Messengers were sent for the members of the Cabinet, for the Surgeon-General, for Dr. Stone, the President's family physician; a crowd of people rushed instinctively to the White House and, bursting through the doors, shouted the dreadful news to Robert Lincoln and Major Hay, who sat gossiping in an upper room. They ran downstairs. Finding a carriage at the door, they entered it to go to Tenth street. As they were driving away, a friend came up and told them that Mr. Seward and most of the Cabinet had been murdered. The news was all so improbable that they could not help hoping it was all untrue. But when they got to Tenth street and found every thoroughfare blocked by the swiftly gathering thousands, agitated by tumultuous excitement, they were prepared for the worst. In a few minutes all who had been sent for, and many others, were gathered in the little chamber where the Chief of the State lay in his agony. His son was met at the door by Dr. Stone, who with grave tenderness informed him that there was no hope. After a natural outburst of grief young Lincoln devoted himself the rest of the night to soothing and comforting his mother.

The President had been shot a few minutes past ten. The wound would have brought in-

treacherously killed his cousin, Alexander de Medicie, who was in reality a tyrant, and left in writing near the body the line of Virgil on Brutus: *Vincet Amor patriæ*

FORD'S THEATRE

TENTH STREET, ABOVE E.

SEASON II..... WEEK XXXI..... NIGHT 196
WHOLE NUMBER OF NIGHTS, 425.

JOHN T. FORD..... PROPRIETOR AND MANAGER
(Able of Holiday St. Theatre, Baltimore, and Academy of Music, Paris.)
Stage Manager..... J. D. WRIGHT
Treasurer..... H. CLAY FORD

Friday Evening, April 14th, 1865

BENEFIT!

—AND—

LAST NIGHT

OF MISS

LAURA KEENE

THE DISTINGUISHED MANAGERESS, AUTHORESS AND ACTRESS,
Supported by

MR. JOHN DYOTT
AND
MR. HARRY HAWK.

TOM TAYLOR'S CELEBRATED ECCENTRIC COMEDY,
As originally produced in America by Miss Keene, and performed by her upwards of

ONE THOUSAND NIGHTS,
ENTITLED

OUR AMERICAN COUSIN

FLORENCE TRENCHARD..... MISS LAURA KEENE
(Her original character.)

Abel Marcott, Clerk to Attorney.....	John Dyott
Ann Trenchard.....	Harry Hawk
Sir Edward Trenchard.....	T. C. GOURLAY
Lord Dondreary.....	E. A. EMERSON
Mr. Coyle, Attorney.....	J. MATTHEWS
Lieutenant Vernon, R. N.....	W. J. FERGUSON
Captain De Bode.....	C. BYRNES
Bisby.....	G. G. SPEAR
Boddicomb, a valet.....	J. H. EVANS
John Whicker, a gardener.....	J. L. DEBONAY
Happy, a groom.....	MISS M. HART
Balfie.....	G. A. PARKHURST and L. JOHNSON
Mary Trenchard.....	MISS J. GOURLAY
Mrs. Mountchossington.....	Mrs. H. MUZZY
Augusta.....	MISS H. TRUMAN
Georgiana.....	MISS M. HART
Sharpe.....	Mrs. J. H. EVANS
Skillet.....	MISS M. GOURLAY

SATURDAY EVENING, APRIL 15.

BENEFIT of Miss JENNIE GOURLAY
Who will be presented DOUGLASS'S Grand Sensation Drama,

THE OCTOBEROON

Enter Monday, APRIL 17, Engagement of the YOUNG AMERICAN TRAGEDIAN,

EDWIN ADAMS

FOR TWELVE NIGHTS ONLY.

FACSIMILE OF A PLAY-BILL FOUND IN PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S BOX AFTER THE ASSASSINATION. THE ORIGINAL IS OWNED BY E. A. EMERSON, OF LYNCHBURG, VA.

J. A. Case, of Brooklyn, also has a play-bill, given to A. K. Brown by John T. Ford, the proprietor of Ford's Opera House in Washington, who noted on it that it was found under President Lincoln's chair.—EDITOR.

laudumque immensa Cupido. It was the thirst of fame which was the real incentive to these savage deeds." [Gazette de France, April 30, 1865.]

stant death to most men, but his vital tenacity was extraordinary. He was, of course, unconscious from the first moment; but he breathed with slow and regular respiration throughout the night. As the dawn came, and the lamplight grew pale in the fresher beams, his pulse began to fail; but his face even then was scarcely more haggard than those of the sorrowing group of statesmen and generals around him. His automatic moaning, which had continued through the night, ceased; a look of unspeakable peace came upon his worn features. At twenty-two minutes after seven he died.¹ Stanton broke the silence by saying, "Now he belongs to the ages." Dr. Gurley knelt by the bedside and prayed fervently. The widow came in from the adjoining room supported by her son and cast herself with loud outcry on the dead body.

THE FATE OF THE ASSASSINS.

BOOTH had done his work efficiently. His principal subordinate, the young Floridian called Payne, had acted with equal audacity and cruelty, but not with equally fatal results. He had made a shambles of the residence of the Secretary of State, but among all his mangled victims there was not one killed. At eight o'clock that night he received his final orders from Booth,² who placed in his hands a knife and revolver, and a little package like a prescription, and taught him his lesson. Payne³ was a young man, hardly of age, of herculean strength, of very limited mental capacity, blindly devoted to Booth, who had selected him as the fitting instrument of his mad hatred. He obeyed the orders of his fascinating senior as exactly and remorselessly as a steel machine. At precisely the moment when Booth entered the theater, Payne came on horseback to the door of Mr. Seward's residence on Lafayette Square.⁴ Dismounting, he pretended to be a messenger from the attending physician, with a package of medicine, and demanded immediate access to the sick-room of the Secretary. Mr. Seward had been thrown from his carriage a few days before and his right arm and jaw were fractured. The servant at the door tried to prevent Payne from going up the stairs, but he persisted, and the noise the two men made in mounting brought Frederick Seward out into the hall. The Secretary had been very restless and had with difficulty at

last been composed to sleep. Fearing that this restorative slumber might be broken, Frederick Seward came out to check the intruders. He met Payne at the head of the stairs, and after hearing his story bade him go back, offering himself to take charge of the medicine. Payne seemed for an instant to give up his purpose in the face of this unexpected obstacle, but suddenly turned and rushed furiously upon Frederick Seward, putting a pistol to his head. It missed fire, and he then began beating him on the head with it, tearing his scalp and fracturing his skull. Still struggling, the two came to the Secretary's room and fell together through the door. Frederick Seward soon became unconscious and remained so for several weeks, being perhaps the last man in the civilized world who learned the strange story of the night. The Secretary lay on the farther side of the bed from the door; in the room was his daughter and a soldier-nurse named Robinson. They both sprang up at the noise of the disturbance; Payne struck them right and left out of his way, wounding Robinson with his knife; then rushed to the bed and began striking at the throat of the crippled statesman, inflicting three terrible wounds in cheek and neck; the Secretary rolled off between the bed and the wall. Robinson had by this time recovered himself and seized the assassin from behind, trying to pull him away from the bed. He fought with the quickness of a cat, stabbing Robinson twice severely over his shoulder, in spite of which the nurse still held on to him bravely. Colonel Augustus Seward, roused by his sister's screams, came in his nightdress into the room, and seeing the two forms in this deadly grapple thought at first his father was delirious and was struggling with the nurse; but noting in a moment the size and strength of the man, he changed his mind and thought that the nurse had gone mad and was murdering the Secretary. Nothing but madness was at first thought of anywhere to account for the night's work. He seized Payne, and after a struggle forced him out of the door—the assassin stabbing him repeatedly about the head and face. Payne broke away at last and ran rapidly downstairs, seriously wounding an attendant named Hansell on the way. He reached the door unhurt, leaped upon his horse, and rode leisurely away out Vermont Avenue to the eastern suburb. When surgical aid arrived, the quiet house, ordinarily so

¹ The persons about the deathbed of the President, besides his wife and son, were Vice-President Johnson, all the Cabinet with the exception of Mr. Seward, viz.: Stanton, Welles, McCulloch, Usher, Dennison, and Speed; Generals Halleck, Meigs, Farnsworth, Augur, and Todd; Senator Sumner; Rev. Dr. Gurley; Schuyler Colfax; Governor Farwell; Judges Cartter and Otto; Surgeon-General Barnes; Drs. Stone, Crane,

and Leale; Major John Hay, A. A. G.; and Maunsell B. Field. Mr. Nicolay was in Charleston at the flag-raising over Sumter.

² Doster's speech, Pitman, p. 314.

³ His true name was Lewis Thornton Powell.

⁴ Now the residence of James G. Blaine, Secretary of State.

decorous and well ordered, the scene of an affectionate home life and an unobtrusive hospitality, looked like a field hospital; five of its inmates were bleeding from ghastly wounds, and two of them—among the highest officials of the nation—it was thought might never see the light of another day; though all providentially recovered.

The assassin left behind him in his flight his bloodstained knife, his revolver,—or rather the fragments of it, for he had beaten it to pieces over the head of Frederick Seward,—and his hat. This last apparently trivial loss cost him and one of his fellow-conspirators their lives; for as soon as he had left the immediate scene of his crime, his perceptions being quickened by a murderer's avenging fears, it occurred to him that the lack of a hat would expose him to suspicion wherever he was seen; so instead of making good his escape, he abandoned his horse and hid himself for two days in the woods east of Washington. Driven by hunger he at last resolved to return to the city, to the house on H street which had been the headquarters of the conspiracy. He made himself a cap from the sleeve of his woolen shirt, threw over his shoulder a pickaxe he had found in a trench, and coming into town under cover of the darkness knocked about midnight at Mrs. Surratt's door. As his fate would have it, the house was full of officers who had that moment arrested all the inmates and were about to take them to the office of the provost-marshal. Payne thus fell into the hands of justice, and the utterance of half a dozen words by him and the unhappy woman whose shelter he had sought was the death warrant of both. Being asked by Major Smith to give an account of himself, he said he had been hired by Mrs. Surratt to dig a drain for her. She was called out and asked if she knew him. Not being aware of what he had said, she raised her right hand, with uncalled-for solemnity, and said, "Before God, I do not know him, never saw him, and never hired him." These words, the evidence of a guilty secret shared between them, started a train of evidence which led them both to the scaffold.

Booth was recognized by dozens of people as he stood before the footlights and brandished his dripping dagger in a Brutus attitude. His swift horse quickly carried him beyond the reach of any haphazard pursuit. He gained the navy-yard bridge in a few minutes, was hailed by a sentry, but persuaded the sergeant of the guard that he was returning to his home in Charles County and that he had waited in

Washington till the moon should rise. He was allowed to pass, and shortly afterwards Herold came to the bridge and passed over with similar explanations. A moment later the owner of the horse which Herold rode came up in pursuit of his animal. He, the only honest man of the three, was turned back by the guard—the sergeant felt he must draw the line somewhere. The assassin and his wretched acolyte came at midnight to Mrs. Surratt's tavern. Booth, whose broken leg was by this time giving him excruciating torture, remained outside, on his horse, and Herold went in, shouting to the inn-keeper to give him "those things." Lloyd, knowing what was meant, without a word brought the whisky, carbines, and field-glass which the Surratts had deposited there. Booth refused his gun, being unable in his crippled condition to carry it. Herold told Lloyd they had killed the President, and they rode away, leaving Lloyd, who was a sodden drunkard and contrabandist, unnerved by the news and by his muddy perception of his own complicity in the crime. He held his tongue for a day or two; but at last, overcome by fear, told all that he knew to the authorities. Booth and Herold pushed on through the moonlight to the house of an acquaintance of Booth, a rebel sympathizer, a surgeon named Samuel Mudd. The pain of his broken bone had become intolerable and day was approaching; aid and shelter had become pressingly necessary. Mudd received them kindly, set Booth's leg, and gave him a room where he rested until the middle of the afternoon; Mudd had a crutch made for him, and in the evening sent them on their desolate way to the South.

If Booth had been in health there is no reason why he should not have remained at large a good while; he might even have made his escape to some foreign country, though, sooner or later, a crime so prodigious will generally find its perpetrator out. But it is easy to hide among a sympathizing people. Many a Union soldier, escaping from prison, has walked hundreds of miles through the enemy's country relying implicitly upon the friendship of the negroes. Booth, from the hour he crossed the navy-yard bridge, though he met with a considerable number of men, was given shelter and assistance by every one whose sympathies were with the South. After parting with Dr. Mudd, he and Herold went to the residence of Samuel Cox,¹ near Port Tobacco, and were by him given into the charge of Thomas Jones, a contraband trader between Maryland and Richmond, a man so devoted

¹ What Booth and Herold were about during the week between the 15th and the 22d of April was not brought out upon the trial of the conspirators, but Mr. George Alfred Townsend, while making the ex-

tensive and careful studies for his historical novel, "Katy of Catoctin," reconstructed the entire itinerary of the assassin, and published an admirably clear account of it in THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for April, 1884.

to the interests of the Confederacy that treason and murder seemed every-day incidents to be accepted as natural and necessary. He kept Booth and Herold in hiding, at the peril of his own life, for more than a week, feeding and caring for them in the woods near his house, watching for an opportunity to ferry them across the Potomac. He did this while every woodpath was haunted by Government detectives, while his own neighborhood was under strong suspicion, knowing that death would promptly follow his own detection, and that a reward was offered for the capture of his helpless charge which would make a rich man of any one who gave him up. So close was the search that Herold killed the horses on which they had ridden out of Washington for fear a neigh might betray them.

With such devoted aid Booth might have wandered a long way; but there is no final escape but suicide for an assassin with a broken leg. At each painful move the chances of discovery increased. Jones was indeed able, after repeated failures, to ferry his fated guests across the Potomac. Arriving on the Virginia side, they lived the lives of hunted animals for two or three days longer, finding to their horror that they were received by the strongest Confederates with more of annoyance than enthusiasm — though none indeed offered to betray them. At one house, while food was given him, hospitality was not offered.¹ Booth wrote the proprietor a note, pathetic in its attempted dignity, inclosing five dollars — “though hard to spare” — for his entertainment. He had by this time seen the comments of the newspapers on his work, and bitterer than death or wounds was the blow to his vanity.² He confided his feelings of wrong to his diary :

I struck boldly, and not as the papers say; I walked with a firm step through thousands of his friends; was stopped, but pushed on. A colonel was at his side. I shouted *Sic Semper* before I fired. In jumping broke my leg. I passed all his pickets. Rode sixty miles that night, with the bone of my leg tearing the flesh at every jump.

On Friday the 21st he writes :

After being hunted like a dog through swamps, woods, and last night chased by gun-boats till I was forced to return, wet, cold, and starving, with every man's hand against me, I am here in despair. And why? For doing what Brutus was honored for — what made Tell a hero.

He goes on comparing himself favorably with these stage heroes, and adds :

I struck for my country and that alone — a country that groaned beneath his tyranny and prayed for this end; and yet now behold the cold hand they extend to me.

He was especially grieved that the grandiloquent letter he had intrusted to his fellow-

actor Matthews — and which he in his terror had destroyed — had not been published. He thought the Government had wickedly suppressed it; he was tortured with doubts whether God would forgive him, whether it would not be better to go back to Washington and “clear his name.” “I am abandoned, with the curse of Cain upon me, when, if the world knew my heart, that one blow would have made me great.” With blessings on his mother, upon his wretched companion of crime and flight, upon the world which he thought was not worthy of him, he closed these strange outpourings, saying, “I do not wish to shed a drop of blood, but I must fight the course.”

The course was soon ended. At Port Conway, on the Rappahannock, Booth and Herold met three young men in Confederate uniforms. They were disbanded soldiers; but Herold, imagining that they were recruiting for the Southern army, told them his story with perfect frankness and even pride, saying, “We are the assassins of the President,” and asked their company into the Confederate lines. He was disappointed at learning they were not going South, but his confidence was not misplaced. The soldiers took the fugitives to Port Royal, and tried to get shelter for them, representing Booth as a wounded Confederate soldier. After one or two failures they found refuge on the farm of a man named Garrett on the road to Bowling Green.

On the night of the 25th of April a party under Lieutenant E. P. Doherty arrested, in his bed at Bowling Green, William Jett, one of the Confederate soldiers mentioned above, and forced him to guide them to Garrett's farm. Booth and Herold were sleeping in the barn. When called upon to surrender, Booth refused, and threatened to shoot young Garrett, who had gone in to get his arms. A parley took place, lasting some minutes. Booth offered to fight the party at a hundred yards, and when this was refused cried out in a theatrical tone, “Well, my brave boys, prepare a stretcher for me.” Doherty then told him he would fire the barn; upon this Herold came out and surrendered. The barn was fired, and while it was burning, Booth, who was clearly visible by the flames through the cracks in the building, was shot by Boston Corbett, a sergeant of cavalry, a soldier of a gloomy and fanatical disposition, which afterwards developed into insanity.³ Booth was hit in the back of the neck, not far from the place where he had shot the President. He lingered about three hours in great pain, conscious but nearly inarticulate, and died at seven in the morning.

¹ Trial of J. H. Surratt, p. 402. ² *Ibid.*, p. 310.

³ He is still living, 1889, in an insane asylum in Kansas.

The surviving conspirators, with the exception of John H. Surratt, were tried by a military commission¹ sitting in Washington in the months of May and June. The charges against them specified that they were "incited and encouraged" to treason and murder by Jefferson Davis and the Confederate emissaries in Canada. This was not proved on the trial: the evidence bearing on the case showed frequent communication between Canada and Richmond and the Booth coterie in Washington, and some transactions in drafts at the Montreal Bank, where Jacob Thompson and Booth both kept their accounts. It was shown by the sworn testimony of a reputable witness that Jefferson Davis at Greensboro', on hearing of the assassination, expressed his gratification at the news; but this, so far from proving any direct complicity in the crime, would rather prove the opposite, as a conscious murderer usually conceals his malice.² Against all the rest the facts we have briefly stated were abundantly proved, though in the case of Mrs. Surratt the repugnance which all men feel at the execution of a woman induced the commission to unite in a recommendation to mercy, which President Johnson, then in the first flush of his zeal against traitors, disregarded.³ Habeas corpus proceedings were then resorted to, and failed in virtue of the President's orders to the military in charge of the prisoners. The sentences were accordingly executed: Mrs. Surratt, Payne, Herold, and Atzerodt were hanged on the 7th of July; Mudd, Arnold, and McLaughlin were imprisoned for life at the Tortugas, though the term was afterwards shortened, and Spangler, the scene shifter at the theater, was sentenced to six years of jail. John Surratt escaped to Canada, lay in hiding some months in a monastery, and in the autumn sailed for England under an assumed name. He wandered over Europe, enlisted in the Papal Zouaves, deserted and fled to Egypt, where he was detected and brought back to Washington in 1867. His trial lasted two months and ended in a disagreement of the jury.

THE MOURNING PAGEANT.

RECOUNTING the fate of these wretched malefactors has led us far afield. We will now

¹ This commission was composed of officers not only of high rank and distinction, but of unusual weight of character. They were Generals David Hunter, Lew Wallace, August V. Kautz, A. P. Howe, R. S. Foster, J. A. Ekin, T. N. Harris, Colonels C. H. Tompkins and D. R. Clendenin. The Judge Advocate and Recorder was Joseph Holt, assisted by the Hon. John A. Bingham and Colonel H. L. Burnett.

² Mr. Davis, in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," contradicts this evidence of Mr. Lewis F. Bates. He admits, however, that the dispatch, being read in his presence to the troops with him, elicited

return to the morning of the 15th of April and sketch, in brief and wholly inadequate words, the honors which the nation paid to its dead. The appalling news spread quickly over the country; millions of citizens learned at their breakfast tables that the President had been shot and was dying; and two hours after his death, when a squad of soldiers were escorting his mortal remains to the Executive Mansion, the dreadful fact was known at all the great centers of population. This was the first time the telegraph had been called upon to spread over the world tidings of such deep and mournful significance; it was therefore the first time the entire people of the United States had been called to deplore the passing away of an idolized leader even before his body was cold in death. The news fell with peculiar severity upon hearts which were glowing with the joy of a great victory. For the last four days, in every city and hamlet of the land, the people were breaking forth into unusual and fantastic expressions of gaiety and content; bonfires flamed through the nights; the days were uproarious with the firing of guns; the streets were hung with flags and wreaths, and whatever decorations could be on the instant improvised by a people not especially gifted with the scenic sense; and committees were everywhere forming to arrange for elaborate and official functions of joy. Upon this mirth and expansion the awful intelligence from Washington fell with the crushing and stunning effect of an unspeakable calamity. In the sudden rigor of this unexpected misfortune the country lost sight of the vast national success of the past week; and it thus came to pass that there was never any organized expression of the general exultation or rejoicing in the North over the downfall of the rebellion. It was unquestionably best that it should be so; and Lincoln himself would not have had it otherwise. He hated the arrogance of triumph; and even in his cruel death he would have been glad to know that his passage to eternity would prevent too loud an exultation over the vanquished. As it was, the South could take no umbrage at a grief so genuine and so legitimate; the people of that section even shared, to a certain degree, in the lamentations over the bier of one whom in their

cheers, "as was natural at news of the fall of one they considered their most powerful foe"; and he adds, "For an enemy so relentless, in the war for our subjugation, we could not be expected to mourn." When captured by General Wilson he affected to think he cleared himself of all suspicion in this regard by saying that Johnson was more objectionable to him than Lincoln—not noticing that the conspiracy contemplated the murder of both of them.

³ See argument of Pierrepont on trial of John H. Surratt, p. 77.

inmost hearts they knew to have wished them well.

There was one exception to the general grief too remarkable to be passed over in silence. Among the extreme radicals in Congress Mr. Lincoln's determined clemency and liberality towards the Southern people had made an impression so unfavorable that, though they were naturally shocked at his murder, they did not among themselves conceal their gratification that he was no longer in their way. In a political caucus, held a few hours after the President's death, they resolved on an entire change of the Cabinet, and a "line of policy less conciliatory than that of Mr. Lincoln; . . . the feeling was nearly universal"—we are using the language of one of their most prominent representatives¹—"that the accession of Johnson to the Presidency would prove a godsend to the country." The next day the Committee on the Conduct of the War called on the new President, and Senator Wade bluntly expressed to him the feeling of his associates: "Johnson, we have faith in you. By the gods, there will be no trouble now in running the Government."² Before many months passed away they had opportunity to learn that violence of speech was no guarantee of political consistency.

In Washington, with this singular exception, the manifestation of the public grief was immediate and demonstrative. The insignia of rejoicing at once disappeared, and within an hour after the body of the President was taken to the White House the town was shrouded in black. Not only the public buildings, the stores and shops, and the better class of residences were draped in funeral decorations, but a still more touching proof of the affection with which the dead man was regarded was seen in the poorest class of houses, where the laboring men of both colors found means in their penury to afford some scanty show of mourning. The interest and the veneration of the people still centered in the White House, where, under a tall catafalque in the east room, the late Chief of the State lay in the majesty of death, and not at the modest tavern on Pennsylvania Avenue where the new President had his lodging. At eleven o'clock Chief-Justice Chase administered the oath of office to Andrew Johnson in the presence of a few witnesses. He immediately summoned the Cabinet for a brief meeting. Mr. William Hunter was appointed Acting Secretary of State during the interim of the disability of Mr. Seward and his son, and directed to communicate to the country and the world the change in the head of the Government brought about

by the last night's crime. It was determined that the funeral ceremonies in Washington should be celebrated on Wednesday, the 19th of April, and all the churches throughout the country were invited to join at the same time "in solemnizing the occasion" by appropriate observances. All of pomp and circumstance which the Government could command was employed to give a fitting escort from the White House to the Capitol, where the body of the President was to lie in state. A splendidly appointed force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry formed the greater part of the procession, which was completed by delegations from Illinois and Kentucky as mourners, the new President, the Cabinet, the ministers of foreign powers, and all the high officers of the nation, legislative, judicial, and executive. The pall-bearers comprised the leading members of both houses of Congress and the officers of the highest rank in the army and navy.

The ceremonies in the east room were brief and simple. The Rev. Dr. Hall of the Church of the Epiphany read the burial service. Bishop Simpson of the Methodist Church, distinguished equally for his eloquence and his patriotism, offered a prayer, and the Rev. Dr. P. D. Gurley, at whose church the President and his family habitually attended worship, delivered a short address, commemorating, in language notably free from courtly flattery, the qualities of courage, purity, and sublime faith which had made the dead man great and useful. The coffin was carried to the funeral car, and the vast procession moved to the Capitol amid the tolling of all the bells in Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria, and the booming of minute-guns at Lafayette Square, at the City Hall, and on the hill of the Capitol. To associate the pomp of the day with the greatest work of Lincoln's life, a detachment of colored troops marched at the head of the line. In the rotunda, under the soaring dome of the Capitol, the coffin rested during the day and night of the 19th and until the evening of the next day. The people passed by in thousands to gaze on the face of the liberator—which had taken on in death an expression of profound happiness and repose, like that so often seen on the features of soldiers shot dead in battle.

It had been decided from the first that the President was to be buried at Springfield. Whenever a President dies, whose personality, more than his office, has endeared him to the people, it is proposed that his body shall rest at Washington; but the better instinct of the country, no less than the natural feelings of the family, insist that his dust shall lie among his own neighbors and kin. It is fitting that Washington shall sleep at Mount Vernon, the Adamases at Quincy, that even Harrison and

¹ George W. Julian, "Political Recollections," p.

255.
² *Ibid.*, p. 257.

Taylor and Garfield, though they died in office, should be conveyed to the bosom of the States which had cherished them and sent them to the service of the nation. So Illinois claimed her greatest citizen for final sepulture amid the scenes which witnessed the growth and development of his unique character. The town of Springfield set apart a lovely spot in its northern suburb for his grave and appropriated \$20,000—a large sum considering the size and wealth of the town—to defray the expenses of his funeral. As soon as it was announced that he was to be buried in Illinois every town and city on the route begged that the train might halt within its limits and give its people the opportunity of testifying their grief and their reverence. It was finally arranged that the funeral cortège should follow substantially the same route over which Lincoln had come in 1861 to take possession of the place to which he had given a new dignity and value for all time.

Governor Brough of Ohio and Mr. John W. Garrett of Baltimore were placed in general charge of the solemn journey. A guard of honor consisting of a dozen officers of high rank in the army and navy¹ was detailed by their respective departments, which received the remains of the President at the station in Washington at eight o'clock on the morning of Friday, the 21st of April, and the train, decked in somber trappings, moved out towards Baltimore. In this city, through which, four years before, it was a question whether the President-elect could pass with safety to his life, the train made a halt; the coffin was taken with sacred care to the great dome of the Exchange, and there, surrounded by evergreens and lilies, it lay for several hours, the people passing by in mournful throngs. Night was closing in, with rain and wind, when the train reached Harrisburg, and the coffin was carried through the muddy streets to the State Capitol, where the next morning the same scenes of grief and affection were seen. We need not enumerate the many stopping-places of this mournful pageant. The same demonstration was repeated, gaining continually in intensity of feeling and solemn splendor of display, in every city through which the procession passed. At Philadelphia a vast concourse accompanied the dead President to Independence Hall: he had shown himself worthy of the lofty fate he courted when, on that hallowed spot, on the birthday of Washington, 1861, he had said he would rather be assassinated than give up the principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence.

¹ General E. D. Townsend represented the Secretary of War, Rear-Admiral C. H. Davis the Secretary of the Navy.



THE FUNERAL CAR. (AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY P. RELVEA.)

Here, as at many other places, the most touching manifestations of loving remembrance came from the poor, who brought flowers twined by themselves to lay upon the coffin. The reception at New York was worthy alike of the great city and of the memory of the man they honored. The body lay in state in the City Hall and a half-million of people passed in deep silence before it. Here General Scott came, pale and feeble, but resolute, to pay his tribute of respect to his departed friend and commander.

The train went up the Hudson River by night, and at every town and village on the way vast crowds were revealed in waiting by the fitful glare of torches; dirges and hymns were sung as the train moved by. Midnight had passed when the coffin was borne to the Capitol at Albany, yet the multitude rushed in as if it were day, and for twelve hours the long line of people from northern New York and the neighboring States poured through the room.

Over the broad spaces of New York the cortège made its way, through one continuous crowd of mourners. At Syracuse thirty thousand people came out in a storm at midnight to greet the passing train with fires and bells and cannons; at Rochester the same solemn observances made the night memorable; at Buffalo—it was now the morning of the 27th—the body lay in state at St. James's Hall, visited by a multitude from the western counties. As the train passed into Ohio the crowds increased in density, and the public grief seemed intensified at every step westward; the people of the great central basin seemed to be claiming their own. The day spent at Cleveland was unexampled in the depth of emotion it brought to life, the warm devotion to the memory of the great man gone which was exhibited; some of the guard of honor have said that it was at that point they began to appreciate the place which Lincoln was to hold in history. The authorities, seeing that no building could accommodate the crowd which was sure to come from all over the



THE MONUMENT AT SPRINGFIELD. (AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BY J. A. W. PITTMAN FOR J. C. POWER.)

State, wisely erected in the public square an imposing mortuary tabernacle for the lying in state, brilliant with evergreens and flowers by day, and innumerable gas jets by night, and surmounted by the inscription, *Extinctus amabitur idem*. Impressive religious ceremonies were conducted in the square by Bishop McIlvaine, and an immense procession moved to the station at night between two lines of torchlights. Columbus and Indianapolis, the State capitals of Ohio and Indiana, were next visited. The whole State, in each case, seemed gathered to meet their dead hero; an intense personal regard was everywhere evident; it was the man, not the ruler, they appeared to be celebrating; the banners and scrolls bore principally his own words: "With malice towards none, with charity for all"; "The purposes of the Lord are perfect and must prevail"; "Let us resolve that the dead shall not have died in vain"; and other brief passages from his writings. On arriving in Chicago, on the 1st of May, amid a scene of magnificent mourning, the body was borne to the court-house, where it lay for two days under a canopy of somber richness, inscribed with that noble Hebrew lament, "The beauty of Israel is slain upon thy high places." From all the States of the Northwest an innumerable throng poured for

these two days into Chicago, and flowed, a mighty stream of humanity, past the coffin of the dead President, in the midst of evidences of public grief which was all the more genuine for being quiet and reserved.

The last stage of this extraordinary progress was the journey to Springfield, which began on the night of the 2d of May and ended at nine o'clock the next morning — the schedule made in Washington twelve days before having been accurately carried out. On all the railroads centering in Springfield the trains for several days had been crowded to their utmost capacity with people who desired to see the last of Abraham Lincoln upon earth. Nothing had been done or thought of for two weeks in Springfield but the preparations for this day; they were made with a thoroughness which surprised the visitors from the East. The body lay in state in the Capitol, which was richly draped from roof to basement in black velvet and silver fringe; within it was a bower of bloom and fragrance. For twenty-four hours an unbroken stream of people passed through, bidding their friend and neighbor welcome home and farewell, and at ten o'clock on the 4th of May the coffin lid was closed at last and a vast procession moved out to Oak Ridge, where the dead President was committed to the soil of the State which had so loved and honored him. The ceremonies at the grave were simple and touching. Bishop Simpson delivered a pathetic oration; prayers were offered and hymns were sung; but the weightiest and most eloquent words uttered anywhere that day were those of the Second Inaugural, which the committee had wisely ordained to be read over his grave, as the friends of Raphael chose the incomparable canvas of the Transfiguration as the chief ornament of his funeral.

An association was immediately formed to build a monument over the grave of Lincoln. The work was in the hands of his best and oldest friends in Illinois, and was pushed with vigor. Few large subscriptions were received, with the exception of \$50,000 voted by the State of Illinois and \$10,000 by New York; but innumerable small contributions afforded all that was needed. The soldiers and sailors of the nation gave \$28,000, of which the disproportionately large amount of \$8,000 was the gift of the negro troops, whose manhood Lincoln had recognized by putting arms in their hands.¹ In all \$180,000 was raised, and the monument, built after a design by Larkin G. Mead, was dedicated on the 15th of October, 1874. The day was fine, the concourse of

¹ Besides contributing thus generally to the Springfield monument, the freed people gave another touching instance of their gratitude by erecting in a public square on Capitol Hill in Washington a noble group

in bronze, including Lincoln, and entitled "Emancipation." The subscription for this purpose was started by a negro washerwoman. The statue is by Thomas Ball.

people was enormous; there were music and eloquence and a brilliant decorative display. The orator of the day was Governor Oglesby, who praised his friend with warm but sober eulogy; General Sherman added his honest and hearty tribute; and General Grant, twice elected President, uttered these carefully chosen words, which had all the weight that belongs to the rare discourses of that candid and reticent soldier:

From March, 1864, to the day when the hand of the assassin opened a grave for Mr. Lincoln, then

President of the United States, my personal relations with him were as close and intimate as the nature of our respective duties would permit. To know him personally was to love and respect him for his great qualities of heart and head, and for his patience and patriotism. With all his disappointments from failures on the part of those to whom he had intrusted commands, and treachery on the part of those who had gained his confidence but to betray it, I never heard him utter a complaint, nor cast a censure, for bad conduct or bad faith. It was his nature to find excuses for his adversaries. In his death the nation lost its greatest hero; in his death the South lost its most just friend.

PURSUIT AND DEATH OF JOHN WILKES BOOTH.

[JOHN WILKES BOOTH was my schoolmate in Maryland, many years ago; and by a strange coincidence three of my particular friends were concerned, in one way or another, with his pursuit and death. Two of them were Confederate officers—Major M. B. Ruggles, son of General Daniel Ruggles of the old army, and Lieutenant A. R. Bainbridge, both of whom, with Captain Jett, also of Mosby's command, met Booth and Herold in their flight and aided them to cross the Rappahannock. The other friend is Captain E. P. Doherty, who commanded the detachment of the 16th New York Cavalry that captured the fugitives. From the lips of all three I have heard accounts of the incidents that they witnessed, and the narratives that follow are given in the words of Major Ruggles and Captain Doherty.¹—PRENTISS INGRAHAM.]

MAJOR RUGGLES'S NARRATIVE.



AT the close of the civil war Colonel Mosby, to whose command I belonged, surrendered to General Hancock, at Millwood, Virginia. In company with two comrades, A. R. Bainbridge, now in business in New York, and William Jett, now dead, I started for my home in King George County, Virginia. We had heard from United States officers of the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, and that the assassin had been captured in Washington, and little dreamed, when we rode up to the bank of the Rappahannock River, that we were there to come face to face with John Wilkes Booth.

Port Conway is on the King George side of the river, there about three hundred yards wide, and opposite Port Royal. The ferry was owned by a man named Rollins, but the scow was run—that is, poled across—by Peyton Washington, a negro. The scow was on the

other side of the river when we rode up, and I observed there a wagon, drawn by two very wretched-looking horses. In the wagon were two men. On seeing us approach, one of them came towards us, and, finding that we were Confederate soldiers, said that his name was Boyd, and that his brother had been wounded severely in the leg while escaping from prison, where they had been for some time. He furthermore said that their negro driver, Lucas, refused to take them any farther, and that they were anxious to get on their way, and asked our aid. I at once said we would help them; and while discussing the speedy coming of the scow, the other got out of the wagon, and walking with evident pain, with the aid of a rude crutch, came towards us. He apparently mistrusted his companion, for as he came forward he said, "I suppose you have been told who I am?" Thinking he meant that Herold had told us they were Confederate soldiers, escaped from prison, I answered in the affirmative. Instantly he dropped his weight back upon his crutch, and drawing a revolver said sternly, with the utmost coolness, "Yes, I am John Wilkes Booth, the slayer of Abraham Lincoln, and I am worth just \$175,000 to the man who captures me."² We were greatly surprised, and yet the coolness of the man won our admiration; for we saw that he was wounded, desperate, and at bay. His face was

¹ The proofs of this article have been read and corrected (Nov., 1889) by Colonel Ingraham, Major Ruggles, Lieutenant Bainbridge, and Captain Doherty.—EDITOR.

² The reward as offered was \$100,000 by the U. S. Government, and \$25,000 each by three of the States.

haggard, pinched with suffering, his dark eyes sunken, but strangely bright, and though he had shaved off his mustache, upon his lip and face was a beard of some ten days' growth.

In response to his defiant words I said that we had been told that Lincoln's slayer had been captured; but that, though we did not sanction his act as an assassin, we were not men to take "blood money"; and that having promised his friend, who proved to be Herold, to take them across the river to a place of safety, we would do so. Though it is contrary to the general belief of the people of the North, I believe that had the war then been going on, Booth, instead of finding an asylum in the South, would have been taken and surrendered to the United States by the Confederate Government.

Booth replaced his weapon at my words, and, thanking us, said he was utterly unable to walk. I dismounted, and we lifted him upon my horse—a fact that seemed to give the saddle and bridle a great pecuniary value, as I learned through correspondence with Mr. Barnum; though they were never exhibited as relics, and are now at my brother's home in Virginia, there kept as souvenirs of my "days with Mosby."

¹ Colonel John J. Garnett, who at the close of the war was with General Joseph E. Johnston as Chief of Artillery, received from Lieutenant Bainbridge, whom he has known for many years, the following additional particulars of the intercourse of the three Confederate officers with Booth and Herold: "Captain Jett was well acquainted in Caroline County, on the opposite side of the river, and he told Booth, with our approval, that he would find a place of safety for him. 'God bless you, sir!' said Booth, his face wincing with the pain of his disabled leg. When Booth realized that we were kindly disposed, he threw off all reserve and became quite communicative. Booth was dressed in a dark suit of clothes that looked seamed and ravelly, as if from rough contact with thorny undergrowth. On his head was a seedy looking black slouch hat, which he kept well pulled down over his forehead. The lame foot was entirely free from all covering, save a black stocking. The shoe which was on it was entirely cut away at the top, the heel only being covered with leather. The foot was much swollen, and seemed to trouble him greatly. The crutch he carried was rough-hewn and ungainly. His long dark mustache swept over his mouth in a straggling, unkempt manner, although it was evident that he had tried to preserve its shape by frequent handling. Indeed, during all the time he sat with us he was constantly pulling it into shape. His beard, of a coal-black hue, was of about two weeks' growth and gave his face an unclean appearance. Over his shoulders drooped a long gray shawl, which he said had served him well in covering the tell-tale initials 'J. W. B.' done in Indian ink on his right hand. These letters he showed to us to establish his identity. Strung over his shoulders by a long strap were a pair of large field glasses, which he said had not been of much use to him, because he had 'been forced to keep under cover too much.' . . . The wind lulled after we had waited a long time, and the ferryman came over for us. Captain Ruggles helped Booth to mount his horse, and together we went over to Port Royal, a village opposite Port Conway. The ferryman eyed us all very closely and we said but very little. Booth sat squarely on his horse, looking expectantly

Booth and Herold both seemed to be the worse for their exposure and hardships of the past few days. Booth wore a black soft hat, dark clothes, one cavalry boot,—the one on his wounded leg having been cut off,—and his weapons were a carbine, two revolvers, and a knife, the blade of the latter bearing the stain of blood, for with it he had wounded Major Rathbone. I noticed that his wounded leg was greatly swollen, inflamed, and dark, as from bruised blood, while it seemed to have been wretchedly dressed, the splints being simply pasteboard rudely tied about it. That he suffered intense pain all the time there was no doubt, though he tried to conceal his agony, both physical and mental.

When the scow arrived Peyton Washington ferried us across the river. After a ride of three miles we came to the Garrett farm, where we asked for shelter for the fugitives, which was granted. We also remained all night near Garrett's, sleeping in the woods, and the next day Herold went with us to Bowling Green, where we left Jett.¹

The next day, Herold having decided upon the best course to pursue in his flight, Bain-

towards the opposite shore, and when the boat struck the wharf he lost no time in landing. I could see that his spirits were improving, and he laughed heartily when we surrounded him in a group. 'I'm safe in glorious old Virginia, thank God!' he exclaimed. 'Now, boys,' said Jett, 'I propose to take our friend Booth up to Garrett's house. I think they'll give him shelter there and treat him kindly.' 'Whatever you deem best to do with me, my friends,' replied Booth, 'I'll agree to be satisfied.' 'Jett understands this country,' said Captain Ruggles, 'and I think that it will be well to act as he directs.' 'I'm in your hands,' said Booth; 'do with me, boys, as you think best.' 'Well,' said Jett, 'I want to do the best I can for you; and I think our plan is to escort Mr. Booth up to Garrett's, tell the family who he is, and trust to their hospitality to see him kindly cared for until such time as he sees fit to seek other quarters.' After a few minutes' further conversation we left the wharf and started through Port Royal on the road to Garrett's farm. His house was some distance from the main road, and when we reached the gate leading into the farm Herold, who said that he wanted to go with us as far as Bowling Green to buy a pair of shoes, remained with me, while Jett and Ruggles accompanied Booth to the house. Garrett's residence was in the style at that time in vogue among Southern planters. It was a large, wooden framed building, with broad porches on every side. It stood on a hill, from which sloped in every direction broad rolling fields, fair in their verdure as ever greeted the eye of man. When Booth was a few rods distant in the lane from where Herold and I were standing, he suddenly wheeled his horse about, and lifting his slouch hat from his head waved it towards us and shouted back: 'Good-by, old fellow. Good-by, Lieutenant; come and see me again. I shall always be pleased to see you both.' 'I'll be with you soon, John,' returned Herold; 'keep in good spirits.' 'Have no fear about me, Herold,' Booth replied; 'I am among friends now'; with which he turned his horse, and followed at a gallop after Jett and Ruggles, who were far in advance of him. Booth impressed me at that moment as the most reckless man I had ever met. Without a parole as I

bridge and myself accompanied him back to Garrett's. We found Booth lying on the grass, in front of the house, and sitting by his side I heard from his lips his version of the tragic conspiracy, his fatal shot, his motives, escape, and flight up to his coming to the Garretts'. In answer to my questions he spoke quietly, repressing now and then a groan of pain, and showing emotion and stern defiance at times. He said, in substance, that the plot had been to capture Mr. Lincoln and carry him a prisoner into the Confederacy, for he believed that by such an act the war could be brought to an end, as the South could dictate terms with such a hostage. Failing in this, he decided at the last moment, as it were, to strike deadly blows at Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Seward, and General Grant. In the plot to kill, Payne¹ alone was implicated with him, not even Herold knowing what was to be done. Atzerodt knew nothing of the intended assassination, nor did, according to Booth's statement to me, any other, excepting Payne. The name of Mrs. Surratt was not mentioned by him. He said

was, and in my own country, amid scenes with which I had been familiar since childhood, I did not feel that I was perfectly safe. If he felt any premonitions of danger, as I certainly felt that in his position he should, he gave no signs of them. He seemed as light-hearted and careless as a schoolboy just released from his studies. Herold and I went on to Bowling Green, where we remained all night, stopping at the house of a Mr. Clark. Jett and Ruggles, after escorting Booth up to Garrett's house and seeing him well disposed, went on to Bowling Green, where they stopped with Mr. Goldman, for whose daughter Jett had tender feelings. On the following day I learned of Johnston's surrender, and decided to go back to my home in King George County and settle down to the life of a peaceful citizen. I met Jett and Ruggles and told them of my intention, and they concluded to do likewise. I inquired for Booth, and in what shape they had left him, and Willie Jett told me that he did not think under the existing state of affairs the Garretts liked to harbor Booth in their house. 'And yet,' said Jett, 'they did not like to turn him away.' After a little persuasion Mr. Garrett agreed to allow him to remain on his place, although he felt that he would be running a big risk in doing so. 'He'll be well taken care of, never fear,' said Jett, who decided to remain at Goldman's house for a few days. Captain Ruggles and I went on the next morning towards Port Royal together, Herold accompanying us as far as Garrett's gate, where we left him. He told us that he was going right up to join Booth, and that he would stick by him to the death. Just before reaching Port Royal I met a soldier of my command, who told me that if we had not got our paroles, and did not want to be captured, to turn back. 'For,' said he, 'the town is full of Yankees in search of Booth, who, they say, crossed the river yesterday.' We turned immediately and rode back to Garrett's. As we approached the front gate Booth was lying on the lawn in front of the house. As soon as he recognized us he arose, and hobbling towards us said, 'Well, boys, what's in the wind now?' We told him the enemy was upon his trail, and advised him to seek shelter in the woods. I remember pointing to a thick piece of woodland some distance from the house, and saying: 'Booth, get over there at once,

that Payne was to strike a death blow at Secretary Seward, and he, favored by the fact that President Lincoln and General Grant were to attend the theater together, was to kill both of them. General Grant's having been called away alone saved his life, for, said Booth, "I would have made no failure with either, as I had laid my plans for success only." That Andrew Johnson might appear to be implicated in the plot of assassination, Booth said that he had left that morning a note at the hotel where the Vice-President lived, to compromise him. He had no idea, he said, from the information received about Washington, that the war had really ended; for had he not believed that it would have been kept up by the South, he would not have struck the blow as he did. After getting safely out of Washington his intention was to cross the line, as quickly as possible, into the Confederacy. Joining Herold at a rendezvous, they had ridden hard through the night to gain a place of safety; but having a broken leg, and learning after several days, through the papers, that the war

and hide yourself. In those wooded ravines you will never be found.' 'Yes,' said Ruggles, 'get there as quickly as you can, and lose no time about starting.' Booth turned around to look for Herold, but he was nowhere in sight, as indeed was no one else. He then straightened himself up to his full height, and replied: 'I'll do as you say, boys, right off. Ride on! Good-by! It will never do for you to be found in my company.' Then biting his lips, as if he had conceived a desperate resolve, he said, 'Rest assured of one thing, good friend, Wilkes Booth will never be taken alive.' The ferryman at Port Conway had recognized Jett, and when Lieutenant Doherty arrived there with his troops, and described the men they were pursuing, he knew at once that he had assisted them across the river the day before. He told the officers that he had taken five men across, three of whom were Confederate soldiers, one of whom he knew to be Captain Jett, as he had often taken him across. If he had only stopped there all might have been well so far as Booth was concerned, for some time. But the ferryman was frightened. He thought if he did not tell all he knew he would be arrested as an accomplice in the assassination of Lincoln, so he volunteered the information that Captain Jett had a sweetheart at Bowling Green, and that in all probability he would be found there. The people of the South conceived the idea that Captain Jett deliberately betrayed Booth. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Had they been in his place, I make bold to say they would have acted as he did. It was *his* life or Booth's. The latter had no hopes; but Jett, with a parole in his possession, had, so far as he knew, a long life of happiness before him. Lieutenant Doherty and his troops were hot upon the assassin's trail, and were not to be denied their prey. Poor Jett had only one alternative, and that was to become their guide, and I am sure he did so unwillingly. He has been dead many years, and I know that he was loyal to the cause he espoused, and fought gallantly for it to the end. He guided the troops back to Garrett's, and he afterward told me that he had hopes that Booth might have been warned in time to escape, as indeed he had been by us."—EDITOR.

¹ Payne was a deserter from a Confederate Florida regiment.

was really at an end, he determined to make his way to the silver mines of Mexico, feeling that the South would be no place of refuge for him. It has been said that Booth had plenty of money with him; but he showed me three five-dollar bills, all that he had, excepting a bill of exchange; while Herold had not as much. I asked him why he did not attempt to get to Europe, and his answer was that there was no asylum for such as he where monarchs ruled, as they feared their own lives might be in danger from the example he had set.

It is generally believed that Herold shot his own and Booth's horse; but Booth told me that after weighting them down they led them into the Potomac the night they embarked in the boat to cross, and drawing their heads over the gunwale cut their throats and saw them sink from sight. This would account for the fact that their bodies were never found.¹

Booth seemed to feel that he had been spurred on to the deed through a duty he owed the country to bring the war to an end, and he said that he would never be taken alive. If he had not broken his leg he could readily have distanced all pursuit. He was without doubt disappointed at the reception he met in Virginia, and said that he was prepared to meet any fate. The calm courage of the man in the midst of his great peril, and while racked by suffering, impressed me in spite of myself, for there was no braggadocio about him; simply a determination to submit to the inevitable, parleying when it should become necessary to do so. The few extracts he read me from his diary showed this.

From the examination I made of his broken leg, aided by some experience I had had with wounds, I feel confident that amputation would have been necessary to save his life, and perhaps that would not have prevented a speedy death.

Soon after my long conversation with Booth, Bainbridge and myself bade him and Herold good-by and went on our way, remaining that night in the pines, and next day going to Robb's, where we learned that a company of United States cavalry were scouring the country and had captured the fugitives in Garrett's barn. Knowing the barn well, and judging from all the circumstances connected with the burning of it, I feel convinced that Sergeant Boston Corbett has a reputation undeserved as the slayer of Mr. Lincoln's assassin. From the spot where Sergeant Corbett was he could not have seen Booth where he stood, and certainly could

not have been able to shoot him in the back of the head. Having asked Captain Doherty to fall back fifty paces with his men and give him a chance to come out, and very properly and naturally being refused his request by that gallant officer, deserted by Herold, the barn on fire, and seeing that he must perish in the flames or be taken to Washington and hanged, Booth, hopeless, alone, and at bay, placed his pistol to the back of his head, and took his own life. No one saw Corbett fire, and one chamber of Booth's revolver held in his hand was empty, and I am by no means alone in the belief that he killed himself.

Learning that Jett was a prisoner, and that we were to be arrested, tried, and hanged, as aiders and abettors, Bainbridge and myself stood not on the order of going, but went at once. Making our way into Essex County and crossing to Westmoreland, we went to our home up in King George County. Some ten days after, I was arrested at night by a squad of United States cavalry. Bainbridge was also captured. We were taken to Washington and placed in the Old Capitol Prison. We were not alone in our misery, however, for Dr. Stewart, at whose house Booth had stopped, William Lucas, the negro who had driven him to the ferry, and a number of others, were there, among them being Jett, who had escaped from Captain Doherty, and had been recaptured at his home in Westmoreland County.

From Booth's own words to me as he lay on the grass in front of Garrett's house, I feel assured that in the excitement of the times there were some innocent ones who were punished for the crimes of Booth and Payne.

After the trial, by a strange mistake I was sent to Johnson's Island, where as a Confederate prisoner I had passed half a year; but after a few days spent there I was returned to Washington, and after taking the oath of allegiance I was released.

M. B. Ruggles.

CAPTAIN DOHERTY'S NARRATIVE.

ABOUT the hour of 4 P. M. April 24, 1865, when Booth and Herold were taken by their newly made Confederate friends to the Garrett farm, where Booth was killed and Herold captured, I was seated, with another officer of the 16th New York Cavalry, on a bench in the park opposite the White House. There I received the following orders from a messenger:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON, April 24, 1865. Commanding Officer 16th New York

¹ Lieutenant Bainbridge is positive that he heard Booth say: "After we had been three days in the pines, I deemed it advisable to act on Jones's advice and kill our horses. I could hear in the distance the neighing

of the horses of the Federal cavalry as they went scouting through the country, and I was afraid that ours might answer them and betray our whereabouts, so I asked Herold to shoot them, which he did."—EDITOR.

Cavalry. Sir: You will at once detail a reliable and discreet commission officer with twenty-five men, well mounted, with three days' rations and forage, to report at once to Colonel L. C. Baker, Agent of the War Department, at 211 Pennsylvania Ave. Command of General C. C. Augur.—J. C. SEWELL, A. A. A. Gen'l.

In accordance with the foregoing order First Lieutenant E. P. Doherty¹ is hereby detailed for the duty, and will report at once to Colonel Baker, 211 Pennsylvania Ave.—N. B. SWITZER, Colonel 10th New York Cavalry, Bvt. Brig. Gen'l, U. S. A.

I proceeded to the barracks, had "boots and saddles" sounded, and in less than half an hour had reported to Colonel Baker. I took the first twenty-five men in the saddle, Sergeant Boston Corbett being the only member of my own company. Colonel Baker handed me photographs of the assassins of President Lincoln. He told me no troops had yet been in Fredericksburg, but that I must reach that vicinity with all dispatch. He introduced me to E. J. Conger and L. B. Baker, of the detective force, and said they would accompany me. I proceeded down to the Sixth street wharf, where I found the steamer *John S. Ide*, and directed Captain Wilson to move down to Aquia Creek and to Belle Plain. After the detachment had landed I directed the captain of the boat to move off to a place of safe anchorage and await my return. Should I not return before 6 P. M. on the 26th he was to go back to Washington and report to Captain Allen, assistant quartermaster. I proceeded directly south until I struck the main road to Fredericksburg. Here I halted at 4 A. M. A negro informed me that a regiment of cav-

alry had passed to Fredericksburg the previous evening, going along on the north side of the Rappahannock River. I then determined to push down and go up on the south side, where no troops had been.

The detectives asked for a detail of four men and a sergeant to scour the country, while I with the rest of the men continued on towards the Rappahannock. The detectives returned about 3 P. M. without any clue to the whereabouts of the assassins. I went to the ferry at Port Conway and saw Mrs. Rollins, the ferryman's wife, and another woman sitting on the steps of the ferry-house. Drawing Booth's picture from my pocket I showed it to them, and inferred from their looks that Booth was not far distant. One of them said that Booth and Herold had been brought there in a wagon the evening before by a negro named Lucas, who would carry them no farther. While they were bargaining with her husband to take them to Orange Court House, three Confederate soldiers, Ruggles, Bainbridge, and Jett, rode up and they entered into conversation. By and by they were all taken over the ferry. Booth was put on Ruggles's horse and they proceeded towards Bowling Green.

I at once sent the bugler to Sergeant Corbett, telling him to mount the detachment, which I had left a mile behind, feeding, and move down as quickly as possible. Mrs. Rollins went for her husband, who was fishing, and I sent him for the scow, which was on the other side of the river. During his absence the command arrived at the ferry and we were soon over the

¹ The following is taken from the report of Generals Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate, and E. D. Townsend, Adjutant-General, U. S. A., to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, on the subject of the arrest of those engaged in the assassination of President Lincoln, which was transmitted to Congress: "The parties who made the arrest of Booth and Herold were a detachment of the 16th New York Cavalry (consisting of Lieutenant E. P. Doherty, commanding, and two sergeants, seven corporals, and seventeen privates), accompanied by E. J. Conger and L. B. Baker, two employees in the detective service of Colonel L. C. Baker, Provost-Marshal, etc., the officer who originated and directed the expedition, though not personally accompanying it. . . . The military element of the expedition for the arrest of these criminals Booth and Herold is therefore believed to have been that which was essential to its success, and without which its results could not have been attained. As the commander of the detachment employed upon this important duty, Lieutenant Doherty was solely responsible for its discipline and efficiency. He is found to have been active and energetic, and it is believed to be established by the weight of testimony that it was he who personally made the actual seizure of Herold. It was he, too (in conjunction with Mr. Baker), who obtained the first reliable information which rendered the capture of the criminals almost certain; and though, in the direction of the investigation, the initiative would seem more frequently to have been taken by Conger, yet Lieutenant Doherty is shown to have acted and been recognized as the commander of

the expedition in the only written instructions which appear to have been issued during the march, to wit, those given by him to the master of the steamer which conveyed the party to and from Belle Plain. Upon the whole, therefore, it is concluded that as such commander he may properly be awarded the one-tenth portion of the whole amount which is payable by law to the commanding officer of a vessel immediately engaged in the capture of a prize, and his share will therefore be \$7500. The services of Messrs. Conger and Baker upon this expedition were, no doubt, of great value; and, inasmuch as these parties immediately represented the views and intentions of Colonel Baker, their part in carrying out the original plan was particularly important. It is understood that their expenses incurred upon this duty have been reimbursed, and that they have also been paid, or are entitled to be paid, for their general services, as detectives at this period, at the rate of \$150 per month. They should, however, both be liberally, and, as it is thought, equally compensated; and it is concluded that of the amount offered as reward there may properly be paid to each the sum of \$4000."

Sergeants Corbett and Wendell each received \$2545.68; each of the seven corporals received \$2291.09; and each of the seventeen privates \$2036.53. Of the \$75,000 thus distributed as a reward for the arrest of Booth and Herold, Colonel L. C. Baker received the share that "would be payable to the commander of a squadron, by a separate ship of which a prize had been taken," that is, one-twentieth, or \$3750.—EDITOR.

river. I arrested Rollins the ferryman, and took him as guide to Bowling Green. At dark we passed the Garrett farm, not then dreaming that the assassins were concealed there. Arriving at Bowling Green, I surrounded Goldman's Hotel. After some hesitation the door was opened by Mrs. Goldman. I inquired of her who were the male inmates of the house. She replied that there was only her wounded son, and I directed her to show me his room, telling her that if my men were fired on I should burn the building and take the inmates prisoners to Washington. She took me up one flight of stairs to her son's room, and as I entered Captain Jett sprang from his bed, half-dressed. Her son lay on another bed, wounded. Jett admitted his identity, and drawing Mr. Stanton's proclamation from my pocket I read it to him, and then said, "I have known your movements for the past two or three days, and if you do not tell me the truth I will hang you; but if you give me the information I want, I will protect you." He was greatly excited, and told me that he had left Booth at Garrett's house, three miles from Port Conway, the evening before, and that Herold had come to Bowling Green with him, and returned that morning. I had Jett's horse taken from the stable, and placing a guard over him, we retraced our steps towards Garrett's. It was now about midnight, and my men, having been out since the 24th without sleep and with very little food, were exhausted; those who had been left on the edge of the town had fallen asleep. I had some difficulty in arousing them, but when they learned that we were on Booth's track new life seemed to be infused into them. I placed Corbett in the rear with orders to allow no man to fall out of line. Upon reaching Garrett's orchard fence I halted, and in company with Rollins and the detectives took a survey of the premises. I had the fence taken down. I told off six men, gave out the countersign of "Boston," and sent the six men as a patrol in rear of the out-buildings, with instructions to allow no one to pass through the field or to approach them without the countersign. The gates in front of Garrett's house were quietly opened, and in a minute the whole premises were surrounded. I dismounted, and knocked loudly at the front door. Old Mr. Garrett came out. I seized him, and asked him where the men were who were there yesterday. He replied that they had gone to the woods when the cavalry passed the previous afternoon. While I was speaking with him some of the men had entered the house to search it. Soon one of the soldiers sang out, "O Lieutenant! I have a man here I found in the corn-crib." It was young Garrett, and I demanded the whereabouts of the fugitives. He replied, "In the

barn." Leaving a few men around the house, we proceeded in the direction of the barn, which we surrounded. I kicked on the door of the barn several times without receiving a reply. Meantime another son of Garrett's had been captured. The barn was secured with a padlock, and young Garrett carried the key. I unlocked the door, and again summoned the inmates of the building to surrender. After some delay Booth said, "For whom do you take me?" I replied, "It does n't make any difference. Come out." He said, "I am a cripple and alone." I said, "I know who is with you, and you had better surrender." He replied, "I may be taken by my friends, but not by my foes." I said, "If you don't come out, I'll burn the building." I directed a corporal to pile up some hay in a crack in the wall of the barn, and set the building on fire. As the corporal was picking up the hay and brush Booth said, "If you come back here I will put a bullet through you." I then motioned to the corporal to desist, and decided to wait for daylight and then to enter the barn by both doors and overpower the assassins. Booth then said, in a drawling voice, "O Captain! there is a man in here who wants to surrender awful bad." I replied, "You had better follow his example and come out." His answer was, "No, I have not made up my mind; but draw your men up fifty paces off and give me a chance for my life." I told him I had not come to fight; that I had fifty men, and could take him. Then he said, "Well, my brave boys, prepare me a stretcher, and place another stain on our glorious banner."

At this moment Herold reached the door. I asked him to hand out his arms; he replied that he had none. I told him I knew exactly what weapons he had. Booth replied, "I own all the arms, and may have to use them on you, gentlemen." I then said to Herold, "Let me see your hands." He put them through the partly opened door and I seized him by the wrists. I handed him over to a non-commissioned officer. Just at this moment I heard a shot, and thought Booth had shot himself. Throwing open the door, I saw that the straw and hay behind Booth were on fire. He was half-turning towards it.

He had a crutch, and he held a carbine in his hand. I rushed into the burning barn, followed by my men, and as he was falling caught him under the arms and pulled him out of the barn. The burning building becoming too hot, I had him carried to the veranda of Garrett's house.

Booth received his death-shot in this manner. While I was taking Herold out of the barn one of the detectives went to the rear, and pulling out some protruding straw set fire

to it. I had placed Sergeant Boston Corbett at a large crack in the side of the barn, and he, seeing by the igniting hay that Booth was leveling his carbine at either Herold or myself, fired, to disable him in the arm; but Booth making a sudden move, the aim erred, and the bullet struck Booth in the back of the head, about an inch below the spot where his shot had entered the head of Mr. Lincoln. Booth asked me by signs to raise his hands. I lifted them up and he gasped, "Useless, useless!" We gave him brandy and water, but he could not swallow it. I sent to Port Royal for a physician, who could do nothing when he came, and at seven o'clock Booth breathed his last. He had on his person a diary, a large bowie knife, two pistols, a compass, and a draft on Canada for £60.

I took a saddle blanket off my horse, and, borrowing a darning needle from Miss Garrett, sewed his body in it. The men found an old wagon, and impressed it, with the negro driver. The body was placed upon it, and two hours

after Booth's death I was on the way back to Belle Plain, where I had left the steamboat.

I had released Rollins and sent him ahead to have his ferry-boat ready to take us across the river. About 6 p. m. I reached the boat, and found the captain preparing to return to Washington. We reached Washington at 2 a. m., April 27. I placed the body of Booth and the prisoner Herold on board the monitor *Montauk*, after which I marched my worn-out command up through the navy yard to their quarters.

The next morning an autopsy was held, and measures were taken to identify the body of Booth. The portion of the neck and head through which the bullet had passed was cut out, and is to-day preserved in the National Museum of Anatomy at Washington. The body was buried in a cell in the Penitentiary, where it remained nearly four years, with the bodies of the other assassins. It was then given to his friends, and now lies in a cemetery in Baltimore.


Edward P. Doherty.



THE WINTER FIELDS.

WINDS here, and sleet, and frost that bites like steel.
 The low, bleak hill rounds under the low sky.
 Naked of flock and fold the fallows lie,
 Thin-streaked with meager drift. The gusts reveal
 By fits the dim, gray snakes of fence that steal
 Through the white dusk. The hill-foot poplars sigh,
 While storm and death with winter trample by;
 And the iron fields ring sharp, and blind lights reel.
 Yet, in the lonely ridges, wrenched with pain,
 Harsh, solitary hillocks, bound and dumb,
 Grave glebes, close-lipped beneath the scourge and chain,
 Lurks hid the germ of ecstasy, the sum
 Of life that waits on summer, till the rain
 Whisper in April and the crocus come.

Charles G. D. Roberts.



ENGRAVED BY J. H. E. WHITNEY.

STATUE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, LINCOLN PARK, CHICAGO.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.¹

THE CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS—THE END OF REBELLION—LINCOLN'S FAME.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS.



WHEN Jefferson Davis and the remnant of the Confederate Cabinet, with the most important and portable portion of their department archives, left Richmond on the night of April 2, in consequence

of Lee's retreat, they proceeded to Danville, southwest of Richmond, arriving there the following morning. In a conference between Davis and Lee, in which the probability of abandoning Richmond was discussed, they had agreed upon this point at which to endeavor to unite the armies of Lee and Johnston, first to attack and beat Sherman and then return and defeat Grant. We have related how Grant, so far from permitting Lee to execute the proposed junction, did not even allow him to reach Danville. Lee had been pressed so hard that he had not found opportunity to inform Davis where he was going, and this absence of news probably served to give Davis an intimation that their preconcerted plans were not likely to reach fulfillment. Nevertheless, the rebel President made a show of confidence; rooms were obtained, and, he says, the "different departments resumed their routine labors," though it may be doubted whether in these labors they earned the compensation which the Confederate States promised them.

Two days after his arrival at Danville, Jefferson Davis added one more to his many rhetorical efforts to "fire the Southern heart." On the 5th he issued a proclamation, in which, after reciting the late disasters in as hopeful a strain as possible, he broke again into his never-failing grandiloquence:

We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle. Relieved from the necessity of guarding particular points, our army will be free to move from point to point, to strike the enemy in detail far from his base. Let us but will it and we are free.

Animated by that confidence in your spirit and fortitude which never yet failed me, I announce to you, fellow-countrymen, that it is my purpose to

maintain your cause with my whole heart and soul; that I will never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot of the soil of any of the States of the Confederacy; that Virginia—noble State, whose ancient renown has been eclipsed by her still more glorious recent history; whose bosom has been bared to receive the main shock of this war; whose sons and daughters have exhibited heroism so sublime as to render her illustrious in all time to come—that Virginia, with the help of the people and by the blessing of Providence, shall be held and defended, and no peace ever be made with the infamous invaders of her territory.

If, by the stress of numbers, we shall be compelled to a temporary withdrawal from her limits or those of any other border State, we will return until the baffled and exhausted enemy shall abandon in despair his endless and impossible task of making slaves of a people resolved to be free.²

In his book, written many years after, Davis is frank enough to admit that this language in the light of subsequent events may fairly be said to have been oversanguine. He probably very soon reached this conviction, for almost before the ink was dry on his proclamation, a son of Governor Wise, escaping through the Federal lines on a swift horse, brought him information of the surrender of Lee's army to Grant. Rumor also reaching him that the Federal cavalry was pushing southward west of Danville, the Confederate Government again hastily packed its archives into a railroad train and moved to Greensboro', North Carolina. Its reception at this place was cold and foreboding. The headquarters of the Government remained on the train at the depot. Only Jefferson Davis and Secretary Trenholm, who was ill, were provided with lodgings. From this point Davis sent a despatch to General Johnston, soliciting a conference, either at Greensboro' or at the general's headquarters; and in response to this request Johnston came without delay to Greensboro', arriving there on the morning of April 12. Within an hour or two both Generals Johnston and Beauregard were summoned to meet the Confederate President in a council of war,

² Davis, proclamation; "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 677.

¹ Copyright by J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, 1886. All rights reserved.

there being also present the members of the rebel Cabinet, namely: Benjamin, Secretary of State; Mallory, Secretary of the Navy, and Reagan, Postmaster-General. The meeting was held in a room some twelve by sixteen feet in size, on the second floor of a small dwelling, and contained a bed, a few chairs, and a table with writing-materials.¹

The infatuation under which Davis had plunged his section into rebellion against the Government, pitting the South with its disparity of numbers² and resources against the North, still beset him in the hour of her collapse and the agony of her surrender. He had figured out how the united armies of Lee and Johnston could successively demolish Sherman and Grant, but he could not grasp the logic of common sense that by the same rule the united armies of Grant and Sherman would make short work of the army of Johnston alone whenever they could reach it. The spirit of obstinate confidence with which he entered upon the interview may be best inferred from the description of it written by the two principal actors themselves. Davis says:

I did not think we should despair. We still had effective armies in the field, and a vast extent of rich and productive territory both east and west of the Mississippi, whose citizens had evinced no disposition to surrender. Ample supplies had been collected in the railroad depots, and much still remained to be placed at our disposal when needed by the army in North Carolina. . . . My motive, therefore, in holding an interview with the senior generals of the army in North Carolina was not to learn their opinion as to what might be done by negotiation with the United States Government, but to derive from them information in regard to the army under their command, and what it was feasible and advisable to do as a military problem.³

Johnston's statement shows still more distinctly how impossible it was for Davis to lay aside the airs of dictator:

We had supposed we were to be questioned concerning the military resources of our department, in connection with the question of continuing or terminating the war. But the President's object seemed to be to give, not to obtain, information; for, addressing the party, he said that in two or three weeks he would have a large army in the field by bringing back into the ranks those who had abandoned them in less desperate circumstances, and by calling out the enrolled men whom the conscript bureau with its forces had been unable to bring into the army. . . . Neither opinions nor information was asked, and the conference terminated.⁴

¹ Frank H. Alfriend, "Life of Jefferson Davis," p. 623.

² "Dividing their free population between the two sections, and the odds were six and a half millions against twenty and a half millions." [Ibid., p. 573.]

³ Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., pp. 679, 680.

Pollard, the Southern historian, is probably not far wrong in saying that this

was an interview of inevitable embarrassment and pain. The two generals [Johnston and Beauregard] were those who had experienced most of the prejudice and injustice of the President; he had always felt aversion for them, and it would have been an almost impossible excess of Christian magnanimity if they had not returned something of resentment and coldness to the man who, they believed, had arrogantly domineered over them and more than once sought their ruin.⁵

Now when Davis, without even the preface of asking their opinions, bade these two men resuscitate his military and political power and transform him from a fugitive to a commander-in-chief, it is not to be wondered at that the interview terminated without result.

Matters were thus left in an awkward situation for all parties: the rebel chief had no promise of confidence or support; the generals no authority to negotiate or surrender; the Cabinet no excuse to intervene by advice or protest to either party. This condition was, however, opportunely relieved by the arrival during the afternoon of the Secretary of War, Breckinridge, who was the first to bring them the official and undoubted intelligence of the surrender of Lee with his whole army, of which they had hitherto been informed only by rumor, and which they had of course hoped to the last moment might prove unfounded. The fresh news naturally opened up another discussion and review of the emergency between the various individuals, and seems at length to have brought them to a frank avowal of their real feelings to each other in private. Johnston and Beauregard, holding military counsel together, "agreed in the opinion that the Southern Confederacy was overthrown."⁶ This opinion Johnston also repeated to Breckinridge and Mallory, both of whom, it would seem, entertained the same view. The absence of anything like full confidence and cordial intimacy between Davis and his advisers is shown by the fact that these two members of his Cabinet were unwilling to tell their chief the truth which both recognized, and urged upon General Johnston the duty of making the unwelcome suggestion "that negotiations to end the war should be commenced." Breckinridge promised to bring about an opportunity; and it was evidently upon his suggestion that Davis called together a second conference of his Cabinet and his generals.⁷ There is a conflict of statement as to when it

⁴ Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," pp. 396, 397.

⁵ Pollard, "Life of Jefferson Davis, with a Secret History of the Confederacy," p. 514.

⁶ Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 397.

⁷ Ibid., p. 398.

took place. Both Davis and Mallory in their accounts group together all the incidents as if they occurred at a single meeting, which Mallory places on the evening of the 12th, while Johnston's account mentions the two separate meetings, the first on the morning of the 12th, and the second on the morning of the 13th; there being, however, substantial agreement between all as to the points discussed.

Of this occasion, so full of historical interest, we fortunately have the records of two of the participants. General Johnston writes:

Being desired by the President to do it, we compared the military forces of the two parties to the war. Ours, an army of about 20,000 infantry and artillery, and 5000 mounted troops; those of the United States, three armies that could be combined against ours, which was insignificant compared with either Grant's of 180,000 men, Sherman's of 110,000 at least, and Canby's of 60,000—odds of 17 or 18 to 1, which in a few weeks could be more than doubled. I represented that under such circumstances it would be the greatest of human crimes for us to attempt to continue the war; for, having neither money nor credit, nor arms but those in the hands of our soldiers, nor ammunition but that in their cartridge-boxes, nor shops for repairing arms or fixing ammunition, the effect of our keeping the field would be, not to harm the enemy, but to complete the devastation of our country and ruin of its people. I therefore urged that the President should exercise at once the only function of government still in his possession, and open negotiations for peace. The members of the Cabinet present were then desired by the President to express their opinions on the important question. General Breckinridge, Mr. Mallory, and Mr. Reagan thought that the war was decided against us, and that it was absolutely necessary to make peace. Mr. Benjamin expressed the contrary opinion. The latter made a speech for war much like that of Sempronius in Addison's play.¹

Secretary Mallory's account is even more full of realistic vividness. He represents Davis, after introducing the dreaded topic by several irrelevant subjects of conversation, and coming finally to "the situation of the country," as saying:

"Of course we all feel the magnitude of the moment. Our late disasters are terrible, but I do not think we should regard them as fatal. I think we can whip the enemy yet, if our people will turn out. We must look at matters calmly, however, and see what is left for us to do. Whatever can be done must be done at once. We have not a day to lose." A pause ensued, General Johnston not seeming to deem himself expected to speak, when the President said, "We should like to hear your views, General Johnston." Upon this the general, without preface or introduction,—his words translating the expression which his face had worn since he entered

the room,—said, in his terse, concise, demonstrative way, as if seeking to condense thoughts that were crowding for utterance: "My views are, sir, that our people are tired of the war, feel themselves whipped, and will not fight. Our country is overrun, its military resources greatly diminished, while the enemy's military power and resources were never greater, and may be increased to any desired extent. We cannot place another large army in the field; and cut off as we are from foreign intercourse, I do not see how we could maintain it in fighting condition if we had it. My men are daily deserting in large numbers, and are taking my artillery teams to aid their escape to their homes. Since Lee's defeat they regard the war as at an end. If I march out of North Carolina, her people will leave my ranks. It will be the same as I proceed south through South Carolina and Georgia, and I shall expect to retain no man beyond the by-road or cow-path that leads to his house. My small force is melting away like snow before the sun, and I am hopeless of recruiting it. We may perhaps obtain terms which we ought to accept." The tone and manner, almost spiteful, in which the general jerked out these brief, decisive sentences, pausing at every paragraph, left no doubt as to his own convictions. When he ceased speaking, whatever was thought of his statements—and their importance was fully understood—they elicited neither comment nor inquiry. The President, who during their delivery had sat with his eyes fixed upon a scrap of paper which he was folding and refolding abstractedly, and who had listened without a change of position or expression, broke the silence by saying, in a low, even tone, "What do you say, General Beauregard?" "I concur in all General Johnston has said," he replied. Another silence, more eloquent of the full appreciation of the condition of the country than words could have been, succeeded, during which the President's manner was unchanged.²

Davis's optimism had taken an obstinate form, and even after these irrefutable arguments and stern decisions he remained unconvinced. He writes that he "never expected a Confederate army to surrender while it was able either to fight or to retreat";³ but sustained only by the sophomoric eloquence of Mr. Benjamin, he had no alternative. He inquired of Johnston how terms were to be obtained; to which the latter answered, by negotiation between military commanders, proposing that he should be allowed to open such negotiations with Sherman. To this Davis consented, and upon Johnston's suggestion Secretary Mallory took up a pen and at Davis's dictation wrote down the letter to Sherman⁴ which we have quoted elsewhere, and the results of which have been related. The council of war over, General Johnston returned to his army to begin negotiations with Sherman. On the following day, April 14, Davis and his party, without waiting to

¹ Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," pp. 398, 399.

² Alfriend, "Life of Jefferson Davis," pp. 623-625.

³ Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," p. 682.

⁴ Alfriend, "Life of Jefferson Davis," p. 625.

hear the result, left Greensboro' to continue their journey southward.¹

The dignity and resources of the Confederate Government were rapidly shrinking; railroad travel had ceased on account of burned bridges, and it could no longer even maintain the state enjoyed in its car at Greensboro'. We are not informed what became of the archives; its personnel — President, Cabinet, and sundry staff officers — scraped together a lot of miscellaneous transportation, composed of riding horses, ambulances, and other vehicles, which, over roads rendered almost impassable by mud, made their progress to the last degree vexatious and toilsome. The country was so full of fugitives that horse-stealing seems to have become for the time an admitted custom and privilege. We have the statement of Davis's private secretary that eight or ten young Mississippians, one of them an officer, who volunteered to become the rebel President's bodyguard, equipped themselves by "pressing" the horses of neighboring farmers, rendering necessary a premature and somewhat sudden departure in advance of the official party.² Obtaining shelter by night when they could, and camping at other times, the distinguished fugitives made their way to Charlotte, North Carolina, where they arrived on the 18th of April. Since the Confederate Government had considerable establishments at Charlotte, orders were despatched to the quartermaster to prepare accommodations; and this request was reasonably satisfied for all the members of the party except its chief. The quartermaster met them near the town and

explained that, though quarters could be furnished for the rest of us, he had as yet been able to find only one person willing to receive Mr. Davis, saying the people generally were afraid that whoever entertained him would have his house burned by the enemy; that, indeed, it was understood threats to that effect had been made everywhere by Stoneman's cavalry. There seemed to be nothing to do but to go to the one domicile offered. It was on the main street of the town, and was occupied by Mr. Bates, a man said to be of Northern birth, a bachelor of convivial habits, the local agent of the Southern Express Company, apparently living alone with his negro servants, and keeping a sort of "open house," where a broad, well-equipped sideboard was the most conspicuous feature of the situation — not at all a seemly place for Mr. Davis.³

Mr. Davis was perforce obliged to accept this entertainment; and whether he failed to realize the significance of such treatment or whether he was moved by his suppressed in-

dignation to a defiant self-assertion, when a detachment of rebel cavalry passing along the street saluted him with cheers and called him out for a speech, after the usual compliments to soldiers, he "expressed his own determination not to despair of the Confederacy, but to remain with the last organized band upholding the flag."⁴ And this feeling he again emphasized during his stay in Charlotte by a remark to his private secretary, "I *cannot* feel like a beaten man."

The stay at Charlotte was prolonged, evidently to wait for news from Johnston's army. No information came till April 23, when Breckinridge, Secretary of War, arrived, bringing the memorandum agreement made by Sherman and Johnston on the 18th.⁵ The memorandum seems to have been discussed at a Cabinet meeting held on the morning of the 24th, and Mr. Davis yielded to the advice they all gave him to accept and ratify the agreement. He wrote a letter to that effect,⁶ but almost immediately received further information, which Sherman communicated to Johnston, that the Washington authorities had rejected the terms and agreement, and directed Sherman to continue his military operations, and that Sherman had given notice to terminate the armistice. This change, coupled with the news of the assassination of President Lincoln, which the party had received on their arrival in Charlotte, stimulated the hopes of the rebel President, and he sent back instructions to Johnston to disband his infantry and retreat southward with so much of his cavalry and light artillery as he could bring away. Against the daily evidence of his own observation and the steady current of advice from his followers, he was still dreaming of some romantic or miraculous renewal of his chances and fortunes. And in his book, written fifteen years afterward, he makes no attempt to conceal his displeasure that General Johnston refused to obey his desperate and futile orders.

The armistice expired on the 26th, and the fugitive Confederate Government once more took up its southward flight. At starting, the party still made show of holding together. There were the President, most of the members of the Cabinet, several staff officers, and fragments of six cavalry brigades, counting about two thousand, which had escaped in small parties from Johnston's surrender. This was enough to form a respectable escort. There was still talk of the expedition turning westward and making its way across the Mississippi to join Kirby Smith and Magruder. But the

¹ Burton N. Harrison in *THE CENTURY*, November, 1883, pp. 134, 137.

² *Ibid.*, p. 133.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ "Southern Historical Papers," Vol. XII., pp. 100, 102.

⁶ Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 688.

meager accounts plainly indicate that Davis's advisers fed his hope for politeness' sake, or to furnish the only pastime with which it was possible to relieve the tedium of their journey; for as they proceeded the expedition melted away as if by enchantment. Davis directed his course towards Abbeville, South Carolina. Mr. Mallory records that though they had met no enemy,

At Abbeville the fragments of disorganized cavalry commands, which had thus far performed, in some respects, an escort's duty, were found to be reduced to a handful of men, anxious only to reach their homes as early as practicable, and whose services could not further be relied on. . . . Almost every cross-road witnessed the separation of comrades in arms, who had long shared the perils and privations of a terrific struggle, now seeking their several homes to resume their duties as peaceful citizens.¹

The members of the Cabinet, except Reagan, also soon dropped off on various pretexts. Benjamin decided to pursue another route, Breckinridge remained behind with the cavalry at the crossing of the Savannah River and never caught up. At Washington, Georgia, a little farther on, Mallory halted "to attend to the needs of his family." Davis waited a whole day at Washington, and finding that neither troops nor leaders appeared, the actual situation seems at last to have dawned upon him. "I spoke to Captain Campbell of Kentucky, commanding my escort," he writes, "explained to him the condition of affairs, and telling him that his company was not strong enough to fight, and too large to pass without observation, asked him to inquire if there were ten men who would volunteer to go with me without question wherever I should choose."² With these, two officers, three members of his personal staff, and Postmaster-General Reagan, he pushed ahead, still nursing his project of crossing the Mississippi River.

Davis's private secretary had been sent ahead to join Mrs. Davis and her family party at Abbeville, South Carolina, and they continued their journey, in advance, with a comfortable wagon train. After passing Washington, in Georgia, rumors of pursuit by Federal cavalry increased, and a more ominous rumor gained circulation that a gang of disbanded Confederates was preparing to plunder the train under the idea that it carried a portion of the official treasure. Apprehension of this latter danger induced the Confederate President to hurry forward and overtake his family, and during three days he traveled in their company. It seems to have been a dismal journey; the roads were bad, heavy storms

were prevailing, signs of danger and prospects of capture were continually increasing, and they were sometimes compelled to start at midnight and push on through driving rain to make good their concealed flight.

They halted about five o'clock in the afternoon of May 9, to camp and rest in the pine woods by a small stream in the neighborhood of Irwinville, Irwin County, near the middle of southern Georgia. Here the situation was discussed, and it became clear that any hope of reaching the trans-Mississippi country was visionary. The determination was finally arrived at to proceed to the east coast of Florida, and by means of a small sailing vessel, stated to be in readiness, endeavor to gain the Texas coast by sea. It was also agreed that Davis should at once leave his family and push ahead with a few companions. Davis explains that he and his special party did not start ahead at nightfall, as had been arranged, because a rumor reached him that the expected marauding party would probably attack the camp that night, and that he delayed his departure for the protection of the women and children, still intending, however, to start during the night. With this view, his own and other horses remained saddled and ready. But the camp was undisturbed, and fatigue seems to have held its inmates in deep slumber until dawn of May 10, when by a complete surprise a troop of Federal cavalry suddenly captured the whole party and camp. There is naturally some variance in the accounts of the incident, but the differences are in the shades of coloring rather than in the essential facts.

Two expeditions had been sent from Macon by General James H. Wilson in pursuit of Jefferson Davis and his party—the one to scour the left, the other the right bank of the Ocmulgee River; one, under Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Harnden, commanding the 1st Wisconsin Cavalry, starting on the 6th, and the other, under Lieutenant-Colonel B. D. Pritchard, commanding the 4th Michigan Cavalry, starting on the 7th of May. Following different routes, these two officers met at the village of Abbeville, Georgia, in the afternoon of May 9, where they compared notes and decided to continue the pursuit by different roads. As the chase grew hot, smaller detachments from each party spurred on, learned the location of the slumbering camp, and posted themselves in readiness to attack it at daylight, but remained unconscious of each other's proximity.

The fugitives' camp was in the dense pine woods a mile and a half north of Irwinville. Pritchard had reached this village after midnight, obtained information about the camp, and procured a negro boy to guide him to it.

¹ Alfriend, "Life of Jefferson Davis," p. 630.

² Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 695.

Approaching to within half a mile, he halted, both to wait for daylight and to send his lieutenant, Purinton, with twenty-five dismounted men to gain the rear of the camp, but cautioning him that a part of Harnden's command would in all probability approach from that direction, and that he must avoid a conflict with them. (See also pages 586 and 595.)

At daybreak [writes Captain Lawton of Pritchard's force] the order was passed in a whisper to make ready to enter the camp. The men were alive to the work. Mounting their horses, the column moved at a walk until the tents came in sight, and then, at the word, dashed in. The camp was found pitched on both sides of the road. On the left hand, as we entered, were wagons, horses, tents, and men; on the right were two wall-tents, fronting from the road. All was quiet in the camp. We encountered no guards; if there were any out, they must have been asleep.¹

Just at this instant, however, firing was heard back of the camp, where Purinton had been sent. This created instant confusion, and Pritchard with most of his force rushed forward through the camp to resist a supposed Confederate attack. It turned out that, despite the precautions taken, the detachment of Pritchard's men under Purinton (the 4th Michigan) had met a detachment of Harnden's men (the 1st Wisconsin), and in the darkness they had mistaken and fired on each other, causing two deaths and wounding a number.

The rush of the cavalry and the firing of course aroused the sleepers, and as they emerged from their tents there was a moment of confusion during which only one or two Federal soldiers remained in the camp. One of these had secured Davis's horse,² which had stood saddled since the previous evening, and which a colored servant had just brought to

¹ G. W. Lawton in "The Atlantic," September, 1865, p. 344.

² Ibid.

³ Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," pp. 701, 702.

It is but just to give the following narrative of Captain G. W. Lawton of the 4th Michigan Cavalry. It was printed in "The Atlantic Monthly" for September, 1865, and the reader may profitably compare it with Jefferson Davis's own narrative which is quoted in the text.

"Andrew Bee, a private of Company L, went to the entrance of Davis's tent, and was met by Mrs. Davis, 'bareheaded and barefoot,' as he describes her, who, putting her hand on his arm, said:

"Please don't go in there till my daughter gets herself dressed."

"Andrew thereupon drew back, and in a few minutes a young lady (Miss Howell) and another person, bent over as with age, wearing a lady's 'waterproof,' gathered at the waist, with a shawl drawn over the head, and carrying a tin pail, appear, and ask to go to 'the run' for water. Mrs. Davis also appears, and says: "'For God's sake, let my old mother go to get some water!'

"No objections being made, they passed out. But

his tent. Of what ensued, we give Mr. Davis's own account:

I stepped out of my wife's tent and saw some horsemen, whom I immediately recognized as cavalry, deploying around the encampment. I turned back and told my wife these were not the expected marauders, but regular troopers. She implored me to leave her at once. I hesitated, from unwillingness to do so, and lost a few precious moments before yielding to her importunity. My horse and arms were near the road on which I expected to leave, and down which the cavalry approached; it was, therefore, impracticable to reach them. I was compelled to start in the opposite direction. As it was quite dark in the tent, I picked up what was supposed to be my "raglan," a waterproof light overcoat, without sleeves; it was subsequently found to be my wife's, so very like my own as to be mistaken for it; as I started, my wife thoughtfully threw over my head and shoulders a shawl. I had gone perhaps fifteen or twenty yards when a trooper galloped up and ordered me to halt and surrender, to which I gave a defiant answer, and dropping the shawl and raglan from my shoulders advanced towards him; he leveled his carbine at me, but I expected, if he fired, he would miss me, and my intention was in that event to put my hand under his foot, tumble him off on the other side, spring into his saddle and attempt to escape. My wife, who had been watching, when she saw the soldier aim his carbine at me, ran forward and threw her arms around me. Success depended on instantaneous action, and recognizing that the opportunity had been lost I turned back, and, the morning being damp and chilly, passed to a fire beyond the tent.³

Colonel Pritchard relates in his official report:

Upon returning to camp I was accosted by Davis from among the prisoners, who asked if I was the officer in command, and upon my answering him that I was, and asking him whom I was to call him, he replied that I might call him what or whoever I

sharp eyes were upon the singular-looking 'old mother.' Suddenly, Corporal Munger of Company C, and others, at the same instant, discovered that the 'old mother' was wearing very heavy boots for an aged female, and the corporal exclaimed:

"That is not a woman! Don't you see the boots?'" and spurring his horse forward and cocking his carbine, compelled the withdrawal of the shawl, and disclosed Jeff. Davis.

"As if stung by this discovery of his unmanliness, Jeff. struck an attitude, and cried out:

"Is there a man among you? If there is, let me see him!"

"Yes," said the corporal, 'I am one; and if you stir, I will blow your brains out!'

"I know my fate," said Davis, 'and might as well die here.'

"But his wife threw her arms around his neck, and kept herself between him and the threatening corporal.

"No harm, however, was done him, and he was generally kindly spoken to: he was only stripped of his female attire.

"As a man, he was dressed in a complete suit of gray, a light felt hat, and high cavalry boots, with a gray beard of about six weeks' growth covering his face.

pleased. When I replied to him that I would call him Davis, and after a moment's hesitation he said that was his name, he suddenly drew himself up in true royal dignity and exclaimed, "I suppose that you consider it bravery to charge a train of defenseless women and children, but it is theft, it is vandalism!"¹

That the correctness of the report may not be questioned, we add the corroborating statement of Postmaster-General Reagan, the sole member of the rebel Cabinet remaining with the party:

Colonel Pritchard did not come up for some time after Mr. Davis was made a prisoner. When he rode up there was a crowd, chiefly of Federal soldiers, around Mr. Davis. He was standing, and dressed in the suit he habitually wore. He turned towards Colonel Pritchard and asked, "Who commands these troops?" Colonel Pritchard replied, without hesitation, that he did. Mr. Davis said to him, "You command a set of thieves and robbers. They rob women and children." Colonel Pritchard then said, "Mr. Davis, you should remember that you are a prisoner." And Mr. Davis replied: "I am fully conscious of that. It would be bad enough to be the prisoner of soldiers and gentlemen. I am still lawful game, and would rather be dead than be your prisoner."²

Colonel Pritchard's official report gives the following list of the persons who fell into his hands:

I ascertained that we had captured Jefferson Davis and family (a wife and four children); John H. Reagan, his Postmaster-General; Colonels Harrison and Lubbock, A. D. C. to Davis; Burton N. Harrison, his private secretary; Major Maurin and Captain Moody, Lieutenant Hathaway; Jeff. D. Howell, midshipman in the rebel navy, and twelve private soldiers; Miss Maggie Howell, sister of Mrs. Davis; two waiting maids, one white and one black, and several other servants. We also captured five wagons, three ambulances, about fifteen horses, and from twenty-five to thirty mules. The train was mostly loaded with commissary stores and private baggage of the party.

The details of the return march are unnecessary; there is no allegation that the prisoners were ill treated. They arrived at Macon on May 13, both captors and prisoners having on the way first learned of the offer of a reward of one hundred thousand dollars for Davis's apprehension on the charge of having been an accomplice in the assassination of President Lincoln. In due time Davis was imprisoned in Fort Monroe. These pages do not afford room to narrate his captivity of about

"He said he thought our Government was too magnanimous to hunt women and children that way.

"When Colonel Pritchard told him that he would do the best he could for his comfort, he answered:

"I ask no favors of you."

"To which surly reply the colonel courteously responded by assuring him of kind treatment.

two years, his arraignment at Richmond before the United States Circuit Court for the District of Virginia for the crime of treason, and his liberation on bail, Horace Greeley having volunteered to become his principal bondsman.

On the 3d of December, 1868, a motion was made to quash the indictment on the ground that the penalties and disabilities denounced against and inflicted on him for his alleged offense, by the third section of the fourteenth article of the Constitution of the United States, were a bar to any proceedings upon such indictment. The court, consisting of Chief-Justice Chase and Judge Underwood, considered the motion, and two days later announced that they disagreed in opinion, and certified the question to the Supreme Court of the United States. Though not announced, it was understood that the Chief-Justice held the affirmative and Judge Underwood the negative on the question. Three weeks from that day President Johnson bestowed upon Mr. Davis and those who had been his followers a liberal and fraternal Christmas gift. On the 25th of December, 1868, he issued a proclamation supplementing the various prior proclamations of amnesty, which declared "unconditionally and without reservation, to all and to every person who directly or indirectly participated in the late insurrection or rebellion, a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States, or of adhering to their enemies during the late civil war, with restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof." The Government of course took no further action in the suit; and at a subsequent term of the Circuit Court the indictment was dismissed on motion of Mr. Davis's counsel. The ex-President of the Confederate States was thus relieved from all penalties for his rebellion except the disability to hold office imposed by the third section of the XIVth Amendment, which Congress has hitherto refused to remove.

THE END OF REBELLION.

IN the early years of the war, after every considerable success of the national arms, the newspapers were in the habit of announcing that "the back of the rebellion was broken." But at last the time came when the phrase was true; after Appomattox, the rebellion fell to pieces all at once. Lee surrendered less than

"Arrangements were forthwith made to return to Macon. . . .

"The members of Davis's staff submitted with a better grace than he to the capture and march, and were generally quite communicative."

¹ Pritchard to Stanton, May 25, 1865.

² J. H. Reagan in "Annals of the War," p. 155.

one-sixth of the Confederates in arms on the 9th of April; the armies that still remained to them, though inconsiderable when compared with the mighty host under the national colors, were yet infinitely larger than any Washington had commanded, and were capable of strenuous resistance and of incalculable mischief. Leading minds on both sides thought the war might be indefinitely prolonged. We have seen that Jefferson Davis, after Richmond fell, issued his swelling manifesto, saying the Confederates had "now entered upon a new phase of the struggle," and that he would "never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot of the soil of any of the States of the Confederacy." General Sherman, so late as the 25th of April, said, "I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse; and instead of dealing with six or seven States, we will have to deal with numberless bands of desperadoes." Neither side comprehended fully the intense weariness of war that had taken possession of the South; and peace came more swiftly and completely than any one had ever dared to hope.

The march of Sherman from Atlanta to the sea and his northward progress through the Carolinas had predisposed the great interior region to make an end of strife, a tendency which was greatly promoted by Wilson's energetic and masterly raid. The rough usage received by Taylor and by Forrest at his hands, and the blow their dignity suffered in the capture of their fugitive President, made their surrender more practicable. An officer of Taylor's staff came to Canby's headquarters on the 19th of April to make arrangements for the surrender of all the Confederate forces east of the Mississippi not already paroled by Sherman and by Wilson—embracing some 42,000 men. On the 4th of May the terms were agreed upon and signed at the village of Citronelle in Alabama. General Taylor gives a picturesque incident of his meeting with General Canby. The Union officers invited the Confederates to a luncheon, and while the latter were enjoying a menu to which they had long been unaccustomed, the military band in attendance began playing "Hail, Columbia." Canby—with a courtesy, Taylor says, equal to anything recorded by Froissart—excused himself, and walked to the door; the music ceased for a moment, and then the air of "Dixie" was heard. The Confederates, not to be left in arrears of good-breeding, then demanded the national air, and the flag of the reunited country was toasted by both sides. The terms agreed upon were those accorded by Grant to Lee with slight changes of detail, the United States Government furnishing transportation and subsistence on the way home to the men lately engaged in the effort

to destroy it. The Confederates willingly testify to the cordial generosity with which they were treated. "Public property," says General Taylor, "was turned over and receipted for, and this as orderly and quickly as in time of peace between officers of the same service." At the same time and place the Confederate Commodore Farrand surrendered to Admiral Thatcher all the naval forces of the Confederacy in the neighborhood of Mobile—a dozen vessels and some hundreds of officers.

General Kirby Smith commanded all the insurgent forces west of the Mississippi. On him the desperate hopes of Mr. Davis and his flying Cabinet were fixed, after the successive surrenders of Lee and Johnston had left them no prospect in the east. They imagined they could move westward, gathering up stragglers as they fled, and, crossing the river, could join Smith's forces, and "form an army, which in that portion of the country, abounding in supplies and deficient in rivers and railroads, could have continued the war. . . ." "To this hope," adds Mr. Davis, "I persistently clung." Smith, on the 21st of April, called upon his soldiers to continue the fight.

You possess the means of long resisting invasion. You have hopes of succor from abroad. . . . The great resources of this department, its vast extent, the numbers, the discipline, and the efficiency of the army, will secure to our country terms that a proud people can with honor accept, and may, under the providence of God, be the means of checking the triumph of our enemy and securing the final success of our cause.

The attitude of Smith seemed so threatening that Sheridan was sent from Washington to bring him to reason. But he did not long hold his position of solitary defiance. One more useless skirmish took place near Brazos, and then Smith followed the example of Taylor, and surrendered his entire force, some 18,000, to General Canby on the 26th of May. The same generous terms were accorded him that had been given to Taylor—the Government fed his troops and carried them to their homes.

Meanwhile, General Wilson had been paroling many thousands of prisoners, who wandered in straggling parties within the limits of his command. One hundred and seventy-five thousand men in all were surrendered by the different Confederate commanders, and there were, in addition to these, about ninety-nine thousand prisoners in national custody during the year; one-third of these were exchanged and two-thirds released. This was done as rapidly as possible, by successive orders of the War Department, beginning on the 9th of May and continuing through the summer.

The first object of the Government was to stop the waste of war. Recruiting ceased im-

mediately after Lee's surrender; the purchase of arms and supplies was curtailed, and measures were taken to reduce as promptly as possible the vast military establishment. It had grown during the last few months to portentous dimensions. The impression that a great and final victory was near at hand, the stimulus of the national hope, the prospect of a brief and prosperous campaign, had brought the army up to the magnificent complement of a million men.¹ The reduction of this vast armament, the retrenchment of the enormous expenses incident to it, were immediately undertaken with a method and despatch which were the result of four years' thorough and practical training, and which would have been impossible under any other circumstances. Every chief of bureau was ordered on the 28th of April to proceed at once to the reduction of expenses in his department to a peace footing, and this before Taylor or Smith had surrendered and while Jefferson Davis was still at large. The transportation department gave up the railroads of the South to their owners, mainly in better condition than that in which they had been received. They began without delay to sell the immense accumulation of draught animals; eight million dollars were realized from that source within the year. The other departments also disposed of their surplus stores. The stupendous difference which the close of the war at once caused in the finances of the country may be seen in the fact that the appropriations for the army in the fiscal year succeeding the war were \$33,814,461 as against \$516,240,131 for the preceding year. The army of a million men was brought down, with incredible ease and celerity, to one of twenty-five thousand.

Before the great army melted away into the greater body of the Republic the soldiers enjoyed one final triumph, a march through the capital, undisturbed by death or danger, under the eyes of their highest commanders, military and civilian, and the representatives of the people whose nationality they had saved. The Army of the Potomac and the army of Sherman — such corps of them as were stationed within reach, waiting their discharge — were ordered to pass in review before General Grant and President Johnson, in front of the Executive Mansion, on the 23d and 24th of May. Those who witnessed this solemn yet joyous pageant will never forget it, and will pray that their children may never witness anything like it. For two whole days this formidable host, eight times the number of the entire peace es-

tablishment, marched the long stretch of Pennsylvania Avenue, starting from the shadow of the dome of the Capitol, and filling that wide thoroughfare to Georgetown with their serried mass, moving with the easy, yet rapid pace of veterans in cadence step. On a platform in front of the White House stood the President and all the first officers of the state, the judges of the highest court, the most eminent generals and admirals of the army and the navy. The weather, on both days, was the finest a Washington May could afford; the trees of Lafayette Square were leafing out in their strong and delicate verdure.

The Army of the Potomac, which for four years had been the living bulwark of the capital, was rightly given the precedence. Meade himself rode at the head of his column, then came the cavalry headed by Merritt — for Sheridan had already started for his new command in the Southwest. Custer, commanding the Third Division, had an opportunity of displaying his splendid horsemanship, as his charger, excited beyond control by the pomp and martial music, bolted near the Treasury, and dashed with the speed of the wind past the reviewing stand, but was soon mastered by the young general, who was greeted with stormy applause as he rode gravely by the second time, covered with garlands of flowers, the gifts of friends on the pavement. The same graceful guerdon was given all the leading commanders; even subalterns and hundreds of private soldiers marched decked with these fragrant offerings. The three infantry corps, the Ninth, under Parke, the Fifth, under Griffin, — though Warren was on the stand, hailed with tumultuous cheers by his soldiers, — and the Second, under Humphreys, moved swiftly forward. Wright, with the Sixth, was too far away to join in the day's parade.² The memory of hundreds of hard-fought battles, of saddening defeats and glorious victories, of the dead and maimed comrades who had fallen forever out of the thinned ranks, was present to every one who saw the veteran divisions marching by under the charge of generals who had served with them in every vicissitude of battle and siege — trained officers like Crook and Ayres, and young and brilliant soldiers who had risen like rockets from among the volunteers, such as Barlow and Miles. Every brigade had its days of immortal prowess to boast, every tattered guidon had its history.

On the 24th Sherman's army marched in review. The general rode in person at the head of his troops, and was received by the dense multitude that thronged the avenue with a tumult of rapturous plaudits, which might have assured him of the peculiar place he was

¹ May 1, 1865, the aggregate was 1,000,516. [Johnson, Message, Dec. 4, 1865. Appendix, "Globe," p. 4.]

² His corps was reviewed on the 7th of June.

to hold thereafter in the hearts of his fellow-citizens. His horse and he were loaded with flowers; and his principal commanders were not neglected. Howard had just been appointed chief of the Freedmen's Bureau, and therefore Logan commanded the right wing of the Army of the Tennessee, the place he had hoped for, and, his friends insist, deserved, when McPherson fell: Hazen had succeeded to the Fifteenth Corps, and Frank Blair, a chivalrous and martial figure, rode at the head of the Seventeenth. Slocum led the left wing,—the Army of Georgia,—consisting of the Twentieth Corps under Mower, and the Fourteenth under J. C. Davis. The armies of Meade and Sherman were not exclusively from the East and West respectively; for Sherman had the contingent which Hooker and Howard had brought to Chattanooga from the East; and there were regiments from as far west as Wisconsin and Minnesota in the Army of the Potomac. But Sherman's troops were to all intents and purposes Western men, and they were scanned with keen and hospitable interest by the vast crowd of spectators, who were mainly from the East. There was little to choose between the two armies: a trifle more of neatness and discipline, perhaps, among the veterans of Meade; a slight preponderance in physique and in swinging vigor of march among the Westerners; but the trivial differences were lost in the immense and evident likeness, as of brothers in one family. There was a touch of the grotesque in the march of Sherman's legions which was absent from the well-ordered corps of Meade. A small squad of bummers followed each brigade, in their characteristic garb and accessories; small donkeys loaded with queer spoils; goats and game-cocks, regimental pets, sitting gravely on the backs of mules; and pickaninnies, the adopted children of companies, showed their black faces between the ranks, their eyes and teeth gleaming with delight.

As a mere spectacle, this march of the mightiest host the continent had ever seen gathered together was grand and imposing, but it was not as a spectacle alone that it affected the beholder most deeply. It was not a mere holiday parade; it was an army of citizens on their way home after a long and terrible war. Their clothes were worn with toilsome marches and pierced with bullets; their banners had been torn with shot and shell and lashed in the winds of a thousand battles; the very drums and fifes that played the ruffles as each battalion passed the President had called out the troops to numberless night alarms, had sounded the onset at Vicksburg and Antietam, had inspired the wasted valor of Kenesaw and Fredericksburg, had throbbled with the electric pulse of

victory at Chattanooga and Five Forks. The whole country claimed these heroes as a part of themselves, an infinite gratification forever to the national self-love; and the thoughtful diplomatists who looked on the scene from the reviewing stand could not help seeing that there was a conservative force in an intelligent democracy which the world had never before known.

With all the shouting and the laughter and the joy of this unprecedented ceremony there was one sad and dominant thought which could not be driven from the minds of those who saw it—that of the men who were absent, and who had, nevertheless, richly earned the right to be there. The soldiers, in their shrunken companies, were conscious of the ever-present memories of the brave comrades who had fallen by the way; and in the whole army there was the passionate and unavailing regret that their wise, gentle, and powerful friend, Abraham Lincoln, was gone forever from the house by the avenue, where their loyal votes, supporting their loyal bayonets, had contributed so much to place him.

The world has had many lessons to learn from this great war: the naval fight in Hampton Roads opened a new era in maritime warfare; the marches of Sherman disturbed all previous axioms of logistics; the system of instantaneous intrenchments, adopted by the soldiers of both sides in the latter part of the war, changed the whole character of modern field tactics. But the greatest of all the lessons afforded to humanity by the Titanic struggle in which the American Republic saved its life is the manner in which its armies were levied, and, when the occasion for their employment was over, were dismissed. Though there were periods when recruiting was slow and expensive, yet there were others, when some crying necessity for troops was apparent, that showed almost incredible speed and efficiency in the supply of men. Mr. Stanton, in his report for 1865, says:

After the disaster on the Peninsula, in 1862, over 80,000 troops were enlisted, organized, armed, equipped, and sent to the field in less than a month. Sixty thousand troops have repeatedly gone to the field within four weeks; and 90,000 infantry were once sent to the armies from the five States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin within twenty days.

This certainly shows a wealth of resources nothing less than imperial, and a power of commanding the physical and moral forces of the nation which has rarely been paralleled. Even more important, by way of instruction and example, was the lesson given the nations by the quick and noiseless dispersion of the enormous host when the war was done. The best friends of the Republic in Europe feared for it in this crisis, and those who disbelieved in

the conservative power of democracy were loud in their prophecies of the trouble which would arise on the attempt to disband the army. A million men, with arms in their hands, flushed with intoxicating victory, led by officers schooled in battle, loved and trusted—were they not ready for any adventure? Was it reasonable to believe that they would consent to disband and go to work again at the bidding of a few men in black coats at Washington? Especially after Lincoln was dead, could the tailor from Tennessee direct these myriads of warriors to lay down their arms and melt away into the everyday life of citizens? In America there was no anxiety on this score among the friends of the Union. Without giving the subject a thought they knew there was no danger. The war had been made to execute the laws and to save the national existence, and when those objects were attained there was no thought among the soldiers, from the general to the humblest file-closer, but to wait for the expected orders from the civil authorities for their disbandment.

The orders came as a mere matter of course, and were executed with a thoroughness and rapidity which then seemed also a matter of course, but which will appear more and more wonderful to succeeding generations. The muster-out began on the 29th of April, before Lincoln was borne to his grave, before Davis was caught, before the rebels of the Trans-Mississippi had ceased uttering their boasts of eternal defiance. First the new recruits, next the veterans whose terms were nearly expired, next those expensive corps the cavalry and artillery, and so on in regular order. Sherman's laurel-crowned army was the first to complete its muster-out, and the heroic Army of the Potomac was not far behind it. These veterans of hundreds of battlefields were soon found mingled in all the pursuits of civic activity. By the 7th of August 641,000 troops had become citizens; by the middle of November over 800,000 had been mustered out—without a fancy in any mind that there was anything else to do.

The Navy Department had not waited for the return of peace to begin the reduction of expenses. As soon as Fort Fisher fell the retrenchment began, and before Grant started on his last campaign considerable progress had been made in that direction. The 1st of May the squadrons were reduced one-half, and in July but thirty steamers comprised the entire blockading squadron on the Atlantic and the Gulf. The Potomac and Mississippi flotillas were wholly discontinued in another month. When Mr. Welles made his annual report in December he could say: "There were in the several blockading squadrons in January last,

exclusive of other duty, 471 vessels and 2445 guns. There are now but 29 vessels remaining on the coast, carrying 210 guns, exclusive of howitzers." Superfluous vessels were sold by hundreds and the money covered into the Treasury; thousands of the officers and sailors who had patriotically left the merchant service to fight under the national flag went back to the pursuits of peace.

For the purposes of pacification and the reëstablishment of the national authority the country was divided into five grand divisions—that of the Atlantic, commanded by Meade; the Mississippi, by Sherman; the Gulf, by Sheridan; the Tennessee, by Thomas; and the Pacific, by Halleck. These again were subdivided into nineteen departments, and we print here the names of the generals commanding them for the last time, as a roll of the men who survived the war, most favored by fortune and their own merits: Hooker, Hancock, Augur, Ord, Stoneman, Palmer (J. M.), Pope, Terry, Schofield, Sickles, Steedman, Foster (J. G.), Wood (T. J.), Wood (C. R.), Canby, Wright, Reynolds, Steele, McDowell. The success or failure of these soldiers in administering the trusts confided to them, their relations to the people among whom they were stationed, and to the President who succeeded to the vacant chair of Lincoln, form no part of the story we have attempted to tell.

On the 13th of June the President proclaimed the insurrection at an end in the State of Tennessee; it was not until the second day of April, 1866, that he proclaimed a state of peace as existing in the rest of the United States, and then he excepted the State of Texas; on the 20th of August, in the same year, he made his final proclamation, announcing the reëstablishment of the national authority in Texas, and thereupon he concluded, "I do further proclaim that the said insurrection is at an end, and that peace, order, tranquillity, and civil authority now exist in and throughout the whole of the United States of America."

LINCOLN'S FAME.

THE death of Lincoln awoke all over the world a quick and deep emotion of grief and admiration. If he had died in the days of doubt and gloom which preceded his reelection, he would have been sincerely mourned and praised by the friends of the Union, but its enemies would have curtly dismissed him as one of the necessary and misguided victims of sectional hate. They would have used his death to justify their malevolent forebodings, to point the moral of new lectures on the instability of democracies. But as he had fallen in the moment of a stupendous victory, the halo

of a radiant success enveloped his memory and dazzled the eyes even of his most hostile critics. That portion of the press of England and the Continent which had persistently vilified him now joined in the universal chorus of elegiac praise.¹ Cabinets and courts which had been cold or unfriendly sent their messages of condolence. The French government, spurred on by their Liberal opponents, took prompt measures to express their admiration for his character and their horror at his taking-off. In the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies the imperialists and the republicans vied with each other in utterances of grief and of praise; the Emperor and the Empress sent their personal condolences to Mrs. Lincoln. In England there was perhaps a trifle of self-consciousness at the bottom of the official expressions of sympathy. The Foreign Office searched the records for precedents, finding nothing which suited the occasion since the assassination of Henry IV. The sterling English character could not, so gracefully as the courtiers of Napoleon III., bend to praise one who had been treated almost as an enemy for so long. When Sir George Grey opened his dignified and pathetic speech in the House of Commons, by saying that a majority of the people of England sympathized with the North, he was greeted with loud protestations and denials on the part of those who favored the Confederacy. But his references to Lincoln's virtues were cordially received, and when he said that the Queen had written to Mrs. Lincoln with her own hand, "as a widow to a widow," the House broke out in loud cheering. Mr. Disraeli spoke on behalf of the Conservatives with his usual dexterity and with a touch of factitious feeling.

There is [he said] in the character of the victim, and even in the accessories of his last moments, something so homely and innocent, that it takes the question, as it were, out of all the pomp of history and the ceremonial of diplomacy; it touches the heart of nations and appeals to the domestic sentiment of mankind.

In the House of Lords the matter was treated with characteristic reticence. The speech of

¹ One of the finest poems on the occasion of his death was that in which the London "Punch" made its manly recantation of the slanders with which it had pursued him for four years:

Beside this corpse that bears for winding-sheet
The Stars and Stripes he lived to rear anew,
Between the mourners at his head and feet,
Say, scurrile jester, is there room for you?

Yes, he had lived to shame me from my sneer,
To lame my pencil, and confute my pen;
To make me own this hind of princes peer,
This rail-splitter a true-born king of men.

Lord Russell was full of that rugged truthfulness, that unbending integrity of spirit, which appeared at the time to disguise his real friendliness to America, and which was only the natural expression of a mind extraordinarily upright, and English to the verge of caricature. Lord Derby followed him in a speech of curious elegance, the object of which was rather to launch a polished shaft against his opponents than to show honor to the dead President; and the address proposed by the Government was voted. While these reserved and careful public proceedings were going on, the heart of England was expressing its sympathy with the kindred beyond sea by its thousand organs of utterance in the press, the resolutions of municipal bodies, the pulpit, and the platform.

In Germany the same manifestations were seen of official expressions of sympathy from royalty and its ministers, and of heartfelt affection and grief from the people and their representatives. Otto von Bismarck, then at the beginning of his illustrious career, gave utterance to the courteous regrets of the King of Prussia; the eloquent deputy, William Loewe, from his place in the House, made a brief and touching speech.

The man [he said] who accomplished such great deeds from the simple desire conscientiously to perform his duty, the man who never wished to be more nor less than the most faithful servant of his people, will find his own glorious place in the pages of history. In the deepest reverence I bow my head before this modest greatness, and I think it is especially agreeable to the spirit of our own nation, with its deep inner life and admiration of self-sacrificing devotion and effort after the ideal, to pay the tribute of veneration to such greatness, exalted as it is by simplicity and modesty.

Two hundred and fifty members of the Chamber signed an address to the American minister in Berlin, full of the cordial sympathy and admiration felt, not only for the dead President, but for the national cause, by the people of Germany.

You are aware [they said] that Germany has looked with pride and joy on the thousands of her sons who in this struggle have placed themselves so resolutely on the side of law and right. You have seen with what pleasure the victories of the Union have been hailed, and how confident the faith in the final triumph of the great cause and the restoration of the Union in all its greatness has ever been, even in the midst of calamity.

Workingmen's clubs, artisans' unions, sent numberless addresses, not merely expressive of sympathy, but conveying singularly just appreciations of the character and career of Lincoln. His death seemed to have marked a step in the education of the people everywhere.

In fact it was among the common people of the entire civilized world that the most genuine and spontaneous manifestations of sorrow and appreciation were produced, and to this fact we attribute the sudden and solid foundation of Lincoln's fame. It requires years, perhaps centuries, to build the structure of a reputation which rests upon the opinion of those distinguished for learning or intelligence; the progress of opinion from the few to the many is slow and painful. But in the case of Lincoln the many imposed their opinion all at once; he was canonized, as he lay on his bier, by the irresistible decree of countless millions. The greater part of the aristocracy of England thought little of him, but the burst of grief from the English people silenced in an instant every discordant voice. It would have been as imprudent to speak slightly of him in London as it was in New York. Especially among the Dissenters was honor and reverence shown to his name. The humbler people instinctively felt that their order had lost its wisest champion.

Not only among those of Saxon blood was this outburst of emotion seen. In France a national manifestation took place which the government disliked, but did not think it wise to suppress. The students of Paris marched in a body to the American Legation to express their sympathy. A two-cent subscription was started to strike a massive gold medal; the money was soon raised, but the committee was forced to have the work done in Switzerland. A committee of French Liberals brought the medal to the American minister, to be sent to Mrs. Lincoln. "Tell her," said Eugène Pelletan, "the heart of France is in that little box." The inscription had a double sense; while honoring the dead Republican, it struck at the Empire. "Lincoln — the Honest Man; abolished slavery, reestablished the Union: Saved the Republic, without veiling the statue of Liberty." Everywhere on the Continent the same swift apotheosis of the people's hero was seen. An Austrian deputy said to the writer, "Among my people his memory has already assumed superhuman proportions; he has become a myth, a type of ideal democracy." Almost before the earth closed over him he began to be the subject of fable. The Freemasons of Europe generally regard him as one of them — his portrait in Masonic garb is often displayed; yet he was not one of that brotherhood. The Spiritualists claim him as their most illustrious adept, but he was not a Spiritualist; and there is hardly a sect in the Western world, from the Calvinist to the atheist, but affects to believe he was of their opinion.

A collection of the expressions of sympa-

thy and condolence which came to Washington from foreign governments, associations, and public bodies of all sorts was made by the State Department, and afterwards published by order of Congress. It forms a large quarto of a thousand pages, and embraces the utterances of grief and regret from every country under the sun, in almost every language spoken by man.

But admired and venerated as he was in Europe, he was best understood and appreciated at home. It is not to be denied that in his case, as in that of all heroic personages who occupy a great place in history, a certain element of legend mingles with his righteous fame. He was a man, in fact, especially liable to legend. We have been told by farmers in central Illinois that the brown thrush did not sing for a year after he died. He was gentle and merciful, and therefore he seems in a certain class of annals to have passed all his time in soothing misfortune and pardoning crime. He had more than his share of the shrewd native humor, and therefore the loose jest books of two centuries have been ransacked for anecdotes to be attributed to him. He was a great and powerful lover of mankind, especially of those not favored by fortune. One night he had a dream, which he repeated the next morning to the writer of these lines, which quaintly illustrates his unpretending and kindly democracy. He was in some great assembly; the people made a lane to let him pass. "He is a common-looking fellow," some one said. Lincoln in his dream turned to his critic and replied, in his Quaker phrase, "Friend, the Lord prefers common-looking people: that is why he made so many of them." He that abases himself shall be exalted. Because Lincoln kept himself in such constant sympathy with the common people, whom he respected too highly to flatter or mislead, he was rewarded by a reverence and a love hardly ever given to a human being. Among the humble working people of the South whom he had made free this veneration and affection easily passed into the supernatural. At a religious meeting among the negroes of the Sea Islands a young man expressed the wish that he might see Lincoln. A gray-headed negro rebuked the rash aspiration: "No man see Linkum. Linkum walk as Jesus walk — no man see Linkum."¹ But leaving aside these fables, which are a natural enough expression of a popular awe and love, it seems to us no calmer nor more just estimate of Lincoln's relation to his time has ever been made — nor perhaps ever will be — than that uttered by one of the wisest and most Amer-

¹ Mr. Hay had this story from Captain E. W. Hooper immediately after it happened. It has been told with many variations.

ican of thinkers, Ralph Waldo Emerson, a few days after the assassination. We cannot forbear quoting a few words of this remarkable discourse, which shows how Lincoln seemed to the greatest of his contemporaries.

A plain man of the people, an extraordinary fortune attended him. Lord Bacon says, "Manifest virtues procure reputation; occult ones fortune." . . . His occupying the chair of state was a triumph of the good sense of mankind and of the public conscience. . . . He grew according to the need; his mind mastered the problem of the day; and as the problem grew, so did his comprehension of it. Rarely was a man so fitted to the event. . . . It cannot be said that there is any exaggeration of his worth. If ever a man was fairly tested, he was. There was no lack of resistance, nor of slander, nor of ridicule. . . . Then what an occasion was the whirlwind of the war! Here was no place for holiday magistrate, nor fair-weather sailor; the new pilot was hurried to the helm in a tornado. In four years—four years of battle-days—his endurance, his fertility of resources, his magnanimity, were sorely tried and never found wanting. There by his courage, his justice, his even temper, his fertile counsel, his humanity, he stood a heroic figure in the center of a heroic epoch. He is the true history of the American people in his time; the true representative of this continent—father of his country, the pulse of twenty millions throbbing in his heart, the thought of their minds articulated by his tongue.

The quick instinct by which the world recognized him, even at the moment of his death, as one of its greatest men, was not deceived. It has been confirmed by the sober thought of a quarter of a century. The writers of each nation compare him with their first popular hero. The French find points of resemblance in him to Henry IV.; the Dutch liken him to William of Orange; the cruel stroke of murder and treason by which all three perished in the height of their power naturally suggests the comparison, which is strangely justified in both cases, though the two princes were so widely different in character. Lincoln had the wit, the bonhomie, the keen, practical insight into affairs of the Béarnais; and the tyrannous moral sense, the wide comprehension, the heroic patience of the Dutch patriot, whose motto might have served equally well for the American President—*Sævis tranquillus in undis*. European historians speak of him in words reserved for the most illustrious names. Merle d'Aubigné says, "The name of Lincoln will remain one of the greatest that history has to inscribe on its annals." Henri Martin predicts nothing less than a universal apotheosis: "This man will stand out in the traditions of his country and the world as an incarnation of the people, and of modern democracy itself."

¹ "Battles and Leaders," Vol. II., p. 405.

² H. W. Grady.

In this country, where millions still live who were his contemporaries, and thousands who knew him personally, where the envies and jealousies which dog the footsteps of success still linger in the hearts of a few, where journals still exist that loaded his name for four years with daily calumny, and writers of memoirs vainly try to make themselves important by belittling him, his fame has become as universal as the air, as deeply rooted as the hills. The faint discords are not heard in the wide chorus that hails him second to none and equaled by Washington alone. The eulogies of him form a special literature. Preachers, poets, soldiers, and statesmen employ the same phrases of unconditional love and reverence. Men speaking with the authority of fame use unqualified superlatives. Lowell, in an immortal ode, calls him "New birth of our new soil, the first American." General Sherman says, "Of all the men I ever met, he seemed to possess more of the elements of greatness, combined with goodness, than any other." He is spoken of, with scarcely less of enthusiasm, by the more generous and liberal spirits among those who revolted against his election and were vanquished by his power. General Longstreet¹ calls him "the greatest man of rebellion times, the one matchless among forty millions for the peculiar difficulties of the period." An eminent Southern orator,² referring to our mixed Northern and Southern ancestry, says:

From the union of those colonists, from the straightening of their purposes and the crossing of their blood, slow perfecting through a century, came he who stands as the first typical American, the first who comprehended within himself all the strength and gentleness, all the majesty and grace of this republic—Abraham Lincoln.

It is not difficult to perceive the basis of this sudden and world-wide fame, nor rash to predict its indefinite duration. There are two classes of men whose names are more enduring than any monument—the great writers, and the men of great achievement; the founders of states, the conquerors. Lincoln has the singular fortune to belong to both these categories; upon these broad and stable foundations his renown is securely built. Nothing would have more amazed him while he lived than to hear himself called a man of letters; but this age has produced few greater writers. We are only recording here the judgment of his peers. Emerson ranks him with Æsop and Pilpay in his lighter moods, and says:

The weight and penetration of many passages in his letters, messages, and speeches, hidden now by the very closeness of their application to the moment, are destined to a wide fame. What pregnant definitions, what unerring common sense, what foresight, and on great occasions what lofty, and

more than national, what human tone! His brief speech at Gettysburg¹ will not easily be surpassed by words on any recorded occasion.²

His style extorted the high praise of French Academicians; Montalembert³ commended it as a model for the imitation of princes. Many of his phrases form part of the common speech of mankind. It is true that in his writings the range of subjects is not great; he is concerned chiefly with the political problems of the time, and the moral considerations involved in them. But the range of treatment is remarkably wide; it runs from the wit, the gay humor, the florid eloquence of his stump speeches to the marvelous sententiousness and brevity of the letter to Greeley and the address at Gettysburg, and the sustained and lofty grandeur of the Second Inaugural.

The more his writings are studied in connection with the important transactions of his age the higher will his reputation stand in the opinion of the lettered class. But the men of study and research are never numerous; and it is principally as a man of action that the world at large will regard him. It is the story of his objective life that will forever touch and hold the heart of mankind. His birthright was privation and ignorance—not peculiar to his family, but the universal environment of his place and time; he burst through those enchain- ing conditions by the force of native genius and will; vice had no temptation for him; his course was as naturally upward as the skylark's; he won, against all conceivable obstacles, a high place in an exacting profession and an honorable position in public and private

life; he became the foremost representative of a party founded on an uprising of the national conscience against a secular wrong, and thus came to the awful responsibilities of power in a time of terror and gloom. He met them with incomparable strength and virtue. Caring for nothing but the public good, free from envy or jealous fears, he surrounded himself with the leading men of his party, his most formidable rivals in public esteem, and through four years of stupendous difficulties he was head and shoulders above them all in the vital qualities of wisdom, foresight, knowledge of men, and thorough comprehension of measures. Personally opposed, as the radicals claim, by more than half of his own party in Congress, and bitterly denounced and maligned by his open adversaries, he yet bore himself with such extraordinary discretion and skill, that he obtained for the Government all the legislation it required, and so impressed himself upon the national mind that without personal effort or solicitation he became the only possible candidate of his party for reelection, and was chosen by an almost unanimous vote of the Electoral Colleges. His qualities would have rendered his administration illustrious even in time of peace; but when we consider that in addition to the ordinary work of the executive office he was forced to assume the duties of commander-in-chief of the national forces engaged in the most complex and difficult war of modern times, the greatness of spirit as well as the intellectual strength he evinced in that capacity is nothing short of prodigious. After times will wonder, not at the few and unim-

the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."—EDITOR.

² It has sometimes been said that this speech was not appreciated at the time of its delivery; we therefore add the testimony of another high authority to that of Emerson. On the day after the dedication Edward Everett wrote to the President: "Permit me . . . to express my great admiration of the thoughts expressed by you with such eloquent simplicity and appropriateness at the consecration of the cemetery. I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion, in two hours, as you did in two minutes." Mr. Lincoln replied: "Your kind note of to-day is received. In our respective parts yesterday, you could not have been excused to make a short address, nor I a long one. I am pleased to know that in your judgment the little I did say was not entirely a failure. Of course I knew that Mr. Everett would not fail; and yet while the whole discourse was eminently satisfactory, and will be of great value, there were passages in it which transcended my expectations. The point made against the theory of the General Government being only an agency, whose principals are the States, was new to me, and, as I think, is one of the best arguments for the national supremacy. The tribute to our noble women for their angel ministering to the suffering soldiers surpasses in its way, as do the subjects of it, whatever has gone before." [Unpublished MS.]

³ "La Victoire du Nord," p. 133.

¹ The text of the address, as slightly revised by President Lincoln, is as follows, and is taken from the autographic copy made for the Soldiers' and Sailors' Fair in Baltimore in 1864:

"Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now, we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us; that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of

portant mistakes he may have committed, but at the intuitive knowledge of his business that he displayed. We would not presume to express a personal opinion in this matter. We use the testimony only of the most authoritative names. General W. T. Sherman has repeatedly expressed the admiration and surprise with which he has read Mr. Lincoln's correspondence with his generals, and his opinion of the remarkable correctness of his military views. General W. F. Smith says:

I have long held to the opinion that at the close of the war Mr. Lincoln was the superior of his generals in his comprehension of the effect of strategic movements and the proper method of following up victories to their legitimate conclusions.¹


General J. H. Wilson holds the same opinion; and Colonel Robert N. Scott, in whose lamented death the army lost one of its most vigorous and best-trained intellects, frequently called Mr. Lincoln "the ablest strategist of the war."


To these qualifications of high literary excellence, and easy practical mastery of affairs of transcendent importance, we must add, as an explanation of his immediate and world-wide fame, his possession of certain moral qualities rarely combined, in such high degree, in one individual. His heart was so tender that he would dismount from his horse in a forest to replace in their nest young birds which had fallen by the roadside; he could not sleep at night if he knew that a soldier-boy was under sentence of death; he could not, even at the bidding of duty or policy, refuse the prayer of age or helplessness in distress. Children instinctively loved him; they never found his rugged features ugly; his sympathies were quick and seemingly unlimited. He was absolutely without prejudice of class or condition. Frederick Douglass says he was the only man of distinction he ever met who never reminded him by word or manner of his color; he was as just and generous to the rich and well born as to the poor

and humble — a thing rare among politicians. He was tolerant even of evil: though no man can ever have lived with a loftier scorn of meanness and selfishness, he yet recognized their existence and counted with them. He said one day, with a flash of cynical wisdom worthy of La Rochefoucauld, that honest statesmanship was the employment of individual meannesses for the public good. He never asked perfection of any one; he did not even insist for others upon the high standards he set up for himself. At a time before the word was invented he was the first of opportunists. With the fire of a reformer and a martyr in his heart he yet proceeded by the ways of cautious and practical statecraft. He always worked with things as they were, while never relinquishing the desire and effort to make them better. To a hope which saw the Delectable Mountains of absolute justice and peace in the future, to a faith that God in his own time would give to all men the things convenient to them, he added a charity which embraced in its deep bosom all the good and the bad, all the virtues and the infirmities of men, and a patience like that of nature, which in its vast and fruitful activity knows neither haste nor rest.

A character like this is among the precious heirlooms of the Republic; and by a special good fortune every part of the country has an equal claim and pride in it. Lincoln's blood came from the veins of New England emigrants, of Middle State Quakers, of Virginia planters, of Kentucky pioneers; he himself was one of the men who grew up with the earliest growth of the Great West. Every jewel of his mind or his conduct sheds radiance on each portion of the nation. The marvelous symmetry and balance of his intellect and character may have owed something to this varied environment of his race, and they may fitly typify the variety and solidity of the Republic. It may not be unreasonable to hope that his name and his renown may be forever a bond of union to the country which he loved with an affection so impartial, and served — in life and in death — with such entire devotion.

¹ "Lincoln Memorial Album," p. 555.





ENGRAVED BY J. W. EVANS.

THE GRAND REVIEW OF UNION TROOPS AT THE CLOSE OF THE WAR.

PAINTED BY JAMES E. TAYLOR.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

I.—THE LIFE MASK

AT THE NATIONAL MUSEUM IN WASHINGTON.

AH, countless wonders, brought from every zone,
Not all your wealth could turn the heart away
From that one semblance of our common clay,
The brow whereon the precious life long flown,
Leaving a homely glory all its own,
Seems still to linger, with a mournful play
Of light and shadow!— His, who held a sway
And power of magic to himself unknown,
Through what is granted but God's chosen few,
Earth's crownless, yet anointed kings,— a soul
Divinely simple and sublimely true
In that unconscious greatness that shall bless
This petty world while stars their courses roll,
Whose finest flower is *self-forgetfulness*.

Stuart Sterne.

II.—THE CENOTAPH.¹

AND so they buried Lincoln? Strange and vain!
Has any creature thought of Lincoln hid
In any vault, 'neath any coffin-lid,
In all the years since that wild Spring of pain?
'T is false,— he never in the grave hath lain.
You could not bury him although you slid
Upon his clay the Cheops pyramid
Or heaped it with the Rocky Mountain chain.
They slew themselves; they but set Lincoln free.
In all the earth his great heart beats as strong,
Shall beat while pulses throb to chivalry
And burn with hate of tyranny and wrong.
Whoever will may find him, anywhere
Save in the tomb. Not there,— he is not there!

James T. McKay.

HOW SAL CAME THROUGH.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "TWO RUNAWAYS," ETC.



THE summer sun balanced itself so evenly over Holly Bluff plantation that the broad white dwelling cast no shadow. But there was shade for all that, great stretches of it where, between the road that curved around the house and the fields now wreathed in tranquil cotton bloom, the pines had been left to check the western winds; and along the edge of the ravine too, where stood the cabins, were cool Rembrandt shadows, into which the open doorways looked out pleasantly, the colors of sundry and varied garments strung along the lines that linked the spreading oaks lending cheerfulness to the scene.

And there was a deep, cool shade in the broad back porch overlooking the blooming field, whose thousand acres ran off under the

¹ On April 14, 1887, the twenty-second anniversary of Lincoln's assassination, press despatches from Springfield reported his final burial in the monumental tomb.

THE BIOGRAPHERS OF LINCOLN.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN was the first American to reach the lonely height of immortal fame.

Before him within the narrow compass of our history loom but two preëminent names: Columbus the discoverer, and Washington the founder,—the one an Italian seer, the other an English country gentleman.

In a narrow sense, of course, Washington was American: he was born, lived, and died here; it was here he drew his sword and cut the petty, vexatious net which a stupid king had flung over us, and by his even, well-balanced, cool intelligence helped to guide us through national infancy. For all that he was English, and in his nature, habits, moral standards, and social theories, in short, in all points which, aside from mere geographical position, make up a man, was as thoroughgoing a British colonial gentleman as one could find anywhere beneath the Union Jack.

The genuine American of the Lincoln type came later, was the product of a new life, and departed very far from the Englishmen of colonial America.

The United States cast off its European habits about the end of the last century, and began in earnest its own proper career. From that day to this its whole history may be summed up as the subjugation of the continent, the elaboration of democracy, and the rebellion. In all of these Abraham Lincoln bore a part. He was pioneer, legislator, and the supreme figure of the war.

Not long before his birth there had sprung up over all inhabited parts of the United States a determination to grapple with the continental *terra incognita*, to wrest it from barbarism, to dare its solitudes, to search in the great vacant spaces between the eastern fringe of civilization and the far Pacific for whatever of goodly land or other lure lay therein. The tortuous thread of every river was traced through primeval forests and across virgin plains. A general roaming search was instituted and urged on by passionate geographical curiosity, by honest cupidity, but above all by a dominating resolve to found new homes where the conditions of nature were favorable to instant comfort and not too distant wealth. This great sweeping campaign against nature, this prodigious advance of a horde of home-makers, has been pushed since the dawn of the century, till now in its declining years the occupation of the continent is complete. With-

in the lifetime of Lincoln and since his death, forests and prairies, cañons and rivers, mountains and plains have all been explored. Siberian Montana has been ransacked, Saháran Arizona has yielded up its last secrets, and even the blizzard has been tracked to its lair. Into every gorge the pioneer has gone to hunt anything worth having, and at last even the ice-armored crags have been stormed and scaled by those hammer-bearing sons of Thor the geologists.

We know our country, we have got it conquered, we have bound it with railroad iron, and seized upon every coigne of vantage.

This vast ACT OF POSSESSION is far the most impressive feature of our history, and when its political and military and commercial achievements sink back with the perspective of time and take their true places in the general picture of human life, there will be nothing about them so wonderful as the great Westward march of home-makers.

Such another migration has not been seen since the dark beginnings of Old World tradition, when that primitive Aryan snail took thousands of years to crawl into Europe and make of himself even a German.

It is true that the implements of modern civilization are tools of swiftness, that railways and telegraphs dragged at the heels of the pioneers vastly hastened the filling up of the West, as needle-guns and rifled cannon have urged war to its present awful brevity. Yet with all due allowance for the acceleration of the nineteenth century, the conquering and peopling of a broad continent within the short span of a single century remains the most extraordinary feat in the annals of the peaceful deeds of mankind.

It is out of this great migration that the true, hardy American people have sprung; it was out of it that Lincoln came.

The rabble millions that have had themselves ferried over here to clutch for a share of American abundance, and who taint the pure air with odor of European degradation, are not numerous enough, thank God, to fatally dilute the strong new race. The sons of the pioneers are the true Americans; in the century's struggle with nature they have gathered an Antæan strength, and, flushed with their victory over a savage continent, believe themselves the coming leaders of the world. Are there not signs that deep down in her secret consciousness Europe thinks so too?

The very war of the Rebellion was but a quarrel in this business of Western home-making. In the midst of our career of land settlement we stopped short, flung down the axe and plow, and fought out the question whether these myriad new homes should be free or slave homes. The war was only a furious, dreadful interruption, and when it was done, on rolled the Westward tide again, as if nothing had happened.

From the days of the Revolution, when Washington an English commoner vanquished George an English king, until the Rebellion, there was no display of heroic greatness, no passion hot enough to melt the refractory soul of the nation and pour it forth like lava from an angry crater. The war of '12 was a mere episode. In that span of peaceful days there was no lack of noblest devotion to purpose; indeed, the whole story of Western settlement is one long tale of struggle and privation, of courage and death. The fallen in this quasi-peaceful campaign vastly outnumber the victims of war and count among them regiments of gentle women and defenseless children. Still the drama of life was never more than narrow and local; it was a period full of the sounds of pioneering, whose echoes scarcely ever carried beyond the lines of township and county.

Thus it is that the contemplation of Washington and Lincoln is like gazing upon two far-separated mountains, with a broad fertile valley stretching between them. Yonder in the misty lowlands are a million undistinguishable homes, the faintly seen spires of God's houses, smoke of toil and far reverberation of industries; with nothing anywhere to pierce the earth mist and reach toward the blue.

But up there in the clearer, finer air, the two star-neighboring giants wear upon their brows the white reflection of that universal and perpetual light which is true fame. Washington stands upon the border line of English and American history. Lincoln looms up from the very heart of American life, a true and characteristic son of the men of the West.

In claiming his preëminence as a great central figure of the war, there is no word or thought to disparage the goodly company of civil and military champions whose labor and valor were so closely linked together in the victory. For all of them we have our estimate of value; and each has received his fair division of the laurels. But for Lincoln there is a feeling of mystery and distance which is not to be explained by his short career and his early martyrdom; rather it has its origin in the consciousness that he was nearest to the hand of Divine Providence, and that the lips which uttered the Emancipation Proclamation and Gettysburg Consecration spoke with the deep vibra-

tion of a nature bowed and overcome by the great moral power which guides the destiny of the nation.

It is of this man that we are to have a biography, not a jostling forward of uncontrollable conceit in so-called personal reminiscences, but a serious and full account of an unexampled life.

Ah! how many things a biography may mean! Velasquez could paint a complete one of Philip IV. on a single square of canvas in an idle hour. With the icy courage of a vivisectioning naturalist, he gave you all there was of his weak, sensual patron, and cartloads of books do not throw another solitary ray on his character. A Boswell may crawl along at the heel of mediocrity and amuse whole generations with his twaddle and tattle. Carlyle could scream his hero-worship in forced, fantastic phrase, and still leave you an utter stranger to his demi-god.

As to Lincoln, what the world thirsts for is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. From the hands of John George Nicolay and John Hay we shall have *all* that.

They were his devoted friends, his faithful secretaries, the custodians and students of his papers. Moreover, as will presently be seen, they have by life and acquirement types of mind which give us the promise of a thoroughly good performance of their task.

John George Nicolay was born in the village of Essingen, in Rhenish Bavaria. His parents emigrated to this country when he was a child; they lived for a while in Cincinnati and then pushed on to Illinois. The elder Nicolay bought a farm in Pike County, and his son grew up there, acquiring in that beautiful country of forest and stream a strong love of rural life and field sports.

John Hay was born in Indiana, October 8, 1838; his father, a physician of standing and a type of the old-fashioned, high-minded professional gentleman; his mother, of a good Rhode Island family. His boyhood was passed in the West in the midst of all the political interest of the second stage of the business of community-making; namely, that period when the thin picket line of pioneer villages was followed by the organization of great towns, and when all the initial steps of local self-government were of foremost interest.

In the mean time slowly ripened the free-soil question, and thus these boys were forced into a far clearer knowledge of the structure of the civil and political institutions of their country and of impending issues than if they had grown up in an older State.

In communities like the Indiana and Illinois of forty years ago, boys led no separate life, there was no specialized hot-house treatment

as if a boy were an orchid or other frail exotic to be glassed away from the rough air of manhood; but they mingled with men, saw men's work, to a certain degree shared it, and fed upon men's books instead of the debilitating milk and water literature which is now given them. If in consequence manhood came a little prematurely, it did no harm, but much good in preparing young fellows for the early assumption of responsibility. Moreover it gave rise to those frank intimacies between men like Lincoln and youths like Nicolay and Hay.

Like most educated Western boys, therefore, they knew in detail the political life of which Lincoln was the outgrowth and the expression; and, what is of as much value in the interest of Lincoln's biography, they were equally familiar with the new type of manhood which was springing up about them.

Nicolay had begun his English education at Cincinnati, and continued to attend such schools as were within his reach until he was about eighteen years of age, when he resolved to become a printer and entered the office of the "Free Press" in Pittsfield. He soon became extremely expert in the business, and, not satisfied with knowing all there was to be learned in a country printing-office, he began to investigate the principle of the machinery employed, and at last invented a new form of press, for which he obtained a patent before he was nineteen years old. He next became associate editor, and it grew rapidly evident that there was not room enough for him in the office as a subordinate. With a little assistance from friends whose confidence he had gained by his energy and capacity, he bought the paper, assuming with the light heart of youth the care of its direction and the burden of debt which its purchase entailed. He made a good newspaper of it, and paid his debts with punctuality; but he felt no call to pass his life in Pittsfield, and when his friend O. M. Hatch was elected Secretary of State, he accepted his invitation to go to Springfield and take a position in his office.

Hay, growing up on the western verge of the State, early appreciated the untrammelled, un-Grundied man of the Mississippi Basin. He was arrested by the sharp contrast of manner and thought and speech between these children of the soil and the gentlemen who were a survival of colonial and early republican times; he perceived with relish the rich indigenous humor which blossomed out from the new human conditions, but never made the stupid, dull mistake of suspecting that because a man lacked the leather and prunella (for which there was little room in the wagon of the pioneer) he must lack also the generosity and honor of the gentleman.

It requires a certain amount of independence to be sure of moral qualities when found dissociated from their traditional accompaniments. "Is that man over there a gentleman?" said a pretty countess in a London drawing-room. "It is hard to fancy it with such a degenerate-looking cravat-knot."

No one has learned the new American better than did Hay in his youth, and ever since he has managed to keep the touch of comprehending sympathy equally with the free and equal, spontaneous Westerner and the prisoner who contentedly paces the iron-barred cages of caste in London or Madrid.

Hence there was no barrier of ignorance to prevent these men from understanding Lincoln. To them there was nothing baffling that this outgrowth of log-cabins and flat-boats should be full of tenderness and honor, nothing strange that the man of a quiet country law practice should rise and crush Douglas with lofty argument, and then lift the policy of the American Government from the mire of cowardly compromise to the firm, high ground of moral duty.

Coming to Springfield in the early years of the life of the Republican party, Nicolay not only faithfully fulfilled his duties in the office of the Secretary of State, but he also made himself felt in the politics of Illinois. He wrote constantly for the Illinois and St. Louis papers; he did much of the work of the State and local Republican committees; he frequently spoke at public meetings in Sangamon and the adjoining counties; he formed the acquaintance and gained the intimate friendship of the prominent Republican leaders of Illinois, and when, in the spring of 1860, Mr. Lincoln was nominated at Chicago, Mr. Nicolay was at once selected by him as the most discreet and competent person in his reach to assume the charge of his extensive correspondence. He acted in that capacity throughout that intensely excited and eventful campaign, and it is worthy of remark that not a line written from Mr. Lincoln's office from the nomination to the election gave the slightest embarrassment to the Republicans in any part of the country. Neither the President nor his secretary had had any special training in those fields where tact and discretion are supposed to be acquired; but there was an amount of good sense and sound judgment in the office which then, as thereafter, always proved equal to any demand. So perfect an understanding grew up during the campaign between Mr. Lincoln and his secretary, that after his election he determined to make the relation a permanent one, and the first nomination the President signed after his inauguration was

that of John G. Nicolay to be his official private secretary.

His confidence was not misplaced; for four years Mr. Nicolay served him with the greatest devotion, ability, and judgment. He made no mistakes; he never put himself forward; he did not magnify his office; he met the throng of place-seekers, of congressmen, of national and State officers, of cranks and inventors, who crowded the corridors of the White House,—all eager to impress their views or their claims upon the attention of the President,—with unflinching courtesy and patience, but with a reserve which promised nothing, and therefore gave no excuse for resentment when nothing was gained. Not only in Washington was he useful to Mr. Lincoln. He was frequently sent on delicate and confidential errands to different parts of the country, and acted constantly as a medium of communication between the President and prominent men of his party who lived away from the capital.

By the time Hay was sixteen, besides these precious lessons of Western life, he had been grounded so well in the preliminary studies of a university course that he was able to go to Rhode Island, the early home of his mother, and enter the Sophomore class of Brown University. There he remained three years, being graduated in the summer of 1858.

After that he continued his studies (among them the law) in Springfield, Illinois, and was admitted to the bar in February, 1861.

It was during this period that Lincoln formed for the young student that friendship which led him, when he entered the White House, to call Hay to his aid as assistant secretary, associating him in duty with Mr. Nicolay.

At twenty-one years of age, after a quiet boyhood, and a few calm years of university and professional study, Hay was flung suddenly into the dark vortex of the greatest modern struggle. The friend, the intimate of the President, living with him in the White House, sustaining, day after day, relations of the closest confidence, he saw the whole complex progress of events, and from the very force of position gained an accurate knowledge of the truth of that swiftly made history, free from the mixture of falsehood and distortion, which the public has too often and too credulously accepted. He knew from the lips of his chief the motives, estimates, and intentions of the man, and bore a share of that Atlas-load of desperate perplexity and incalculable care which rested with crushing weight on the shoulders of Lincoln. Not only in Washington, by the side of the President, did he do service, but for a time was called to

active military duty in the field, where, as assistant adjutant-general on the staffs of Generals Hunter and Gilmore, he rendered that "faithful and meritorious service" for which the brevets of lieutenant-colonel and colonel were bestowed. Early in 1864 he was recalled to the White House as aid-de-camp to the President, and remained on duty to the end. He watched by the martyr's death-bed heard the last respiration, and saw the lamp of life dim and die.

The war was over. Lincoln's wise and generous character had disappeared from the stage. The nation and its people went out as from some black tragedy into the sunlight of every day, and resumed a suspended life.


The two secretaries, with their clear, well-balanced observation, had watched the whole vast drama from behind the scenes, and more than all else they had beheld the great man, by the might and majesty of sincere conviction, and by faith in Divine Providence, rise and grow with the hour into giant stature.

The country lived and laughed again. Every one went his way. Nicolay and Hay went to Paris. Nicolay was appointed to succeed the Hon. John Bigelow as consul-general. Before sailing for his post he joined the party which went from New York to celebrate at Charleston the raising of the national flag upon the ruins of Fort Sumter. Four years before, the banner had been lowered on that fortress, the first victory of treason; the 14th of April, 1865, had been set aside as a festival day to commemorate its restoration; but even a darker significance was to be given to the second date than that which attached to the first. Mr. Nicolay shared in the rejoicings at Charleston and returned to the North to hear of the President's assassination. His appointment to Paris was confirmed by Mr. Johnson, and he managed the Paris consulate for more than four years with the ability and faithfulness with which he has always discharged every trust confided to him. The business of the office was admirably conducted during his incumbency and paid large sums annually into the Treasury.

For two years Hay occupied the post of secretary of legation.

The White House had been the scene of strain and perplexity, at length of tragedy and martyrdom, the very sun had seemed eclipsed by the smoke of war, and now the two young men found themselves in Paris the laughing, with the great city flinging her sparkling life gayly into the light, as the waters of the *grandes eaux* are tossed to the sapphire sky.

In the intervals of his regular official duties Hay refreshed himself with deep draughts from the streams of literature and art which water



Drawn by J. W. Alexander.

JOHN G. NICOLAY.

Engraved by T. Johnson.

and fertilize the flowery capital and flow on into the great mother river of the intellectual world of Europe. There, too, as we gather from his writings, he made, as we all do, his mocking bow to the modern god, Conventionality, that child of artifice and vanity, whom they over there have deified without waiting like good Latins till his death.

After two years in this city of wit and rapiers, of art and epigram, of polished intelligence and graceful extravagance, Hay went as *chargé d'affaires* to Vienna, where again his official position gave him rare facilities for learning what they do with their lives in that part of the world, and what if anything is behind the smiling *Gemüthlichkeit* on which the Viennese so frankly founds his civic pride.

Nicolay meantime remained in Paris till 1869, when he returned to America and assumed for a while the editorial control of the Chicago "Republican," a position which a change of proprietors caused him to relinquish.

Not long afterwards the position of marshal of the Supreme Court at Washington became vacant by the election to Congress of the Hon. Richard C. Parsons, and Mr. Nicolay was elected to fill it by the vote of the bench. He has occupied this post ever since. It leaves him a good deal of leisure, all of which he has devoted, for fifteen years, to the important work which is now approaching completion—"The Life of Abraham Lincoln."

Though he began without especial advantages, and though he has never been favored with robust health, there are few men who have made more of life than Mr. Nicolay. With little assistance from teachers he has acquired a knowledge of several languages; he has made himself thoroughly acquainted with all that is best worth knowing in English, French and German literature; he is an intelligent connoisseur of music, a lover of art, and something of an artist himself. He has an unusual comprehension of mechanical principles; has devised and patented numerous inventions, which he has never had the time or perhaps the inclination to turn to pecuniary advantage. He was, like Mr. Hay,—until the attention of both was monopolized by the exacting claims of their historical work,—a frequent and welcome contributor to the magazines in prose and verse, and is the author of the admirable volume with which Scribner & Company began their "Campaigns of the Civil War," and which at once took rank, by the unanimous verdict of intelligent critics, as one of the best of the series. It is called "The Outbreak of Rebellion," and contains the most accurate and valuable account yet printed of the events immediately preceding the war, and its opening scenes down to the battle of Bull Run. The hand

of a master may be recognized in a hurried sketch as well as in a finished picture, and this little book showed Mr. Nicolay to possess the indispensable qualifications of an historian,—calmness of temper, unflinching candor of statement, untiring industry in the collection and arrangement of facts, and unusual clearness and decision of judgment, entirely free from dogmatism or prejudice. His style is clear and graphic, with the ease and force which naturally flow from a definite purpose and a perfect comprehension of the subject in hand. He lives in a pleasant house of his own on Capitol Hill, with an only daughter, a student of art of the highest promise. Mrs. Nicolay recently died, deplored by the many who appreciated her winning and beautiful character, her strong trained intellect, and her active kindness and sympathy.

Hay's next diplomatic appointment after Vienna was secretary of legation at Madrid, where, to judge from the charming memorial of his stay, "Castilian Days," he found the Spanish character, and the all but unknown artistic and historic wealth under which Spain fairly groans, a fresher and more captivating field for his observation than northern Europe.

Hay's stay in Europe, from 1865 to 1870, was (as is plain to all who know him) a period of constant and devoted study. The intervals of duty were crammed full of observation and reading, not merely of art and letters, but of diplomacy and statesmanship. In our great cyclone he had stood by the side of the Captain with his hand on the shuddering wheel; what more natural than that he should watch with eager and critical eye the quaint old methods of navigation with which the dynastic admirals were manœuvring the cumbersome fleet of European nationalities. That he came back even a firmer Republican than he went is known to all his intimates.

That he had in common with the rest of his countrymen reduced his life from the strained pitch of war to the livable tones of every day was discernible from the spirit of the able leaders he wrote from 1871 to 1875 in the New York "Tribune," a series which reflected in scholarly finish and wide-world knowledge the ripe results of his years of European study.

It was at this period that, besides numerous contributions to the magazines, he published "Castilian Days" and "Pike County Ballads,"—the one a group of masterly pictures of a land and people with glory and greatness behind them; a land in the afternoon of life with the fading light of a declining history pouring back over heroes and armies, over castle wall and cathedral spire, glinting a single ray on the helmet of Don Quixote.



Drawn by J. W. Alexander.

Engraved by J. H. E. Whitney

JOHN HAY

touching the crumbling towers of the Visigoths, and falling mellow and full upon the inspired canvases of Velasquez and Murillo; the other a singing of the deeds of those rough, coarse demi-gods of Pike, a race as crude as if fashioned out of Mississippi River mud with a bowie knife, as archaic as Homer's Greeks, as shaggy and dangerous as their early ancestors of the Rhine on whom Cæsar put his iron heel.

Both pictures were true. Together they serve to show the range of perception of the writer.

The charm of "Castilian Days," beyond its diamondlike brilliancy, is the strength of Hay's critical attitude and the realist's habit of looking at things as they are, of justly distinguishing the truth. He says, in the delightful chapter on the "Cradle and Grave of Cervantes," "Having examined the evidence, we considered ourselves justly entitled to all the usual emotions in visiting the church of the parish, Santa Maria la Major." Jestingly said of himself, this is nevertheless characteristic of his insistence in getting at the realities of men and events.

This little book on Spain, so flowingly written, so full of wit and epigram, has passages of classic eloquence, like the burst of praise uttered before Murillo's Virgin in Madrid.

He should be ranked as a realist in the art of literature; and by that is not meant one who is contented with the visible actualities of men and nature, but who has imagination and poetic vision enough to truthfully discern those equally actual motives and tendencies which constitute the whole hidden framework of society. To be a realist in that sense is simply not to be driven from a normal, sound conception of the material and external facts of life, by the powerful current which surges through the channels of thought and feeling of all poetic natures. The greatest realist is he who can keep his feet always on the solid bottom while wading deepest into the foaming river of life, and such is Hay.

In 1879 Hay accepted the first assistant-secretaryship of state and discharged its duties to the end of the Hayes administration, in the mean time representing the United States at the International Sanitary Congress, of which he was elected President. Then, fulfilling a long-cherished intention, he declined the urgent invitation of Garfield and Blaine to remain in public life, and retired to devote himself to the life of Lincoln. It will hereafter appear that he did wisely, despite the regret of Garfield, and of Hay's fellow-citizens of Cleveland, who already looked upon him as a political leader. They naturally did not want to lose the man who had opened the

Garfield campaign with such solid argumentative shot. That they circulated hundred of thousands of copies of his speech had no effect in modifying his determination, and so to the library table he turned.

In all this long course of public labors, Hay has always rendered distinguished service, and has steadily gained in public estimation as a sound, evenly balanced, judicially minded man. This is a triumph for any one, most of all for a very bright man.

Few great men have been fortunate in their contemporary biographers. Even when they chose them themselves, as some of the Cæsars did, there is something in the attitude of court favorite and leader of a literary *claque* that begets triviality and servility, something in the passive pose of a mere observer that incapacitates from a living knowledge of the struggles and purposes of a high career.

To know the life of a contemporary, one must share it.

With the lapse of centuries, even of decades after death, difficulties in the way of writing a life increase almost as the square of the distance. Not merely a million details of the personal habits of the hero are forgotten, but so swift is the wheel of human change that men lose the power of realizing and appreciating the manners and spirit of a past epoch to such a degree that neither erudition nor patience can ever make up the loss.

Consider, for example, the difficulty of knowing a man like Hadrian, and how neither the dull biographies of his day nor the brilliant pages of Gregorovius can solve the enigmatical nature of the great artist emperor. It is clearly impossible to root out the *Zeitgeist* of the nineteenth century from one's brain and live one's self into the social and national current of another age. The very attitude of study is fatal; the very need of archæology means the death of that free, spontaneous sympathy which is a vital basis of knowledge.

Only to poets is it given to plunge their souls into the sensitizing solution of the imagination, to hold them up to the invisible actinic light of other days, and to develop a true picture of a forgotten age.

On the other hand, some time must elapse after the close of a great career before deeds and policies, characters and events, gain their true and permanent perspective. Even the greatest acts require time to justify themselves, the sycophants and maligners must hide their heads, the turbid waters of a great popular flood must subside to the mean level of national life and clarify themselves.

There comes a time when the life and epoch of a great man pass from the level of the present to a higher plane; when from the theater

ODE.

[Read at Symphony Hall, Boston, on the Eve of the Centenary of the Birth of Emerson, May 24,
1903.]

Not on slight errands come the Immortals;
Loud the alarm; they burst the portals,
 Bringing new ages,
 Saints, poets, sages;
 They rend, they trample;
 Their power is ample
To do great deeds and tasks unshared,
That only the single soul has ever dared.
 In them, and what they can,
 Is the greatness of man.

O City, set amid the bloom and brine
Of bowery summer by her Northern seas,
Sweet is thy azure morn, thy blowing breeze;
But deeper our lives with thee entwine;
And as young children at their mother's knees
Gaze on her face, such loveliness is thine;
For half their eyes behold, and half their hearts divine,
And their dropt lids adore the unseen throne;
 So has our boyhood known
The heavenly glory felt in greatness gone
That in its native fields long lingers on:
 Blest feet that walked thy ancient ways,
 And edged with light thy morning days;
 Forms that along thy ice-bound shore
 The sword and lamp in each hand bore;
 Who build one age, and hew the next,
 While Freedom hoards each gospel text.
Through lowly lives the frugal centuries roll
And each rude cradle holds a child of God;
Long generations nurse the new-born soul,
And show the shining track the Saviour trod.
 So from that first and famous race
Who smote the rock whence poured this stream of years,
Came forth the bloom of prayer and flower of grace
Whose incense sweeter in the sons appears.

O Mother-state, white with departing May,
A hundred Mays depart; this beauty aye
Streams from thy breasts, a thousand children owning
Whose lives are made the scriptures of thy youth,
And foremost he, whose prophet voice intoning
With pointing finger read God's primal truth.
From sire to son was stored the sacred seed;
Age piled on age to meet a nation's need;
 Till the high natal hour,
 Rounding to perfect power,
 On climbing centuries borne,
 Found genius' height sublime,

And set a star upon the front of time,
That spreads, as far as sunset flames, thy spiritual morn.

O boon, all other gifts above
That loads our veins with power, with love,
Joyful is birth wherever mothers are,
Since over Bethlehem stood the children's star!
Ever by that transcendent sign
The budding boy is born divine;
Infinity into his being flows
As if all nature flowered in one rose;
A million blooms suffuse the fragrant hills,
And, look! a manhood race our emerald valleys fills!

I see great cities stand,
Mothers of equal men,
Each leading by the hand
A multitude immense, sweet to command,
Her clinging broods; the tool, the book, the pen,
Letters and arts whereby a man may live,
To each child she doth give,
And with fraternity she binds all fast,
Honoring the spark of God; she cherisheth
The mighty flame to be her blood and breath,
And her immortal pinion over death;
For as these little ones shall fare, her fates are cast.

A manhood race! we are not children now,
Fronting the fates with knit imperial brow,—
Lords over Nature; fast her mystic reign
Fades in the finer mystery of the brain,
That now with intellect and will informs
Her clashing atoms and her wandering storms;
Deep in the sphere the mighty magic plies;
Darkness has fled from matter; from the skies
Space has departed; the invisible
Pestilence shivers in life's ultimate cell;
While continents divide like Egypt's sea,
And the still ocean-floors wonder what thought may be.
And better in the human strife
We labor blest, the lords of life,
Blending the many-nationed race
Where God through all mankind has poured the torrent of His grace.
Bright in our midst His Mercy-seat
Throngs with innumerable feet;
Nor hath He made their multitude complete;
And where the human storm terrific rears
Above the flying land,
One word the throne of heaven hears
That all tongues understand:
America, they whisper low
As down through flame and blood they go
To the pale ocean strand;
Nor once, nor twice, this rising coast appears

Beneath its heaven-streaming torch illumed,
 Man's ark of safety on the flood of years;
 There have we clothed them naked, and there fed

On Freedom's loaf, whose blessed bread,
 Forever multiplied and unconsumed,
 As if the Master's voice still in it spoke
 Our hands have to uncounted millions broke;
 There have we wiped away a whole world's tears.
 Wide as the gates of life, let stand our gates,
 Nor them deny whom God denied not birth;
 Nor, though we house all outcasts of the earth,
 Christ being within our city, fear the fates!

O birthright found the sweetest
 That in our blood began!

O manhood-faith found fleetest
 Of all the faiths of man!

We own the one great Mother
 Who first the man-child bore,
 And every man a brother

Who wears the form Christ wore.

Such mighty voices murmured round our youth,
 Souls dedicated to immortal toil;
 And, battle-bound, the fiery wings of truth
 Sublime swept past us o'er the sacred soil;
 So loud a morn was to our childhood given,
 And mixed with flashes out of heaven

Pealing words our spirits shook,
 And awful forms with superhuman look, —
 Our cradle-truths; so native to our lips,
 That like our mother tongue their thunder slips;
 We have no memory when it was not so.
 Wherefore we fear not, coming to our own;
 Men are we, greatness that our sons shall know
 Who us inherit; now we wield alone
 The glory; for the mighty ones lie low;

They are dead, brain and hand; they are dust, blood and bone.

I lay the singing laurel down
 Upon the silent grave;

'Tis vain; the master slumbers on
 Nor knows the gift he gave.

I take again the murmuring crown
 Whose life is here and now;

And every leaf sings Emerson;
 His music binds my brow.

For in this changeful mortal scene,
 Where all things mourn what once has been,
 Only the touch of soul with soul

At last escapes from death's control:

And from himself I learnt it, — the true singer
 Of his own heavens must be the bright star-bringer,
 And sphere of dawning lights his morning song;
 So shall his music to God's time belong.

Not to an age, thus did his orb,
 Though dark with earth, the eternal ray absorb
 And bright renew; he heard the wind-harp's strings,
 The cosmic pulse, the chemic dance,
 And saw through spirit-mating things
 Man's secular advance.

The song the sons of morning sang
 He found on Nature's lyre,
 And carols that angelic rang,
 Within the heart's desire;
 Thence he drew with burning palms
 Hymns and far millennial psalms;
 And, high o'er all, one strain no dark could daunt,
 With notes sublimely dominant,
 Sang victory, victory, victory unto man
 In whose fair soul victorious good began;
 The vision beautiful,
 The labor dutiful,
 Truth, the finder,
 Love, the binder;

And close about our mortal tasks the sacred faces came,
 Sweet faces pale beside our paler flame.
 He fed our souls with holy dew,
 Yet taught us by the line to hew,
 Shaping here the type ideal
 Our farthest years shall bright reveal
 In millions multiplied,
 Who shall swarm the green land o'er,
 The snow-clad and the golden shore,
 And dwell with beauty, side by side;
 A type to witness what the spirit can
 Amid its daily tasks,
 Even such a one as the pure gospel asks,
 The bravest lover of his kind, the man American.

And thou, O Fountain, whence we issued forth,
 Source of all kindly grace and noble worth,
 Who in our fathers poured so wide a flood,
 Leave not our temples, fail not from our blood;
 Even this that doth along my pulses fleet
 From the crown of my head to the soles of my feet,
 With all the American years made sweet,
 The sweetest blood that flows!

Make us to dwell secure where tempests are,
 And find in peace the mightiest arm of war;
 And if, past justice' bound, our foes increase,
 Make war the harbinger of larger peace;
 So in us shall the higher be found
 With palm and olive, equal trophies, crowned.
 Last for the soul make we our great appeal;
 There foster and confirm thy own ideal;
 Grant us self-conquest and self-sacrifice,
 Since only upon these may virtue rise.

George Edward Woodberry.

LINCOLN'S LITERARY EXPERIMENTS.

WITH A LECTURE AND VERSES HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED.



PERHAPS no point in the career of Abraham Lincoln has excited more surprise or comment than his remarkable power of literary expression. It is a constant puzzle to many men of letters how a person growing up without the advantage of schools and books could have acquired the art which enabled him to write the Gettysburg address and the second inaugural. At first view, indeed, the question appears to be an educational one; and when men who devote their days and nights to rules, theories, and text-books find themselves baffled in such an acquirement, they naturally wonder how a laboring frontiersman could have gained it.

Their main error, of course, consists in assuming that it is merely an educational problem. The prime factor in such phenomena always consists of natural gifts — of the element we call genius. It is not because of their condition and surroundings, but in spite of them, that individuals occasionally manifest and develop these exceptional qualities. We find no such manifestations or results in the lives of the relatives, neighbors, or companions of Abraham Lincoln, who grew up with and about him in the woods and the cabins of Kentucky and Indiana, and who shared alike his experiences, his privations, and his opportunities, but were without his natural ability. This view, however, does not lessen our curiosity and interest in his educational processes.

We cannot better show his educational beginnings than by quoting his own statement made in two brief autobiographical sketches. In the first, written in December, 1859, he says:

My father, at the death of his father, was but six years of age, and he grew up literally without education. He removed from Kentucky to what is now Spencer County, Indiana, in my eighth year. We reached our new home about the time the State came into the Union. It was a wild region, with many bears and other wild animals still in the woods. There I grew up. There were some schools, so called, but no qualification was ever required of a teacher beyond "readin', writin', and cipherin'" to the rule of three. If a straggler supposed to understand Latin happened to sojourn in the neighborhood, he was looked upon as a wizard. There was absolutely nothing to excite ambition for education. Of course, when I came of age I did not know much. Still, somehow, I could read, write, and cipher to the rule of three.

Again, in a sketch written immediately after his first nomination for President, to be used as material for a campaign biography, his boyhood is thus spoken of:

Before leaving Kentucky, he and his sister were sent for short periods to A B C schools, the first kept by Zachariah Riney, and the second by Caleb Hazel. . . . His father's residence continued at the same place in Indiana till 1830. While here, Abraham went to A B C schools by litters, kept successively by Andrew Crawford, — Sweeny, and Azel W. Dorsey. He does not remember any other. The family of Mr. Dorsey now resides in Schuyler County, Illinois. Abraham now thinks that the aggregate of all his schooling did not amount to one year. He was never in a college or academy as a student, and never inside of a college or academy building till since he had a law license. What he has in the way of education he has picked up. After he was twenty-three and had separated from his father, he studied English grammar — imperfectly, of course, but so as to speak and write as well as he now does. He studied and nearly mastered the six books of Euclid since he was a member of Congress.

In these extracts Lincoln gives us certainly not the full picture, but at least a vivid suggestion of the early influences acting upon his intellectual development — his isolation in childhood and boyhood; the personal privations under which he grew up; the ignorance and mental poverty of his parents, companions, and neighbors; the rudeness of the manners amid which he lived; the absence of example and emulation to prompt him to study and improvement; the lamentable insufficiency of tuition which came to him from the two or three school-masters competent to give only the most primary instruction; the scarcity of books, and their elementary contents, — always excepting the Bible, — which could fall into his hands.

These conditions, which followed him from his birth until he attained his majority, impressed upon him certain characteristics that never afterward left him, — a certain plainness of manner, of thought, and of speech, differentiating him in a marked and unmistakable degree from the boy and youth who, during the same period, had grown up in comfort and plenty, in schools and colleges, in intelligent society and social refinement, — forming a striking contrast between the man of the frontier and the man of the city.

Yet these disadvantages, which were destructive clogs to sluggish or ordinary intellects,

brought some compensations to a quick and energetic mind. Though the range of ideas and experiences was narrow, and confined to the routine of farm work, hunting, and neighborhood merrymaking, though thought and speech were simple, they were at least clear and direct. Though the vocabulary was scanty, the words were short and forcible. If one inquired after the health of an ailing neighbor, and received for answer that he felt "mighty weak," the faulty construction was somewhat mitigated by the intended vigor of the statement. Most valuable of all was the aid these experiences afforded in the judgment of human nature. If Lincoln, when a barefoot country boy, or after he had grown to the stature and strength of a backwoods rail-splitter, was ever prompted to imagine the feelings and actions of a practising lawyer, or a member of Congress, or a President of the United States, when he in turn became a practising lawyer, a member of Congress, and a President of the United States, he never had need to imagine the feelings and actions of barefoot boys, or of stalwart rail-splitters, or of the plain people of the nation: he knew them by heart.

These were the influences from without. The influences from within — the natural forces of character — were, that without the stimulus of example and emulation he applied himself, with marked diligence and persistent ambition, to mastering the lessons he received; that he read, wrote, and ciphered under difficulties and discouragements which other boys failed to overcome; that even in his boyish days he put his hard-gained knowledge to practical, if not the most commendable, service in neighborhood discussions and debates, in writing copy-book essays, doggerel rhymes and satires, in now and then mounting a lonely stump and making a mock harangue to nodding corn-rows and the stolid pumpkins that lay between them. There is no record of these boyish pranks, but they can be readily imagined by all who are familiar with frontier life. There is no escape from the conclusion that his self-education must have employed these, the only available means for improvement.

His father's emigration from Indiana to Illinois occurred in 1830. The first six months of the year 1831 were taken up by flat-boat building and by his trip to New Orleans. He did not begin life at New Salem until August of that year, and the following winter was scarcely over when he made up his mind to become a candidate for the legislature from Sangamon County.

His first political address or circular is dated March 9, 1832, and was printed in the "Sangamon Journal" of March 15. As there had been neither time nor opportunity for school-

ing in any form since his arrival in Illinois, this written address gives us the measure of the intellectual development he must have brought with him from Indiana. It is an earnest, well-arranged, and clearly expressed statement of his political views, discussing not merely the improvement of the Sangamon River, which was the local political hobby, but also railroads, usury, education, and the amendment of several specific statutes. As a literary production, no ordinary college graduate would need to be ashamed of it; as the program of an embryo legislator, it was probably fully up to the average of the best-educated of his competitors. The evidence is unmistakable that when he came of age he already possessed acquirements far beyond the mere ability to "read, write, and cipher to the rule of three."

The educational experiences of what may be called his second period, beginning with this first political venture in March, 1832, and extending to the end of his term in Congress in 1849, a period of seventeen years, partake of this same twofold character, the concurrent result of influences from without and influences from within. The influences from without consisted in his active participation in practical politics — party consultation or caucusing, personal electioneering, and political discussion on the stump; such elementary statesmanship as he could learn during eight years of membership in the State legislature, and two years of membership in Congress; such a study of the principles of law as was necessary to obtain an attorney's license; and such an examination and criticism of statutes as occurred in his consequent law-practice before local courts. Perhaps the most powerful outside influence was the change in his social status: he had moved from New Salem to Springfield, and had been thrown into the companionship and rivalry of a group of young men as talented, brilliant, and ambitious as ever graced the history of a State capital.

But even these outside influences now produced a twofold effect: all this while the conditions surrounding him kept him in close contact and association with the "plain people," with primitive pioneer life. Social intercourse, argument before a court, debate on the stump or legislative discussion with Douglas, Stuart, Logan, Browning, Baker, Hardin, Trumbull, Calhoun, McDougal, and others extended his knowledge, sharpened his wit, and improved his oratory; but when he went to the cabins of the settlers to solicit their votes, or when as surveyor he located their roads and ran out their farm lines, the simple modes of thought and strong rural phraseology he had learned as boy and youth were renewed and deepened, and the tendency to express ex-

travagant ideas in high-sounding words were repressed and chastened. And this was not alone the exercise of good judgment, but a measure of immediate utility. In the beginnings of his political career he had no fame to collect great audiences, such as listened to the Lincoln-Douglas debates or his Cooper Institute speech. The aspiring local candidate of those days was lucky if he found a gathering of twenty or thirty settlers at a shooting-match, a raising, or other neighborhood occasion, to whom he could propose his reforms in State legislation, or his national views on tariff and internal improvement. Sometimes it was an evening meeting assembled in a district log school-house, lighted by two or three tallow candles, with an audience of ten or fifteen persons. Only those who have been through experiences of this kind can appreciate the chilling effect of such surroundings upon oratorical enthusiasm. Here the speaker needed all his epigrams and anecdotes to dissipate the expectant gravity, the staring solemnity, of his auditors in the ghostly half-light inside and the dismal darkness and loneliness outside the little cabin. These talks were uncongenial soil for rhetoric and literary style. They needed to be seasoned with pithy argument and witty illustration, and rendered in a vocabulary that had the flavor of the cabin and the energy of the frontier. It was this kind of training in Lincoln's art which not only helped him to four successive elections to the legislature, but became to a certain degree ingrained in his literary development; for its better and higher effects are distinctly traceable in the most successful writings and utterances of his later life.

Stump-speeches, debates in the State legislature, and arguments before juries, were, in the very nature of things, always extemporaneous during his earlier days. While this practice taught him confidence and expedients in discussion, it subjected him to the danger of becoming wordy and prolix. At that period strong temptation toward this defect lay in the prevailing fashion of "spread-eagle" oratory, and in one of Mr. Lincoln's printed speeches there is a slight taint of the pernicious habit. But he quickly realized the danger, and overcame the temptation. In his later years he used to repeat with great glee and appreciation the picturesque description of the Southwestern orator of whom it was said, "He mounted the rostrum, threw back his head, shined his eyes, opened his mouth, and left the consequences to God."

With the exception of arguments addressed to juries, the law furnished him one of the strongest safeguards against rambling thought and redundant speech. The text-books of that

science afford no encouragement to the misuse of words or logic. Their formulas of legal principles are nearly as cold and rigid as the multiplication table. To these we may confidently trace Lincoln's strong tendency to definitions and axioms in his political discussions; while from the briefs and declarations he was compelled to write he gained invaluable habits of brevity and conciseness.

It is a popular and suggestive, if not entirely correct, saying that only three books are needed to make up a sufficient library—that in the Bible, Blackstone, and Shakspeare, a man may find all that is best in philosophy, law, and literature. It is certain that Lincoln worked with industry in these great intellectual quarries, and the solidity and grace that they gave to his temple of fame are plainly discernible.

If he had been a man possessing merely an average intellect, his literary and political growth would have been limited as well as fashioned by the outside influences which have been mentioned. He would have become a shrewd and successful jury lawyer, and a valuable "rabble-rousing" party lieutenant with a local fame. But all this time the influences within himself were as active and fruitful as the exterior ones. His ambition, however much hampered by the want of school training or by primitive surroundings, always prompted him to seek a better mode of expression, as well as finer thought.

The same genius, industry, and perseverance which enabled him to extract so much benefit from the poor A B C schools of Kentucky and Indiana now served him to turn to good account the practical schooling afforded by active politics and miscellaneous law practice before justices of the peace, and the circuit courts which he and the young lawyers and politicians of his coterie followed from county to county. The remarkable thing was that while nature and opportunity gave him talent and great success at story-telling and extemporaneous talking, he learned to write—learned to appreciate the value of the pen as an instrument to formulate and record his thought, and the more clearly, forcibly, and elegantly to express it.

Doubtless he made slow progress. Without books, without teachers, without a "literary" atmosphere to excite emulation, his efforts were probably only secondary—only incidental to the more engrossing occupations of law and politics. The list of his writings of this class is not large, and yet it is enough to create the inference that much similar labor must have gone to waste. In 1837 he wrote, delivered, and printed a lecture on "The Perpetuation of our Free Institutions." In 1839 he wrote out and printed a speech that he made

in one of the political debates with which the young men of Springfield enlivened their winters. In 1842 he wrote and printed a "Washingtonian" temperance address. All his longer speeches in Congress were prepared with great care, both as to argument and handwriting; and when his political idol, Henry Clay, died in 1852, he delivered and printed a long and able eulogy on his life and character.

It will thus be seen that in the course of his self-education, Lincoln from time to time engaged in composition as an art. As a further illustration of this practice, a few specimens are here for the first time printed of what may be appropriately classed as his "literary experiments." While they call for no special admiration on account of intrinsic merit, they are of exceeding interest as stepping-stones to the attainment of that literary style and power which, in his later speeches and writings, have elicited the enthusiasm of the best scholars and critics.

TREMONT, April 18, 1846.

FRIEND JOHNSTON: Your letter, written some six weeks since, was received in due course, and also the paper with the parody. It is true, as suggested it might be, that I have never seen Poe's "Raven"; and I very well know that a parody is almost entirely dependent for its interest upon the reader's acquaintance with the original. Still there is enough in the polecat, self-considered, to afford one several hearty laughs. I think four or five of the last stanzas are decidedly funny, particularly where Jeremiah "scrubbed and washed, and prayed and fasted."

I have not your letter now before me; but, from memory, I think you ask me who is the author of the piece I sent you, and that you do so ask as to indicate a slight suspicion that I myself am the author. Beyond all question, I am not the author. I would give all I am worth, and go in debt, to be able to write so fine a piece as I think that is. Neither do I know who is the author. I met it in a straggling form in a newspaper last summer, and I remember to have seen it once before, about fifteen years ago, and this is all I know about it.

The piece of poetry of my own which I alluded to, I was led to write under the following circumstances. In the fall of 1844, thinking I might aid some to carry the State of Indiana for Mr. Clay, I went into the neighborhood in that State in which I was raised, where my mother and only sister were buried, and from which I had been absent about fifteen years.

That part of the country is, within itself, as unpoetical as any spot of the earth; but still, seeing it and its objects and inhabitants aroused feelings in me which were certainly poetry; though whether my expression of those feelings is poetry is quite another question. When I got to writing, the change of subject divided the thing into four little divisions or cantos, the first only of which I send you now, and may send the others hereafter.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

My childhood's home I see again,
And sadden with the view;
And still, as memory crowds my brain,
There 's pleasure in it too.

O Memory! thou midway world
'Twixt earth and paradise,
Where things decayed and loved ones lost
In dreamy shadows rise,

And, freed from all that 's earthly vile,
Seem hallowed, pure and bright,
Like scenes in some enchanted isle
All bathed in liquid light.

As dusky mountains please the eye
When twilight chases day;
As bugle-notes that, passing by,
In distance die away;

As leaving some grand waterfall,
We, lingering, list its roar—
So memory will hallow all
We 've known but know no more.

Near twenty years have passed away
Since here I bid farewell
To woods and fields, and scenes of play,
And playmates loved so well.

Where many were, but few remain
Of old familiar things;
But seeing them to mind again
The lost and absent brings.

The friends I left that parting day,
How changed, as time has sped!
Young childhood grown, strong manhood gray;
And half of all are dead.

I hear the loved survivors tell
How nought from death could save,
Till every sound appears a knell,
And every spot a grave.

I range the fields with pensive tread,
And pace the hollow rooms,
And feel (companion of the dead)
I 'm living in the tombs.

SPRINGFIELD, September 6, 1846.

FRIEND JOHNSTON: You remember when I wrote you from Tremont last spring, sending you a little canto of what I called poetry, I promised to bore you with another some time. I now fulfil the promise. The subject of the present one is an insane man; his name is Matthew Gentry. He is three years older than I, and when we were boys we went to school together. He was rather a bright lad, and the son of the rich man of a very poor neighborhood. At the age of nineteen he unaccountably became furiously mad, from which condition he gradually settled down into harmless insanity. When, as I told you in my other letter, I visited my old home in the fall of 1844, I found him still lingering in this wretched condition. In my poetizing mood, I could not forget the impression his case made upon me. Here is the result:

But here 's an object more of dread
 Than aught the grave contains —
 A human form with reason fled,
 While wretched life remains.

When terror spread, and neighbors ran
 Your dangerous strength to bind,
 And soon, a howling, crazy man,
 Your limbs were fast confined;

How then you strove and shrieked aloud,
 Your bones and sinews bared;
 And fiendish on the gazing crowd
 With burning eyeballs glared;

And begged and swore, and wept and prayed,
 With maniac laughter joined;
 How fearful were these signs displayed
 By pangs that killed the mind!

And when at length the drear and long
 Time soothed thy fiercer woes,
 How plaintively thy mournful song
 Upon the still night rose!

I've heard it oft as if I dreamed,
 Far distant, sweet and lone,
 The funeral dirge it ever seemed
 Of reason dead and gone.

To drink its strains I've stole away,
 All stealthily and still,
 Ere yet the rising god of day
 Had streaked the eastern hill.

Air held her breath; trees with the spell
 Seemed sorrowing angels round,
 Whose swelling tears in dewdrops fell
 Upon the listening ground.

But this is past, and naught remains
 That raised thee o'er the brute:
 Thy piercing shrieks and soothing strains
 Are like, forever mute.

Now fare thee well! More thou the cause
 Than subject now of woe.
 All mental pangs by time's kind laws
 Hast lost the power to know.

O death! thou awe-inspiring prince
 That keptst the world in fear,
 Why dost thou tear more blest ones hence,
 And leave him lingering here?

If I should ever send another, the subject will be
 a "Bear Hunt." Yours as ever,

A. LINCOLN.

FRAGMENT: NOTES FOR A LECTURE.

NIAGARA FALLS! By what mysterious power is it that millions and millions are drawn from all parts of the world to gaze upon Niagara Falls? There is no mystery about the thing itself. Every effect is just as any intelligent man, knowing the causes, would anticipate without seeing it. If the water, moving onward in a great river, reaches a

point where there is a perpendicular jog of a hundred feet in descent in the bottom of the river, it is plain the water will have a violent and continuous plunge at that point. It is also plain, the water, thus plunging, will foam, and roar, and send up a mist continuously, in which last, during sunshine, there will be perpetual rainbows. The mere physical of Niagara Falls is only this.

Yet this is really a very small part of that world's wonder. Its power to excite reflection and emotion is its great charm. The geologist will demonstrate that the plunge, or fall, was once at Lake Ontario, and has worn its way back to its present position; he will ascertain how fast it is wearing now, and so get a basis for determining how long it has been wearing back from Lake Ontario, and finally demonstrate by it that this world is at least fourteen thousand years old. A philosopher of a slightly different turn will say, "Niagara Falls is only the lip of the basin out of which pours all the surplus water which rains down on two or three hundred thousand square miles of the earth's surface." He will estimate with approximate accuracy that five hundred thousand tons of water fall with their full weight a distance of a hundred feet each minute — thus exerting a force equal to the lifting of the same weight, through the same space, in the same time. And then the further reflection comes that this vast amount of water, constantly pounding down, is supplied by an equal amount constantly lifted up by the sun; and still he says, "If this much is lifted up for this one space of two or three hundred thousand square miles, an equal amount must be lifted up for every other equal space"; and he is overwhelmed in the contemplation of the vast power the sun is constantly exerting in the quiet noiseless operation of lifting water up to be rained down again.

But still there is more. It calls up the indefinite past. When Columbus first sought this continent — when Christ suffered on the cross — when Moses led Israel through the Red Sea — nay, even when Adam first came from the hand of his Maker: then, as now, Niagara was roaring here. The eyes of that species of extinct giants whose bones fill the mounds of America have gazed on Niagara as ours do now. Contemporary with the first race of men, and older than the first man, Niagara is strong and fresh to-day as ten thousand years ago. The mammoth and mastodon, so long dead that fragments of their monstrous bones alone testify that they ever lived, have gazed on Niagara — in that long, long time, never still for a single moment [never dried], never froze, never slept, never rested.

FRAGMENT: NOTES FOR LAW LECTURE.

I AM not an accomplished lawyer. I find quite as much material for a lecture in those points wherein I have failed, as in those wherein I have been moderately successful. The leading rule for the lawyer, as for the man of every other calling, is diligence. Leave nothing for to-morrow which can be done to-day. Never let your correspondence fall behind. Whatever piece of business you have in hand, before stopping, do all the labor pertaining to it which can be done. When you bring a common-law suit, if you have the

facts for doing so, write the declaration at once. If a law point be involved, examine the books, and note the authority you rely on, upon the declaration, itself, where you are sure to find it when wanted. The same of defenses and pleas. In business not likely to be litigated — ordinary collection cases, foreclosures, partitions, and the like — make all examinations of titles, and note them, and even draft orders and decrees in advance. This course has a triple advantage; it avoids omissions and neglect, saves your labor when once done, performs the labor out of court when you have leisure, rather than in court when you have not. Extemporaneous speaking should be practised and cultivated. It is the lawyer's avenue to the public. However able and faithful he may be in other respects, people are slow to bring him business if he cannot make a speech. And yet there is not a more fatal error to young lawyers than relying too much on speech-making. If any one, upon his rare powers of speaking, shall claim an exemption from the drudgery of the law, his case is a failure in advance.

Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser — in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There will still be business enough.

Never stir up litigation. A worse man can scarcely be found than one who does this. Who can be more nearly a fiend than he who habitually overhauls the register of deeds in search of defects in titles, whereon to stir up strife, and put money in his pocket? A moral tone ought to be infused into the profession which should drive such men out of it.

The matter of fees is important — far beyond the mere question of bread and butter involved. Properly attended to, fuller justice is done to both lawyer and client. An exorbitant fee should never be claimed. As a general rule never take your whole fee in advance, nor any more than a small retainer. When fully paid beforehand, you are more than a common mortal if you can feel the same interest in the case as if something was still in prospect for you as well as for your client. And when you lack interest in the case, the job will very likely lack skill and diligence in the performance. Settle the amount of fee and take a note in advance. Then you will feel that you are working for something, and you are sure to do your work faithfully and well. Never sell a fee note — at least not before the consideration service is performed. It leads to negligence and dishonesty — negligence by losing interest in the case, and dishonesty in refusing to refund when you have allowed the consideration to fail.

There is a vague popular belief that lawyers are necessarily dishonest. I say vague, because when we consider to what extent confidence and honors are reposed in and conferred upon lawyers by the people, it appears improbable that their impression of dishonesty is very distinct and vivid. Yet the impression is common, almost universal. Let no young man choosing the law for a calling for a moment yield to the popular belief — resolve to be honest at all events; and if in your own judg-

ment you cannot be an honest lawyer, resolve to be honest without being a lawyer. Choose some other occupation, rather than one in the choosing of which you do, in advance, consent to be a knave.

LECTURE ON "DISCOVERIES, INVENTIONS, AND IMPROVEMENTS," DELIVERED IN NEIGHBORING TOWNS IN 1859, AND BEFORE THE SPRINGFIELD LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, February 22, 1860.

From an autograph manuscript in the Lincoln collection of Charles F. Gunther, Esq., Chicago, Illinois.

WE have all heard of Young America. He is the most current youth of the age. Some think him conceited and arrogant; but has he not reason to entertain a rather extensive opinion of himself? Is he not the inventor and owner of the present, and sole hope of the future? Men and things everywhere are ministering unto him. Look at his apparel, and you shall see cotton fabrics from Manchester and Lowell; flax linen from Ireland; wool cloth from Spain; silk from France; furs from the Arctic region; with a buffalo-robe from the Rocky Mountains as a general outsider. At his table, besides plain bread and meat made at home, are sugar from Louisiana; coffee and fruits from the tropics; salt from Turk's Island; fish from Newfoundland; tea from China; and spices from the Indies. The whale of the Pacific furnishes his candle-light; he has a diamond ring from Brazil, a gold watch from California, and a Spanish cigar from Havana. He not only has a present supply of all these, and much more, but thousands of hands are engaged in producing fresh supplies, and other thousands in bringing them to him. The iron horse is panting and impatient to carry him everywhere in no time; and the lightning stands ready harnessed to take and bring his tidings in a trifle less than no time. He owns a large part of the world by right of possessing it, and all the rest by right of wanting it, and intending to have it. As Plato had for the immortality of the soul, so Young America has "a pleasing hope, a fond desire — a longing after" territory. He has a great passion — a perfect rage — for the "new"; particularly new men for office, and the new earth mentioned in the Revelations, in which, being no more sea, there must be about three times as much land as in the present. He is a great friend of humanity; and his desire for land is not selfish, but merely an impulse to extend the area of freedom. He is very anxious to fight for the liberation of enslaved nations and colonies, provided, always, they have land, and have not any liking for his interference. As to those who have no land, and would be glad of help from any quarter, he considers they can afford to wait a few hundred years longer. In knowledge he is particularly rich. He knows all that can possibly be known; inclines to believe in spiritual rappings, and is the unquestioned inventor of "Manifest Destiny." His horror is for all that is old, particularly "Old Fogy"; and if there be anything old which he can endure, it is only old whisky and old tobacco.

If the said Young America really is, as he claims

to be, the owner of all present, it must be admitted that he has considerable advantage of Old Foggy. Take, for instance, the first of all fogies, Father Adam. There he stood, a very perfect physical man, as poets and painters inform us; but he must have been very ignorant, and simple in his habits. He had had no sufficient time to learn much by observation, and he had no near neighbors to teach him anything. No part of his breakfast had been brought from the other side of the world; and it is quite probable he had no conception of the world having any other side. In all these things, it is very plain, he was no equal of Young America; the most that can be said is, that according to his chance he may have been quite as much of a man as his very self-complacent descendant. Little as was what he knew, let the youngster discard all he has learned from others, and then show, if he can, any advantage on his side. In the way of land and live stock, Adam was quite in the ascendant. He had dominion over all the earth, and all the living things upon and round about it. The land has been sadly divided out since; but never fret, Young America will re-annex it.

The great difference between Young America and Old Foggy is the result of discoveries, inventions, and improvements. These, in turn, are the result of observation, reflection, and experiment. For instance, it is quite certain that ever since water has been boiled in covered vessels, men have seen the lids of the vessels rise and fall a little, with a sort of fluttering motion, by force of the steam; but so long as this was not specially observed, and reflected, and experimented upon, it came to nothing. At length, however, after many thousand years, some man observes this long-known effect of hot water lifting a pot-lid, and begins a train of reflection upon it. He says, "Why, to be sure, the force that lifts the pot-lid will lift anything else which is no heavier than the pot-lid. And as man has much hard fighting to do, cannot this hot-water power be made to help him?" He has become a little excited on the subject, and he fancies he hears a voice answering "Try me." He does try it; and the observation, reflection, and trial give to the world the control of that tremendous and now well-known agent called steam-power. This is not the actual history in detail, but the general principle.

But was this first inventor of the application of steam wiser or more ingenious than those who had gone before him? Not at all. Had he not learned much of those, he never would have succeeded, probably never would have thought of making the attempt. To be fruitful in invention, it is indispensable to have a habit of observation and reflection; and this habit our steam friend acquired, no doubt, from those who, to him, were Old Fogies. But for the difference in habit of observation, why did Yankees almost instantly discover gold in California, which had been trodden upon and overlooked by Indians and Mexican greasers for centuries? Gold-mines are not the only mines overlooked in the same way. There are more mines above the earth's surface than below it. All nature—the whole world, material, moral, and intellectual—is a mine; and in Adam's

day it was a wholly unexplored mine. Now, it was the destined work of Adam's race to develop, by discoveries, inventions, and improvements, the hidden treasures of this mine. But Adam had nothing to turn his attention to the work. If he should do anything in the way of inventions, he had first to invent the art of invention, the instance, at least, if not the habit, of observation and reflection. As might be expected, he seems not to have been a very observing man at first; for it appears he went about naked a considerable length of time before he ever noticed that obvious fact. But when he did observe it, the observation was not lost upon him; for it immediately led to the first of all inventions of which we have any direct account—the fig-leaf apron.

The inclination to exchange thoughts with one another is probably an original impulse of our nature. If I be in pain, I wish to let you know it, and to ask your sympathy and assistance; and my pleasurable emotions also I wish to communicate to and share with you. But to carry on such communications, some instrumentality is indispensable. Accordingly, speech—articulate sounds rattled off from the tongue—was used by our first parents, and even by Adam before the creation of Eve. He gave names to the animals while she was still a bone in his side; and he broke out quite volubly when she first stood before him, the best present of his Maker.

From this it would appear that speech was not an invention of man, but rather the direct gift of his Creator. But whether divine gift or invention, it is still plain that if a mode of communication had been left to invention, speech must have been the first from the superior adaptation to the end, of the organs of speech, over every other means within the whole range of nature. Of the organs of speech the tongue is the principal; and if we shall test it, we shall find the capacities of the tongue in the utterance of articulate sounds absolutely wonderful. You can count from one to one hundred quite distinctly in about forty seconds. In doing this, two hundred and eighty-three distinct sounds or syllables are uttered, being seven to each second, and yet there should be enough difference between every two to be easily recognized by the ear of the hearer. What other signs to represent things could possibly be produced so rapidly? Or even if ready-made, could be arranged so rapidly to express the sense? Motions with the hands are no adequate substitute. Marks for the recognition of the eye—writing—although a wonderful auxiliary of speech, is no worthy substitute for it. In addition to the more slow and laborious process of getting up a communication in writing, the materials—pen, ink, and paper—are not always at hand. But one always has his tongue with him, and the breath of his life is the ever-ready material with which it works.

Speech, then, by enabling different individuals to interchange thoughts, and thereby to combine their powers of observation and reflection, greatly facilitates useful discoveries and inventions. What one observes, and would himself infer nothing from, he tells to another, and that other at once sees a valuable hint in it. A result is thus reached

which neither alone would have arrived at. And this reminds me of what I passed unnoticed before: that the very first invention was a joint operation. Eve having shared with Adam the getting up of the apron. And, indeed, judging from the fact that sewing has come down to our times as "woman's work," it is very probable she took the leading part, he, perhaps, doing no more than to stand by and thread the needle. That proceeding may be reckoned as the mother of all "sewing-societies," and the first and perfect "World's Fair," all inventions and all inventors then in the world being on the spot.

But speech alone, valuable as it ever has been and is, has not advanced the condition of the world much. This is abundantly evident when we look at the degraded condition of all those tribes of human creatures who have no additional means of communicating thoughts. Writing, the art of communicating thoughts to the mind through the eye, is the great invention of the world. Great is the astonishing range of analysis and combination which necessarily underlies the most crude and general conception of it — great, very great, in enabling us to converse with the dead, the absent, and the unborn, at all distances of time and space; and great, not only in its direct benefits, but greatest help to all other inventions. Suppose the art, with all conceptions of it, were this day lost to the world, how long, think you, would it be before Young America could get up the letter A with any adequate notion of using it to advantage? The precise period at which writing was invented is not known, but it certainly was as early as the time of Moses; from which we may safely infer that its inventors were very Old Fogies.

Webster, at the time of writing his dictionary, speaks of the English language as then consisting of seventy or eighty thousand words. If so, the language in which the five books of Moses were written must at that time, now thirty-three or four hundred years ago, have consisted of at least one quarter as many, or twenty thousand. When we remember that words are sounds merely, we shall conclude that the idea of representing those sounds by marks, so that whoever should at any time after see the marks, would understand what sounds they meant, was a bold and ingenious conception, not likely to occur to one man in a million in the run of a thousand years. And when it did occur, a distinct mark for each word, giving twenty thousand different marks first to be learned, and afterward to be remembered, would follow as the second thought, and would present such a difficulty as would lead to the conclusion that the whole thing was impracticable.

But the necessity still would exist; and we may readily suppose that the idea was conceived, and lost, and reproduced, and dropped, and taken up again and again, until at last the thought of dividing sounds into parts, and making a mark, not to represent a whole sound, but only a part of one, and then of combining those marks, not very many in number, upon principles of permutation, so as to represent any and all of the whole twenty thousand words, and even any additional number, was somehow conceived and pushed into practice. This was the invention of phonetic writing, as distin-

guished from the clumsy picture-writing of some of the nations. That it was difficult of conception and execution is apparent, as well by the foregoing reflection as the fact that so many tribes of men have come down from Adam's time to our own without ever having possessed it. Its utility may be conceived by the reflection that to it we owe everything which distinguishes us from savages. Take it from us, and the Bible, all history, all science, all government, all commerce, and nearly all social intercourse, go with it.

The great activity of the tongue in articulating sounds has already been mentioned; and it may be of some passing interest to notice the wonderful power of the eye in conveying ideas to the mind from writing. Take the same example of the numbers from one to one hundred written down, and you can run your eye over the list, and be assured that every number is in it, in about one half the time it would require to pronounce the words with the voice; and not only so, but you can in the same short time determine whether every word is spelled correctly, by which it is evident that every separate letter, amounting to eight hundred and sixty-four, has been recognized and reported to the mind within the incredibly short space of twenty seconds, or one third of a minute.

I have already intimated my opinion that in the world's history certain inventions and discoveries occurred of peculiar value, on account of their great efficiency in facilitating all other inventions and discoveries. Of these were the arts of writing and of printing, the discovery of America, and the introduction of patent laws. The date of the first, as already stated, is unknown; but it certainly was as much as fifteen hundred years before the Christian era; the second — printing — came in 1436, or nearly three thousand years after the first. The others followed more rapidly — the discovery of America in 1492, and the first patent laws in 1624. Though not apposite to my present purpose, it is but justice to the fruitfulness of that period to mention two other important events — the Lutheran Reformation in 1517, and, still earlier, the invention of negroes, or of the present mode of using them, in 1434. But to return to the consideration of printing, it is plain that it is but the other half, and in reality the better half, of writing; and that both together are but the assistants of speech in the communication of thoughts between man and man. When man was possessed of speech alone, the chances of invention, discovery, and improvement were very limited; but by the introduction of each of these they were greatly multiplied. When writing was invented, any important observation likely to lead to a discovery had at least a chance of being written down, and consequently a little chance of never being forgotten, and of being seen and reflected upon by a much greater number of persons; and thereby the chances of a valuable hint being caught proportionately augmented. By this means the observation of a single individual might lead to an important invention years, and even centuries, after he was dead. In one word, by means of writing the seeds of invention were more permanently preserved and more widely sown. And yet for three thousand years during

which printing remained undiscovered after writing was in use, it was only a small portion of the people who could write, or read writing; and consequently the field of invention, though much extended, still continued very limited. At length printing came. It gave ten thousand copies of any written matter quite as cheaply as ten were given before; and consequently a thousand minds were brought into the field where there was but one before. This was a great gain—and history shows a great change corresponding to it—in point of time.

I will venture to consider it the true termination of that period called "the dark ages." Discoveries, inventions, and improvements followed rapidly, and have been increasing their rapidity ever since. The effects could not come all at once. It required time to bring them out; and they are still coming. The capacity to read could not be multiplied as fast as the means of reading. Spelling-books just began to go into the hands of the children, but the teachers were not very numerous or very competent, so that it is safe to infer they did not advance so speedily as they do nowadays. It is very probable—almost certain—that the great mass of men at that time were utterly unconscious that their condition or their minds were capable of improvement. They not only looked upon the educated few as superior beings, but they supposed themselves to be naturally incapable of rising to equality.

To emancipate the mind from this false underestimate of itself is the great task which printing came into the world to perform. It is difficult for us now and here to conceive how strong this slavery of the mind was, and how long it did of necessity take to break its shackles, and to get a habit of freedom of thought established.

It is, in this connection, a curious fact that a new country is most favorable—almost necessary—to the emancipation of thought, and the consequent advancement of civilization and the arts. The human family originated, as is thought, somewhere in Asia, and have worked their way principally westward. Just now, in civilization and the arts the people of Asia are entirely behind those of Europe; those of the east of Europe behind those of the west of it; while we, here in America, think we discover, and invent, and improve, faster than any of them. They may think this is arrogance; but they cannot deny that Russia has called on us to show her how to build steamboats and railroads, while in the older parts of Asia they scarcely know that such things as steamboats and railroads exist.

In anciently inhabited countries, the dust of ages—a real, downright old-fogyism—seems to settle upon and smother the intellects and energies of man. It is in this view that I have mentioned the discovery of America as an event greatly favoring and facilitating useful discoveries and inventions. Next came the patent laws. These began in England in 1624, and in this country with the adoption of our Constitution. Before then any man [might] instantly use what another man had invented, so that the inventor had no special advantage from his invention. The patent system changed this, secured to the

inventor for a limited time exclusive use of his inventions, and thereby added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius in the discovery and production of new and useful things.

It would obviously be unjust to devote any serious criticism to the foregoing quotations from Mr. Lincoln's miscellaneous writings. They must be regarded in the light of mere recreation to satisfy the craving for a change from the monotony of law and politics. In the United States, where the extended circulation of newspapers stimulates not alone the habit of reading, but also the taste for writing, and affords abundant opportunity to gratify it, even versification becomes contagious. Could we know all the biographical secrets of our great names in statesmanship and jurisprudence, we should doubtless be surprised at the quantity of rhyme attempted or perpetrated by them at some period in their lives. As it is, we have many conspicuous examples, among which we need mention only President John Quincy Adams, Justice Joseph Story, the great expounder of the Constitution Daniel Webster, the historian George Bancroft, and Chief-Justice Salmon P. Chase.

Lincoln's poetical temperament is sufficiently evinced in his fine appreciation of Shakspeare, Burns, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and probably many other poets whom tradition has not brought to general knowledge. The music of Lincoln's thought was always in the minor key. His favorite poems, such as "Oh, Why Should the Spirit of Mortal be Proud?" and Holmes's "Last Leaf," specially emphasize this mood; they are distinctively poems of sadness. So also among Shakspeare's plays he found his chief fascination in "Macbeth," full of the same undercurrent of the great problems of life and destiny with which his own slight attempts at versification are in harmony.

The date of Lincoln's verses likewise serves to show that they sprang from the mere desire for a temporary change in his currents of thought. He tells us that he wrote them in the fall of 1844, when, as a candidate for presidential elector, he was making stump speeches in Indiana for Henry Clay. Weary with the monotony of political harangues, a visit to the graves of his mother and only sister touched and gave utterance to emotions which the hard, practical duties of his life, perhaps even more than the consciousness of literary imperfection, held in patient subjection.

It is more difficult to fix the date when the lecture on "Discoveries, Inventions, and Improvements" was written. He states in a letter of March 28, 1859, that he "delivered a sort of lecture to three different audiences during the last month and this," which can only apply to the one here printed. He also delivered it on

February 22, 1860, in Cook's Hall, Springfield, Illinois, before the Library Association of that city. The writer, then living in Springfield, sat among the audience in Cook's Hall, and remembers that the version of the lecture he then heard was much longer than the present one, and contained several fine passages which made an impression on his memory; notably a reference to the importance and value of laughter, and a characterization of it as the "joyous, beautiful, universal evergreen of life." This confirms the belief that the version here printed is only a portion of the original draft, as indeed its form and brevity sufficiently indicate. First delivered in 1859, it must have been written at odd moments before that date, but certainly within ten years before, for it mentions the California gold discoveries.

The strong probability is that it was at least partly composed within that period of comparative leisure when, in March, 1849, his service of one term in Congress ended, and before the Nebraska Bill in January, 1854, unchained the

new political controversy in which Lincoln became so conspicuous an actor and so dominant a leader. It was during that five years' lull following his congressional service that, he tells us, he took up and worked through the first six books of Euclid, by way of practice in the art of reasoning and demonstration; and the supposition is not a violent one that he may have added occasional literary composition as attractive by-play.

Since this fragment has been preserved, which sufficiently illustrates his steps in the use of language, we need not grieve over the loss of the more perfect "lecture." Five days after he read it in Cook's Hall, he was in New York, and delivered there his famous Cooper Institute speech, which showed that he had trained himself for better uses than writing newspaper verses, describing Niagara, or extolling the material achievements of Young America. A gigantic moral and patriotic crusade was about to open, to which his thoughts, his words, his patience, his will, were destined to give voice, courage, perseverance, victory.

John G. Nicolay.

OLD DUTCH MASTERS.

MEYNDERT HOBBEEMA (1638-1709).



HE landscapes of Meyndert Hobbema were little known or appreciated until about a century after his death, and consequently the details of his life are few and scanty. He is said to have studied under Salomon van Ruisdael, though by others he is believed to have been the pupil of the greater Jacob van Ruisdael, nephew of the former. He certainly enjoyed the friendship and advice of the latter, whose junior he was by a few years, and, as might naturally be expected, his works bear a certain affinity to those of his famous contemporary. He was born in 1638, probably at Amsterdam, though the city of Haarlem, the town of Koeverden, and the village of Middelharnis in Holland are each said to have been his birthplace. He is known, however, to have resided at Amsterdam, and to have been married there in 1668, to which event his friend Jacob was a witness. He then recorded his age as thirty. He died in Amsterdam, December 14, 1709, and was buried there, ending his days in poverty and obscurity, his last lodging being in the Roosgraft, the street in which Rembrandt had died, just as poor, forty years before.

Only thirty-five years ago the best of his works were not valued at much more than thirty dol-

lars, and often the signatures were effaced from them, and better known names, such as Ruisdael and Decker, were substituted. Now, however, his canvases are highly valued, and a work which before went begging at thirty dollars would probably fetch a thousand times as much. Hobbema ranks next to Ruisdael as a landscape-painter. Most of his works are in England.

The subject I have engraved is known as "The Avenue, Middelharnis, Holland." The long avenue of straight, lopped trees leads up to the village, in which the church tower is a conspicuous object. It is a faithful and characteristic glimpse of Holland, with its pastures, waterways, low horizons, and expansive and impressive skies. Above all, it is the sky which holds us here; we feel the vastness of the immense vault of heaven. The work is gray and neutral in coloring, yet clear, strong, and fresh. In this respect Hobbema stands about midway between the golden manner of Cuyp and the cool, sober style of Ruisdael. This painting is one of the finest of Hobbema's, and is to be seen in the National Gallery, London. It is on canvas, and measures three feet, four and one half inches high, by four feet, seven and one half inches wide. The date upon it, 16-9, is read by some to be 1689, which would make it one of the latest of the artist's signed pictures.

T. Cole.



ENGRAVED BY T. COLE.

THE AVENUE, MIDDELHARNIS, HOLLAND.

FROM THE ORIGINAL PAINTING BY MEINDEERT HOBBERM, IN THE NATIONAL GALLERY, LONDON.

MY FIRST AND LAST BALLOON ASCENSION.

(ARTISTS' ADVENTURES SERIES.)



IN the year 1886 I was a student at the Académie Julian in Paris. One Sunday afternoon, while wandering about the city in search of amusement, my eye was caught by the advertisement of a balloon ascension which was to take place on the following Sunday, under the auspices of the Société des Aéroplanes.

Thinking that here might be found amusement, or the chance of a new experience, I wrote to the society, asking on what conditions I would be permitted to accompany the aéronaut. I received a courteous reply stating that if I would pay for the extra amount of gas required to levitate my person to the clouds, I might go.

The next Sunday afternoon, therefore, found me at the inclosed field near the Champ-de-Mars from which I was to take my first leave of earth.

The balloon was there, or, rather, two of them, already half inflated, and weighted to the ground by sand-bags, which, as the balloons filled, were attached lower down on the netting. Finally the inflated fabrics floated clear of the ground, restrained by ropes, but swaying gracefully in the increasing breeze.

I was introduced to the young man, the assistant of the aéronaut, who was to be my conductor. I observed with regret that the balloon in which we were to sail was the older of the two, and had seen service, as its numerous patches attested.

With consternation I inspected the car, or, rather, basket (for it was nothing more), of wickerwork. Its sides were less than two feet high, and it was so light that a well-placed kick would have sent it twenty feet. It did not strike me as being a safe vehicle in which to be "wafted to the skies."

While inspecting this small edition of a family clothes-basket, a strange and novel sensation of weakness about the knees took possession of me. As I shall not again recur to this phenomenon, the reader may as well understand that it did not leave me until I again reached what Mrs. Partington calls "terra cotta."

However, my friends and fellow-students were present, and escape was impossible; so with a pretense of great calm I watched the workmen attach the car to the wooden ring to which was gathered the network of the balloon. Six small ropes held the car.

Into the basket we stepped, and after many hand-shakings the ropes were cast off.

We did not rise, and being informed that we

must leave behind either a sand-bag or my heavy winter overcoat, I heroically sacrificed the latter. Standing in the basket, I tossed it to a friend, when, presto! he as well as the rest of the world sank out of sight. At that moment I sat down. I can still recall the howl of derision and delight which greeted this commonplace act.

The cries of the spectators were succeeded by a most profound silence, broken only by the fearsome creaking of the willow basket, as my companion leaned from side to side.

I was soon aware of another sound, to which my ears seemed slowly to become attuned—the low, muffled roar of the great city, which produced a continued note almost as pure as a musical tone, but lower in pitch than any note of the musical scale.

The barometer soon showed an elevation of half a mile, and, looking over the side of the car (I was still seated on the floor), I saw the whole of Paris pass beneath me—the public buildings, the Madeleine with its bright copper-green roof, the toy cathedral of Notre Dame on its little island. The distance was so great that all giddiness was gone, and the roar of the city was hushed. Throwing out much of our store of sand, we rose into great cumulus clouds. The barometer indicated a height of two miles; the air had the pure but thin feeling of an Alpine mountain-top. There was no sight, no noise save the patter of the feet of two pigeons on the summit of the balloon. They had refused to leave us, and, after hovering like land-birds about a ship, had settled on our rigging.

The mist congealed on the fabric, trickled down the ropes, and made us so many pounds heavier that it soon became apparent that we could not surmount the cloud.

In the utter silence of these heights the novice, awed by the sublimity of the situation, has no thought of danger. The vast, sightless, silent void in which the bubble hung self-poised impressed the mind with a sense, not of violence, but of calm. Yet danger there was, and that most imminent. Anxiously scanning the barometer, my companion announced that we were falling. Seizing a bag of tissue-papers, he threw a handful from the car. Instantly they disappeared, but *above* us. We were rushing down to the city at an angle of about forty-five degrees. Now the two pigeons left the balloon, and even this slight diminution of weight gave us a short respite. As we approached the earth we struck the ground breeze, which we saw would carry us nearly the entire length of the city. Quickly



DRAWN BY F. L. M. PAPE. AFTER A SKETCH BY A. B. SEWELL.

ENGRAVED BY F. H. WELLINGTON.

“THROUGH THESE WE SMASHED.”

divesting ourselves of our coats and waistcoats, we took a rapid inventory of the pitifully small remainder of ballast, with a view to keeping the air-ship afloat as long as possible.

To a novice who has ever gone down a toboggan-slide the horror of that rush over the spires and chimneys of the great city may be dimly shown if he can imagine his sensations increased a thousandfold. Collision with a building meant almost sure death, while the speed was so great that landing in a boulevard was an impossibility. The roar of one street as it grew less distinct was quickly followed by the roar of the next, as the excited and interested Parisians watched our flight. Several times we avoided collision only by throwing out a coat, basket, or bottle, the balloon each time taking a slight bound, and clearing the obstacle.

At last, without hats, coats, or waistcoats, we approached the river. If we could only cross it there was a possibility of landing in a field on the other side. My companion suggested that we climb into the ring, and unbutton the car and let it drop.

The car weighed over twenty pounds, and, released of its weight, the balloon might mount to an elevation of over half a mile, which was quite high enough to kill any one who might fall out of the barrel-hoop on which my friend suggested that we should sit, and sail through space. I declined with much warmth, and said that a descent into the river would be much

safer. He thought otherwise, as he could not swim.

We were then nearly over the boulevard that skirted the river, and, calculating the distance, which was perhaps five hundred feet, my companion excitedly pulled the rent-rope, and a great tear was opened in the balloon. The pear-shaped neck collapsed upward, the bag took the form of a parachute, and, deprived of almost all our gas, we dropped swiftly to the boulevard.

A telegraph line of about ten wires followed the river, and through these we smashed, breaking one wire after another.

We struck the sidewalk with enough force to prostrate and stun us both. On recovering, I found myself surrounded by a crowd of the *cannaille* of the barriers, who were excitedly tearing the wreck of the balloon under pretense of offering assistance. Hastily folding up the remains of our balloon, we threw it into the basket, and carried it to a wine-shop, followed by a rabble that made violent demands for payment for imaginary services. As we were hatless and coatless, we thought it best to remain in our temporary asylum, and to send to town for these necessaries. They arrived late that evening, and, after a certain amount of health-drinking, I bade farewell to my aerial conductor, and departed with the resolution that this my first should be my last balloon ascension.

Robert V. V. Sewell.

THE DEATH OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

BY IDA M. TARBELL,

Author of "The Early Life of Lincoln."



HE war is over." Throughout the breadth of the North this was the jubilant cry with which people greeted one another on the morning of April 14, 1865. For ten days reports of victories had been coming to them; Petersburg evacuated, Richmond fallen, Jefferson Davis and his cabinet fled, Lee surrendered, Mobile captured. Nothing of the Confederacy, in short, remained but Johnston's army, and it was generally believed that its surrender to Sherman was but a matter of hours. How completely the conflict was at an end, however, the people of the North had not realized until they read in their newspapers, on that Good Friday morning, an order of the Secretary of War suspending the draft, stopping the purchase of military sup-

plies, and removing military restrictions from trade. The war was over indeed.

Such a day of rejoicing as followed the world has rarely seen. At Fort Sumter scores of well-known citizens of the North, among them Henry Ward Beecher, William Lloyd Garrison, General Robert Anderson, and Theodore Tilton, raised over the black and shattered pile the flag which four years ago (Charleston, now lying desolate and wasted, had dragged down.

Cities and towns, hamlets and country road-sides blossomed with flags and bunting. Stock exchanges met to pass resolutions. Bells rang. Every man who could make a speech was on his feet. It was a Millennium Day, restoring broken homes, quieting aching hearts, easing distracted minds. Even those who mourned—and who could count

the number whom that dreadful four years had stripped of those they held dearest?—even those who mourned exulted. Their dead had saved a nation, freed a people. And so a subtle joy, mingled triumph, resignation, and hope, swept over the North. It was with all men as James Russell Lowell wrote to his friend Norton that it was with him: “The news, my dear Charles, is from Heaven. I felt a strange and tender exaltation. I wanted to laugh and I wanted to cry, and ended by holding my peace and feeling devoutly thankful.”

One man before all others in the nation felt and showed his gladness that day—the President, Abraham Lincoln. For weeks now he had seen the end approaching, and little by little he had been thankfully laying aside the ways of war and returning to those of peace. His soul, tuned by nature to gentleness and good-will, had been for four years forced to lead in a pitiless war. Now his duties were to “bind up the nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan;” to devise plans by which the members of the restored Union could live together in harmony, to plan for the future of the four million human beings to whom he had given freedom. All those who were with him at this time remarked the change in his feelings and his ways. He seemed to be aroused to a new sense of the beauty of peace and rest. For the first time since he entered the Presidency he took a holiday. He loved to linger in quiet spots, and he read over and over with infinite satisfaction lines of poetry which expressed repose. The perfect tranquillity in death seemed especially to appeal to him. Mrs. Lincoln related to her friend, Isaac Arnold, that, while visiting Grant’s headquarters, at City Point, in April, she was driving one day with her husband along the banks of the James, when they passed a country graveyard. “It was a retired place, shaded with trees, and early spring flowers were opening on nearly every grave. It was so quiet and attractive that they stopped the carriage and walked through it. Mr. Lincoln seemed thoughtful and impressed. He said: ‘Mary, you are younger than I. You will survive me. When I am gone, lay my remains in some quiet place like this.’”

A few days after this, as he was sailing down the James bound for Washington, Charles Sumner, who was in the party, was much impressed by the tone and manner in which Mr. Lincoln read aloud two or three times a passage from Macbeth:


“Duncan is in his grave;
After life’s fitful fever, he sleeps well;
Treason has done his worst: nor steel, nor poison,
Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing,
Can touch him further!”

There was a marked change in his appearance. All through 1863 and 1864 his thin face had day by day grown more haggard, its lines had deepened, its pallor had become a more ghastly gray. His eye, always sad when he was in thought, had a look of unutterable grief. Through all these months Lincoln was, in fact, consumed by sorrow. “I think I shall never be glad again,” he said once to a friend. But as one by one the weights lifted, a change came over him; his form straightened, his face cleared, the lines became less accentuated. “His whole appearance, poise, and bearing had marvelously changed,” says the Hon. James Harlan. “He was, in fact, transfigured. That indescribable sadness which had previously seemed to be an adamant element of his very being, had been suddenly changed for an equally indescribable expression of serene joy, as if conscious that the great purpose of his life had been achieved.”*

Never since he had become convinced that the end of the war was near had Mr. Lincoln seemed to his friends more glad, more serene, than on the 14th of April. The morning was soft and sunny in Washington, and as the spring was early in 1865, the Judas-trees and the dogwood were blossoming on the hillsides, the willows were green along the Potomac, and in the parks and gardens the lilacs bloomed—a day of promise and joy to which the whole town responded. Indeed, ever since the news of the fall of Richmond reached Washington the town had been indulging in an almost unbroken celebration, each new victory arousing a fresh outburst and rekindling enthusiasm. On the night of the 13th, there had been a splendid illumination, and on the 14th, the rejoicing went on. The suspension of the draft and the presence of Grant in town—come this time not to plan new campaigns, but to talk of peace and reconstruction—seemed to furnish special reason for celebrating.

At the White House the family party which met at breakfast was unusually happy. Captain Robert Lincoln, the President’s oldest son, then an aide-de-camp on Grant’s staff, had arrived that morning, and the closing scenes of Grant’s campaign were discussed with the deepest interest by father

* From an unpublished manuscript, “Recollections of Abraham Lincoln.”



THE LAST PORTRAIT OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN, TAKEN APRIL 9, 1865, THE SUNDAY BEFORE HIS ASSASSINATION.

Drawn from a photograph made by Alexander Gardner, photographer to the Army of the Potomac, while the President was sharpening a pencil for his son Tad. Copyright, 1894, by Watson Porter.

as if scaring sheep. Enough lives have been sacrificed. We must extinguish our resentment if we expect harmony and union. There was too much desire on the part of our very good friends to be masters, to interfere with and dictate to those States, to treat the people not as fellow-citizens; there was too little respect for their rights. He didn't sympathize in these feelings."

The impression he made on all the cabinet that day was expressed twenty-four hours later by Secretary Stanton: "He was more

cheerful and happy than I had ever seen him, rejoiced at the near prospect of firm and durable peace at home and abroad, manifested in marked degree the kindness and humanity of his disposition, and the tender and forgiving spirit that so eminently distinguished him."

In the afternoon the President went for his usual drive. Only Mrs. Lincoln was with him. Years afterward Mrs. Lincoln related to Isaac Arnold what she remembered of Mr. Lincoln's words that day: "Mary," he said, "we have had a hard time of it since we came to Washington; but the war is over, and with God's blessing we may hope for four years of peace and happiness, and then we will go back to Illinois, and pass the rest of our lives in quiet. We have laid by some money, and during this term we will try and save up more, but shall not have enough to support us. We will go back to Illinois, and I will open a law office at Springfield or Chicago, and practice law, and at least do enough to help give us a livelihood."

It was late in the afternoon when he returned from his drive, and as he left his carriage he saw going across the lawn toward the Treasury a group of friends, among them Richard Oglesby, then Governor of Illinois. "Come back, boys, come back," he shouted. The party turned, and joined the President on the portico, and went up to his office with him.

"How long we remained there I do not remember," says Governor Oglesby. "Lincoln got to reading some humorous book; I think it was by 'John Phoenix.' They kept sending for him to come to dinner. He promised each time to go, but would continue reading the book. Finally he got a sort of peremptory order that he must come to dinner at once. It was explained to me by the old man at the door that they were going to have dinner and then go to the theater."*

A theater party had been made up by Mrs. Lincoln for that evening—General and Mrs. Grant being her guests—to see Laura Keene, at Ford's Theater, in "Our American Cousin." Miss Keene was ending her season in Washington that night with a benefit. The box had been ordered in the morning, and unusual preparations had been made to receive the Presidential party. The partition between the two upper proscenium boxes at the left of the stage had been removed, comfortable upholstered chairs had been put in, and the front of the box had been draped with flags. The manager, of course, took

care to announce in the afternoon paper that the "President and his Lady" and the "Hero of Appomattox" would attend Miss Keene's benefit that evening.

By eight o'clock the house was filled with the half-idle, half-curious crowd of a holiday night. Many had come simply to see General Grant, whose face was then unfamiliar in Washington. Others, strolling down the street, had dropped in because they had nothing better to do. The play began promptly, the house following its nonsensical fun with friendly eyes and generous applause, one eye on the President's box.

The Presidential party was late. Indeed it had not left the White House until after eight o'clock, and then it was made up differently from what Mrs. Lincoln had expected, for in the afternoon she had received word that General and Mrs. Grant had decided to go North that night. It was suggested then that the party be given up, but the fear that the public would be disappointed decided the President to keep the engagement. Two young friends, the daughter of Senator Ira Harris and his stepson, Major H. R. Rathbone, had been invited to take the place of General and Mrs. Grant.

Schuyler Colfax and Mr. Ashmun, of Massachusetts, had called early in the evening, and the President had talked with them a little while. He rose finally with evident regret to go to his carriage. The two gentlemen accompanied him to the door, and he paused there long enough to write on a card, "Admit Mr. Ashmun and friend to-morrow morning at nine o'clock." As he shook hands with them he said to Mr. Colfax: "Colfax, don't forget to tell those people in the mining regions what I told you this morning." Then, entering the carriage, he was driven to the theater on Tenth Street, between E and F.

When the Presidential party finally entered the theater, making its way along the gallery behind the seats of the dress circle, the orchestra broke into "Hail to the Chief," and the people, rising in their seats and waving hats and handkerchiefs, cheered and cheered, the actors on the stage standing silent in the meantime. The party passed through the narrow entrance into the box, and the several members laid aside their wraps, and bowing and smiling to the enthusiastic crowd below, seated themselves, Mr. Lincoln in a large arm-chair at the left, Mrs. Lincoln next to him, Miss Harris next, and to the extreme right, a little behind Miss Harris, Major Rathbone; and then the play went on.

* *Illustration for McClure's Magazine.*



MARY TODD LINCOLN, WIFE OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

From a photograph taken by Brady, in the War Department Collection of Civil War Photographs.

The party in the box was well entertained, it seemed, especially the President, who laughed good-humoredly at the jokes and chatted cheerfully between the acts. He moved from his seat but once, rising then to put on his overcoat, for the house was chilly. The audience was well entertained, too, though not a few kept an eye on the box entrance, still expecting General Grant. The few whose eyes sought the box now and then noticed, in the second scene of the third act, that a man was passing behind the seats of the dress circle and approaching the entrance to the box. Those who did not

know him noticed that he was strikingly handsome, though very pale; that was all. They did not look again. It was not General Grant.

One man did watch him. He knew him, and wanted to see who in the Presidential box it could be that he knew well enough to call on in the middle of an act. If any attendant saw him, there was no question of his movements. He was a privileged person

his right hand a Derringer revolver, and that he raised the weapon and aimed it steadily at the head of the smiling President.

No eye saw him, but a second later and every ear heard a pistol shot. Those in the house unfamiliar with the play thought it a part of the performance, and waited expectant. Those familiar with "Our American Cousin," the orchestra, attendants, actors, searched in amazement to see from

where the sound came. Only three persons in all the house knew just where it was—three of the four in the box knew it was there by their side—a tragedy. The fourth saw nothing, heard nothing, thought nothing. His head had fallen quietly on his breast, his arms had relaxed a little, the smile was still on his lips.

Then from the box, now filled with white smoke, came a woman's sharp cry, and there was a sound of a struggle. Major Rathbone, at the sound of the shot, had sprung to

Allow Mr. Ashmun
 & friends to come in
 at 9. AM. to mor
 row -
 A. Lincoln
 April 14. 1865.

THE LAST BIT OF WRITING DONE BY LINCOLN.

Loaned by G. A. Morton, New Haven, Connecticut.

in the theater, having free entrance to every corner. He had been there in the course of the day; he had passed out and in once or twice during the evening.

Crowding behind some loose chairs in the aisle, the man took from his pocket a package of visiting cards, and, selecting one, gave it to the messenger at the door, saying he knew the President. A moment later he passed out of sight through the door leading into the passage behind the box. He closed the door behind him, and did a curious thing for a visitor to a theater party. He picked up a piece of stout plank which he seemed to know just where to find, and slipped one end into a hole gouged into the wall close to the door-casing. The plank extended across the door, making a rough but effective bolt. Turning to the door which led from the passage to the boxes, he may have peered through a tiny hole which had been drilled through the panel. If he did, he saw a quiet party intent on the play, the President just then smiling over a bit of homely wit.

Opening the door so quietly that no one heard him, the man entered the box. Then if any eye in the house could but have looked, if one head in the box had been turned, it would have been seen that the man held in

his feet and grappled with the stranger, who now had a dagger in his hand, and who struck viciously with it at the Major's heart. He, warding the blow from his breast, received it in his upper arm, and his hold relaxed. The stranger sprang to the balustrade of the box as if about to leap, but Major Rathbone caught at his garments. They were torn from his grasp, and the man vaulted toward the stage, a light, agile leap, which turned to a plunge as the silken flag in front caught at a stirrup on his boot. As the man struck the floor his left leg bent and a bone snapped, but instantly he was up; and limping to the middle of the stage, a long strip of the silken banner trailing from his stirrup, he turned full on the house, which still stared straight ahead, searching for the meaning of the muffled pistol shot. Brandishing his dagger and shouting—so many thought, though there were others whose ears were so frozen with amazement that they heard nothing—"Sic semper tyrannis!" he turned to fly. Not, however, before more than one person in the house had said to himself, "Why, it is John Wilkes Booth!" Not before others had realized that the shot was that of a murderer, that the woman's cry in the box came from Mrs. Lincoln, that the



WATCHING AT THE BEDSIDE OF THE DYING PRESIDENT ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 14 AND 15, 1865.

President in all the turmoil alone sat calm, his head unmoved on his breast. As these few grasped the awful meaning of the confused scene, it seemed to them that they could not rise nor cry out. They stretched out inarticulate arms, struggling to tear themselves from the nightmare which held them. When strength and voice did return, they plunged over the seats, forgetting their companions, bruising themselves, and clamored to the stage, crying aloud in rage and despair, "Hang him, hang him!" But Booth, though his leg was broken, was too quick. He struck with his dagger at one who caught him, plunged through a familiar back exit, and, leaping upon a horse standing ready for him, fled. When those who pursued reached the street, they heard only the rapidly receding clatter of a horse's hoofs.

But while a few in the house pursued Booth, others had thought only of reaching the box. The stage was now full of actors in their paint and furbelows, musicians with their instruments, men in evening dress, officers in uniform—a motley, wild-eyed crowd which, as Miss Harris appeared at the edge of the box crying out, "Bring water. Has any one stimulants?" demanded, "What is it? What is the matter?"

"The President is shot," was her reply.

A surgeon was helped over the balustrade into the box. The star of the evening, whose triumph this was to have been, strove to calm the distracted throng; then she, too, sought the box. Major Rathbone, who first of all in the house had realized that a foul crime had been attempted, had turned from his unsuccessful attempt to stop the murderer to see that it was the President who had been shot. He had rushed to the door of the passage, where men were already beating in a furious effort to gain admission, and had found it barred. It was an instant before he could pull away the plank, explain the tragedy, demand surgeons, and press back the crowd.

The physicians admitted lifted the silent figure, still sitting calmly in the chair, stretched it on the floor, and began to tear away the clothing to find the wound, which they supposed was in the breast. It was a moment before it was discovered that the ball had entered the head back of the left ear and was imbedded in the brain.

There seemed to be but one desire then: that was to get the wounded man from the scene of the murder. Two persons lifted him, and the stricken party passed from the box, through the dress circle, down the stairs

into the street, the blood dripping from the wound faster and faster as they went. No one seemed to know where they were going, for as they reached the street there was a helpless pause and an appeal from the bearers, "Where shall we take him?" Across the street, on the high front steps of a plain, three-storied brick house, stood a man, who but a moment before had left the theater, rather bored by the play. He had seen, as he stood there idly wondering if he should go in to bed or not, a violent commotion in the vestibule of the theater; had seen people rushing out, the street filling up, policemen and soldiers appearing. He did not know what it all meant. Then two men bearing a body came from the theater, behind them a woman in evening gown, flowers in her hair, jewels on her neck. She was wringing her hands and moaning. The man on the steps heard some one say, "The President is shot;" heard the bearers of the body asking, "Where shall we take him?" and quickly coming forward, he said, "Bring him here into my room."*

And so the President was carried up the high steps, through a narrow hall, and laid, still unconscious, still motionless, on the bed of a poor, little, commonplace room of a commonplace lodging-house, where surgeons and physicians gathered about in a desperate attempt to rescue him from death.

While the surgeons worked the news was spreading to the town. Every man and woman in the theater rushed forth to tell it. Some ran wildly down the streets, exclaiming to those they met, "The President is killed! The President is killed!" One rushed into a ball-room, and told it to the dancers; another bursting into a room where a party of eminent public men were playing cards, cried, "Lincoln is shot!" Another, running into the auditorium of Grover's Theater, cried, "President Lincoln has been shot in his private box at Ford's Theater." Those who heard the cry thought the man insane or drunk, but a moment later they saw the actors in a combat called from the stage, the manager coming forward. His face was pale, his voice agonized, as he said, "Ladies and gentlemen, I feel it my duty to say to you that the announcement made from the front of the theater just now is true, President Lincoln has been shot." One ran to summon Secretary Stanton. A boy picked up at

*The man who gave his room to the dying President was William T. Clarke, of the Thirtieth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, then on detail service in the War Department. Mr. Clarke is now dead, but papers establishing his story are owned by his brother-in-law, Mr. H. E. Wright, of Roxbury, Massachusetts.



THE CAPTURE OF JOHN WILKES BOOTH, THE ASSASSIN OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Booth was tracked from Washington to a farm near Bowling Green, Virginia, where, on the night of April 25th, eleven days after the assassination, he was found in a barn. He refused to surrender, and the barn was set on fire. While it was burning Booth was shot by one of the pursuing party. He died three hours later.

the door of the house where the President lay was sent to the White House for Robert Lincoln. The news spread by the very force of its own horror, and as it spread it met other news no less terrible. At the same hour that Booth had sent the ball into the President's brain, a man had forced his way into the house of Secretary Seward, then lying in bed with a broken arm, and had stabbed both the Secretary and his son Frederick so seriously that it was feared they would die. In his entrance and exit he had wounded three other members of the household. Like Booth, he had escaped. Horror bred rumor, and Secretary Stanton, too, was reported wounded, while later it was said that Grant had been killed on his way North. Dread seized the town. "Rumors are so thick," wrote the editor of the "National Intelligencer" at two o'clock in the morning, "the excitement of this hour is so intense, that we rely entirely upon our reporters to advise the public of the details and result of this night of horrors. Evidently conspirators are among us. To what extent does the conspiracy exist? This is a terrible question. When a spirit so horrible as this is abroad, what man is safe? We can only advise the utmost vigilance and the most prompt measures by the authorities. We can only pray God to shield us, His unworthy people, from further calamities like these."

The civil and military authorities prepared for attack from within and without. Martial law was at once established. The long roll was beaten; every exit from the city was guarded; out-going trains were stopped; mounted police and cavalry clattered up and down the street; the forts were ordered on the alert; guns were manned.

In the meantime there had gathered in the house on Tenth Street, where the President lay, his family physician and intimate friends, as well as many prominent officials. Before they reached him it was known there was no hope, that the wound was fatal. They grouped themselves about the bedside or in the adjoining rooms, trying to comfort the weeping wife, or listening awe-struck to the steady moaning and labored breathing of the unconscious man, which at times could be heard all over the house. Stanton alone seemed able to act methodically. No man felt the tragedy more than the great War Secretary, for no one in the cabinet was by greatness of heart and intellect so well able to comprehend the worth of the dying President; but no man in that distracted night

acted with greater energy or calm. Summoning the Assistant Secretary, C. A. Dana, and a stenographer, he began dictating orders to the authorities on all sides, notifying them of the tragedy, directing them what precautions to take, what persons to arrest. Grant, now returning to Washington, he directed should be warned to keep close watch on all persons who came close to him in the cars and to see that an engine be sent in front of his train. He sent out, too, an official account of the assassination. To-day the best brief account of the night's awful work remains the one which Secretary Stanton dictated within sound of the moaning of the dying President.

And so the hours passed without perceptible change in the President's condition, and with only slight shifting of the scene around him. The testimony of those who had witnessed the murder began to be taken in an adjoining room. Occasionally the figures at the bedside changed. Mrs. Lincoln came in at intervals, sobbing out her grief, and then was led away. This man went, another took his place. It was not until daylight that there came a perceptible change. Then the breathing grew quieter, the face became more calm. The doctors at Lincoln's side knew that dissolution was near. Their bulletin of six o'clock read, "Pulse failing;" that of half-past six, "Still failing;" that of seven, "Symptoms of immediate dissolution," and then at twenty-two minutes past seven, in the presence of his son Robert, Secretaries Stanton, Welles, and Usher, Attorney-General Speed, Senator Sumner, Private Secretary Hay, Dr. Gurley, his pastor, and several physicians and friends, Abraham Lincoln died. There was a prayer, and then the solemn voice of Stanton broke the stillness, "Now he belongs to the ages."

Two hours later the body of the President, wrapped in an American flag, was borne from the house in Tenth Street, and carried through the hushed streets, where already thousands of flags were at half-mast and the gay bunting and garlands had been replaced by black draperies, and where the men who for days had been cheering in excess of joy and relief now stood with uncovered heads and wet eyes. They carried him to an upper room in the private apartments of the White House, and there he lay until three days later a heart-broken people claimed their right to look for a last time on his face.

SOME RECOLLECTIONS OF JOHN WILKES BOOTH.

BY CLARA MORRIS.



glancing back over two crowded and busy seasons, one figure stands out with clearness and beauty. In his case only (so far as my personal knowledge goes), there was nothing derogatory to dignity or to manhood in being called beautiful, for he was that bud of splendid promise blasted to the core,

before its full triumphant blooming—known to the world as a madman and an assassin, but to the profession as “that unhappy boy”—John Wilkes Booth.

He was so young, so bright, so gay—so kind. I could not have known him well; of course, too—there are two or three different people in every man's skin; yet when we remember that stars are not generally in the habit of showing their brightest, their best side to the company at rehearsal, we cannot help feeling both respect and liking for the one who does.

There are not many men who can receive a gash over the eye in a scene at night, without at least a momentary outburst of temper; but when the combat between Richard and Richmond was being rehearsed, Mr. Booth had again and again urged Mr. McCollom (that six-foot tall and handsome leading-man, who entrusted me with the care of his watch during such encounters) to come on hard! to come on hot! hot, old fellow! harder—faster! He'd take the chance of a blow—if only they could make a hot fight of it!

And Mr. McCollom, who was a cold man, at night became nervous in his effort to act like a fiery one—he forgot he had struck the full number of head blows, and when Booth was pantingly expecting a thrust, McCollom, wielding his sword with both hands, brought it down with awful force fair across Booth's forehead; a cry of horror rose, for in one moment his face was masked in blood, one eyebrow was cleanly cut through—there came simultaneously one deep groan from Richard and the exclamation: “Oh, good God! good God!” from Richmond, who stood shaking like a leaf and staring at his work. Then Booth, flinging the blood from his eyes

with his left hand, said as genially as man could speak: “That's all right, old man! never mind me—only come on hard, for God's sake, and save the fight!”

Which he resumed at once, and though he was perceptibly weakened, it required the sharp order of Mr. Ellsler, to “ring the first curtain bell,” to force him to bring the fight to a close, a single blow shorter than usual. Then there was a running to and fro, with ice and vinegar-paper and raw steak and raw oysters. When the doctor had placed a few stitches where they were most required, he laughingly declared there was provision enough in the room to start a restaurant. Mr. McCollom came to try to apologize—to explain, but Booth would have none of it; he held out his hand, crying: “Why, old fellow, you look as if *you* had lost the blood. Don't worry—now if my eye had gone, that *would* have been bad!” and so with light words he tried to set the unfortunate man at ease, and though he must have suffered much mortification as well as pain from the eye—that in spite of all endeavors would blacken—he never made a sign.

He was, like his great elder brother, rather lacking in height, but his head and throat, and the manner of their rising from his shoulders, were truly beautiful. His coloring was unusual—the ivory pallor of his skin, the inky blackness of his densely thick hair, the heavy lids of his glowing eyes were all Oriental, and they gave a touch of mystery to his face when it fell into gravity—but there was generally a flash of white teeth behind his silky moustache, and a laugh in his eyes.

One thing I shall never cease to admire him for. When a man has placed a clean and honest name in his wife's care for life, about the most stupidly wicked use she can make of it is as a signature to a burst of amatory flattery addressed to an unknown actor—who will despise her for her trouble. Some women may shrivel as though attacked with “peach-leaf curl,” when they hear how these silly letters are sometimes passed about and laughed at. “No gentleman would so betray a confidence!” Of course not; but once, when I made that remark to an actor, who was then flaunting the food his vanity fed

upon, he roughly answered: "And no *lady* would so address an unknown man—she cast away her right to respectful consideration when she thrust that letter in the box." That was brutal; but there are those who think like him this very day, and oh, foolish tamperers with fire—who act like him!

Now it is scarcely exaggeration to say the sex was in love with John Booth—the name Wilkes being apparently unknown to his family and close friends. At depot restaurants those fiercely unwilling maiden slammers of the plates and shooters of coffee cups made to him swift and gentle offerings of hot steaks, hot biscuits, hot coffee—crowding about him like doves about a grain basket, leaving other travelers to wait upon themselves or go without refreshment. At the hotels maids had been known to enter his room and tear asunder the already-made-up bed, that the "turn-over" might be broader by a thread or two, and both pillows slant at the perfectly correct angle. At the theater—good heaven! as the sunflowers turn upon their stalks to follow the beloved sun, so, old or young—our faces smiling—turned to him. Yes, old or young; for the little daughter of the manager, who played but the Duke of York in "Richard III," came to the theater each day, each night of the engagement, arrayed in her best gowns, and turned on him fervid eyes that might well have served for Juliet. The manager's wife, whose sternly aggressive virtue no one could doubt or question, with aid of art waved and fluffed her hair, and softened thus her too hard line of brow, and let her keen black eyes fill with friendly sparkles for us all—yet, 'twas because of him. And when the old woman made to threaten him with her finger, and he caught her lifted hand and, uncovering his bonnie head, stooped and kissed it—then came the wanton blood up in her cheek, as she had been a girl again.

His letters then from flirtatious women, and alas! girls, you may well believe were legion; a cloud used to gather upon his face at sight of them. I have, of course, no faintest idea that he lived the godly, righteous, and sober life that is enjoined upon us all, but I do remember with respect that this idolized man, when the letters were many and rehearsal already on, would carefully cut off every signature and utterly destroy them, then pile the unread letters up and—I don't know what their final end was, but he remarked with knit brows as he caught

me watching him at his work one morning: "They," pointing to the pile of mutilated letters, "they are harmless now, little one—their sting lies in the tail!" and when a certain free-and-easy actor laughingly picked up a very elegantly written note, and said: "I can read it, can't I, now the signature is gone?" he answered, shortly: "The woman's folly is no excuse for our knavery—lay the letter down, please!"

I played the "Player-Queen" to my great joy, and in the "Marble Heart" I was one of the group of three statues in the first act. We were supposed to represent Lais, Aspasia, and Phryne, and when we read the cast I glanced at the other girls (we were not strikingly handsome) and remarked, gravely: "Well, it's a comfort to know that we look so like the three beautiful Grecians."


A laugh at our backs brought us around suddenly to face Mr. Booth, who said to me: "You satirical little wretch, how do you come to know these Grecian ladies? Perhaps you have the advantage of them in being all beautiful within?"

"I wish it would strike outward then," I answered. "You know it's always best to have things come to the surface!"

"I know some very precious things are hidden from common sight; and I know, too, you caught my meaning in the first place. Good night!" and he left us.

We had been told to descend to the stage at night with our white robes hanging free and straight, that Mr. Booth himself might drape them as we stood upon the pedestal. It really is a charming picture—that of the statues in the first act. Against a backing of black velvet the three white figures, carefully posed, strongly lighted, stand out so marble-like that when they slowly turn their faces and point to their chosen master, the effect is uncanny enough to chill the looker-on.

Well, with white wigs, white tights, and white robes, and half strangled with the powder we had inhaled in our efforts to make our lips stay white, we cautiously descended the stairs—we dared not talk, we dared not blink our eyes, for fear of disturbing the coat of powder—we were lifted to the pedestal and took our places as we expected to stand. Then Mr. Booth came—such a picture in his Greek garments as made even the men exclaim at him—and began to pose us. It happened one of us had very good limbs, one medium good, and the third had, apparently, walked on broom-sticks. When Mr.



JOHN WILKES BOOTH.

From a photograph in the possession of Miss Clara Morris.

Booth slightly raised the drapery of No. 3 his features gave a twist as though he had suddenly tasted lemon-juice, but quick as a flash he said: "I believe I'll advance you to the center for the stately and wise Aspasia,"—the central figure wore her draperies hanging straight to her feet, hence the "advance" and consequent concealment of the unlovely limbs. It was quickly and kindly done, for the girl was not only spared mortification, but in the word "advance" she saw a compliment and was happy accordingly. Then my turn came. My arms were placed about Aspasia, my head bent and turned and twisted—my right hand curved upon my breast so that the forefinger touched my chin—I felt I was a personified simper; but I was silent and patient, until the arrangement of my draperies began—then I squirmed anxiously.

"Take care—take care!" he cautioned. "You will sway the others if you move!" But in spite of the risk of my marble make-up I faintly groaned: "Oh dear! must it be like that?"

Regardless of the pins in the corner of his mouth he burst into laughter, and, taking a photograph from the bosom of his Greek shirt, he said: "I expected a protest from you, Miss, so I came prepared—don't move your head, but just look at this."

He held the picture of a group of statuary up to me. "This is you on the right. It's not so dreadful; now, is it?" And I cautiously murmured: "That if I wasn't any worse than that I wouldn't mind."

And so we were all satisfied, and our statue scene was very successful. Next morning I saw Mr. Booth come running out of the theater on his way to the telegraph office at the corner, and right in the middle of the walk, staring about him, stood a child—a small roamer of the stony streets, who had evidently got far enough beyond his native ward to arouse misgivings as to his personal safety, and at the very moment he stopped to consider matters Mr. Booth dashed out of the stage-door and added to his bewilderment by capsizing him completely.

"Oh, good lord! Baby, are you hurt?" exclaimed Mr. Booth, pausing instantly to pick up the dirty, tousled small heap and stand it on its bandy legs again.

"Don't cry, little chap!" And the aforesaid little chap not only ceased to cry, but gave him a damp and grimy smile, at which the actor bent towards him quickly, but paused, took out his handkerchief, and first carefully wiping the dirty little nose and

mouth, stooped and kissed him heartily, put some change in each freckled paw, and continued his run to the telegraph office.

He knew of no witness to the act. To kiss a pretty, clean child under the approving eyes of mamma might mean nothing but politeness, but surely it required the prompting of a warm and tender heart to make a young and thoughtless man feel for and caress such a dirty, forlorn bit of babyhood as that.

Of his work I suppose I was too young and too ignorant to judge correctly, but I remember well hearing the older members of the company express their opinions. Mr. Ellsler, who had been on terms of friendship with the elder Booth, was delighted with the promise of his work. He greatly admired Edwin's intellectual power, his artistic care; but "John," he cried, "has more of the old man's power in one performance than Edwin can show in a year. He has the fire, the dash, the touch of strangeness. He often produces unstudied effects at night. I question him: 'Did you rehearse that business to-day, John?' He answers: 'No; I didn't rehearse it, it just came to me in the scene and I couldn't help doing it, but it went all right, didn't it?' Full of impulse just now, like a colt, his heels are in the air nearly as often as his head, but wait a year or two till he gets used to the harness and quiets down a bit, and you will see as great an actor as America can produce!"

And by the way, speaking of Mr. Ellsler and the elder Booth, I am reminded that I have in my possession a letter from the latter to the former. It is written in a rather cramped hand that carries the address and the marks of the red wafers, as that was before the appearance of envelopes, and it informs Mr. Ellsler that he, "Junius Brutus Booth, will play a star engagement of one week"—for the sum of how many dollars? If it were not unguessable I should insist upon your guessing, but that would not be fair, so here it is: "for the sum of \$300;" and wants to know, "How many and what plays he is desired to do that he may select his wardrobe."

Think of it—the mighty father of our Edwin asking but \$300 for a week of such acting as he could do, which, if this bright, light-hearted boy was so much like him, must have been brilliant indeed.

One morning, going on the stage where a group were talking with John Wilkes, I heard him say: "No; oh, no! There's but one Hamlet to my mind—that's my brother

Edwin. You see, between ourselves, he is Hamlet—melancholy and all!”

That was an awful time, when the dread news came to us. We were in Columbus, Ohio. We had been horrified by the great crime at Washington. My room-mate and I had, from our small earnings, bought some black cotton at a tripled price, as all the black material in the city was not sufficient to meet the demand; and as we tacked it about our one window, a man passing told us the assassin had been discovered, and that he was the actor Booth. Hattie laughed so she nearly swallowed the tack that, girl-like, she held between her lips, and I, after a laugh, told him it was a poor subject for a jest, and we went in. There was no store in Columbus then where play-books were sold, and as Mr. Ellsler had a very large and complete stage library, he frequently lent his books to us, and we would hurriedly copy out our lines and return the book for his own use. On that occasion he was going to study his part first and then leave the play with us as he passed, going home. We heard his knock. I was busy pressing a bit of stage finery. Hattie opened the door, and then I heard her exclaiming: “Why—why—what!” I turned quickly. Mr. Ellsler was coming slowly into the room. He is a very dark man, but he was perfectly livid then—his lips even were blanched to the whiteness of his cheeks. His eyes were dreadful, they were so glassy and seemed so unseeing. He was devoted to his children, and all I could think of as likely to bring such a look upon his face was disaster to one of them, and I cried, as I drew a chair to him: “What is it? Oh, what has happened to them?”

He sank down—he wiped his brow—he looked almost stupidly at me; then, very faintly, he said: “You—haven’t—heard—anything?”

Like a flash Hattie’s eyes and mine met. We thought of the supposed ill-timed jest of the stranger. My lips moved wordlessly. Hattie stammered: “A man—he—lied though—said that Wi-likes Boo-th—but he did lie—didn’t he?” and in the same faint voice Mr. Ellsler answered slowly: “No—no! he did not lie—it’s true!”

Down fell our heads, and the waves of shame and sorrow seemed fairly to overwhelm us; and while our sobs filled the little room, Mr. Ellsler rose and laid two play-books on the table. Then, while standing there, staring into space, I heard his far, faint voice saying: “So great—so good a

man destroyed, and by the hand of that unhappy boy! my God! my God!” He wiped his brow again and slowly left the house, apparently unconscious of our presence.

When we resumed our work—the theater had closed because of the national calamity—many a painted cheek showed runnels made by bitter tears, and one old actress, with quivering lips, exclaimed: “One woe doth tread upon another’s heels, so fast they follow!” but with no thought of quoting, and God knows, the words expressed the situation perfectly.

Mrs. Ellsler, whom I never saw shed a tear for any sickness, sorrow, or trouble of her own, shed tears for the mad boy, who had suddenly become the assassin of God’s anointed—the great, the blameless Lincoln.

We crept about, quietly. Every one winced at the sound of the overture. It was as if one dead lay within the walls—one who belonged to us.

When the rumors about Booth being the murderer proved to be authentic, the police feared a possible outbreak of mob feeling, and a demonstration against the theater building, or against the actors individually; but we had been a decent, law-abiding, well-behaved people—liked and respected—so we were not made to suffer for the awful act of one of our number. Still, when the mass-meeting was held in front of the Capitol, there was much anxiety on the subject, and Mr. Ellsler urged all the company to keep away from it, lest their presence might arouse some ill-feeling. The crowd was immense, the sun had gloomed over, and the Capitol building, draped in black, loomed up with stern severity and that massive dignity only attained by heavily columned buildings. The people surged like waves about the speakers’ stand, and the policemen glanced anxiously toward the not far away new theater, and prayed that some bombastic, revengeful ruffian might not crop up from this mixed crowd of excited humanity to stir them to violence.

Three speakers, however, in their addresses had confined themselves to eulogizing the great Dead. In life Mr. Lincoln had been abused by many—in death he was worshiped by all; and these speakers found their words of love and sorrow eagerly listened to, and made no harsh allusions to the profession from which the assassin sprang. And then an unknown man clambered up from the crowd to the portico platform and began to speak, without asking any one’s permission.

He had a far-reaching voice—he had fire and “go.”

“Here’s the fellow to look out for!” said the policemen; and, sure enough, suddenly the dread word “theater” was tossed into the air, and every one was still in a moment, waiting for—what? I don’t know what they hoped for—I do know what many feared; but this is what he said: “Yes, look over at our theater and think of the little body of men and women there, who are to-day sore-hearted and cast down; who feel that they are looked at askant, because one of their number has committed that hideous crime! Think of what they have to bear of shame and horror, and spare for them, too, a little pity!”

He paused. It had been a bold thing to do—to appeal for consideration for actors at such a time. The crowd swayed for a moment to and fro, a curious growling came from it, and then all heads turned toward the theater. A faint cheer was given, and afterwards there was not the slightest allusion made to us—and verily we were grateful.

That the homely, tender-hearted “Father Abraham”—rare combination of courage, justice, and humanity—died at an actor’s hand, will be a grief, a horror, and a shame to the profession forever; yet I cannot believe that John Wilkes Booth was “the leader of a band of bloody conspirators”!

Who shall draw a line and say: here

genius ends and madness begins? There was that touch of—strangeness. In Edwin it was a profound melancholy; in John it was an exaggeration of spirit—almost a wildness. There was the natural vanity of the actor, too, who craves a dramatic situation in real life. There was his passionate love and sympathy for the South—why, he was “easier to be played on than a pipe.”

Undoubtedly he conspired to kidnap the President—that would appeal to him; but after that I truly believe he was a tool—certainly he was no leader. Those who led him knew his courage, his belief in Fate, his loyalty to his friends; and, because they knew these things, he drew the lot, as it was meant he should from the first. Then, half mad, he accepted the part Fate cast him for—committed the monstrous crime, and paid the awful price. And since

“God moves in a mysterious way,
His wonders to perform,”

we venture to pray for His mercy upon the guilty soul who may have repented and confessed his manifold sins and offences during those awful hours of suffering before the end came.

And “God shutteth not up His mercies forever in displeasure!” We can only shiver and turn our thoughts away from the bright light that went out in such utter darkness. Poor, guilty, unhappy John Wilkes Booth!

HOME.

BY PAUL KESTER.

I WANT to go home
To the dull old town
With the shaded streets
And the open square
And the hill
And the flats
And the house I love
And the paths I know—
I want to go home.
If I can’t go back
To the happy days,
Yet I can live
Where their shadows lie,
Under the trees
And over the grass—
I want to be there
Where the joy was once.
Oh, I want to go home,
I want to go home.



Drawn by Mary Hallock Foote

Engraved by C. J. A. State.

ON THE BRINK.

THE CAPTURE, DEATH, AND BURIAL OF J. WILKES BOOTH.

BY RAY STANNARD BAKER.

THE TRUE STORY OF THE PURSUIT AND CAPTURE, AND DEATH AND BURIAL OF THE ASSASSIN OF LINCOLN, NOW FIRST TOLD FROM THE PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF COLONEL L. C. BAKER AND LIEUTENANT L. B. BAKER, WHO DIRECTED THE PURSUIT AND DISPOSED OF BOOTH'S BODY.

[The final capture of John Wilkes Booth, the murderer of President Lincoln, has been generally credited to Lieutenant E. P. Doherty and a squad of cavalry under his command. Morse, in his "Abraham Lincoln," says: "Late on April 25, a squad of cavalry traced Booth to a barn in Virginia," etc. Nicolay and Hay, in their history, say: "On the night of the 25th of April, a party under Lieutenant E. P. Doherty arrested, in his bed at Bowling Green, William Jett, one of the Confederate soldiers mentioned above, and forced him to guide them to Garrett's barn." Lieutenant Doherty has also given himself the credit of the capture in an article in "The Century Magazine" for January, 1890. The truth is that Lieutenant Doherty and his command were simply an escort furnished to a detective who had been employed by Secretary Stanton to find the murderer of the President. This detective was Colonel L. C. Baker. He had as aids Lieutenant L. B. Baker and Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. Conger. They had become convinced that Booth must be near a certain point, and asked an escort in their search. This escort was directly under Colonel Baker and his lieutenants, and had nothing whatever to do but obey their orders, which it undoubtedly did. The confusion in the story, which has crept into the best histories, has induced Mr. Ray S. Baker of Chicago, a cousin of Colonel Baker and a nephew of Lieutenant L. B. Baker, to prepare an exact account of the pursuit and capture. He has used in preparing his article the private papers and reminiscences of his cousin and uncle, the records of the War Department, the newspapers of the day, and the printed reports of the trial of Booth's accomplices. We believe that his article is not only historically accurate, but that it gives a vivid description of this remarkable transaction such as would be impossible save from one who had received his information first-hand from one of the leading actors in it.—IDA M. TARBELL.]

PRESIDENT LINCOLN was shot a few minutes after ten o'clock, Friday evening, April 14, 1865.

The conspirators could not have chosen a more favorable occasion for their bloody work. Washington and the North were in a paroxysm of rejoicing over the surrender of Lee and the close of a long and bloody war. The rigor of military restrictions was in some degree relaxed, and the highways of travel north and south were rapidly opening. Everywhere the air was filled with the spirit of disorganization consequent on the mustering out of armed men and the return of the soldier to his plow-handle. Even the President of the United States, weary of tedious cabinet meetings, had laid aside his arduous duties on that fateful Friday evening, to seek much needed rest at the theater.

No doubt Booth and his accomplices were conscious of this general relaxation, and calculated on it to assist them in their escape when the plotted deed in Washington was done. Certain it is that if the military cordon had been drawn as closely as it was while active hostilities were in progress, the chief assassin and his assistant never would have thundered past the sentinel on the navy-yard bridge and escaped into the yet hostile South. And compelled to remain within the confines of Washington, their capture by the police doubtless would have been a question of only a few hours.

As soon as the news of the assassination reached the War Department, thousands of soldiers, policemen, and detectives were despatched to guard every possible avenue of escape, with orders to arrest every per-

son who sought under any pretext to leave Washington. The Navy Department sent numberless tugs, steamers, and even ships of war to patrol the Potomac, in the hope of preventing the flight of the assassins by boat. Before the morning of the 15th the lines were so thoroughly established that the shrewdest spy would have found difficulty in creeping through them without being captured. But at that late hour it was all to no purpose; Booth was miles away.

In this emergency, Secretary of War Stanton turned to the national secret service bureau, a branch of the department which was under his immediate direction and control. Colonel Lafayette C. Baker (afterwards General), its chief, was in New York city making plans for the capture of a band of bounty-jumpers then operating in the North. Mr. Stanton telegraphed him in the following words:

April 15, 3:20.

COLONEL L. C. BAKER:

Come here immediately and see if you can find the murderer of the President.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Early the next morning Colonel Baker reached Washington. He was accompanied by his cousin, Lieutenant L. B. Baker, a member of the bureau, who recently had been mustered out of the First District of Columbia cavalry. They went at once to the office of the War Department, and, after a conference with Secretary Stanton, began the search for the murderers of the President.

Up to this time the confusion had been so great that few of the ordinary detective measures for the apprehension of criminals had been employed. No rewards had been offered, little or no attempt had been made to collect and analyze the clues in the furtherance of a systematic search, and the pursuit was wholly without a directing leadership.

Colonel Baker's first step was the publi-

cation over his own name of a handbill offering \$30,000 reward for the capture of the fugitives.* Twenty thousand dollars of this amount was subscribed by the city of Washington, and the other \$10,000 Colonel Baker offered on his own account, as authorized by the War Department. To this handbill minute descriptions of Booth and the unknown person who attempted the assassination of Secretary Seward were appended. Hardly had the bills been posted when the United States Government authorized the publication of additional rewards to the amount of \$100,000

for the capture of Booth, Surratt, and Herold, Surratt at that time being suspected of direct complicity in the assassination.† Three States increased this sum by

* Following is a copy of the reward handbill issued by Colonel Baker—the first to be sent out:

\$30,000 Reward.

Description
of

JOHN WILKES BOOTH,

Who assassinated the
PRESIDENT on the
evening of April 14th,
1865.

Height 5 feet 8 inches; weight 160 pounds; compact build; hair jet black, inclined to curl, medium length, parted behind; eyes black, and heavy eyebrows; wears a large sealing on little finger; when talking inclines his head forward; looks down.

Description of the person who attempted to assassinate Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

Height 6 feet 1 inch; hair black, thick, full, and straight; no beard nor appearance of beard; cheeks red on the jaws; face moderately full; 22 or 23 years of age; eyes, color not known—large eyes not prominent; brows not heavy but dark; face not large but rather round; complexion healthy; nose straight and well formed, medium size; lips thin; upper lip protruded when he talked; chin pointed and prominent; head medium size; neck short and of medium length; hands soft and small; fingers tapering; shows no signs of hard labor; broad shoulders; taper waist; straight figure; strong-looking man; manner not gentlemanly, but vulgar. Overcoat double-breasted; color mixed of pink and gray spots, small—was a sack overcoat, pockets inside and one on breast, with lapels or flaps; pants black, common stuff; new heavy boots; voice small and thin, inclined to tenor.

The common council of Washington, D. C., have offered a reward of \$20,000 for the arrest and conviction of these assassins, in addition to which I will pay \$10,000.

L. C. BAKER,

Colonel, and Agent of the War Department.


† This was the exact wording of the reward handbills issued by Secretary Stanton and circulated by Colonel Baker:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 20, 1865. \$100,000 reward. The murderer of our late beloved President, Abraham Lincoln, is still at large. \$50,000 reward will be paid by this department for his apprehension in addition to



LIEUTENANT L. B. BAKER AND HIS HORSE "BUCKSKIN."

From a photograph taken in 1881. This was the horse ridden by Lieutenant Baker in the pursuit of Booth. His body is now mounted and preserved in the Museum of the Michigan Agricultural College.



MAP SHOWING THE COURSE OF BOOTH'S FLIGHT AND LIEUTENANT BAKER'S PURSUIT. THE DOTTED LINE MARKS BOOTH'S COURSE; THE BLACK LINE, BAKER'S.

ington—into the field, and the whole of southern Maryland and eastern Virginia was scoured and ransacked until it seemed as if a jack-rabbit could not have escaped. And yet, at the end of ten days, the assassins were still at large.

Booth was accompanied in his flight by a callow, stage-struck youth named David C. Herold, who was bound to the older man by the ties of a marvelous personal magnetism which the actor exercised as a part of his art. Two hours after the assassination the fugitives reached Mrs. Surratt's tavern, where Herold secured a carbine, two flasks of whisky, and a field-glass. They imparted the information with some show of pride that they had just killed the President of the United States. By this time Booth's broken leg had begun to give him excruciating pain, and the two rode without delay to the house of Dr. Mudd, a Southern sympathizer of the most pronounced type. Here the assassin's leg was set and splinted, for lack of better material, with bits of an old cigar-box. Rude crutches were whittled out by a friend of Dr. Mudd's, and on the following day Booth and his deluded follower rode on to the southward.

\$25,000 each, and many individuals and companies, shocked by the awful atrocity of the crime, offered rewards in varying amounts. Fabulous stories were told of the wealth which the assassin's captor would receive, the sums being placed anywhere from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000. This prospect of winning a fortune at once sent hundreds of detectives, recently discharged Union officers and soldiers, and a vast host of mere adventurers—the flotsam of Wash-

any reward offered by municipal authorities or State executives.

\$25,000 reward will be paid for the apprehension of John H. Surratt, one of Booth's accomplices.

\$25,000 reward will be paid for the apprehension of David C. Herold, another of Booth's accomplices.

Liberal rewards will be paid for any information that shall conduce to the arrest of either of the above named criminals or their accomplices.

All persons harboring or secreting the said persons or either of them or aiding or assisting their concealment or escape will be treated as accomplices in the murder of the President and the attempted assassination of the Secretary of State, and shall be held to trial before a military commission and the punishment of death.

Let the stain of innocent blood be removed from the land by the arrest and punishment of the murderers.

All good citizens are exhorted to aid public justice on this occasion. Every man should consider his own conscience charged with this solemn duty, and rest neither night nor day until it is accomplished.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Descriptions:—Booth is 5 feet 7 or 8 inches high, slender

For more than a week they were hidden in a swamp near Port Tobacco by Samuel Cox and Thomas Brown, both of whom were staunch Confederates. Here they were compelled to kill their horses for fear that a whiny might reveal their presence to their eager pursuers. After many attempts Brown was able to send the fugitives across the river in a little boat, for which Booth paid \$300. Once in Virginia, and among Southerners, Booth felt that they would be safe; but in this supposition he was sorely disappointed. At least one prominent Confederate treated them as murderers and out-

build, high forehead, black hair, black eyes, and wore a heavy black moustache, which there is some reason to believe has been shaved off.

John H. Surratt is about 5 feet 9 inches. Hair rather thin and dark; eyes rather light; no beard. Would weigh 145 or 150 pounds. Complexion rather pale and clear, with color in his cheeks. Wore light clothes of fine quality. Shoulders square, cheek bones rather prominent; chin narrow, ears project at the top; forehead rather low and square but broad. Paris his hair on right side; neck rather long. His lips are firmly set. A slim man.

David C. Herold is 5 feet 6 inches high, hair dark, eyes dark, eyebrows rather heavy, full face, nose short, hands short and fleshy, feet small, instep high, round-bodied, naturally quick and active. Slightly closes his eyes when looking at a person.

Notice. In addition to the above State and other authorities have offered rewards amounting to almost One Hundred Thousand Dollars, making an aggregate of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars.

casts, and they were compelled to accept the help of negroes and to skulk and cower under assumed names.

In beginning his search for the assassins, Colonel Baker proceeded on the theory that Jefferson Davis and the whole Confederate cabinet were involved in the plot, and that Booth, Atzerodt, Payne, Surratt, Herold, and the others were mere tools in the hands of more skilled conspirators. He therefore detailed Lieutenant Baker to procure, for the purpose of future identification, photographs of John H. Surratt, John Wilkes Booth, Jefferson Davis, George N. Sanders, Beverly Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, Clement C. Clay, George Harper, George Young, "and others unknown," all of whom were charged with being conspirators.

Later Lieutenant Baker, with half a dozen active men to help him, was sent into lower Maryland to distribute the handbills describing Booth, Herold, and Surratt, and to exhibit the pictures of the fugitives wherever possible. Under instructions from Colonel Baker, they also made a search for clues, but they found themselves harassed and thwarted at every turn by private detectives and soldiers who tried to throw them off the trail in the hope of following it successfully themselves.

On their return to Washington, Lieutenant Baker gave it as his opinion to his

chief that Booth and his companion or companions had not gone south at all, but had taken some other direction, probably toward Philadelphia, where it was known that Booth had several warm friends.

"No, sir," was Colonel Baker's answer, "you are mistaken. There is no place of safety for them on earth except among their friends in the still rebellious South."

Acting on this belief, Colonel Baker sent Theodore Woodall, one of the detectives, into lower Maryland, accompanied by an expert telegrapher named Beckwith, who was to attach his instrument to the wires at any convenient point and report frequently to the headquarters at Washington. These men had been out less than two days when they discovered a voluble



Lieutenant L. B. Baker.

Colonel L. C. Baker.

E. J. Conger.

PLANNING THE PURSUIT OF BOOTH IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE SECRET SERVICE BUREAU, WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

From the original photograph, loaned by Mrs. L. B. Baker, Lansing, Michigan.

negro who told them quite promptly that two men answering to the description of Booth and Herold had crossed the Potomac below Port Tobacco on Saturday night (April 22d) in a fishing-boat. This evidence, which had already been spurned by a company of troops, was regarded as of so much importance, that the negro was hurried to Washington by the next boat, where Colonel Baker questioned him closely, afterward showing him a large number of photographs. He at once selected the pictures of Booth and Herold as being the persons whom he had seen in the boat. Colonel Baker decided that the clue was of the first importance, and, after a hurried conference with Secretary Stanton, he sent a request to General Hancock* for a detachment of cavalry to guard his men in the pursuit. Lieutenant Baker was then ordered to the quartermaster department to make arrangements for transportation down the Potomac. † On his return he was informed that he and E. J. Conger, another detective, were to have charge of the party. The three men then held a conference in which the chief fully explained his theory of the whereabouts of Booth and his accomplice.

Half an hour later Lieutenant Edward P. Doherty of the Sixteenth New York cavalry, with twenty-five men, Sergeant Boston Corbett second in command, reported to Colonel Baker for duty. He was directed to go with Lieutenant Baker and Conger wherever they might order, and to protect them to the extent of his ability. Without waiting even to secure a sufficient supply of rations, Lieutenant Baker and his men galloped down to the Sixth Street dock, where they were hurried on board the government tug "John S. Ide."



JOHN WILKES BOOTH.

From a photograph in the Civil War collection of Mr. Robert Coster.

* Colonel Baker sent the following request to General Hancock:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, April 24th.
MAJOR-GENERAL HANCOCK, United States Army.—

General: I am directed by the Secretary of War to apply to you for a small cavalry force of 25 men, well mounted, to be commanded by a reliable and discreet commissioned officer.

Can you furnish them? And if so, will you please direct the officer commanding the squad to report to me with the men at No. 217 Pennsylvania avenue, opposite Willard's Hotel, at once?

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,
L. C. BAKER,
Colonel, and Agent War Department.

Official:

DUNCAN S. WALKER, A. A. General:

Adjutant-General A. R. Sewell sent an order to the commanding officer of the 16th New York cavalry, directing him to send a squad to report at once to Col. J. C. Baker. In compliance with this order Captain J. Schneider commissioned Lieut. E. P. Doherty to undertake the task.

† He returned with the following communication:

ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE,
RIVER TRANSPORTATION, SIXTH STREET WHARF,
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 24th.

COL. L. C. BAKER, Agent War Department:

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that I will have a boat ready for you at four P.M. this day.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. S. ARLER,
Captain, and Assistant Quartermaster.

It was a little after three o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, April 24th, when the expedition started. Seven hours later the tug reached Belle Plaine landing. At this point there is a sharp bend in the river, and Colonel Baker had advised his men to scour the strip of country stretching between it and the Rappahannock.

On disembarking Baker and Conger rode cautiously ahead into the dark, directing Lieutenant Doherty and his detachment to follow within hailing distance. The country was familiar to both of the

leaders of the expedition, and at the homes of the more prominent Confederates they stopped to make inquiries, assuming the names of well-known blockade-runners and mail-carriers.

"We are being pursued by the Yanks," they said; "and in crossing the river we have become separated from two of our party, one of whom is lame. Have you seen them?"

All night long this kind of work, interspersed with much hard riding, was continued. But although the Confederates invariably expressed their sympathy, it was evident that they knew nothing of the fugitives. At dawn the cavalrymen threw off their disguises, and halted an hour for rest and refreshment. Again in their saddles they struck across the country in the direction of Port Conway, a little town on the Rappahannock about twenty-two miles below Fredericksburg. Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon they drew

rein near a planter's house half a mile distant from the town, and ordered dinner for the men and feed for the horses. Conger, who was suffering from an old wound, was now nearly exhausted from the long, hot, and dusty ride, and he and all of the other members of the party except Baker and one of the men—a corporal—dropped down at the roadside to rest.

Baker feared that the presence of the searching party might give warning to Booth and his companion should they be hiding anywhere in the neighborhood. He therefore pushed on ahead to the bank of the Rappahannock. Here, dozing in front of his little cottage in the sunshine, Baker found a fisherman-ferryman whose name was Rollins. He asked him if he had seen a lame man cross the river within the past few days. Yes, he had, and there was another man with him. In fact, Rollins said that he had ferried them across the river. Instantly Baker drew out his photographs, and Rollins pointed without the least hesitation to the pictures of Booth and Herold.

"There are the men," he said, nodding his head; "there are the men, only this one"—pointing to Booth's picture—"had no mustache."

It was with a thrill of intense satisfaction that Baker heard these words. He was now positive that he, of all the hundreds of detectives and soldiers who were swarming the country, was on the right trail. But not a moment was to be lost. Even now the objects of their search might be riding far into the land of the rebels. Baker sent the corporal back with orders for Conger and the cavalrymen to come up without delay. After he was gone Rollins explained that the two men—who could be none other than Booth and Herold—had hired him to ferry them across the river on the previous afternoon. Just before starting three men had ridden up and greeted the fugitives, afterward accompanying them across the river. In response to close questioning Rollins admitted that he knew the three men well; that they were Major M. B. Ruggles, Cap-

tain Willy Jett, and Lieutenant Bainbridge, who had fought during the war with Mosby's guerrillas.

"Do you know where they went?"—Baker pressed the question.

"Waal," drawled the fisherman, "this Captain Jett has a lady-love over at Bowling Green, and I reckon he went over there."

He further explained that Bowling Green was about fifteen miles to the southwest, and that it had a big hotel which would make a good hiding-place for a wounded man. As the cavalry came up Baker told Rollins that he would have to accompany them as a guide until they reached Bowling Green. To this Rollins objected on the ground that he would incur the hatred of his neighbors, none of whom had favored the Union cause.

"But you might make me your prisoner," he said in his slow drawl; "then I would have to go."

Baker felt the necessity of exercising the greatest energy in the pursuit if the fugitives were to be snatched from the shelter of a hostile country. Rollins's ferryboat was old and shaky, and although the loading was done with the greatest despatch, it took three trips to get the detachment across the river. About sundown the actual march for Bowling Green was begun.

As the horses sweltered up the crooked, sandy road from the river, Baker and Conger, who were riding ahead, saw two horsemen standing as motionless as sentinels on the top of the hill, their dark forms silhouetted in black against the sky. They seemed much interested in the movements of the cavalrymen. Baker and Conger at once suspected them of being Booth's friends, who had, in some way, received information of the approach of a searching-party. Baker signaled the horsemen to wait for a parley, but instead of stopping they at once put spurs to their horses and galloped up the road. Conger and Baker gave chase, bent to the necks of their horses and riding at full speed; but just as they were overhauling them, the two horsemen dashed into a blind trail leading from the main road into a dark



THE MAN WHO SHOT BOOTH, SERGEANT BOSTON CORBETT, READING HIS BIBLE.

pine forest. The pursuers drew rein on their winded horses, and, after consultation, decided not to follow further, but to reach Bowling Green as promptly as possible.

These men, as they afterward learned, were Bainbridge and Herold; and Booth at that moment was less than half a mile away, lying on the grass in front of the Garrett house. Indeed, he saw his pursuers distinctly as they passed his hiding-place, and commented on their dusty and saddle-worn appearance. But they believed him to be in Bowling Green, fifteen miles away, and so they pushed on, leaving behind them the very man they so much desired to see.

It was near midnight when the party clattered into Bowling Green, and with hardly a spoken command, surrounded the dark, rambling old hotel. Baker stepped boldly to the front door, while Conger strode to the rear, from whence came the dismal barking of a dog. Presently a light flickered on the fan-light, and some one opened the door a crack and inquired, in a frightened, feminine voice, what was wanted. Baker thrust his toe inside, flung the door wide open, and was confronted by a woman. At this moment Conger came through from the back way, led by a stammering negro. The woman admitted at once that there was a Confederate cavalryman sleeping in her house, and she promptly pointed out the room. Baker and Conger, candle in hand, at once entered. Captain Jett sat up, staring at them.

"What do you want?" he asked.

"We want you," answered Conger; "you took Booth across the river, and you know where he is."

"You are mistaken in your man," he replied, crawling out of bed.

"You lie," roared Conger, springing forward, his pistol clicking close to Jett's head.

By this time the cavalymen were crowding into the room, and Jett saw the candle-light glinting on their brass buttons and on their drawn revolvers.

"Upon honor as a gentleman," he said, paling, "I will tell you all I know if you will shield me from complicity in the whole matter."

"Yes, if we get Booth," responded Conger.

"Booth is at the Garrett house, three miles this side of Port Conway," he said; "if you came that way you may have frightened him off, for you must have passed the place."

In less than thirty minutes the pursuing party was doubling back over the road by which it had just come, bearing Jett with it as a prisoner. His bridle reins were fastened to the men on each side of him, in the fear that he would make a dash to escape and alarm Booth and Herold.

It was a black night, no moon, no stars, and the dust rose in choking clouds. For two days the men had eaten little and slept less, and they were so worn out that they could hardly sit their jaded horses. And yet they plunged and stumbled onward through the darkness, over fifteen miles of meandering country road, reaching Garrett's farm at half past three o'clock in the morning of April 26th. Like many other Southern places, Garrett's house stood far back from the road, with a bridle gate at the end of a long lane. So exhausted were the cavalymen, that some of them dropped down in the sand where their horses stopped and had to be kicked into wakefulness. Rollins and Jett were placed under guard, and Baker and Conger made a dash up the lane, some of the cavalymen following.

Garrett's house was an old-fashioned Southern mansion, somewhat dilapidated, with a wide, hospitable piazza reaching its full length in front, and barns and tobacco houses looming big and dark apart. Baker leaped from his horse to the steps, and thundered on the door. A moment later a window close at hand was cautiously raised, and a man thrust his head out. Before he could say a word Baker seized him by the arm.

"Open the door; be quick about it."

The old man tremblingly complied, and Baker slipped inside, closing the door behind him. A candle was quickly lighted, and then Baker demanded of Garrett to reveal the hiding-place of the two men who had been staying in his house.

"They're gone to the woods," he said, paling and beginning to tremble.

Baker thrust his revolver into the old man's face.

"Don't tell me that," he said; "they are here."

Conger now came in with young Garrett.

"Don't injure father," said the young man; "I will tell you all about it. The men did go to the woods last evening when some cavalry went by, but they came back and wanted us to take them over to Louisa Court House. We said we could not leave home before morning, if at all. We were becoming suspicious of them, and father told them they could not stay with us—"

"Where are they now?" interrupted Baker.

"In the barn; my brother locked them in for fear they would steal the horses. He is now keeping watch in the corn-crib."

It was plain that the Garretts did not know the identity of the men who had been imposing on their hospitality. Consequently, Baker asked no more questions, but taking young Garrett's arm, he made a dash toward the barn. Conger ordered the cavalymen to follow, and formed them in such positions around the barn that no one could escape. By this time the soldiers had found the boy in the crib, and had brought him up with the key. Baker unlocked the door, and told young Garrett that, inasmuch as the two men were his guests, he must go inside and induce them to come out and surrender. The young man objected most vigorously.

"They are armed to the teeth," he faltered; "and they'll shoot me down."

But he appreciated the fact that he was looking into the black mouth of Baker's revolver, and hastily slid through the doorway. There was a sudden rustling of corn-blades, and the sound of voices in low conversation. All around the barn the soldiers were picketed, wrapped in inky blackness and uttering no sound. In the midst of a little circle of candle-light Baker stood at the doorway with drawn revolver. Conger had gone to the rear of the barn. During the heat and excitement of the chase he had assumed command of the cavalymen, somewhat to the umbrage of Lieutenant Doherty, who kept himself in the background during the remainder of the night. Further away, around the house, Garrett's family huddled together trembling and frightened.

Suddenly from the barn a clear, high voice rang out, the voice of the tragedian in his last play.

"You have betrayed me, sir; leave this barn or I will shoot you."

Baker now called to the men in the barn, ordering them to turn over their arms to young Garrett, and to surrender at once.

"If you don't," threatened Baker, "we shall burn the barn, and have a bonfire and a shooting match."

At that Garrett came running to the door and begged to be let out. He said he would do anything he could, but he didn't want to risk his life in the presence of two such desperate men. Baker therefore opened the door, and Garrett came out with a bound. He turned and pointed

to the candle which Baker had been carrying since he left the house.

"Put that out or he will shoot you by its light," he whispered in a frightened voice.

Baker placed the candle on the ground at a little distance from the door so that it would light all the space in front of the barn. Then he called again to Booth to surrender. In a full, clear, ringing voice—a voice that smacked of the stage—Booth replied:

"There is a man here who wishes very much to surrender," and then they heard him say to Herold, "Leave me, will you? Go; I don't want you to stay."

At the door Herold was whimpering: "Let me out; I know nothing of this man in here."

"Bring out your arms and you can come," answered Baker.

Herold denied having any arms, and Booth finally said: "He has no arms; the arms are mine, and I shall keep them."

By this time Herold was praying piteously to be let out. He said he was afraid of being shot, and he begged to be allowed to surrender. Baker opened the door a little, and told him to put out his hands. The moment they appeared Baker seized them, whipped Herold out of the barn, and turned him over to the soldiers.

"You had better come, too," Baker then said to Booth.

"Tell me who you are and what you want of me. It may be that I am being taken by my friends."

"It makes no difference who we are," was the reply. "We know you and we want you. We have fifty well-armed men stationed around this barn. You cannot escape, and we do not wish to kill you."

There was a moment's pause, and then Booth said falteringly:

"Captain, this is a hard case, I swear. I am lame. Give me a chance. Draw up your men twenty yards from here, and I will fight your whole command."

"We are not here to fight," said Baker; "we are here to take you."

Booth then asked for time to consider, and Baker told him that he could have two minutes, no more. Presently he said:

"Captain, I believe you to be a brave and honorable man. I have had half a dozen chances to shoot you. I have a bead drawn on you now—but I do not wish to kill you. Withdraw your men from the door, and I'll go out. Give me this chance for my life. I will not be taken alive."

Even in his deep distress Booth had not

forgotten to be theatrical. If he must die he wished to die at the climax of a highly dramatic situation.

"Your time is up," said Baker firmly; "if you don't come out we shall fire the barn."

"Well, then, my brave boys," came the answer in clear, ringing tones that could be heard by the women who cowered on Garrett's porch, rods away, "you may prepare a stretcher for me." Then, after a slight pause, he added, "One more stain on the glorious old banner."

Conger now came around the corner of the barn and asked Baker if he was ready. Baker nodded, and Conger stepped noiselessly back, drew a handful of corn-blades through a crack in the barn, scratched a match, and in a moment the whole interior of the barn was brilliant with light. Baker opened the door and peered in. Booth had been leaning against the mow, but he now sprang forward, half blinded by the sudden glare of fire, his crutches under his arms and his carbine leveled in the direction of the flames as if he would shoot the man who had set them going. But he could not see into the darkness outside. He hesitated, then reeled forward again. An old table was near at hand. He caught hold of it as though to cast it top down on the fire, but he was not quick enough. Dropping one crutch, he hobbled toward the door. About the middle of the barn he stopped, drew himself up to his full height, and seemed to take in the entire situation. His hat was gone, and his wavy, dark hair was tossed back from his high white forehead; his lips were firmly compressed, and, if he was pale, the ruddy glow of the fire-light concealed that fact. In his full, dark eyes there was an expression of mingled hatred, terror, and the defiance of a tiger hunted to his lair. In one hand he held a carbine, in the other a revolver, and his belt contained another revolver and a bowie-knife. He seemed prepared to fight to the end, no matter what numbers opposed him. By this time the flames in the dry corn-blades had mounted to the rafters of the dingy old building, arching the hunted assassin in a glow of fire more brilliant than the lighting of any theater in which he had ever played. And for once in his life, J. Wilkes Booth was a great actor. He was in the last scene of his last play. The curtain soon would drop.

Suddenly Booth threw aside his remaining crutch, dropped his carbine, raised his revolver, and made a spring for the door.

It was his evident intention to shoot down any one who might bar his way, and make a dash for liberty, fighting as he ran.

There came a shock that sounded above the roar of the flames. Booth leaped in the air and pitched forward on his face. Baker was upon him in an instant, grasping both his arms to prevent the use of the revolver. But this precaution was entirely unnecessary. Booth would struggle no more. Another moment and Conger and the soldiers came rushing in. Baker turned the wounded man over and felt for his heart.

"He must have shot himself," said Conger.

"No," replied Baker; "I saw him every moment after the fire was lighted. The man who did do the shooting goes back to Washington in irons for disobedience of orders."

In the excitement that followed the firing of the barn, Sergeant Boston Corbett,* an eccentric character who had accompanied the cavalry detachment, had stolen up to the side of the barn, placed his revolver to the crack between two boards, and just as Booth was about to spring through the doorway, had fired the fatal shot. He afterward told Lieutenant Baker that he knew Booth's movement meant death either for him (Baker) or for Booth.

Booth's body was caught up and carried out of the barn and laid under an apple-

* Corbett was a most eccentric character. He was born in London, England, in 1832, and came to this country when he was seven years old. He became a hat finisher by trade, wandering about the country from city to city and having no permanent home. While in Boston he joined the Methodist Church, and when he was baptized he took the name of Boston, in honor of the city of his conversion. He enlisted in the Twelfth New York state militia, but was continually in trouble with his superior officers because he persisted in following the dictates of his conscience rather than military orders. One day at dress parade in Franklin Square the colonel commanding found occasion to swear at the regiment for something that displeased him. Corbett at once stepped from the ranks and, with a salute, said: "Colonel, do you know you are breaking God's law?"

At the close of his first period of enlistment as a soldier in the war of the rebellion, he made up his mind that his time expired at midnight on a certain day. He gave due notice that he would leave at that time, but no attention was paid to his vagaries and he was detailed on picket duty. At midnight he left his post and hurried away to make preparations for his departure. He was arrested, court-martialed, and sentenced to be shot for deserting his post in the face of the enemy. But his colonel made an appeal to President Lincoln, who heard the case patiently, inquired into Corbett's general character, and pardoned the man who was to slay his assassin.

After Corbett had shot Booth, and just as day was breaking, he was crossing the lawn in front of Garrett's house. Conger hailed him, and demanded the reason why he had fired against orders. Corbett took the position of a soldier, saluted, and pointed heavenward.

"God Almighty directed me," he said.

"Well," was Conger's answer as he turned away, "I guess He did, or you couldn't have hit Booth through that crack in the barn."

Afterward Corbett said that unless he had fired, Lieutenant Baker, who stood at the door, would have been killed. These were the only excuses that he ever offered for his disobedience of orders.

Years afterward Corbett became insane, and was confined in a Kansas asylum.

tree not far away. Water was dashed in his face, and Baker tried to make him drink, but he seemed unable to swallow. Presently, however, he opened his eyes and seemed to understand the situation. His lips moved, and Baker bent down to hear what he might say.

"Tell mother—tell mother—" he faltered, and then became unconscious again. The flames of the burning barn now grew so intense that it was necessary to remove the dying man to the piazza of the house, where he was laid on a mattress provided by Mrs. Garrett. A cloth wet in brandy was applied to his lips, and under its influence he revived a little. Then he opened his eyes and said with deep bitterness:

"Oh, kill me, kill me quick."

"No, Booth," said Baker, "we don't want you to die. You were shot against orders." Then he was unconscious again for several minutes, and they thought he never would speak again. But his breast heaved, and he acted as if he wished to say something. Baker placed his ear at the dying man's mouth, and Booth faltered:

"Tell mother I died for my country. I did what I thought was best."

With a feeling of pity and tenderness, Baker lifted the limp hand, but it fell back again as if dead at his side. Booth seemed conscious of the movement: he turned his eyes and muttered hopelessly:

"Useless—useless"—and he was dead.

When his collar was removed it was found that the bullet had struck the assassin under the ear, in almost the exact location that his own had struck the President. The great nerve of the spinal column had been severed, resulting in instant paralysis of the entire body below the wound.

About twenty minutes before Booth's death, Conger had started for Washington, taking with him Booth's arms, his diary, and other articles found on his person. While the Garretts were preparing breakfast for the hungry men, Booth's body was wrapped in a saddle blanket and the blanket stoutly sewed together. The body was then placed in an ancient and decrepit market wagon owned by an old colored man, who had been forced into the service somewhat against his will. Without waiting for breakfast, Baker, accompanied by a corporal, set out over the road for Belle Plaine, the negro driving the old horse as rapidly as he could. The cavalry guard was left to follow with Herold and the other prisoners. After crossing the Rappahan-

nock at Rollins's ferry, Baker traveled on for some distance, expecting every moment to see his guard come up. The road did not seem well traveled, and growing anxious, he began to question the negro.

"Dis am all right, massa," was the response. "Ah done gone been long dis yar road many an' many a time befoh de wah, an' ah'm jesh sure dis am de shortes road to Belle Plaine."

Baker sent his orderly back to inform Doherty what road he had taken, and instructing him to come on at once. But no cavalry appeared. They met few teams, and the road grew wilder and more forbidding. Presently straggling bands of men in Confederate uniform appeared, riding dejectedly southward.

"What have you got there?" one of them called out; "a dead Yank?"

"Yes," Baker replied, laughing.

This seemed to satisfy the questioner, and he passed on with a jest.

It had now grown hot and dusty, and Baker feared that Doherty's men had been attacked and routed and that he might be overtaken at any moment, and Booth's body re-captured. He was unnerved with loss of sleep and hunger, having been nearly three days in the saddle without rest. He was alone in an enemy's country, he had lost his way, and the responsibility he had assumed weighed heavily upon him. The old horse was worn out with the rough journey, and it was difficult to get him up the sand-hills with his load. But Baker dared not stop for rest or food.

On one of the hardest hills the king-bolt of the rickety old wagon gave out with a snap; the front of the box dropped down, and Booth's body lurched heavily forward. The big letters "U. S." on the blanket were wet with the assassin's blood, which had also trickled down over the axle and dribbled for miles along the road. The negro driver crawled under the wagon to repair the break, and some of the blood fell on his hand. He sprang back, shrinking in terror.

"Oh," he groaned. "It will neber, neber wash off. It am de blood ob a murderer."

So horrified was he that he tried to leave his burden, wagon, horse, and all, and escape through the woods, but Baker forced him to continue on the journey. After thirty miles of heat and dust, up hill and down, they crept over the top of a sandy knoll, and Baker saw the blessed blue of the Potomac glimmering through

the trees. It was just twilight, and the tinkle of cow-bells came up drowsily from the river-bank. Booth's body, wrapped in blue, was now gray with dust.

Reaching the water's edge, Baker could find no trace of dock or steamer. Sometime during the war the government had changed the landing from its old location known to the negro, to a point nearly a mile further up the river. They could see the "John S. Ide" lying at the wharf, but they had no boat with which to reach it. To shout might bring the marauding enemy sooner than friends. With the help of the negro, Baker bore the body down to the river and hid it under a clump of willows. Securing a promise from the old driver that he would remain and watch faithfully, Baker started back, a distance of over two miles by the road, never sparing his jaded horse until he reached the tug.* Doherty's command was already there. Baker asked the corporal whom he had sent back why he did not return to him, and he said that Doherty would not allow him to.

A small boat from the tug was lowered, and with two of the crew to row, Baker soon reached the upper landing. The negro was found still on watch, faithful to his trust. The body was placed in the boat, and, a few minutes later, it was hoisted to the deck of the "John S. Ide." Baker saw it properly under guard, and then sank in a stupor of sleep on the deck. Three hours later the "John S. Ide" was met by another tug, having on board Colonel L. C. Baker; General T. T. Eckert, Assistant Secretary of War; Surgeon-General Barnes, and others.

On reaching Washington the body was removed to the gunboat "Saugatuck," which lay at anchor in the navy yard,† and there the autopsy and the inquest were held.‡

* The horse which Lieutenant Baker rode bore the name of "Buckskin." He lived to be twenty-nine years of age, dying in 1887 at Lansing, Michigan. His body was presented to the State, was mounted, and is now on exhibition in the museum of the Michigan Agricultural College, near Lansing.

† This is the order which Secretary Stanton gave Colonel Baker:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 26th.
TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD:
Let Colonel Baker come into the Navy Yard wharf and alongside the ironclad, to place one or two prisoners on board.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

‡ Secretary Stanton sent the following order to many of his generals immediately on receiving the news of Booth's capture:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY,
April 27, 1865, to A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HAMCOCK, BRIGHTON, MD.
Booth and Herold were traced by Baker to Garrett's farm three miles from Port Royal yesterday morning. They were

Conger had brought the news of the capture to Washington many hours before, and every town in the country was ringing with the tidings. The moment the evidences of Booth's death—the diary, two revolvers, the carbine, the belt, and the compass—were placed in Colonel Baker's hands, he carried them to the office of the Secretary of War.

"I rushed into the room," relates Colonel Baker, "and said, 'We have got Booth.' Secretary Stanton was distinguished during the whole war for his coolness, but I never saw such an exhibition of it in my life as at that time. He put his hands over his eyes and lay for nearly a minute without saying a word. Then he got up, put on his coat, and inquired how the capture had come about."

Immediately on his return Lieutenant Baker was called to the office of Secretary Stanton, where he related the story of the capture. Mr. Stanton had Booth's carbine, and when the narrative was finished, he handed it to Baker with the question,

"Are you accustomed to using a carbine? If so, what is the matter with this one? It cannot be discharged."

Baker examined the weapon, and found that a cartridge had slipped out of position so that when the lever was worked it could not be thrown under the hammer. Perhaps it was for this reason that Booth cast it aside in the barn. It was a part of the ill luck that followed the assassin and every one with whom he came in contact from the moment he fired the fatal shot at President Lincoln.

Late in the afternoon of the second day after Booth's body was brought to Washington (April 28th) Colonel Baker received orders to dispose of the body in the way that seemed best to him, so that Booth's Confederate friends might never get it. Taking Lieutenant Baker with him, he started at once for the navy yard, stopping on the way at the old penitentiary prison. They reached the ironclad on which Booth's body reposed just as twilight was deepening into night. The body was sewn again in its bloody winding-sheet and lowered into a small rowboat. Hundreds of people stood watching on the shore, knowing that it was Booth's body, and determined to ascertain what was to be

secreted in a barn. The barn was fired. Booth, in making his escape, was killed and Herold captured. Booth's body and Herold are now here. They crossed the Potomac Saturday night or Sunday night. Their horses were left in the swamp and should be secured; also all persons who aided their concealment.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

done with it. Colonel Baker had brought with him a heavy ball and chain, which he placed in the boat by the side of the body, making no apparent attempt at secrecy. He and Lieutenant Baker stepped into the little craft, and a few strokes of the oars sent it speeding out on the black Potomac in the gathering darkness. It had passed from lip to lip that the body of Booth was to be sunk in the river, and the crowds followed eagerly along the shore until the little rowboat and its occupants disappeared. It was a moonless, starless night, warm with mid-spring. In the distance blinked the lights of the city, vying with the near illumination of the river craft. For nearly two miles the boat drifted silently. Its occupants spoke no word; there was not even the creak of an oarlock.

At Geeseborough Point the river widens and its shallows grow rank with rushes and marsh weeds. Here the boat was driven toward shore until its speed was quenched in the mud of a little cove. It was the loneliest of lonely spots on the Potomac—the burial ground of worn-out and condemned government horses and mules—a place dreaded alike by white men and negroes. For a time the two officers listened intently to make sure they were not followed. All was quiet on the Potomac. No sounds reached their ears but the strident croak of bull-frogs and the lapping of the water on the sedgy shore.

Presently the boat was turned and pulled slowly back toward the city. The utmost caution was observed to make no sound. They dreaded even the lipping of the oars and the faint lapping of the water at the gunwales. Suddenly against the sky loomed the huge black hulk of the old penitentiary. A few more strokes and the boat reached the base of the grim, forbidding wall. Silently they crept along until they came to a hole let into the solid masonry close to the water's edge. An offi-

cer who stood just inside of the opening, challenged the party in a low voice, and Colonel Baker answered with the countersign.

They lifted the body from the boat and carried it through the hole in the masonry into a convict's cell. A huge stone slab, worn with the fretting of many a prisoner, had been lifted up, and under it there was a shallow grave, dug only a few hours before. A dim lantern outlined the damp walls of the cell and emphasized the shadows. Just at midnight Booth's body was lowered into the black hole, the stone slab was replaced over the unhonored grave, and the two officers crept back to their boat and returned to Washington.

It was believed that the body had been sunk in the Potomac, and for days the river was dragged by Booth's friends in the hope of finding it. The newspapers gave circumstantial accounts of the watery burial, and "Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly" for May 20, 1865, had a full-page illustration showing Colonel Baker and Lieutenant Baker in the act of slipping the body over the edge of the boat into the river. It was entitled "an authentic sketch."

For several years no one but Colonel Baker, Lieutenant Baker, and two or three other officers knew of the disposition of Booth's body. Indeed, there were rumors, widely credited in certain parts of the country, that Booth never had been captured. Later, however, after the heat and excitement of the time had subsided, permission was given for the removal of the remains to Baltimore, where they now rest.

Before the trial of the conspirators was begun, Lieutenant Baker was again sent into lower Maryland to collect evidence against Booth and his accomplices. He was so far successful as to find the boat in which Booth and Herold crossed the Potomac, and also Booth's opera-glass, hidden near Garrett's house, both of which he took with him to Washington.



FOUR NEGRO SONGS.

BY JOHN CHARLES McNEILL.

WITH PICTURES BY E. W. KEMBLE.

THE POSSUM AND THE COON.

EF yuh has seed de possum, boss,
Yuh sho won't trust 'im far:
He looks es gentle es Sister Sal
When de pahson 's a-leadin' in pra'r;
En all of er sudden he 's up en turnt
(When yuh 's totin' 'im desso),
En fastened 'is jaws to de calf er yo' leg—
Den, Sadie, bar de do'!

Den, Sadie, bar de do', my gal!
O Sadie, bar de do'!



'S fer me, I 'd ruther hab de coon,
'Ca'se he 's jis wut he is:
He don't hab no dog nosin' his ribs
Whilst he lay still, lak dis;
But all de time, lak Sister Sal
When de preachin' is over en gone,
He 's es sassy en mean es a hongry cur
A-gwineter bury his bone.

Den, Sadie, keep de do,' my gal,
En be sho to hol' yo' own!

One day I seed 'em jine in fight,
Lak Sister Sal en me:
Lord, boss, hit wus de ongawdlies' sight
Dat eber dis nigger did see!
Br'er Possum he lay dar, 's if he sleep;
Br'er Coon he sniff 'im er li'l',
En den he snag Br'er Possum lak
De teeth er yo' ol' sawmill!

O Sadie, lock de do', my gal,
En prop hit wid er sill!

Br'er Possum, fer common, don't lose his
head;
He kin stan' 'mos' any trile;
But he thought he 'us struck by er young
slycoon,¹
En 'e clean fergit to smile.
Whoop, boss, yuh oughter been dar yusse'f
When dat possum woke up wide!
Hit 'us *wussen* Sal, when he made his teeth
Some sockets in Br'er Coon's hide!

O Sadie, stan' ag'in' de do',
En pull de string inside!

"EN FASTENED 'IS JAWS TO DE CALF ER YO' LEG."

¹ Cyclone.

PROFESSION VS. PRACTICE.

AUNT RACHEL JANE AND HER PICCANINNIES.

SCENE: *Small cotton-patch about a cabin.*

Now, Grover Clevelan', here I is
 Er-hoein' cotton de whole year roun',
 En fas' es I gits hit clean, yuh wants
 To roll in de dirt en mash hit down.

I ain' gwine work in no sich style;
 I 'd jis es soon hab er storm er hail.
 Don't yuh know de winter 'll come some day
 En ketch yuh out in yo' same shirt-tail?

Here 's de pills fer yuh, boy—dat en dat!—
 Bawl, den! bawl, wid yo' fis' in yo' eye!
 Yuh 'll git wuss remedies, 'f yuh don't look
 sha'p.
 Git outer de patch ef yuh boun' to cry!

(Singing) Lawd, trus' de chilluns in my
 han's,
 In my han's, in my han's!
 Trus' de little chilluns in my han's,
 En sweetly dey will rest.
 Lawd, let de little uns—



"BUT DAT DEBBLISH POSSUM, ES FAT ES HE WUS,
 WE NEBER YIT AIN'T FOUN'."

De coon he flounce en flop en flam;
 De possum he jis hol' on,
 Ontwel I seed ef hit stayed dat way
 De coon wus sholy gone.
 Lak Sal says, I ain' de man to see
 De hypererite git on top;
 So den 's when I turnt ol' Tige erloose
 Dat scan'lous fight to stop.

*O Sadie, stan' en hol' dat do'
 Twell we makes de nex' year's crep.*

Tige made er dive into de fray;
 Den green eyes, fur, en fuss!
 Whoop, turn 'im, Tige!—I kin see 'm
 now!—
 But things allus goes fer de wuss,
 'Ca'se, when dat dust 'us settled, dar
 War de dead coon on de groun':
 But dat debblish possum, es fat es he wus,
 We neber yit ain't foun'.

*O Sadie, turn de do' erloose.
 Hit ain't wo'th while. Se' down.*



"TO ROLL IN DE DIRT EN MASH HIT DOWN."

Yuh, Benjermun Frankelin General Grant,
Wut is yuh doin' in de shed?
Done scared dat blue hen offen 'er nes'!
Well, de po'house 's all I sees erhead.

De mo' yuh grows, de mo' yuh gits
Jis lak dat triflin' nigger man,
Yo' daddy, loaf'n' all day at de still
(Es ef he wus er turpentine han'!)

En er-comin' home at night to eat,
Wid nothin' in his lazy fis'.
Ef yuh don't men' yo' meddlin' ways,
Yuh 's gwine be lak yo' dad, yuh is!

(Singing) Lawd, lemme teach de chilluns how,
Teach 'em how, teach 'em how
To honor deir daddy en mammy
now,
Fo' hit gwine be too late,
Too late, too late, gwine be too
late
To git in de golden—

Dar! dat beats all dat 's happened yit!
Jis look wut Neebuckineezar 's done
Wilst I wus down at de yudder eend!
He pullt up ebery single one

Er dem calamis-roots (de conju' cyore)
En prince's-feathers en jimson-weeds.
I sot 'em out dat long-pas' year
When Marse John's cow mire' down in de
reeds.

Dar ain' no way but to beat yuh-all,
Grove en Ben en Neeb, all three.
Come right erlong, now! I 'll tan yo' hides
Wid de limbs f'om offer dat ol' peach-tree.

(Singing) Lawd, let de chilluns come unter
me,
Come unter me, come unter me,
Let de little chilluns come unter
me,
En dey shall sho 'ceive peace!

THE STOLEN MELON.



YUH, Bill! yuh need n' be sneakin' erway,
Fer yo' mammy's done seed yuh dodgin'
erroun',
Yuh low-down coon! Take dat million out
En lay hit dar by de crib on de groun'.

Now lemme tell yuh, I knows right whar
Dat million growed in de squire's fence
jam—
Yuh, Bill! don't lie! I seed hit dar!
Don't yuh open yo' mouf, er I 'll hit yuh,
bam!

I 's tired er preachin' en preachin', I is,
En scrubbin' to yearn my honus' bread,
Wilst yuh 's er-nosin' erbout in de weeds,
Er-gwine des so wid yo' rat-snake head,

Huntin' er millions in yudder folks' fiel's!
I 's er good min' to whale yuh, big es yuh
is,
En tell de pahson to stan' at de gate
Wid Peter, en head yuh outen bliss.

Jis gimme dat knife. Does yuh hear me,
Bill?
Han' it right here, er I 'll knock yuh flat!
Not 'ca'se I laks de pesky thing,
Not 'ca'se I 'm hungry, mind yuh dat—

"YUH LOW-DOWN COON! TAKE DAT MILLION OUT!"

To make yuh travel fer yo' sin
 I 's gwineter eat dis million up,
 Es slow en temptin' es I kin;
 En yuh stan' dar, lak er sheepy pup,

En hear de juice er-gurglin' down
 Clean th'ough yo' mammy's gooze quill,
 En watch 'er lick 'er mouf, lak dis,
 En shake 'erse'f en grin er li'l.

I sees hit now, er-layin' dar:
 Two ha'ves es red es yo' Sunday tie,
 En cool es ice—oh, gimme de knife!
 Lawd, boy, be quick, 'r I 'll sholy die!

Now, look at dat! Jis look fer shame!
 Did Hanner hab dat triflin' chile,
 En raise 'im wid two shirts er year,
 En er plug tobaccor once 'n er while?

Wus 't her dat had dat crazy coon,
 Dat nigger so ongawdly mean
 He stolt er million en fotch it home,
 En never knowed dat hit wus green?

Look here, nigger, don't yuh know—
 Yuh 's no mo' sense 'en er hick'ry chunk!—
 Dat er green un allus will go *plunk*,
 En er ripe un allus will go *plunk*?

Now, ain't dis here a purty come-off?
 Wilst makin' yuh drink yo' bitter cup,
 I 's got so hongry en thirsty, I is,
 Dat I 'most could eat dis green un up.

Don't steal no mo'; but ef yuh does,
 Show dat yuh 's wiser 'en I think,
 By fetchin' f'om de 'simmon-tree patch
 A million dat won't say nothin' but *plunk*.

THE CATFISH.

(BANJO SONG.)

OH, de trout am good, but 'e want er live
 bait,
 En de jack 'e 's er leetle bit better,
 En de pike 'e 's sweet, but 'e gits dar late
 En 'e oon't stay hung on de setter.
 But de fish dat bites w'en de moon gits
 slim
 En de possum 's up de 'simmon-tree
 Am de catfish—oh, t'ank de Lawd fer him!
 Fer de cat am de fish fer me.

De cat am de fish fer me, my gal!
 De cat am de fish fer me!
 He 'll swaller any bait 'e c'n git 'is peepers
 on,
 He 'll swim all night w'en de udder fish 's
 gone,
 En 'e 'll hang twell Gab'el blow de silber
 ho'n!
 Oh, de cat am de fish fer me!

De goggle-eye he een't noth'n' but ribs,
 En de brim een't noth'n' but scales,
 De eel 's fust cuss'n to de snek, 'r I fibs,
 En de tarpin 's all haids en tails:
 So de unly good fish, de unly fat fish,
 En de unly fish fitten fer me,
 Am de good ol' cat on er tin-can dish,
 Wid er onion en sassyfrac tea!



"EN 'E 'LL HANG TWELL GAB'EL BLOW
 DE SILBER HO'N!"

CHARACTERISTIC GLIMPSES OF LINCOLN.

I. LINCOLN'S APPLICATION FOR A RAILWAY-PASS.

Springfield, Feb^y 13. 1856

R. P. Morgan, Esq
Dear Sir

Says Tom to John "Here's your
da rotten wheelbarrow" "I've broke it, use it"
"I wish you wmead omead it, caw I shall want
to borrow it this arternoon!"

Acting on this as a precedent
"Here's your da "chalked hat" "I wish you
wmead take it, and send me a new one; caw
I shall want to use it the first of March".

Yours truly
A. Lincoln

FACSIMILE (SOMEWHAT REDUCED IN SCALE) OF THE ORIGINAL LETTER IN THE POSSESSION OF MRS. NELSON ABBOTT.

A LETTER OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD.

In a brief account of the history of the above letter, Mrs. S. Marion Douglass of Mansfield, Ohio, writes that the late Nelson Abbott told her that as a boy of seventeen, in 1863, he was employed in the general offices of the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company, at Bloomington, Illinois. One day his duties took him to the company's warehouse, where, in a box of old papers, he found this Lincoln letter, which had been written seven years earlier to Mr. R. P. Morgan, the president of the company. Mrs. Douglass reminds us that "a pass is known to railroad men as 'a chalked hat,'" and she infers that Lincoln was at the time a member of the Illinois legislature and thereby, according to custom, was favored with a pass. On this point the late John G. Nicolay (Lincoln's private secretary, and, with Colonel John Hay, author of the Lincoln "Life") wrote: "Mr. Lincoln was not a member of the legislature in 1856. He had been elected in 1854, but resigned before it met in January, 1855, and was not afterward a member. It is probable that he was an attorney of the Chicago and Alton Railroad, and received his passes on that score. The letter has never been printed, to my knowledge."—EDITOR.

II. LINCOLN AND KENTUCKY.

BY CICERO T. SUTTON.

STATE pride has always been strong in Kentucky, and when Abraham Lincoln was nominated for the Presidency in 1860, the Kentucky blood, which had become superheated in the preliminary conflict, was cooled in some degree by the fact that he was a native of Kentucky.

Nevertheless, there were violent spirits

who said he was a traitor to the land that gave him birth. Removal from the State, though embracing the longest absence, was held not to absolve the Kentuckian from the allegiance which he owes his birthplace. A Kentuckian must always be for Kentucky and stand by her, right or wrong.

Still there were some who held to the

inviolability of the individual, their creed being that Kentucky should stand by the Kentuckian, within certain limits. It was this element which could not repress the feeling of pride that a native had been honored. While they regretted that Lincoln had cast in his lot with the "Abolitionists," he was still theirs by ties that could not be dissolved.

Samuel Haycraft 'of Elizabethtown was one of those who held to the latter creed. Born in the place of his residence in 1795, he was fourteen years old when, in the same county, Abraham Lincoln saw the light. His father was one of the first settlers of the State, and a man of wealth for that day, and frequently gave employment to Thomas Lincoln, the father of the future President. Samuel, in his earliest boyhood, knew him well, and the acquaintance was kept up until the removal of the elder Lincoln from the State. Mr. Haycraft was clerk of the county and circuit courts of Hardin County from a date soon after his majority until 1850. Thomas Lincoln lived in Hardin County in 1805, and while on a visit to Mordecai Lincoln, in Washington County, met and married Nancy Hanks, an orphan, who lived with a cousin, Frank Berry, a prosperous farmer, whose home was near Springfield. The marriage license was issued in Springfield, June 10, 1805, as appears of record, and the following certificate of return is shown:

I certify that on the 22^d of September, 1805, I solemnized the rites of matrimony between Thomas Lincoln & Nancy Hanks. JESSE HEAD
D. M. E. C.

In the handwriting of the venerable clerk is the indorsement:

License bond dated 10 June, 1805. Why he got his license three months before he was married is a mystery.

After the marriage Thomas and Nancy Lincoln removed to Elizabethtown, and here their first child, a daughter, was born in 1807. Young Haycraft was frequently at their house, and as Thomas, at that day, was not too industrious, the boy found him a genial companion in many of his youthful sports.

Presuming on this acquaintance, Mr. Haycraft in 1860 wrote to Abraham Lincoln, and received the following reply:

SPRINGFIELD, ILLS., May 28, 1860.

HON SAM'L HAYCRAFT.

DEAR SIR: Your recent letter, without date, is received. Also the copy of your speech on the

contemplated Daniel Boone monument, which I have not yet had time to read. In the main you are right about my history. My father was Thomas Lincoln, and Mrs. Sally Johnston was his second wife. You are mistaken about my mother. Her maiden name was Nancy Hanks. I was not born at Elizabethtown, but my mother's first child, a daughter, two years older than myself, and now long since deceased, was. I was born February 12, 1809, near where Hogginsville [Hodgensville] now is, then in Hardin county. I do not think I ever saw you, though I very well know who you are—so well that I recognized your handwriting, on opening your letter, before I saw the signature. My recollection is that Ben Helm was first clerk, that you succeeded him, that Jack Thomas and William Farleigh graduated in the same office, and that your handwritings were all very similar. Am I right?

My father has been dead near ten years; but my step-mother, (Mrs. Johnston,) is still living.

I am really very glad of your letter, and shall be pleased to receive another at any time. Yours very truly A LINCOLN.

Mr. Haycraft answered immediately, inviting Mr. Lincoln to visit Kentucky as his guest. In reply he received the following:

PRIVATE

SPRINGFIELD, ILLS., June 4, 1860

HON. SAM'L HAYCRAFT.

DEAR SIR: Your second letter, dated May 31st is received. You suggest that a visit to the place of my nativity might be pleasant to me. Indeed it would. But would it be safe? Would not the people Lynch me?

The place on Knob creek, mentioned by Mr. Read, I remember very well; but I was not born there. As my parents have told me, I was born on Nolin, very much nearer Hodgins' Mill than the Knob creek place is. My earliest recollection, however, is of the Knob creek place.

Like you, I belonged to the Whig party from its origin to its close. I never belonged to the American party organization; nor ever to a party called a Union party; though I hope I neither am, or ever have been, less devoted to the Union than yourself or any other patriotic man.

It may not be altogether without interest to let you know that my wife is a daughter of the late Robert S. Todd, of Lexington, Ky., and that a half-sister of hers is the wife of Ben Hardin Helm, born and raised at your town, but residing at Louisville now, as I believe. Yours, very truly, A LINCOLN.

The opening sentences of this letter show that Abraham Lincoln understood the fierce passions that even then filled the breasts of his more implacable political opponents; but subsequent statements show that by "the people" he meant only those, and not Kentuckians in general, whom he ever held in

the respect which was their due, and toward whom he showed the kindly feeling which made up so large a part of his great nature.

During the second week of August, 1860, the correspondent of a New York paper arrived in Springfield, Illinois. After a day spent with Mr. Lincoln he wrote to his paper that an attempt had been made to inveigle Mr. Lincoln to Kentucky for the purpose of doing him violence. The statement was made as coming from Mr. Lincoln himself, and its effect in Kentucky may well be imagined. It was a gratuitous insult thrown at a chivalrous people, and was resented as such. Mr. Haycraft was deeply hurt. He felt that he had been misunderstood by Mr. Lincoln, and his opinion of that gentleman was by no means heightened. Frank and open himself, he thought that a suspicious man could not be wholly a good man. Mr. Lincoln had indeed expressed to him a fear of the result should he visit Kentucky, but that had not prepared him for the shock which the newspaper article gave him and his friends. Their verdict was that Abraham Lincoln was not only an apostate, but otherwise an unworthy man.

The instant the New York paper fell under Mr. Lincoln's eye he remembered his Kentucky friend, and lost not a moment in writing him the following letter, which cemented their strong and lasting friendship:

SPRINGFIELD, ILLS., Aug. 16, 1860.

HON SAM'L HAYCRAFT.

MY DEAR SIR: A correspondent of the New-York Herald, who was here a week ago, writing to that paper, represents me as saying I had been invited to visit Kentucky, but that I suspected it was a trap to inveigle me into Kentucky in order to do violence to me. This is wholly a mistake. I said no such thing. I do not remember, but possibly I did mention my correspondence with you. But very certainly I was not guilty of stating, or insinuating, a suspicion of any intended violence, deception or other wrong, against me, by you, or any other Kentuckian. Thinking the Herald correspondence might fall under your eye, I think it due to myself to enter my protest against the correctness of this part of it. I scarcely think the correspondent was malicious, but rather that he misunderstood what was said. Yours, very truly, A LINCOLN.

This letter lifted a load from the hearts of Mr. Haycraft and his friends, but the harm had been done. The newspaper article had circulated far and wide, while the quick and

noble denial was restricted to a narrow circle. During the entire war the feeling that the President had slandered the State rankled in the hearts of thousands of its citizens, and the injury was never forgotten.

Another letter quickly followed, which was more personal and more energetic:

SPRINGFIELD, ILLS., Aug. 23, 1860

HON SAM'L HAYCRAFT.

MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 19th just received. I now fear I may have given you some uneasiness by my last letter. I did not mean to intimate that I had, to any extent, been involved or embarrassed by you; nor yet to draw from you anything to relieve myself from difficulty. My only object was to assure you that I had not, as represented by the Herald correspondent, charged you with an attempt to inveigle me into Kentucky to do me violence. I believe no such thing of you or of Kentuckians generally; and I dislike to be represented to them as slandering them in that way. Yours, very truly, A LINCOLN.

This emphatic letter was accepted in the spirit in which it was written, and Samuel Haycraft, quiet, prudent, and forceful as a Union Democrat, did much to keep Kentucky true to the flag. Mr. Lincoln wrote many times to the Kentucky friend whom he had never seen. One more letter is given to show the feelings of the newly elected President, who, though pressed beyond measure for time, found the opportunity to write:

Private and confidential.

SPRINGFIELD, ILLS., Nov. 13, 1860.

HON SAMUEL HAYCRAFT,

MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 9th is just received. I can only answer briefly. Rest fully assured that the good people of the South, who will put themselves in the same temper and mood towards me which you do, will find no cause to complain of me.

While I cannot, as yet, make any committal as to offices, I sincerely hope I may find it in my power to oblige the friends of Mr. Wintersmith. Yours, very truly, A LINCOLN.

The Mr. Wintersmith referred to was appointed postmaster at Elizabethtown; and this was the beginning of a series of favors bestowed by the President on his friend, or rather on that friend's friends, for Mr. Haycraft never asked anything for himself. His was a character much like Lincoln's—honest, manly, incorruptible. He died in 1878, and his greatest pride was that Abraham Lincoln had reckoned him among his friends.

Lincoln and Booth

A CHRONICLE OF THEIR LAST DAYS

By Clara E. Laughlin

Illustrations from Photographs

HE was brilliantly beautiful, very talented, very successful, very much sought after. Although barely twenty-six years old, he had an income from his profession (that of actor) of about twenty thousand dollars a year. He was tall and full of slender grace; his features were classic in their perfectness; his big black eyes were teasing, tender, laughing, bewitching; a crown of slightly curling jet-black hair was worn pushed boyishly back from a brow of rare intellectual and physical beauty. He was elegant in his dress, blithe and winsome in his manner. Indeed, he was only too winsome—too easy to love and too hard to scold, too quick to charm and too charming to be judged. He was generous and kind, affectionate and gay. His name was John Wilkes Booth, brother of Edwin Booth, the tragedian.

At first, John contented himself with a stupendous scheme. It was a plan to seize the President of the United States, hurry him out of Washington, down through intensely disloyal counties of Maryland to the Potomac, ferry him across into Virginia, and carry him to Richmond, there to turn him over to the Confederate authorities to be held on their own terms—either the termination of the war, or the exchange of one President for all Southern prisoners held by the North. But this scheme fell through—and John evolved another.

Thursday, April 13, 1865, General Grant, who had gone modestly from Appomattox to City Point, arrived in Washington and was greeted tumultuously. That night the city was *en fête*.

Nobody knows where Booth was that evening, or that night. He was not at the National Hotel after Thursday noon, so far as anyone knows. During the afternoon he dropped in at Grover's Theater and asked Manager Hess if he were going to invite the President to the play the following night when the fall of Sumter would be celebrated. After that we

have no trace of him until about noon on Friday. He was never again seen by anyone about the National Hotel, a fact which disposes of the widely current story of his throwing his key on the counter about eight o'clock Friday night and announcing that there was to be "some good acting at Ford's" that evening.

At noon on Friday, however, he sauntered up to Ford's Theater, on Tenth Street between E and F Streets, where he frequently got mail. There was one long letter for Booth that morning, and he smiled repeatedly as he sat on the steps reading it. When he had finished, some one said teasingly—John was an excellent subject to tease, quick with his retorts but always good-natured—"Your friends, Lincoln and Grant, are coming to the theater to-night, John, and we're fixin' to have Lee sit with them."

"Lee would never do that," John replied, with spirit. "He would never let himself be paraded, like a conquered Roman, by his captors."

Then he got up, thoughtfully, and walked away.

Meanwhile, that same morning, President Lincoln went to the War Office to hunt through the telegraph files, and while he was there something was said about his going to the theater that evening. Stanton characterized the intention as "crazy," and in his blunt, grim way inveighed against it with all his might. But the President, who had never listened willingly to such cautionings, contending that to die once were far better than to die a thousand deaths through fear, felt sure that there could not now be any cause to be afraid. It had never seemed likely to Lincoln that any enemy could desire his death, since that would only leave his power in the hands of another; and of all those to whom any share of it might fall, he knew that none had half his mercy for the South. That Washington and, indeed, the whole North, not to mention the

South, was full of his enemies he had every reason to believe. He is even said by some to have been convinced that he would be assassinated. Others say he believed in a foreboding that he should die in the hour of his greatest triumph. If that apprehension were true, it is quite compatible, nevertheless, with his dislike of being constantly guarded. For he was a fatalist, he believed that what was to be, must be. "If it is to be done," he argued, "it is impossible to prevent it." So he went about his business quietly and endured only when he must the futile guardianship of a special policeman.

The Grants were to have accompanied the President and Mrs. Lincoln to the theater that night, but they had to leave for Philadelphia and in their stead Mrs. Lincoln invited Miss Clara Harris, daughter of Senator Ira Harris of New York, and her fiancé, Major Henry Rathbone.

In the early afternoon, the President and Mrs. Lincoln went for a long drive out in the direction of the Soldiers' Home. He talked to Mrs. Lincoln of what they would do when his term of office was over and they could take up a quiet life again. "We have saved some money," he said, "and ought to be able to save some more. And with that and what I can earn from my law practice we can settle down in Springfield or Chicago, and live cozily to a green old age."

After dinner, Speaker Colfax called again and brought with him Mr. Ashmun of Massachusetts. These gentlemen were shown into one of the parlors and talked briefly with the President. While they were there the card of Senator Stewart of Nevada was brought in. The Senator had taken a friend, Judge Searles, to call on the President, and in about five minutes the usher came back with a card from Mr. Lincoln, who had written:

I am engaged to go to the theater with Mrs. Lincoln. It is the kind of an engagement I never break. Come with your friend to-morrow at ten and I shall be glad to see you.

A. LINCOLN.

At the door of Captain Robert T. Lincoln's room, which was over the entrance, the President had stopped as he went downstairs and said: "We're going to the theater, Bob, don't you want to go?" But Captain Robert had not slept in a bed for nearly two weeks and he said that if his father did not mind he would rather stay at home and "turn in early." His father did not mind at all, and they parted with cheery "Good nights."

Mr. Ashmun was disappointed at the short time he had with the President, and Mr. Lincoln urged him to come back in the morning. "Come as early as nine, if you will," he said. And lest there be any difficulty about getting admittance an hour before the official day began, the President stopped at the door as he was going to his carriage, picked up a card and wrote on it:

Allow Mr. Ashmun and friends to come in at nine A.M. to-morrow.

A. LINCOLN.

This he gave Mr. Ashmun as he bade him good night, and in a minute the carriage drove rapidly away. The young sweethearts were in festive mood at the evening's prospect, and the President responded to it with much happiness in their care-free company. The play of the evening was Tom Taylor's eccentric comedy "Our American Cousin."

THE MOVEMENTS OF BOOTH

Some time during the lunch hour, vaguely described by everybody as "about noon," Booth went to Pumphrey's stable on C Street, back of the National Hotel, and hired a horse, for which he said he would call at four-thirty. Booth got his horse and put it up in his stable in the alley back of Ford's Theater. Between that time (probably about five) and eight o'clock in the evening we have no absolute knowledge of John Booth's movements, but he may have been in the auditorium of Ford's Theater for a while—possibly between five-thirty and six, when most of the theater employees would be at their early dinner. It was about three o'clock when the decorations of Lincoln's state box at the theater were completed, and the auditorium lapsed again into that ghostly stillness of the theater in daytime—the shadowy reaches of it full of phantom forms, the intense silence of it loud with echoes of dead eloquence. Then into the draped and decorated box stole a man! God knows who the man was—no one else does know.

He stooped down and "sighted" for the elevation of a tall man's head above the top of the rocker, and on a line with that elevation he cut in the door behind the chair a hole big enough to admit the passage of a bullet; the hole was apparently bored with a small gimlet, then cut clean with a sharp penknife. This was, presumably, in event of the assassin getting into the passageway behind the boxes and finding the doors to the boxes locked for

the distinguished occupants' safety. It was, however, an unnecessary preparation, for the lock on box 8 (in which was the President's chair) had been burst on the 7th of March when some late comers found their seats occupied.

Another thing the man did was to set one end of a bar of wood three feet six inches long against the outer door, and cut to fit the other end of it a mortise in the plaster of the passageway. There was no lock on the outer door, and this brace must be the assassin's sole protection against interference from the house until his deed was done and his leap accomplished. The passageway was a small blind alley such as is usually found leading to theater boxes. The reason the assassin would have to leap to the stage to flee was because the only other escape from the passageway was back through the crowd in the balcony.

Edward Spangler, the stage carpenter, was suspected of this preparation, but the job looked less like a carpenter's than like the work of some one who had no kit of tools. There was a gimlet found in Booth's trunk at the National next day, but he was not at the National after this work was done *IF* it was done Friday afternoon. It may possibly have been done earlier when the abduction plan was uppermost and Ford's Theater was considered a likely place from which to make the seizure. No one knows; but the hole in the door was said to look as if very recently done, and the probability is that Booth himself did the work that afternoon between five and six o'clock.

THE PRESIDENT ENTERS

The play was well under way when the Presidential party got to the theater. The

scene on the stage as they entered represented the after-dinner hour in an English country house. The drawing-room was full of voluminously crinolined ladies whose *ennui* had just been relieved by the arrival of the gentlemen from their postprandials in the dining room. Miss Keene, as *Florence Trechard*, was trying to explain a joke to the dull *Dundreary*. "Can't you see it?" she asked. No; he couldn't. "You can't see it?" No. There was a slight commotion as she spoke, and as *Dundreary* assured her for the second time that he couldn't "see it," she looked up and saw the Presidential party entering the state box. "Well, everybody can see *that*," she said, quickly improvising and looking meaningfully at the Chief Executive as she made a sweeping courtesy. Then the orchestra struck up "Hail to the Chief," the audience cheered and cheered, and for several moments the play was at a standstill, while Mr. Lincoln bowed and smiled his appreciation of the ovation.



ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

From a photograph made shortly before his assassination.

When the party sat down, Mrs. Lincoln was on the President's right, Miss Harris next to her on *her* right; and nearest to the stage, sitting on the end of the sofa, was young Major Rathbone.

During the next two hours the President moved from his seat but once, and that was to rise and put on his overcoat. The night was warm; no one else seemed to feel any chill, but something that did not strike the bared shoulders of the ladies in the box, made the tall, gaunt man in black broadcloth shiver.

Between nine-thirty and ten o'clock, John Booth appeared at the stage door leading his horse, and said: "Tell Spangler to come to the door and hold my horse."

Spangler went to the stage door and explained to Mr. Booth that he could not hold his horse. "Tell Peanut John to come here and hold this horse," Spangler called. "I haven't time." "Peanuts" objected that he had his door to attend to, but Spangler said it would be all right, and if there was anything wrong about it to lay the blame on him. "Peanuts" had a bench in the alley by the door, and as he sat there on guard he held the bridle rein of Mr. Booth's horse.

BOOTH IN A JOKING MOOD

Now, Booth knew perfectly the situation of the play in progress; knew that in the second scene of the third act there was a brief time when only *Asa Trenchard* was on the stage and few of the other players were in the wings, awaiting cues. This was his time to strike, and it occurred about twenty minutes past ten.

After the curtain went up on the third act, Booth stepped to the front door of the theater where Buckingham, the doorkeeper—his attention being directed for the moment to something in the house—had placed his right arm as a barrier across the doorway so that none might pass without his knowledge. Some one came up behind him, took two fingers of that hand and shook them, and Buckingham turned to look. It was John Booth, smiling his boyish smile. "You don't want a ticket from me, do you?" he asked jocularly. And Buckingham smiled back at him and said he "guessed not." Booth went into the house, looked around, and came out almost immediately. When he returned to the door Buckingham was talking to some out-of-town acquaintances who were in the audience, and when the young tragedian passed him, the doorkeeper halted him and introduced his acquaintances, to whom, even in that awful hour, John made some genial remarks.

He seems to have hovered about the door, nervously, for a quarter of an hour or more. Once he asked Buckingham the time; once he asked for a chew of tobacco and was accommodated. About ten minutes past ten he went into the restaurant south of the theater and took a drink of whisky, came quickly out, passed Buckingham at the door, humming a tune as he went, ascended the stairs to the dress circle and walked down along the south wall of the theater close to the entrance of the President's box. There was no sentry at the door. No one was there. John Parker, who had gone to the theater as the

President's guard, had left his post at the door to the passageway, and gone to a seat in the dress circle, whence he could better see the play. Booth had no one to elude; no one to make pretext to; his movements were entirely unchallenged. The play waxed funnier and funnier, more and more absorbing. Every eye in the house was fixed otherwise than on that door—every eye but John Booth's.

On the stage, there was a tart dialogue going on between *Asa Trenchard* and a designing old woman, *Mrs. Mountchessington*, who presently flounced off with a taunt about *Asa's* unaccustomedness to society.

"Society, eh?" said *Asa*, looking after her. "Well, I guess I know enough to turn you inside out, you darned old sockdolaging man-trap!"

Shouts of laughter greeted this characteristic defense of "Our American Cousin," and while they were rolling across the footlights there mingled with them a sharper sound—a pistol report. Booth had stepped into the passageway, dropped the bar of wood in place to hold the door against ingress, entered the box and, shouting "*Sic semper tyrannis*," fired a Derringer pistol a few inches from the President's head. For a second or two the audience thought the shooting was behind the scenes, a part of the play; not an eye turned toward the State box where Major Rathbone was grappling with the assassin. Booth had dropped his pistol when it was fired and drawn a large knife with which he slashed Major Rathbone, striking for his breast but gashing instead the left arm which the Major thrust up to parry the blow. Notwithstanding his wound, the Major grabbed at the assassin as he was preparing to leap from the box to the stage fourteen feet below, but he was unable to hold him. All this happened in far fewer seconds than it takes to tell it, and, almost before anyone could realize that there was something wrong, Booth had jumped and fallen, his right leg doubled under him, was instantly up again and running across the front of the stage. Almost simultaneously Mrs. Lincoln's heartrending cry rang out and Major Rathbone shouted: "Catch that man!" But for a paralyzed moment, no one stirred.

ASSASSIN ESCAPES FROM THE THEATER

Impeded in his jump—which ordinarily would have been nothing to one of his athletic training—by Rathbone's clutch, Booth had caught his spur in the Treasury flag, gashed the frame of Washington's picture hanging

there, and broken the small bone of his left leg in the heavy fall. But he was down scarcely a moment, and before anyone in the house or on the stage could realize what he had done, he had reached the "prompt" entrance and was running through the cleared passage leading to the stage door.

Some of the spectators, when they got to thinking about it afterwards, felt sure Booth stopped in the center-front of the stage, brandished his dagger and yelled, "The South is Avenged!" Some thought he shouted "*Sic semper*" as he struck the stage; some that he shouted it as he ran. He crossed the stage some feet in front of Harry Hawk (*Asa Trenchard*), ran between Miss Keene and W. J. Ferguson standing in the passage near the prompt entrance, rushed past Withers, the orchestra leader, who was on his way to the stairs close by the back door, and as Withers stood stock-still in his way, Booth struck at him with the knife, knocking him down, made a rush for the door, and was gone.

Joseph B. Stewart, who sat in the front row on the right-hand side of the orchestra almost directly under the President's box, was the first man on the stage. He rushed after the fleeing assassin, shouting, "Stop that man!" But before anyone seemed to have sense to think of pursuit, the clattering of hoofs on the stone-paved alley had died away, and John Wilkes Booth was swallowed up in the night.

LINCOLN UNCONSCIOUS TO THE LAST

Meanwhile, in that upper box, the tall, gaunt man in the rocking chair had not changed his position, the smile he wore over *Asa's* last sally had not even given place to a look of pain—so lightning-quick had unconsciousness come. The head was bent slightly forward, the eyes were closed; Mrs. Lincoln had clutched his arm, but had not moved from her seat; neither had Miss Harris. At the barred door to the passageway many persons were frantically pounding, and Major Rathbone, staggering to the door, found the bar, removed it, and of those seeking admittance allowed several who represented themselves to be surgeons to come in. Another surgeon was lifted up into the box from the stage, and almost as soon as any to reach the scene of the tragedy was Miss Keene, who took the President's head into her lap.

There was a slight delay in locating the wound; some looked for it in the breast and tore open the President's shirt. Dr. Charles Taft, who had been lifted into the box,

located the wound behind the left ear, and countermanded the order just given for the President's carriage. The ride over the then cobble-paved streets of Washington was not to be thought of, and Dr. Taft directed that instead, the nearest bed be sought. He lifted the President's head and, others helping with the rest of the long, inert body, a shutter was impressed for service as a litter, and the horror-stricken little procession went along the upper lobby toward the stairs. They took the body across Tenth Street to the house of William Peterson, a tailor. At the end of the front hall was a long, narrow bedroom the tenant of which, a young soldier named Willie Clark, was not in. On the neat, though small, bed in that room the President was laid—cornerwise, as only that way could his great length be accommodated—and messengers were sent in every direction, for Captain Robert Lincoln, for the members of the Cabinet, for the Surgeon General, for the President's private physician, Dr. Stone, for his pastor, Dr. Gurley of the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church.

Through the house, above the soft footfalls of those ministering to the dying, above the hushed tones of Stanton and Dana, above the sobbing of Mrs. Lincoln, sounded the incessant moaning, the stertorous breathing of the President. He was entirely unconscious; not the faintest glimmer of understanding had come to him since the bullet plowed its way through his brain.



JOHN WILKES BOOTH.

The assassin of President Lincoln.

At a quarter before two Mrs. Lincoln went into the little room. The President was quiet then—the moaning, the struggling motion of the long arms, were over. She stayed until ten minutes after two, when she returned to her sofa in the parlor. At three o'clock she went in again for a few moments. At three-thirty-five Dr. Gurley knelt by the bedside and prayed. At six o'clock the pulse began to fall. At six-thirty the labored breathing was heard again. At seven the physicians announced signs of immediate dissolution, and at seven-twenty-two the faint pulse ceased, the last breath fluttered from between the parted lips, and Stanton's voice broke the unbearable stillness, saying: "Now he belongs to the ages."

At nine o'clock the body of the President was placed in a temporary coffin, wrapped in an American flag, and borne by six soldiers to a hearse. Then, very quietly, with only a tiny escort, moving through Tenth to I Street, the return to the White House was made. A spring rain had been falling since early morning, and the gay buntings that were so soon to be replaced with the trappings of woe, wore a bedraggled look as the hero of peace went past.

BOOTH'S ESCAPE

When Booth left the alley behind Ford's Theater, he fled to the Navy Yard bridge over the eastern branch of the Potomac. He got past the sentry by saying he had waited for moonrise before beginning his ride home. Ten minutes later Davy Herold, Booth's accomplice, and possibly one of the original conspirators to abduct Lincoln, crossed the bridge, and caught up with the assassin. Booth, it must be remembered, had broken in his fall to the stage the fibula, or small bone, of his left leg, and was suffering the most excruciating torture as he rode, the splintered bone tearing into the flesh at every move. At the top of Good Hope Hill Booth and Herold turned to the right into the road to Surrattsville, Maryland, thirteen miles southeast of Washington. Some miles farther on they came to a physician's house, where the injured leg was set and the refugees were innocently given shelter. Dr. Samuel Mudd, who performed this office, was afterwards sentenced for life to the Dry Tortugas, a barren fortified island off the Florida coast.

The next day the two men rode away, although Booth was hobbling painfully. They made for the house of a Colonel Samuel Cox, known as a strong Southern sympathizer. The Colonel, however, had heard of the

assassination and refused to take in the strangers. This forced them to seek shelter in a gully on the Cox farm. There they were found by Cox on Sunday—Easter Sunday—morning. Booth immediately disclosed his identity and threw himself upon the older man's mercy.

ASSASSIN EXPECTED TO BE PRAISED

Cox's reprehension of Booth's awful deed was the first shock the mad, misguided young murderer had, his first bitter taste of the world's malediction in the stead of that grateful praise he had so confidently expected. Colonel Cox agreed, nevertheless, to give them the protection he had promised and he conducted them to a pine thicket about a mile and a half from his home. Returning to the house, he sent a white farm hand to Huckleberry Farm to fetch Thomas A. Jones, his foster-brother, to care for Booth. Colonel Cox directed him to the thicket and told him to give a certain whistle as a signal so he might reach the men without being shot. Herold came out of the dense pines, on hearing the whistle, and conducted Jones to where Booth lay on the ground wrapped in blankets, his face drawn with great pain. Booth asked Jones a great many questions as to what people thought of the assassination, and appeared, Jones thought, to be proud of what he had done.

"I at the time," Jones afterwards admitted, "thought he had done a great act; but great God! I soon saw that it was the worst blow ever struck for the South."

It was while Booth lay there and knew the surrounding country to be full of soldiers searching for him, that he made two entries in his little red leather-bound diary which he carried in an inner pocket and in the back of which he had the photographs of half a dozen pretty girls. He dated the first entry "April 13, 14, Friday the Ides," writing that date around the words "*te amo*," evidently of long previous inscription at some happier time when he was practicing love messages in Latin. This first entry reads:

Until to-day nothing was ever thought of sacrificing to our country's wrongs. For six months we had worked to capture. But our cause being almost lost, something decisive and great must be done. But its failure was owing to others who did not strike for their country with a heart. I struck boldly, and not as the papers say. I walked with a firm step through a thousand of his friends; was stopped, but pushed on. A colonel was at his side. I shouted *sic semper* before I fired. In jumping, broke my leg. I passed all his pickets. Rode sixty miles (*sic!*) that

night, with the bone of my leg tearing the flesh at every jump.

I can never repent it, though we hated to kill. Our country owed all her troubles to him, and God simply made me the instrument of his punishment.

The country is not what it was. This forced Union is not what I have loved. I care not what becomes of me. I have no desire to outlive my country. This night (before the deed) I wrote a long article and left it for one of the editors of the *National Intelligencer*, in which I fully set forth our reasons for proceeding. He or the gov'n—

Here, either from weakness or perhaps with a sudden alarm, the diary abruptly breaks. And there is but one more entry, dated "Friday 21."

EXTRACTS FROM BOOTH'S DIARY

Fourteen hundred cavalymen were assembled around Port Tobacco, Maryland, and ordered to search the swamps for him; but no trace could be found. The following Friday Jones, however, overheard information which made him decide that the fugitives must be moved. Nothing could be done until after dark, and it was doubtless while waiting for this cover of the moonless night that Booth made the second and last entry in his diary. From the first sentence of this it would seem that on Thursday night Booth and Herold must have made a desperate and unadvised attempt to get away. The entry reads:

Friday. 21—After being hunted like a dog through swamps and woods, and last night being chased by gunboats till I was forced to return, wet, cold, and starving, with every man's hand against me, I am here in despair. And why? For doing what Brutus was honored for—what made William Tell a hero, and yet I, for striking down an even greater tyrant than they ever knew, am looked upon as a common cutthroat. My act was purer than either of theirs. One hoped to be great himself, and the other had not only his country's, but his own, wrongs to avenge. I hoped for no gain; I knew no private wrong. I struck for my country, and her alone. A people ground beneath this tyranny prayed for this end, and yet now see the cold hands they extend to me! God cannot pardon me if I have done wrong; yet I cannot see any wrong, except in serving a degenerate people. The little, the very little, I left behind to clear my name, the Government will not allow to be printed. So ends all! For my country I have given up all that makes life sweet and holy—to-night misfortune upon my family, and am sure there is no pardon for me in the heavens, since man condemns me so. I have only heard of what has been done (except what I did myself), and it fills me with horror. God, try and forgive me and bless my mother. To-night I will once more try the river, with the intention to cross; though I have a greater desire and almost a mind to return to Washington, and in a measure clear my name, which I feel I can do.

I do not repent the blow I struck. I may before my God, but not to man. I think I have done well,



HOUSE IN WHICH LINCOLN DIED.

though I am abandoned, with the curse of Cain upon me, when, if the world knew my heart, that one blow would have made me great, though I did desire no greatness. To-night I try once more to escape these bloodhounds. Who, who, can read his fate! God's will be done. I have too great a soul to die like a criminal. Oh! may He spare me that, and let me die bravely. I bless the entire world. I have never hated or wronged anyone. This last was not a wrong, unless God deems it so, and it is with Him to damn or bless me. And for this brave boy, Herold, here with me, who often prays (yes, before and since) with a true sincere heart, was it a crime in him? If so, why can he pray the same? I do not wish to shed a drop of blood, but I must fight the course. 'Tis all that's left me.

When the darkness permitted, Jones went to the thicket and, with Herold's help, lifted Booth to his (Jones's) horse. Then, Herold leading the horse and Jones walking a little in advance to show the way and to scout, they proceeded to Huckleberry Farm, which was about three quarters of a mile from the Potomac. From Huckleberry Farm they reached the river, pushed out in a flat-bottomed boat, and for two days cruised among the neighboring creeks, crossing to the Virginia shore on Saturday night. Sunday they stayed in the cabin of a negro named William Lucas. Monday morning early he took them in a wagon to Port Conway on the Rappahannock, where they arrived at nine-thirty. Herold asked William Rollins, the ferryman, about getting across the river and was told he would have to wait a little while, until the tide rose.

While he and Booth were waiting, three Confederate officers rode up to the ferry. They were Captain William M. Jett, Lieutenant A. R. Bainbridge, and Lieutenant Ruggles. Herold turned to Jett—they were all sitting down now in front of Rollins's house—touched him on the shoulder and, saying he wanted to speak to him, led him over to the wharf where he entreated Jett to take his "brother" and him South.

BEFRIENDED BY CONFEDERATES

Jett answered: "I cannot go with any man that I don't know anything about." And Herold, after a moment's thought, whispered, in great agitation: "We are the assassins of the President." Jett was confounded beyond the power of reply. He saw Ruggles at the river watering his horse and called him to the wharf. There was a consultation in which Booth presently joined, hobbling down from the house; and the upshot of it was that when the tide rose they crossed together, Booth riding Ruggles's horse.

The five men went along the road toward Bowling Green and about three miles on the way came to the comfortable farmhouse of a Mr. Garrett, who consented, on solicitation, to shelter a wounded Confederate for a day or two.

It was about three o'clock Monday afternoon when Jett—although he did not know Mr. Garrett—undertook the introduction to him of "John William Boyd" and asked Mr. Garrett to care for "Boyd" until Wednesday morning, at which time his companions would call for him. About four o'clock—shortly after Booth had been taken into the Garrett home—twenty-nine pursuers under Colonel E. J. Conger embarked on the steamer *John S. Ide* and sailed down to Belle Plain, the nearest landing to Fredericksburg, arriving at ten o'clock. From Belle Plain they galloped across country, riding all night and all day Tuesday. At three o'clock Tuesday afternoon they arrived at the Port Conway Ferry, found Rollins, showed him photographs of Booth and Herold, and learned from him that the men wanted had been ferried across the Rappahannock by him just about twenty-four hours before. Rollins said they had started for Bowling Green, in company with three Confederate officers. He was arrested and taken as guide, the river was ferried again, and about sundown the posse galloped past Garrett's, where Booth and the family were seated on the porch. Herold was there, too.

When Booth saw the troops go by, he and Herold retired precipitately to a thicket behind the barn, not venturing thence until summoned to supper. Asked why they feared the Federal troops now that the war was over, Booth said they had been "in a little brush over in Maryland" and thought best to lie low for a few days.

The Garretts suspected their guests. When bedtime came, Booth manifested strong reluctance to going upstairs, and on insisting he would rather sleep anywhere else, even in a barn, was conducted to a large tobacco house. Jack Garrett believed this sleeping in a barn was a ruse; that the strange men would get up in the night and steal their horses. So he locked them into the tobacco house and gave the key to a Miss Holloway, who boarded with the Garretts. And he and his brother went to a shed near the tobacco house, whence they could keep watch of their suspicious visitors.

It was after eleven o'clock that night when the soldiers Booth had seen passing Garrett's before sundown reached Bowling Green, surrounded the little tavern, and arrested Jett, who was in bed. Conger demanded to know where the two men Jett had crossed the ferry with were now, and Jett, very much frightened, told Conger where they were and offered to go as guide and show the way.

CAUGHT ON THE GARRETT FARM

At two in the morning the squad of thirty surrounded Garrett's farmhouse, and a lieutenant named Baker rapped loudly at the kitchen door. Presently the elder Garrett came to the door, in his night-clothes, and was roughly seized by Baker, who clutched the old man's throat with one hand and with the other held a pistol to his head. When Mr. Garrett could speak, he said the men were gone. Just then Jack Garrett appeared from the shed, and urged upon his father, whom Conger was threatening to hang, the need of telling the truth in the matter. A guard was left to watch the father and the rest of the posse, led by Jack Garrett, approached the tobacco house. The soldiers were stationed around the building—which was only about one hundred feet from the residence—at a distance of ten yards, with four of them at the padlocked door. The key was brought from the house, and while they were waiting for it a rustling noise could be heard within the tobacco house.

Baker spoke to the men inside, saying he

would send in one of the young Garretts to demand their surrender. To this youth he ordered them to deliver their arms; after which they were to come out and give themselves up.

OFFERS TO FIGHT HIS PURSUERS

Accordingly, the trembling Garrett boy was sent within, and soon returned reporting that Booth had cursed him for a betrayer and "reached down into the hay behind him" as if for a weapon, whereupon Garrett waited not on the order of his going, but went at once. Then Baker called into them that if they did not come out in five minutes he would fire the tobacco house. To which Booth replied in a ringing voice: "Who are you? what do you want? whom do you want?"

"We want you," said Baker, "and we know who you are; give up your arms and come out."

"Let us have a little time to consider," urged Booth; and this was granted.

Ten minutes went by in hushed stillness, awaiting the least sound from within. Fifteen minutes. And from within the tobacco house, not a sound. At length, the ringing voice again:

"Who are you and what do you want?"

And from Baker the reply: "We want you; we want to take you prisoners."

"Captain," said the clear voice, every tone of which was distinguishable on the gallery, a hundred feet away, "I know you to be a brave man, and I believe you to be honorable. I am a cripple: I have got but one leg. If you will withdraw your men in line one hundred yards from the door, I will come out and fight you."

Baker replied that he had not come to fight, but to capture; to which Booth said: "If you will take your men fifty yards from the door, I'll come out and fight you. Give me a chance for my life!"

Later, he offered to fight all the men singly: and when Baker again refused, the word came back: "Well, my brave boys, prepare a stretcher for me."

Some one close to the tobacco house heard Booth say to his companion: "You damned coward, will you leave me now? Go! Go! I would not have you stay with me."

Booth then came to the door and announced: "There's a man in here who wants to come out."

"Very well," said Baker, "let him hand his arms out and come."

Thereupon Herold came to the door and said: "Let me out."

"Hand out your arms," ordered Baker. "You carried a carbine and you must hand it out."

"The arms are mine," called Booth, "and I have got them. Upon the word and honor of a gentleman, this man has none. And I declare before my Maker that he is innocent of any crime whatever."

Herold was then ordered to put out his hands, they were manacled, and he was quickly dragged out, the door slammed behind him, and the easy prisoner hurried to a remote corner of the yard with a couple of cavalrymen to guard him. Immediately Herold was secured, Conger went around to the corner of the tobacco house, pulled a whisp of hay through a crack, set fire to it and stuck it back. The hay was very dry and blazed almost instantly. Booth turned, when he heard it crackling, and seemed to be looking to see if he could put it out. Then, as if convinced that he could not, he started toward the door. At that moment a shot rang out. Boston Corbett, a trooper of the Sixteenth New York, had lost his head, disobeyed orders, and fired through a crack with deadly aim.

BOOTH WAS SHOT BY MISTAKE

"He has shot himself!" was the instant thought of everyone. Conger rushed into the barn and found Baker already there and raising Booth up. They discovered a wound in the neck, close to the back of the head, from which the blood was pouring freely. Out onto the grass beneath the locust trees they dragged him, and there they left him for dead while they went to see if the fire could not be put out. It could not, and Conger left it and returned to Booth, whose eyes and lips were moving as if he wanted to speak. He was carried to the gallery, Miss Holloway fetched a pillow for his head and dipped a rag in brandy and water to moisten his lips. Presently he was able to articulate, and Conger bent over him to hear what he might say.

"Tell mother—I die—for my—country," he gasped; "I did—what I thought—was—best."

Conger then searched the dying man's pockets and took all they contained—the diary, a knife, a pipe, a little file, a pocket compass smeared with candle drippings, a bill of exchange bought in Montreal in October, etc. Booth whispered pleadingly: "Kill me, kill me."

"We don't want to kill you," Conger assured him, "we want you to get well."

Conger then left, telling Baker that if Booth was not dead in an hour "to send over to Belle Plain for a surgeon from one of the gunships; if he died, to get the best conveyance he could and bring him on." Conger was in mad haste to get to Secretary Stanton and tell him that the reward of \$75,000 had been earned. He reached Washington at 5 P.M., and with Chief Baker went at once to Mr. Stanton to tell him the news. They thought to excite the grim War Minister for once, but they were mistaken. He took the announcement quite stolidly.

BOOTH'S LAST WORDS

Corbett fired about 3.15 A.M., that Wednesday, the 26th day of April. Booth lingered until half-past five; conscious to the last he must have been, said the doctors who knew the nature of the wound, and suffering the most excruciating agony a human being can know.

Toward the end, as the dawn was breaking into brilliant day, he indicated by a look, a feeble motion, that he wanted his paralyzed arms raised so he could see his hands. This was done, and he said, very faintly, as he looked at them: "Useless—useless!" Those were his last words.

They took the body to Belle Plain, where the *Ide* lay; the *Ide* arrived at Alexandria at twenty minutes to eleven that night.

A tug was there, by Secretary Stanton's orders, to meet the *Ide*; on it were Conger and Chief L. C. Baker of the Secret Service, and to it were transferred the body of Booth and the person of Herold. At a quarter to two in the morning the tug came alongside the monitor *Montauk*, anchored off the Navy Yard; and Herold was put in double irons and placed in the hold, while the body of Booth was, on Baker's orders, kept on deck under a guard.

It was about two o'clock in the afternoon when the body having been fully identified, photographed, and officially attested dead, left the ironclad. Then Chief Baker put the body into a rowboat, and the boat was rowed down the eastern branch and up the main stream of the Potomac, which bounds Washington on the south. At the foot of Four and One-Half Street, on the river, was the Arsenal inclosure. The party in the small boat steered for the Arsenal wharf, and there, at about four

o'clock, the body of Booth was landed and laid on the wharf in charge of a sentry.

During the night it was carried into one of the cellar storerooms of the old penitentiary, some bricks were removed from the floor, a grave was dug, the body was put into a gun box and covered with a blanket, the earth and then the bricks were hastily replaced, and the room was locked, the key being taken to Mr. Stanton by Major Eckert. That was where John Booth lay while rumors of his incineration, his burial at sea, his dismemberment, filled the air.

Four years later, in February, 1869, when President Johnson's permission was secured by the Booth family, Mr. Harvey, a Washington undertaker, drove out to the Arsenal grounds one afternoon and returned with the gun box containing John's remains.

The establishment of Harvey & Marr was on F Street near Tenth; and after dark on that winter afternoon the little company waiting tensely, in the back shop, heard the sound of hoofs and wheels on the cobble-paved alley, and some one said, "There they are!" and in a moment the wagon was backed into the stable. John Booth's body had come back, after nearly four years, to be confined at a spot not a stone's throw from where his flight began.

The gun box was set on trestles, in the stable, and a lantern was called for; this was the light by which the cover was pried off the box, the gray army blankets lifted, and the remains disclosed. In the next room sat the great Hamlet, his brother Edwin, waiting.

FATE OF ASSASSIN'S ACCOMPLICES


The identification being satisfactory—aided by the dentist who had filled John Booth's teeth—the body, in a new casket, was sent to Baltimore that night and the following day interred in the family plot at Greenmount, where it lies beneath thick ivy under the east face of the monument reared to Junius Brutus Booth by his son Edwin in 1858.

The fate of all connected with Booth was severe in the extreme: Dr. Mudd, Arnold, and O'Laughlin were sentenced for life at the Dry Tortugas, and Spangler for six years. Mrs. Suratt, Atzerodt, Davy Herold, and Lewis Payne (who tried to assassinate Seward) were simultaneously hanged until dead from the same scaffold in the prison yard at Washington.



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY SHAW IN THE COLLECTION OF ROBERT CURTIS. MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN.



ABRAHAM LINCOLN

This portrait of Lincoln, published for the first time in *THE OAKS* of February 7, is reproduced in our Memorial Number by special request and on account of the wide interest its publication aroused. The original is owned by Dr. J. B. McFarrich.

Lincoln's Last Day

NEW FACTS NOW TOLD FOR THE FIRST TIME

BY WILLIAM H. CROOK (HIS PERSONAL BODY GUARD)

COMPILED AND WRITTEN DOWN BY MARGARITA SPALDING GERRY

AS March 31, 1865, drew near, the President (then at City Point, Virginia) knew that Grant was to make a general attack upon Petersburg, and grew depressed. The fact that his own son was with Grant was one source of anxiety. But the knowledge of the loss of life that must follow hung about him until he could think of nothing else. On the 31st there was, of course, no news. Most of the first day of April Mr. Lincoln spent in the telegraph-office, receiving telegrams and sending them on to Washington. Toward evening he came back to the *River Queen*, on which we had sailed from Washington to City Point.

There his anxiety became more intense. There had been a slight reverse during the day; he feared that the struggle might be prolonged. We could hear the cannon as they pounded away at Drury's Bluff up the river. We knew that not many miles away Grant was pouring fire into Lee's forces about Petersburg.

It grew dark. Then we could see the flash of the cannon. Mr. Lincoln would not go to his room. Almost all night he walked up and down the deck, pausing now and then to listen or to look out into the darkness to see if he could see anything. I have never seen such suffering in the face of any man as was in his that night.

On the morning of April 2d a message came from General Grant asking the President to come to his headquarters, some miles distant from City Point and near Petersburg. It was on Sunday. We rode out to the entrenchments, close to the battle-ground. Mr. Lincoln watched the life-and-death struggle for some time, and then returned to City Point. In the evening he received a despatch from

General Grant telling him that he had pushed Lee to his last lines about Petersburg. The news made the President happy. He said to Captain Penrose that the end of the war was now in sight. He could go to bed and sleep now. I remember how cheerful was his "Good night, Crook."

On Monday, the 3d, a message came to the President that Petersburg was in possession of the Federal army, and that General Grant was waiting there to see him. We mounted and rode over the battle-field to Petersburg. As we rode through Fort Hell and Fort Damnation—as the men had named the outposts of the two armies which faced each other, not far apart—many of the dead and dying were still on the ground. I can still see one man with a bullet-hole through his forehead and another with both arms shot away. As we rode, the President's face settled into its old lines of sadness.

At the end of fifteen miles we reached Petersburg, and were met by Captain Robert Lincoln of General Grant's staff, who, with some other officers, escorted us to General Grant. We found him and the rest of his staff sitting on the piazza of a white frame house. Grant did not look like one's idea of a conquering hero. He didn't appear exultant, and he was as quiet as he had ever been. The meeting between Grant and Lincoln was cordial; the President was almost affectionate. While they were talking I took the opportunity to stroll through Petersburg. It seemed deserted, but I met a few of the inhabitants. They said they were glad that the Union army had taken possession; they were half starved. They certainly looked so. The tobacco warehouses were on fire, and boys were carrying away tobacco to sell to the soldiers.

I bought a five-pound bale of smoking-tobacco for twenty-five cents. Just before we started back a little girl came up with a bunch of wild flowers for the President. He thanked the child for them kindly, and we rode away. Soon after we got back to City Point news came of the evacuation of Richmond.

In the midst of the rejoicing some Confederate prisoners were brought aboard transports at the dock near us. The President hung over the rail and watched them. They were in a pitiable condition, ragged and thin; they looked half starved. When they were on board they took out of their knapsacks the last rations that had been issued to them before capture. There was nothing but bread, which looked as if it had been mixed with tar. When they cut it we could see how hard it was and heavy; it was more like cheese than bread.

"Poor fellows!" Mr. Lincoln said. "It's a hard lot. Poor fellows—"

I looked up. His face was pitying and sorrowful. All the happiness had gone.

On the 4th of April, Admiral Porter asked the President to go to Richmond with him. At first the President did not want to go. He knew it was foolhardy. And he had no wish to see the spectacle of the Confederacy's humiliation. It has been generally believed that it was Mr. Lincoln's own idea, and he has been blamed for rashness because of it. I understand that when Mr. Stanton, who was a vehement man, heard that the expedition had started, he was so alarmed that he was angry against the President. "That fool!" he exclaimed. Mr. Lincoln knew perfectly well how dangerous the trip was, and, as I said, at first he did not want to go, realizing that he had no right to risk his life unnecessarily. But he was convinced by Admiral Porter's arguments. Admiral Porter thought that the President ought to be in Richmond as soon after the surrender as possible. In that way he could gather up the reins of government most readily and give an impression of confidence in the South that would be helpful in the reorganization of the government. Mr. Lincoln immediately saw the wisdom of this position and went forward, calmly accepting the possibility of death.

Mrs. Lincoln, by this time, had gone

back to Washington. Mr. Lincoln, Taddie and I went up the James River on the *River Queen* to meet Admiral Porter's fleet. Taddie went down immediately to inspect the engine and talk with his friends the sailors; the President remained on deck. Near where Mr. Lincoln sat was a large bowl of apples on a table; there must have been at least half a peck. The President reached forward for one.

"These must have been put here for us," he said. "I guess I will sample them." We both began to pare and eat. Before we reached the Admiral's flagship every apple had disappeared—and the parings too. When the last one was gone the President said with a smile, "I guess I have cleaned that fellow out."

When we had met Admiral Porter's fleet the question of the best way to get to Richmond had to be decided. While some effort had been made to fish the torpedoes and other obstructions out of the water, but little headway had been made. The river was full of wreckage of all sorts, and torpedoes were floating everywhere. The plan had been to sail to Richmond in Admiral Porter's flag-ship *Malvern*, escorted by the *Bat*, and with the *Columbus* for the horses. But it was soon evident that it would not be possible to get so large a boat through at Drury's Bluff, where the naturally narrow and rapid channel was made impassable by a boat which had missed the channel and gone aground. It was determined to abandon the *Malvern* for the captain's gig, manned by twelve sailors. When the party, consisting of President Lincoln, Admiral Porter, Captain Penrose, Taddie and myself, were seated, a little tug, the *Bat*, which the President had used for his trips about City Point, came alongside and took us in tow. There were a number of marines on board the tug. We were kept at a safe distance from the tug by means of a long hawser, so that if she struck a torpedo and was blown up, the President and his party would be safe. Even with this precaution the trip was exciting enough. On either side dead horses, broken ordnance, wrecked boats, floated near our boat, and we passed so close to torpedoes that we could have put out our hands and touched them. We were dragged over one wreck which

was so near the surface that it could be clearly seen.

Beyond Drury's Bluff, at a point where a bridge spans the water, the tug was sent back to help a steamboat which had stuck fast across the stream. It seems that it was the *Allison*, a captured Confederate vessel, and Admiral Farragut, who had taken it, was on board. The marines, of course, went with the tug. In the attempt to help the larger boat the tug was grounded. Then we went on with no other motive-power than the oars in the arms of the twelve sailors.

The shore for some distance before we reached Richmond was black with negroes. They had heard that President Lincoln was on his way—they had some sort of an underground telegraph, I am sure. They were wild with excitement and yelling like so many wild men: "Dar comes Massa Linkum, de Sabier ob de lan"—we is so glad to see him!" We landed at the Rocketts, over a hundred yards back of Libbey Prison. By the time we were on shore hundreds of black hands were outstretched to the President, and he shook some of them and thanked the darkies for their welcome. While we stood still a few minutes before beginning our walk through the city, we saw some soldiers not far away "initiating" some negroes by tossing them on a blanket. When they came down they were supposed to be transformed into Yankees. The darkies yelled lustily during the process, and came down livid under their black skins. But they were all eager for the ordeal. The President laughed boyishly—I heard him afterward telling some one about the funny sight.

We formed in line. Six sailors were in advance and six in the rear. They were armed with short carbines. Mr. Lincoln was in the centre, with Admiral Porter and Captain Penrose on the right and I on the left, holding Taddie by the hand. I was armed with a Colt's revolver. We looked more like prisoners than anything else as we walked up the streets of Richmond not thirty-six hours after the Confederates had evacuated.

At first, except the blacks, there were not many people on the streets. But soon we were walking through streets that were alive with spectators. Wherever it was possible for a human being to find a foot-

hold there was some man or woman or boy straining his eyes after the President. Every window was crowded with heads. Men were hanging from tree-boxes and telegraph-poles. But it was a silent crowd. There was something oppressive in those thousands of watchers without a sound, either of welcome or hatred. I think we would have welcomed a yell of defiance. I stole a look sideways at Mr. Lincoln. His face was set. It had the calm in it that comes over the face of a brave man when he is ready for whatever may come. In all Richmond the only sign of welcome I saw, after we left the negroes at the landing-place and until we reached our own men, was from a young lady who was on a sort of bridge that connected the Spottwood House with another hotel across the street. She had an American flag over her shoulders.

We had not gone far when the blinds of a second-story window of a house on our left were partly opened, and a man dressed in gray pointed something that looked like a gun directly at the President. I dropped Tad's hand and stepped in front of Mr. Lincoln. Later the President explained it otherwise. But we were all so aware of the danger of his entrance into Richmond right on the heels of the army, with such bitterness of feeling on the part of the Confederates, the streets swarming with disorderly characters, that our nerves were not steady. It seems to me nothing short of miraculous that some attempt on his life was not made. It is to the everlasting glory of the South that he was permitted to come and go in peace.

We were glad when we reached General Weitzel's headquarters in the abandoned Davis mansion and were at last among friends. Every one relaxed in the generous welcome of the General and his staff. The President congratulated General Weitzel and a jubilation followed.

The Jefferson Davis home was a large house of gray stucco, with a garden at the back. It was a fine place, though everything looked dilapidated after the long siege. It was still completely furnished, and there was an old negro house-servant in charge. He told me that Mrs. Davis had ordered him to have the house in good condition for the Yankees.

"I am going out into the world a

wanderer without a home," she had said when she bade him good-by.

I was glad to know that he was to have everything "in good condition," for I was thirsty after so much excitement, and surely his orders must have included something to drink. I put the question to him. He said,

"Yes, indeed, boss, there is some fine old whiskey in the cellar."

In a few minutes he produced a long, black bottle. The bottle was passed around. When it came back it was empty. Every one had taken a pull except the President, who never touched anything of the sort.

An officer's ambulance was brought to the door, and President Lincoln, Admiral Porter, General Weitzel with some of his staff, Captain Penrose, and Taddie took their seats. There was no room for me.

"Where is the place for Crook?" Mr. Lincoln asked. "I want him to go with me." Then they provided me with a saddle-horse, and I rode by the side on which Mr. Lincoln sat. We went through the city. Everywhere were signs of war, hundreds of homes had been fired, in some places buildings were still burning. It was with difficulty that we could get along, the crowd was so great. We passed Libbey Prison. The only place that we entered was the Capitol. We were shown the room that had been occupied by Davis and his cabinet. The furniture was completely wrecked; the coverings of desks and chairs had been stripped off by relic-hunters, and the chairs were hacked to pieces.

The ambulance took us back to the wharf. Admiral Porter's flag-ship *Malvern* had by this time made her way up the river, and we boarded her. It was with a decided feeling of relief that we saw the President safe on board.

We did not start back until the next morning, so there was time for several rumors of designs against the President's life to get abroad. But although he saw many visitors, there was no attempt against him. Nothing worse happened than the interview with Mr. Duff Green.

Duff Green was a conspicuous figure at the time. He was a newspaper man, an ardent rebel. He always carried with him a huge staff, as tall as he was himself—and he was a tall man. Admiral Porter

published an account of the interview in the New York *Tribune* of January, 1885, which was not altogether accurate. What really happened was this:

As Mr. Green approached him, the President held out his hand. Mr. Green refused to take it, saying, "I did not come to shake hands." Mr. Lincoln then sat down; so did Mr. Green. There were present at the time General Weitzel, Admiral Porter, one or two others, and myself. Mr. Green began to abuse Mr. Lincoln for the part he had taken in the struggle between the North and the South. His last words were:

"I do not know how God and your conscience will let you sleep at night after being guilty of the notorious crime of setting the niggers free."

The President listened to his diatribe without the slightest show of emotion. He said nothing. There was nothing in his face to show that he was angry. When Mr. Green had exhausted himself, he said,

"I would like, sir, to go to my friends."

The President turned to General Weitzel and said, "General, please give Mr. Green a pass to go to his friends." Mr. Green was set ashore and was seen no more.

That night Taddie and I were fast asleep, when I was startled into wakefulness. Something tall and white and ghostly stood by my berth. For a moment I trembled. When I was fairly awake I saw that it was Mr. Lincoln in his long white nightgown. He had come in to see if Taddie was all right. He stopped to talk a few minutes.

He referred to Mr. Duff Green: "The old man is pretty angry, but I guess he will get over it." Then he said, "Good night and a good night's rest, Crook," and he went back to his stateroom.

Our return trip to City Point was in the *Malvern*, and quiet enough in comparison with the approach to Richmond. When we reached the "Dutch Gap Canal," which was one of the engineering features of the day, the President wanted to go through it. Admiral Porter lowered a boat, and in it we passed through the canal to the James below. The canal cuts off a long loop of the river. We had to wait some time for the *Malvern* to go round.

Mrs. Lincoln had returned to City Point with a party which included Senator Sumner and Senator and Mrs. Harlan. They made a visit to Richmond, accompanied by Captain Penrose, while the President remained at City Point, the guest of Admiral Porter, until the 8th. Then, having heard of the injury to Secretary Seward when he was thrown from his carriage in a runaway accident, he felt that he must go back to Washington. He had intended to remain until Lee surrendered.

We reached home Sunday evening, the 9th. The President's carriage met us at the wharf. There Mr. Lincoln parted from Captain Penrose; he took the captain by the hand and thanked him for the manner in which he had performed his duty. Then he started for the White House.

The streets were alive with people, all very much excited. There were bonfires everywhere. We were all curious to know what had happened. Tad was so excited he couldn't keep still. We halted the carriage and asked a bystander,

"What has happened?"

He looked at us in amazement, not recognizing Mr. Lincoln:

"Why, where have you been? Lee has surrendered."

There is one point which is not understood, I think, about the President's trip to City Point and Richmond. I would like to tell here what my experience has made me believe. The expedition has been spoken of almost as if it were a pleasure trip. Some one says of it, "It was the first recreation the President had known." Of course in one sense this was true. He did get away from the routine of office work. He had pleasant associations with General Grant and General Sherman and enjoyed genial talks in the open over the camp-fire. But to give the impression that it was a sort of holiday excursion is a mistake. It was a matter of executive duty, and a very trying and saddening duty in many of its features. The President's suspense during the days when he knew the battle of Petersburg was imminent, his agony when the thunder of the cannon told him that men were being cut down like grass, his sight of the poor torn bodies of the

dead and dying on the field of Petersburg, his painful sympathy with the forlorn rebel prisoners, the revelation of the devastation of a noble people in ruined Richmond—these things may have been compensated for by his exultation when he first knew the long struggle was over. But I think not. These things wore new furrows in his face. Mr. Lincoln never looked sadder in his life than when he walked through the streets of Richmond and knew it saved to the Union, and himself victorious.

Although I reported early at the White House on the morning after our return from City Point, I found the President already at his desk. He was looking over his mail, but as I came in he looked up and said pleasantly:

"Good morning, Crook. How do you feel?"

I answered: "First rate, Mr. President. How are you?"

"I am well, but rather tired," he said.

Then I noticed that he did look tired. His worn face made me understand, more clearly than I had done before, what a strain the experiences at Petersburg and Richmond had been. Now that the excitement was over, the reaction allowed it to be seen.

I was on duty near the President all that day. We settled back into the usual routine. It seemed odd to go on as if nothing had happened; the trip had been such a great event. It was a particularly busy day. Correspondence had been held for Mr. Lincoln's attention during the seventeen days of absence; besides that, his office was thronged with visitors. Some of them had come to congratulate him on the successful outcome of the war; others had come to advise him what course to pursue toward the conquered Confederacy; still others wanted appointments. One gentleman, who was bold enough to ask aloud what everybody was asking privately, said,

"Mr. President, what will you do with Jeff Davis when he is caught?"

Mr. Lincoln sat up straight and crossed his legs, as he always did when he was going to tell a story.

"Gentlemen," he said, "that reminds me"—at the familiar words every one settled back and waited for the story—

"that reminds me of an incident which occurred in a little town in Illinois where I once practised law. One morning I was on my way to the office, when I saw a boy standing on the street corner crying. I felt sorry for the woe-begone little fellow. So I stopped and questioned him as to the cause of his griefs. He looked into my face, the tears running down his cheeks, and said, 'Mister, do you see that coon?'—pointing to a very poor specimen of the coon family which glared at us from the end of the string. 'Well, sir, that coon has given me a heap of trouble. He has nearly gnawed the string in two—I just wish he would finish it. Then I could go home and say he had got away.'"

Everybody laughed. They all knew quite well what the President would like to do with Jeff Davis—when Jeff Davis was caught.

Later in the morning a great crowd came marching into the White House grounds. Every man was cheering and a band was playing patriotic airs. The workmen at the Navy-Yard had started the procession, and by the time it had reached us it was over two thousand strong. Of course they called for the President, and he stepped to the window to see his guests. When the cheering had subsided he spoke to them very kindly and good-naturedly, begging that they would not ask him for a serious speech.

"I am going to make a formal address this evening," he said, "and if I dribble it out to you now, my speech to-night will be spoiled." Then, with his humorous smile, he spoke to the band:

"I think it would be a good plan for you to play 'Dixie.' I always thought that it was the most beautiful of our songs. I have submitted the question of its ownership to the Attorney-General, and he has given it as his legal opinion that we have fairly earned the right to have it back." As the opening bars of "Dixie" burst out, Mr. Lincoln disappeared from the window. The crowd went off in high good humor, marching to the infectious rhythm of the hard-won tune.

On the afternoon of the same day, about six o'clock, a deputation of fifteen men called. Mr. Lincoln met them in the corridor just after they had entered

the main door. They were presented to the President, and then the gentleman who had introduced them made a speech. It was a very pretty speech, full of loyal sentiments and praise for the man who had safely guided the country through the great crisis. Mr. Lincoln listened to them pleasantly. Then a picture was put into his hands. When he saw his own rugged features facing him from an elaborate silver frame a smile broadened his face.

"Gentlemen," he said, "I thank you for this token of your esteem. You did your best. It wasn't your fault that the frame is so much more rare than the picture."

On the evening of the 11th the President made the speech which he had promised the day before. Had we only known it, this was to be his last public utterance. The whole city was brilliantly illuminated that night. The public buildings were decorated and, from the Capitol to the Treasury, the whole length of Pennsylvania Avenue bore witness, with flags and lights, to the joy everybody felt because the war was over. Streaming up Pennsylvania Avenue, which was the one great thoroughfare then, the only paved street, and from every other quarter of the city, came the people. In spite of the unpleasant drizzle which fell the whole evening and the mud through which every one had to wade, a great crowd cheered Mr. Lincoln when he appeared at an upper window. From another window Mrs. Lincoln bowed to the people and was greeted enthusiastically. The President immediately began his speech, which had been in preparation ever since his return from City Point. The care which he had taken to express himself accurately was shown from the fact that the whole address was written out. Inside, little Tad was running around the room while "papa-day" was speaking. As the President let the sheets of manuscript fall, Taddie gathered them up and begged his father to let them go faster.

The President spoke with reverence of the cause for thanksgiving that the long struggle was over. He passed rapidly to that question which he knew the whole nation was debating—the future policy

toward the South. In discussing his already much-debated "Louisiana Policy" he expressed the two great principles which were embodied in it: the mass of the Southern people should be restored to their citizenship as soon as it was evident that they desired it; punishment, *if punishment there be*, should fall upon those who had been proved to be chiefly instrumental in leading the South into rebellion. These principles were reiterated by Senator Harlan, the Secretary of the Interior to be, who spoke after the President; they were reiterated, of course, by the President's desire. During President Andrew Johnson's long struggle with a bitter Northern Congress, I have often recalled the simplicity and kindness of Abraham Lincoln's theory.

During the next three days—as, in fact, since the fall of Richmond—Washington was a little delirious. Everybody was celebrating. The kind of celebration depended on the kind of person. It was merely a question of whether the intoxication was mental or physical. Every day there was a stream of callers who came to congratulate the President, to tell how loyal they had been, and how they had always been sure he would be victorious. There were serenades; there were deputations of leading citizens; on the evening of the 13th there was another illumination. The city became disorderly with the men who were celebrating too hilariously. Those about the President lost somewhat of the feeling, usually present, that his life was not safe. It did not seem possible that, now that the war was over and the government—glad to follow General Grant's splendid initiative—had been so magnanimous in its treatment of General Lee, after President Lincoln had offered himself a target for Southern bullets in the streets of Richmond and had come out unscathed, there could be danger. For my part, I had drawn a full breath of relief after we got out of Richmond and had forgotten to be anxious since.

Because of the general joyousness, I was surprised when, late on the afternoon of the 14th, I accompanied Mr. Lincoln on a hurried visit to the War Department, I found that the President was more depressed than I had ever

seen him and his step unusually slow. Afterward Mrs. Lincoln told me that when he drove with her to the Soldiers' Home earlier in the afternoon he had been extremely cheerful, even buoyant. She said that he had talked of the calm future that was in store for them, of the ease which they had never known, when, his term over, they would go back to their home in Illinois. He lounged, a little wistfully, for that time to come with its promise of peace. The depression I noticed may have been due to one of the sudden changes of mood to which I have been told the President was subject. I had heard of the transitions from almost wild spirits to abject melancholy which marked him. I had never seen anything of the sort, and had concluded that all this must have belonged to his earlier days. In the time when I knew him his mood, when there was no outside sorrow to disturb him, was one of settled calm. I wondered at him that day and felt uneasy.

In crossing over to the War Department we passed some drunken men. Possibly their violence suggested the thought to the President. After we had passed them, Mr. Lincoln said to me:

"Crook, do you know, I believe there are men who want to take my life?" Then, after a pause, he said, half to himself, "And I have no doubt they will do it."

The conviction with which he spoke dismayed me. I wanted to protest, but his tone had been so calm and sure that I found myself saying instead, "Why do you think so, Mr. President?"

"Other men have been assassinated," was his reply, still in that manner of stating something to himself.

All I could say was, "I hope you are mistaken, Mr. President."

We walked a few paces in silence. Then he said, in a more ordinary tone:

"I have perfect confidence in those who are around me, in every one of you men. I know no one could do it and escape alive. But if it is to be done, it is impossible to prevent it."

By this time we were at the War Department, and he went in to his conference with Secretary Stanton. It was shorter than usual that evening. Mr. Lincoln was belated. When Mrs. Lin-

coln and he came home from their drive he had found friends awaiting him. He had slipped away from dinner, and there were more people waiting to talk to him when he got back. He came out of the Secretary's office in a short time. Then I saw that every trace of the depression, or perhaps I should say intense seriousness, which had surprised me before had vanished. He talked to me as usual. He said that Mrs. Lincoln and he, with a party, were going to the theatre to see *Our American Cousin*.

"It has been advertised that we will be there," he said, "and I cannot disappoint the people. Otherwise I would not go. I do not want to go."

I remember particularly that he said this, because it surprised me. The President's love for the theatre was well known. He went often when it was announced that he would be there; but more often he would slip away, alone or with Tad, get into the theatre, unobserved if he could, watch the play from the back of the house for a short time, and then go back to his work. Mr. Buckingham, the doorkeeper of Ford's Theatre, used to say that he went in just to "take a laugh." So it seemed unusual to hear him say he did not want to go. When we had reached the White House and he had climbed the steps he turned and stood there a moment before he went in. Then he said,

"Good-by, Crook."

It startled me. As far as I remember he had never said anything but "Good night, Crook," before. Of course it is possible that I may be mistaken. In looking back, every word that he said has significance. But I remember distinctly the shock of surprise and the impression, at the time, that he had never said it before.

By this time I felt queer and sad. I hated to leave him. But he had gone in, so I turned away and started on my walk home. I lived in a little house on "Rodbird's Hill." It was a long distance from the White House—it would be about on First Street now in the middle of the block between L and M streets. The whole tract from there to North Capitol Street belonged either to my father-in-law or to his family. He was an old retired sea-captain named

Rodbird; he had the hull of his last sailing-vessel set up in his front yard.

The feeling of sadness with which I left the President lasted a long time, but after a while—I was young and healthy, I was going home to my wife and baby, and, the man who followed me on duty having been late for some reason, it was long past my usual dinner-time, and I was hungry. By the time I had had my dinner I was sleepy, so I went to bed early. I did not hear until early in the morning that the President had been shot. It seems incredible now, but it was so.

My first thought was—If I had been on duty at the theatre, I would be dead now. My next was to wonder whether Parker, who had gone to the theatre with the President, was dead. Then I remembered what the President had said the evening before. Then I went to the house on Tenth Street where they had taken him.

They would not let me in. The little room where he lay was crowded with the men who had been associated with the President during the war. They were gathered around the bed watching, while, long after the great spirit had flown, life, little by little, loosened its hold on the long, gaunt body. Among them, I knew, were men who had contended with him during his life or who had laughed. Charles Sumner stood at the very head of the bed. I know that it was to him that Robert Lincoln, who was only a boy for all his shoulder-straps, turned in the long strain of watching. And on Charles Sumner's shoulder the son sobbed out his grief. But the room was full, and they would not let me in.

After the President had died they took him back to the White House. It was to the guest-room with its old four-poster bed that they carried him. I was in the room while the men prepared his body to be seen by his people when they came to take their leave. It was hard for me to be there. It seemed fitting that the body should be there, where he had never been in life. I am glad that his own room could be left to the memory of his living presence.

The days during which the President lay in state before they took him away for his long progress over the country

he had saved were even more distressing than grief would have made them. Mrs. Lincoln was almost frantic with suffering. Some women spiritualists in some way gained access to her. They poured into her ears pretended messages from her dead husband. Mrs. Lincoln was so weakened that she had not force enough to resist the cruel cheat. These women nearly crazed her. Mr. Robert Lincoln, who had to take his place now as the head of the family, finally ordered them out of the house.

After the President's remains were taken from the White House, the family began preparations for leaving, but they were delayed a month by Mrs. Lincoln's illness. The shock of her husband's death had brought about a nervous disorder. Her physician, Dr. Stone, refused to allow her to be moved until she was somewhat restored. During the whole of the time while she was shut up in her room Mrs. Gideon Welles, the wife of the Secretary of the Navy, was in almost daily attendance upon her. Mrs. Welles was Mrs. Lincoln's friend, of all the women in official position, and she did much with her kindly ministrations to restore the President's widow to her normal condition. It was not until the 23d of May, at six o'clock, that Mrs. Lincoln finally left for Chicago.

Captain Robert Lincoln accompanied her, and a colored woman, a seamstress, in whom she had great confidence, went with the party to act as Mrs. Lincoln's maid. They asked me to go with them to do what I could to help. But no one could do much for Mrs. Lincoln. During most of the fifty-four hours that we were on the way she was in a daze: it seemed almost a stupor. She hardly spoke. No one could get near enough to her grief to comfort her. But I could be of some use to Taddie. Being a child, he had been able to cry away some of his grief, and he could be distracted with the sights out of the car window. There was an observation-car at the end of our coach. Taddie and I spent a good deal of time there, looking at the scenes flying past. He began to ask questions.

It had been expected that Mrs. Lincoln would go back to her old home in

Illinois. But she did not seem to be able to make up her mind to go there. She remained for some time in Chicago at the old Palmer House.

I went to a friend who had gone to Chicago to live from Washington and remained with him for the week I was in the city. I went to the hotel every day. Mrs. Lincoln I rarely saw. Taddie I took out for a walk almost every day and tried to interest him in the sights we saw. But he was a sad little fellow and mourned for his father.

At last I went back to Washington and to the White House. President Johnson had established his offices there when I got back.

Now that I have told the story of my three months' association with Abraham Lincoln, there are two things of which I feel that I must speak. The first question relates to the circumstances of the assassination of President Lincoln. It has never been made public before.

I have often wondered why the negligence of the guard who accompanied the President to the theatre on the night of the 14th has never been divulged. So far as I know, it was never even investigated by the police department. Yet, had he done his duty, I believe President Lincoln might not have been murdered by Booth. The man was John Parker. He was a native of the District, and had volunteered, as I believe each of the other guards had done, in response to the President's first call for troops from the District. He is dead now and, as far as I have been able to discover, all of his family. So it is no unkindness to speak of the costly mistake he made.

It was the custom for the guard who accompanied the President to the theatre to remain in the little passageway outside the box—that passageway through which Booth entered. Mr. Buckingham, who was the doorkeeper at Ford's Theatre, remembers that a chair was placed there for the guard on the evening of the 14th. Whether Parker occupied it at all I do not know—Mr. Buckingham is of the impression that he did. If he did, he left it almost immediately; for he confessed to me the next day that he went to a seat at the front of the first gallery so that he could

see the play. The door of the President's box was shut; probably Mr. Lincoln never knew that the guard had left his post.

Mr. Buckingham tells that Booth was in and out of the house five times before he finally shot the President. Each time he looked about the theatre in a restless, excited manner. I think there can be no doubt that he was studying the scene of his intended crime, and that he observed that Parker, whom he must have been watching, was not at his post. To me it is very probable that the fact that there was no one on guard may have determined the time of his attack. Booth had found it necessary to stimulate himself with whiskey in order to reach the proper pitch of fanaticism. Had he found a man at the door of the President's box armed with a Colt's revolver, his alcohol courage might have evaporated.

However that may be, Parker's absence had much to do with the success of Booth's purpose. The assassin was armed with a dagger and a pistol. The story used to be that the dagger was intended for General Grant when the President had been despatched. That is absurd. While it had been announced that General and Mrs. Grant would be in the box, Booth, during one of his five visits of inspection, had certainly had an opportunity to observe that the General was absent. The dagger, which was noiseless, was intended for any one who might intercept him before he could fire. The pistol, which was noisy and would arouse pursuit, was for the President. As it happened, since the attack was a complete surprise, Major Rathbone, who, the President having been shot, attempted to prevent Booth's escape, received the dagger in his arm.

Had Parker been at his post at the back of the box—Booth still being determined to make the attempt that night—he would have been stabbed, probably killed. The noise of the struggle—Parker could surely have managed to make some outcry—would have given the alarm. Major Rathbone was a brave man, and the President was a brave man and of enormous muscular strength. It would have been an easy thing for the two men to have disarmed Booth, who

was not a man of great physical strength. It was the suddenness of his attack on the President that made it so devilishly successful. It makes me feel rather bitter when I remember that the President had said, just a few hours before, that he knew he could trust all his guards. And then to think that in that one moment of test one of us should have utterly failed him! Parker knew that he had failed in duty. He looked like a convicted criminal the next day. He was never the same man afterward.

The other fact that I think people should know has been stated before in the President's own words: President Lincoln believed that it was probable he would be assassinated.

The conversation that I had with him on the 14th was not the only one we had on that same subject. Any one can see how natural it was that the matter should have come up between us—my very presence beside him was a reminder that there was danger of assassination. In his general kindness he wanted to talk about the thing that constituted my own particular occupation. He often spoke of the possibility of an attempt being made on his life. With the exception of that last time, however, he never treated it very seriously. He merely expressed the general idea that, I afterwards learned, he had expressed to Marshal Lamon and other men: if any one was willing to give his own life in the attempt to murder the President, it would be impossible to prevent him.

On that last evening he went further. He said with conviction that he believed that the men who wanted to take his life would do it. As far as I know, I am the only person to whom President Lincoln made such a statement. He may possibly have spoken about it to the other guards, but I never heard of it, and I am sure that had he done so I would have known of it.

More than this, I believe that he had some vague sort of a warning that the attempt would be made on the night of the 14th. I know that this is an extraordinary statement to make, and that it is late in the day to make it. I have been waiting for just the proper opportunity to say this thing; I did not care to talk idly about it. I would like

to give my reasons for feeling as I do. The chain of circumstances is at least an interesting thing to consider.

It is a matter of record that on the morning of the 14th, at a cabinet meeting, the President spoke of the recurrence the night before of a dream which, he said, had always forerun something of moment in his life. In the dream a ship under full sail bore down upon him. At the time he spoke of it he felt that some good fortune was on its way to him. He was serene, even joyous, over it. Later in the day, while he was driving with his wife, his mind still seemed to be dwelling on the question of the future. It was their future together of which he spoke. He was almost impatient that his term should be over. He seemed eager for rest and peace. When I accompanied him to the War Department, he had become depressed and spoke of his belief that he would be assassinated. When we returned to the White House, he said that he did not want to go to the theatre that evening, but that he must go so as not to disappoint the people. In connection with this it is to be remembered that he was extremely fond of the theatre, and that the bill that evening, *Our American Cousin*, was a very popular one. When he was about to enter the White House he said "Good-by," as I never remember to have heard him say before when I was leaving for the night.

These things have a curious interest. President Lincoln was a man of entire sanity. But no one has ever sounded the spring of spiritual insight from which his nature was fed. To me it all means that he had, with his waking on that day, a strong prescience of coming change. As the day wore on, the feeling darkened into an impression of coming evil. The suggestion of the crude violence we witnessed on the street pointed to the direction from which that evil should come. He was human; he shrank from it. But he had what some men call fatalism; others, devotion to duty; still others, religious faith. Therefore he went open-eyed to the place where he met, at last, the blind fanatic. And in that meeting the President, who had dealt out justice with a tender heart, who had groaned in spirit over fallen Richmond, fell.

More and more, people who have heard that I was with Mr. Lincoln come to me asking,

"What was he like?"

These last years, when, at a Lincoln birthday celebration or some other memorial gathering, they ask for a few words from the man who used to be Abraham Lincoln's guard, the younger people look at me as if I were some strange spectacle—a man who lived by Lincoln's side. It has made me feel as if the time had come when I ought to tell the world the little that I know about him. Soon there will be nothing of him but the things that have been written.

Yet, when I try to say what sort of a man he seemed to me, I fail. I have no words. All I can do is to give little snatches of reminiscences—I cannot picture the man. I can say:

He is the only man I ever knew the foundation of whose spirit was love. That love made him suffer. I saw him look at the ragged, hungry prisoners at City Point, I saw him ride over the battlefield at Petersburg, the man with the hole in his forehead and the man with both arms shot away lying accusing before his eyes. I saw him enter into Richmond, walking between lanes of silent men and women who had lost their battle. I remember his face. . . . And yet my memory of him is not of an unhappy man. I hear so much to-day about the President's melancholy. It is true no man could suffer more. But he was very easily amused. I have never seen a man who enjoyed more anything pleasant or funny that came his way. I think the balance between pain and pleasure was fairly struck, and in the last months when I knew him he was in love with life because he found it possible to do so much. . . . I never saw evidence of faltering. I do not believe any one ever did. From the moment he, who was all pity, pledged himself to war, he kept straight on.

I can follow Secretary John Hay and say: He was the greatest man I have ever known—or shall ever know.

That ought to be enough to say, and yet—nothing so merely of words seems to express him. Something that he did tells so much more.

I remember one afternoon, not long

before the President was shot, we were on our way to the War Department, when we passed a ragged, dirty man in army clothes, lounging just outside the White House enclosure. He had evidently been waiting to see the President, for he jumped up and went toward him with his story. He had been wounded, was just out of the hospital—he looked forlorn enough. There was something he wanted the President to do; he had papers with him. Mr. Lincoln was in a hurry, but he put out his hands for the papers. Then he sat down on the curbstone, the man beside him, and examined them. When he had satisfied himself about the matter, he smiled at the anxious fellow, reassuringly, and told him to come back the next day. Then he would arrange the matter for him. A thing like that says more than any man could express. If I could only

make people see him as I did—see how simple he was with every one; how he could talk with a child so that the child could understand and smile up at him; how you would never know, from his manner to the plainest or poorest or meanest, that there was the least difference between that man and himself; how from that man to the greatest, and all degrees between, the President could meet every man square on the plane where he stood and speak to him, man to man, from that plane—if I could do that, I would feel that I had told something of what he was. For no one to whom he spoke with his perfect simplicity ever presumed to answer him familiarly, and I never saw him stand beside any man—and I saw him with the greatest men of the day—that I did not feel there again President Lincoln was supreme. If I had only words to tell what he seemed to me!

Exultation

BY MARY EASTWOOD KNEVELS

THE day an invitation is
To bathe myself in blue,
To cleave as with a swimmer's arms
The radiancy through.

What lies beyond, what lies behind,
What stretches every side?
The wind is growing populous,
The air is deified.

Things touch me, now the blue's alive,
I feel the whirl of wings,
And little clouds go flying by
On pilgrim wanderings.

I drink the very color where
The West has filled his cup;
The dizzy stars look down at me,
The staring world looks up.

A vagabond in scarlet rags,
A lost leaf in the air,
A reckless, eager, joyous thing
The wind blows everywhere.



Ad Myrtillam

MYRTILLA, the distance between us
Is measured by miles and by days,
So Mars is compelled to court Venus
Afar in the dullest of ways:
I hate to make love in a letter —
But what is a fellow to do?
I like the old-fashioned way better:
Don't you?

There's little of news. Indeed, only
One topic comes pat to my pen.—
That's *you*, and you don't know how lonely
I am,—most impatient of men!
The club or a drive in a hansom,
The theatre,—these are a few
Diversions. I'd give a queen's ransom
For you!

Time never before took the trouble
To loiter and lag in his flight;
And when you come back he will double
His regular speed, just for spite:
I know of the chips on his shoulder:
I think I have hit one or two.
Who cares! It is I who grow older,
Not you.

So here is the hope that your heart is
Not wholly forgetful of me,
And here is a kiss,—but the chart is
A trifle obscure, as you see.
Of absence, of course, as you wander,
You find the old adage is true:
I know of one heart that grows fonder
Of you. FELIX CARMEN.

HOW WILKES BOOTH CROSSED THE POTOMAC.

THE most dramatic of historical assassinations has had, until now, an unrelated interval. The actor John Wilkes Booth shot President Abraham Lincoln about ten o'clock Friday night, April 14th, 1865. Near midnight he and his uninteresting road pilot, David E. Herold, called at Surratt's tavern, about ten miles south-east of Washington, and obtained the arms, field glass, etc., previously prepared for them there. Saturday morning they were at Dr. Samuel A. Mudd's, twenty miles farther on, where Booth's broken ankle was set and a crutch made for him; and that evening the two fugitives were guided in a roundabout way to the gate of Samuel Cox, a prosperous Southern sympathizer, about fifteen miles south-west.

The last witness in Maryland ended here. The Government, in its prosecution of the conspirators, took up the fugitive next at the crossing of the Rappahannock River in Virginia, on the 24th of April, having failed to trace Booth a single step farther in Maryland, although he did not cross the Potomac until Saturday night, April 22d. A whole week remains unaccounted for; and for the first time the missing links of the connection are here made public. Probably not half a dozen people are alive who have ever heard the narrative fully told.

When Annapolis was a greater place than Baltimore, and the Patuxent Valley the most populous part of Maryland, the main roads and ferries to all-powerful Virginia were on the lower Potomac, instead of being, as now, above Washington City. The most important of these ferries crossed at a narrow part of the river, where it is from two to three miles wide, near a stream on the Maryland side called Pope's Creek. Just below this spot, and not far above it, there are deep indentations from the river which narrow the open ground over which its banks are reached. A railroad, built since the war, for this reason has its terminus at Pope's Creek. About five miles north of the terminus is Cox's Station, which is about six miles south of the old courthouse village of Port Tobacco. A short distance east of Cox's Station is Samuel Cox's house; a short distance west of Cox's Station, perhaps two or three miles, is the old Catholic manor house of St. Thomas's, by an ancient church which gives the name to "Chapel" Point. Here the Potomac sends up Port Tobacco River, a broad tidal stream,

naturally indicated at the beginning of the war as the nearest safe point for spies and go-betweens to reach broad water from Washington. Mathias Point, on the Virginia side, makes a high salient angle into the waters of Maryland here, and is almost in the direct line from Washington to Richmond.

In this old region of the Calvert Catholics, a civilization existed at the close of the last century probably comparable with that of tide-water Virginia. The Episcopal Church, tobacco, and large landed estates, with slaves, were features of the high bluff country, which was plentifully watered with running streams amidst the hills of clay and gravel. But the Revolution emancipated the Catholic worship originally planted on the lower Potomac by the founders of Maryland, and a curious English society took root, with its little churches surmounted by the cross, its slaves attendants upon mass and confession; and much of the country, originally poor, was covered with decaying estates, old fields grown up in small pines, and deep gullies penetrating to the heart of the hills. The malaria almost depopulated the little towns and hamlets, tobacco became an uncertain crop, slavery kept the people poor, and intercourse fell off with the rest of the world, possibly excepting some of the old counties in Virginia in Washington's "Northern Neck."

Soon after the year 1820 Mr. Cox was born in the district below Port Tobacco, and his mother dying, he was put to nurse with a Mrs. Jones, the wife of a plain man, possibly an overseer, who inhabited the house. She had a son, Thomas A. Jones, who grew up with young Cox; they were playmates and attended the same log school-house, and Cox, as life progressed, had the ruling influence over Jones, who was a cool, brave man, but without the self-assertion of his comrade, who soon developed into one of the most energetic men in that region.

A portrait of Samuel Cox shows him to have been of an indomitable will, strengthened by that consumptive tendency which often gives desperation to men fond of life. At the breaking out of the war Mr. Cox had thirty to forty slaves, plenty of land, a large house with out-buildings, negro quarters, woodlands, and a superior appearance for those parts. He became the captain of a volunteer company, which he drilled at Bryantown, a small settlement in the eastern part of the county,

where the lands were unusually good and the neighbors plentiful in slaves. Hardly one of them an original secessionist, the course of events forced most of those slave-holders into sympathy with the South, if not through their sensitiveness about their slave property, yet from the fact that their sons often hastened to cross the river into the Confederate army, while in many cases their negroes slipped off in the opposite direction within the Federal lines. The responsibility for disloyalty did not rest with these humble people off the great highways of life, but followed from the political consequences of breaking the Union asunder, and leaving them on the Union frontier with all the necessities and traditions of slavery. The Government paid but little attention to them, seeing that they were below the line of military operations, divided by a broad river from the ragged peninsulas of the rebellion; and, therefore, there almost immediately sprang up in lower Maryland, a system of contraband travel and traffic which soon demoralized nearly everybody.

Thomas A. Jones, who had somewhat risen in the world and had a few slaves, sympathized warmly with the South; he owned a farm right at Pope's Creek, the most eligible situation of all for easy intercourse with Virginia. His house was on a bluff eighty to one hundred feet high, from which he could look up the Potomac to the west, across Mathias Point, and see at least seven miles of the river-way, while his view down the Potomac was fully nine miles.

The moment actual war broke out, and intercourse ceased at Washington and above it with Virginia, great numbers of people came to the house of Jones and to that of his next neighbor on the bluff, Major Roderick G. Watson, asking to be sent across the Potomac. These fugitives were of all descriptions: lawyers, business men, women, resigned army officers, adventurers, suspected persons,—even the agents of foreign bankers and of foreign countries.

Major Watson had a large frame house, relatively new, two stories high, with dormer windows in the high roof, and with a servants' wing. He had a son in the Confederate army, and grown-up daughters; and his house became the signal station for the Confederates across the river, one of his daughters setting the signal, which consisted of a shawl or other black object, put up at the dormer window, whenever it was not safe to send the boat across from Virginia. This window was kept in focus from Grimes's house on the other side, about two miles and a half distant,—a small low house, planted at the water's edge, from which the glass could read the signal,

which no Federal officer, whether in his gunboat or ashore, could suspect. Major Watson was somewhat advanced in years, and died while his neighbor Jones was serving an imprisonment in the Old Capitol prison.

On Jones's return to his home, he therefore became the most trusted neighbor of the Watson family, and they accommodated him as he assisted them. The young lady in the family was as enthusiastic for the Confederate cause, and as discreet in all her talks and walks as Jones himself, on whose countenance no human being could ever read what was passing within his mind. He had attended to his fishery and his farm until the war broke out, without having had an incident to mark his life; but suddenly there was an incursion of strangers to whose needs his rooted ideas of hospitality, no less than his sympathy for the Confederates, led him to hearken. His farming was almost broken up, and he took to crossing the river nearly every night, and sometimes twice or more of a night, with boats, sometimes rowed by two pairs of oars, at others by three, while he steered with an oar in the stern. The interlopers could ride down from Washington to Pope's Creek in six or seven hours, and Jones could put them at Grimes's house opposite in less than an hour. The idea of making money in this traffic never seems to have occurred to the man at all: he regarded these strangers as intrusted to his care by Providence or pity; and although his liberty was constantly in danger, he seldom received more than a dollar or two for taking anybody across. Some persons argued with him that he did not charge enough, and told him to look out for his family and the future; but, as the sequel will show, he did a vast amount of hard and dangerous labor for next to nothing, and in the end the Confederate Government also left him unpaid.

The original rebel route from Pope's Creek to Richmond was through Fredericksburg; but this being considerably to the west, a new route was opened over the old road to Port Royal on the Rappahannock River. Adventurers were taken by Jones or his neighbors across to Grimes's, who, assisted by one or two of his neighbors, carried them by vehicles in three or four hours to Port Conway, where a ferry was maintained across the Rappahannock River to Port Royal, and eighteen miles beyond it the high road from Washington to Richmond was open. Mr. Jones says that he may have crossed the Potomac one hundred times before he was arrested, but has no record of the days.

In the latter part of June, 1861, General Sickles came with troops to the lower Po-

tomac to keep a watch on the contraband intercourse. Grimes was found on the Maryland shore and sent to Fort Delaware. Jones was arrested when he returned from his second visit to Richmond and sent to the Old Capitol prison at Washington, and kept there six months. He was allowed to write to his family, subject to the inspection of his letters, and to talk to any of them when an officer was by. This imprisonment, together with his adventurous cruises previously, sharpened his wits, increased his knowledge of men and the world, and educated him for the official position he was soon afterward to occupy of chief signal agent of the Confederacy north of the Potomac. Misfortunes, however, attended his affairs. His wife, who had a large family of children, was taken sick through care and confinement while he was absent, and died. His farm was mortgaged, and, not pursuing the regular vocations of peace, the mortgage slowly ate up the farm, and near the close of the war he had to remove from his river-side residence to an old place called Huckleberry, about two miles and a half inland.

Mr. Jones was released in March, 1862, by a general jail delivery ordered by Congress under the belief that the prisons were full of innocent men. He took an oath that he would not communicate with the enemy again, and was informed of the penalty of breaking it. He returned to his house on the river bluff, and soon an armed patrol and steam vessels were maintained on the river, and the Federal officers boasted that they had a spy on every farm. One of the fine old mansions on the river, Hooe's house, which had been the almost immemorial ferry-house, was set on fire by the Federal flotilla and burnt, for having given harborage to one of Grimes's boat parties.

Grimes again communicated with Jones, and asked him to go into an undertaking to carry the Confederate mail from Canada and the United States to Richmond. Jones replied that the risk was too great, and that his duty to his children required him to stay at home, although his heart was in the Confederate cause, and he would give it any assistance possible. Upon this, the Confederate signal officer, Major William Norris, who had been a Maryland man and is still alive, held an interview with Jones, and asked him to take charge of the rebel communications, stating that they were of the utmost consequence to the management of the Confederate cause and its intercourse with the outer world, the Federal blockade now being well maintained and every portion of the border closely watched, while the broad Potomac River and the pine-covered hills of lower Maryland afforded almost a sure crossing-place. Finally, Jones said that if he

were given absolute control, not only over the ferry, but over all agents to be retained in Maryland, the names of none of whom he should be called upon ever to mention, he would undertake the work. He said to the Confederate agent: "It is useless to expect me to maintain a boat service with you. You must keep the boat on the Virginia side, cross to my beach, and bring and take the mail there, so that I cannot be suspected." He then indicated a post-office in the hollow of an old tree which grew near the foot of his bluff.

His previous observations on the river had shown him that toward evening, when the sun had fallen below the Virginia woods, there was a certain grayness on the surface of the water, increased by the shadows from the high bluffs, which nearly erased the mark of a boat floating on the Potomac. The pickets that were now maintained along the bluffs were not set till toward night. Therefore it was arranged that the Virginia boat should come in just before the pickets were set, and its navigator noiselessly take out the mail from the old tree and deposit the Virginia packet, and then, with scarcely a word whispered or a sign given, slip back again to his Virginia cove. Generally the boat was hauled ashore in Virginia out of the observation of the patrol gun-boats and their launches, and sometimes it was kept back of Grimes's house, but sometimes back of Upper Machodoc Creek, which is six miles due south of Pope's Creek, and only about twelve miles from Port Royal.

When the rebel mail had been left in the stump, Jones obtained it, either in person or by one of his faithful slaves. It is a singular fact that not only were women the best co-operative agents in this spy system, but the slaves, whose interests might be considered as opposed to a Southern triumph, frequently adhered to their masters from discipline or affection. Jones had a slave named Henry Woodland, still alive, who not only pulled in his boat to Virginia during the early months of the war, but, imitating the habits of his master, was discreet down to the time that Booth escaped, while probably suspecting, if he did not know, all that was going on. He and his master seldom informed each other upon anything, and did not need even to exchange glances, so well did they know each other's ways. The negro was nearly a duplicate of his master in methods, went about his work without speech, and asked no questions. Two other negroes, named John Swan and George Murray, pulled oars in Jones's boats in the early part of the war. One of these, it is believed, turned spy upon his master, and finally ran away, but was sent back

to Jones by the commandant of the camp, received a flogging, and some time afterward deserted to a vessel in the river.

When the rebel mail had been put ashore, Jones would sometimes get it by slipping down through some of the wooded gullies cutting the bluff. The Federal patrol walked on the top of the bluff, and as the night grew dark would be apt to avoid these dark places, from which a shot might be fired or an assassin spring. Jones sometimes ran risks getting down the bluff, which was almost perpendicular, and after a time he constructed a sort of stairs or steps down one portion of it. His foster-brother Cox, who was more noisy and expressive, had contrived early in the war a set of post-offices for the deposit of the mail as it came up from the river, in stumps, etc. One of these post-offices was pointed out to me where the railroad now goes through a cutting below Cox's Station. The Maryland neighbors, however, became so careless about sending their letters through these stump post-offices, that when Jones made his agreement with the Confederate Government, he dispensed with that system altogether, and relied upon more ordinary methods. Having no passion for mere glory or praise, contented to do his work according to his own ideas of right and expediency, he merely made use of substantial, plain people, whose hearts were in the Confederate cause, but whose methods were all discreet. Thus he had a young woman to hoist his signal of black, and it never was hoisted if the course was open and clear on the river. He arranged that no mail matter should come close to his home, not even to Port Tobacco, which was perhaps ten miles distant. It was generally sent to Bryantown, fifteen to twenty miles distant, and collected there, or dispatched from that office, and it was carried by such neighbors as Dr. Stowten S. Dent, who died in 1883, at the age of eighty. This old gentleman had two sons in the Confederate army, and was a practicing physician, riding on his horse from place to place, and it seemed to be the case that some person in Major Watson's family was generally sick. There the good old doctor would go, wearing a big overcoat with immense pockets, and big boots coming high toward his knees. Everybody liked him, the Federal officers and soldiers as well as the negroes and neighbors, for he was impartial in his cures. At the greatest risk, even of his neck, the old man carried the rebel mail which Jones had delivered to him, and frequently went all the way to Bryantown with it. He would stuff his pockets, and sometimes his boots, with letters and newspapers.

There were one or two other persons some-

times made available as mail-carriers. Perhaps Mr. Cox himself would do a little work of this kind. A man on the opposite side of the river, by the name of Thomas H. Harbin, who now lives in Washington, was a sort of general voluntary agent for the Confederacy, making his head-quarters now in Washington and now in Richmond, and again on the river bank. In his desire to accommodate everybody, Harbin sometimes put too much matter in the mail; and Jones's cautious soul was much disturbed to find, on one occasion, two large satchels filled with stuff not pertinent to the Confederate Government. He sent word over that there must be more sense in the putting up of that mail, as it would be impossible to get it off if it grew larger.

Jones's house at this time was of dark, rain-washed plank, one story high, with a door in the middle, an outside chimney at each end, and a small kitchen and intervening colonnade which he added himself. The house was about thirty yards from the edge of the bluff. His farm contained five hundred and forty acres. Besides his neighbors the Watsons below, Mr. Thomas Stone had a place just above him, across Pope's Creek, on a high hill, called "Ellenborough," the mansion of which was one of the largest brick buildings in this region. Next above Stone's, on Port Tobacco River, was George Dent, who also had an interesting mansion. The third farm to the north was Brentfield, and back of it Huckleberry, from which Booth departed.

Mr. Jones himself is a man of hardly medium height, slim and wiry, with one of those thin, mournful faces common to tide-water Maryland, with high cheek-bones, gray-blue eyes, no great height or breadth of forehead, and thick, strong hair. The tone of his mind and intercourse is slow and mournful, somewhat complaining, as if the summer heats had given a nervous tone to his views, which are generally instinctive and kind. Judge Frederick Stone told me that he once crossed the river with Jones, when a Federal vessel suddenly loomed up, apparently right above them, and in the twinkling of an eye, the passenger said, he could see the interior of the Old Capitol prison for himself and all his companions; but at that moment Jones was as cool as if he had not noticed the vessel at all, and extricated them in an instant from the danger. Jones's education is small. He does not swear, does not smoke, and does not drink. When he was exposed on the river, he says, he sometimes took a little spirits to drive away the cold and wet; but he has few needs, and probably has not changed any of his habits since early life.

Born poor, somewhat of the overseer class, and struggling toward independence without greed enough ever to accomplish it, he was eminently made to obey instructions and to keep faith. His neighbor Cox was more subtle and influential, and, although he was rough and domineering, seldom failed to bring any man to his views by magnetism or persuasion. Jones's judgment often differed from Cox's, and in the end his courage was altogether superior; but still, from early habits, the humble farmer and fisherman always yielded at last to what Cox insisted upon.

Mr. Jones was not alone in his operations during the war, but he was the only trusted man in Maryland with whom the Confederate Government had an official relation. His very humility was his protection. He impressed the Federal officers and Union men generally as a man of rather slow wits, of an indolent mind, with but little intelligence or interest in what was going on around him. Yet a cunning which had no expression but acts, a devotion which never asked to be appreciated, and perseverance to this day remarkable, were his. Some of his neighbors were running boats across the river for hire or gain. In the little village of Port Tobacco most of the mechanics and loungers had become demoralized by this traffic, and among these was George A. Atzerodt, a coach-maker, of but little moral or physical stamina, who was afterward hanged among the conspirators. This man left his work after the war began, and took to the business of pulling a boat down Port Tobacco River to Virginia. Among the persons who occasionally crossed the river was John H. Surratt, a country boy of respectable aspirations until some time after the breaking out of the war, when he, too, was caught in the meshes of the contraband trade, and, possessing but little mind and too much vanity, was carried away with his importance. Jones went to Richmond once or twice toward the close of the war, and on one of these occasions Surratt and a woman under his care crossed in the same boat. Sometimes these boats would go so heavily laden that a gale on the broad river would almost capsize them. One portion of Jones's business was to put the New York and Northern newspapers every day into Richmond. These newspapers would go to Bryantown post-office, or sometimes to Charlotte Hall post-office, and would generally reach the Potomac near dusk, and being conveyed all night by the Confederate mail-carriers, by way of Port Royal, would be in the hands of the rebel Cabinet next morning, twenty-four hours only after the people in New York were reading them; and Jones says that there was

hardly a failure one day in the year to take them through.

The Federal authorities never had a tittle of the thoroughness of suspicion and violation of personal liberty which the Confederates always exercised. Hence the doom of Abraham Lincoln was slowly coming onward through these little country-side beginnings, starting without origin and ending in appalling calamity.

About the third year of the war, Jones understood that a very important act had been agreed upon, namely, to seize the President of the United States in the city of Washington, and by relays and forced horses take him to the west side of Port Tobacco Creek, about four miles below the town of that name, and dispatch him across the Potomac a prisoner of war. I possess the names of the two persons on Port Tobacco Creek who, with their sons, were prominent in this scheme; but the frankness with which the information was given to me persuades me not to print them. A person already named, in Washington, was in the conspiracy; and it was given out that "the big actor, Booth," was also "in it." Jones heard of this about December, 1864. It was not designed that he should take any part in the scheme, though he regarded it as a proper undertaking in time of war. From the time this scheme was proposed until the very end of the war, the bateau which was to carry Mr. Lincoln off was kept ready, and the oars and men were ever near at hand, to dispatch the illustrious captive.

That winter was unusually mild, and therefore the roads were particularly bad in this region of clay and marsh, and did not harden with the frost—a circumstance which perhaps spared Mr. Lincoln the terrors of such a desperate expedition. Inquiries were made from time to time as to when the thing was to be done, and it was generally answered that the roads were too heavy to give the opportunity. The idea Jones has of this matter is that Mr. Lincoln was to be seized, not on his way to the Soldiers' Home, but near the Navy Yard, and gagged quietly, and the carriage then driven across the Navy Yard bridge or the next bridge above, while the captors were to point to the President and wave their hands to the guards on the bridge, saying, "The President of the United States." When we consider that he was finally killed in the presence of a vast audience, and that his captors then crossed the same bridge without opposition and without passes, the original scheme does not seem extraordinary. There is no doubt but that in this original scheme the late Dr. Samuel A. Mudd was to play some part. Booth had

made his acquaintance during that fall or winter on his first visit to the country, and some of Dr. Mudd's relatives admit that he knew Booth well, and probably was in the abduction scheme. The calculation of the conspirators was that the pursuers would have no opportunity to change horses on the way, while the captors would have fresh horses every few miles and drive them to the top of their speed, and all they required was to get to the Potomac River, seven hours distant, a very little in advance. The distance was from thirty-six to thirty-eight miles, and the river could be passed in half an hour or little more with the boat all ready. Jones thinks that this scheme never was given up, until suddenly information came that Booth had killed the President instead of capturing him, and was supposed to be in that region of country. Jones had never seen Booth, and had scarcely any knowledge of him.

When Jones went to Richmond, just before the assassination, it was to collect his stipend, which he had confidently allowed to accumulate until it amounted to almost twenty-three hundred dollars, presumably for three years' work. He reached Richmond Friday, and called on Charles Caywood, the same who kept the signal camp in the swampy woods back of Grimes's house. The chief signal officer said he would pay five hundred dollars on Saturday, but if Jones would wait till Tuesday the whole amount would be paid him. Jones waited. Sunday night Petersburg fell, and on Monday Richmond was evacuated, so the Confederacy expired without paying him a cent. Moreover, he had invested three thousand dollars in Confederate bonds earlier in the war, paying for them sixty-five cents on the dollar, and keeping them till they were mere brown paper in his hands.

Jones heard of the murder of Lincoln on Saturday afternoon, April 15th, at or near his own farm of Huckleberry. Two Federal officers or cavalymen came by on horseback, and one of them said to Jones, "Is that your boat a piece above here?" "Yes," said Jones. "Then you had better take good care of it, because there are dangerous people around here who might take it to cross the river." "That is just what I am thinking about," said Jones, "and I have had it pulled up to let my black man go fishing for the shad which are now running." The two horsemen conferred together a minute or two, and one of them said:

"Have you heard the news from Washington?" "No." "Our President has been murdered." "Indeed!" said Jones, with a melancholy face, as if he had no friend left in the world. "Yes," said the horseman;

"President Lincoln was killed last night, and we are looking out for the men, who, we think, escaped this way."

On Sunday morning, the 16th of April, about nine o'clock, a young white man came from Samuel Cox's to Jones's second farm, called Huckleberry, which has been already described as about two and a half miles back from the old river residence, which Jones had been forced to give up when it appeared probable that the Confederate cause was lost. The Huckleberry farm consisted of about five hundred acres, and had on it a one-story and garret house, with a low-pitched roof, end chimneys, and door in the middle. There was a stable north of the house, and a barn south of it, and it was only three-quarters of a mile from the house to the river, which here runs to the north to make the indentation called Port Tobacco Creek or river. Although Jones, therefore, had moved some distance from his former house, he was yet very near tide-water. The new farm was much retired, was not on the public road, and consisted of clearings amidst rain-washed hills with deep gullies, almost impenetrable short pines, and some swamp and forest timber. Henry Woodland, the black servant, who was then about twenty-seven years old, was still Jones's chief assistant, and was kept alternately farming and fishing.

The young man who came from Cox's was told, if stopped on the road, to say that he was going to Jones's to ask if he could let Cox have some seed corn, which in that climate is planted early in April. He told Jones that Colonel Cox wished him to come immediately to his house, about three miles to the north. The young man mysteriously intimated that there were very remarkable visitors at Cox's the night before. Accustomed to obey the summons of his old friend, Jones mounted his horse and went to Cox's. The prosperous foster-brother lived in a large two-story house, with handsome piazzas front and rear, and a tall, windowless roof with double chimneys at both ends; and to the right of the house, which faced west, was a long one-story extension, used by Cox for his bedroom. The house is on a slight elevation, and has both an outer and inner yard, to both of which are gates. With its trellis-work and vines, fruit and shade trees, green shutters and dark red roofs, Cox's property, called Rich Hill, made an agreeable contrast to the somber short pines which, at no great distance, seemed to cover the plain almost as thickly as wheat straws in the grain field.

Taking Jones aside, Cox related that on the previous night the assassin of President Lincoln had come to his house in company

with another person, guided by a negro, and had asked for assistance to cross the Potomac River; "and," said Cox to Jones, "you will have to get him across." Cox indicated where the fugitives were concealed, perhaps one mile distant, a few rods west of the present railroad track, and just south of Cox's station. Jones was to give a signal by whistling in a certain way as he approached the place, else he might be fired upon and killed. Nobody, it is believed, ever saw Booth and Herold after this time in Maryland, besides Cox's overseer, Franklin Roby, and Jones. Cox's family protest that the fugitives never entered the house at all; his adopted son, still living, says Booth did not come into the house. Herold, who was with Booth, related to his counsel, as the latter thinks, that after they left Mudd's house they never were in any house whatever in Maryland. The negro who was employed to guide Booth from Dr. Mudd's to Cox's testified that he saw them enter the house; but as the Government did not use him on the trial, it is probable that he related his belief rather than what he saw.

But there is no doubt of the fact that when Dr. Mudd found Booth on his hands on Saturday, with a broken ankle, and the soldiery already pouring into Bryantown, he and Booth and Herold became equally frightened, and in the early evening the two latter started by a road to the east for Cox's house, turning Bryantown and leaving it to the north, and arriving about or before midnight at Cox's. There the negro was sent back. Herold advanced to the porch and communicated with Cox, and Booth sat on his horse off toward the outer gate. The two men cursed Cox after they backed out to where the negro was,—he remaining at the outer gate,—and said that Cox was no gentleman and no host. These words were probably intended to mislead the negro when they sent him back to Dr. Mudd's. This negro was arrested, as was a colored woman in Cox's family, and, with the same remarkable fidelity I have mentioned, the woman confronted the negro man and swore that what he said was untrue.

Nevertheless, Booth and Herold were sent into the short pines, and there Jones found them. He says that as he was advancing into the pines he came upon a bay mare, with black legs, mane, and tail, and a white star on the forehead; she was saddled, and roving around in a little cleared place as if trying to nibble something to eat. Jones took the mare and tied her to a tree or stump. He then advanced and gave what he calls the counter-sign, or whistle, which he does not precisely remember now, though he thinks it was two whistles in a peculiar way, and a whistle after

an interval. The first person he saw was Herold, fully armed, and with a carbine in his hand, coming out to see who it was. Jones explained that he had been sent to see them and was then taken to Booth, who was but a few rods farther along.

Booth was lying on the ground, wrapped up in blankets, with his foot supported and bandaged, and a crutch beside him. His rumpled dress looked respectable for the country, and Jones says it was of black cloth. His face was pale at all times, and never ceased to be so during the several days that Jones saw him. He was in great pain from his broken ankle, which had suffered a fracture of one of the two bones in the leg down close to the foot. It would not have given him any very great pain but for the exertion of his escape, which irritated it by scraping the ends of the broken bone perhaps in the flesh; it was now highly irritated, and whichever way the man moved he expressed by a twitch or a groan the pain he felt. Jones says that this pain was more or less continuous, and was greatly aggravated by the peril of Booth's situation—unable to cross the river without assistance, and unable to walk any distance whatever. Jones believes that Booth did not rise from the ground at any time until he was finally put on Jones' horse to be taken to the water-side some day afterward.

Booth's first solicitude seemed to be to learn what mankind thought of the crime. The question he put almost immediately to Jones and continued to ask what different classes of people thought about it. Jones told him that it was gratifying news to most of the men of Southern sympathies. He frankly says that he himself at first regarded it as good news, but somewhat later, when he saw the injurious consequences of the crime to the South, he changed his mind. Booth desired newspapers if they could be had, which would convey to him an idea of public feeling. Jones soon obtained newspapers for him, and continued to send them in; and Booth lay there, where the pines were so thick that one could not see more than thirty or forty feet into them reading what the world had to say about his case. He seemed never tired of information on this one subject, and the only thing besides he was solicitous about was to get across the river into Virginia.

Jones says Booth admitted that he was the man who killed Lincoln, and expressed no regret for the act, knowing all the consequences it involved. He harped again and again upon the necessity of his crossing the river. He said if he could only get to Virginia he could have medical attendance

Jones told him frankly that he would receive no medical attendance in Maryland. Said he: "The country is full of soldiers, and all that I can do for you is to get you off, if I can, for Cox's protection and my own, and for your own safety. That I will do for you, if there is any way in the world to do it."

When I received this account from Mr. Jones, I asked him question after question to see if I could extract any information as to what Booth inquired about while in that wilderness. I asked if he spoke of his mother, of where he was going when he reached Virginia, of whether he meant to act on the stage again; whether he blamed himself for jumping from the theater box; whether he expressed any apprehensions for Mrs. Surratt or his friends in Washington. To these and to many other questions Jones uniformly replied: "No, he did not speak about any of those things. He wanted food, and to cross the river, and to know what was said about the deed." Booth, he thinks, wore a slouched hat. At first meeting Booth in the pines, he proved himself to be the assassin by showing upon his wrist, in India ink, the initials J. W. B. He showed the same to Captain Jett in Virginia. Jones says Booth was a determined man, not boasting, but one who would have sold his life dear. He said he would not be taken alive.

Mr. Jones went up to Port Tobacco in a day or two to hear about the murder, and heard a detective there from Alexandria say: "I will give one hundred thousand dollars and guarantee it to the man who can tell where Booth is." When we consider that the end of the war had come, and all the Confederate hopes were blasted and every man's slaves set free, we may reflect upon the fidelity of this poor man, whose land was not his own, and with inevitable poverty before him perhaps for the rest of his days, when the next morning he was told that to him alone would be intrusted that man for whom the Government had offered a fortune, and was increasing the reward. Mr. Jones says it never occurred to him for one moment that it would be a good thing to have that money. On the contrary, his sympathies were enlisted for the pale-faced young man, so ardent to get to Virginia and have the comforts of a doctor.

Said he to Booth: "You must remain right here, however long, and wait till I can see some way to get you out; and I do not believe I can get you away from here until this hue and cry is somewhat over. Meantime I will see that you are fed." He then continued to visit them daily, generally about ten o'clock in the morning. He always went alone, taking with him such food

as the country had—ham, whisky, bread, fish, and coffee. Part of the way Jones had to go by the public road, but he generally worked into the pines as quickly as possible. His intercourse at each visit with the fugitives was short, because he was in great personal danger himself, was not inquisitive, and was wholly intent on keeping his faith with his old friend and the new ones. He says that Herold had nothing to say of the least importance, and was nothing but a pilot for Booth. Not improbably Cox sent his own overseer into the pines sometimes to see these men or to give them something, but he took no active part in their escape. The blankets they possessed came either from Cox's or from Dr. Mudd's.

Booth, as has been said, rode a small bay mare from the rear of Ford's Theater to Cox's pines. Herold rode a horse of another color. These horses were hired at different livery stables in Washington. Jones is not conversant with all the facts about the shooting of these horses, but the testimony of Cox before he died was nearly as follows: After Booth entered the pines he distinctly heard, the next day or the day following, a band of cavalry going along the road at no great distance, and the neighing of their horses. He said to Herold: "If we can hear those horses, they can certainly hear the neighing of ours, which are uneasy from want of food and stabling." When Jones on Sunday morning came through the woods and found one of the horses loose, he told Cox, as well as Booth, that the horses ought to be put out of the way. Cox had Herold advised to take the horses down into Zekiah Swamp, and shoot them both with his revolver, which he did.

The weather during those days and nights was of a foggy, misty character—not cold, but uncomfortable, although there was no rain. At regular intervals the farmer got on his horse and went through the pines the two or three miles to the spot where still lay the yearning man with the great crime behind him and the great wish to see Virginia. Booth had a sympathetic nature, and seldom failed to make a good impression; and that he made this impression on Jones will presently appear. No incident broke the monotony of these visits for days. Jones sent his faithful negro out with the boat to fish with gill-nets, so that it should not be broken up in the precautions used by the Federals to prevent Booth's escape. Jones was now reduced to one poor boat, which had cost him eighteen dollars in Baltimore. He had lost several boats in the war, costing him from eighty to one hundred and twenty-five dollars apiece. This little gray or lead-colored skiff was the only

means by which the fugitives could get across the river. Every evening the man returned it to the mouth of the little gut or marsh called Dent's Meadow, in front of the Huckleberry farm. This is not two miles north of Pope's Creek, and from that spot Booth and Herold finally escaped.

Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday passed by, and more soldiers came in and began to ride hither and thither, and to examine the marshes; but they did not penetrate the pines at all, which at no time were visited. The houses were all examined, and old St. Thomas's brick buildings, of a venerable and imposing appearance, above Chapel Point, were ransacked. The story went abroad that there were vaults under the priests' house, leading down to the river, and finally the soldiers tore the farm and terraces all to pieces. Yet for six nights and days Booth and Herold kept in the woods, and on Friday Jones slipped over to a little settlement called Allen's Fresh, two or three miles from his farm, to see if he could hear anything. A large body of cavalry were in the little town, guided by a Marylander, and while Jones in his indifferent way was loitering about, he heard the officer say: "We have just got news that those fellows have been seen down in St. Mary's County." The cavalry were ordered to mount and set out. At that time it was along toward the gray of the night, and instantly Jones mounted his horse and rode from Allen's Fresh by the road and through the woods to where Booth and Herold were.

Said he, with decision: "Now, friends, this is your only chance. The night is pitch dark and my boat is close by. I will get you some supper at my house, and send you off if I can." With considerable difficulty, and with sighs and pain, Booth was lifted on to Jones's horse, and Herold was put at the bridle. "Now," whispered Jones, "as we cannot see twenty yards before us, I will go ahead. We must not speak. When I get to a point where everything is clear from me to you, I will whistle so," giving the whistle. In that way he went forward through the blackness, repeating the signal now and then; and although the wooded paths are generally tortuous and obstructed, nothing happened. For a short distance they were on the public road; they finally turned into the Huckleberry farm, and about fifty yards from the house the assassin and his pilot stopped under two pear-trees.

At this moment a very pathetic incident took place. Jones whispered to Booth: "Now I will go in and get something for you to eat, and you eat it here while I get something for myself." Booth, with a sudden longing, ex-

claimed: "Oh, can't I go in the house just a moment and get a little of your warm coffee?" Jones says that he felt the tears come to his eyes when he replied: "Oh, my friend, it would not be safe. This is your last chance to get away. I have negroes at the house; and if they see you, you are lost and so am I." But Jones says, as he went in, he felt his throat choked. To this day he remembers that wistful request of the assassin to be allowed to enter a warm habitation once more before embarking on the wide and unknown river.

The negro, Henry Woodland, was in the kitchen stolidly taking his meal, and neither looking nor asking any questions, though he must have suspected from the occurrences of a few days past that something was in the wind. "Henry," said Jones, "did you bring the boat back to Dent's meadow where I told you?" "Yes, master." "How many shad did you catch, Henry?" "I caught about seventy, master." "And you brought them all here to the house, Henry?" "Yes, master."

Jones then took his supper without haste, and rejoined the two men. It was about three-quarters of a mile to the water-side, and, although it was very dark, they kept on picking their way down through the ravine, where a little, almost dry stream ran off to the marshes. Not far from the water-side was a strong fence, which they were unable to take down.

Booth was now lifted from the horse by Herold and Jones, and they got under his arms, he with the crutch at hand, and so they nearly carried him to the water. The boat could be got by a little wading, and Jones brought it in. Booth took his place in the stern. He was heavily armed, and Jones says had not only his carbine, as had Herold, but revolvers and a knife. Herold took the oars, which had been left in the boat, and sat amidships. Jones then lighted a piece of candle which he had brought with him, and took a compass which Booth had brought out from Washington, and by the aid of the candle he showed Booth the true direction to steer. Said he: "Keep the course I lay down for you, and it will bring you right into Machodoc Creek. Row up the creek to the first house, where you will find Mrs. Quesenberry, and I think she will take care of you if you use my name."

They were together at the water-side an unknown time, from fifteen minutes to half an hour. At last Booth, with his voice full of emotion, said to Jones: "God bless you, my dear friend, for all you have done for me." The last words Jones thinks Booth said were: "Good-bye, old fellow!" There was a moment's sound of oars on the water, and the fugitives were gone.

For the danger and the labor of those six days Jones received from Booth seventeen dollars in greenbacks, or a little less than the cost of the boat which Jones had to surrender forever. Booth had about three hundred dollars in his possession, and he told Jones that he was poor, and intimated that he would give him a check or draft on some one, or on some bank. "No," said Jones; "I don't want your money. I want to get you away for your own safety and for ours."

It was not until months after this that Jones ascertained that the fugitives did not succeed in crossing the river that Friday night. They struck the flood tide in a few minutes, were inexperienced in navigating, and when they touched the shore sometime that night and discovered a house near by, to which Herold made his way, the latter saw something familiar about the place, he knowing all that country well. It was the residence of Colonel John J. Hughes, near Nanjemoy Stores, in Maryland, directly west of Pope's Creek, about eight or nine miles. The Potomac is here so wide, and has so many broad inlets, that in the darkness the Virginia shore and the Maryland shore seem the same. Herold went to the house and asked for food, and said that Booth was in the marsh near by, where they had pulled up the boat out of observation. The good man of the house was much disturbed, but gave Herold food, and it is supposed that after lying concealed that day they pushed off again in the evening, and this time successfully made the passage of the river, though they had to come back twelve to fourteen miles. The keeper of the house at Nanjemoy became frightened after they left, and rode into Port Tobacco and told his lawyer of the circumstance, who took him at once before a Federal officer.

Some time on Sunday morning, the ninth morning after the assassination, the fugitives got to Machodoc Creek, at Mrs. Quesenberry's, with whom they left the boat. It is not sure that they entered her house, but they went to the house of a man named Bryan on the next farm, and probably revealed themselves. Bryan next day took them to the summer-house of Dr. Richard Stewart, which is two or three miles back in the country. This Dr. Stewart was the richest man in King George County, Virginia, and had a very large brick house at Mathias Point on the river; but on account of the malaria and heat he went in summer to a large barn-like mansion back in the woodlands, a queer, strange house two stories high, with a broad passage. He was entertaining some friends just returned from the Confederate service, and was much annoyed to find

that on his place were the assassins of President Lincoln, after the war was all over. The men were not invited into the house, but were sent to an out-building of some kind, either the negro quarters or the barn; and Booth was so much chagrined at this welcome to Virginia that he took the diary which was found on his dead body and wrote a letter in lead pencil to Dr. Stewart, sorrowful rather than angry, saying that he would not take hospitality extended in that way without paying for it, and sending three dollars.

Booth procured a conveyance, or one was procured for him, from Dr. Stewart's to Port Conway: it was driven by a negro named Lucas. He probably spent Sunday in Bryan's house, and got to Dr. Stewart's house, it is said, on Monday, where he asked for breakfast, and the same day reached the Rappahannock River and went across with Captain Jett. This crossing was made on Monday, the twenty-fourth of April. That afternoon he was lodged at Garrett's farm three miles back. He spent the next day at this house and slept in the barn. Being informed that a large body of Federal cavalry had gone up the road this Tuesday, he became much distressed. On Wednesday morning, soon after midnight, the cavalry returned, guided by Captain Jett. The barn was set afire and Booth shot soon after three o'clock in the morning. He died a little after sunrise on Wednesday.

I may recapitulate Booth's diary during those days as Jones has indicated it. At ten o'clock Friday night, April 14th, Booth shot the President. A little after midnight he was at Surratt's tavern, where he received his carbine and whisky. (I forgot to say that, among the articles of comfort given to Booth by Jones when he went to the boat, was a bottle of whisky.) In gray dawn of Saturday morning Booth was at Dr. Mudd's, where he had his leg set, and a laboring white man there whittled him a crutch. On Saturday night, near midnight, he was at Cox's house, and some time between that and morning was lodged in the pines, where he remained Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday; and Friday night, between eight and nine o'clock, he started on the boat, spent Saturday in Nanjemoy Creek, and arrived some time Saturday night or before light on Sunday at Mrs. Quesenberry's. It is understood that on the Virginia side he was welcomed by two men named Harbin and Joseph Badden, the latter of whom is dead. The boat in which Booth crossed the river he gave Mrs. Quesenberry, who was arrested. The boat was put on a war vessel and probably carried to Washington.

A few days after Booth crossed the river and had been killed, suspicion turned upon both Jones and Cox. The negro who had taken the fugitives to Cox's gate gave information. Negroes near Jones's farm said he had recently concealed men, and showed the officers a sort of litter or camp about two hundred yards from his house. Here, in reality, quite a different fugitive had hidden some time before. Jones looked at it in his mournful way, and expressed the opinion that it was nothing but where a hog had been penned up. He was arrested and taken to Bryantown, and kept there eight days in the second story of the tavern where Booth had stopped, and in sight of the country Catholic church where Booth first met Dr. Mudd and others, six months before. Cox was there, but was in two or three days sent to Washington. The detectives from all the cities of the East sat in the street under Jones, and described how he was to be hanged. He remarks of Colonel

Wells: "He were a most bloodthirsty man, and tried to scare out of me just what I'm tellin' of you now." In eight days Jones was sent to the old Carroll prison, Washington. There he contrived to communicate with Cox, who was completely broken in spirit, and told him by no means to admit anything; and when Jones, in about a month, saw Swan the negro witness, going past his window toward the Navy Yard bridge with a satchel, Jones said to Cox: "You have nothing to fear." The Government soon released these men, who indeed had taken no part in Mr. Lincoln's death, though they may have been accomplices after the fact. Jones was kept six and Cox seven weeks.

Mr. Jones is married again, and now has ten children. He has filled some places under the Maryland and Baltimore political governments, and now keeps a coal, wood and feed yard in North Baltimore.

George Alfred Townsend.

EVENING.

I.

It is that pale, delaying hour
When Nature closes like a flower,
And in the spirit hallowed lies
The silence of the earth and skies.

The world has thoughts she will not own
When shades and dreams with night have flown;
Bright overhead, the early star
Makes golden guesses what they are.

II.

A light lies here, a shadow there,
With little winds at play between;
As though the elves were delving where
The sunbeams vanished in the green.

The softest clouds are flocking white
Among faint stars with centers gold,—
Slowly from daisied fields of night,
Heaven's shepherd fills his airy fold.

John Vance Cheney.



THE "SHADOW BABY."

"WHAT is it, baby Kathie, wid your eyes o' Irish blue,
Tuggin' away at me hand, to tag along o' you?
Somethin' follows you roun'—oh yes, there it is; I see
A black, black shadow baby, cunning as cunning can be!
Come, we will catch it—'t is running away—
Now we have got it, and here it shall stay!

"Sure it is lost now, or hidin' somewhere—
There I just see it behind that old chair:
Come, we will catch it, 't is gone through the door;
'T is here on the wall; 't is here on the floor!
What is it, baby Kathie, wid your eyes o' Irish blue:
Cryin', baby Kathie?—sure the shadow 's cryin' too!

"Poor shadow baby, widout any name—
Hoo! wipe up your eyes, 't is doin' the same.
Dance away, Kathie, on heel an' on toe,
Whirl on your twinkle feet, faster an' slow:
Gay little shadow, as gay as can be,
Gay little shadow, dancin' wid thee:
What is it, baby Kathie, wid your eyes o' Irish blue:
Laughin', baby Kathie?—sure th' shadow 's laughin' too!"

Jennie E. T. Dowc.

LINCOLN'S PLACE IN HISTORY.



It is seldom safe to anticipate the verdict of history; for time makes many abatements of the estimates men put upon their contemporaries, and seen through the interval of a century, with its cold light and long perspectives, many who were heroes to their own times shrink pitifully. But it is already safe to say that Abraham Lincoln was not one of these. The amazing growth he made in the esteem of his countrymen and of the world, while he was doing his great work, has been paralleled by the increase of his fame in the years since he died. More and more, as men have realized the tremendous import of that struggle in which he was the trusted leader, have they come also to appreciate the proportions of this man who bore so large a share of its burdens. So that one may venture to say some things of Abraham Lincoln such as would be rash and premature if said of one less assured of his place in the esteem of the future. He made his mark upon his contemporaries — a mark so clear, so easily read, so ineffaceable, that time can only deepen it, and the disclosures of reminiscence and history but serve to keep its lines sharp and well defined.

The personality of Abraham Lincoln ranks him easily as the greatest of Americans since Washington; and it is by no means a heresy to the rising thought of the age to see in Lincoln and in Ralph Waldo Emerson types of American greatness more thoroughly our own than even that of Washington.

But every great man has, besides his own personal place in the lists of character, another place which he holds by virtue of the service he has rendered to his fellow-men by means of that character and moral life. He has what may be called a biographical standing. He has also a historical standing. That is, he takes one rank according to what he is, and another according to what he does. In this latter light it is not as yet at all common to think of Abraham Lincoln. Consider as said, therefore, all that the most sincere admirer could say of Lincoln's stalwart character, his original nature, trained by unparalleled events, his genius, so entirely American, shaped in circumstances America alone could supply; but remember also that when we study him from this point of view, we are taking him, after all, only in his national relations as a country-

man and an American. We have not yet sought his place in the larger human circle which includes the world. What place does he hold there? What are his relations to humanity? Has he any claims to rank beside the heroes whose fame, far from being provincial, the heritage of a state or a race, is swept up into the loftier glory that belongs to the great men of all time and all ages and all races? It is time for us to put our man of the West in his world relations. If our nation itself has a clear function in the development of the world's social and political life, then this man who sustained such important relations to our national existence had certain equally important functions in the economy of international progress. This man, who stepped from the prairies of Illinois to the leadership of the most momentous struggle of modern times, was by that very fact brought into relation with the whole scheme of the world's political history, and was called to one of the most important posts in the march of civilization. Yet men have hardly begun to understand the full import of Lincoln's influence in the great struggle which shook this continent a quarter-century ago. He was a wiser man and a more opportune man than we have realized. He comprehended the circumstances of the hour, and saw their relations to the political life of the ages, with an intuition the accuracy of which is all the more impressive from the fact that it seems to have been half unconscious. When a man, in the midst of the babel of policies and principles which fills the ears in a time of excitement and uncertainty, singles out the one transcendent and supreme thought, holds to it firmly, and makes it the guide of all his acts and the test of all his methods, he gives incontestable evidence of greatness and genius. How marvelously Lincoln fulfilled the test of greatness we are just beginning to see. For we are beginning to perceive the connection of our struggle with the evolution of the nations, and how definite a relation it had to the world's advance from barbarism to political order, from anarchy to constitutional freedom, from a state of perpetual feuds to a condition nearer to essential peacefulness than the world has previously known.

Glance for a moment at the train of events in the world's history of which the civil war in America was an integral part, and see what we were called to do when Abraham Lincoln became the leader of this people.


It is possible to trace the evolution of social organization and the progress of mankind along many and differing paths. The battles of progress have been fought on many lines and under many names. One historian traces the rise of civilization in the "progress of religious ideas." Another follows the gains made in the direction of personal liberty, the enlarging opportunity and security of the individual under law. There is an economic interpretation of history, and a growth illustrated in letters and the arts. There are great names identified with any one of these phases of progress—names before which the world makes obeisance for their service in advancing human interests, each along his own path and with recourse to his own powers. Lincoln's place, however, was in none of these categories. His was not the work of a Moses or of a Paul, a Montfort or a Hampden, a Cobden, a Shakspeare, or a Michelangelo. To find his historical place, we must turn to still another phase of human society and its expanding life.

It is becoming an accepted thought among intelligent students of history, especially since the suggestive treatises of Mr. Herbert Spencer upon sociology have so impressed modern thought, that the development of mankind has been a continual struggle after conditions of orderly and peacefulliving. The aspiration of man has been from the earliest times toward a state in which he could live in quietness and safety, harmless and unharmed. His experiments in statecraft have been efforts to frame a political system which should secure him in this right by means of institutions and laws. History fully bears out this theory. It has always been the struggle of the more intelligent of mankind to establish a social and political condition in which they should be at liberty to pursue the higher ends of living, without molestation from the savage and barbarous elements of society. In almost every great war there has been some element of this sort to give it a significance beyond the mere collision of brute forces. The great conflicts of arms show one party striving in the interests of order and social stability. Most of the fighting which men have done has been in the interest of tranquillity. The great wars of the world have been for the sake of peace. The question which was decided on the field of Marathon was not whether the Persian or the Greek was the better fighter, but whether the civilizing and peaceful forces at work in Greece should be annihilated by a horde of barbarous satraps. It was a triumph in the interests of enlightenment, peace, and progress in tranquil living. "These are world-historic victories," says Hegel, speaking of this war; "they were

the salvation of culture and spiritual vigor." The internal contentions among the Greeks, after the expulsion of the Persians, were struggles between the forces of coöperation and paternity among the cities, and tendencies toward disruption and municipal individualism, and it was a reverse to the cause of civilization when the attempts at federation failed, and the civic bodies fell apart, and the autonomy of the states—the "state-sovereignty" principle of the Hellenic world—asserted itself in the destruction of the spirit of Pan-Hellenism.

So, too, when Ariovistus led the Germanic tribes against the borders of the Roman empire, it was in the interest of peace that Cæsar went out against him and extended the limits of civilization. For, in the words of John Fiske, "It occurred to the prescient genius of Cæsar to be beforehand and conquer Gaul, and enlist all its giant barbaric forces on the side of civilization. This great work was as thoroughly done as anything that ever was done in human history, and we ought to be thankful to Cæsar for it every day we live." The full fruit of this work of the first emperor was not gathered till that mighty wrestle between the invading Huns and the allied defenders of Gaul which culminated in the victory of those whom Julius Cæsar had converted into the friends of civilization over the fierce and barbarian Kalmuck hordes. The destructive career of Attila was arrested at the battle of Châlons-sur-Marne, which was, as John Fiske says again, "The last day on which barbarism was able to contend with civilization on equal terms." That was a fight in the interest of peace.

The wars of the early English, in which John Milton could see only "mere battles of kites and crows," are described by John Richard Green as "The Making of England," a phrase which identifies them at once as a part of the great struggle for unity among men and a chance to live without dread of the restless and destructive barbarian. When the French fled from their opponents on the Plains of Abraham it was decided that English ideas—that is, the principles which give the most repose and tranquillity to society—should prevail on the American continent. Francis Parkman says of the Peace of Paris, to which this signal victory so largely contributed: "[It] makes an epoch than which none in modern history is more fruitful of grand results. With it began a new chapter in the annals of the world." John Richard Green gives the grand reason which justifies so sweeping a declaration, in saying "[The] Conquest of Canada . . . laid the foundation of the United States." ("A Short History of the English People," p. 725.) And when Corn-



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A. Lincoln.

FROM AN ORIGINAL, UNRETOUCHED NEGATIVE, MADE IN 1864, AT THE TIME THE PRESIDENT COMMISSIONED ULYSSES S. GRANT LIEUTENANT-GENERAL AND COMMANDER OF ALL THE ARMIES OF THE REPUBLIC. IT IS STATED THAT THIS NEGATIVE, "WITH ONE OF GENERAL U. S. GRANT," WAS MADE IN COMMEMORATION OF THAT EVENT.

wallis gave up his army at Yorktown, a war was ended which presented this nation to mankind as the most marvelous embodiment of the forces of political and social stability as yet known to man. The war of the Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution were two of the most momentous events in the whole history of advancing civilization. They marked a double victory. The Revolution secured the *independence* of the States, the Constitution established their *interdependence*. Nor would the first have been of the least avail to humanity without the second. "Liberty or Death" was a good war-cry, and it wrought independence; but after independence was won, Franklin's old motto, "Join or Die," helped to secure that interdependence which was the only guarantee of freedom. The glory of the men who carried through that twofold struggle is not merely that they freed themselves from England, but that they bound themselves to one another. It was not only that they displayed so intractable a spirit of independence, but also that they showed such aptness for concert of action. They not only vindicated the right of a man to his own freedom, but they showed that the only way in which liberty can be made available is by joining it to some form of political community. They founded a free nation. But that nation was made up of thirteen United States. It was and is in reality a federation of nations. For every State in this nation is as good as an independent nation; and yet the aggregate makes but one organic whole. And by far the most valuable lesson which this nation has given to the world at large is in demonstrating the possibility of the voluntary union of small political groups into a great political group. We have shown that it is possible for some fifty States, covering an area of 3,600,000 square miles, to organize themselves on a basis of peaceful coöperation. And we can hardly realize what a vast gain upon the past this success implies, unless we remember that Europe, for example, with her twenty-two states lives to this day in armed and threatening jealousy and disunion, every nation watching its neighbors with sinister and hostile disposition. Independence indeed was a noble prize, well earned, and well worth the struggle which won it; but the safeguard of independence was federation. The security of our liberties lies in our union of States. There was more than magnificent rhetoric, there was all the inspiration of statesmanship, in that eloquent burst of Webster's, when he exclaimed in the Senate, "Liberty and Union, one and inseparable!"

It would be difficult to lay too much stress upon this truth for which our national existence stands. This nation is a perpetual exam-

ple of the tendency of the human race toward more humane, peaceful, and fraternal ways of living together. Its very system of government is an embodiment of those peaceful aims which grow with the growth of civilization, and which are destined at last to rule mankind. It has been well said by an American writer: "The principle of federalism . . . contains within itself the seeds of permanent peace between nations, and to this glorious end I believe it will come in the fullness of time. . . . It was indeed reserved for this nation to show the world the way to this pacific mode of national life, but ours will not be the last among the lands of the earth to profit by it."

Thus, from the beginning of time, the wars of society have tended to the peace of society. The fighting men have been continually playing into the hands of the men of peace. The iron plow of war has broken up the soil for the sowing of the seed of quietness and assurance among men. And thanks to the larger knowledge of our time, and the more intelligent study of the march of mankind, he who listens down the past and hears

The bursting shell, the gateway wrenched
asunder,
The rattling musketry, the clashing blade,
And ever and anon, in tones of thunder
The diapason of the cannonade,

this trembling listener may confirm, out of the historian's cautious prophecy, the hope of the poet,

Down the dark future, through long generations,
The echoing sounds grow fainter and then
cease;
And like a bell, with solemn, sweet vibrations,
I hear once more the voice of Christ say,
"Peace."

Now, when Abraham Lincoln was thrust forward to lead the American people, he found himself called to face a new peril to the interests of mankind. The conspiracy against the national life was a threat to all the world. It was an attempt to undo the work of centuries. It was a reaction from that splendid work which had been achieved, in the way just indicated, through twenty-five centuries of strife and war. For the world had been learning how men could live together in fraternity, and had been incorporating that knowledge into its laws and institutions. It had learned how the individual could live more comfortably if he had the help of his family, his kin; and so they had stopped fighting their relatives. It had learned that families might with advantage stop fighting one another, and secure a little more peace by banding themselves in a clan against

some other annoying and quarrelsome family. Then it had found how to combine families and tribes into nations, and under some common ruler, and some compact and constitution, get a still larger portion of peace and tranquillity.

For a long time it got no further than this, but when at last the genius of the American people, embodied in the intellects of Hamilton and Madison, framed that Constitution, well called the "finest specimen of constructive statesmanship the world has ever seen," it advanced mankind one step more. For now it showed the nations how separate states, with all their own internal interests and concerns going on harmoniously, can dwell in peace, side by side, held by a mutual compact, adjusting their disputes by established tribunals, loyal to one another through their loyalty to a common government. It was the sublimest work of statesmanship the world had achieved. It was the solution of the last great problem in the search for methods of peace and law among men. The American Union is the highest political embodiment of Christianity. It is the highest proof of the possibility of a universal peace. It is the most convincing test of man's capacity for unity in diversity and diversity in unity. It is evidence, incontestable, that states, like individuals, can decide their differences not by brutal war, but by systematic legislation, or by a common tribunal. This Union is the consummation of all the struggles of all men toward a state of universal peace. It is the life and aspiration of the world organized into a nation.

This was the result, so pregnant with the highest destiny of all people, which was put in peril by the revolt of the South. The first test had come to this new principle of government and of civilization, and it was a test which may fairly be called terrific. Never were forces better in hand for the overthrow of a great principle. Bold and compact, shrewd and determined, fully equipped, and with definite purposes and aims pursued relentlessly, the Southern leaders arrayed themselves to destroy this peaceful compact, and to rive into fragments this splendid fabric to which the centuries had given their best work. It was a well-organized attempt, and it was as likely as not to succeed. Because the issue did not appear as simple as we have pictured it, the dispute was made to seem as if it were a question of the rights of certain States, or as if it were a quarrel over the emancipation of the slaves. There were many at the North who were so full of burning indignation against negro slavery that they could see no other issue than this; while to most of the Southern people the defense of their right to hold slaves seemed

a supreme and compelling crisis, demanding the extreme measures of civil war.

And yet both were wrong. The abolition of slavery was only an incident of the war. It was an involved issue, and not the main one. Emancipation was a priceless gain to this nation; it was deliverance from a plague, a pest, a curse, as North and South alike agree to-day. The nation bought that deliverance cheaply, even at the price of a horrible war. But that was not the main question. This other one under-ran and over-weighted it. The gravest matter involved in that struggle was not the freeing of the slaves; that would have come anyhow in time, for it was impossible that slavery should continue in this land. But the one momentous issue of that trial hour, and the one in which not the fate of the negro race alone, but of all races and nations, was involved, was whether, in the first real difficulty in its administration, this principle of the peaceful union of great states should survive, or be overthrown and destroyed. If the Union was maintained, the way was clear for other peoples to go on and enter into the promised land of peace. If it was destroyed, its ruins would block the way of progress, and delay the advance of the nations, perhaps for a thousand years.

It is here that we come to the application of all this matter to the name and the nature of Abraham Lincoln. These facts out of the histories throw a white light of disclosure upon the character of the great war President. How easy in that confusing hour for the wisest to make mistakes! How easy for the calmest judgment to miss the real issue, and be diverted to lesser and to false ones! How easy to undervalue the real signs of the times, and to be the fool of fate by following the lures of the crafty or the stupid! It is such hours as those of the great Rebellion which test men's minds, and show the true leaders and the master heads. To stand upon the swinging deck when the rising gales are roaring in one's ears; when the threatening cloud just skims the wave and the wave tosses up to the cloud; when the blinding wrack of foam sweeps against the breath, and the eye can scarcely see the swaying compass as the ship goes plunging among hidden reefs; when the hardiest sailor turns his back and the coolest is confused, uncertain, anxious, or appalled; to be cool, to be clear,—to read the signs of the trackless sea, and, undaunted by the play of all these raging elements and these distracting dangers, to guide the keel straight down the channels where lie safety and salvation,—this marks the man of God's own making, called forth to be the helmsman for a stormy hour, the pilot of mighty destinies,

dowered by heaven for his task. And this, all this, was Abraham Lincoln.

He saw, from the moment that he became convinced of the intentions of the South, the one imperative, absolute aim he must keep in view. He seized the one transcendent issue of the hour, and, disentangling it from all that could confuse or deceive, held it up for his own guidance, and kept it continually before the nation. It was the preservation of the Union. It was the vindication of the great principle of the pacific federation of states for the cultivation of a larger life of order and fraternity. Of course Lincoln never reasoned about the matter at all as we have done. He had no time for that. He had no facilities for entering upon the subject from this side. So much the more is his wonderful genius approved, if thus, instinctively, and by the innate good sense and political sagacity of his nature, he came straight at the truth and took hold of his real work. He had the instinct of the highest statesmanship, the sense of what things are essential, preëminent, absolutely needful to be done. And for this high qualification for the work set before him his fame will grow with every century. With this conviction firm and foremost in his mind, nothing in all those four years,—no difficulty, hardship, peril, criticism at home or hostility abroad, persuasion of friend or threat of foe, trial to patience or test of courage,—nothing could swerve or turn him from the central aim of his mind. To preserve the Union was his purpose; whatever would effect that end he would try. He would listen to any one who had that at heart. He would listen to none who had not. He would sacrifice anything, any man, all the resources at his command, tears, treasure, troops, the blood of the bravest men, his own strength, pride, ambitions; but he would not sacrifice the Union.

This conviction is pronounced with a full sense of the possible shock it may bring to those who love to think of Lincoln's chief renown as connected with the race he freed from bondage. It is hard for many of us not to feel that emancipation was the great achievement of that struggle, and that the war was waged to decide whether this should be a free nation or a land of bonds and stripes. But the wiser years will decide against us. All our thankfulness and honor to the man who made the act of emancipation a weapon with which to strike rebellion must not blind us to the fact that this splendid stroke of policy, this noble deed of statecraft, was only an incident and not the aim of the struggle. Viewed in its relations to the long world-history, the development of mankind, the work of civilization, the American people under their great leader were en-

gaged in determining whether the great principle of federation, the peaceful coexistence of great states, should succeed or fail. They were in a struggle to decide whether the rule of peace and good-will should extend, or stop and go no further. And Abraham Lincoln's clear, unerring eye perceived the meaning of the struggle, his strong mind grasped its vital import, and his steadfast soul clung to that thought with a tenacity that could be expressed only in some such words as Paul's, "This one thing I do."

We have thus far been accustomed to rank our great President among the heroes of our own land, and seldom have dared to talk of him in connection with his place among the world's famous ones. Sometimes it has seemed to come to us that he was worthy a fame outside the limits of this land. Some rare voices have found courage to say, as Lowell said,

Here was a type of the true elder race,
And one of Plutarch's men talked with us
face to face.

There is enough in his personality, so fresh, so strong, so inspiring, to justify our highest pride in him, and to make us hold up this new product of our new land, whose honesty and strong good sense, whose earnest faith and indomitable purpose, fit him to stand like a modern Aristides or a New World Cato. But when the slow judgment of the years is made up, it will take this man of the West, who led us through the fires of a terrible civil strife, and, seeing how his achievement reached out to all mankind and secured the work which cost the toil and struggle of ages, will range him side by side with the men who saved Greece from Persian barbarism, and those who saved Rome from Gallic anarchy, and those who gave this continent to the free institutions of the English race.

I praise him not; it were too late;
And some innate weakness there must be
In him who condescends to victory
Such as the Present gives, and cannot wait,
Safe in himself as in a fate.

So always firmly he:
He knew to bide his time,
And can his fame abide.
Still patient in his simple faith sublime,
Till the wise years decide.

There stands in the city of Chicago the noblest statue of this man which the artistic genius of the land has yet produced. The sculptor has entered with most wonderful sympathy into Lincoln's nature, and has shown us the man in all the simplicity, the honest humanity, the rugged grandeur of his soul. There could be no nobler expression of the faith, the sincerity, the wise insight of the man, than that

statue, which, "standing like a tower," will draw the loving gaze of millions in the coming years. But the artist has shown as keen an insight into the historic place of Lincoln as he has into his personal traits, in the words which he has chosen from Lincoln's rejoinder to his old friend Greeley, inscribed at the base of the statue:

"If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If

I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear I forbear, because I do not believe it would help to save the Union."

There spake God's man, instinctively grasping the truth for which he was brought into this world; and those words, above all others, shall finally give him his niche in the temple set apart for those who have signally served in the world's great wars of progress toward peace.

John Coleman Adams.



LINCOLN'S GETTYSBURG ADDRESS.¹



HERE are three sources of authority for Lincoln's Gettysburg address, or, to speak more concisely, three successive versions of it—all identical in thought, but differing slightly in expression. The

last of these is the regular outgrowth of the two which preceded it, and is the perfected product of the President's rhetorical and literary mastery. The three versions are:

1. The original autograph MS. draft, written by Mr. Lincoln partly at Washington and partly at Gettysburg.

2. The version made by the shorthand reporter on the stand at Gettysburg when the President delivered it, which was telegraphed, and was printed in the leading newspapers of the country on the following morning.

3. The revised copy made by the President a few days after his return to Washington, upon a careful comparison of his original draft and the printed newspaper version with his own recollections of the exact form in which he delivered it.

¹ In Chapter vii., Vol. VIII. of "Abraham Lincoln: A History," the authors have given the authentic text of the famous address delivered by President Lincoln at the dedication of the Gettysburg National Cemetery,

Mr. David Wills, of Gettysburg, first suggested the creation of a national cemetery on the battle-field, and under Governor Curtin's direction and coöperation he purchased the land for Pennsylvania and other States interested, and superintended the improvements. It had been intended to hold the dedication ceremonies on October 23, 1863, but Edward Everett, who was chosen to deliver the oration, had engagements for that time, and at his suggestion the occasion was postponed to November 19.

On November 2 Mr. Wills wrote the President a formal invitation to take part in the dedication.

These grounds [said his letter in part] will be consecrated and set apart to this sacred purpose by appropriate ceremonies on Thursday, the 19th inst. Hon. Edward Everett will deliver the oration. I am authorized by the governors of the different States to invite you to be present, and to participate in these ceremonies, which will doubtless be very imposing and solemnly impressive. It is the desire that, after the oration, you, as Chief Executive of the nation, formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few appropriate remarks.

both in type and in facsimile of the President's handwriting, as well as the principal points in its history. To show how that text was established, and to explain some additional details, are the objects of this paper.

Accompanying this official invitation was also a private note from Mr. Wills, which said :

As the hotels in our town will be crowded and in confusion at the time referred to in the inclosed invitation, I write to invite you to stop with me. I hope you will feel it your duty to lay aside pressing business for a day to come on here to perform this last sad rite to our brave soldier dead, on the 19th inst. Governor Curtin and Hon. Edward Everett will be my guests at that time, and if you come you will please join them at my house.

From the above date it will be seen that Mr. Lincoln had a little more than two weeks in which to prepare the remarks he might intend to make. It was a time when he was extremely busy, not alone with the important and complicated military affairs in the various armies, but also with the consideration of his annual message to Congress, which was to meet early in December. There was even great uncertainty whether he could take enough time from his pressing official duties to go to Gettysburg at all. Up to the 17th of November, only two days before the ceremonies, no definite arrangements for the journey had been made. The whole cabinet had of course been invited, as well as the President, and on the 17th, which was Tuesday, Mr. Lincoln wrote to Secretary Chase :

I expected to see you here at cabinet meeting, and to say something about going to Gettysburg. There will be a train to take and return us. The time for starting is not yet fixed; but when it shall be I will notify you.

However, Mr. Chase had already written a note to Mr. Wills, expressing his inability to go, and apparently a little later on the same day Secretary Stanton sent the President this "time-table" for the trip :

It is proposed by the Baltimore and Ohio road: First, to leave Washington Thursday morning at 6 A. M. Second, to leave Baltimore at 8 A. M., arriving at Gettysburg at twelve, noon, thus giving two hours to view the ground before the dedication ceremonies commence. Third, to leave Gettysburg at 6 P. M., and arrive at Washington at midnight, thus doing all in one day.

Upon this proposition Mr. Lincoln, with his unfailing common-sense judgment, made this indorsement :

I do not like this arrangement. I do not wish to so go that by the slightest accident we fail entirely; and, at the best, the whole to be a mere breathless running of the gantlet. But any way.

There is no decisive record of when Mr. Lincoln wrote the first sentences of his pro-

posed address. He probably followed his usual habit in such matters, using great deliberation in arranging his thoughts, and molding his phrases mentally, waiting to reduce them to writing until they had taken satisfactory form.

There was much greater necessity for such precaution in this case, because the invitation specified that the address of dedication should only be "a few appropriate remarks." Brevity in speech and writing was one of Lincoln's marked characteristics; but in this instance there existed two other motives calculated to strongly support his natural inclination. One was that Mr. Everett would be quite certain to make a long address; the other, the want of opportunity even to think leisurely about what he might desire to say. All this strongly confirms the correctness of the statement made by the Hon. James Speed, in an interview printed in the "Louisville Commercial" in November, 1879, that the President told him that "the day before he left Washington he found time to write about half of his speech."

The President's criticism of the time-table first suggested must have struck Secretary Stanton as having force, for the arrangement was changed, so that instead of starting on Thursday morning, the day of the ceremonies, the President's special train left Washington at noon of Wednesday the 18th. Three members of the cabinet—Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, Mr. Usher, Secretary of the Interior, and Mr. Blair, Postmaster-General—accompanied the President, as did the French minister M. Mercier, the Italian minister M. Bertinatti, and several legation secretaries and attachés. Mr. Lincoln also had with him his private secretary Mr. Nicolay, and his assistant private secretary Colonel John Hay. Captain H. A. Wise of the navy and Mrs. Wise (daughter of Edward Everett) were also of the party; likewise a number of newspaper correspondents from Washington, and a military guard of honor to take part in the Gettysburg procession. Other parties of military officers joined the train on the way.

No accident or delay occurred, and the party arrived in Gettysburg about nightfall. According to invitation Mr. Lincoln went to the house of Mr. Wills, while the members of the cabinet, and other distinguished persons of his party, were entertained elsewhere.

Except during its days of battle the little town of Gettysburg had never been so full of people. After the usual supper hour the streets literally swarmed with visitors, and the stirring music of regimental bands and patriotic glee-clubs sounded in many directions. With material so abundant, and enthusiasm so plentiful, a serenading party soon organized itself to

Executive Mansion,

Washington,, 186

Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth, upon this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that "all men are created equal"

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived, and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of it, as a final rest:

ing place for those who die here, that the nation
might live. This we may, in all propriety do. But, in a
larger sense, we can not dedicate — we can not
consecrate — we can not hallow, this ground —
the brave men, living and dead, who struggled
here, have hallowed it, far above our poor power
to add or detract, The world will little note, nor long
remember what we say here; while it can never
forget what they did here.

It is rather for us, the living, ^{we have} to ~~stand~~ ^{be} here,

ted to the great tasks remaining before us—
that, from these honored dead we take in-
creased devotion to that cause for which
they here, gave the last full measure of our
notion— that we here highly resolve that
these shall not have died in vain; that
the nation, shall have a new birth of free-
dom, and that government of the people by
the people for the people, shall not perish
with from the earth.

call on prominent personages for impromptu speeches, and of course the President could not escape.

The crowd persisted in calling him out, but Mr. Lincoln showed himself only long enough to utter the few commonplace excuses which politeness required. He said:

I appear before you, fellow-citizens, merely to thank you for this compliment. The inference is a very fair one that you would hear me for a little while at least, were I to commence to make a speech. I do not appear before you for the purpose of doing so, and for several substantial reasons. The most substantial of these is that I have no speech to make. In my position it is somewhat important that I should not say any foolish things. [A voice: If you can help it."] It very often happens that the only way to help it is to say nothing at all. Believing that is my present condition this evening, I must beg of you to excuse me from addressing you further.

The crowd followed the music to seek other notabilities, and had the satisfaction of hearing short speeches from Secretary Seward, Representatives McPherson and McKnight, Judge Shannon, Colonel John W. Forney, Wayne MacVeagh, and perhaps others. These addresses were not altogether perfunctory. A certain political tension existed throughout the entire war period, which rarely failed to color every word of a public speaker, and attune the ear of every public listener to subtle and oracular meanings. Even in this ceremonial gathering there was a keen watchfulness for any sign or omen which might disclose a drift in popular feeling, either on the local Pennsylvania quarrel between Cameron and Curtin, or the final success or failure of the Emancipation Proclamation; or whether the President would or would not succeed himself by a re-nomination and reelection in the coming campaign of 1864.

There were still here and there ultra-radical newspapers that suspected and questioned Seward's hearty support of the emancipation policy. These made favorable note of his little address in which he predicted that the war would end in the removal of slavery, and that "when that cause is removed, simply by the operation of abolishing it, as the origin and agent of the treason that is without justification and without parallel, we shall henceforth be united, be only one country, having only one hope, one ambition, and one destiny."

Speech-making finally came to an end, and such of the visitors as were blessed with friends or good luck sought the retirement of their rooms, where in spite of brass-bands and glee-clubs, and the restless tramping of the less fortunate along the sidewalks, they slept the slumber of mental, added to physical, weariness.

It was after the breakfast hour on the morning of the 19th that the writer, Mr. Lincoln's private secretary, went to the upper room in the house of Mr. Wills which Mr. Lincoln occupied, to report for duty, and remained with the President while he finished writing the Gettysburg address, during the short leisure he could utilize for this purpose before being called to take his place in the procession, which was announced on the program to move promptly at ten o'clock.

There is neither record, evidence, nor well-founded tradition that Mr. Lincoln did any writing, or made any notes, on the journey between Washington and Gettysburg. The train consisted of four passenger-coaches, and either composition or writing would have been extremely troublesome amid all the movement, the noise, the conversation, the greetings, and the questionings which ordinary courtesy required him to undergo in these surroundings; but still worse would have been the rockings and joltings of the train, rendering writing virtually impossible. Mr. Lincoln carried in his pocket the autograph manuscript of so much of his address as he had written at Washington the day before. Precisely what that was the reader can now see by turning to the facsimile reproduction of the original draft, which is for the first time printed and made public in this article. It fills one page of the letter-paper at that time habitually used in the Executive Mansion, containing the plainly printed blank heading; both paper and print giving convincing testimony to the simple and economical business methods then prevailing in the White House. (See pages 598 and 599.)

This portion of the manuscript begins with the line "Four score and seven years ago," and ends "It is rather for us the living," etc. The whole of this first page — nineteen lines — is written in ink in the President's strong clear hand, without blot or erasure; and the last line is in the following form: "It is rather for us the living to stand here," the last three words being, like the rest, in ink. From the fact that this sentence is incomplete, we may infer that at the time of writing it in Washington the remainder of the sentence was also written in ink on another piece of paper. But when, at Gettysburg on the morning of the ceremonies, Mr. Lincoln finished his manuscript, he used a lead pencil, with which he crossed out the last three words of the first page, and wrote above them in pencil "we here be dedica," at which point he took up a new half sheet of paper — not white letter-paper as before, but a bluish-gray foolscap of large size with wide lines, habitually used by him for long or formal documents, and on this he wrote, all in pencil, the remainder of the word, and of the first draft

of the address, comprising a total of nine lines and a half. (See page 600.)

The time occupied in this final writing was probably about an hour, for it is not likely that he left the breakfast table before nine o'clock, and the formation of the procession began at ten. The grand marshal of the day had made preparations for an imposing procession, and to this end, instead of carriages ordinarily used on such occasions, had arranged that the President and other dignitaries should ride to the grounds on horseback. We learn from the newspaper reports that at about ten o'clock the President issued from Mr. Wills's house attired in black, with white gauntlets upon his hands: that as soon as he had mounted he was besieged by a crowd eager to shake hands with him, and that the marshals had some difficulty in inducing the people to desist and allow him to sit in peace upon his horse. Secretaries Seward, Blair, and Usher also mounted horses, as did others of the official retinue. There were the usual delays incident to such occasions, rather aggravated in this instance by the fact that intense curiosity to see the battle-field had already drawn thither the larger part of the great crowd in the village without waiting to join the procession; so that for want of numbers the pageant did not make the imposing display which had been anticipated.

The procession, however, finally moved, and at about eleven o'clock the Presidential party reached the platform. Mr. Everett, the orator of the day, arrived fully half an hour later, and there was still further waiting before the military bodies and civic spectators could be properly ranged and stationed. It was therefore fully noon before Mr. Everett began his address, after which, for two hours, he held the assembled multitude in rapt attention with his eloquent description and argument, his polished diction, his carefully studied and practised delivery.

When he had concluded, and the band had performed the usual musical interlude, President Lincoln rose to fill the part assigned him in the program. It was entirely natural for

every one to expect that this would consist of a few perfunctory words, the mere formality of official dedication. There is every probability that the assemblage regarded Mr. Everett as the mouthpiece, the organ of expression of the thought and feeling of the hour, and took it for granted that Mr. Lincoln was there as a mere official figure-head, the culminating decoration, so to speak, of the elaborately planned pageant of the day. They were therefore totally unprepared for what they heard, and could not immediately realize that *his* words, and not those of the carefully selected orator, were to carry the concentrated thought of the occasion like a trumpet-peal to farthest posterity.

The newspaper records indicate that when Mr. Lincoln began to speak, he held in his hand the manuscript first draft of his address which he had finished only a short time before. But it is the distinct recollection of the writer, who sat within a few feet of him, that he did not read from the written pages, though that impression was naturally left upon many of his auditors. That it was not a mere mechanical reading is, however, more definitely confirmed by the circumstance that Mr. Lincoln did not deliver the address in the exact form in which his first draft is written. It was taken down in shorthand by the reporter for the "Associated Press," telegraphed to the principal cities, and printed on the following morning in the leading newspapers.

It would also appear that a few, but only a very few, independent shorthand reports or abstracts were made by other correspondents.

For all practical purposes of criticism, therefore, the three versions mentioned at the beginning of this article, namely: (1) The first draft; (2) the Associated Press report; (3) the revised autograph copy, may be used as standards of comparison, and for this purpose these three versions are here arranged in successive lines. The middle line, or Associated Press report (the one printed in the New York dailies), is in italics, and the transition which the address underwent at the hands of Mr. Lincoln himself is thus exactly shown.

(Autograph Original Draft.)—Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth,
 (*Associated Press Report.*)—*Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth*
 (Revised Autograph Copy.)—Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth

upon this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that
upon this continent a new Nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that
 on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that

"all men are created equal."
all men are created equal. [Applause.]
 all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that Nation or any Nation so
 Now we are engaged in a great civil war; testing whether that nation, or any nation so
 conceived, and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war.
conceived and so dedicated can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war.
 conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war.

We have come to dedicate a portion of it, as a final resting place for those who died
We are met to dedicate a portion of it as the final resting-place of those who
 We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who

here, that the nation might live. This we may in all propriety do.
here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we
 here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we

should do this.
 should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow—
But in a larger sense we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow
 But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow—

this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have hallowed it far above
this ground. The brave men living and dead who struggled here have consecrated it far above
 this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here have consecrated it far above

our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remem-
our power to add or detract. [Applause.] The world will little note nor long remem-
 our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remem-

ber what we say here; while it can never forget what they did here. It is
ber what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. [Applause.] It is
 ber what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is

rather for us, the living,
for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they
 for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who

have thus far so nobly carried on. [Applause.] It is rather for us to be here dedi-
 fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedi-

task remaining before us—that, from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that
cated to the great task remaining before us, that from these honored dead we take increased devo-
 cated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devo-

cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve
tion to that cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly re-
 tion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly re-

these dead shall not have died in vain; that the nation,
solve that the dead shall not have died in vain [applause]; that the nation shall, under God,
 solve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God,

shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the
have a new birth of freedom; and that governments of the people by the people and for the
 shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the

people, shall not perish from the earth.
people, shall not perish from the earth. [Long continued applause.]
 people, shall not perish from the earth.

If now we make the comparative analysis, we find that between the first draft as Mr. Lincoln wrote it, and the Associated Press report as he delivered it, the following essential changes occurred:

1. The phrase, "Those who died here," was changed to "Those who here gave their lives." This was a gain in rhetorical form.

2. The entire sentence, "This we may in all propriety do," was changed to "It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this." It was a mere recasting of the phrase for greater emphasis.

3. The sentence in the original draft, "It is rather for us the living we here be dedicated to the great task remaining before us," was transformed into two sentences, thus: "It is for us the living rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they have thus far so nobly carried on. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us." This is a repetition and slight amplification of the sentence and thought. The "we" in the original was of course a mere slip of the pencil—"to" having been intended.

4. The phrase, "Shall have a new birth of freedom," was changed as follows: "Shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom," a change which added dignity and solemnity.

The above changes show that Mr. Lincoln did not read his address, but that he delivered it from the fullness and conciseness of thought and memory, rounding it out to nearly its final rhetorical completeness. The changes may have been prompted by the oratorical impulse of the moment; but it is more likely that in the interval of four hours occupied by coming to the grounds, and the delivery of Mr. Everett's oration, he fashioned the phrases anew in his silent thought, and had them ready for use when he rose to speak.

The other changes were merely verbal: as, "have come" changed to "are met"; "a" changed to "the"; "for" changed to "of"; "the" changed to "that"; "hallowed" changed to "consecrated"; the word "poor" omitted; "while" changed to "but"; "these" changed to "that the"; "government" changed to "governments"; and the word "and" interpolated in the last sentence. Most, if not all, of these are clearly errors of the shorthand. Such variation as existed between the print in New York dailies and in other cities (excepting of course the independent abstracts) seem due either to telegraph operators or newspaper type-setting and proof-reading.

The delivery of the address formed the conclusion of the dedication ceremonies, and the same evening about six o'clock the Presidential party left Gettysburg on their special train, arriving at Washington near midnight. It has

sometimes been stated that Mr. Lincoln's Gettysburg address received little attention or appreciation from those who heard it. On the contrary, the Associated Press report printed above shows that during its delivery it was six times interrupted by applause; and on the next day Mr. Everett, who had accompanied the President to Washington, sent him the following note:

MY DEAR SIR: Not wishing to intrude upon your privacy when you must be much engaged, I beg leave in this way to thank you very sincerely for your great thoughtfulness for my daughter's accommodation on the platform yesterday, and much kindness to me and mine at Gettysburg. Permit me also to express my great admiration of the thoughts expressed by you with such eloquent simplicity and appropriateness at the consecration of the cemetery. I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near the central idea of the occasion in two hours as you did in two minutes. My son, who parted from me at Baltimore, and my daughter concur in this statement.

Mr. Lincoln's acknowledgment of this compliment from so fine a critic was in his usual tone of frank modesty.

Your kind note of to-day is received. In our respective parts yesterday, you could not have been excused to make a short address, nor I a long one. I am pleased to know that in your judgment the little I did say was not a failure. Of course I knew that Mr. Everett would not fail; and yet, while the whole discourse was eminently satisfactory, and will be of great value, there were passages in it which transcended my expectations. The point made against the theory of the General Government being only an agency whose principals are the States was new to me, and, as I think, is one of the best arguments for national supremacy. The tribute to our noble women for their angel ministering to the suffering soldiers surpasses in its way, as do the subjects of it, whatever has gone before.

Four days after Mr. Lincoln's return to Washington, Mr. Wills once more wrote him, saying:

On behalf of the States interested in the National Cemetery here, I request of you the original manuscript of the dedicatory remarks delivered by you here last Thursday. We desire them to be placed with the correspondence and other papers connected with the project.

To comply with this request, the President reexamined his original draft, and the version which had appeared in the newspapers, and saw that, because of the variations between them, the first seemed incomplete, and the others imperfect. By his direction, therefore, his secretaries made copies of the Associated Press

report as it was printed in several prominent newspapers. Comparing these with his original draft, and with his own fresh recollection of the form in which he delivered it, he made a new autograph copy—a careful and deliberate revision—which has become the standard and authentic text.

In addition to that from Mr. Wills, other requests soon came to him for autograph copies. The number he made, and for what friends, cannot now be confidently stated, though it was probably half a dozen or more, all written by him with painstaking care to correspond word for word with his revision. If in any respect they differed from each other, it was due to accident, and against his intention. At this period of the war unusual efforts were being made to collect funds for the use of the Sanitary Commission in sending supplies and relief in various forms to sick and wounded soldiers in army hospitals and camps in the South. During that autumn the President had given the original manuscript of his final Emancipation Proclamation to a fair held at Chicago for this object, at the close of which the manuscript was sold at auction for the handsome sum of three thousand dollars. The managers of other fairs naturally wished to take similar advantage of his personal popularity. Thus Mr. Everett wrote him under date of January 30, 1864:

I shall have the honor of forwarding to you by express, to-day or on Monday next, a copy of the authorized edition of my Gettysburg address and of the remarks made by yourself, and the other matters connected with the ceremonial of the dedication of the Cemetery. It appeared, owing to unavoidable delays, only yesterday.

I have promised to give the manuscript of my address to Mrs. Governor Fish of New York, who is at the head of the Ladies' Committee of the Metropolitan fair. It would add very greatly to its value if I could bind up with it the manuscript of your dedicatory remarks, if you happen to have preserved it.

I would further venture to request, that you would allow me also to bind up in the volume the very obliging letter of the 20th November, 1863, which you did me the favor to write me. I shall part with it with much reluctance, and I shrink a little from the apparent indelicacy of giving some publicity to a letter highly complimentary to myself. But as its insertion would greatly enhance the value of the volume when sold at the fair, I shall, if I have your kind permission, waive all other considerations.

To this request Mr. Lincoln replied under date of February 4:

Yours of January 30th was received four days ago; and since then the address mentioned has arrived. Thank you for it. I send herewith the manuscript of my remarks at Gettysburg, which,

with my note to you of November 20th, you are at liberty to use for the benefit of our soldiers, as you have requested.

Baltimore also was being stirred by the same spirit of national patriotism, and a novel attraction was planned in aid of its Soldiers' and Sailors' Fair, the opening day of which was fixed for April 18, 1864. On the 5th of February a committee consisting of the Honorable John P. Kennedy, author of "Swallow Barn" and other novels, and Colonel Alexander Bliss, then serving on the military staff of General Schenck commanding at Baltimore, sent a circular to prominent American authors, soliciting from each a page or two of autograph manuscript to be published in facsimile in a small quarto volume and to be sold for the benefit of the fair. Some time in the month of February George Bancroft, the historian, who was in Washington, made verbal application to the President, on their behalf, for an autograph copy of his Gettysburg address, to be included in the volume. Mr. Lincoln wrote and sent them a copy; and when it was discovered that it was written on both sides of a letter sheet, and on that account was not available to be used in the process of lithographing, he made them a second copy, written only on one side of the letter pages. This was sent to the committee on March 11, 1864, and Mr. Bancroft was permitted to keep the first; which appears recently to have passed, with other papers of the great historian, into the possession of the Lenox Library. The Baltimore committee had the other duly lithographed and printed in their volume, and it was sold at the fair. The first facsimile in the book of two hundred pages is that of the "Star-Spangled Banner," the second, Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg address, and the last, "Home, Sweet Home"; while between them are autograph specimen-pages from the writings of nearly a hundred American authors.¹ It is this Baltimore facsimile which by frequent photographs, and therefore exact reproduction, has properly become the standard text, and which, not having heretofore been given in *THE CENTURY MAGAZINE*, is printed on pages 606 and 607, slightly reduced in size. The originals of the whole collection are still in the possession of Colonel Alexander Bliss, of Washington, D. C., who, as one of the committee, conducted the correspondence in gathering it.

Having made a comparison of the President's original draft with the Associated Press report printed in the newspapers, it will now be interesting to compare the Associated Press report with the final revision. A careful examination shows that there were in all thirteen

¹ "Autograph Leaves of our Country's Authors." Baltimore: Cushings and Bailey. 1864.

changes: that seven of these are a mere return to, or restoration of, words in the first draft, correcting the errors which evidently occurred in the transmission by telegraph and the newspaper type-setting, namely: "are met" changed back to "have come"; "the" changed back to "a"; "of" changed back to "for"; "power" changed back to "poor power"; "the" changed back to "these"; "governments" changed back to "government"; "and" omitted from the last sentence, as at first.

The other six changes are the President's own deliberate revision, namely: "upon" changed to "on"; "it" changed to "that field"; "they have" changed to "they who fought here have"; "carried on" changed to "advanced"; "they here gave" changed to "they gave"; and the phrase "shall under God" transposed to read "under God shall."

By this comparative analysis we have clearly before us in every detail the whole process of

growth and perfection which the Gettysburg address underwent from the original draft to the final artistic form in which, after mature reflection, he desired it should stand. That this amplifying process was important and valuable in a literary point of view is evident. But if we count the changes, five in number, between the original draft and the spoken address, and six more between the spoken address and the final revision, and then study the nature and quality of the changes, we see that in the elements of brevity and force of statement, philosophic breadth of thought, and terse, vigorous expression — in short, in everything except mere rhetorical finish, the first draft is as complete and worthy of admiration as the final revision.

In the almost universal attention and comment which the address has received from scholars and critics, it is not unnatural that many attempts should have been made to trace its source by a search for parallels to some of its

*Address delivered at the dedication of the
Cemetery at Gettysburg.*

*Four score and seven years ago our fathers
brought forth on this continent, a new na-
tion, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated
to the proposition that all men are crea-
ted equal.*

*Now we are engaged in a great civil war,
testing whether that nation, or any nation
so conceived and so dedicated, can long
endure. We are met on a great battle-field
of that war. We have come to dedicate a
portion of that field, as a final resting
place for those who here gave their lives
that that nation might live. It is alto-
gether fitting and proper that we should
do this.*

But, in a larger sense, we can not dedic

cato— we can not consecrate— we can not
 hallow— this ground. The brave men, liv-
 ing and dead, who struggled here have con-
 secrated it, far above our poor power to add
 or detract. The world will little note, nor
 long remember what we say here, but it can
 never forget what they did here. It is for us
 the living, rather, to be dedicated here to
 the unfinished work which they who fought
 here have thus far so nobly advanced.
 It is rather for us to be here dedicated to
 the great task remaining before us— that
 from these honored dead we take increased
 devotion to that cause for which they gave
 the last full measure of devotion— that
 we here highly resolve that these dead shall
 not have died in vain— that this nation,
 under God, shall have a new birth of free-
 dom— and that government of the people,
 by the people, for the people, shall not per-
 ish from the earth.

Abraham Lincoln.

November 19, 1863.

FACSIMILE OF THE MANUSCRIPT WRITTEN FOR THE BALTIMORE FAIR—THE STANDARD VERSION.

phrases, especially to the sentence with which
 it closes, "that government of the people, by
 the people, for the people, shall not perish from
 the earth." The following among others have
 been cited:

1. The depressed vassal of the old Continent
 becomes co-legislator, and co-ruler, in a govern-
 ment where all power is from the people, and in
 the people, and for the people. — [From "The Ad-

vancement of Society in Knowledge and Religion."
 By James Douglas. Edinburgh, 1830. 3d edition,
 p. 70. First edition published in 1825. Also in
 "Rhetorical Reader," by Ebenezer Porter. An-
 dover, 1831, p. 196.]

2. The people's government: made for the peo-
 ple; made by the people; and answerable to the
 people. — [From Webster's reply to Hayne, United
 States Senate, January 26, 1830.]

3. A democracy — that is, a government of all
 the people, by all the people, for all the people.

—[From a speech by Theodore Parker at the New England Anti-Slavery Convention, Boston, May 29, 1850.]

4. Unlike Europe, there are no disaffected people in this country for a foe to tamper with. The government is by the people, for the people, and with the people. It is the people.—[From Lieutenant M. F. Maury's Report of August, 1851, on the Subject of Fortifications, H. R. Ex. Doc. No. 5, 32d Congress, 1st Session.]

The mere arrangement of these quotations in their chronological order shows how unjust is any inference that Mr. Lincoln took his sentence at second hand. There is no more reason to suppose that he copied his phrase from Theodore Parker, than there is that Parker copied his from Daniel Webster, or Webster his from James Douglas. All these are plainly coincidences growing out of the very nature of the topic.

Mr. Lincoln's humble birth, the experiences of his boyhood, and all the incidents in the rugged path of his self-education for political service, imbued him with a deep sympathy for, and an unswerving faith in, the people as a political entity and power. His speeches probably contain more genuine expressions of this sympathy and faith than those of any other American statesman. The whole of the great Lincoln-Douglas debate hinged itself upon this essential idea, which Douglas crystallized into his phrase "popular sovereignty," the issue between the disputants being only in what manner the popular will should be exercised. In Lincoln's Ohio speeches of 1859 are found some of his strongest formulas embodying this idea: "Public opinion in this country is everything"; "The people of these United States are the rightful masters of both congresses and courts, not to overthrow the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution." In his first inaugural he said he would execute the laws of the Union, as far as practicable, "unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite means, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary." "This country with its institutions belongs to the people who inhabit it." "Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people?" "If the almighty ruler of nations, with his eternal truth and jus-

tice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the American people." And in his first message to Congress he said, describing the insurrection: "It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy—a government of the people by the same people—can or can not maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes." "This is essentially a people's contest." "I am most happy to believe that the plain people understand and appreciate this."

Such expressions, such definitions, such quotations might be greatly multiplied. Enough are cited to show that the idea was ever present in his philosophy of government, and that he had no need to draw upon the memory of his early political reading to enable him to formulate the closing sentence of the Gettysburg address.

It may be pertinent here to point out an error which, if uncontradicted, may confuse and mislead readers and students of the Gettysburg incident in the future. In a recent biography of President Lincoln by Mr. John T. Morse, Jr., the following, referring to the Gettysburg address, occurs in a foot-note on page 216 of Vol. II.

It is, perhaps, not generally remembered that Mr. Lincoln added to the words which he himself had written a quotation of one of Daniel Webster's most famous flights of oratory—that familiar passage in the reply to Hayne, beginning: "When my eyes turn to behold for the last time the sun in Heaven," etc. The modesty was better than the skill of this addition; the simplicity of the President's language, and the elevation of the sentiment which it expressed, did not accord well with the more rhetorical enthusiasm of Webster's outburst. The two passages, each so fine in its own way, were incongruous in their juxtaposition.

The accomplished biographer has been seriously misinformed. President Lincoln added no quotation from Daniel Webster to his Gettysburg address, nor any word other than those set forth in this paper.

John G. Nicolay.

NOTE.—The reader is referred to the "Open Letter" in this number for comments on the "Variations in the Reports of the Gettysburg Address."



BY JOHN R. MCPHERSON


SIX miles north of the Maryland line, at its nearest point, and about thirty-five miles south of Harrisburg, lies the quaint town of Gettysburg. The broken ranges of the South Mountain, through the passes in which Lee and his expectant, confident legions marched more than a third of a century ago, lie a short distance to the west and north, while surrounding the town on all sides are gently rolling ridges. The undulating character of the country, the facilities for the concentration of armies afforded by the numerous roads, which radiate from the town like the spokes of a wheel, the heights and intervening plains, the woodlands and open fields, all combine to make it an ideal place for a battle.

Previous to the eventful days of July, 1863, little known beyond the borders of the State, and known within its borders chiefly as the former home of Thaddeus Stevens and the site of Pennsylvania College, a Lutheran institution, Gettysburg, in the twinkling of an eye, was on the lips of a nation; and the result of the fratricidal struggle there enacted drew to it the attention of military men of the world.

During three days the fate of the nation hung in the balance; for on the outcome of Meade's effort to drive back the invading Southern hosts depended the integrity

of the Union. The Confederacy was at the zenith of its power and confidence. Foreign intervention and acknowledgment of the Confederate government were imminent, and Lee decided to change the seat of the war to the North and carry some of its horrors amid the homes of the prosperous Pennsylvania farmers.

Gettysburg was the only battle of the war fought north of the Mason and Dixon line; it was the bloodiest single battle of the war, and one of the greatest battles of modern times. Not more fierce and prolonged than some others, yet in the numbers engaged, the courage displayed, the valor of the assaults and the stoutness of the resistance, it was the equal of any; while in its pivotal character and the importance of the issues at stake, it was the greatest of all. Along these heights the flower and chivalry of the South and the North met and measured steel and manhood, and no American need ever blush for the record made on either side. Eighty-two thousand men under Meade fought on the ridges and over the plains about the town for mastery over eighty thousand under Lee. For three days, with varying success, these defenders of the North struggled to drive beyond the Potomac the invading army of the South. In this effort were troops from Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,




MEADE EQUESTRIAN STATUE.


Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin, and from the regular army. Is it any wonder, then, that after the struggle was ended and Longstreet's veterans, who made their gallant, hopeless and almost matchless charge on the Union center, had been met and repulsed from the high-water mark of the rebellion, that Gettysburg became for all time the Mecca of patriots who glory in the struggle there made to keep our Republic one and indissoluble? After Gettysburg, to the far-seeing, the hope of the Confederacy began to wane, and it continued to the end, until it went out in darkness at Appomattox. The importance of the success achieved was soon fully realized, and efforts were almost immediately put forth to honor the memory of the men who died that the country might live, and to furnish to succeeding generations evidence of the generosity of republics. From this little town have originated two movements to honor the patriot dead—the one to establish the National Cemetery, at the dedication of which President Lincoln made his immortal address, and from which has sprung the whole network of national cemeteries throughout the South, where lie so many of the nation's dead; the other to preserve and to so thoroughly mark for all time this famous battlefield that it may be the spot to which students of military science and future generations may journey to understand what sacrifices were made for home and country, and to inspire them to like deeds of courage and valor, if ever the demand be made of them.

The Soldiers' National Cemetery was incorporated by act of the Pennsylvania Assembly of March 25, 1864, the prime mover being the late David Wills, Esq., of Gettysburg. The cemetery is on the hill of that name, and contains seventeen acres of beautifully situated and developed land. The arrangement of the grounds was planned by Mr. William Saunders, who has made effective use of his opportunities. Three thousand five hundred and fifty-five bodies are buried within its limits. The known dead are interred by States, and the unknown, of whom there are nine hundred and seventy-nine, are also buried together, their resting-places being marked by numbered white marble headstones. The land was purchased and the improvements made by the aid of appropriations by the States that had troops in the battle. Within the cemetery are the national monument, designed by J. G. Batterson, of Hartford, Con-

necticut, and the monument to the Sixth New York Cavalry, designed by J. H. Harris, of Gardiner, New York. The monument to the Sixth New York Cavalry is a fine example of the art of the sculptor, and is a fitting memorial to the brave men who fought and died for their country.



MONUMENT TO THE SIXTH NEW YORK CAVALRY.



VIEW FROM LITTLE ROUND TOP, SHOWING STATE OF GENERAL WARREN, THE "VALLEY OF DEATH" AND THE WHEAT FIELD.

necticut; the bronze statue of General Reynolds, by J. Q. A. Ward, and the New York State monument. In 1872 the cemetery was transferred to the National Government, and it is under the care of the United States Quartermaster-General.

From the other movement has sprung the United States Battlefield Commissions of Chickamauga, Shiloh, Antietam and Gettysburg, which, though first in point of time, was the last to receive national aid and to pass under the control of the Government. This was largely due to the admirable and successful work performed

memorials would be of wood, that they might the sooner decay and be forgotten. But that its purpose was not to emphasize the bitterness of defeat and to keep alive the animosities of the struggle is shown by the interest in the marking of the field by the survivors of the defeated army. They desire absolute accuracy in locating positions and monuments, and their representative on the United States commission is deeply concerned in everything that tends to heighten the interest of the field.

Among the incorporators were such well-known men as Joseph R. Ingersoll,



MEADE'S HEADQUARTERS.

by the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, an efficient and beneficent public corporation. It was incorporated by the Pennsylvania Assembly April 30, 1854. The act of the legislature was one of a series intended to preserve for all time the memory of the soldiers and organizations that took part in this decisive battle.

This laudable purpose enlisted the aid and sympathy of public-spirited men throughout the country. After the war was closed General Lee objected to the mission of the corporation, because, as he said, he did not wish to see perpetuated the memories of the struggle; on the contrary, he expressed the wish that the me-

Henry C. Carey, Justices William Strong and Daniel Agnew, Generals George G. Meade, S. Wylie Crawford and Winfield S. Hancock, ex-United States Senators John Scott and William A. Wallace, Richard C. McMurtrie, Theodore Cuyler and A. K. McClure. Joseph R. Ingersoll was the first president and David McConaughy, Esq., of Gettysburg, secretary. The corporation was not for profit; it was purely benevolent. There were no dividends for the stockholders, and for many years no salaries for any of its officers.

At first interest was manifested in the work, and some of the important portions


of the field were purchased at an early day. The association was local only in the sense that its aim was to preserve the battlefield and perpetuate its historic relations to the great struggle for the suppression of the Rebellion. Its membership was widely scattered over different States. Up to 1880 comparatively little work was done in the development of the field. In that year the officers of the State G. A. R. interested themselves and, soon controlling in the corporation, elected new directors, and the next year secured an appropriation of ten thousand dollars from the Pennsylvania Legislature. From that time the purpose of the association was steadily kept in view, and improvements and developments were made with each year.

The plan of the association was to purchase the prominent strategic and tactical positions and the lines of battle of the Union Army. To secure uniformity, the directors decided to mark the positions of the regiments and batteries as they stood in line of battle, and have the advanced positions, in case of a charge or picket duty, also indicated by markers. Over these lines of battle were opened driveways, enabling one to pass along the very ground occupied by the army, and study with ease and accuracy every movement made. During its life of thirty-one years the association completed sev-

enteen miles of such avenues and purchased five hundred and twenty-two acres of land over which the battle was fought, embracing the grove where General Reynolds was killed, the famous "Wheat Field," the two "Round Tops," East Cemetery Hill, Culp's Hill, the Cavalry Field and the Union lines of battle.

It was instrumental in locating and erecting three hundred and twenty monuments, and in having the position of every volunteer command of the Union Army, except three, marked with memorials, at a cost of more than a million of dollars. Every State having sons in this battle, with the single exception of West Virginia, is represented. Her three regiments and the United States Regulars have as yet nothing to indicate the parts they played in this contest, though sites for monuments have been purchased.

There were two armies at Gettysburg; and the day came, after the passion and resentments of the last generation had passed away, when the visitor wished to know not only where Reynolds fell and Sickles and Hancock were wounded and Webb resisted Longstreet's onslaught, but also where the latter's attacking column was formed and where Alexander's batteries were planted. As time showed this interest of the public, the direct-




NEW YORK STATE MONUMENT



MONUMENT TO THE FOURTEENTH
BROOKLYN.

ors of the association realized the importance of not restricting the development to the lines and positions of the Union Army; and in 1889 it was resolved that Congress be asked to appropriate money to purchase the land necessary for the avenues along the whole line of battle occupied by the Army of Northern Virginia, and that these positions be marked with tablets. In 1891 a committee was appointed to devise a plan of raising means for future maintenance, and at a later meeting a committee was appointed to inquire into the feasibility of transferring the property of the association to the United States Government. The report was favorable; the stockholders subsequently approved, and in 1895 all the property acquired by the association was transferred to the United States.

The battle of Gettysburg, as well as other battles of the Rebellion, taught Americans that there is no need to go to the fields of Europe for examples of highest heroism and valor. At Gettysburg there were fifteen Union and five Confederate regiments whose losses in killed and wounded exceeded the loss of the Light Brigade at Balaklava. The monuments, which can be seen singly and in clusters all over the fateful field, and which were erected by the survivors of the gallant regiments, tell where they fought and their comrades fell. The inscriptions tell in imperishable letters of the ebb and flow of the battle, of the movements of the various commands, and, with slight play of the imagination, one can picture to himself the scene as it was in 1863. It is astonishing, considering the few materials for use in such work, how artistic are many of the designs and how few are the duplications. Originality of conception has been shown in the grouping of the implements of war, and the execution, in the main, has been well done by the bronze and granite men. The first marker put in position was erected in 1878 to indicate the spot where General Strong Vincent fell on the slope of Little Round Top. One year later the survivors of the Second Massachusetts erected the first regimental monument. On an immense boulder they placed their simple tablet in memory of their fallen comrades, little dreaming that the beginning so modestly made would develop into such costly memorials. A bill to place the battlefield in charge of the United States, which did not meet the approval of the House Military Committee, had been pending in Congress for several years; and it was again doomed to defeat by the Fifty-second Congress, when a few days before final adjournment, in March, 1893, an amendment was made to the sundry civil bill. This carried an appropriation of twenty-five thousand dollars to mark the positions of the Army of the Potomac and of the Army of Northern Virginia with suitable tablets, each bearing a brief historical legend, compiled without



GENERAL BUFORD'S STATUE.



Copyright, 1895, by W. H. Tipton.

THE NATIONAL CEMETERY.

praise and without censure, the money to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of War. In due time there was appointed a United States Gettysburg Battlefield Commission, composed of Colonel John P. Nicholson, of Philadelphia, representing the Army of the Potomac; General William Forney, of Alabama, representing the Army of Northern Virginia, and Colonel John B. Batchelder, a civilian of Massachusetts, who had been identified with the battlefield since 1863, and who was the maker of maps specially prepared for the Government.

The Gettysburg National Park was established by the act of Congress of February 11, 1895, its author being Major-

General Daniel E. Sickles. It provides for a commission, subject to the Secretary of War, and for the acquirement, by purchase or condemnation, of all lands contained in a map prepared by General Sickles and on file in the office of the Secretary of War. In each sundry civil bill

an appropriation of fifty thousand dollars is made for the work of this commission. It has acquired the lands formerly owned by the Battlefield Memorial Association, and has purchased numerous additional tracts. More than ten miles of standard Telford road have already been made; five sixty-foot steel observation towers have been erected at important points on the field; trees have been planted; fences and defenses have



SEVENTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY MONUMENT.

been rebuilt; guns have been placed at all battery positions, some of the Confederate Whitworth guns occupying the places they did in the battle; miles of substantial fencing have been built; the entire property has been restored, as nearly as possible, to its original condition; while park guards have been appointed to care for these multifarious interests of the Government and save them from spoliation at the hands of vandals.

It is the purpose of the commissioners to eventually have all the avenues on the field converted into the Telford roads, that the visitor may have access to all points of the field at all seasons of the year. The State of Pennsylvania has ceded to



MONUMENT TO THE FIRST MASSACHUSETTS.

the United States control over more than fourteen miles of ordinary roads within the confines of the park. These, too, are to be made as fine as the principal avenues.

The present members of the commission are Colonel John P. Nicholson, of Pennsylvania, chairman; Major W. M. Robbins, of North Carolina, and Major Charles A. Richardson, of New York, the two latter being appointed to succeed General Forney and Colonel Batchelder, who died. When their plans are carried out, the people of the United States will have a park, beautiful in its natural aspect, adorned with noble works of art—a lesson to the military student and an inspiration to the patriot.



IN MEMORY OF THE SECOND MASSACHUSETTS—THE FIRST REGIMENTAL MONUMENT ERECTED ON THE FIELD.



THE MOON-FLOWER.

THE sun has burned his way across the sky,
 And sunk in sultry splendor; now the earth
 Lies spent and gray, wrapped in the grateful dusk;
 Stars tremble into sight, and in the west
 The curved moon glows faintly. 'T is the hour!
 See! Flower on flower the buds unfold, until
 The air is filled with odors exquisite
 And amorous sighs, and all the verdurous gloom
 Is starred with silvery disks.

Oh, Flower of Dreams! —
 Of lover's dreams, where bliss and anguish meet;
 Dreams of dead joys, and joys that ne'er have been;
 Keenest of all, the joys that ne'er shall be!

Julia Schayer.

THE NATIONAL MILITARY PARK.

(EMBRACING THE CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA BATTLE-FIELDS.)



THE Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, which is to be dedicated with imposing ceremonies on September 19 to 21, is the first project of its kind in any land.


Some of its distinguishing features have been followed upon other fields, but as a whole it has no parallel.

The main body of the park embraces the battle-field of Chickamauga. The legal boundaries, as authorized by Congress and ratified by the States of Georgia and Tennessee, contain fifteen square miles, of which eleven have already been acquired. About 5000 acres of the latter, or eight square miles, are forest, and of this 3500 acres have been so cleared of underbrush and the smaller timber that carriages may be driven through every portion of the tract.

Besides the main body of the park, there is now included a tract — Orchard Knob — of

about seven acres and a half, which was at first the strongest point of the Confederate lines through the center of the plain about Chattanooga, and, after its capture, Grant's and Thomas's headquarters during the battle of Missionary Ridge. A considerable area about Bragg's headquarters on Missionary Ridge has been purchased, and also a jutting spur, a mile or more farther north, which commands a view of those central slopes of the ridge which the Army of the Cumberland assaulted. The ground of Sherman's assault and of Hardee's defense at the north end of Missionary Ridge has also been purchased. In Lookout Valley, upon Hooker's battle-ground, several sites for monuments have been acquired, and Congress has given authority to buy enough of Lookout Mountain to illustrate fully Hooker's bold assault upon that stronghold and Walthall's brilliant defense.

In addition to the lands here specified, the



ENGRAVED BY T. JOHNSON.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS, U. S. A. ("THE ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA").

Government has acquired by cession the roads along the entire length of Missionary Ridge and over Lookout Mountain, and most of those by which both armies reached and left the Chickamauga field. These are known as approaches, and many miles of them have been improved in the most substantial manner. About forty-five miles of these roads have been completed. The Government has no-

where built roads of such extent equal to these.

The municipal and county authorities at Chattanooga have improved the main avenues from the city to their junctions with the park roads, and by formal action have granted permission for the erection of monuments, markers, and historical tablets at convenient points in and about the city. Many such have already

been set up in the city. The practical result of this liberal action has been virtually to add to the National Park the entire city of Chattanooga and its surroundings, which were all a part of great battle-fields. The central drive of the park, extending along the crest of Missionary Ridge upon Bragg's line of battle from Tunnel Hill to Rossville, and thence through the Chickamauga field to Bragg's left at Glass's Mill, is twenty miles, and eighteen miles of it are completed. From these elementary dimensions the magnitude of the park project will sufficiently appear.

The battle-fields, either within the park or along the approaches, the lines of which will be marked by monuments, historical tablets, and the location of batteries at the fighting positions of artillery, are Chickamauga (three days' operations), Wauhatchie, Orchard Knob, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, and Ringgold, one of the approaches of the park extending from the Chickamauga field to the latter town. These battles comprised eight days' operations, in five of which great armies were engaged. The infantry organizations under Rosecrans at Chickamauga numbered only two less than those under McClellan during the Seven Days' Battles, while Bragg's infantry regiments were only three less than those on the Confederate side in the engagements on the Peninsula; and when Sherman's and Hooker's troops arrived at Chattanooga, they added eighty-eight regiments to the Union strength.

Standing upon the point of Lookout Mountain, the eye plainly follows twelve miles of battle-lines from Wauhatchie to Sherman's left beyond the north point of Missionary Ridge. Starting at Glass's Mill (which, as to the infantry, was the Confederate left and Union right in the battle of Chickamauga), it is a drive of twenty-two miles to Sherman's point of crossing the Tennessee for his attack on Missionary Ridge at Tunnel Hill. The cavalry lines extended much farther on the Glass's Mill flank. The entire route is over battle-fields. Four miles of it are through the ground of the heaviest fighting at Chickamauga. Seven miles lie directly along Bragg's final line of battle on Missionary Ridge.

These facts will make clear the extent of the military operations which it is the purpose of the park project to illustrate fully upon the exact ground where they occurred.

For this extended government work Congress has already appropriated \$725,000. The States have added \$400,000 for monuments and the expenses of their commissions.


It is not a park in the sense of being an ornamented pleasure-ground. Its objects are simply the restoration of battle-fields, so far as possible, to their condition at the time of the

engagements, and the erection along the lines of actual fighting, of such comprehensive historical tablets, monuments, and other markers as shall make it possible for a visitor to trace the movements of every organization down to the units of regiments and batteries, from the opening to the close of the engagements. When it is considered that the great operations thus fully illustrated embraced the crossing of a wide river and three mountain-ranges in the enemy's country, scaling a lofty mountain held by the enemy in force, assaulting and carrying a formidable ridge five miles in length, much fighting in the open field, engagements in force in extensive forests, Longstreet's assaults on Snodgrass Hill (lasting throughout an afternoon), the opening of river communication (which had been closed by the enemy posted on Lookout Mountain), the siege of a city, and the raising of that siege by defeating the investing army, it will be seen that such an object-lesson illustrating actual battle has never before been set up on the world's theater of war.

Union and Confederate lines are marked with equal care. The same exhaustive study is given to the positions and movements of the one as to those of the other. There are historical tablets for armies, wings, corps, divisions, brigades, and batteries. Upon these plates appear the names of the commanders of each organization, and text setting forth the movements at all points where they were engaged.

An impressive feature of marking the lines is the restoration of the field batteries on each side at the several points where each was engaged. The guns are such as were actually used in the war, and those selected for each battery are of the same patterns as the guns which composed it. These are mounted on cast-iron carriages which in design are a reproduction of those used on the field. Including the duplication of batteries which fought at several positions, there will be over four hundred guns thus mounted on the Chickamauga field alone. Siege-pieces will be put up on Lookout Mountain and at several points about Chattanooga.

Imposing markers of large shells are erected on the spots where those exercising the command of a general officer were killed. These are eight in number, four for Union and four for Confederate officers. Three lofty steel observation towers rise above the forests on the Chickamauga field at its most prominent elevations. These are in sight of one another and of Lookout Mountain, and of two similar towers on Missionary Ridge. Thus the relative positions of all points of the great field are seen at a glance, as well as the mountain-ranges and the rivers which reveal the outlines of the grand strategy of each army. From these



MAP OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY PARK NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

NOTE: This map and the Chickamauga map on the opposite page show the positions of the opposing troops in the battles of Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge. The maps may be compared conveniently by taking Rossville, at the lower margin of the left-hand map and at the upper left-hand corner of the right-hand map, as the key-point.

The reservations at Chattanooga, as indicated by the black rectangles, are: Orchard Knob (Grant's headquarters), 7 4-10 acres; Bragg's Hill (or

headquarters), 2 1-2 acres; De Long's, 5 1-4 acres; and Trueblood, 50 acres. The National Cemetery lies between Bragg's Hill and the city. On the field of Chickamauga the heavy continuous line marks the boundaries of the land actually secured for the National Military Park, while the heavy dash line, which on the east follows the banks of Chickamauga Creek, indicates the legal limits within which additional land may be acquired.



towers the tactical movements of the battles can be followed to the smallest details.






Union and Confederate movements and fighting are set forth with absolute impartiality. The controlling idea upon which it was founded, and which has shaped every feature of the project, has been to restore and preserve the accurate history of these famous fields, and by the means employed to illustrate the prowess of the American soldier in battle.


Twenty-five States, including all the Southern States, have commissions at work assisting the National Commission in locating the fighting lines of their troops. Half of them have ascertained these positions, and their States have made liberal appropriations for monuments. Seventy-nine monuments and fifty granite markers are now in place. One hundred and six monuments and one hundred and fifty granite markers are under contract to be finished and set up before the dedication.

As the park itself is something entirely new in military history, and would be an impossible scheme in any other country, so the national dedication, authorized by act of Congress, and to take place during the present month under the direction of the Hon. Daniel S. Lamont, Secretary of War, will be an event without precedent, and one which would not be possible under any other government than ours. To this dedication, by express authority of Congress, the three coördinate branches of the Government have been invited, and each will be prominently and impressively represented. Under the same authority, Secretary Lamont has invited the Governors of all the States with their staffs, the Lieutenant-General of the Army and the Admiral of the navy, and lastly, and with still greater significance, the attendance of all veterans, both Union and Confederate. Including the dedication of State monuments and the reunion of the Society of the Army of the


BATTLE FIELD OF CHICKAMAUGA

LAND ACQUIRED FOR THE NATIONAL MILITARY PARK
SHOWN THUS  LEGAL LIMITS THUS 

- Union 
 Confederate 
 Direction of lines of battle, Sept. 18th. 
 Direction of lines of battle, Sept. 19th. 
 First lines of battle, Sept. 20th. 
 Last lines of battle, Sept. 20th.
 Cavalry:



INDICATES POSITIONS OF UNION TROOPS AFTER THE BATTLE



Cumberland, to which all other army societies will be invited, the ceremonies will continue a week. The park dedication proper will occupy two days and two evenings, during which there will be four public assemblages. These will be

addressed by the most prominent public men of the nation and by noted veterans of the opposing armies. Thus it will be seen that, in every element, both the project and the event of dedication are essentially national.

H. V. Boynton.

THE BALLAD OF CHICKAMAUGA.

BY Chickamauga's crooked stream the martial trumpets blew ;
 The North and South stood face to face, with War's dread work to do.
 O lion-strong, unselfish, brave, twin athletes battle-wise,
 Brothers yet enemies, the fire of conflict in their eyes,
 All banner-led and bugle-stirred, they set them to the fight,
 Hearing the god of slaughter laugh from mountain height to height.

The ruddy, fair-haired, giant North breathed loud and strove amain ;
 The swarthy shoulders of the South did heave them to the strain ;
 An earthquake shuddered underfoot, a cloud rolled overhead,
 And serpent-tongues of flame cut through and lapped and twinkled red,
 Where back and forth a bullet-stream went singing like a breeze,
 What time the snarling cannon-balls to splinters tore the trees.

"Make way, make way!" a voice boomed out, "I'm marching to the sea!"
 The answer was the rebel yell and Bragg's artillery.
 Where Negley struck, the cohorts gray like storm-tossed clouds were rent ;
 Where Buckner charged, a cyclone fell, the blue to tatters went ;
 The noble Brannan cheered his men, Pat Cleburne answered back,
 And Lytle stormed, and life was naught in Walthall's bloody track.

Old Taylor's Ridge rocked to its base, and Pigeon Mountain shook ;
 And Helm went down, and Lytle died, and broken was McCook.
 Van Cleve moved like a hurricane, a tempest blew with Hood,
 Awful the sweep of Breckinridge across the flaming wood.
 Never before did battle-roar such chords of thunder make,
 Never again shall tides of men over such barriers break.

"Stand fast, stand fast!" cried Rosecrans ; and Thomas said, "I will!"
 And, crash on crash, his batteries dashed their broadsides down the hill.
 Brave Longstreet's splendid rush tore through whatever barred its track,
 Till the Rock of Chickamauga hurled the roaring columns back,
 And gave the tide of victory a red tinge of defeat,
 Adding a noble dignity to that hard word, retreat.

Two days they fought, and evermore those days shall stand apart,
 Key-notes of epic chivalry within the nation's heart.
 Come, come, and set the carven rocks to mark this glorious spot ;
 Here let the deeds of heroes live, their hatreds be forgot.
 Build, build, but never monument of stone shall last as long
 As one old soldier's ballad borne on breath of battle-song.

Maurice Thompson.



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SAINT-GAUDENS'S STATUE OF HIAWATHA. OWNED BY THE HILTON ESTATE, SARATOGA

The assassination of Abraham Lincoln

You lay a wreath on murdered Lincoln's bier,
You, who with mocking pencil went to trace,
Broad for the self-complacent British sneer,
His length of shambling limb, his furrowed
face,

His gaunt, gnarled hands, his unkempt, bris-
tling hair,
His garb uncouth, his bearing ill at ease,
His lack of all we prize as debonair,
Of power or will to shine, of art to please ;

You, whose smart pen backed up the pencil's
laugh,
Judging each step, as though the way were
plain ;

Reckless, so it could point its paragraph,
Of chief's perplexity, or people's pain.

Beside this corpse that bears for winding-
sheet
The Stars and Stripes he lived to rear
anew,

Between the mourners at his head and feet,
Say, scurrile jester, is there room for you ?

Yes ; he had lived to shame me from my sneer,
To lame my pencil and confute my pen ;
To make me own this hind of princes peer,
This rail-splitter a true-born king of men.

My shallow judgment I had learned to rue,
Noting how to occasion's height he rose ;
How his quaint wit made home-truth seem
more true ;
How, iron-like, his temper grew by blows ;

How humble yet how hopeful he could be ;
How in good fortune and in ill the same ;
Nor bitter in success, nor boastful he,
Thirsty for gold, nor feverish for fame.

He went about his work—such work as few
Ever had laid on head and heart and hand—
As one who knows, where there's a task to do,
Man's honest will must Heaven's good grace
command ;

Who trusts the strength will with the burden
grow,
That God makes instruments to work his
will,

If but that will we can arrive to know,
Nor tamper with the weights of good and ill.
So he went forth to battle on the side
That he felt clear was Liberty's and Right's,
As in his peasant boyhood he had plied
His warfare with rude Nature's thwarting
mights—

The uncleared forest, the unbroken soil,
The iron bark that turns the lumberer's ax,
The rapid that o'erbears the boatman's toil,
The prairie hiding the mazed wanderer's
tracks,

The ambushed Indian, and the prowling bear,—
Such were the deeds that helped his youth
to train ;
Rough culture, but such trees large fruit may
bear,
If but their stocks be of right girth and grain.

So he grew up, a destined work to do,
And lived to do it ; four long-suffering years'
Ill fate, ill feeling, ill report lived through,
And then he heard the hisses change to
cheers,

The taunts to tribute, the abuse to praise,
And took both with the same unwavering
mood,—
Till, as he came on light from darkling days,
And seemed to touch the goal from where
he stood,

A felon hand, between the goal and him,
Reached from behind his back, a trigger
prest,
And those perplexed and patient eyes were dim,
Those gaunt, long-laboring limbs were laid
to rest.

The words of mercy were upon his lips,
Forgiveness in his heart and on his pen,
When this vile murderer brought swift eclipse
To thoughts of peace on earth, good will to
men.

The Old World and the New, from sea to sea,
Utter one voice of sympathy and shame.
Sore heart, so stopped when it at last beat high !
Sad life, cut short just as its triumph came !

A deed accurst ! Strokes have been struck
before
By the assassin's hand, whereof men doubt
If more of horror or disgrace they bore ;
But thy foul crime, like Cain's, stands darkly
out.

Vile hand, that brandest murder on a strife,
Whate'er its grounds, stoutly and nobly
striven,
And with the martyr's crown crownest a life
With much to praise, little to be forgiven."

